Introduction

In the first volume of The Positivistic Philosophy, French sociologist August Comte (1875) divided sociological theories into those explaining “social statics” and those accounting for “social dynamics.” As Bottomore and Nisbet (1978: 558–59, emphasis added) perceptively observed social structure “can be static in character or it can be genetic and dynamic. In each instance, the aim is the ascertainment of the crucial patterns or shapes, whether at a given moment or over a period of time.” Our concern here deals with neither the origin of this distinction nor the development of the nuances in its meaning (Bottomore and Nisbet 1978: 558–59; Nisbet 1976: 38–39), which can be traced as far back as the beginnings of Western thought in the works of the ancient Greek philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle. Instead, our concern will be focused on the role that this specific distinction, which is now referred to as between theories of “social structure” and “social change,” has played during the better part of the twentieth century in American sociology.

Although American sociology has long accepted the division of theories into one of two categories-- those explaining social structure (formerly known, as “social statics”) and those explaining social change (formerly known as “social dynamics”)-- there is no pressing, logic-driven need for sociologists to choose between constructing the former or latter types of theories. There exists a sensible need for studying them both. Why? Examination over a sufficiently lengthy period will invariably reveal that all complex social habitats undergo alternating periods of relatively social stability and calm, as well as phases of social instability and change. Since human social existence displays both stability and flux, both must be ultimately accounted for. In a key passage from one of Park’s last published articles, he (Park 1940/1955: 305) forcibly argues against creating a false dualism between theories of social structure and so-called social processes:

“In analyzing and describing social phenomena, some writers have emphasized the aspect of process [change]; others structures . . . Almost every fundamental problem of society, whether theoretical or practical, revolves finally, it seems, about the necessity of reconciling changes in the social order with the perpetuation of the function for which that order exists.”

Moreover, if we push Park’s argument to its rational point of conclusion, then it must be added that sociologists cannot fully understand social change without comprehending social structures and vice versa. Thus, to achieve a logically complete theory of the human habitat, sociologists must ultimately explain both social change and social structure instead of remaining content to account only for one or the other. While Park (1942/1955: 323) became well-known as an early advocate in American sociology for the study of social change (see, for example: Coser 1978:317, Fisher and Strauss 1978: 490, MacIver 1942: 130, Martindale 1981/1988:240), he never dismissed the need for explaining social structure. To the contrary, in the classic Introduction to the Science of Sociology, Park and Burgess 1924: 51) sought to explain both social structure and social change, which they referred to as “social process.”

In the posthumously published volume, Industrialization as an Agent of Social Change, Herbert Blumer (1990: 145–67), one of Park’s former graduate student who went on to become his junior colleague at the University of Chicago, postulated that before a theory of social change can be considered as valid from a logical standpoint, the defining characteristics of a human habitat’s social structure must be identified before and after its alleged transformation, in order to reasonably identify the exact nature of the change undergone by that human habitat’s social structure. Thus, according to Blumer, it is rationally impossible for us to escape from the need to include social structure in our explanations of social change. Park would have undoubtedly agreed with Blumer on this important point (Park and Burgess 1924: 51).

During Park’s year-long leave from the University of Chicago’s Department of Sociology in 1933 and later his official retirement from the University in 1934, Blumer accepted the responsibility, at Park’s request, for teaching the department’s courses on collective behavior (Faris 1967/1970:106). Later, Park (Raushenbush 1979: 125) decided to pass on to Blumer (1939a/1969), who inherited Park’s office (Abbott and Gaziano 1995: 271), the job of writing an essay on “collective behavior” for inclusion in Alfred Mc Clung Lee’s Principles of Sociology. In the essay on collective behavior that was published in Principles of Sociology, Blumer masterfully weaved together many of Park’s early key ideas about collective behavior, which was no small feat considering the desultory state in which Park left his work at the time of his death in 1944. Despite this, Blumer felt compelled to acknowledge that “Park laid the foundation for this area of sociological concern and should be regarded as it source. My own indebtedness to him in the area of collective behavior is enormous” (Raushenbush 1979: 125).

Thanks to Blumer’s heroic pedagogical efforts, through the courses on collective behavior that he taught at Chicago and later at Berkeley, Park’s ideas on collective behavior continued to circulate in sociology long enough for latter-day sociologists to directly build upon them (see, for example: Lang and Lang 1961; Prus 1999; Shibutani 1986; and Turner and Killian 1972). While Blumer’s performance of his role as promoter of Mead’s ideas at Berkeley and Chicago are now well known (Shibutani 1970: v-viii), furthering Park’s ideas at these institutions garnered less well acknowledgement and appreciation. Nevertheless, Blumer (1966:5) later took pains to make clear to Winifred Rausenbush, Park’s former graduate student and later biographer, that Mead, not Park, played the role of his main mentor: “My high esteem for Park does not spring from any favored relation with him as a student. In a strict sense, I was not one of his students and had very little association with him in my graduate training. Instead, I worked more closely with George Herbert Mead.”

Unfortunately, only a few scholars from Chicago, and other institutions of higher learning apparently ever recognized much less ever tried to finish the theory that Park (1938/1950: 40–43; 48–52) had only barely started developing in his mind for explaining how societal change occurs over an ongoing cycle (Carey 1975; 119). For me, the key to solving the theoretical enigma of how to complete the cyclical theory that Park left while still in its infancy is to first identify the major theoretical pieces of this puzzle, and then, devise a theoretical strategy for integrating them in a manner that would produce a logically consistent account of how societal change occurs. Above all else, this new cyclical model of social change must explain the micro and macro processes that push complex human habitats through the cycle’s different phases, as well as identify the roles that domination and power plays in each one of its phases.

Thus, this paper will propose a solution for completing Park’s largely unfinished theory while avoiding the contradictions and filling in most of the theoretical gaps that apparently prevented him from finishing it before his death. Before moving on to the solution of this puzzle, it should be underscored that the value of this project will go beyond merely completing Park’s unfinished theoretical project for explaining societal change for the sake of itself. Why? Because during the process of advancing its completion, some important new insights will be used to explain macroscopic and microscopic societal change from a radical interactionist’s perspective, which his writings largely inspired (Athens 2007, 2013, 2015; but also see: Jacobsen and Picart 2019; Musolf 2014; Shaw 2016). The further development of this new interactionist’s perspective will also demonstrate the wisdom of still following the old admonition of looking for theoretical gems hidden in the classics not just to tackle present-day, stubborn theoretical problems, but also to avoid inventing a worse form of the wheel, repeating the same intellectual mistakes of the past, and to build much-needed continuity between the old and the new (Coser 1981; Merton 1949/1968: 35–38). In my opinion, most of problems bedeviling symbolic interactionism derives from its followers failure to build much more faithfully on Mead’s and Park’s work (Athens 2017). Almost a half century ago, James Carey (1975: 119, emphasis added) lamented this sad state of affairs, which unfortunately still plagues interactionism to this day, remarking that “the main lines of investigation marked out by Park and Burgess and their students were not clarified, extended, or deepened.” Our goal is to clarify, deepen, and especially, extend Park’s theory, with the hope that one day, it can become a viable alternative to conflict and functionalist theories of societal change.

