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Corporate Governance in the EU, the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and Corporate Governance in Selected Other Jurisdictions

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German Corporate Governance in International and European Context

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Abstract

Good corporate governance is a top priority in business worldwide. We have witnessed scandalous corporate collapses like Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, and Tyco (all USA), Parmalat (Italy), Livedoor (Japan), SK Group (South Korea), Satyam (India) and others in many countries. When financing companies in global markets, the temptations of corporate corruption have to be viewed from an international perspective. In the aftermath of the ‘Enron’-era we saw a powerful global tide towards higher standards in corporate governance.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For a summary of the circumstances that led to the collapse of Enron, see Skousen et al. (2005), pp. 3–5.

  2. 2.

    Luttermann (2010), pp. 1–4. See also Chap. 8.

  3. 3.

    Luttermann (1999a), pp. 771–89.

  4. 4.

    See http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/index_en.htm.

  5. 5.

    See http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/index_en.htm.

  6. 6.

    COM (2003) 284 final. European Parliament resolution on that topic: OJ C 104 E 30 Apr 2004, 0714. See generally Hopt (2005), p. 119; Hopt (2009), at 51–57.

  7. 7.

    Geen and Hopt (2010).

  8. 8.

    EC, Action Plan: European Company Law and Corporate Governance – A Modern Legal Framework for More Engaged Shareholder and Sustainable Companies, COM(2012) 740 (12 December 2012) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52012DC0740:EN:NOT / http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0740:FIN:EN:PDF at 2.

  9. 9.

    EC, ‘Commission Plans to Modernise European Company Law and Corporate Governance’, Press Release (12 December 2012) http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1340_en.htm.

  10. 10.

    See generally Johnston (2009), p. 10. Since the first Action Plan was adopted in 2003 most short-term measures have been realised. The Commission has published a recommendation (on 14 Dec 2004) fostering an appropriate regime for the compensation of directors of listed companies ([2004] OJ L385/55) and another recommendation (of 15 Feb 2005) on the role of non-executive or supervisory directors of listed companies and on the committees of the (supervisory) board ([2005] OJ L52/51). Furthermore a proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directives (EEC) 78/660 and (EEC) 83/349 concerning the annual accounts of certain types of companies and consolidated accounts, COM (2004) 725 final, and another proposal for a Directive on the exercise of voting rights by shareholders of companies having their registered office in a Member State and whose shares are admitted to trading on a regulated market and amending Directive (EC) 2004/109, COM (2005) 685 final have been published.

  11. 11.

    See http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/ecgforum/index_en.htm.

  12. 12.

    See the Minutes of the Meeting held at 9 June 2011, circulated on 1 August 2011 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/ecgforum/minutes-20110801_en.pdf where it was minuted as follows under Item 5: ‘The Chairman recalled the usefulness of the Forum to which the Commissioner attached great value. New guidelines on expert groups had been set within the Commission which would among others change nomination procedures, so that it would be difficult to continue the Forum in its current form. In view of their expertise, the Members were likely to continue to be consulted by the Commission in the future.’

  13. 13.

    See EUCGF Statement, 20 February 2010, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/ecgforum/ecgf_empty_voting_en.pdf.

  14. 14.

    See EUCGF Statement, 23 March 2009, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/ecgforum/ecgf-crossborder_en.pdf.

  15. 15.

    Final Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on a Modern Regulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe (Final Winter Report) available at the ECGI webpage http://www.ecgi.org/publications/winter.htm at 12, Item III.16.

  16. 16.

    See Press Release, ‘Corporate governance: Commission creates European Forum to promote convergence in Europe’ (IP/04/1241, 18 October 2004) http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/04/1241&format=HTML&aged=0&language=en&guiLanguage=en. The current webadress for the ECGF is http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/ecgforum/index_en.htm.

  17. 17.

    See EU Single Market, European Corporate Governance Forum http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/ecgforum/index_en.htm.

  18. 18.

    Since 2008 they were: (1) Antonio Borges (PT), Chairman of the Hedge Fund Standards Board and of the European Corporate Governance Institute; board member for several corporations; (2) Bistra Boeva (BG), University for National and World Economic Studies Sofia; (3) Niklas Bruun (FI), Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration, (Hanken); (4) Bertrand Collomb (FR), Honorary Chairman of Lafarge and former Chairman of ‘Association Française des Entreprises Privées’ (AFEP); (5) David Devlin (IE), Partner PricewaterhouseCoopers; (6) Jose Maria Garrido Garcia (ES), University of Castilla—La Mancha, member of the Spanish Commission for Corporate Governance; (7) Peter Montagnon (UK), Head of Investment Affairs, Association of British Insurers; (8) Klaus-Peter Müller (DE), Chairman of the Supervisory Board of Commerzbank, President of the German Corporate Governance Code Commission; (9) Colette Neuville (FR), Chairman of the Association de défense des actionnaires minoritaires (ADAM); (10) Roland Oetker (DE), Chairman of Deutsche Schutzvereinigung für Wertpapierbesitz (DSW); (11) Marek Sowa (PL), President of the Management Board of Agora SA; (12) Rolf Skog (SE), University of Stockholm; (13) Trelawny Williams (UK), Director Corporate Finance, Fidelity International; (14) Jaap Winter (NL), Partner at De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek and Professor at the University of Amsterdam; (15) Eddy Wymeersch (BE), Chairman of the Belgian Banking, Finance and Insurance Commission (CBFA) and of the Committee of European Securities Regulators. See Press Release, ‘Corporate governance: Commission appoints new members of European Corporate Governance Forum’ (IP/08/1081, 2 July 2008) http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/04/1241&format=HTML&aged=0&lalangua=en&guiLanguage=en.

  19. 19.

    See EU Single Market, European Corporate Governance Forum http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/ecgforum/index_en.htm.

  20. 20.

