Abstract.
This paper introduces the “Extended Pareto” axiom on Social Welfare Functions and gives a characterization of the axiom when it is assumed that the Social Welfare Functions that satisfy it in a framework of preferences over lotteries also satisfy the restrictions (on the domain and range of preferences) implied by the von-Neumann Morgenstern axioms. With the addition of 2 other axioms: “Anonymity” and a weak version of Arrow's Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axiom: “Weak IIA” it is shown that there is a unique Social Welfare Function called “Relative Utilitarianism” that consists of normalising individual utilities between 0 and 1 and adding them.
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Received: 7 June 1994 / Accepted: 28 April 1997
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Dhillon, A. Extended Pareto rules and relative utilitarianism. Soc Choice Welfare 15, 521–542 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050121
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050121