Goffman and Schutz on Multiple Realities

Abstract

Erving Goffman (1922–1982) was one of the foremost American sociologists in the development of qualitative approaches to the study of everyday life. He was widely read and was familiar with all contemporaneous approaches to the study of everyday life from Schutz, Garfinkel, Sacks, the symbolic interactionists, Chicago School sociologists, and others who used qualitative perspectives. In advancing his own approach he would often comment on the approaches of others, if not directly then in a subtle manner which could be understood by those concerned. As one example, I will focus on his examination of Alfred Schutz in one of his books, Frame Analysis (1974), where he critiques Schutz’s notion of multiple realities. This was one of the rare occasions when he wrote about Schutz. This paper addresses the differences between Schutz and Goffman, why they never seem to have directly encountered each other, and the kinds of alternatives Goffman offers to the study of the world of everyday life in contrast to Schutz.

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Erving Goffman, one of America’s most widely read and influential sociologists, offered his own critique of Schutz’s conceptualization of multiple realities and developed his own framework in its stead. Goffman, who was born in Canada in 1922 to Jewish emigré parents and died in the U.S. in 1982, was, according to a number of commentators, one of the major figures in American twentieth century sociology. Tom Scheff (2006) writes:

Goffman is perhaps the most widely read sociologist in the history of the discipline. […] not to take away from Durkheim, but to call attention to the diversity of his audience, which includes vast numbers of laypersons. Perhaps almost as widely cited, his work has been noted throughout the social sciences and humanities.

Trevino (2003) notes:

Erving Goffman, the twentieth century’s pre-eminent sociologist of the structure of face-to-face interaction – what he termed ‘the interaction order¹’ – established his own unique domain of inquiry and methods of research. His books – written in an accessible and engaging style, and thus widely sold not only in college bookstores but in commercial bookstores as well have been received as part of the canon in micro-sociology, and in particular symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology, phenomenology and conversation analysis. Goffman’s work is also regarded as one of the fundamental references for the wider community of scholars, most notably in cultural anthropology, psychiatry, social psychology, and sociolinguistics. Moreover, many of the colorful and captivating words and phrases that he coined – impression management, stigma, passing, total institution, presentation of self, to name only some of the more widely circulated – have now become part of our common parlance.

Alfred Schutz, born in Vienna in 1899, emigrated to the United States (as a Jewish refugee) with his family in July, 1939, lived in New York City, taught at the New School part-time, worked full time in banking and conducted an enormous correspondence with many other scholars of his day as well as carrying on his own writing projects.

By 1932, Schutz published his first book, Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt (translated into English, 1967), and approximately eight papers (published in English), primarily in philosophical journals. He published two further papers in the American Journal of Sociology, which was based in Chicago, in 1944 and 1945 (“The Stranger” and “The Homecomer”) and all before Goffman began his graduate studies (1945–1953). The first volume of his Collected Papers did not appear in English until 1962 and was subsequently followed by two more edited volumes in 1964 and 1966 (cf. Schutz 1962, 1964, 1966). Studying at Chicago, Goffman² would have had ample opportunity to become acquainted with Schutz’s work (who, between 1945 and 1959 published some 15 additional papers in English) and certainly with German sociology (Goffman 1959).

Regardless, there seems to have been no direct influence on Goffman from the direction of Schutz nor any indication of an awareness by Goffman of Schutz’s writings until he published Frame Analysis, 1974. Goffman’s extensive anecdotes, examples and illustrations in footnotes in all of his writings prior to this time would give some clue to this matter if it had happened. But as far as I know, there is no mention of Schutz in Goffman’s writings until 1974 in Frame Analysis.³

1 Opportunities to Meet

As I have argued elsewhere (Psathas 2004), Schutz’s position as a part-time faculty member at the New School (he became full-time in 1956), his training in the European tradition of scholarship, and his teaching at a school not prominent in American sociology undoubtedly restricted his intellectual network , his influence in academia, and certainly his influence on American sociology.

Although the University of Chicago, dominating the mid-west, was receptive to German sociologists, such as Simmel, Schutz was not among those accepted. It is indeed likely that Goffman was influenced by G. Simmel⁴ and Goffman has, in turn, been called “America’s Simmel” by some American sociologists.⁵ Phenomenology in general, however, was not widely known and its acceptance at Chicago was minimal.

