Abstract
This paper addresses the welfare consequences of applying the Ramsey rule when the regulated firm is not a monopolist in all of its markets. The partially regulated optimum and the outcome of myopic regulation, the “Short-Sighted Ramsey Equilibrium” (SSRE), are examined in a differentiated duopoly model. In the optimum, the markup of competitive substitute goods is relatively high. In the SSRE, the regulator is likely to set the price of competitive substitute goods lower than optimal, and complementary goods higher than optimal. Strategic reactions by a competitor may reverse the result.
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I thank Kenneth Train, Michael Crew (the editor), seminar participants at the University of California, Berkeley, and an anonymous referee for comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.
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Prieger, J.E. Ramsey pricing and competition: The consequences of myopic regulation. J Regul Econ 10, 307–321 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00157675
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00157675