    DG Internal Market, Study on Monitoring and Enforcement Practices in Corporate Governance in the Member States, EU Commission (23 September 2009) http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/ecgforum/studies/comply-or-explain-090923_en.pdf.

  21. 21.

    Ibid 9 and 11.

  22. 22.

    Johnston (2009), pp. 355–356.

  23. 23.

    http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/business_registers/index_en.htm.

  24. 24.

    Buschmann (2010), p. 87.

  25. 25.

    Ibid; Mülbert (2010), p. 379 et seq.

  26. 26.

    See in detail Hopt (2013), p. 219 et seq and http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/modern/corporate_governance_in_financial_institutions_en.htm.

  27. 27.

    European Commission, Green Paper: The EU corporate governance framework, 5.4.2011, COM(2011) 164 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/com2011-164_en.pdf at 2.

  28. 28.

    Ibid 3.

  29. 29.

    Study on Monitoring and Enforcement Practices in Corporate Governance in the Member States http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/ecgforum/studies/comply-or-explain-090923_en.pdf.

  30. 30.

    See again Dine and Koutsias (2013).

  31. 31.

    EC Treaty Art 56.

  32. 32.

    OJ L 345, 31 Dec 2003, 64, amending Dir 2001/34/EC.

  33. 33.

    EC Commission, Draft Commission Reg, amending Commission Reg (EC) 809/2004 of 29 Apr 2004 implementing Dir 2003/71/EC of the EP and of the Council as regards information contained in prospectuses as well as the format, incorporation by reference and publication of such prospectuses and dissemination of advertisements, Working Document ESC/23/2006–rev3. On the implementation of financial services legislation OJ C 284 E 21 Nov 2002, 115 (Lamfalussy report).

  34. 34.

    4 June 2010, Report to the European Securities Committee and to the European Parliament on Convergence between IFRS and Third Country National Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAPs): COM(2010)292 final; see Sect. 7.7.8 and http://ec.europa.eu.

  35. 35.

    See Sect. 7.3.3.

  36. 36.

    22 April 2008, Report on convergence between IFRS and third country national Generally Accepted Accounting Principles and on the progress towards the elimination of reconciliation requirements that apply to Community issuers under the rules of these third countries.

  37. 37.

    On that topic Luttermann (1999b), pp. 134–136 (calling for an ‘International Court of Accounting’).

  38. 38.

    See http://www.fasb.org/intl/convergence_iasb.shtml.

  39. 39.

    Report of the Reflection Group on the Future of EU Company Law, 5 April 2011 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/reflectiongroup_report_en.pdf. There also pp. 3–4, on the member who do not represent particular institutions or Member States, and work of the “Reflection Group”.

  40. 40.

    The Report, 10 (1.3).

  41. 41.

    The Report, 11 (1.3).

  42. 42.

    Ibid.

  43. 43.

    The proposal is available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2014:213:FIN.

  44. 44.

    Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52012DC0740.

  45. 45.

    http://ec.europa.eu/finance/company-reporting/non-financial_reporting/index_en.htm#news.

  46. 46.

    Seibt (2014), pp. 1910 at 1910.

  47. 47.

    See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P8-TA-2015-0257+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN for the European Parliament’s amended version.

  48. 48.

    Statement of the Governmental Commission from 1 February 2015, http://www.dcgk.de/de/kommission/die-kommission-im-dialog/deteilansicht/kodex-kommission-kritisiert-ueberbordende-buerokratie-bei-eu-corporate-governance-empfehlungen-und-richtlinien-ohne-angemessenen.html?file=files/dcgk/usercontent/de/download/Stellungn 1–2.

  49. 49.

    The following paragraphs have been extracted, with permission of the Companies and Securities Law Journal (C&SLJ), from du Plessis (2016a), pp. 69 at 72–73. See further du Plessis (2017) pp.14-16.

  50. 50.

    2014/208/EU, L 109 of 12 April 2014. The recommendation is an implementation of the Action Plan Corporate Governance as well and is available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32014H0208; see also the statement by the Government Commission on the German Corporate Governance Code http://www.dcgk.de/de/kommission/die-kommission-im-dialog/deteilansicht/kodex-kommission-kritisiert-ueberbordende-buerokratie-bei-eu-corporate-governance-empfehlungen-und-richtlinien-ohne-angemessenen.html?file=files/dcgk/usercontent/de/download/Stellungnahmen/2015-01-30%20Stellungnahme%20Regierungskommission%20zur%20Aktionaersrechterichtlinie.pdf; see also in detail von Werder (2015), p. 847.

  51. 51.

    Explanatory Preamble to Directive 2014/95/EU, paragraph (14).

  52. 52.

    Implemented by way of a new Articles 19a and 29a of Directive 2013/34/EU.

  53. 53.

    Explanatory Preamble to Directive 2014/95/EU, paragraph (6).

  54. 54.

    Explanatory Preamble to Directive 2014/95/EU, paragraph (7).

  55. 55.

    Ibid.

  56. 56.

    Ibid.

  57. 57.

    http://ec.europa.eu/finance/company-reporting/non-financial_reporting/index_en.htm#news.

  58. 58.

    E.g., European Commission (EC), ‘EU Justice Commissioner Reding challenges business leaders to increase women’s presence on corporate boards with “Women on the Board Pledge for Europe”’, MEMO/11/124, 1: ‘[…] can make companies more profitable and trigger sustainable economic growth’.

  59. 59.

    Ibid.

  60. 60.

    Ibid.

  61. 61.

    Reding (2011), p. 127.

  62. 62.

    European Parliament resolution of 6 July 2011 on women and business leadership (2010/2115(INI)).

  63. 63.

    European Commission (EC), ‘European Commission weighs options to break the ‘glass ceiling’ for women on company boards’, Press Release, 5 March 2012, IP/12/213 1, 2.

  64. 64.

    Ibid 1.

  65. 65.

    Ibid 2–5.

  66. 66.