Goffman’s contact with German sociology can only be surmised since there is no evidence of his reading or studying the subject at the time he was at Chicago. Undoubtedly the acquaintance and awareness of Simmel by many of the faculty had reached Goffman though he does not cite Simmel specifically either in his 1980 interview or in his various papers but only in his dissertation. His thesis adviser, Everett Hughes, was a major translator of Simmel’s work and advanced Simmel’s ideas in sociology. As for Schutz,⁶ we find no evidence of any correspondence with Goffman or any other contact. Whether Goffman discovered Schutz in one of Garfinkel’s first papers, dated 1959, is not known. (I mention this paper in particular since I was first introduced to Schutz and Husserl through Garfinkel’s footnotes.)

Goffman’s journeys and studies took him to Chicago, the Shetland Islands, Paris, Washington, D.C., and Berkeley, California; he did not settle on the East coast until his appointment at the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia in 1969. By this time, Schutz was deceased some 10 years. Therefore, it would appear that Schutz and Goffman never met.

2 Schutz and Multiple Realities

Schutz first published “On Multiple Realities” in 1945 and it also later appeared in his Collected Papers Vol. 1, published in 1962 (Goffman cites a 1967 edition). He considers several aspects of multiple realities while focusing on the world of everyday life (the paramount reality). He cites James, (particularly Principles of Psychology (James 1950)) but also Dewey and Mead at the outset of the paper and uses James’ terms “sub-universes” or “orders of reality” (Schutz 1962: 207) in his analysis of the “style of existence” of various orders of reality. Schutz aims to consider the “subjective meaning bestow(ed) upon certain experiences […].” and examines the relation between various “realities,” something which he says has not been fully explored. His use of “scientific contemplation” will also require an analysis of this order of reality as he brings it to bear on the relation between various orders of reality. His approach, therefore, is more theoretical than empirical and aims to clarify meanings and uses of “reality” as well as the relation between “realities.”

3 Goffman and Frame Analysis

In this book, possibly for the first time, Goffman attempts to distance himself from phenomenology and to contrast it with his own approach. He had been associated with phenomenology by others though he never claimed this position. Heretofore he had concentrated on empirical studies of the interaction order but here he proposes to develop a more theoretical position regarding interaction. It may be characterized as his own version of “multiple realities” but it takes a distinctively different turn. His concepts will include keys, keying, footing, lamination, transformations, frames, and frameworks. At the outset, however, he discusses James and Schutz, whom he characterizes as leading the way to the study of “multiple realities.”

Goffman’s first objection is that phenomenology has not conducted extensive empirical studies of persons’ activities in the world of everyday life. With regard to the kinds of ordinary interactional events which Goffman regarded as important, phenomenology did not provide a rich description or analysis. His focus, he says, is on the ‘interaction order’ (see Footnote 1 for an extensive description of this concept.) and he states this in his final paper (1983), published posthumously, as well as in his earliest work (his dissertation in 1953). His training led him to believe that empirical studies of ordinary activities were the specific domain of sociology.⁷

Goffman accepts, seemingly without question, the world of everyday life, the world of working, the “paramount reality”, as simply given and in no further need of analysis. His approach has been called ‘naïve realism’, nevertheless, the everyday life-world is the chosen domain for his studies.

Goffman further says too close a reading of Schutz, or any attempt to follow him in the direction of (more philosophical) examinations of the ordinary would be a distraction. Schutz, he believes, has “hypnotized some students” into treating his “pronouncements” as “definitive rather than suggestive.” This point addresses what he considers a failure on the part of Schutzians to think past that which has been said or outlined by the master.

The reader will note recurring themes in the material that follows: the importance of rules; rules and meaning; world and worlds; the role of shock; frame and frameworks; and additional formulations. The focus will be on Goffman’s critique and his ensuing offer of an alternative view of multiple realities.

Goffman begins Frame Analysis by saying that the ‘line’ that gives great credence to the writer/analyst about “perception, thought, brain, culture, a new methodology or novel social forces” and thinks it can “lift the veil” so that persons may see more clearly what is going on is “pathetic” because it gives too much credence to the writer and what he writes. Goffman further believes that “if men define situations as real they are real in their consequences,” this is one of the major doctrines of social psychology based on W. I. Thomas, a doctrine moreover which is “true as it reads but false as it is taken.” Persons may negotiate aspects of the “arrangements under which (they) live” but, once settled, they then act routinely. He argues further that definitions of the situation may matter but are hardly significant in contributing to the “events in progress.” Thus it is not that participants “create” the definition of the situation, even though their society may in fact “create it”, but that they act appropriately in a situation, taking it for granted once they are settled – and continue routinely (mechanically) as though things had always been settled. On occasion, we may have to wait until events are almost over before we discover what they had been about – or we can delay any decisions as to how we describe what we have been doing.

