Leadership is solving problems. The day soldiers stop bringing you their problems is the day you have stopped leading them. They have either lost confidence that you can help or concluded you do not care. Either case is a failure of leadership. Gen. Colin PowellFootnote 1

A leader is best when people barely know he exists, when his work is done, his aim fulfilled, they will say: we did it ourselves. Lau TzuFootnote 2

There is certainly nothing banal about President Trump’s leadership, if we understand banality as common or boring. The businessman and entertainer has, for many people, been a fresh start, a welcome change to the proverbial political swamp that is Washington, DC. Enthusiastic supporters overlook Trump’s crudity, incivility, and limitless braggadocio because they have high hopes he will bring more jobs to the country and “Make America Great Again.” For his detractors, Trump is not banal either, though many see him as an authoritarian, racist, xenophobic, and misogynistic leader, who is obsessively preoccupied with self-promotion while at the same time undermining democratic values and institutions. On this side, there is no shortage of psychological diagnosesFootnote 3 of Trump’s personality and leadership style. While supporters and detractors of Trump may not associate him with banality, Hannah Arendt’s (1965/1994) analysis of Adolph Eichmann and her use of the term would reveal that Trump is exceedingly banal.

I suspect many readers, in noting the title, made the connection between the noun “banality” and Arendt’s reflections on the Eichmann trial, as well as her use of the controversial term “banality of evil,” referring to Eichmann’s mendacious contributions in the systematic murdering of Jews during World War II. Let me state strongly that I am not interested in making a link between what Eichmann did and Trump’s actions. I am, however, interested in Arendt’s analysis and depiction of Eichmann’s personality and how this compares to Trump and his leadership style. But it is not only Arendt I rely on in analyzing Trump’s leadership. I also depend, in part, on Daniel Boorstin’s (2012/1961) classic text, The Image, wherein he analyzes celebrity culture. I supplement Arendt’s and Boorstin’s analyses with the notion of care. In other words, I use Arendt’s and Boorstin’s work filtered through the lens of care, which is not simply a pastoralFootnote 4 concept; it is a political one as well (Engster 2007; Hamington 2004; Noddings 2002; Tronto 1993). It is my hope that the lens of care deepens and broadens the analysis of Trump’s leadership in relation to the larger socio-political context in which he emerged. In addition, I argue that, just as Eichmann’s leadership cannot be fully grasped without locating it within the Nazi culture that gave rise to and legitimated it, we cannot comprehend Trump’s leadership simply in terms of his personality. We must also locate his leadership within the context of a neoliberal culture/capitalismFootnote 5 and attending celebrity culture, both of which undermine and distort care. In this sense, Trump’s leadership, I contend, is an indictment of this culture. I begin with Arendt’s analysis of Eichmann, followed by Boorstin’s depiction of image. The last section depicts Trump’s leadership as arising from a neoliberal culture/capitalism and, in my view, an indictment of this culture.

Before beginning, a brief interlude is necessary to clarify the notion of care from the perspective of pastoral theology. The idea of care is central to pastoral theological inquiry, which includes traditional analyses of what Clebsch and Jaekle (1994) call the guiding functions with regard to the community of faith and its ministries. One aspect of guiding vis-à-vis pastoral care is governing, which is often framed in terms of Jesus’ ministry as servant leadership—a leader who cares about and serves the needs of the people. There are two points here. First, governing or servant leadership is understood within the context of the covenant and God’s care for the people of God. Second, governing and care are inextricably linked to the political. Horsley (2009) notes, the term ekklesia “referred to the assembly of citizens in a self-governing state city” (p.14). The leaders of the ekklesia are servant leaders who care about and for the needs of the community and for individuals within the community. All of this is to say that a pastoral theological foray into analyzing political leaders will necessarily involve the notion of care (and justice) as a hermeneutical lens for analysis and critique (LaMothe 2014, 2017).

Care, banality, and image: Trump’s leadership

In this section, I use the notion of care along with Arendt’s and Boorstin’s perspectives to analyze and critique Trump’s leadership. It is helpful to begin with more specificity regarding the meaning of care, a slippery and disputed concept. For the last four decades, feminist philosophers have argued that care is a political concept and while there is agreement about this premise, the definition of care is contested.Footnote 6 I find Daniel Engster’s (2007) definition to be helpful, though it, too, has limitations, which I will not address here (see LaMothe 2017). Care, he writes, is “everything we do to help individuals meet their vital biological needs, develop or maintain their basic capabilities, and avoid or alleviate unnecessary or unwanted pain and suffering, so that they can survive, develop, and function in society” (p.28). For Engster, the responsibility to care is individual, social, and political. As individuals, we are obliged to care for others so that they may survive and thrive. At the same time, the larger society and its political leaders and institutions possess an obligation to care for the common good of all residents. The “political,” Sheldon Wolin (2016) notes, “emerges as the shared concerns of human beings to take care of themselves and the part of the world they claim as their lot” (p.248). To this perspective, we can add Clebsch and Jaekle’s (1994) view of pastoral care as “the ministry of the cure of souls [which] consists of helping acts, done by representative Christian persons, directed toward the healing, sustaining, guiding, and reconciling of troubled persons whose troubles arise in the context of ultimate meaning and concerns” (p.4). Their depiction of care, while involving spiritual aspects and the community of faith, includes caring for the vital biological and psychosocial needs of persons and communities. My point here is that, while pastoral care is framed in terms of theological language, it has affinities to existential philosophical notions of care. In any case, care, politically understood, necessarily means being concerned about the survival and flourishing needs (common good) of individuals, families, and communities within the society, and the obligation to care includes state and non-state leaders and organizations that are necessary for addressing these common needs.

