Contributions To Phenomenology 68

Michael Staudigl
George Berguno *Editors*

Schutzian Phenomenology and Hermeneutic Traditions

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Reflections on the Relationship of "Social Phenomenology" and Hermeneutics in Alfred Schutz. An Introduction

Michael Staudigl

The present volume assembles contributions that disclose and assess the hermeneutic potential of Alfred Schutz's thought. While the importance of Schutz's work for the hermeneutics of the social sciences (*sozialwissenschaftliche Hermeneutik*) as well as for a large variety of "interpretive methodologies" is evident, it is not regarded as a major influence in philosophical hermeneutics and hermeneutic phenomenology. To relate Schutz and hermeneutics is, therefore, not a self-evident undertaking. Moreover, Schutz himself hardly ever mentions any classical hermeneutic positions, not even Heidegger's "hermeneutics of facticity." As regards the later hermeneutic phenomenologies of Gadamer and Ricœur, Schutz's premature death prevented him from ever knowing or appreciating their work.

From an empirical point of view, hermeneutics has no major bearing on Schutz's *work*. Schutz's *thought*, however, makes extensive use of hermeneutic categories. Concepts like "interpretation," "understanding" or "explication," not to mention the basic hermeneutic categories of "meaning" or "sense," are omnipresent and are of paramount operative importance. In his study "The Stranger" Schutz goes so far as to define his method as a "general theory of interpretation" (Schutz 1964: 91). Yet hermeneutics is not only conceptually relevant to his work; a systematic appraisal of Schutz's work reveals a *fundamental hermeneutical trait* throughout his oeuvre. This is already partly evident in his early masterpiece "The Meaningful Constitution of the Social World," but is made explicit in the unfinished "Structures of the Life-World." This is due to the fact that Schutz explicates the "meaningful structures" of social reality not only through recourse to the meaning-bestowing activities of a transcendental subject, but as an originally interactive and, hence, historic process

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of "sense formation."[1] In other words, Schutz's "mundane phenomenology" does not exhaust itself in the explication of "subjective meaning," i.e., in the attempt to *understand the understanding* of the social actor, which was indeed the major task of his early phenomenological reformulation of Max Weber's "interpretive sociology." For Schutz, the self-constitution of the self and, consequently, the constitution of social meaning, rather takes place as a performative articulation within the pregiven senses of the phenomenal field and its horizontal, i.e., its historic, social, and cultural pre-determinations. This is evident later in Schutz's ambitious attempt at *systematically integrating his account of social action with his theory of the life-world, as well as with his reflections on relevance*. Inasmuch as he focuses on the pre-reflective and hence passive genesis of relevancies, which motivate our patterns of interpretation and action, his approach can be termed '*proto-hermeneutical*'; inasmuch as he deals with the "limits of understanding," which appear in our interactional processes of understanding and thus become genetic conditions of understanding as such, it is *explicitly hermeneutical*.

By focusing on those pre-reflective processes that generate the life-world as a dynamic nexus of sense that is not only *reproduced* in social action but also *co-determines* it, Schutz reformulates the "hermeneutic circle" in social-phenomenological terms. Notwithstanding the controversial discussion regarding the status and scope of a so-called "social phenomenology,"[2] (*Sozialphänomenologie*) Schutz's approach might thus be called a *hermeneutical social phenomenology*. This appears to be all the more appropriate, since the basic phenomenological trait of his account—i.e., the thematization of a primordial sociality as the horizon wherein the "things themselves" appear—is intrinsically coupled with the hermeneutical gesture of questioning back into the social conditioning of this horizon's meaningfulness.

Concretely viewed this implies that phenomenology and hermeneutics function as *reciprocal correctives* for each other in Schutz's account: On one hand, the phenomenological description of experiences of transcendence that we are confronted with at the "limits of the life-world" (ranging from imaginative literature and the extraordinary appeal of others to the borderline experience of the death-camp), limits all too comprehensive attempts at understanding and makes room for Schutz's theory of "multiple realities," which accounts for the possibility of the coexistence of incompossible projects of interpretation. On the other hand, the hermeneutical attentiveness to the pre-reflective genesis of sense, to the symbolic

[1] For Husserl, at least since the *Crisis*, the process of constitution escapes the confines of subjective "sense-bestowal" as delineated in his 'Ideas pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology' and the 'transcendental turn' they promoted. In his later genetic perspective, he rather considers constitution as an interdependent and dynamic process of active sense-bestowal (*Sinngebung*), passive sense-formation (*Sinnbildung*) and the symbolic institution of sense (*Sinnstiftung*). Whereas sense-bestowing acts refer to the subjective registry of experience, symbolic institutions relate to the level of intersubjectivity, while the passive processes of sense-formation unfold in the back of our consciousness, i.e. in embodiment and expression.

