Abstract
Let serious propositional contingentism (SPC) be the package of views which consists in (i) the thesis that propositions expressed by sentences featuring terms depend, for their existence, on the existence of the referents of those terms, (ii) serious actualism—the view that it is impossible for an object to exemplify a property and not exist—and (iii) contingentism—the view that it is at least possible that some thing might not have been something. SPC is popular and compelling. But what should we say about possible worlds, if we accept SPC? Here, I first show that a natural view of possible worlds, well-represented in the literature, in conjunction with SPC is inadequate. Though I note various alternative ways of thinking about possible worlds in response to the first problem, I then outline a second more general problem—a master argument—which generally shows that any account of possible worlds meeting very minimal requirements will be inconsistent with compelling claims about mere possibilia which the serious propositional contingentist should accept.
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Acknowledgements
I’d like to especially thank Peter Fritz and Francesco Berto for many helpful discussions about many versions of this paper. Also thanks to Christopher Menzel, Nathan Wildman, Greg Restall, Petronella Randell, Benjamin Marschall, Stuart Masterman, and audiences at both Issues on the (Im)Possible IX in Tilburg and Arché’s Metaphysics and Logic Seminar in St Andrews.
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Appendix
Appendix
Here, I prove minor technical results underpinning the arguments in this paper.
Proposition 1
Let’s say that \(\mathbb {P}_{\mathfrak {M}}\) is full if \(\mathbb {P}_{\mathfrak {M}} = \mathcal {P}(W) \times \mathcal {P}(W)\).
-
(i)
Any \(\mathfrak {M}\) satisfying Definition 3, where \(\mathbb {P}_{\mathfrak {M}}\) is full, is an \(\mathfrak {M} \in \mathbb {M}\).
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(ii)
For some \(\mathfrak {M} \in \mathbb {M}\), \(\mathfrak {M} \vDash \lozenge \exists x \lozenge \lnot \exists y (y=x)\).
Proof
First, (i). Consider arbitrary \(\mathfrak {M} = \langle W, R, \mathbb {P}_{\mathfrak {M}}, D_i, w^*, v \rangle \), where \(\mathbb {P}_{\mathfrak {M}} = \mathcal {P}(W) \times \mathcal {P}(W)\). Suppose that Definition 3 is satisfied. \(\mathfrak {M} \in \mathbb {M}\) iff \(\mathfrak {M} \vDash \textrm{E}[\phi ^{t_1, ..., t_n}] \leftrightarrow \bigwedge _{i \le n} \textrm{E}t_i\), for any \(\phi ^{t_1, ..., t_n} \in \mathcal {L}_{\lozenge }\). \(\mathfrak {M} \vDash \textrm{E}[\phi ^{t_1, ..., t_n}] \leftrightarrow \bigwedge _{i \le n} \textrm{E}t_i\) iff, any \(w \in W\) and a: \(\mathfrak {M}, w, a \vDash \textrm{E}[\phi ^{t_1, ..., t_n}]\) iff \(\mathfrak {M}, w, a \vDash \bigwedge _{i \le n}\textrm{E}t_i\), for any \(\phi ^{t_1, ..., t_n} \in \mathcal {L}_{\lozenge }\). First, the left-to-right direction:
Second, the right-to-left direction. If \(\mathbb {P}_{\mathfrak {M}} = \mathcal {P}(W) \times \mathcal {P}(W)\), then every every \(\langle \alpha , \beta \rangle \) such that \(\alpha \subseteq \beta \) and \(w \in \beta \) is in \(\mathbb {P}_{\mathfrak {M}}\), for every \(w \in W\). Thus, for any \(\phi ^{t_1, ..., t_n} \in \mathcal {L}_{\lozenge }\), there is a \(\langle \alpha , \beta \rangle \in \mathbb {P}_{\mathfrak {M}}\) such that \(\delta _a([\phi ^{t_1, ..., t_n}]) = \langle \alpha , \beta \rangle \). Given the constraints on \(D_p\), it follows that \(\mathfrak {M}, w, a \vDash \textrm{E}[\phi ^{t_1, ..., t_n}]\) iff \(\mathfrak {M}, w, a \vDash \bigwedge _{i \le n} \textrm{E}t_i\), for any \(\phi ^{t_1, ..., t_n}\). Second, (ii). Consider \(\mathfrak {M} = \langle W, R, \mathbb {P}_{\mathfrak {M}}, D_i, w^*, v \rangle \), where \(W = \{1, 2 \}\), for any \(w, w' \in W\), \(Rww'\), \(\mathbb {P}_{\mathfrak {M}}\) is full, \(D_i(1) = \{3\}\) and \(D_i(2) = \{4\}\), \(v(F)_1 = \{3\}, v(F)_2 = \varnothing , v(G)_1 = \varnothing \), and \(v(G)_2 = \{4\}\). By inspection, \(v(F)_w \subset D(w)\) and \(v(G)_w \subset D(w)\), for any \(w \in W\) and so \(\mathfrak {M}\) satisfies Definition 3. Since \(\mathbb {P}_{\mathfrak {M}}\) is full, \(\mathfrak {M} \vDash \textrm{E}[\phi ^{t_1, ..., t_n}] \leftrightarrow \bigwedge _{i \le n} \textrm{E}t_i\), for any \(\phi ^{t_1, ..., t_n} \in \mathcal {L}_{\lozenge }\). Since \(D_i(1) \ne D_i(2)\) and \(Rww'\), for any \(w, w' \in W\), it follows that, for some \(w \in W\) and a: \(\mathfrak {M}, w, a \vDash \lozenge \exists x \lozenge \lnot \exists y (y = x)\). \(\square \)
Proposition 2
Any \(\mathfrak {M} \in \mathbb {M}^{\tau }\): (i) \(\mathfrak {M} \vDash \Box \forall x \Box \exists y (y = x)\) (ii) \(\mathfrak {M} \vDash \Box \forall p \Box \exists q (q = p)\).
Proof
Suppose \(\mathfrak {M}\) is some arbitrary \(\mathfrak {M} \in \mathbb {M}^{\tau }\) and that \(\mathfrak {M}, w, a \vDash \lozenge \lnot \textrm{E}x\), for arbitrary w and a. Given that \(\mathfrak {M} \vDash \lozenge \phi \rightarrow \lozenge \textrm{T}[\phi ]\), it follows that \(\mathfrak {M}, w, a \vDash \lozenge \textrm{T}[\lnot \textrm{E}x]\). Now, given that \(\mathbb {M}^\tau \subset \mathbb {M}\), \(\mathfrak {M}, w, a \vDash \Box (\textrm{T}[\lnot \textrm{E}x] \rightarrow \textrm{E}x)\). Thus, if \(\mathfrak {M}, w, a \vDash \lozenge \lnot \textrm{E}x\), then \(\mathfrak {M}, w, a \vDash \lozenge (\textrm{E}x \wedge \lnot \textrm{E}x)\). Thus: \(\mathfrak {M}, w, a \vDash \Box \textrm{E}x\). Now, this just means: \(\mathfrak {M}, w, a \vDash \Box \exists y (y = x)\), for arbitrary w. Given no specific variable played a role: \(\mathfrak {M}, w, a[x/d] \vDash \Box \exists y (y = x)\), for any \(d \in D_i(w)\). Thus: \(\mathfrak {M}, w, a \vDash \forall x \Box \exists y (y = x)\). Since w, as well as a, was arbitrary: \(\mathfrak {M} \vDash \Box \forall x \Box \exists y (y = x)\). The same reasoning can be given for \(\mathfrak {M} \vDash \Box \forall p \Box \exists q (q = p)\), modulo the changes because of the changes in the sort of variable. \(\square \)
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Masterman, C.J. Some Ways the Ways the World Could Have Been Can’t Be. J Philos Logic 53, 997–1025 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-024-09755-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-024-09755-6