I use this brief depiction of care when using Arendt’s and Boorstin’s analyses, because it expands and deepens our understanding of leadership, in general, and the problems with Trump’s leadership in particular. Let me begin with Arendt (1965/1994), who travelled to Jerusalem to report on the trial of Adolph Eichmann. As she observed the proceedings, Arendt identified and described several characteristics of Eichmann’s interactions. First, Eichmann’s speech, she noted, “was full of clichés, many of them outrageous, self-fabricated stock phrases” (p.53). “Eichmann’s mind,” she wrote, “was filled to the brim with such sentences” (p.53). Indeed, “He was genuinely incapable of uttering a single sentence that was not a cliché” (p.48). Arendt called this feature of Eichmann’s behavior “empty talk” (p.49). For instance, Eichmann repeated a stock phrase about finding peace with his former enemies, which was said in the context of admitting his crimes without any inkling of remorse. Arendt regarded this and other clichés to be devoid of reality and meaning. Trump’s speech is similarly filled with trite, repetitive phrases and he seems incapable of uttering a sentence without superlatives. If he likes someone, they are wonderful, amazing, or incredible, all of which tell us nothing about the person. For those who criticize him, Trump predictably uses negative terms to ridicule them (crooked Hillary, Ted Cruz a maniac, Jeb Bush a total disaster, Comey a failed leader). Even his campaign slogan, “Make America Great Again,” while appealing to his supporters, is hackneyed and, in some ways, devoid of clear meaning, if not reality. Trump’s speech is empty in the sense that it has little substance and is not based in substantive thought/ideas. Put another way, his speech, like Eichmann’s, is aimed at furthering or protecting his image—an image with no intellectual, self-reflective depth.

In terms of care, the banality of Trump’s empty talk reduces listeners’ capacities to think responsibly, while at the same time fostering divisions. Let me tackle the first part of this claim. Good-enough parents cultivate their child’s ability to think, to reflect, not simply because it is necessary to live a life in common with some independence and to care about and for others, but also because the greater one’s capacity for reflection, the deeper, richer, and more complex one’s life is. Parents who demand that their children believe unquestioningly whatever they say are placing themselves and their needs first, while hampering their child’s independent thought/agency. Moreover, it reduces the child’s critical thinking skill, which is necessary for their functioning in a complex and diverse society. It also diminishes one’s sense of responsibility. If people are to believe everything they are told and obey whatever is asked, then their responsibility is diminished, which is clearly evident in Eichmann’s trial. Why would or should he care or express remorse when he only believed and acted as he was told? It is not simply that an unreflective life is not worth living (i.e., an empty life); it is a life where one is simplistic and not fully accountable.Footnote 7

In a democratic society, critical thinking and responsibility are especially necessary.Footnote 8 It is not simply that Trump seems dispositionally unable to take responsibility; his banal and vacant speech leads to division, revealing a kind of deliberate, irresponsible carelessness and lack of critical thinking skills. Put differently, demagogues rule by division and this rule is facilitated by empty discourse that furthers alienation within the body politic, which heightens the lack of social-political care between factions. A good-enough leader in a democratic society is a leader who cares about their speech, such that they do not deliberately and continually foster division and enmity among voters.

Empty talk, Arendt argues, is closely related to a form of thoughtlessness. She writes that “the longer one listened to him [Eichmann], the more obvious it became that his inability to speak was closely connected to an inability to think, namely to think from the standpoint of somebody else” (p.49). What Arendt is addressing here, at least in part, is the capacity for empathy, which is necessary for acts of care. Eichmann lacked empathy for his victims, because he was singularly preoccupied about himself. As a leader, Trump has repeatedly demonstrated an inability to be thoughtful or empathic toward anyone who does not hold the same views as he does. We might say there was a smattering of empathy when he asked FBI Director James Comey to drop the investigation of General Flynn, remarking that Flynn was a good man who apparently, like Trump, does not deserve to suffer the consequences for his actions. But this kind of “empathy” is tainted by Trump’s self-interest. One could also point out that Trump was empathic to the citizens of Britain after the terror attack in Manchester. I am willing to concede that there are occasions of empathy, but these are rare and, more to the point, contaminated by Trump’s preoccupation with his image. To show empathy for the sake of promoting one’s public image is not an act of genuine care that involves thinking from the standpoint of others. More common than glimpses of pseudo-empathy is Trump’s thoughtlessness and lack of empathy, which are evident in his budget proposal that slashes programs that care for the poor and elderly, while raising military spending and lowering taxes on the wealthy.Footnote 9 Trump, in short, seems incapable or unwilling to think from a standpoint of people who are different from him or who do not agree with his beliefs about himself.

