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Corporate Governance in the United States

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Corporate Governance and Finance Law
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Abstract

The study of corporate governance has undergone major changes in the past two decades, not only in the United States but also globally. Factors that have led to the study of what constitutes effective corporate governance include the fall of the Soviet Union coupled with the near elimination of communism both in theory and in practice; the internationalization of corporations; and the recent global economic crisis. Other factors are the worldwide expansion of capital markets; the fall of trade barriers due in large part to the agreements entered into in the World Trade Organization that replaced the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; the transparency of financial information about corporate performance; and the great improvements in information technology that almost single-handedly have united peoples of the world.

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Notes

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© 2013 Roy Girasa

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Girasa, R. (2013). Corporate Governance in the United States. In: Corporate Governance and Finance Law. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137345431_2

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