    Ibid 4. See, however, Deloitte, Women in the Boardroom: A Global Perspective (November 2011) http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Risk/gx-ccg-women-in-the-boardroom.pdf at 21 for slightly different statistics.

  67. 67.

    European Commission, ‘European Commission weighs options to break the ‘glass ceiling’ for women on company boards’, Press Release, 5 March 2012, IP/12/213 1, 7.

  68. 68.

    ‘Reding will europaweite Frauenquote durchdrücken’, Financial Times Deutschland, 14 June 2012.

  69. 69.

    They included, Vice-President Antonio Tajani (Industry and Entrepreneurship), Vice-President Joaquín Almunia (Competition), Vice-President Olli Rehn (Economic and Monetary Affairs), Commissioner Michel Barnier (Internal Market and Services) and Commissioner László Andor (Employment and Social Affairs)—see http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1205_en.htm.

  70. 70.

    SAI Global Corporate Law Bulletin (ed Ian Ramsay), Bulletin No. 196, 17 December 2013.

  71. 71.

    See EU, Press Release, 14 November 2012 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1205_en.htm.

  72. 72.

    See also du Plessis (2015), 1 at 8.

  73. 73.

    Press release from the 3357th European Council meeting, Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs, Brussels, 11 December 2014, pp. 9–10, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/lsa/146172.pdf.

  74. 74.

    Ibid.

  75. 75.

    See Kempny (2010) for a concise overview of company law developments and harmonisation of national company laws in the EU.

  76. 76.

    Johnston (2009), p. 359.

  77. 77.

    Romano (1993). See generally Hopt (2006), pp. 1161 at 1174–1178.

  78. 78.

    See ‘About OECD’, at http://www.oecd.org/about/.

  79. 79.

    OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (1999).

  80. 80.

    OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004), available at http://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/31557724.pdf.

  81. 81.

    See further the papers published by OECD, Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis, available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceandthefinancialcrisis.htm.

  82. 82.

    The peer review papers are available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/2014-review-oecd-corporate-governance-principles.htm.

  83. 83.

    OECD, 2014 Review of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/2014-review-oecd-corporate-governance-principles.htm.

  84. 84.

    G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2015), available at http://www.oecd.org/corporate/principles-corporate-governance.htm.

  85. 85.

    Ibid 9.

  86. 86.

    Ibid 10.

  87. 87.

    Ibid 9.

  88. 88.

    Ibid 11.

  89. 89.

    Ibid 13–14.

  90. 90.

    The enforcement of corporate governance principles is discussed in OECD, Supervision and Enforcement in Corporate Governance, 2013, available at: http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/SupervisionandEnforcementinCorporateGovernance2013.pdf.

  91. 91.

    Ibid 15.

  92. 92.

    Ibid 37.

  93. 93.

    Ibid 38–42.

  94. 94.

    Ibid 42.

  95. 95.

    Ibid 42–43.

  96. 96.

    Ibid 44.

  97. 97.

    Ibid.

  98. 98.

    Ibid 37–38.

  99. 99.

    Ibid 38.

  100. 100.

    Ibid 37.

  101. 101.

    Hopt (1993) i; Berle and Means (1932).

  102. 102.

    Mace (1971).

  103. 103.

    Veasey (1993), p. 1267.

  104. 104.

    Millstein (1993), pp. 1485, 1489.

  105. 105.

    See Effross (2013).

  106. 106.

    See generally Kendall and Kendall (1998), p. 22; and Garratt (1997), p. 123.

  107. 107.

    American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance and Structure: Analysis and Recommendations (2004), S 2.01(a).

  108. 108.

    See du Plessis et al. (2015), pp. 6–13. See further du Plessis (2016b) p. 238; and du Plessis (2017) p. 1.

  109. 109.

    Bainbridge (2006), p. 1735.

  110. 110.

    Bainbridge (2008), p. 11.

  111. 111.

    Effross (2013), pp. 13–14. See also du Plessis (2016b) p. 238.

  112. 112.

    Manning (1993), pp. 1319, 1320.

  113. 113.

    Ibid 1319, 1324.

  114. 114.

    Ibid 1319, 1325.

  115. 115.

    Eisenberg (1993), pp. 1271, 1295.

  116. 116.

    Veasey (1993), p. 1267.

  117. 117.

    See in particular Bainbridge (2002), p. 218; Eisenberg (1993), pp. 1273–1274; and Manning (1993), pp. 1319, 1321, 1328–1329.

  118. 118.

    Manning (1993), p. 1278.

  119. 119.

    S 8.01(b) of the Model Business Corporations Act (1984 and Supplement) reads as follows: ‘All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business affairs of the corporation managed by or under the direction of, its board of directors.’

  120. 120.

    du Plessis et al. (2015), p. 101.

  121. 121.

    Bainbridge (2002), p. 195.

  122. 122.

    As quoted by Skousen et al. (2005), p. 48.

  123. 123.

    Ibid 2–3 and 31–32.

  124. 124.

    Ibid 35–36.

  125. 125.

    Ibid 5.

  126. 126.

    Ibid 39 and 40–44 and 49 et seq.

  127. 127.

    George Bush, address delivered at the University of Cologne 5 Feb 2003 (http://www.thisnation.com/library/sotu/2003gwb.html).

  128. 128.

    See http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-89a.htm.

  129. 129.

    Skousen et al. (2005), p. 5.

  130. 130.

    See also Mäntysaari (2005), p. 44.

  131. 131.

    S 201(b) Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002.

  132. 132.

    See also Monks and Minow (2011), p. 392–394; Smerdon (2010), p. 628 et seq.

  133. 133.

    For a similar view expressed later, see Nicholson (2008), pp. 100 at 103–106 and 118; Johnstone and Chalk (2008), pp. 146 at 154.

  134. 134.

    Tricker (2012), p. 23. See also (2008), pp. 100 and 107–108.

  135. 135.