[2] This refers to a long-standing discussion that seems to date back at least to the 1970s in the United States (cf. Hall 1977); for a recent orientation see Bird (2009).

over-determinations of our lived experience and to the independent life of semiotic processes require a profound phenomenological effort: they urge us to include those phenomena into our phenomenological description that not only escape their reduction to the authority of a meaning bestowing consciousness, but—be it in terms of *texts*, *discourses*, or, finally, *media structures*—at once co-determine its concrete experiential genesis.

Against this background—under the twofold sign of the irreducibility of sociality as well as the discursive irretrievability of transcendence—the contributions to this volume address the productive intertwining of phenomenology and hermeneutics in Schutz's thought. They do so by referring to a broad variety of hermeneutical accounts in philosophy and social theory that are inspired by Schutz's thought. As regards the latter, their significance is that it demonstrates that Schutz was indeed among the very first *interdisciplinary* thinkers. It also attests to the fruitful impulses that his ideas pose for a dialogue between the social sciences, the humanities, and philosophy. Confirmation of this is found in the sociologically orientated contributions to this volume, which do not shy away from addressing genuinely philosophical problems. It can also be found in the philosophical contributions, which, in their turn, take seriously Schutz's starting point in the paramount reality of our "everyday life-world" as a major challenge for the very status of their reflections.

The papers that comprise this volume should be viewed against this background of a reciprocal insemination of phenomenological philosophy and social theory that presents itself in hermeneutical terms. The volume is divided into four parts. The contributions in the first part situate Schutz's thought in the *context of hermeneutic theories and traditions*. The opening paper by Thomas S. Eberle addresses the basic question concerning the "adequacy of understanding." The author critically reassesses the overall methodological significance of this concept in Schutz's thought and further demonstrates its relevance for recent qualitative research in the social sciences. Martin Endreß's contribution examines the heterogeneous history of "understanding sociology" and clarifies the extent to which it was influenced by hermeneutic traditions. Furthermore, he addresses the constitutive role of non-understanding in all understanding, and, viewed against this background, drafts a rigorously self-reflective type of 'understanding sociology' (*verstehende Soziologie*) that seeks to thematize the generative interdependence of subjective, inter-subjective, and trans-subjective sense structures. Hisashi Nasu's article poses the question whether—and if so, under which conditions—a *non-reductive* "sociology of knowledge" is possible. By reassessing Karl Mannheim's approach in the light of Schutz's theory of the life-world, which connects a theory of social knowledge with his proto-hermeneutical theory of relevance, the author provides an outline of such a position. Lester Embree's article presents the results of empirical research on the usage and frequency of hermeneutical concepts in Schutz's American works. On this basis (and by showing that Schutz does not readily equate experience and interpretation), he refutes those positions that regard Schutz as an "extreme interpretationist."

The papers constituting the second section deal with *theoretical and conceptual reassessments of Schutz's thought*. This section opens with a systematic presentation

by Ilja Srubar who argues that Schutz's "pragmatic theory of the life world" serves as the basis for elaborating a comprehensive "hermeneutics of the social sciences" (*sozialwissenschaftliche Hermeneutik*). As the author shows, Schutz's "theory of the sign" allows for the integration of reflections on semantics, media, and discourses in his theory of the life-world, thus enabling us to consider the semiotic order of the life-world as a co-constitutive dimension of its primarily pragmatically meaningful constitution. By expanding Schutz's "theory of the life-world in a similar direction," Ruth Ayaß's contribution aims at uncovering what she calls "media structures" of the life-world. Her article thus reflects the central problem of Schutz's late works—the question concerning the invariant structures of our life-worlds—and applies it creatively to the omnipresent phenomenon of various media that shape our (post)modern life-worlds. In this context, Ayaß's overarching question concerns the problem of how media modify the paramount reality of the everyday world and how they affect the interactional order. Andreas Stascheit's article shows that music can be understood as a central guiding thread for Schutz's hermeneutics of the social world. Consulting Schutz's yet unpublished manuscripts on the phenomenology of music, Stascheit explains how our pre-predicative openness to the aesthetic world and its specific temporal, pragmatic, and "rational" structuring functions as the primal, yet largely implicit frame for Schutz's understanding of sociality.