Empty talk and thoughtlessness, Arendt argued, were inextricably joined to Eichmann’s “extinguishing of conscience” (p.116). Eichmann was able to snuff out his conscience through defective memory (p.106). He would, for instance, revise personal history by saying he was obedient and law-abiding, while being involved in one of the most egregious crimes in human history. In the court’s summation, the judge noted that “you said you had never acted from base motives, that you had never had any inclinations to kill anybody, that you had never hated Jews, and still that you could not have acted otherwise and that you did not feel guilty” (p.278). Eichmann’s thoughtlessness and defective memory, while necessary for a lack of conscience and remorse, were joined to a hermeneutics of self-promotion and self-protection, which he used not simply to revise his history, but to gain promotion in rank by fulfilling the expectations of his superiors—murdering Jews. Arendt considered Eichmann’s hermeneutic to be filled with “self-deception, lies, and stupidity” (p.52), which extinguished any moral sensibility. The extinguishing of conscience, whether by revising history or acting out of a hermeneutic of self-promotion, accompanies an astounding void of care toward others. Eichmann, in short, in being unable to think from the standpoint of the Other and in extinguishing his conscience, was unwilling (perhaps incapable) to care about or for the needs of others—particularly Jews. Put another way, in the thoughtless pursuit of self-promotion, one’s lack of conscience signals the presence of cruel carelessness.

It is important to stress that Arendt did not consider Eichmann to be stupid, just thoughtless and lacking conscience, which for her were not identical terms (pp.287–288). Extinguishing his conscience enabled Eichmann to take a role in dehumanizing and murdering millions of Jews, which points to a kind of intelligence, though an intelligence divorced from morality, empathy, and care. Moreover, his intelligence enabled him to live for years after WWII, evading capture and living without remorse. Indeed, even when confronted with evidence of his crimes during the trial, Eichmann demonstrated a remarkable ability to use his intelligence to remain blameless—at least in his eyes.

Trump, like Eichmann, is not only a revisionist when it comes to his history and not taking responsibility, he possesses a hermeneutic of self-promotion that P.T. Barnum would envy. Moreover, long before he ever ran for office, he had been known as an inveterate liar. Mark Singer (1997) notes that Alair Townsend, a former deputy mayor in the Koch administration, once quipped, “I wouldn’t believe Donald Trump if his tongue were notarized.” Together, intelligence, revisionism, and lying accompany a complete absence of remorse for actions that harm or hurt other people. He never apologized for publicly ridiculing a reporter who had a disability (Bessler 2015). He showed no remorse (let alone shame) for misogynistic and violent comments he made on a radio show (Graham 2016). Indeed, he has never shown remorse for sexist comments he has made throughout his adult life. He showed no repentance for bilking thousands of dollars from students who enrolled in Trump University, even though he was forced to settle the lawsuit for $25 million. Even before a crowd of supporters, Trump, in making a reference to how much he has done in his first 4 months in comparison with any president, joked with the audience that he had to be careful because the media might say he lied. Recently, he was roundly condemned by many world leaders for calling African nations, Haiti, and El Salvador “shitholes.” Not surprisingly, he denied using that word, which, of course, means he is not guilty. With all the media coverage, I cannot recall a single time when Trump has accepted responsibility for lying or for demeaning other people. These examples point to a “leader” who continually revises the script to fit his motivation for self-promotion, which reveals an inability or unwillingness to genuinely care for others who are different. The “care” he demonstrates for his supporters is almost certainly framed in terms of his hermeneutic lens of self-promotion and self-protection.

Someone might point out that there may be a difference between Trump’s public-political persona and Trump as a private person. Perhaps he shows remorse and is honest and caring in his reflections about himself with family and trusted friends—if he has any. I am confident that there are differences in public personas and private ones, not just of politicians but all of us. Yet, if we imagine this to be true in Trump’s case, it would nevertheless show a profound difference or gap between the two, which in my view would reflect significant characterological issues, or what Robert Jay Lifton (1986, pp.418-421) called psychological doubling, wherein the individual avoids taking responsibility in relation to deeds others consider reprehensible. In my view, it is more likely that there is little difference between Trump’s public and private behavior.

Leaders who are preoccupied with maintaining their image/brand through lying, self-deception, self-promotion, and amorality are unwilling, or perhaps constitutionally unable, to care for and about Others. When they do show care, it usually means that they are focused on maintaining an image or attaining some personal aim. For instance, Trump has repeatedly said he cares about his supporters, but this is a conditional caring. If Trump loses his base of supporters, he will do what he has done throughout his life, and that will be to see them as traitors or enemies and himself as the victim. Unconditional care, then, is not something we would attribute to Eichmann or Trump.