    Commentators like Skousen et al. (2005), 6 provide a very clear picture of unacceptable compensation practices in the USA, especially as far as compensation by way of overvalued stock was concerned.

  136. 136.

    See Annalisa Barrett and Paula Todd, ‘NACD Blue Ribbon Commission Report on Executive Compensation and the Role of the Compensation Committee’ http://corpgov.net/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/NACD_BRC_Report.pdf.

  137. 137.

    King Report on Governance for South Africa 2009 (King (2009) Report), Institute of directors (2009) 9 https://jutalaw.co.za/uploads/King_III_Report at 6 and 9.

  138. 138.

    Clarke and Chanlat (2009), p. 1.

  139. 139.

    King Report on Governance for South Africa 2009 (King (2009) Report), Institute of directors (2009) at 6.

  140. 140.

    Tricker (2012), p. 112.

  141. 141.

    Principles that must guide financial regulation. June 15 2009, Financial Times, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2bd494d6-59d8-11de-b687-00144feabdc0.html.

  142. 142.

    NYSE Corporate Governance Rules (3 Nov 2004) http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/finalcorpgovrules.pdf 1. For the current standards, see http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp_1_4&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm-sections%2F.

  143. 143.

    Ibid 3.

  144. 144.

    Ibid s 303A.06.

  145. 145.

    Ibid s 303A.11.

  146. 146.

    Ibid s 303A.12(b).

  147. 147.

    Ibid s 303A.12(c).

  148. 148.

    See https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/nyse/regulation/nyse/FPI_Annual_WA_1_4_10.pdf for the ‘Foreign Private Issuer Annual Written Affirmation Form’.

  149. 149.

    See http://nysemanual.nyse.com/lcm/ for the full text to the NYSE Listed Company Manual .

  150. 150.

    Bainbridge (2008), p. 177.

  151. 151.

    For an economic assessment of the Dodd-Frank Act, see Acharya and Richardson (2012), pp. 1–38—Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2170916 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-financial-030912-140516.

  152. 152.

    See http://www.whitehouse.gov/economy/middle-class/dodd-frank-wall-street-reform. For opposing views on the utility of the Dodd-Frank reforms, see Bainbridge (2010–2011), p. 1779; Coffee (2012), p. 1019.

  153. 153.

    Bericht der Regierungskommission Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex an die Bundesregierung, November 2010 http://dcgk.de/de/presse/deteilansicht/pressemitteilung-22.html?file=files/dcgk/usercontent/de/download/2010/Governance_Bericht_Nov_2010.pdf>at 96.

  154. 154.

    Some of the bullet points were extracted from Bericht der Regierungskommission Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex an die Bundesregierung, November 2010 http://dcgk.de/de/presse/deteilansicht/pressemitteilung-22.html?file=files/dcgk/usercontent/de/download/2010/Governance_Bericht_Nov_2010.pdf at 102–103. For critical appraisal, see Fisch (2013), p. 731.

  155. 155.

    See http://sec.gov/rules/final/2011/33-9178.pdf for new provisions adopted on 4 April 2011.

  156. 156.

    Anthony Reyes (US Department of the Treasury), ‘The Financial Crisis Five Years Later: Response, Reform, and Progress in Charts’, Treasury Notes (9 November 2013) http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/The-Financial-Crisis-Five-Years-Later.aspx.

  157. 157.

    Ilir Haxhi, Hans van Ees, and Arndt Sorge provide an excellent overview of the development of Codes of Conduct in the UK corporate environment. See Haxhi et al. (2013), pp. 535, 536–539. See also Lütz et al. (2011), pp. 315, 319–325.

  158. 158.

    The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance: Draft Report (hereafter ‘Cadbury Report (Draft)’) Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (1992) 7 para 2.1; Villiers (1992), p. 214.

  159. 159.

    Shaw (1998), pp. 21, 23; Stanley (1993), p. 104.

  160. 160.

    Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (hereafter Cadbury Report (1992)) Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (1992).

  161. 161.

    The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance: Draft Report, Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (1992) 5 para 1.1.

  162. 162.

    Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (1992) 11 para 1.3.

  163. 163.

    Ibid 58 et seq.

  164. 164.

    Ibid 20 et seq.

  165. 165.

    Ibid 36 et seq.

  166. 166.

    Ibid 48 et seq.

  167. 167.

    Ibid 12 para 1.9.

  168. 168.

    Ibid 16 para 3.2.

  169. 169.

    Ibid 16 para 3.1.

  170. 170.

    Ibid 17 paras 3.7–3.9.

  171. 171.

    Ibid 16 para 3.1.

  172. 172.

    See http://www.frc.org.uk/Home.aspx.

  173. 173.

    See http://www.frc.org.uk/About-the-FRC/FRC-structure.aspx.

  174. 174.

    See http://www.frc.org.uk/About-the-FRC/FRC-structure/Codes-and-Standards-Committee.aspx.

  175. 175.

    See FRC, The UK Approach to Corporate Governance (October 2010) http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/The-UK-Approach-to-Corporate-Governance.aspx.

  176. 176.

    See http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/FRC-Board/Draft-Updated-Regulatory-Strategy-and-Plan-Budget.pdf.

  177. 177.

    Ibid at 4.

  178. 178.

    Donald Nordberg and Terry McNulty trace the codification of UK corporate governance between 1992 and 2010 and provide some background on the Cadbury and Higgs Reports. See Nordberg and McNulty (2013), pp. 348, 350–352 and the comparative Table on 354–355.

  179. 179.

    Nicholson (2008), pp. 108–109.

  180. 180.

    Kendall and Kendall (1998), p. 23.

  181. 181.

    Hampel Commission, Corporate Governance (Hampel Report 1998) para 1.6.

  182. 182.

    Ibid para 1.7.

  183. 183.

    Ibid paras 1.12–1.14.

  184. 184.