The third section contains contributions that explore the *structures and limits of the practical world*. Daniel Bischur's contribution uses Schutz's theory of the "world of working" (*Wirkwelt*) for a sociological explication of scientific practice in biological laboratory work including animal experiments. Against this background, the author develops a "theory of the scientific world of working" and scrutinizes the everyday pragmatics of scientific action, thereby showing that pragmatics not only affect "scientific working," but effectively also "scientific theorizing." Annette Hilt's paper develops a "hermeneutics of manifold transcendences" that takes the experience of the limits of the social world as its starting point. In a phenomenological-hermeneutical dialogue between Schutz's approach and Imre Kertész's autobiographical expression of lived limit experiences, she focuses on experiences that escape socially derived patterns of typification. The crucial question raised by Hilt concerns the possibility of a traumatized subject creating a space for understanding and mastering a world that has lost its sense. Following Kertész, Hilt finds this potential in the power of expression which implies the capacity to access other provinces of meaning beyond the relevancies of the everyday life-world, in which the singularity of experience can be preserved. Ion Copoeru's article addresses the problem of normativity in Schutz's thought. He argues that Schutz's approach to an inter-subjective dimension of lived normativity is helpful for elaborating a practical-hermeneutical approach to law and legal practices in modern judicialized societies. Moreover, such an approach carries the potential to overcome the shortcomings of traditional legal hermeneutics. Finally, Bernhard Waldenfels' contribution provides a fundamental revision of traditional moral philosophies that follows up critically on Schutz's prioritization of everydayness. Faced with the apparent "moral abstinence" of Schutz which threatens to reduce his pragmatic theory of the life-world to an everyday pragmatism, Waldenfels searches for gateways to what is beyond the

everyday *in* the everydayness. According to the author, we need to be sensitive to this beyond and its foreignness to prevent the everyday and its lived morals from becoming banal and effete.

The papers of the fourth, concluding part of this edition offer hermeneutic *investigations into "multiple realities," their inner structure, and logic*. The first paper by George Psathas offers a comparison of Goffman and Schutz that focuses on Schutz's conception of "multiple realities." By contextualizing Schutz's views in the framework of Goffman's critique, the author sheds new light on this conception and its shortcomings, thus paving the way for concrete applications of this concept. In this context, Michael Barber's analysis of Schutz's Goethe manuscripts is exemplary. He elaborates a hermeneutics of "multiple realities" that seeks to investigate the constitutive relationships between the pragmatically relevant everyday world and the literary "reality". To clarify this question, which is undoubtedly of paramount interest to all textual hermeneutics, Barber shows how the phenomenological epoché enables us to enter the intrinsically meaningful "reality" of literature and to unveil its inner logic. Jochen Dreher's paper also deals with Schutz's Goethe manuscripts. He shows that Schutz's specific interpretive method—as based in his theory of the symbol and the life-world—offers a viable instrument for analyzing aesthetic experiences in general. As Dreher argues, this results from the fact that Schutz's approach allows us to focus on the inherently meaningful field that unfolds between author, artwork, and recipient, in which the very "phenomenon of art"—understood as a "reinterpretation" of the life-worldly structures of relevance—originally unfolds. Dirk Tänzler's article, finally, clarifies to what extent images and aesthetic experiences in general are accessible to hermeneutic interpretation. Working with a case study, he shows that the hermeneutic endeavour to understand aesthetic products and their medial staging is not only apt when considering their "objective content," but also when considering the symbolic power of the media; that is, the socializing functions of their identifying potentials.

The majority of the contributions to this volume date from a conference in honour of Alfred Schutz, which took place at the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna, Austria, in September 2007. I would like to wholeheartedly thank the institute, the various funding institutions, and all the people who helped to make this event a great success: Klaus Nellen, for his support, Barbara Weisswasser and Giovanni Leghissa for proposing to organize an event in the hope of fostering interest in Schutz's work and legacy, George Berguno for accepting a lot of work in co-editing this volume, and, last but by no means least, Evelyn S. Lang, who travelled from the United States to participate in and open this conference in honour of her father.

