Abstract
Group decision making is very significant in a broad variety of settings. This paper deals with committees that make binary decisions and addresses the question of whether informative decisions can be assumed within this framework. We show that when using the optimal decision rule, informative decision making is a Nash equilibrium. Thus we justify the assumption of informative decision making and provide support for the relevance of assumptions such as independent decision making, when using the optimal decision rule.
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The author is grateful for comments by Leif Danziger and for the suggestions made by anonymous referee. The author acknowledges the support of the Schnitzer Foundation for Research on the Israeli Economy and Society.
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Ben-Yashar, R. Information is important to Condorcet jurors. Public Choice 127, 305–319 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-006-2745-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-006-2745-3