    Hampel Commission, Corporate Governance (Hampel Report 1998) para 1.16.

  185. 185.

    Ibid paras 3.7–3.8.

  186. 186.

    A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and other Financial Industry Entities http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/walker_review_261109.pdf at 9.

  187. 187.

    A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and other Financial Industry Entities (Walker Review) http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/walker_ review_261109.pdf.

  188. 188.

    A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and other Financial Industry Entities (Walker Review) http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/walker_ review_261109.pdf at 11–13.

  189. 189.

    FRC, Implementation of the UK Stewardship Code, (July 2010) https://www.frc.org.uk/FRC-Documents/FRC/Implementation-of-the-UK-Stewardship-Code.pdf.

  190. 190.

    See FRC, The UK Approach to Corporate Governance (October 2010) http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/The-UK-Approach-to-Corporate-Governance.aspx.

  191. 191.

    FRC, 2009 Review of the Combined Code: Final Report (December 2009) http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/2009-Review-of-the-Combined-Code-Final-Report.aspx.

  192. 192.

    This is ensured through the LSE Listing Rule 12.43A—see generally Smerdon (2010), pp. 19, 20.

  193. 193.

    FRC, The UK Corporate Governance Code (September 2012) http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-September-2012.aspx at 4.

  194. 194.

    FRC, The UK Corporate Governance Code (September 2012) http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-September-2012.aspx at 4.

  195. 195.

    FRC, What Constitutes an Explanation under ‘Comply or Explain’ (February 2012) http://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/590dd61a-d3b1-4a2e-a214-90f17453fa24/What-constitutes-an-explanation-under-comply-or-explain.aspx.

  196. 196.

    Association of British Insurers (ABI), Comply or Explain: Investor Expectations and Current Practices (December 2012) https://www.ivis.co.uk/media/5923/ABI-Report-on-Comply-or-Explain-Investor-Expectations-Dec-2012.pdf at 4 and 6.

  197. 197.

    See Association of British Insurers (ABI), Comply or Explain: Investor Expectations and Current Practices (December 2012) https://www.ivis.co.uk/media/5923/ABI-Report-on-Comply-or-Explain-Investor-Expectations-Dec-2012.pdf at 4 and 6; NAPF, Corporate Governance Policy and Voting Guidelines (November 2012) http://www.napf.co.uk/PolicyandResearch/DocumentLibrary/~/media/Policy/Documents/0277_Corporate_governance_policy_and_voting_guidelines_an_NAPF_document.ashx.

  198. 198.

    Sir Nicholson (2008), pp. 103–106; Johnstone and Chalk (2008), pp. 146 at 168–70; Low (2008), pp. 222 at 240–241.

  199. 199.

    FRC, 2009 Review of the Combined Code: Final Report (December 2009) http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/2009-Review-of-the-Combined-Code-Final-Report.aspx.

  200. 200.

    See FRC, Consultation on the Revised UK Corporate Governance Code (December 2009) https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/Consultation-on-the-Revised-UK-Corporate-Governanc-File.pdf.

  201. 201.

    FRC, 2009 Review of the Combined Code: Final Report (December 2009) http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/2009-Review-of-the-Combined-Code-Final-Report.aspx at 3.

  202. 202.

    FRC, The UK Corporate Governance Code (September 2012) http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-September-2012.aspx. See also FRC, Feedback Statement: Revisions to the UK Corporate Governance Code and Guidance on Audit Committees (September 2012) http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/Feedback-statement-on-UK-Corporate-Governance-Code.aspx.

  203. 203.

    See further FRC, FRC Publishes Updates to UK Corporate Governance Code and Stewardship Code [PN010] (28 September 2012) http://www.frc.org.uk/News-and-Events/FRC-Press/Press/2012/September/FRC-publishes-updates-to-UK-Corporate-Governance-C.aspx. For a convenient summary of all the changes, see Ashurst, ‘Corporate Briefing: Revisions to the UK Corporate Governance Code and the Guidance on Audit Committees’ (October 2012) https://www.ashurst.com/page.aspx?id_Content=8354.

  204. 204.

    For a discussion on the development of reporting on the gender component of Boards and the growing gender diversity on UK Boards, see Sealy and Vinnicombe (2013), p. 191.

  205. 205.

    Rafel Crespí-Cladera and Bartolomé Pascual-Fuster discuss the relevance of independence and provide a comparative table of the definitions of and requirements regarding independent directors contained in the NYSE Listed Company Manual, the European Union commission recommendation, the UK unified corporate governance code and the Spanish unified good governance code in Rafel Crespí-Cladera and Bartolomé Pascual-Fuster, ‘Does the Independence of independent Directors Matter?’ 2013 Journal of Corporate Finance available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/09291199/28.

  206. 206.

    See FRC, Developments in Corporate Governance 2013 (December 2012) http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/Developments-in-Corporate-Governance-2013.pdf at 11.

  207. 207.

    See FRC, Developments in Corporate Governance 2013 (December 2012) http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/Developments-in-Corporate-Governance-2013.pdf at 12.

  208. 208.

    See FRC, Developments in Corporate Governance 2013 (December 2012) http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/Developments-in-Corporate-Governance-2013.pdf at 12.

  209. 209.

    See FRC, Developments in Corporate Governance 2012 (December 2012) http://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/47293b70-bd65-485c-bbcd-d9a63688b87d/Developments-in-Corporate-Governance-in-2012.aspx at 12.

  210. 210.

    See FRC, Developments in Corporate Governance 2013 (December 2012) http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/Developments-in-Corporate-Governance-2013.pdf at 11. In 2012 there were nearly 250 signatories to the Code—see FRC, Developments in Corporate Governance 2012 (December 2012) http://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/47293b70-bd65-485c-bbcd-d9a63688b87d/Developments-in-Corporate-Governance-in-2012.aspx at 1.

  211. 211.