In the context of applying phenomenology to issues of the practical world like politics, the arts, and science, the contributions to this volume seek to underscore the lasting influence of Schutz's approach for recent developments in social theory and its critical engagements with philosophy. In addition, I very much hope that this edition will help to show that research activities on Schutz in Europe, especially in its German speaking parts, are again on the rise. In this context, I should, finally, mention that a collection of essays in German, which is partly identical to this

edition, has meanwhile appeared under the title "Alfred Schutz und die Hermeneutik," at UVK, Konstanz, in 2010. There is, of course, no longer the need to retranslate Schutz's American works into German (as there was some decades ago). Yet, there is still, I believe, a deep need to foster exchange between all those who are interested in promoting Schutz's ideas but who are, all too often, lost without a translation. Hence, scholarship and research on Schutz also requires, I believe, some translational work. That being so, I would, finally, like to thank the translators, the Editors of this Series, the publishers for their willingness to make this project possible, and, last but not least, George Berguno for his willingness to run this adventurous editorial project together with me as well as Mahon O'Brien for his Herculean work with the flood of linguistic corrections.

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Part I
Schutzian Phenomenology and Hermeneutic Traditions

Methodological Implications of Phenomenological Life-World Analysis

Thomas S. Eberle

Alfred Schutz's work is obviously multilayered and can thus be examined from a variety of perspectives. His central motive, however, was, without question, the contribution of an analysis of the life-world to the methodology of the social sciences. The avowed goal of his major work *The Phenomenology of the Social World* was to develop a "philosophically founded theory of method" for social scientific research (Schutz 1967: xxxi). Despite the various topical ramifications of his work, Schutz never lost sight of this goal. Accordingly, his blueprints for the structure of his planned opus *The Structures of the Life-World* features a chapter titled "Sciences of[1] the Life-World" (Schutz and Luckmann 1973: xxii) as a quasi-crowning conclusion. In this concluding work, the diverse facets of the phenomenological analysis of the life-world were therefore arranged to culminate in a philosophical founding of the sciences of the life-world. Since Luckmann decided to excise this chapter, when editing the *Structures* posthumously, interpreters of Schutz less familiar with the entirety of the corpus have sometimes lost sight of this fundamental objective. This article then looks to explicate and discuss some methodological implications of the phenomenological life-world analysis for the social sciences.

My line of argumentation goes as follows: In the first chapter I discuss Schutz's original plans for a philosophical foundation for the methodology of the social sciences. I begin with his reflections in *The Phenomenology of the Social World* and present his plan for the final, omitted chapter of the *The Structures of the Life-World* on the basis of his index cards. In the second chapter I briefly sketch Schutz's postulates of social-scientific constructs and focus in the third chapter on the postulate of adequacy which is the crucial one.

[1] The English edition uses the expression "sciences *in* the life-world," but this is a mistake: in his German note-books Schutz explicitly refers to "sciences *of* the life-world".

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Many social scientists are not aware that the postulate of causal adequacy originated in statistics and jurisprudence and was introduced to sociology by Max Weber who analogously coined the postulate of meaning adequacy. In the first section (Sect. 3.1) I reconstruct the history and meaning of these two postulates in Weber's sociology. In the second section (Sect. 3.2) I describe Schutz's reflections on both postulates, his reasons for rejecting the postulate of causal adequacy and why he only adopts meaning adequacy for social scientific constructs of social actions. In Sect. 3.3 I propose a radicalization of Schutz's loosely formulated postulate of adequacy, a more restrictive interpretation that would allow it to be used as an effective criterion for evaluating research approaches as well as empirical studies. I use unpublished pieces of Schutz's correspondence in which he criticizes the approach of Austrian Economics, in particular of his mentor Ludwig Mises, and argue that Schutz would sympathize with such a radicalized interpretation, although he never admitted as much in public. In the fourth chapter I present some recent developments of qualitative research approaches that are based on Schutz's life-world analysis and which attempt to achieve *adequate* empirical research.[2]

1 Phenomenological Life-World Analysis as a Foundation of the Social Sciences

The Phenomenology of the Social World had a clear structure in this regard: In the "Statement of Our Problem" (first chapter) Schutz laid out his problem and adapted Max Weber's theory of action as a foundation for interpretative sociology, but also critically analyzed his notion of meaning since it is beset with ambiguities. Then, he formulated his intent "to determine the precise nature of the *phenomenon of meaning*, and to do this by an analysis of the constituting function" in order to "analyze step by step the meaning structure of the social world. By following this procedure we shall be able to anchor the methodological apparatus of interpretative sociology at a far deeper point than Max Weber was able to do" (Schutz 1967: 13). The second chapter elaborates on "the constitution of meaningful lived experience in the constitutor's own stream of consciousness", and therefore on the polythetic processes of the constitution of meaning and their temporality, the formation of contexts of meaning and experience, the attentional modifications of meaning, the composition of the world of experience and its ordering under interpretive schemes, the notion of action and its "in-order-to" and "because"-motive as well as the self-explication from a particular Here-Now-and-Thus. In the third chapter, Schutz delineates the "foundations of a theory of intersubjective understanding" in which he takes the step from transcendental to mundane phenomenology with the "general thesis of alter ego in the natural perception" and describes intersubjective understanding as a signitive apprehension of the other through signs and indications in acts of