Goffman contends, in the tradition of William James as he sees it, that using the term ‘reality’ leads us to focus on what participants think and feel is real, and like James, asks the question “Under what circumstances do we think things are real?” This would lead to a focus on the conditions under which such a thought is generated and not on asking what reality is for the particular persons being studied. This emphasis may be what has led some to consider Goffman’s approach phenomenological, i.e. the focus on the subject’s experience, but as I shall argue below, his approach is not really phenomenological.

Goffman says that although the analysis of social reality “has a bad name” he will still focus on it; however, and as we shall see, he adds his own particular meanings and approaches to the problem and avoids, as much as possible, the use of the term “reality.”

William James (1950: Ch. 21, 283–324) in his approach, stresses such factors as “selective attention, intimate involvement, and non contradiction by what is otherwise known.” He sought to differentiate the different “worlds” which could be made “real” by virtue of attention and interest. These are “possible subuniverses” or “orders of existence” (Garfinkel 1964) and would include such worlds as: “the world of the senses, the world of scientific objects, the world of abstract philosophical truths, the worlds of myth and supernatural beliefs, the madman’s world, etc.”, each having its own “special and separate style of existence” and each being “real after its own fashion.” With a lapse of attention, reality would also lapse.

One problem, says Goffman, was that James, in using the word “world” “implied that it was more than one person’s world” (or “reality”) which would lapse after it was no longer attended. Nonetheless, Goffman insists, even though James took this “radical stand,” he ultimately “copped out”⁸ and afforded a privileged position to the world of the senses which he judged to be the “realest reality,” “the one before which the other worlds must give way” (Goffman 1974: 3). The “cop out”, presumably, is James’s failure to live up to his responsibility and to treat all of these realities as deserving of equal attention, if not equal in themselves.

Goffman did not accord such prominence to any one reality and saw a weakness of phenomenology here in that he himself tried rather to distinguish between one “reality” and others rather than accept one as more important or significant than any other. Any subworld can have its own “special and separate style of existence” and each world, whilst it is attended to (E.G. italics) is real after its own fashion; only the reality lapses with the attention” (Goffman 1974: quoting James, p. 3). Thus, “world” was not meant as “the” world but a “particular person’s current world”, and perhaps not even that. He accuses James of “opening a door and letting in wind as well as light” (ibid.: p. 3), i.e., the wind may bother our eyes and hamper our ability to discern clearly; but the light will illuminate.

Likewise Schutz would appear to be guilty in Goffman’s eyes because he calls the reality of the world of everyday life, the “working world,” the “paramount reality” and also gives it preferential status if not priority. Schutz, at least, he says, paid attention to the “possibility of uncovering the conditions that must be fulfilled if we are to generate one realm of “reality,” one “finite province of meaning.” Schutz further incorporated the notion of a “shock”⁹ as persons move from one world to another. Although in placing emphasis on the “working world” he was more “reserved” than James about its “objective character” since he gave priority to persons rather than the views of the observer/theorist, e.g. Schutz says, and he quotes: “We speak of provinces of meaning and not of subuniverses because it is the meaning of our experience and not the ontological structure of the objects which constitute reality” (Schutz 1962: 230).

Goffman takes this to mean that Schutz differs from James in that he consistently gives priority to the participants. Each subuniverse has a particular “cognitive style,” a phrase which he prefers to that of saying that each is “generative (according to) of certain structural principles” (Goffman 1974: 5). Actors may be bodily involved in their participation and each may be affecting and “be affected by the everyday world.” But for Goffman the preference is to consider the many in contrast to the singular – and any intimation of a unity or singularity is avoided by him. That is not to say that this is Schutz’s position but we’ll soon see how Goffman construes James and Schutz in this manner.

3.1 Excursus: Shock

In an extended quote of Schutz, Goffman (1974: 4) takes the use of the term “shock” (or “leap” accompanied by a “shock experience which radically alters the tension of consciousness”) to indicate a shift of the participant’s attention from one reality to another. In his view this transition is characterized much too abruptly. It signals a major shift as though the person could not hold more than two realities simultaneously or easily shift from one to the other without difficulty. In his view, transitions are readily accomplished by shifts or “transformations” and several layers, or laminations of different “meanings” are possible; the individual would have no difficulty in transitioning from one to another. The word “shock” connotes something major whereas “shift” or “transformation” seems more cognitive/intellectual, than one involving bodily involvement. His disagreement with Schutz on this issue is resolved through his use of the terms “key”, “footing” and “lamination,” his own concepts which, in part, describe how one can move easily from and between different “keyings.”

