Abstract.
We develop a procedure for implementing an efficient and envy-free allocation of m objects among n individuals with the possibility of monetary side-payments, assuming that players have quasi–linear utility functions. The procedure eliminates envy by compensating envious players. It is fully descriptive and says explicitly which compensations should be made, and in what order. Moreover, it is simple enough to be carried out without computer support. We formally characterize the properties of the procedure, show how it establishes envy-freeness with minimal resources, and demonstrate its application to a wide class of fair-division problems.
Article PDF
Similar content being viewed by others
Avoid common mistakes on your manuscript.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Additional information
Received: 6 March 2000/Accepted: 21 May 2001
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Haake, CJ., Raith, M. & Su, F. Bidding for envy-freeness: A procedural approach to n-player fair-division problems. Soc Choice Welfare 19, 723–749 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550100149
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550100149