The Three Major Pieces of the Puzzle for Completing Park’s Unfinished Cyclical Theory of Societal Change

First Critical Piece of the Puzzle: Social Orders

According to Park, the social structures of modern or complex human social habitats are comprised of what he (Park 1927a/Park 1955: 15–16; Park 1934/1952:163; Park 1940/1955: 301–05) referred to as “social orders,” which he defined as a complex or constellation of separate, yet interlocking social institutions that operate on the basis of highly intricate and intertwined principles of action. Park’s use of this critical idea predated by over a quarter of a century before Gerth and Mills (1954/1970) popularization of it in American sociological circles. Although Park (1936b/1952, 1939a/1952, 1940/1955) agonized for several years over the most appropriate names for these social orders and how many existed, it may now be reasonably concluded that he finally settled on four distinct types: (1) territorial, (2) economic, (3) political, and (4) moral (Athens 2018: 553–55).

For Park (1931a/ 1955: 243–52; 1931b: 284–92), the moral order operates on the basis of William Graham Sumner’s notion of the “mores,” for which he distinguished two types: “prescriptive” and “proscriptive.” On the one hand, prescriptive mores state what attitudes an acting unit, whether it is a group or individual, should display, what roles they should seek to perform, and what accompanying social statuses, they should seek to attain in the territories in which they inhabit. On the other hand, proscriptive mores state which attitudes acting units should not display, what roles they should not seek to perform, and what accompanying social statuses that they should not seek to attain, in their territory’s social habitat. If as Park  (1934/1952, 1936b) contended “dominance,” or as I (2015: 132–51) have more precisely argued elsewhere, “domination,” is the master principle on which all complex social habitats are ultimately organized, then the most important prescriptions and proscriptions comprising the moral order would necessarily concern who can and cannot exhibit superior and inferior attitudes, who can and cannot perform superordinate and subordinate roles in collective activities, and on the basis of these two facts, who can and cannot attain the highest and lowest ranks in the different hierarchical orders that operate in the territory in which they inhabit.

It may further be inferred that for Park, the territorial order refers to the dominative order, or hierarchy, that results from the struggle among its inhabitants to secure for themselves, as well as their families, clans, tribes, nationalities, and races, the most prized locations in which to reside, work, and luxuriate within its territorial borders. The inhabitants, who, succeed in this struggle under the operating mores of their territory get to display dominant attitudes, enact superordinate roles during the cooperative collective acts within their territorial boundaries and rise to the top of its pecking order. Conversely, the inhabitants, who regularly fail in this struggle under their own system of mores must exhibit submissive attitudes, perform subordinate roles during the assembly of corporate collective acts and fall to the bottom of their territorial pecking order. Thus, to borrow Park’s metaphor, the former inhabitants and their extended familial units, nationalities or races typically reside, work, and indulge themselves in the most coveted “spots under the sun,” while the latter inhabitants and their associates are most often relegated to living, working, and relaxing in the least desirable or most toxic “spots under the sun” within their territorial borders (Natali 2016).

It may be similarly surmised that for Park (1936c/1952:228–29) the economic order is jointly produced by the struggle among the inhabitants of a territory to rise and avoid falling in the ranks of two intimately related hierarchies. The first hierarchy, which may be termed the “occupational order,” emerges from the outcome of the struggle among a territory’s inhabitants under its mores to secure gainful employment by not only performing super-ordinate roles in their particular occupations, but more importantly, by obtaining super-ordinate occupational roles in the most prestigious and lucrative occupations available in their territory’s job market. Thus, the inhabitants who take on superordinate roles in the top occupations rise to higher ranks in their territory’s occupational order than those who perform superordinate roles in the least lucrative and prestigious occupations. The inhabitants who ultimately sink to bottom of the occupational hierarchy are those who must perform subordinate roles even in the least coveted and lowliest occupations.

The other closely related economic hierarchy identified by Park may be designated as the “consumer” hierarchy, for lack of a better term. The consumer hierarchy is a by-product of the struggle among a territory’s inhabitants to purchase not only basic products for themselves and their families, but luxuries as well. Inhabitants who can easily purchase all their essentials on a regular basis usually occupy higher ranks in their territory’s consumer order than those who cannot consistently afford them, and “live from hand to mouth.” Earnings usually dictate the amount of disposable income of a territory’s inhabitants. Moreover, those who generate the most income are usually the ones who can regularly afford high-end products and engage in what Thorsten Veblen aptly labelled “conspicuous consumption,” which keeps a select few perched atop the highest rungs of their territory’s consumer order (Park and Burgess 1924: 720). Consistent with this, Park and Burgess 1924:576) concluded, “It is because wealth and possessions are bound up with prestige, honor, and position in the world, that men and nations fight about them.”

In a real sense, the political order is a redundancy because all social orders, not just the political order, are organized on the basis of domination (Park 1934/1952:162). The main difference between them lies in the breadth of their jurisdictions, or the diameter of their official domains of operation. The official domain of operation of the political order, at least in principle, extends across the domains of operation of all the other three social orders, whereas the domain of operations of these three other social orders remain for the most part centered in their own specific operating domains. Despite the frequent incursion of these other domains into the political domain and vice versa, the “buck,” as they say, “always stops” with the political order because it is ultimately held responsible for the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of the daily operations of all the social orders.

It may be presumed that for Park, political order emerges from the effort among a particular territory’s inhabitants to exhibit the most superior attitudes, perform the most super-ordinate roles and, as a result, attain the highest possible ranks in its governmental and associated non-governmental political institutions. The hierarchies in governmental political institutions arise as a by-product of the contention among the inhabitants of a territory over who can perform the most superordinate roles, evince the most superior attitudes, and in turn, hold the highest ranks in its officially recognized divisions of government, such as in the executive, judicial, and legislative branches. Conversely, the hierarchies of non-governmental political institutions emerge from the struggle among inhabitants over who can display the most dominant attitudes, enact the most superior roles, and claim the loftiest statuses in their territory’s officially (or unofficially) recognized political parties and special interest groups, such as our notorious political action committees, popularly referred to as “PACS.” Unsurprisingly, it is the highest ranking members of these special interest groups who usually decide which candidates for public office in the different branches of their government receive their public endorsement and material resources, and which candidates will go without these vital resources. As expected, the territory’s inhabitants who are most successful in the struggle for status in the political realm are often the same inhabitants who have proven to be the most victorious in achieving status in the other three social orders, especially in the economic order.

Although it should be now obvious that Park considered the economic and political social orders as integral to the operation of all complex human habitats, and thereby, to the study of human ecology, this did not deter Andrew Abbott (2016: 35, emphasis added), the Gustavus F. and Ann M. Swift Distinguished Service Professor at the University of Chicago, from opining that “the same critique has been made for many years with respect to the Chicago School’s unwillingness to study the external linkages, financial structure and political economy of the city.” In light of our demonstration of Park’s concern with the functioning of economic and political orders in complex human habitats, Abbot should have refrained from repeating this criticism, which cast aspersions on the scholarly reputation of Park, arguably the most famous member in the history of the University of Chicago’s Department of Sociology (Bulmer 1984/1986: 1, 117, 127, 205,214–16).