In addition, Goffman holds that multiple keyings (or re-keyings), virtually simultaneous, are possible, modifying the Schutzian notion of an entry or exit marked by a more “radical” movement of attention. Goffman opts to focus on the subject’s “cognitive style,” a term from Schutz which he favours along with “provinces of meaning” and it is clear that he wishes to focus on the subject’s view and experience rather than “the ontological structure of the objects which constitute reality.” Goffman would appear to accept a phenomenological stance when he makes statements like these, no matter that he may go off in another direction or contradict himself when he continues. Notwithstanding, in Frame Analysis, the focus is on the “organization of experience” and here, presumably, he means the subject’s experience.

Goffman is concerned not only with “shock” but other issues with which he does not agree and uses Garfinkel to support his interpretation.¹⁰ Garfinkel’s work, Goffman argues, “extended the argument about multiple realities by going on to look for rules which…allow us to generate a “world” of a given kind. Presumably a machine designed according to the proper specifications could grind out a reality of our choice.” (Goffman 1974: 5) Thus, Goffman sees the determination of a “reality” as looking for the rules that generate it – the analysis thus consisting of a search for the rules ― and the results would be equivalent to those which a “properly specified ‘machine’ could produce” and as we may choose.¹¹

For Goffman then, (1974: 5–6) reality is “a choice” for the person who specifies “the rules.” What Schutz delineated as the several features of a particular reality, e.g. fantasy, dream, the play, became for Goffman an arbitrary selection of “rules” to describe it. Here he does not see the characteristics of a particular “multiple reality” or “cognitive style” as emerging from the careful (inductive) analysis and description of “reality itself.” For Goffman, any number of “additional assumptions” might be delineated by those who are describing/analyzing it. The process is virtually mechanical since he proposes that a “machine” could “grind out the reality of our choice.” Note, however, that the machine is external to the situation and may not be a part of it just as the observer may be analyst and not participant. In a similar way, meaning depends on the set of rules – any analysis of social life would require examining such rules – and the task of the sociologist becomes one of uncovering and discovering the rules.

Furthermore, Goffman argues, although James and Schutz are “convincing” with respect to the difference in organization between the “world” of dreams and the world of everyday experience, they are less convincing when it comes to indicating how many different worlds there may be or in showing how the “rule-produced plane of being” of everyday, wide-awake life can be seen this way, if seen at all (p. 7).

Constitutive rules, then, also become a game, according to Goffman (1974: 6) and “any number can play forever.” And, since he equates realities or worlds with each having distinctive constitutive rules, one would suppose that there would be as many “realities” described as there would be interests among analysts. Goffman says (p. 6) “players usually come up with five or ten rules (as I will), but there are no grounds for thinking that a thousand additional assumptions might not be listed by others.” The “rules” may be virtually infinite – or run well into the thousands at the very least – and may focus primarily on what individuals may “be engrossed or carried away by” i.e. with the individual’s sense of what is real. The result can be that they claim reality for what they are only engrossed in. Goffman’s objective is to focus on experience and feeling or the sense of what is real; engrossment is not a necessary condition but may actually be a distraction.

Goffman thinks that we would be left with the analysis carried out by others, neglecting the perceptions, interests and attention given by participants. There may be “structural similarities” between the world of everyday life and other “worlds” but we would not know how such a relationship should “modify our view of everyday life.” That is, it is incumbent on analysts of “finite provinces of meaning” to show how interconnections or relations might modify their view of everyday life. Clearly Goffman believes they do not provide such connections and he seems to hold this as a criterion they should aspire to. Why they should is not clear; he merely offers the stipulation. He is only addressing tangentially here the question of the relation between “worlds” – a matter which we shall have to return to later. Goffman’s critical comments show a lack of understanding of “multiple realities” as formulated by Schutz.

It is in this section of his text that Goffman extensively quotes Schutz, offering a lengthy footnote (Goffman 1974:6, fn 11) which provides Schutz’s delineation of the six characteristics of the “cognitive style” of everyday life:

• 1. a specific tension of consciousness, namely wide-awakeness, originating in a full attention to life.

• 2. a specific epoché, namely suspension of doubt

• 3. a prevalent form of spontaneity, namely working…

• 4. a specific form of experiencing one’s self (the working self as a total self)

• 5. a specific form of sociality (the common intersubjective world of communication and social action)

• 6. a specific time perspective (the standard time originating in an interaction between dureé and cosmic time…)

These are at least some of the features of the cognitive style belonging to this particular province of meaning. As long as our experiences of this world – the valid as well as the invalidated ones – partake of this style we may consider this province of meaning as real, we may bestow upon it the accent of reality (Schutz 1962: 230–231).