[2] Parts of the following argumentation were published in Eberle (2010).

self-explication. At this point he introduces the distinction between subjective and objective meaning as well as the notion that complete understanding is not possible (because of the differing stocks of knowledge and relevance systems), rather only approximations to it are. In the fourth chapter, he addresses "the structure of the social world" and exposes how processes of understanding differ according to the mode of givenness of the alter ego: While we can engage with members of the realm of directly experienced social reality in face-to-face interactions and vis-à-vis situations, the realm of contemporaries and the realm of predecessors can only be grasped in the form of types. In the concluding fifth chapter Schutz reflects on "some basic problems of interpretative sociology" and draws a series of conclusions from his concept of proto-hermeneutics for the methodology of the social sciences. He elaborates on the method of the ideal type, the problem of causal adequacy and meaning-adequacy, the social scientist's observation of the world of contemporaries, interpretative sociology's preference for rational action types and the key problem of the social sciences: how objective meaning-contexts can be generated from subjective meaning-contexts.

The Phenomenology of the Social World is – in my view – Alfred Schutz's key work. It lays the foundation for all further streams of reflection in his later works. Compared to the analytical depth and systematic approach of the analyses found here, some of his later examinations are less elaborate – this is especially true of his methodological considerations. On the other hand, he expanded the spectrum of his analysis with important additions, particularly through his contributions concerning the life-world as the unquestioned ground of science (subsequent to the *Crisis*-book by Husserl [1936] 1970), on multiple realities (referring to William James 1907) as well as through the distinction between the everyday world and the world of science and the elaboration of their interrelation. Because of this, two and a half decades later a more sophisticated view on the methodology of the social sciences had emerged. According to the outline of chapters for *The Structures of the Life-World* preserved in his index cards that has commendably been included in the appendix of the second volume of the *Structures* (Schutz and Luckmann 1989: 159–324), Schutz had intended the following structure for the systematical synthesis of his work:

1. The Life-World of the Natural Attitude
2. Stratifications of the Life-World
3. Knowledge of the Life-World. Relevance and Typicality
4. The Life-World as a Province of Praxis
5. The Transcendent Elements of the Life-World and Their Mastery Through Signs and Symbols
6. Sciences in the Life-World

Luckmann refrained from publishing this planned final chapter. He gave two main reasons for this: first, Schutz's drafts did not seem to add much essential to his paper "Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action" (Schutz 1962a), which constitutes the most substantial methodological contribution after *The Phenomenology of the Social World*. Secondly, Luckmann explains that his

own intentions differed from those of Alfred Schutz and that due to the lack of directions, he could not have written this chapter true to Schutz's intent (Luckmann 1973: xvii). One can understand Luckmann's reasons for not including the chapter, but, as a result, the immanent interrelation of Schutz's analysis of the life-world and the methodology of the social sciences is easily overlooked. That the original index cards have not been reproduced in the new (German) edition of the *Structures* (Schütz and Luckmann 2003) could make matters even worse.

I will sketch out the structure envisioned by Schutz for the planned final chapter shortly and which arguments he formulated for it (Schutz and Luckmann 1989: 177–180):

(a) *Life-world as the unexamined ground of all sciences*: Scientific research begins with what has become questionable, which has been taken for granted before, and is embedded in a horizon of what is taken for granted. As Husserl has shown in the *Crisis* ([1936] 1970), the life-world precedes all science; even the natural sciences take root in the life-world, and so does the genealogy of logics (Husserl [1939] 1973).

(b) *On the phenomenology of the natural attitude*: Husserl's postulate to explicate the life-world through a phenomenological analysis of the constituting function would have been described and discussed here. Schutz agreed with Husserl's notion of "*Geisteswissenschaft*" and its role and critically discussed the eidetic analyses of social formations by his students Edith Stein and Gerda Walther. The central question was whether a real ontology of the social world would be possible in the form of an eidetic science. As we know, with his theory of the constitution of the social world, Schutz chose an alternative path to what he called a "picture book phenomenology."