Thus, it follows that Park chose a pyramid to visually depict the temporal sequence of how these social orders emerge in the social evolutionary process, as well as the relative importance that they play in a complex social habitat (Park 1936b/1952:157; Park 1939b/1952:262; 1943/1950b:320). At the base of the pyramid, he placed the territorial order working his way up to the economic order, political order, and finally moral order as the pinnacle of the entire pyramid (Park and Burgess 1924:511). Why did Park place the most importance on the moral social order, despite the fact that the other social orders emerged earlier in the evolutionary process? For Park, our morality, along with our possession of minds, enables the creation of a complex system of mores, and ultimately accounts the most for our humanity. Although societal change may not always start with the moral order, it definitely ends with it because, as will be explained later, the destruction of an effective moral order marks the end of one society and the potential birth of another. Almost four decades later, Tamostu Shibutani, one of Blumer’s former doctoral students at Chicago (Shibutani 1961: 616), seconded Park’s opinion on this crucial point stating, “In last analysis, the major issues that men will face are moral.”

Second Crucial Piece of Puzzle: Communities and Societies

For Park (Athens 2018: 552–56), the main difference between a society and a community is that a society possesses a moral order in which a system of mores necessarily permeates the operations of all the other three social orders, whereas a community does not maintain a moral order with a system of mores that imbue the workings of its political, economic, and territorial orders (Park 1940/1955: 311). Park 1950a/1950b: 16, emphasis added) underscores this point in his assertion that “a territorial community may have an ecological and an economic and political order, but it does not have a moral order.” He unfortunately overlooked that the presence or absence of a moral order not only depends on whether or not any system of mores operates within a complex human habitat, but also, more precisely, whether or not there exists an effective system of mores that makes concerted activities possible among its inhabitants in all or at least most, of its different social orders (Park, 1927a/1955:14–15; Blumer 1937:873; Wirth 1956/1964:46).

Thus, the true litmus test for deciding whether a complex human habitat is a community or a society is the existence of strong public endorsement for using any one of the many different possible systems of moral beliefs that may be circulating within its territorial boundaries at a given time. On the one hand, in a community, the public withholds its stamp of approval from any of the conflicting systems of mores being proposed within its territorial borders, making concerted activities in all or even most of its different social orders impossible, or at least extremely problematic. On the other hand, in a society, the public supports a particular system of mores that not only enables concerted activities among its inhabitants, but also makes such activities relatively routine occurrences in all of its different social orders. As Park’s former doctoral student and later departmental colleague at University of Chicago, Louis Wirth (1948/1964: 328), remarked, “A community thus may be regarded as a state of existence; whereas a society is a state of mind.” Thus, if Park’s (1929/1952:181; 1950a/1950b:15–18) distinction between a community and society is drawn upon, then it appears that a theory of societal change based on his ideas could definitely fulfill Blumer’s (1990) dictum that in order for a theory of social change to be valid, it must demarcate relatively clear-cut starting and ending points, and I would add mid-points as well.

Third Critical Piece of Puzzle: The Phases of the Cycle

The final piece in the theoretical puzzle needed for finishing Park’s uncompleted theory of societal change is the expansion of the cycle during which societies can become transformed into communities, and communities can later retransform into societies. Park was a great believer in Charles Horton Cooley’s famous sociological dictum (1918/1966: 316, emphasis added) that “any real study of society must be first, last, and nearly always be a study of process.” Two dozen years later, Park (1942/1955: 323, emphasis added) reconfirmed his belief in Cooley’s dictum asserting, “the things which science classifies change” adding that “it is these changes and the process by which they are brought about which sociology and the social sciences. .. are ultimately concerned.”

Moreover, Park (1927b/1955) believed that sociologists should strive to move beyond merely studying social processes by conducting analyses of social cycles. It may be inferred that for him (Park 1936a/1952:129), a social cycle represents a special subset of social processes that is distinguished from other such processes by the fact that they endlessly repeat themselves. In Park’s (1936c/1952: 229, emphasis added) mind, it was this fact that made the search for cycles particularly appropriate in the study of social change. Since “every social change that is capable of description in conceptual terms, will have... its characteristic cycle,” the identification of this “cycle seem to be the first step in the analysis and description of social change everywhere” (Park 1927b: 37). According to Park and Burgess (1924:55), “all social changes are preceded by a degree of social disorganization” that “will be ordinarily followed under normal conditions by a movement of reorganization.” Unfortunately, Park and Burgess never got far beyond this two-phase model of social disorganization and reorganization that Thomas and Znaniecki’s (1918, vol. II: 1127–1133; 1303–1306; Blumer 1939b: 62–82) had earlier developed. Nevertheless, one year later, Park (1925/1952:59, emphasis added) had strongly hinted at the need for adding a third phase, which may be called “extant social organization,” as the real starting point of this cycle: “Any form of change that brings about any measurable alteration in the routine of social life tends to break-up habits; and in breaking up habits upon which the existing social organization rests, destroys that organization, itself.”

Although Park had adopted a cyclical model of social change, this did not stop Andrew Abbott (2016: 217–18, emphasis added), the current editor of the American Journal of Sociology, from contending in his highly lauded, Processual Sociology that “the nineteenth century’s immense changes in labor, family, and governance lead thinkers from Ferdinand Tonnies to Emile Durkheim to Robert Park to believe that the enormous transformation in their time was unidirectional, perpetually accelerating process of tradition destruction.” Since Park conceived of societal change as unfolding throughout a cycle, and since a cycle is always repetitive by definition, this also means that a cycle is necessarily bi-directional, which partly undermines Abbott’s criticism of him. Moreover, Park’s intimated three-stage cycle of societal change does not only lead to the destruction of tradition, but also to the reconstruction of a new tradition, which delivers the coup de grace to Abbott’s critique of him. Thus, contrary to Abbott’s assertion, Park’s proposal of a cyclical model of societal change represents a complete break from the simple linear model earlier developed by Durkheim and Tonnies.

Despite this fact, however, Park’s adoption of Thomas and Znanieki’s two-phase model, plus a foreshowed third phase of societal change (Athens 1998: 675), unfortunately created a serious quandary for the completion of his cyclical explanation of societal change. He and Burgess (1924: 506, 574, 785) had identified four “great types or forms” of social interaction that occur in complex human social habitats -- “competition,” “conflict,” “assimilation,” and “accommodation.” Since in Park and Burgess’ (1924:504–784) most exhaustive discussion by far of these four types of social interaction, the forms are presented as following one another in a temporal sequence, it may be safely deduced that they do not only constitute different forms or types, but also more importantly different stages of social interaction.

Unfortunately, there was one stage of social interaction too many for Park to incorporate into his cycle of societal change. To further complicate matters, it may be reasonably inferred that he (Park and Burgess 1924: 506–12; 574–76) had also implicitly subdivided competitive interaction into two sub-types: “cooperative” and “conflictive,” which added still another possible stage of social interaction that needed to be incorporated into the cycle. In all likelihood, this thorny problem was the main culprit in preventing him from ever finishing the latest theory of societal change that he was apparently mulling over for some time before his death in 1944 (See: Park and Burgess 1924: 785; Park 1938/1950: 40–3; Park 1940/1955: 301–2).

