Abstract
The problem of strategic stability of long-range cooperative agreements in dynamic games with coalition structures is investigated. Based on imputation distribution procedures, a general theoretical framework of the differential game with a coalition structure is proposed. A few assumptions about the deviation instant for a coalition are made concerning the behavior of a group of many individuals in certain dynamic environments. From these, the time-consistent cooperative agreement can be strategically supported by ε-Nash or strong ε-Nash equilibria. While in games in the extensive form with perfect information, it is somewhat surprising that without the assumptions of deviation instant for a coalition, Nash or strong Nash equilibria can be constructed.
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Wang, L., Gao, H., Petrosyan, L. et al. Strategically supported cooperation in dynamic games with coalition structures. Sci. China Math. 59, 1015–1028 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11425-016-5131-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11425-016-5131-8
Keywords
- cooperative game theory
- coalition structure
- strategic stability
- imputation distribution procedure
- deviation instant
- ε-Nash equilibrium
- strong ε-Nash equilibrium