    See FRC, Developments in Corporate Governance 2013 (December 2012) http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/Developments-in-Corporate-Governance-2013.pdf at 1 as per the FRC Chairman, Baroness Hogg.

  212. 212.

    FRC, Risk Management, Internal Control and Going Concern Basis of Accounting: Consultation on Draft Guidance to the Directors of Companies applying the UK Corporate Governance Code and Associated Changes to the Code (November 2013) http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/FRC-Board/Consultation-Paper-Risk-Management,-Internal-Contr-File.pdf.

  213. 213.

    FRC, Risk Management, Internal Control and Going Concern Basis of Accounting: Consultation on Draft Guidance to the Directors of Companies applying the UK Corporate Governance Code and Associated Changes to the Code (November 2013) http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/FRC-Board/Consultation-Paper-Risk-Management,-Internal-Contr-File.pdf at 11–12.

  214. 214.

    FRC, Risk Management, Internal Control and Going Concern Basis of Accounting: Consultation on Draft Guidance to the Directors of Companies applying the UK Corporate Governance Code and Associated Changes to the Code (November 2013) http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/FRC-Board/Consultation-Paper-Risk-Management,-Internal-Contr-File.pdf at 2.

  215. 215.

    See FRC, The UK Stewardship Code (July 2010) http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/The-UK-Stewardship-Code.aspx.

  216. 216.

    See FRC, The UK Stewardship Code (September 2012) http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/UK-Stewardship-Code-September-2012.pdf. For a discussion of investor engagement and stewardship, see Micheler (2013), pp. 29, 31 and 44–46.

  217. 217.

    See http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/UK-Stewardship-Code-September-2012.pdf at 1.

  218. 218.

    See FRC, Developments in Corporate Governance 2013 (December 2012) http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/Developments-in-Corporate-Governance-2013.pdf at 1. In 2012 there were nearly 250 signatories to the Code—see FRC, Developments in Corporate Governance 2012 (December 2012) http://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/47293b70-bd65-485c-bbcd-d9a63688b87d/Developments-in-Corporate-Governance-in-2012.aspx at 1.

  219. 219.

    See http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Codes-Standards/Corporate-governance/UK-Stewardship-Code.aspx.

  220. 220.

    See FRC, The UK Stewardship Code (September 2012) http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/UK-Stewardship-Code-September-2012.pdf at 3.

  221. 221.

    See FRC, The UK Stewardship Code (September 2012) http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/UK-Stewardship-Code-September-2012.pdf at 4.

  222. 222.

    This section is partly based on du Plessis (2003b). pp. 225, 227–230. See also du Plessis (2016a) p. 69; and du Plessis (2016b) p. 238.

  223. 223.

    Farrar (2001), p. 6.

  224. 224.

    Hilmer (1993), pp. 1, 4.

  225. 225.

    Sykes (1996).

  226. 226.

    See Sarre (2002), p. 1.

  227. 227.

    Rich v ASIC [2004] HCA 42 (9 Sept 2004) [62].

  228. 228.

    Ibid [117]–[118].

  229. 229.

    See generally HIH Royal Commission Final Report, xiii–xiv; and Clarke and Dean (2001), pp. 72, 89.

  230. 230.

    Baxt (2001), p. 329 (see also Baxt’s critical comments of several recent pieces of legislation on 329–334).

  231. 231.

    See in particular the ‘civil penalty provisions’ listed in s 1317E of the Corporations Act 2001 and the ‘pecuniary penalty orders’ and ‘compensation orders’ in ss 1317G-1317HB of the Corporations Act 2001 a court could make after court has made a ‘declaration of contravention’.

  232. 232.

    It is promising to note that there seems to be some mention of a core and modern corporate law—Baxt (2001), p. 335. See also du Plessis (2017) p. 12.

  233. 233.

    Sarre (2002), p. 1; Sarre (2001), p. 295. See also David Knott, ‘Protecting the Investor: The Regulator and Audit’ Address to the CPA Congress 2002 Conference, Perth Western Australia, 15 May 2002, http://download.asic.gov.au/media/1336292/CPA_Speech_150502.pdf 4.

  234. 234.

    David Knott, Protecting the Investor: The Regulator and Audit’ Address to the CPA Congress 2002 Conference, Perth Western Australia, 15 May 2002, http://download.asic.gov.au/media/1336292/CPA_Speech_150502.pdf 4.

  235. 235.

    See David Knott, ‘Corporate Governance: The 1980s Revisited?’ Monash Law School Foundation Lecture 23 Aug 2001, http://download.asic.gov.au/media/1340822/monash_801.pdf 3–4; Segal (2002a), p. 320.

  236. 236.

    Huse (2007), pp. 26–27.

  237. 237.

    David Knott, ‘Corporate Governance: The 1980s Revisited?’ Monash Law School Foundation Lecture 23 Aug 2001, http://download.asic.gov.au/media/1340822/monash_801.pdf 11.

  238. 238.

    The permission of CUP has been obtained to base parts of this section on Chap. 5 of du Plessis et al. (2011).

  239. 239.

    Business Council of Australia, Corporate Practices and Conduct (hereafter referred to as the Bosch Report (1991)).

  240. 240.

    Business Council of Australia, Corporate Practices and Conduct, 2nd ed (hereafter referred to as the Bosch Report (1993)).

  241. 241.

    Business Council of Australia, Corporate Practices and Conduct, 3rd ed (hereafter referred to as the Bosch Report (1995)).

  242. 242.

    Bosch Report (1991), ‘Foreword’.

  243. 243.

    Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (hereafter ‘Cadbury Report’) Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (1992).

  244. 244.

    Shaw (1998), pp. 21, 23; Christopher (1993), p. 104.

  245. 245.

    Bosch Report (1991),‘Foreword’.

  246. 246.

    HIH Royal Commission Final Report, Vol I, Part III, 102.

  247. 247.

    Bosch Report (1993) 1–2.

  248. 248.

    Ibid 9.