Thus, to complete Park’s incipient theory of societal change in a manner that will eliminate this contradiction and fill in some crucial missing links in his explanation, we will propose an enlarged cycle which encompasses five phases to overcome these two problems: (1) extant social organization, (2) incipient social dis-organization, (3) social disorganization, (4) incipient social reorganization, and (5) emergent social reorganization. While Park did not explicitly identify or even hint at all of these different phases in societal change cycle, he did discuss elsewhere in his work the existence of micro-social processes, forms of elementary collective behavior, such as circular interaction and social contagion, and macro-social process or what may be spoken of as “complex collective behavior,” such as the organization of large-scaled social movements, which Blumer (1939a/1969: 67–69) later made more explicit. The operation of these micro and macro social processes will be used here as the basis for explaining the passage through these five stages of our enlarged cycle.

Finally, regarding the dynamics of this cycle, we will conceive it as operating on the basis of what Howard Becker (1998: 34–5) speaks of as “conditional determinism,” not what Abraham Kaplan (1964: 121–22) aptly labels “apocalyptic” or complete determinism, the form of determinism that Park (see, for example: Park 1926/1950b:150; Park 1936c/1952:222–30) habitually used as the main working principle for his ideas. Thus, the movement through the five phases of this cycle is contingent on the emergence of the previous micro and macro social processes, which launch earlier phases of the cycle into its later phases. Since the path followed by this cycle from the emergence of these different social processes is far from certain, it is difficult to precisely predict when and even if the completion of this cycle will occur (See: Kivisto 2004: 161).

Moreover, Park and Burgess (1924:664–65; see also: Park, 1926/1950b: 151) failed to base their intimated three-phase cycle of societal change on a more sophisticated contingent model of determinacy, even after they acknowledged the possibility of a truncated cycle that can reverse direction and, I might add, become stuck in a phase for a considerable period before the completion of all its remaining phases. For example, it may be speculated that our own complex social habitat may now be stuck in a communal or social dis-organizational phase of societal change that has endured for several decades. Before we proceed to the task of delineating these phases, however, a caveat is in order. Due to the broad scope of our project, it will not be possible for us to give all the ideas touched upon here as much attention as they deserve.

Phase One: Extant Social Organization

During the extant social organizational phase of this cycle, the predominant form of social interaction in society is what Park and Burgess (1924: 506–07) referred to as “competitive cooperation.” During this phase of societal change, the members of a society take for granted the legitimacy of the social orders on which their society operates, so that they seldom, if ever, question the system of mores that underlie the operation of its different hierarchical orders (Wirth 1956/1964:52). According to Wirth (1947/1964: 149), the mores “are part of the atmosphere that each individual breathes.” Thus, societal members assume the that the usage of these mores constitute the natural state of their social existence. While societal members may definitely raise questions about how some particular “more” was applied in a particular concrete situation, they do not question the legitimacy of that more’s general usage. For example, baseball players who are at bat may often dispute an empire’s call of a pitch a “ball” or “strike,” but they rarely dispute whether or not they are “out” after their third strike or the catching of a foul ball.

The few people, who do question the legitimacy of the mores or “rules of the game” under such circumstances are usually stigmatized and rejected from society for being naïve, stupid, or even crazy (Park 1931b/1955: 286–88). The importance of their stigmatization and rejection is that it sparks what Park and Burgess (1924: 789, 866, 874–75) and Blumer (1939a/1969:70–80) referred to in their work as, “circular interaction” and “social contagion,” two forms of micro-social processes or what they called “elementary collective behavior” that often work hand-in-hand. While circular interaction strengthens and hardens the attitudes that people hold toward an issue or problem, social contagion spreads their attitudes to more and more of their fellow societal members, which in this particular phase of societal change supports the prevailing public opinion in favor of maintaining the “status quo.”

In the case of moral order, societal members engage in cooperative competitive interaction to decide who can perform super-ordinate and subordinate roles, display dominant and submissive attitudes, and attain higher and lower statuses on the basis of regularly performing these roles and expressing these attitudes in its moral hierarchy. They accept without complaint the legitimacy of the prescriptive and proscriptive mores used to determine eligibility for executing superordinate or superordinate roles, for showing dominate and submissive attitudes, and for acquiring higher and lower statuses in the moral hierarchy as they regularly perform these roles and express these attitudes. The different amounts and types of power (territorial, economic, and political) that acting units have at their immediate disposal, or can later muster not only impact their roles, attitudes, and statuses within the moral order, but also impact their real-life chances of ever winning this competition.

In the case of the territorial order, members of an extant society also take part in cooperative competitive interaction to see who can claim the most dominant attitudes, the most superordinate roles and, the most exalted statuses as they routinely perform these roles and display these attitudes in the territorial hierarchy. While engaging in cooperative competitive social interaction, they fully accept the prescriptive and proscriptive mores used for establishing who can play which roles, display which attitudes, and acquire which ranks. As far as the impact that their degrees and types of present or future power (moral, economic, and political) have on the these vital matters are concerned, they carry the same weight as in the case of the moral order.

In the case of the economic order, societal members once again use cooperative competitive interaction to settle who will take on the super-ordinate and superordinate roles, superior and inferior attitudes, and higher and lower statuses as they assume these roles, statuses, and attitudes in both the occupational and consumer suborders. While engaging in co-operative competitive social interaction in the occupational suborder, they dutifully accept the prescriptive and proscriptive mores used for deciding who plays the superordinate and subordinate roles in either the most or least lucrative and prestigious occupations, who displays dominant or submissive attitudes in these different occupations, and who acquires higher or lower ranks in the occupational hierarchy. The degree and type of power (moral, territorial, and political) readily or later available to acting units not only affects where they presently stand in the occupational order, but also the future chances of emerging victorious in their competition for jobs in different occupations.

During co-operative competitive social interaction in consumer suborder, societal members continue to embrace the prescriptive and proscriptive mores that are used to decide their eligibility for playing the most superordinate and subordinate roles in the most and least coveted consumer roles, assuming the most dominant and submissive consumer attitudes, and occupying the highest and lowest spots in the consumer hierarchy. Once again, it is both the degrees and categories of power (moral, territorial, and political) which acting units either immediately have at hand or subsequently can bring to the table that determines who will compete for performing these particular consumer roles, exhibiting these particular consumer attitudes, and claiming these particular statuses in the consumer order, but also the likelihood of their ever achieving real success in the competition for consumer products.

Finally, cooperative competition in the political order determines which societal members will perform the super-ordinate or subordinate roles, express superior or inferior attitudes, and land higher or lower ranks by regularly taking on these roles and requisite attitudes in the political hierarchy inside or outside of its official governmental institutions. They also accept without question the legitimacy of the prescriptive and proscriptive mores used to establish these determinations in the political order when they take on these different roles and assume these different attitudes within official governmental institutions or non-governmental political organizations. As in the moral, territorial, and economical orders, how much and what kind of power (territorial, economic, and political) that acting units have at their immediate disposal or can later mobilize under their system of mores not only impacts their eligibility to take on these different roles, distinctive attitudes, and varying statuses in the political order, but also affect their actual chances of winning or losing the competition to do so in its different social orders.