(c) *Natural science and social science*: In the first subchapter of this part, Schutz intended to resolve the alleged difference between the methods of the natural sciences and the humanities. Both work empirically and both strive for a logical consistency in their findings, yet the logical positivist presupposes precisely the subject-matter of the social sciences, namely the social world. The second subchapter addressed the topic of understanding and explaining. For Schutz, understanding is not a category of the social sciences, but a method of everyday practice in the life-world. Here, one needs to distinguish between self-explication by the actor, the intersubjective understanding by a partner who takes part in a social interaction, the understanding of an uninvolved observer in the everyday world and lastly the understanding of a scientific observer in the world of contemporaries. The postulate of the "subjectively intended meaning" implies that one needs to look for the meaning that the action has for the actor. The radical critique of behaviorism is accordingly deduced from this position. In the third subchapter, finally, the fundamental difference between the thought objects of the natural and the social sciences is elaborated: Unlike the world of nature, the social world is always meaningfully pre-interpreted. The two-level-theory follows from this: Social scientific constructs are second-order constructs that need to refer to first-order constructs.

(d) *What is the subject-matter of social science?* Here, Schutz poses the question as to the relationship between the social sciences and the common-sense of the everyday life-world and asks what social reality actually is. Two things are central in this regard: first, foundation in a theory of action in the tradition of Max Weber and his methodological individualism, that is, in the attribution of everything collective to the actions of concrete individuals. And second, the distinction between common-sense and scientific interpretations of social actions.

(e) *The social scientist and his situation*: In this section, Schutz first differentiates between scientific practice (in the everyday world) and the scientific attitude. He then describes what the decision to take this theoretical leap involves for the (social) scientist: He is a "disinterested observer", who stands outside of the lifeworldly situation and brackets his biography and the relevance systems rooted therein. Instead, he orients himself according to the corpus of scientific knowledge and its relevance structures and the relevance of the present problem. This analytical differentiation between separate provinces of meaning which are often tightly interwoven in scientific work appears to be a bit artificial and has been frequently criticized – yet it has often been subject to misunderstandings as well.

(f) *Life-worldly and scientific interpretation of the social world*: Since the life-world encompasses all provinces of reality the heading should really be "common-sense" as opposed to "scientific interpretation of the social world". This chapter deals with the two-level-theory and the principles of model construction in the social sciences: Since all social phenomena have to be attributed to individual action, the scientist constructs homunculi that are endowed with consciousness and typical motives that match the observed types of action. The scientific problem is the "locus" of all possible construction relevant to its solution and is itself embedded in a horizon of the taken-for-granted (and especially of the scientifically accepted).

(g) *Postulates of social-scientific construction*: Here Schutz states the postulates of logical consistency, of subjective interpretation, of adequacy and of rationality (in certain cases), focusing especially on the question of what rationality is. I will elaborate further on these postulates below.

(h) *The unity of science and the problem of continuity*: Schutz accepts both the idea of the unity and of the continuity of science, but in his view they cannot both be based on a (natural scientific) logical positivism (as even contemporary critical rationalism holds). The "true unity" of science is warranted instead by its origin in the life-world. Therefore, it is not oriented by the natural, but by the social sciences in a Husserlian sense. For Schutz, only a phenomenological analysis of the constituting function can fulfill "the positivists' justified postulate for 'continuity'" (Schutz and Luckmann 1989: 180). However, Schutz added critically, it remains doubtful, "whether eidetic and transcendental phenomenology can fulfill Husserl's hopes" (Schutz and Luckmann 1989: 180). Contrary to his conviction in *The Phenomenology of the Social World* he had grown skeptical as to whether a philosophical founding of the social sciences would be ultimately possible.

The scientific community usually reaches a consensus about the facts that the social world is always meaningfully pre-interpreted and that there is a difference between the natural and the social sciences. What we can infer from this, however, remains disputed. In the following I will concentrate on Schutz's postulates of social-scientific constructions.

2 Schutz's Postulates of Social-Scientific Constructions

The distinctive feature of the social sciences is for Schutz that they attempt to *understand the world of contemporaries*. They aim at theoretical contributions and do not study concrete types of persons like historical science does. This follows from *the distinct attitude of the scientist as a 'disinterested observer'*, whose interpretation of meaning is not bound to pragmatic motives but strives for truth. The boundaries of this quest are set on the one hand by the scientific relevance system, especially by the immediate problem, and on the other hand by the corpus of knowledge handed down within the respective discipline. Schutz subsumes the principles by which theoretical models should be construed under the following methodological postulates (Schutz 1962a, b, 1964a, b):