And at this point Goffman ends¹² his consideration of the James/Schutz “line of thought” saying merely that subsequently others have picked it up even though their “initial stimulus came from sources not much connected historically with the phenomenological tradition” (Goffman 1974: 6–7). He gives no indication of who he might mean here – unless he has the authors mentioned immediately afterwards in mind. Here he places the “theater of the absurd” as found in the plays of Luigi Pirandello, the work by Gregory Bateson (A Theory of Play and Fantasy) in which a “usable” notion of bracketing is introduced (whatever this means); the realities of a play and non-play (“the real thing”) are examined – and – most importantly, the term “frame” – in a manner Goffman describes as similar to his own – is used.

Goffman also mentions as relevant sources the work of John Austin, Ludwig Wittgenstein, D.S. Schwayder (The Stratification of Behavior, 1965), Glaser and Strauss “Awareness Contexts and Social Interaction” (1969) as well as the “linguistically oriented disciplines which use the notion of ‘code’ as a device to include all events within its boundaries.” Even though he concedes that he has “borrowed extensively” from all of these he is clearly proceeding to produce his own account with his own particular focus. Despite these earlier explorations of a variety of perspectives – including James and Schutz – Goffman declares that he will “assume the right to pick (his) point of view, (his) motivational relevancies,” with the sole limitation being that his selection is “one which participants will easily recognize to be valid” (Goffman 1974: 8–9).

In the development of this perspective¹³ we find a procedure that Goffman has followed in his other writings: upon finding fault with other approaches, he will indicate what his own stance will be, justify it as having good grounds and even as being in agreement, in (most) (some) respects with the understandings which participants have – and as yielding important “insights.” He will use in his argument numerous relevant examples, illustrations and anecdotes drawn from a variety of sources. The amalgamation or synthesis will be one which suits his purposes in the analyses to come though it is not necessarily one which he will use again.

In Frame Analysis Goffman’s self professed overall aim is to isolate “basic frameworks of understanding available in our society for making sense out of events and to analyze the general vulnerabilities to which these frames of reference are subject.” (p. 10) Frame analysis would enable us to find the basic framework being used in a particular instance. (Later he will talk of “primary frameworks.” Presumably other frameworks are secondary or derivative.) Thus, the task is one of finding a relevant framework, the framework of understanding which will be used to make sense of what the world is for the participant. And, though the term “frame” is not clearly defined, if even defined at all, his mission seems to be to proceed as far as he can, to be selective, and to offer as many examples as will enable him to claim firm grounds for his notions.

As in his other studies, Goffman privileges the viewpoint of the observer – although as was noted, this book is concerned with the organization of experience and, thus, one must presume, the viewpoint of the participants. This is clear when he says, “one thing may momentarily appear to be what is really going on, in fact, what is actually happening is plainly a joke, or a dream, or an accident, or a mistake, or a misunderstanding, or a deception, or a theatrical performance, and so forth” (p. 10). This would clearly indicate that the participant may think he ‘knows’ and yet be mistaken. The observer would know; the participant merely thinks he knows. (G.P. my phrasing) This alternation is consistently Goffmanian and represents his take on sociology using frame analysis, i.e. the observer/sociologist is capable of knowing more clearly or with greater certainty (though he may at times also be confused) “what is really going on.”

Goffman proposes to offer basic or elementary terms for the subject even though they may be abstract and fail to meet the “standards of modern philosophy” (p. 11). He asks the reader to afford him a certain latitude and to read with charity in order that he may proceed smoothly instead of labouring under a cloud of critical suspicion.

4 Responses by Schutz

We should take stock here of the various criticisms which Goffman makes in these few pages and briefly respond, as Schutz might, though not in his more characteristic deliberate and tempered fashion. It is Schutz’s position that:

• 1. Phenomenology is interested in the careful, detailed and systematic study of empirical instances of interactional phenomena.

• 2. Phenomenology is interested in careful, detailed and systematic analyses of finite provinces of meaning or ‘cognitive styles’ as these operate for persons. Please note that I say “careful, detailed and systematic” because there are phenomenologically inspired studies that may not meet these criteria. Nevertheless, such instances do not obviate Schutz’s position just as a few misguided practitioners do not outweigh the legitimate efforts of the majority.