Another related attribute that Arendt identifies with regard to Eichmann is that he was a simple, banal person. “Except for an extraordinary diligence in looking out for his personal advancement,” she wrote, “he had no motives at all” (p.287). It was, she continued, “this lack of imagination which enabled him to sit for months on end facing a German Jew who was conducting the police interrogation, pouring out his heart to the man and explaining again and again how it was that he reached only the rank of lieutenant colonel in the S.S. and that it had not been his fault that he was not promoted” (p.287). Lack of imagination and having a singular motive makes for a boring or banal person, though this does not mean Eichmann was unintelligent, as Arendt made clear. By contrast, individuals who have multiple motives, interests, and a healthy or active imagination are usually complex and interesting individuals. That is, they tend to care about a variety of things, as well as caring for other individuals. Trump, like Eichmann, is also a simple man who possesses one overarching motive, which is promoting his brand. To be sure, he might be exciting or interesting to some who are enamored with his financial and media successes, but that only points to the fact that many people are attracted by money and power, both of which do not really make people interesting or complex. Trump’s simplicity and banality are also noted in his predictability, even though people seem to think that, as a leader, he is unpredictable. Boring people are profoundly and tediously predictable because they have only one motive and, in this case, it is self-promotion. Because of this, Trump is predictable because he shows little interest in subject matters that are not about him (Fisher 2016). Indeed, some news outlets have reported that intelligence officials include Trump’s name throughout their short reports because Trump will continue reading only if he reads his name in the reports (Griffin 2017). Trump is also boringly predictable whenever he encounters criticism, which he takes as attempts to tarnish his image. Predictably, he attacks the source of the criticism. Boring or banal leaders, because of their singular motive, predictably care little about Others, except perhaps for sycophants.

Arendt (1965/1994) concludes her analysis of Eichmann’s banality by saying, “That such remoteness from reality and such thoughtlessness can wreak more havoc than all the evil instincts taken together” (p.288). Arendt’s view is similar to that of Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1953), a German Lutheran theologian who was executed by the Nazis, though Bonhoeffer uses the idea of folly in referring to Nazi leadership. He wrote,

There is no defense against folly. Neither protests nor force are of any avail against it, and it is never amenable to reason. If facts contradict personal prejudices, there is no need to believe them, and if they are undeniable, they can simply be pushed aside as exceptions. Thus, the fool, as compared with the scoundrel, is invariably self-complacent. And he can easily become dangerous, for it does not take much to make him aggressive. Hence, folly requires much more cautious handling than malice. We shall never again try to reason with the fool, for it is both useless and dangerous. (p.8)

I think Arendt would have agreed that a banal person is a fool and, when he is in a position of leadership the fool, while not evil per se, is careless and very dangerous.

In the discussion above, I have mentioned several times that Eichmann’s thoughtlessness, revisionism, amorality, and simple-mindedness were aimed at protecting and furthering his self-image. Similarly, Trump displays an almost maniacal preoccupation about his self-image, but unlike Eichmann, Trump’s image is his brand (and vice-versa). Eichmann had no brand. Daniel Boorstin’s (2012/1961) classic text, The Image, can further our insight into Trump’s leadership vis-à-vis his image/brand and celebrity. An image, Boorstin notes, “is synthetic. It is planned and created especially to serve a purpose, to make a certain kind of impression” (p.185). This image “is vivid and concrete...and is simplified” (p.193). The creator of “the image is expected to fit into the image” (p.188), which suggests that, like the image, he, in this case, is vivid, concrete, and simple. An image does not invite reflection or deep thought, which is reminiscent of Arendt’s view of Eichmann. The image, instead of evoking thought or reflection, titillates or arouses. Trump has long cultivated an image of himself as an extremely successful entrepreneur, which includes entertainment (and now politics). The purpose of this image/brand is to create an impression of a powerful, ruthless businessman who is extremelyFootnote 10 wealthy—a man of means and substance. Yet, the image from Boorstin’s view is insubstantial; it does not invite deep reflection. Trump, the image, Singer (1997) notes two decades ago, is a man “with universal recognition but with a suspicion that an interior life was an intolerable inconvenience.” Perhaps reflection is an intolerable inconvenience because it interferes with the singular, ruthless, and amoral promotion of his image/brand. Consider, for instance, Trump’s unwillingness to divest himself of his company/brand after assuming the Office of the President. While he has handed it off to his sons to protect and further, his sons are in service to the (his) image. Even if Trump had divested himself from his company, I am certain his behavior as president would not have changed. Since he has been cultivating his image for all of his adult life, it is certain that his braggadocio will continue unabated.

