Abstract
We use economic theory to examine the intensity of fundamentalist sects in which leaders work to enhance their followers’ observance level. We model three stylized situations under which fundamentalist groups function, examining the intensity of observance in each. We find that, under reasonable conditions, rivalry among fundamentalists makes them more extreme.
Article PDF
Similar content being viewed by others
Avoid common mistakes on your manuscript.
References
Arce, D.G., & Sandler, T. (2003). An evolutionalry game approach to fundamentalism and conflict. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 159, 132–154.
Berman, E. (2000). Sect, subsidy and sacrifice: An Economist’s view of ultra-orthodox Jews. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 65(3), 905–953.
Eisenstadt, S.N. (1999). Fundamentalism, sectarianism and revolution: The Jacobin dimensions of modernity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Enders, W., & Sandler, T. (2002). Patterns of transnational terrorism, 1970–1999: Alternative time series estimates. International Studies Quarterly, 46, 145–165.
Feigenbaum, S., & Levy, D.M. (1992). Who monitors the monitors? In D. M. Levy (Ed.), The economic ideas of ordinary people (pp. 74–91). NY: Routledge.
Hillman, A.L., & Riley, J.G. (1989). Politically contestable rents and transfers. Economics and Politics, 1, 17–39.
Hirshleifer, J. (1989). Conflict and rent seeking success functions: Ratio vs difference model of relative success. Public Choice, 101–112.
Iannaccone, L.R. (1992). Sacrifice and stigma: Reducing free-riding in cults, communes, and other collectives. Journal of Political Economy, 100, 271–291.
Iannaccone, L.R. (1997). Toward an economic theory of “fundamentalism”. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 153, 100–116.
Kuran, T. (1989). Sparks and prairie fires: A theory of unanticipated political revolution. Public Choice, 61, 41–74.
Lapan, H.E., & Sandler, T. (1993). Terrorism and signalling. European Journal of Political Economy, 9, 383–397.
Lee, D.R., & Sandler, T (1989). On the optimal retaliation against terrorists: the paid-rider option. Public Choice, 61, 141–152.
Marty, M.E., & Appleby, R.S. (Eds.). (1991–1995). The fundamentalism project. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Nitzan, S. (1994). Modeling rent-seeking contests. European Journal of Political Economy, 10, 41–60.
Sandler, T., & Enders, W. (2004). An economic perspective on transnational terrorism. European Journal of Political Economy, 20(2), 301–316.
Tullock, G. (1980). Efficient rent seeking. In J.M. Buchanan, R.D. Tollison, & G. Tullock (Eds.), Toward a theory of the rent seeking society. College Station, TX: Texas Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
JEL Classifications: Z12 (religion), D71 (Social Choice; Clubs; Committees), D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, etc.), D74 (Conflict; Conflict Resolution)
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Epstein, G.S., Gang, I.N. Understanding the development of fundamentalism. Public Choice 132, 257–271 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-007-9150-4
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-007-9150-4