• 3. “Paramount reality” may be held to be paramount by many (most) phenomenologists but it does not necessarily detract from the effort to delineate other and varied realities as these engage the participant.¹⁴

• 4. Schutz does not pay close attention to how easily or rapidly transitions may occur, except to say that “shock” occurs frequently in daily life and reminds us that the world of working is not the sole finite province of meaning. On this matter of transitions Goffman may have a point.

• 5. Schutz does not attempt to enumerate or even hint at how many “worlds” or “cognitive styles” there may be nor does he suggest that his enumeration has done anything more than point in the direction that may be taken by others.

• 6. His analyses of multiple realities is intended to begin their study and in no way is he claiming to be complete or definitive.¹⁵

• 7. Phenomenology does represent a different approach within the social or human sciences and cannot simply be added to or amalgamated with any number of other approaches as it may suit the researcher. In this sense phenomenology is an approach and perspective which needs to be explored/followed/utilized by the empirical researcher and not simply read in order to glean insights without regard for the methods and means whereby its results were achieved. Goffman was a “reader” of many different studies/approaches and it would appear that, in this case, he is “reading” phenomenology, not “doing” it.

• 8. He is concerned with the “world of daily life” and is quite explicit that this world is engaged in while one is in the natural attitude. Goffman assumes the natural attitude as that which persons adopt but makes no mention of it.

• 9. Schutz assumes that the “world of daily life’ means an ‘intersubjective world which existed long before our birth, experienced and interpreted by Others, our predecessors, as an organized world.” “Worlds” are not the result of creative efforts or the development of constitutive rules (“analogous to alchemy” as Goffman says) such that any number can play. Goffman is incorrect in his interpretation and confuses one of Garfinkel’s papers with Schutz’s position.

• 10. Goffman never considers the natural attitude, does not identify it, refer to it, or make use of it in any of his analyses. It can be argued that Goffman works within the natural attitude (and the world of everyday life) and does not question it or subject it to examination nor does he seem to be aware of its features (Schutz orig. 1962, 1971: 208–209). One could say the same with respect to the notion of “bracketing” which he does not seem to understand. He does not comment on the pragmatic motive with which persons in the natural attitude in the world of daily life operate and only indirectly praises the idea that people are bodily enmeshed in the world of working.

• 11. Schutz’s concern with meaning differs from Goffman’s interpretation. Goffman says that meaning is “dependent on a closed, finite set of rules.”

• 12. The difference between different worlds or finite provinces of meaning can be ascertained by comparing and contrasting them but the analyst is not thereby obliged to specify how many different worlds there may be (Goffman 1974: 5) This is a demand which Goffman makes.

• 13. Neither does the analyst have to show, as Goffman demands, “whether everyday wide awake life can actually be seen as but one rule produced plane of being, if so seen at all” (Goffman 1974: 5). Here Goffman’s misinterpretations led him to raise questions which a careful study might have enabled him to answer.

• 14. Schutz particularly wants to consider the world of scientific contemplation and how it relates to the world of everyday life. This is an issue which Goffman does not address.

In contrast then to Goffman, Schutz’s analysis of multiple realities would lead to studies of the constitutive features of any reality; the work of analysis cannot be said to have been concluded, therefore, but only begun. Goffman’s criticism that all of the many realities have not been delineated represents his desire for completion whereas Schutz, beginning in 1945, shows that the task has just begun.

In short, Goffman’s misinterpretations and selective readings lead him to dismiss James/Schutz and any possible relevance which a phenomenological approach might have for his project. His misreadings, I would claim, enable him to be dismissive, a tendency which he undoubtedly had from the start, while at the same time professing an interest in and awareness of the works of others who have studied social interaction.¹⁶ In his interview with Verhoeven in 1980 he goes so far as to say that he was influenced by Schutz. As he continues Frame Analysis it becomes clear that he had his own schema in mind and primarily wished to show that certain frames are (what Schutz might call) “imposed relevances,” i.e. are already in the world and are not “created” or “negotiated” by participants, e.g., ceremony, ritual, drama, game etc. He does cite Schutz once on issues of motivation or relevance (Goffman 1974: 5) but does not consistently use even his own set of concepts as he proceeds.

5 What Are Frames?

The terms Goffman will focus on in this book are frame, footing, strip, keys, keying, laminations, transformations, example or illustration, and reflexivity among others – each taken up briefly or offhandedly, awaiting fuller explication in subsequent chapters. As we shall see, Goffman does not necessarily use his own concepts – consistently or frequently – and is generally intent on using examples and other sources to illustrate and emphasize his positions. For him, analysis consists of collecting and arranging – in providing insights rather than in systematic exposition.