1. The *principle of relevance*: The scientific system of relevance determines the selection of elements, the breath of the perspective, the complexity of the model, etc. Therefore, every model carries the index of the particular problem at hand which suspends all other aspects as irrelevant through a ceteris-paribus-condition. Thus, one needs to take into account that changing the core topic automatically leads to a shift in the horizons of meaning of the terms used.
2. The *postulate of logical consistency*: The system of typical constructs designed by the scientist has to exhibit the highest degree of clarity and definiteness and must entirely conform to the principles of formal logic.
3. The *postulate of subjective interpretation*: As shown, explanations in the social sciences have to refer back to the subjective meaning of the action. This means that a homunculus is constructed based on typical properties of an observed course of action, a model of an actor to whom a consciousness with typical in-order-to and because-motives is attributed. Constructions on a higher level of aggregation (for example working with demand and supply curves) are acceptable; however they have to be conceived in a way that warrants the possibility of referring human action to the subjective meaning that action had for the actor whenever necessary.
4. The *postulate of adequacy*: The constructs of the social scientist have to be consistent with the constructs of common-sense experience of social reality, i.e. they have to be understandable to an actor and must be able to explain an action appropriately.
5. The *postulate of rationality*: Models of rational action are preferred since such action is especially evident and accordingly forms a reference point for the characterization of types of deviance. This postulate is not a mandatory requirement, although economics in particular continues to adhere to it.

3 The Postulate of Adequacy

The postulate of adequacy seems to me to be especially decisive! When can we take scientific constructs to be adequate?

3.1 Adequacy on the Level of Meaning and Adequacy on the Level of Causality in Max Weber's Work

Let us briefly return to Max Weber, from whom Schutz draws on this matter: Explanatory understanding in Weber's sense, which captures the actual as well as the motivational meaning, has to conform to the two methodological postulates of *adequacy on the level of meaning* and *adequacy on the level of causality*:

> We apply the term '*adequacy on the level of meaning*' to the subjective interpretation of a coherent course of conduct when and insofar as, according to our habitual modes of thought and feeling, its component parts taken in their mutual relation are recognized to constitute a 'typical' complex of meaning. It is more common to say 'correct.' The interpretation of a sequence of events will on the other hand be called *causally adequate* insofar as, according to established generalizations from experience, there is a probability that it will always actually occur in the same way. (…) Thus *causal explanation* depends on being able to determine that there is a probability, which in the rare ideal case can be numerically stated, but is always in some sense calculable, that a given observable event (overt or subjective) will be followed or accompanied by another event.[3] (Weber [1922] 1978: 11 – emphasis added by T.S.E.)

In other words, adequacy on the level of meaning is only reached if explanatory understanding is evident. But even an absolutely evident interpretation remains only a *hypothesis* as long as the criterion of causal adequacy is not fulfilled as well. Conversely, a statement that is causally adequate remains only a non-comprehensible statistical probability as long as the criterion of adequacy on the level of meaning has not been fulfilled (Weber [1922] 1978: 10, 12). Conclusion:

> Statistical uniformities constitute understandable types of action, and thus constitute sociological generalizations, only when they can be regarded as manifestations of the understandable subjective meaning of a course of social action." (Weber [1922] 1978: 12) Such generalizations always exhibit a "correspondence between the theoretical interpretation of motivation and its empirical verification (Weber [1922] 1978: 11).

Weber coined the term "*adequacy on the level of meaning*" to parallel the notion of causal adequacy which had been long-established in the fields of political economy and law. With the notion of adequacy on the level of meaning, Weber tried to

[3]This excerpt follows the translation by G. Roth and C. Wittich (Weber [1922] 1978), except for the first phrase (until "insofar as"), where the translation by W. Heydebrand (in Weber 1994) was chosen as it seems to be closer to the original meaning. (The first chapter of *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* was as well published as a separate article in the *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre* and was thus later translated twice.)

stay true to Dilthey's intent within a neo-Kantian framework oriented by Rickert's works (Dilthey [1927] 2002; Rickert [1921] 1962, [1929] 1986). Without elaborating on its manifold facets, it is worth pointing out that Weber measures the degree of adequacy on the level of meaning "according to our habitual modes of thought and feeling" (Weber [1922] 1978: 11). By doing this, he brings in a statistical criterion which is not unproblematic with regard to adequacy on the level of meaning. The reason for this – in my view – is down to the fact that he formed the concept as a parallel to the existing concept of adequacy on the level of causality.

