Abstract
This paper considers a subclass of minimum cost spanning tree games, called information graph games. It is proved that the core of these games can be described by a set of at most 2n — 1 linear constraints, wheren is the number of players. Furthermore, it is proved that each information graph game has an associated concave information graph game, which has the same core as the original game. Consequently, the set of extreme core allocations of an information graph game is characterized as the set of marginal allocation vectors of its associated concave game. Finally, it is proved that all extreme core allocations of an information graph game are marginal allocation vectors of the game itself, though not all marginal allocation vectors need to be core allocations.
Article PDF
Similar content being viewed by others
Avoid common mistakes on your manuscript.
References
C. Berge.Graphs. North-Holland, 1985.
D. Granot and G. Huberman. Minimum cost spanning tree games.Mathematical Programming. 21:1–18, 1981.
D. Granot and G. Huberman. On the core and nucleolus of minimum cost spanning tree games.Mathematical Programming, 29:323–347, 1984.
R. Tarjan. Depth-first search and linear graph algorithms.SIAM J. Comput., 1:146–160, 1972.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Kuipers, J. On the core of information graph games. Int J Game Theory 21, 339–350 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01240149
Received:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01240149