“Frame,”¹⁷ and Goffman says he uses the term similar to the way Bateson does, becomes the definition of the situation as it is built up with “principles of organization which govern (social) events and our subjective involvement in them…” (Goffman 1974: 10) He offers this as his definition of frame and states that it will include as many basic elements as he can identify. Thus, for Goffman, “frame” is not clearly defined but rather is a “slogan,” as he says, to refer to how he goes about examining the organization of experience.¹⁸

Scheff (2006: 77) is just as explicit. He says frame is not explained. The definition of frame is both “casual and vague” and, Scheff argues, Goffman fails to explain what the problem is that frame analysis is “intended to solve.” As a result of these shortcomings, Scheff contends that there are no compelling reasons to subscribe to Goffman’s use of the concept.

Later, however, it seems clear that Goffman is proposing a way of including context in his analysis and Scheff goes on to say that frame analysis is a term that refers to the definition of the situation and, more broadly, the context as it is received and “made sense of” by participants. In this way, Goffman can criticize conversation analysis (or ethnomethodology) for not including “the larger context” and claims that he is aware of this omission and is able to rectify it in his own studies.¹⁹

Context, of course, is another of those important but vague terms that plague the social sciences. Nevertheless, Scheff, for one, is convinced that Goffman is “unpacking’ the idea of context in this book and focuses his own comments on what he considers this important aspect of the book.

“Strip” is used by Goffman to refer to “any arbitrary slice or cut from the stream of ongoing activity, including here sequences of happenings, real or fictive, as seen from the perspective of those subjectively involved in sustaining an interest in them. A “strip” will refer to “any raw batch of occurrences (of whatever status in reality) that one wants to draw attention to as a starting point for analysis” (Goffman 1974: 10).

By this stage in his Introduction to Frame Analysis, Goffman has abandoned the notion of “multiple realities,” James/Schutz, and indeed phenomenology itself in order to advance his own views. Although Goffman’s views here seem similar to those espoused in earlier publications, at least as far as his methods are concerned, there is one significant departure – he says that he is interested in the “organization of experience,” by which he presumably means the subjective experience of the participant in the situation. This would seem to involve a serious inquiry into what is subjectively experienced, not attributed to the experiencing participant. To this end, a method involving more than direct observation would seem necessary, and yet, that is not the preferred method which Goffman will follow.²⁰

Goffman argues that concepts and themes will be developed as they appear necessary and/or relevant. He will hold to no specific sequence because, as he says, conceptual introductions are generally circular rather than linear – their introduction and use is more important than their meaning. Too heavy a reliance on concepts or words or frames would force him to “re-apply in every chapter […] a term that has already been applied” and would make the study “more entangled” since repetition becomes necessary (Goffman 1974: 11).

Even discussions about frame would then require discussions about the frame used to analyze the frame. Goffman’s preference is to proceed along the lines of commonsense assumptions that “ordinary language and ordinary writing practices are sufficiently flexible to allow anything that one wants to express to get expressed.” (Goffman 1974: 11) Similarly, the analysis of his methods of using illustrations, examples, and cases in point to get at “folk theories (which … use) such devices” would also require the use of examples and illustrations thus “vitiating the analysis.”

With respect to dealing with reflexivity Goffman then claims that ordinary language will be adequate, that the “reflexive problem” need not displace other inquiries and he can point out when he is considering reflexive issues. He believes that his readers will understand (in the same way he does) by virtue of the context of use, and may not be able to explicate just how such understanding is achieved (Goffman 1974: 12). Similarly, he argues, the term “real” can also be understood if used “carefully,” until such time as an analysis of it may be needed.

As an additional thought, which functions here as a disclaimer, Goffman adds that “there are lots of good grounds for doubting the kind of analysis [he himself presents]. … It is too bookish, too general too removed from field work to have a good chance of being anything more than a mentalistic adumbration” (Goffman 1974: 13). His self-deprecations confirm his awareness of these issues as well as his desire to adopt a humbler stance in dealing with them. His claim is that “nonetheless, some of the things in this world seem to urge the analysis.” Here, his “compulsion” can be seen as an answer to this insistence, and, although he may handle the job “badly”, at least he will proceed to attempt it.

In this fashion Goffman excuses in advance any problems or insoluble matters he may concern himself with. The claim is reduced to an “at least I tried” attitude and is thereby designed to absolve and reward himself at the same time.