  249. 249.

    Ibid 1.

  250. 250.

    Ibid 2.

  251. 251.

    Ibid 1.

  252. 252.

    See Bosch Report (1995) 4–5.

  253. 253.

    Ibid 1.

  254. 254.

    Cf (for example) Farrar (2008), pp. 381–383; Austin et al. (2005), pp. 15–17.

  255. 255.

    Bosch Report (1995), 3; Lipton (2002), pp. 105, 131.

  256. 256.

    See Lipton (2002), pp. 132–133 for the matters listed in Appendix 4A.

  257. 257.

    Ibid 131–32.

  258. 258.

    AWA Ltd v Daniels (1992) 7 ACSR 759.

  259. 259.

    Hilmer (1993), pp. 1–3.

  260. 260.

    Daniels v Anderson (1995) 13 ACLC 614.

  261. 261.

    Final Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Tricontinental Group of Companies, 1992, vol 2, ch 19, paras 19.53–19.56.

  262. 262.

    Daniels v Anderson (1995) 13 ACLC 663.

  263. 263.

    Ibid 663–64.

  264. 264.

    Andrew Rogers, ‘Update’, in Hilmer (1993), p. 77.

  265. 265.

    See Explanatory Memorandum to the CLERP Bill 1998, paras 6.98–6.105; and the current ss 189–190 and 198D Corporations Act.

  266. 266.

    Hilmer (1993), p. 4.

  267. 267.

    Ibid ch 3.

  268. 268.

    Ibid ch 4.

  269. 269.

    Hilmer (1993), pp. i–ii.

  270. 270.

    Ibid 1–7.

  271. 271.

    Hilmer and Donaldson (1993), p. 81.

  272. 272.

    Hilmer (1993).

  273. 273.

    Hilmer and Donaldson (1993), pp. 81. 58, 86.

  274. 274.

    See du Plessis (2003b), p. 229 and Rich v ASIC [2004] HCA 42 (9 Sept 2004) [117].

  275. 275.

    This part is based on part of the following article: du Plessis (2003b), pp. 225, 230; and (with the permission of CUP) du Plessis et al. (2015) http://www.cambridge.org/au/academic/subjects/management/governance/principles-contemporary-corporate-governance-3rd-edition?format=PB 215 et seq.

  276. 276.

    ASIC Annual Report 2008–09 at 59, available at http://download.asic.gov.au/media/1817583/asic_annual_report_08-09_full.pdf.

  277. 277.

    Australian Securities and Investments Commission: ‘Our Role’ available at http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/ASIC.NSF/byHeadline/Our%20role.

  278. 278.

    Ibid.

  279. 279.

    Ibid. As far as non-shareholder interests are concerned, see du Plessis (2017) pp. 4-6.

  280. 280.

    For fuller discussion, see Harris et al. (2016, Chap. 2 ‘ASIC: Role and Powers’).

  281. 281.

    See also Gilligan et al. (1999a), p. 417, 433–436; Gilligan et al. (1999b), p. 136 (November) Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice 1.

  282. 282.

    Segal (2002a), pp. 1 at 5.

  283. 283.

    Berna Collier, The Role of ASIC in Corporate Governance, Corporate Governance Summit, (27 November 2002) 5. Available at http://download.asic.gov.au/media/1329302/corporate_governance_summit.pdf.

  284. 284.

    For discussion of enforcement actions against officers of GIO Insurance Ltd., HIH Insurance Ltd., One Tel Ltd. and Water Wheel Holdings Ltd., see Harris et al. (2016), Chaps. 16–19 on Directors and Officers Duties).

  285. 285.

    For example, see ASIC v Macdonald (No 11) (2009) 256 ALR 199—discussed in Hargovan (2009), p. 984.

  286. 286.

    See further du Plessis et al. (2015), p. 221 et seq.

  287. 287.

    (2009) 256 ALR 199.

  288. 288.

    James Hardie Proceedings, ASIC Media Release 09–69, 23 April 2009, http://asic.gov.au/about-asic/media-centre/find-a-media-release/2009-releases/09-69-james-hardie-proceedings/.

  289. 289.

    See Commonwealth of Australia. The Treasury. Corporate and Financial Services Division. Review of Sanctions in Corporate Law. (2007) http://archive.treasury.gov.au/documents/1182/PDF/Review_of_Sanctions.pdf.

  290. 290.

    Segal (2002b); David Knott, ‘Corporate Governance: The 1980s Revisited?’ Monash Law School Foundation Lecture, 23 August 2001, http://download.asic.gov.au/media/1340822/monash_801.pdf, 3. Several causes can potentially play a role in any business failure, see Adams and Jones (2001), pp. 205–210.

  291. 291.

    See Adams and Jones (2001), pp. 210–216.

  292. 292.

    The Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) launched a new brand structure on 1 August 2010, when it became known as ASX Group—see http://www.asx.com.au/about/history.htm.

  293. 293.

    See Redmond (2008) par. 5.25 and Lipton (2002), p. 105 at 131.

  294. 294.

    Lipton et al. (2016) par. 13.1.25.

  295. 295.

    Bosch Report (1995) 3.

  296. 296.

    Ramsay and Hoad (1997), pp. 1–2.

  297. 297.

    Bosch Report (1995) 3.

  298. 298.

    The CGC had its 5th meeting on Thursday 20 Feb 2003—Alan Kohler, ‘Directors Face D-day as Old Rules go by the Board’ Australian Financial Rev., 20 Feb 2003.

  299. 299.