Phase Two: Incipient Social Dis-Organization

During the incipient social dis-organizational stage, the predominant form of social interaction in society changes from what Park and Burgess (1924: 506, 574–77) earlier referred to as “competitive cooperation” to what may be called “conflictive competition.” Unlike in the extant social organizational phase, during this phase of societal change, the members of society begin to seriously question the system of mores underlying the operation of their different social orders. The legitimacy of their previously taken for granted system of mores starts to splinter as “social contagion” steadily boosts the ranks of societal members who no longer view the usage of their present system of mores as a natural part of everyday social existence. They eventually go beyond just questioning the application of these specific mores in particular concrete situations, to more importantly, the legitimacy of a specific “more” or even the entire system of mores it belongs to. Thus, as more and more members of a society start casting doubt on the general validity of a specific more or the entire body of the “rules of the game,” fewer and fewer of them are stigmatized and rejected for challenging the continued adherence to the present system of mores or only particular mores within this larger system. To the contrary, as more of their fellow societal members heap praise on the dissenters for their courage to question the present system of mores, it only further ignites circular interaction among them that strengthens their skeptical attitudes toward the legitimacy of their entire current system of mores or only specific parts of it. Despite the fact that these dissenters’ attitudes remain at odds with the prevailing public opinion on this issue, the longer that circular interaction continues among them, the more that it solidifies their opposition to their fellow societal members whose blind allegiance to the present system of mores remains firmly entrenched, creating an “us” versus “them” mentality.

In the case of moral order, societal members engage in conflictive competitive interaction when deciding who can express superior and inferior attitudes, claim super-ordinate and superordinate roles, and acquire higher and lower statuses on the basis of their regularly playing of these roles and exhibiting these attitudes in its moral hierarchy. During this conflictive competitive interaction, however, they not only begrudgingly accept, but may even balk occasionally at the legitimacy of the prescriptive and proscriptive mores used to determine ineligibility for assuming superordinate roles, dominate attitudes, and higher positions in the moral hierarchy on the basis of their regular conduct. The different levels and types of power (territorial, economic, and political) that acting units have at their fingertips or can later acquire affect their eligibility under the present system of mores as they compete against each other to play certain roles, exhibit certain attitudes, and reach a certain status in the moral order, as well as the likelihood of ever beating out their competitors.

In the case of the territorial order, conflictive competitive interaction among the members of an extant society determines who can execute the most superordinate roles, show the most superior attitudes, and occupy the highest ranks in its territorial hierarchy. During the course of this conflictive competition, they only reluctantly accept and, on rare occasions, openly confront the creditability of the prescriptive and proscriptive mores used for deciding who can claim which roles, attitudes, and statuses in the territorial hierarchy on the basis of their routine actions. As in the case of the moral order, the amount and kind of power (moral, economic, political) that acting units have immediately at hand or can draw from later, under the present system of mores, always impacts the outcome of what roles, attitudes, and ranks that they can claim in this competition.

Turning to the economic order, under their present system of mores, societal members use conflictive competitive interaction as a determining factor for who gets to express dominant and submissive attitudes, discharge super-ordinate and subordinate roles, and land on higher or lower ranks on the basis of their typical conduct in its occupational and consumer suborders. During participation in conflictive competitive interaction in occupational suborder, they usually unenthusiastically accept and, on occasion, even openly challenge the validity of the prescriptive and proscriptive mores used for deciding who is who in the occupational hierarchy in response to their regular role performances and attitudinal expressions. As in the territorial order, the degree and type of power (moral, territorial, and political) that acting units can utilize right away or later scrounge up under their present system of mores always sways how far that they can go, as well as their chances of ever prevailing during this form of competition.

While engaging in conflictive competitive interaction in the consumer suborder, acting units unhappily accept and at times also balk at the legitimacy of the prescriptive and proscriptive mores employed to distinguish the upper from the lower echelon positions in the consumer hierarchy based on their regular assumption of superordinate roles and superior attitudes, and purchasing of staple, as well as luxury products in the consumer marketplace. As with the occupational suborder, the levels and types of power (moral, territorial, and political) available to the acting units either immediately or later continue to affect to some degree, their real chances of ever achieving lasting success in their competition for consumer goods.

Finally, in the case of political order, societal members rely on conflictive competitive interaction to decide who will ultimately get to express dominant and submissive attitudes, execute super-ordinate and subordinate roles, and claim higher or lower ranks in the political hierarchy inside or outside its formal governmental institutions. During this form of social interaction, societal members now only halfheartedly accept and every now and then dispute the soundness of the prescriptive and proscriptive mores employed for distinguishing the rank from the file in the political hierarchy based on the their routinely performed roles, expressed attitudes, and claimed statuses within official governmental institutions or non-governmental political organizations. As in the previous cases of the moral, territorial, and economical orders, it merits stressing here that the different degrees and kinds of power (territorial, economic, and moral) that acting units can summon under their present system of mores not only consistently impacts their eligibility to assume specific roles and attitudes, and occupy specific rungs of the political order, but also always influences their chances of prevailing in this competition.

Phase Three: Social Disorganization

During the social disorganizational phase of this cycle, the predominant form of social interaction switches from “conflictive competition” to what will be referred to here as the “unmitigated conflictive” form of social interaction. While in this phase of societal change, the former members of a society have now become unceremoniously downgraded into members of a community, where increasing numbers of their fellow communal members no longer even reluctantly accept the system of mores that had underpinned the operation of all the different social orders in their former society, which they had earlier merely taken for granted. Instead, they now not only complain about abiding by the old system of mores, but openly rebel against their continued abidance, making it highly problematical for the present occupants of the upper ranks of some or all the hierarchies to exercise their domination. Thus, the previously taken for granted legitimacy of the system of mores in the former society has now frayed apart in the face of increasing social unrest among its members (Park and Burgess 1924:926; Park 1929/1952:203; Park 1943/1950b:319). According to Park and Burgess (1924: 866, emphasis added), “The significance of social unrest is that it represents at once the breaking up of the established and a preparation for new collective action.” As circular interaction intensifies so does the palpable defiance among community members who already oppose the continued use of the past system of mores. As social contagion spreads, feelings of defiance intensify among more and more other communal members, and the degree of social unrest in the community finally reaches a crescendo, at which point it can crystallize into effective leadership with concerted efforts to organize social movements dedicated to changing these mores. For both Park and Blumer, the organization of social movements represent a more complex or higher form of collective behavior than the more elementary and primitive forms, such as circular interaction and social contagion.

Park and Burgess (1924: 874,933–34), as well as Blumer (1939a/1969: 99–103), distinguish two different basic types of social movements, “specific” and “general.” On the one hand, during a specific social movement, acting units rebel against their assignments under their past system of mores to perform subordinate roles, exhibit submissive attitudes, and occupy lower ranked positions in the hierarchal orders of only some, but not all their community’s different social orders so that these movements manifest themselves as “reform movements.” The goal of reform movements is to only change the operating system of mores in at most, a few social orders. Thus, for the most part, the acting units from the community, who still accept and take for granted the legitimacy of the past system of mores for deciding their eligibility to enact superordinate roles, adopt superior attitudes, and to occupy higher positions in most, but not all, of the different social orders, usually join reform social movements.

Unlike specific or reform movements, during general social movements, the acting units revolt against their assignments under their past system of mores to accept subordinate roles, submissive attitudes, and lower ranks in the hierarchal orders of all or most of their community’s different social orders, so that they manifest the form of a “revolutionary movement.” The objective of revolutionary movements is to change the entire system of mores operating in most or all the social orders. Thus, the acting units, who no longer accept or take for granted the authority of the past system of mores that restrict their eligibility to take on superior roles, assume dominant attitudes, and achieve higher statuses in virtually all the social orders, join a general social movement that aims to overhaul the entire system of mores operating in all the social orders. Thus, unlike, a specific social movement, a general one always exhibits the form of a revolutionary movement.