The image is part of what Boorstin calls a pseudo-event. A pseudo-event “is not spontaneous…Typically, it is not a train wreck or an earthquake, but an interview” (p.11). The pseudo-event “is planted (not always exclusively) for the immediate purpose of being reported or reproduced…Its success is measured by how widely it is reported” (p.11). Boorstin notes further that pseudo-events “are commonly fictitious or factitious” (p.11). Whether it is real or not is not as important as whether it is newsworthy. Given these criteria, Trump himself is a pseudo-event. His fetishistic and simplistic tweets become news, even though there is no substance to the tweets. Moreover, the tweets and his interviews are more fictitious and factitious than rooted in truth. PolitiFact, an independent news site that assesses whether politicians lie, tell the truth or some mixture of it, has indicated that Trump tells falsehoods and half-truths 83% of the time.Footnote 11 (Even a broken analogue clock is right twice a day.) I think it would be fair to say that Trump’s falsehoods, which may indicate he is unable to distinguish truths from facts, are in the service of maintaining his image/brand. As indicated above, as a simple man he has a singular motivation and that is to promote his image/brand.

When an individual is singularly preoccupied in promoting his brand, we can be confident that his ability to care for others is diminished or absent. As noted above, being enthralled with one’s image, as Eichmann was, makes it difficult to think from the standpoint of others. Multiply this a hundred times in a celebrity culture. It is likely that Trump sought the presidency not because he cared about the country, but rather because it is the ultimate in celebrity—celebrity on the world stage. In a Trump presidency, servant leadership morphs into leadership in service of the brand.

Boorstin connects celebrity with pseudo-events. Celebrity, he argues, is being known for one’s well-knownness (p.57). The celebrity “is the human pseudo-event. He has been fabricated on purpose to satisfy our exaggerated expectations of human greatness” (p.58). This does not mean the celebrity is a great person. Boorstin points out that the hero is “distinguished by his achievement; the celebrity by his image or trademark….The hero was a big man; the celebrity is a big name” (p.61). We might say that the hero, like a real event, has substance and complexity, while the celebrity, like a pseudo-event, lacks depth and complexity. Trump is clearly a celebrity who has spent decades cultivating and ruthlessly protecting his image/brand, while pursuing celebrity. Where Hollywood often fabricates celebrity, Trump has used Hollywood and the media to further his celebrity. When he announced he was running for president, Trump, the celebrity, planned a pseudo-event wherein the viewer was pulled into the spectacle—a spectacle that screens the lack of substance that pervades the celebrity who would be president.

A pseudo-event and celebrity, as noted above, are planned. Real events, for Boorstin, are spontaneous, rather than deliberate creations. A celebrity is not spontaneous, because he has to plan what he is saying and doing, calculating its impact with regard to hisFootnote 12 image. Reporter Natalie Walters (2016) interviewed candidate Trump and noticed that his desk at work was covered with magazines and newspapers, all of which had to do with Donald Trump. President Trump has a different desk now, but the same obsession for watching multiple news outlets about himself. Anyone who has worked with someone who is obsessive and preoccupied knows that the person lacks the spontaneity of playfulness and is seemingly incapable of caring about anything or anyone except whether they advance the brand/image/celebrity. Someone may point out that Trump seems spontaneous in his speeches before crowds, but spontaneity is not equivalent to rashness. What about his tweets? Again, puerile impetuousness is not spontaneity. A singular motivation to advance his image/brand reflects a kind of seriousness that belies playfulness and spontaneity.

This is important to mention because playfulness, as Winnicott (1971) so clearly depicted, arises in mutual relations of trust and care. The child, in other words, is able to be spontaneous because of the trust that exists between parents and child. As adults, this is true as well. Generally speaking, we are most spontaneous and playful when there is mutual care and trust, wherein we can feel free to be vulnerable—a necessary feature of interpersonal play. Trump’s lack of spontaneity reveals a man who is very serious and preoccupied about his image/brand. To be sure, he “cares” about others and things that serve this motivation and preoccupation, which makes it difficult for him to relax and be playful. Put another way, it is very difficult to be spontaneous when one is obsessed about and engrossed in one’s image.

An interesting connection between Arendt and Boorstin concerns the issue of morality. In Arendt’s analysis of Eichmann, she viewed him as unthinking and amoral, because he was preoccupied with his image. Boorstin similarly argued that the celebrity “is neither good nor bad…He is the human pseudo-event...[and] is morally neutral” (pp.57–58). Being morally neutral is a core attribute of pseudo-events and celebrities, because the primary motivation is to be well known and to protect and further the brand. Put another way, amorality signifies flexibility with regard to the truth or facts. Lying and exaggeration, for the celebrity, are simply in the service of his/her brand. Character and virtue do not concern the celebrity. Of course, celebrities can be moral, as long as it serves the purpose of their images/brands. Evidence of Trump’s amorality is legion. He has repeatedly failed to pay contractors (Jackson et al. 2016). It is well documented that he played a hand in bankrupting his casinos, ruining investors while making millions.Footnote 13 As noted above, the pseudo-event of Trump University financially harmed hundreds. I see no morality in his demeaning comments about and behavior toward women and people of color. These and other examples reveal that his primary motivation in promoting his image/brand shoves morality into the shadows.