    In 2010 the following associations, institutes, councils and groups formed the Corporate Governance Council: Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia Ltd.; Australian Council of Superannuation Investors; Australian Financial Markets Association Limited; Australian Institute of Company Directors; Australian Institute of Superannuation Trustees; Australasian Investor Relations Association Limited; Australian Shareholders’ Association Limited; ASX Limited (trading as Australian Securities Exchange); Business Council of Australia; Chartered Secretaries Australia; CPA Australia Ltd.; Financial Services Institute of Australasia; Group of 100 Inc.; The Institute of Actuaries of Australia; The Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia; The Institute of Internal Auditors—Australia; Investment and Financial Services Association Limited; Law Council of Australia Limited; National Institute of Accountants; Property Council of Australia Limited; and Securities & Derivatives Industry Association Limited.

  300. 300.

    Listing Rule 4.10.3—see http://www.asx.com.au/documents/rules/Chapter04.pdf.

  301. 301.

    See http://www.asx.com.au/documents/rules/gn09_disclosure_corporate_governance_practices.pdf, 2 f. 2: ‘Corporate governance statement’ is defined in Listing Rule 19.12 to mean the statement referred to in Listing Rule 4.10.3, which discloses the extent to which an entity has followed the recommendations set by the ASX Corporate Governance Council during a particular reporting period.

  302. 302.

    See http://www.asx.com.au/documents/rules/gn09_disclosure_corporate_governance_practices.pdf.

  303. 303.

    ASX Corporate Governance Council, Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations (3rd ed, 2014) http://www.asx.com.au/documents/asx-compliance/cgc-principles-and-recommendations-3rd-edn.pdf.

  304. 304.

    Ibid.

  305. 305.

    Cameron (2009), p. 115 at 118.

  306. 306.

    The permission of CUP has been obtained to base parts of this section on du Plessis et al. (2015) http://www.cambridge.org/au/academic/subjects/management/governance/principles-contemporary-corporate-governance-3rd-edition?format=PB 162 et seq.

  307. 307.

    BCA, Executive Remuneration: A Position Paper Prepared by the Business Council of Australia http://www.bca.com.au/docs/729E26F2-B737-48C0-8404-09475003F0F6/executive_remuneration_position_paper_final_24-6-2004.pdf (June 2004).

  308. 308.

    For example, the BCA’s submission of 17 July 2009 to the Australian Parliamentary Senate Economics Legislation Committee re the Corporations Amendment (Improving Accountability Termination Payments Bill) 2009, http://www.bca.com.au/docs/53A5DA79-178F-499D-A475-A600190A51FC/bca-submission-on-termination-payments-17-7-09.pdf.

  309. 309.

    AIOD, ACID Issues New Guidelines for Boards on Executive Remuneration. Media Release 12 February 2009, http://www.companydirectors.com.au/general/header/media/media-releases/2009/aicd-issues-new-guidelines-for-boards-on-executive-remuneration.

  310. 310.

    See FRC, Directors’ Remuneration: Consultation Document, October 2013 http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/Directors-Remuneration-Consultation-Document-File.pdf; High Pay Centre, Leading or Lagging: Where does the UK stand in the International Debate about Top Pay?, http://highpaycentre.org/pubs/ http://highpaycentre.org/pubs/leading-or-lagging-where-does-the-uk-stand-in-the-international-debate-abou; The Investment Association, Principles of Remuneration (November 2015) https://www.ivis.co.uk/media/11101/Principles-of-Remuneration-2015-Final.pdf.

  311. 311.

    See, for example, the UK Financial Reporting Council (FRC), Lab Project Report: Reporting of Pay and Performance (March 2013) http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Financial-Reporting-Lab/Lab-project-report-Reporting-of-pay-and-performanc.aspx; and High Pay Centre, Paid to Perform? What do we want our Business Leaders to Achieve?, Report (January 2013) http://highpaycentre.org/files/HPC_11_Paid_to_perform_06.pdf.

  312. 312.

    ACSI, CEO Pay in the Top 200 Companies, Research Report, (September 2013); 4-5; SAI Global Corporate Law Bulletin (ed Ian Ramsay), Bulletin No. 194, 21 October 2013, Part 1.14.

  313. 313.

    Productivity Commission, Executive Remuneration in Australia, Report No. 49, Final Inquiry Report, Melbourne, Commonwealth of Australia (December 2009) www.pc.gov.au/projects/inquiry/executive-remuneration/report.

  314. 314.

    See, for instance, Fels (2010), p. 20.

  315. 315.

    See Productivity Commission, above note 317, at XXXII and 296–301.

  316. 316.

    CAMAC, Executive Remuneration Report (April 2011) http://www.camac.gov.au/camac/camac.nsf/byHeadline/PDFFinal+Reports+2011/$file/Executive_remuneration_report_April11.pdf.

  317. 317.

    See further, AICD, ‘New Executive Pay Worries’ 2013 (1 April) Company Director Magazine http://www.companydirectors.com.au/Director-Resource-Centre/Publications/Company-Director-magazine/2013-back-editions/April/Feature-New-executive-pay-worries.

  318. 318.

    See Du Plessis (2003a), pp. 382–383.

  319. 319.

    Davies (2000), paras 135–36.

  320. 320.

    Farrar (2008), pp. 6–7.

  321. 321.

    See and compare Coffee (1999), p. 641 et seq; Hansmann and Kraakman (2001), p. 439 et seq; Branson (2001), p. 321 et seq; Luck (2001), p. 305 et seq; von Nessen (2003), pp. 189, 206 (fn 72); Großfeld (2003), pp. 842, 844–45.

  322. 322.

    Weil, Gotshal and Manges, Comparative Study of Corporate Governance Codes Relevant to the European Union and its Members, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/corpgov/corp-gov-codes-rpt-part1_en.pdf 6–7.

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  1. Deakin Law School, Deakin University, Locked Bag 20001, Waterfront Campus, Geelong, VIC, 3220, Australia

    Jean J. du Plessis

  2. University of Muenster, Muenster, Germany

    Ingo Saenger

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du Plessis, J.J., Saenger, I. (2017). Corporate Governance in the EU, the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and Corporate Governance in Selected Other Jurisdictions. In: German Corporate Governance in International and European Context. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-54198-2_11

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