At this point in our discussion, it may be beneficial to distinguish the anti-status quo from pro-status quo social movements. Under the rubric of anti-status quo movements, we can lump together reform and revolutionary movements, which oppose returning to the status quo in some or all the social orders in their former society, while under the rubric of pro-status quo movements, we can lump together anti-reform and anti-revolutionary movements, which favor returning to the status quo in some or all their former society’s social orders. The division of social movements into these two categories, however, is neither capricious nor arbitrary, for two reasons. First, the emergence of anti-status quo movements almost invariably leads to the development of pro-status quo or reactionary movements and, vice versa, demonstrating the relevance in sociology of the old, often repeated saying of Sir Isaak Newton, that “for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction.”

Second, when “social unrest,” a term which incidentally, both Blumer (1939a/1969: 71–74) and Park and Burgess (1924: 924–25) often used, first breaks out in a community, it is much easier to differentiate anti- status quo from pro-status quo movements, than to differentiate reform from revolutionary pro- or anti-status quo movements from one another because, at least initially, the latter social movements can often operate in conjunction with one another, so their memberships can also overlap frequently. For example, today, there appears to be at least two active anti-status quo movements. One of these movement, Black Lives Matter now appears to be a specific movement, whose members only seek to change the “over-policing” of major and minor communities where people of color predominate, which falls under the political order. The other movement, called Awoke, appears to be a more general social movement, whose members seek nothing less than the overthrow of “white male supremacy” in all the different social orders of our larger nation-wide community. The members of these two movements often participate in some of the same public protests and, voice some of the same slogans, although their participation is done without full recognition yet of the differences in the scope of their respective goals—reform versus revolution.

With regard to the moral order, members of anti-status quo movements are engaged in unmitigated conflictive interaction with members of pro-status quo movements over whose preferred system of mores should be used to decide who should and should not display dominant and submissive attitudes, who should and should not perform super-ordinate and subordinate roles, and who should and who should not attain higher and lower statuses from their regular performance of these respective roles and expression of these requisite attitudes in the moral hierarchy. On the one hand, the anti-status quo groups outright reject the validity of the same prescriptive and proscriptive mores used in the past in their former society and demand the installation a new system of mores for determining who should be allowed to take on dominant or submissive attitudes, and superordinate or subordinate roles, as well as reach higher or lower ranks in the moral hierarchy in light of their regular past performance of these roles and expression of these attitudes (Park 1926/1950b: 144–50; Park 1928/1950b: 367–70). On the other hand, the pro- status quo groups ardently defend the legitimacy of the longtime prescriptive and proscriptive mores used in their former society and staunchly oppose the overhauling them with a new system of mores for making these critical decisions from this point on. An apt present-day example of pro-status group movement is the “Alt Right” and “Proud Boys.” The degree and types of power that the pro- and anti-status quo movements have at their immediate or later disposal impacts whether they can prevail in changing or reverting to the former rules of eligibility under which they compete against one another to claim certain roles, attitudes, and ranks, and as a result, improve or worsen their positions in the moral hierarchy.

With respect to the territorial order, the members of anti-and pro-status quo movements engage in unmitigated conflictive interaction to settle the issue of whose preferred system of mores should be used for deciding who can snag particular roles, attitudes, and statuses on the basis of how they comport themselves in the territorial hierarchy. The members of pro-status quo movement strongly endorse the legitimacy of the prescriptive and proscriptive mores used in the past in their former society and reject the imposition of a new system of mores for making these decisions in the future. Conversely, the members of anti-status quo movements outright reject the creditability of the prescriptive and proscriptive mores used in the past and demand the installation of a new system of mores for guiding these critical decisions. As in the case of the moral order, varying degrees and types of power that acting units from these different movements have immediately on hand or can summon later rarely fails to impact whether they can prevail in modifying or returning to the rules of eligibility used in the past for competing against each other to achieve their goals in the territorial order.

Turning to the economic order, pro-status quo and anti-status quo movement members also enter into unmitigated conflictive interaction to determine whose preferred system of mores should be instituted for deciding who can discharge super-ordinate and subordinate roles, display dominant and submissive attitudes, and secure higher and lower statuses from their regular execution of these roles and expression of these attitudes in both its occupational and consumer suborders. While engaging in unmitigated conflictive interaction in the occupational suborder, the members of anti-status quo movements repudiate the authority of the prescriptive and proscriptive mores used in the past and demand a completely new, or at least, partially revised replacement system of mores to designate who performs these particular roles in the most and least lucrative and prestigious occupations, who displays these particular attitudes in these occupations, and who attains these particular statuses in the occupational hierarchy in response to their past typical occupational conduct. Conversely, the members of pro-status quo movements flatly reject the call for instating a new system of prescriptive and proscriptive mores and demand the resurrection of the earlier system of mores for determining eligibility to vie for enacting superordinate roles, expressing dominant attitudes, and attaining the top ranks in the least and most lucrative and prestigious occupations in the occupational hierarchy.

During unmitigated conflictive social interaction in the consumer suborder, members of anti-status quo movements not only reject the soundness of the prescriptive and proscriptive mores used in the past, but they also demand a partial or even a complete overhaul of the traditional system of mores followed for selecting who takes on rarefied consumer roles and elitist attitudes and, in turn, secures the top statuses in the consumer marketplace. On the other hand, the members of pro-status quo movements demand an immediate return to the old system of mores used in the former society for designating whose eligible and ineligible to enact superordinate consumer roles and display superior consumer attitudes, and as a result, reach the highest rungs of the consumer ladder.

Once again, the varying degrees and different kinds of power that acting units in the anti- and pro-status movements can immediately access or later mobilize always influences their ability to change or resurrect the old rules used in their former society to see who could contend for the most prestigious occupational roles and lavish consumer roles, as well as the exhibition of the most super eminent attitudes while playing these respective roles in the consumer and occupational sub-orders. Thus, the power that acting units wield affects the outcome of their right to perform certain roles, display certain attitudes, and, occupy certain statuses in both occupational and consumer suborders, and, consequently, their real-life chances of ever rising to the uppermost ranks in the entire economic hierarchy.

Finally, in the case of political order, the members of pro-status quo and anti-status quo movements engage in unmitigated conflictive interaction to resolve the matter of whose preferred system of mores should be used and whose should be rejected when deciding who can take on dominant attitudes and super-ordinate roles, and will occupy the highest statuses in the political hierarchies formed inside or outside its formal governmental institutions. Members of anti-status quo movements rebuke the legitimacy of the prescriptive and proscriptive mores used in the past in their former society and demand a whole or partly new system of mores for making these determinations in the future. On the other hand, the members of the pro-status quo movements champion the merit of the prescriptive and proscriptive mores used in the past and resist their complete or even partial change. As in the previous cases of the moral, territorial, and economical orders, the amount and type of power of the acting units predictably impact their chances of either resurrecting or revising the system of mores that had been in effect in their former society, as well as their future success or failure in a new political hierarchy.