To be morally neutral in the service of advancing an image/brand necessarily accompanies carelessness. The celebrity, to use Simon de Beauvoir’s (1948) philosophical perspective on serious persons, “is one who remains indifferent to the content, that is, to the human meaning of his action, who thinks he can assert his own existence without taking into account that of others” (p.65). In the service of his celebrity, “He will treat them like instruments; he will destroy them if they get in his way” (p.66). The celebrity, in this case Trump, is without care, except for his image/brand. Yes, he may show care for his supporters, but this is not a genuine care for their well-being, for their experiences and needs. Everything and everyone are in the service of the Trump brand, which reveals a profound care-lessness.

When image determines and informs leadership, when celebrity and brand are primary motivations, genuine concern for others is nowhere to be found. This contrasts with the kind of leadership informed by care, moral probity, and selfless service to others. This view of leadership fits well with theological renderings of Jesus, who was not a celebrity or pseudo-event. Granted, the mention of Jesus establishes a very high bar for any leader, and it would be wrong to expect Trump or any other president to live up to the standards of leadership reflected in the life and ministry of Jesus, especially when most of us do not. But we can point to existential and psychological truths reflected not only in scripture, but in other religious traditions regarding the qualities of leaders. From a psychological perspective, we expect good-enough parents—the first leaders—to care about and for their children. These early experiences, though changed by developmental achievements, carry forward into adulthood (Rizzuto 1979). This is not to suggest that political leaders are parental in any way, but I think it is safe to say that most people want a leader who genuinely cares about them and not simply his status or image/brand. That said, in Trump’s case, I suspect, many of his supporters believe he cares about them and their concerns. But consider his long track record of being preoccupied about his image/brand and his celebrity and the people who have been sacrificed in Trump’s pursuit of celebrity. To return to Singer’s (1997) article, he observed that Trump was an “efficient schmoozer.” Singer described Trump in this way:

His dead-on ability to exploit other people’s weaknesses; the perpetual seventeen-year-old who lives in a zero-sum world of winners and “total losers,” loyal friends and “complete scumbags”; the insatiable publicity hound who courts the press on a daily basis and, when he doesn’t like what he reads, attacks the messengers as “human garbage”; the chairman and largest stockholder of a billion-dollar public corporation who seems unable to resist heralding overly optimistic earnings projections, which then fail to materialize, thereby eroding the value of his investment—in sum, a fellow both slippery and naïve, artfully calculating and recklessly heedless of consequences.”

This is Trump the leader and his supporters are caught up in the image and in the careless illusions of Trump.

Trump’s leadership as an indictment of neoliberal-celebrity culture

The analysis of Trump’s leadership above may lead people to simply focus on the person, overlooking the fact that leaders reflect the culture. Eichmann, for instance, certainly had his own personality traits, but his leadership is inextricably linked to the Nazi culture that supported and legitimated his work and rise in rank. Eichmann deserved to be indicted, but any indictment necessarily includes the Nazi ethos that produced him and others. Trump, likewise, has his own personality traits, yet he is also produced and supported by a neoliberal-celebrity culture,Footnote 14 and this culture merits both discussion and indictment.

The rise of Donald Trump as entrepreneur corresponds with the rise of neoliberal culture/capitalism.Footnote 15 The core philosophical tenet of a neoliberal culture is that “market exchange [is the] guide to all human action” (Dean 2009, p.51). This is a key point that needs further explanation. First of all, a neoliberal culture/capitalism economizes political life and non-economic spheres and activities (Brown 2015, p.17), which means that the society does not have a market, it is a market. A market society, through disciplinary and justificatory mechanisms and institutions, produces and reproduces entrepreneurial-consumer subjects whose moral autonomy and “freedom,” it is believed, “[are] best achieved through the operation of markets” (p.51). Moral autonomy and freedom in a neoliberal culture are founded on calculative rationality whereby individuals identify, calculate, and pursue their self-interests. Put another way, each subject in a neoliberal culture is responsible for adhering to the imperatives and compulsions of the market, namely, the imperatives of profit maximization and competition and the compulsions of accumulation and expansion (Woods 2017). To be successful in this culture requires using calculative rationality in the pursuit of one’s desires, which necessarily involves assessing whether others are obstacles or aids to one’s self-interests.

It is likely true that human beings have always pursued their interests. Yet, the calculation and pursuit of one’s desires are accompanied by representational systems that highlight the importance of caring about the needs and desires of others in one’s culture and society—the common good. For instance, in the early Christian communities as depicted in Acts, Christian beliefs and values held that all members of the community shared in caring for other members by sharing their possessions (Acts 4:32–34). The deceit of Ananias and Sapphira represents a violation of those beliefs and values. Put another way, we might imagine that Ananias and Sapphira calculated their own rational self-interests, which resulted in a determination that the demands of other community members conflicted with their aims. The neoliberal capitalist representational system produces entrepreneurial-consumer subjects who are primarily concerned about their own self-interests, which depends on calculative rationality or instrumental reasoning, assessing whether Others are obstacles or aids in the achievement of one’s interests. More strongly stated, a neoliberal culture/capitalist culture is inimical to representational systems that place the care and needs of Others first or on a par with one’s own. To genuinely care about and for another person’s welfare necessarily means that one’s self-interests or desires are secondary. In a market society, the Other’s needs and interests are, at best, secondary to one’s own interests and, at worse, absent. The indictment here is that a neoliberal culture/capitalism, as a dominant representational system that produces entrepreneurial-consumer subjects and social relations, is incapable of fostering genuine caring relations. When caring relations are manifested, it is because another representational system is shaping subjectivity and relations.