As another disclaimer Goffman says that he is not concerned here with the organization of society – with social organization or social structure – but with the “structure of experience” (Goffman 1974: 13) which persons may have at any “moment of their social lives.” Society is first, he says, and the individual is second, but his study will nevertheless deal with the second. This stance leaves him open to the criticism that he is politically conservative, (see also Psathas 1977) since he is not focusing on the differences between those who have and those who have not. He can admit this is true, but turns to address others and says they would need to try to awaken those who are in the sleep of “false consciousness.” He claims that he is not so much lulling people to sleep (“providing a lullaby”) but rather watching the “way they snore.” This justification (excuse) allows him to proceed as he wishes – granting his critics their point – but not yielding to it.²¹ As for the kinds of data and observations²² he employs he states that he is aware of his repetitions and liberal use of footnotes but is only trying to “order his thoughts” (Goffman 1974: 14).

There may be little value in anecdotes and newspaper stories since they do not cover the ordinary and usual. Nevertheless, in their way of providing “unity, coherence, pointedness, self-completeness and drama” they “typify” events rather than “facts” and this makes them eminently suitable. These stories and anecdotes are presented as “clarifying depictions,” as frame fantasies which offer a view of the way the world works and a celebration of beliefs rather than a questioning of them (Goffman 1974: 14–15).

Collected over the years, for a variety of purposes, Goffman is aware that he is not engaged in “systematic sampling” and will even add to this collection such materials as cartoons, comics, novels, the cinema and the stage (Goffman 1974: 15). They are readily available to anyone and his use is in no way intended to be exclusive or even original. Writers and journalists have used them, sometimes to find out more about the nature of society. (We might note that phenomenologists have argued that it is possible to find essences by examining particulars but Goffman does not say this.) His approach is simply to use what is “easy to hand” and their ready availability can also indicate that others are familiar with the issues they raise. In this sense he can be reasonably confident that others are already familiar with matters about which he may choose to write.

Goffman then goes on to comment on the writing of Prefaces and Introductions, matters which I will not take up except to say that his reflexive comments on these display acuity and verbal flexibility. He is, in these short passages, again displaying his unique approach and adding to the current discussion of frame analysis by, in a sense, using different frames (and footings) without necessarily referring openly to these.

6 Conclusion

Thus, with regard to both Schutz and later the ethnomethodologists and conversation analysts, Goffman chose his own way, critiqued others, read them continually, but never really agreed with them. His uniqueness as an ironic critic of society and his many different writings cast him as a well-read and original writer/analyst of social interaction. But his insistence on his own approach led him to be less interested in achieving integration with the approaches of others. His contributions, deprived of the advocacy of students or successors, resulted in his being less recognized than might otherwise have been the case. His efforts to distance himself from other analysts in the social sciences, e.g. Schutz, led him to prefer to work alone. His writings thus became distinctive in their insightfulness and in no way indebted to any particular analytic schema. His conceptual researches enabled him to identify what to him was a distinctive “interaction order” and to draw attention to the importance of studying it.

His differences with the work of conversation analysts and ethnomethodologists led him to be critical of these approaches rather than trying to find points of agreement which might advance his own formulations or to discover additional ways to study the interaction order. He examined and discarded Schutz, James and others and, we might add, phenomenology. Notwithstanding, his criticisms are often mere statements of preference rather than carefully developed critical arguments. One frequently has the impression that he merely wanted to show that he was different and favored his own conceptualizations. He appears not to have been open or accepting to formulations by any other major contributors to the study of meaning or “reality.”, e.g. James, Schutz, Garfinkel, and others.

Schutz, on the other hand, remained consistent and analytic in his study of “multiple realities” or “finite provinces of meaning.”²³ He tried to build upon the work of his predecessors rather than critiquing them with a view to substituting his own formulations for theirs. Each of the various realities which he identifies may be analyzed, at least to begin with, by using the conceptual framework which he introduces. By opening new fields for the study of meaning his analyses succeed in presenting many different realities (finite provinces of meaning) and point to an infinite number of worlds. His continuing focus on the world of everyday life leads him to consider how it retains its dominance or priority even though other realities may be entered into. In contrast to Goffman, he sees such movements as more transformative, as his discussion of ‘shock’ demonstrates, whereas laminations, for Goffman, not only allow for easy transitions from one reality to another but imply their co-existence and a non-radical transition from one to the other.

Goffman’s reliance on a common-sense understanding of his work is further indication of his preference for less theoretical or abstract ventures. It is the empirical study which attracts his interest and it is such studies that he sees as primary, certainly less philosophical and abstract than the work of James and Schutz. Goffman’s work remains original and unique but cannot be said to add very much to our understanding of “multiple realities.” Instead, his original formulations (frame, footing, strip, keys, keying, laminations, etc.) may be understood as offering a different approach to the study of the meaning of “reality.”