Phase Four: Incipient Social re-Organization

During the incipient social re-organizational phase, the predominant form of social interaction in a community changes from what we called “unmitigated conflictive interaction” to what Park and Burgess (1924: 663–733) named “accommodative” interaction. While in this phase of societal change, the leaders of specific or general pro- and anti-status quo social movements, whatever the case maybe, must work toward successfully developing a mutually agreeable plan for modifying or replacing the present system of mores that will end the unmitigated conflictive interaction preventing concerted activity from transpiring smoothly again within some or all of their former community’s social orders. The ultimate key to bringing about an end to this ongoing rancor and strife is for the leaders of these different social movements to throw their support behind changing completely or even partially the entire extant system of mores that they had previously operated on, in exchange for restoring cooperative competition as the predominant form of social interaction in some or all the social orders where concerted activity is now difficult or impossible to achieve. If no such mutually agreeable plan can be brokered, or if a newly developed plan unravels quickly, then a truncated cycle of societal change can occur, prompting the cycle to return back to its earlier social dis-organizational phase before it can proceed forward again (Park and Burgess 1924: 664–65).

With respect to the moral order, the leaders of the anti-status and pro-status quo movements become engaged in accommodative interaction when they bargain with one another over the type and extent of changes that need to be made in the system of proscriptive and prescriptive mores used in the past in their former society to decide who will be eligible to exhibit superior and inferior attitudes, perform superordinate and subordinate roles, and claim the highest and lowest ranked positions in the moral hierarchy. The bargaining chips that the leaders of these movements possess or can later squeeze from those who similarly oppose or support the other social orders, as well as how effectively they use these chips at the bargaining table, largely account for which of these leaders must make the least or most concessions to reach a new, mutually agreed upon, and more viable system of mores for the moral order’s operation in the future.

In the territorial order, the leaders of the pro- and anti-status quo social movements participate in accommodative interaction as they negotiate over the modifications that need to be made in the past system of prescriptive and proscriptive mores that were earlier employed in their former society for deciding who is eligible to display superior and inferior attitudes, play superordinate and subordinate roles, and reach the highest and lowest ranks in the territorial hierarchy from their routinely playing these respective roles and displaying of these attendant attitudes inside its territorial borders. The bargaining chips that the leaders of these movements, have on hand, or can later mobilize from those who also oppose or support the other social orders, and their adroitness at deploying these chips at the bargaining table, ultimately determines which of these powerbrokers must concede the most and least to produce a mutually satisfactory, new and more tenable system of mores for the territorial order to function in the days to come.

Turning to the economic order, the leaders of the pro-status and anti-status quo movements engage in accommodative interaction while negotiating with each other over the kinds and degrees of modifications required in their earlier system of prescriptive and proscriptive mores for deciding who can display dominant and submissive attitudes, who can enact super-ordinate and subordinate roles, and who can attain higher and lower ranks from their regular exhibition of these attitudes and enactment of these roles in both its occupational and consumer suborders. During accommodative interaction in occupational suborder, the leaders of anti-status quo movements bargain with leaders of the pro-status quo movements over whether to entirely replace or only amend the old system of mores used in their former society for making decisions as far as who should be eligible and ineligible to compete for performing superordinate and subordinate roles in the most and least lucrative and prestigious occupations, for displaying the corresponding superior and inferior attitudes while performing these respective roles, and for gaining higher and lower ranks in the occupational hierarchy from their regular performance of these roles and expression of these attitudes. The bargaining chips that the power brokers of these movements can later mobilize from those who likewise oppose or support the other social orders, or have already on hand, and their shrewdness in deploying these chips at the bargaining table, largely account for which powerbrokers must concede the least and most to reach a mutually satisfactory new and more tenable system of mores for the functioning of the occupational sub-order in the future.

While engaging in accommodative social interaction in the consumer suborder, the powerbrokers in the anti- and pro-status quo movements negotiate with each other over whether to only modify or completely revise the system of mores used in the past for determining who is eligible to take on superordinate and subordinate roles, as well as the attendant dominant and submissive attitudes in the consumer marketplace and, as a result, rise into the highest ranks or sink into the lowest ranks in the consumer hierarchy. Once again, it is the bargaining chips that the power brokers of these two movements have at their fingertips or can quickly acquire from those who similarly oppose or support the other social orders, and who can later most deftly deploy these chips at the bargaining table that are primarily responsible for which powerbrokers must make the greatest and fewest concessions when pounding out a new, more workable and mutually agreed on system of mores for the operation of the consumer sub-order.

Finally, in the case of political order, the members of anti- and pro-status quo movements participate in accommodative interactions when they try to settle the nature and scope of the alterations needed in their earlier system of prescriptive and proscriptive mores to effectively decide who discharges super-ordinate roles, displays dominant attitudes, and rises to the top in the political hierarchy. During accommodative interaction, the leaders of anti- and pro-status quo movements must negotiate with each other as to whether a complete overhaul or only some revisions to the system of mores are in order for making these critical decisions inside or outside their formal governmental bodies. The bargaining chips and skills of these movements’ power brokers are ultimately responsible for which ones end up making the biggest and smallest concessions to create a mutually satisfactory system of mores for the operation of the political order in the days ahead.

Phase Five: Emergent Social Reorganization

During the emergent social reorganizational stage of the societal change cycle, the predominant form of social interaction once again switches, but this time it is from what Park and Burgess (1924: 734–84) called “accommodation” to “assimilation.” The goal of assimilative form of interaction is the solidification of the complete or partial changes made to the old system of mores that had been accepted earlier, during the incipient social reorganizational phase. Whether or not this entirely revamped or only partially new system of mores is transmitted from the older generation to the younger generation or vice versa, assimilative interaction must facilitate the continuity of this new and different system of mores among all the different generations of societal members so that they can now form a new critical mass in their emergent society. This newly created critical mass of societal members, which social contagion necessarily plays a major part in creating, must come to accept and take for granted this new system of mores as part of the natural state of their social existence to solidify these changes in the newly emergent society. For all intents and purposes, this last development may be considered as the true litmus test for whether or not assimilative social interaction managed to successfully solidify the newly emergent society (Park and Burgess 1924: 735–36, 774, 785).

With respect to the moral order, societal members engage in assimilative interaction when they adopt the new system of mores for deciding who will take on superior and inferior attitudes, perform superordinate and subordinate roles, and occupy higher and lower statuses in its new moral hierarchy. While engaging in this form of social interaction, however, the collective actions of this new society’s members must not only demonstrate their acceptance of the viability of these new prescriptive and proscriptive mores for making these critical decisions, but they must also instill these new prescriptive and proscriptive mores into the younger and older generations of their fellow societal members to ensure that these new mores will also guide their activities both inside and outside the moral order. The different ranges and types of power that the acting units possess not only affect their eligibility to enact these moral roles, express these moral attitudes, and acquire these moral statuses in the moral hierarchy, but also how likely they are to claim real success as they compete in the moral order after having completed the assimilation of the new system of mores.

Looking at the territorial order, members of the new emerging society enter into assimilative interaction when they apply their new system of mores to figure out who can land the most superordinate roles, show the most superior attitudes, and reach the loftiest ranks in its territorial hierarchy. During assimilative interaction, the members of this newly emergent society must also demonstrate their acceptance of the new prescriptive and proscriptive mores by actually drawing upon them to make these critical decisions inside their new territorial order. The sources and amounts of power held by acting units would continue to influence the success that they experience during their competition to play leadership roles, evince superior attitudes, and acquire higher ranks in the territorial order in the aftermath of their successful assimilation of this new system of mores.