Donald Trump is a paradigmatic example of this culture and this, in part, helps explain his popularity. With great frequency, he touts his economic success and his ruthlessness. He is a neoliberal man par excellence given that he has, for decades, relentlessly pursued his economic self-interests—his brand—to the detriment of others. But what about his charitable giving? Would this not indicate a level of care that contradicts the neoliberal culture? An investigation into his claim of charitable giving revealed that not one donation involved Trump’s money (Fahrenthold and Helderman 2016). Worse still is Trump’s ostensible charitable giving that furthers his own economic self-interests and image. For instance, Trump’s charitable giving to Rancho Palos Verdes, California, actually resulted in Trump being the beneficiary of millions of dollars.Footnote 16 This is pretty slick. Trump can promote his brand by doing something valued by society (charitable giving), without having to spend any of his money. Better, he makes money off of his “charity.” This is neoliberal charity, whereby one calculates his/her economic self-interest such that s/he does not actually have to give a penny, while getting something in return. Wherein genuine charity involves the presence of a non-neoliberal representational system, Trump’s charity is neoliberalism at its “best.”

This indictment of Trump as an individual, who is preoccupied with advancing his economic self-interests, is also an indictment of the culture that produced him. It is a culture that lends itself to sociopathy. I do not mean that neoliberal culture gives rise to sociopaths. Rather, this culture lends itself to preoccupation with one’s own desires/interests and indifference toward the needs and interests of others, except on those occasions when the Other’s needs and interests are in line with or advance one’s own. Put differently, a neoliberal culture tends to produce morally neutral subjects. There is, in other words, a kind of carelessness that a neoliberal culture produces—carelessness that parallels opportunists like Trump.

It is important to mention that neoliberal culture is entangled with celebrity culture, which Trump embodies. He is not only an entrepreneur; he is a showman advancing his own brand—a brand that is itself celebrity. Recall that celebrity “is a person who is known for his well-knownness” (Boorstin 1987, p.57). In a celebrity culture, the famous individual is “fabricated on purpose to satisfy our exaggerated expectations of human greatness” (p.58). Trump surely has done an excellent job in fabricating and marketing his celebrity and the indictment is against all of us who participated in his celebrity. In a celebrity culture, citizens are enamored with the seemingly larger-than-life personas, which members participate in creating.

There are at least two fundamental interrelated problems with celebrity culture. First, the celebrity, as Boorstin notes, “is morally neutral” (p.58). The primary concern/care and motivation of the celebrity-entrepreneur is to be well known and s/he is morally neutral so that this can be accomplished. This implies that the primary motivation is for celebrity, making morals and virtues, at best, secondary, and more likely accidental. Perhaps this is why a neoliberal culture fits hand-in-glove with celebrity culture—both are morally neutral. Morality or character must not impede the aim of being a celebrity or marketing. Let’s return to Trump’s “charitable” giving. One could argue that charity is moral in that it takes into consideration the needs of Others. As a celebrity, Trump “gives” to charities to advance his image and economic interests. His “morality” is secondary to his celebrity, at best. At worse, giving other people’s money away to advance one’s image is hardly moral; it is more aptly called a scam. Indeed, it reveals a character who has no character—only the empty obsession with marketing his celebrity, with his brand.

But it is not entirely fair to lay all the blame at Trump’s feet. The celebrity culture itself is morally neutral. Its members are enthralled by celebrity, and the famous person’s character is secondary in importance, at best. Trump knows this perhaps better than anyone. During his campaign he said, “I could stand in the middle of 5th Avenue and shoot somebody and I wouldn’t lose voters.”Footnote 17 This statement does not simply reflect the extreme loyalty of his supporters; it signifies the moral neutrality of Trump and his followers. What they share—Trump and his supporters—is the desire for the “great man” or, more accurately, the image of the great man. This desire supersedes any desire for and expectation of a great person of character or a person of moral probity. Indeed, citizens’ desire for celebrity also includes not being concerned that Trump did not have any experience and skills in leadership/governing or service in government. There was no concern that Trump had five deferments, avoiding the draft. There was little interest that Trump went through three bankruptcies and had a reputation of delaying payments or not paying workers. In a celebrity culture, people care less about the great “man’s” character and more about his image. Put another way, it is not simply that Trump has fabricated himself; the celebrity culture has helped fabricate and maintain him for the sake of satisfying “our exaggerated expectations of human greatness” (p.58). There is, then, a complementarity between the moral neutrality of the celebrity pursuing fame and the moral neutrality of the crowds that would support him even if he did something unethical or criminal.

The complementarity of moral neutrality in celebrity culture is also a problem of carelessness. Consider Trump’s claim about his voters. To my ears, there is a kind of ruthlessness expressed in this hyperbolic, yet seemingly true, statement. That is, Trump has gained such celebrity that he could shoot someone and not lose any of his supporters. Trump’s ruthlessness, evident in his pursuit of celebrity, complements the ruthlessness of his supporters. They care about the “great man.”

There is a second and related problem with celebrity culture, which is entangled with a neoliberal culture. Recall that Boorstin writes, “The hero was distinguished by his achievement; the celebrity by his image or trademark…The hero was a big man [or woman]; the celebrity is a big name” (p.61). Heroes can be larger-than-life figures or they may be ordinary people doing extraordinary things. What they have in common is that their deeds represent human virtues, such as courage and love. A sergeant who leads and motivates his/her soldiers to secure an objective, an ordinary citizen who braves a fire to save a family from a burning car, individuals who take a public stand against a totalitarian regime are people who may become well known not because they want to, but because their deeds point to something noble about human beings. Heroes act with the aim of aiding others and subordinating their self-interests. By contrast, celebrity-entrepreneurs are pseudo-events because they represent not virtues, ideals or what is noble, but mere celebrity and marketing, which reveals not simply the shallowness of celebrity, but the moral and intellectual shallowness of neoliberal-celebrity culture. Trump’s “success” as a celebrity-entrepreneur is an indictment of the neoliberal-celebrity culture that produces him.

One might counter by saying that some celebrities use their celebrity to advance humanitarian causes, which points to the intersection of celebrity and, if not heroism, genuine care. Bono, Angelina Jolie, and Peyton Manning are celebrities who have used their celebrity to advance good causes. Examples such as these do not necessarily undermine Boorstin’s view. Some celebrities are known because of their excellence in some skill(s), like acting, music, or playing football. They have worked not necessarily to become famous, but to advance their talents and careers, and some of these individuals may decide to use their celebrity for a good cause. Of course, other actors, musicians, etc. may be more deliberate about and focused on marketing their image or brand and, in so doing, fall more clearly into the category Boorstin is addressing. Still other famous people are famous for being famous (e.g., Paris Hilton), using their celebrity to promote their celebrity. Trump has some entrepreneurial skills that he has used to advance his family business and entertainment career, but his primary interest is not business or entertainment; it is the cultivation of his brand and it is our celebrity culture that has made him so successful simply as a brand. Unlike some celebrities who use their celebrity to help in noble causes, Trump uses his celebrity to advance his celebrity. The best illustration of this is his putative charitable giving as mentioned above. It appears he is using his celebrity for humanitarian projects, but in fact he uses other people’s money for charity, which is to further advance his brand. From a neoliberal perspective, this is a great marketing feat. That said, Trump’s actions, then, are empty of any real charity or care and, if some good results, it is accidental.

Leadership does not occur in a vacuum. Leaders are formed by and give form to the cultural milieu. Put another way, elected political leaders reveal something about the culture and ourselves. While many individuals, understandably, may want to decry the current president, it is also incumbent on citizens to consider what this leader tells us about ourselves. All of this is to say that Trump’s attainment of the highest office in the United States is an indictment of our neoliberal-celebrity culture, wherein people are more concerned about the image of a person than they are about their character or morality. In this kind of culture, where celebrity and entrepreneurship seem to be of the highest value, moral neutrality and sociopathy accompanies carelessness in the body politic evidenced, in part, by increasing polarization and hostile political speech. Trump’s leadership, in short, is an indictment of neoliberal-celebrity culture.

Conclusion

Trump’s election campaign and subsequent attainment of the Office of the President elicited discussion in the psychological professions about the Goldwater rule, which prohibits people in the psychological professions from diagnosing public figures with whom they have no direct contact. The rule makes sense and I am (2017) also reluctant to use the Diagnostic Statistical Manual (DSM) to analyze Trump, but more importantly, I do not think it is necessary. Arendt used her considerable intellectual acumen and observations to depict Eichmann’s leadership and her work is relevant in understanding Trump. In addition, the seminal work of Boorstin on image, pseudo-events, and celebrity also help further assess Trump’s leadership. Both Arendt and Boorstin recognized that leadership cannot be abstracted from the culture in which it exists or has form. I argued that Trump’s leadership cannot be understood apart from the neoliberal-celebrity culture in which Trump emerged. Arendt’s and Boorstin’s work were supplemented by the notion of care, whereby I argued that moral neutrality and preoccupation about Trump’s image/brand reveals a kind of profound carelessness. That is, obsessive concern for his brand accompanies a moral neutrality, signifying a lack of care for Others except to the extent that they support his image, which is no care at all. Yet, the analysis of Trump’s leadership necessarily includes an analysis and assessment of culture, which, in this case, leads to an indictment regarding the culture’s creation of Trump, as well as attending cultural moral neutrality and carelessness. In short, Trump’s leadership is the antithesis of servant leadership where there is care about and for citizens and Others.