Turning now to the economic order, societal members rely on assimilative interaction to help them determine who can exhibit the dominant attitudes, who can execute the super-ordinate roles and can secure the higher ranks in its occupational and consumer suborders. During assimilative social interaction in the occupational suborder, members must show allegiance to the new set of mores now used for designating prospective standouts for enacting superordinate roles in the most lucrative and prestigious occupations, exhibiting dominant attitudes, and attaining the highest positions in the occupational hierarchy. The extent and type of power available to acting units still carries the same weight as in the other social orders, including swaying their likelihood of landing even more lucrative and prestigious jobs after successfully completing their assimilation of the new system of mores.

During their engagement in assimilative social interaction in the consumer suborder, the members of the newly emergent society must demonstrate their acceptance of the new prescriptive and proscriptive mores that are now in place for deciding who should vie for enacting superordinate roles and displaying superior attitudes in the consumer marketplace, and consequently, a position atop of the consumer hierarchy. Once again, the power that acting units can marshal under the new system of mores always impacts not only the immediate prospects of their selection for performing these consumer roles, expressing these consumer attitudes, and attaining these consumer statuses in the consumer order, but also the long-term prospects of their achievement of enduring success in the consumer marketplace following their effective assimilation of the new system of mores.

Shifting the focus to the political order, members of this newly emergent society enter into assimilative interaction for guidance in determining who will execute super-ordinate roles, assume superior attitudes, and occupy the higher ranks in the political hierarchy inside or outside the confines of its official governmental institutions. This form of social interaction requires them to embrace the new set of mores now followed for making these critically important decisions. As in the previously described cases of the moral, territorial, and economical orders, the amount and kinds of power wielded by the acting units under their new system of mores not only influences their eligibility for performing these roles, displaying these attitudes, and attaining these statuses in the political order, but also their possibility of prevailing during this quest after they have assimilated the new system of mores.

While the emergence of this new solidified society marks the end of this cycle of societal change, it also simultaneously heralds the beginning of a new cycle of societal change. Thus, the successful solidification of a newly emergent society can never be said to be permanent, but only temporary, because sometime in the unforeseeable future, it will inevitably undergo incipient social disorganization again, restarting the passage through the cycle. It warrants underscoring that once an existing society progresses through all the cycle’s phases, it can never return to the original state in which the society was at phase one. Thus, once changed, a society can always change again, but not back into its pre-changed form. Table 1 below illustrates the different possible circuitous passages through the five phases in the cycle based on the predominant forms of social interaction that occurs during each phase.

Table 1 The Five Phase Cycle Of Societal Change
Full size table

Conclusion

In filling out the general parameters of Park’s incipient theory of societal change, we were forced to address the serious obstacles that had interfered with its completion. First, while he was never able to remedy the stumbling blocks to conclude his building of a cyclical version of his societal change theory, we were able to offer a possible viable solution to them here. We finished his incipient cyclical theory by increasing the number of phases in his cycle from three to five, and by incorporating the operation of each one of the five explicitly or implicitly distinguished types or stages of social interactions proposed by Park and Burgess under each one of the phases of this expanded cycle. More specifically, we subsumed cooperative competitive interaction under the first or extant social organizational phase, conflictive competition under the incipient dis-organizational or second phase, unmitigated conflictive interaction under the social dis-organizational or third phase, accommodative social interaction under the fourth or incipient social reorganizational phase, and finally, assimilative interaction under the emergent social reorganizational or fifth phase. This newly enlarged cycle was refined to explicitly include, not preclude, the truncation or short circuiting of its operation or becoming stuck for a lengthy period in one of the phases, which more often than not happens.

Secondly, we supplied many missing vital details of this new expanded cycle needed for explaining its over-all operation. First, we inserted important micro processes, such as social unrest, social contagion, and circular interaction, and macro social processes, such as the organization of social movements, borrowed from discussions by Park and Blumer about collective behavior to help account for the propelling of the phases through this cycle. Secondly, we abandoned Park’s well-known crude notion of apocalyptic determinism that he incorporated into his work for a much more nuanced model based on contingent determinism, in which the previously mentioned micro and macro social processes operate, as emergent developments. Thus, our newer and more complex cycle of societal change enabled us to avoid the long known and often repeated shortcomings of Park’s much older and simpler proto-type of this cycle (Giddens 1982: 100–107; Hughes, 1963/1984: 532–34; Ridener 2008: 141).

Third, we replaced Park’s old, dated notion of dominance, which can only explain the super-ordination of nonverbal forms of life which do not possess selves, with a much needed up-dated and more nuanced version of super-ordination, which we named domination. Unlike dominance, domination can explain not only the subordination of life forms who are able to communicate verbally and are thereby endowed with selves, but also the subordination of even higher forms of life that in addition to possessing linguistic competence are also endowed with literacy, and consequently possessing both selves and minds (Athens 2015, 2018: 559–63). Fourth, we fulfilled Blumer’s dictum about the need for a theory of societal change that not only provides a clear-cut starting point, which we labelled the “extant society,” and ending point, which we called the “emergent society,” but exceeded these two requirements by also providing a clear-cut midpoint, which we spoke of as the “community.”

Next, we up-dated Park’s conception of the dynamics of super-ordination and subordination by incorporating the indispensable role that power plays in them which not only Park omitted, but most sociologists today still often fail to differentiate between both or erroneously equate with one another (Athens 2015: 144–48). By building and improving upon Park’s ideas about societal change, we also demonstrated that radical interactionism, unlike its older, conservative cousin, symbolic interactionism, can squarely address the problem of societal change and the exercise of domination and power on both macroscopic and microscopic levels and not just on a microscopic plane, without violating its basic tenets and distorting its root images (Athens 2015: 1–41).

Finally, as a result of completing Park’s incipient cyclical model of societal change, as well as simultaneously improving its operational dynamics and providing the missing vital details necessary for understanding its operation, we were able to construct a relatively novel explanation of societal change from a radical interactionist perspective. While this has been a major blind spot in the development of this perspective for the last two decades or so, it still remains as a weakness from the symbolic interactionist’s perspective, despite its much earlier inception almost a century ago. Beyond filling this void in the development of radical interactionism, however, our proposed and still under development explanation provides an attractive alternative to much older and more established conflict and functionalist theories of societal change.

Why? Unlike theories of societal change constructed from a functionalist (See, for example: Chirot 1994) or conflict perspective (For example, see: Collins 1994), a theory constructed from a radical interactionist perspective avoids the critical mistake of making cooperation more important than conflict or vice-versa (Athens 2015: 15–16). Instead, a theory explaining societal change from a radical interactionist’s perspective sometimes emphasizes cooperation more while, at other times, conflict more depending on which particular phase of cyclical change a society is in. During first phase of this cycle, extant social organization, cooperation is stressed much more than conflict; during the second phase of it, incipient social disorganization, cooperation is emphasized, but only slightly more than conflict; during the third phase, social disorganization, conflict is stressed much more than cooperation; during stage four, incipient social reorganization, cooperation is still emphasized, but only barely more than conflict, and finally, during the fifth phase, emergent social reorganization, cooperation is stressed far more than conflict. Thus, through introduction and use of our advanced cyclical model, it was possible for us to construct a theory of societal change in which cooperation plays just as vital a role as conflict – something which neither the traditional functionalist or conflict theories have rarely sought nor been able to do.