The notion of "*adequate causation*" can already be found in the works of John Stuart Mill (1943). A longstanding debate that began in the late 1880s in the field of law, however, was to exert much more of an influence on Weber's understanding. Decisive in this context was the "Theory of Adequacy" developed by the physiological psychologist and theorist of the foundations of probability Johannes von Kries (1886, 1888, 1889). Stimulated by von Liszt, Kries applied the theory of probability to the legal terms "causation and causal relationship" (Kries 1889: 531). In this way, he tried to generalize constant linkages as statistical regularities in order to use them as foundations for attribution structures. In doing this, he built on the notion of *objective probability* rather than subjective probability (while explicitly differentiating between the two). While subjective probability refers to the expectation of an individual concerning the occurrence of a certain event, objective probability concerns classes of events which occur independently of subjective expectations.

Kries sees the relevance of *general causal relationships* between actions and results for penological attributions since an action must be capable of evoking the respective result according to common (statistical) experience. An "adequate causation" can only be affirmed if this is the case. If, for example, a coachman falls asleep, causing him to run off the road and his passenger is subsequently killed by lightning, there is no adequate causation between his falling asleep and the death of the passenger, "since the sleeping of the coachman in general does not heighten the possibility of being killed by lightning, (that is) it is generally not capable of inducing it" (Kries 1889: 532). With the concept of general causation based on statistical regularity, Kries intends to explicate a norm on which "penal attribution depends in public legal thinking" (Kries 1889: 532). Thus, he does not assume that probabilistic statements can be applied directly to singular cases, but that judges as well as laymen – usually intuitively – are guided by such general assumptions in penal attributions.

Weber's discussion of causal adequacy was based on this debate. Weber was interested, however, not so much in jurisprudence, but in *history*. He saw the same logical structure in questions of historical causality as in the question of penal attribution. Unlike historical science, causal attribution in jurisprudence includes not only the objective causal attribution of a result to an action but also the question as to whether this attribution is sufficient to qualify as subjective guilt on the part of an individual. According to many legal norms, the attribution of guilt depends on subjective factors such as whether the actor committed his actions willfully, whether he could have foreseen the result of his actions, and so on. Common to both disciplines

is the fact that they are confronted with an infinite number of determinants of any concrete incident or course of actions and thus have to make a selection. Both apply a *principle of selection* in order to differentiate between essential and unessential factors: Which aspects are seen as relevant or irrelevant in a consideration of causes, is in Jurisprudence decided by the criterion of whether something can be subsumed under a certain legal norm, while in historical science it is determined according to the type of historical research interest involved. What Weber wants to stress here is that the construction of a causal relationship requires a number of "logical operations", in particular, a "series of abstractions", which superimpose categories on the actual course of actions and events (Weber 1949: 171).

"Nomological knowledge" is crucial for the considerations of Kries. It is composed of "certain known empirical rules, particularly those relating to the ways in which human beings are prone to react under given situations" (Weber 1949: 174). Since human beings tend to react differently each time and therefore divert from "empirical rules", only probabilistic statements can be made about their actions. For this reason Weber takes up Kries' notion of *"adequate causation"*: In relation to human action, the opposite of "chance" cannot be "necessity", but only "adequacy". Therefore, the construction of a causal relationship refers to the relative frequency of a type of action, in other words: to its objective likelihood. If such an interrelation cannot be "adequately" established, one needs to speak of "chance" causation (Weber 1949: 185). To clarify this point with an example: If the historian Meyer (1902) intends to clarify the "significance" of the battle of Marathon for the development of occidental culture, for Weber, this argument has to be stated in the following logical terms:

> it is not the case that Persian victory *must* have led to a quite different development of Hellenic and therewith of world culture – such a judgement would be quite impossible. Rather is that significance to be put as follows: that a different development of Hellenic and world culture 'would have' been the '*adequate*' effect of such an event as a Persian victory. (Weber 1949: 184f.)

Parallel to Kries' theory of jurisdiction, Weber thinks it is possible, in principle, to determine the *adequacy of constructions of historical causations*. If this were impossible, we could not draw the distinction between the causally "important" and "unimportant" (Weber 1949: 184). That such a determination of adequacy in the framework of "fantasized" alternative scenarios and constellations must also be grounded in nomological knowledge has not been explicitly pointed out by Weber, but has been sufficiently substantiated by Kries, who exercised a considerable influence on Weber on this matter.

3.2 Schutz's Renunciation of Causal Adequacy

As is generally known, Schutz dismissed the notion of causal adequacy. Already in his early notes written in Vienna, which have been published in German recently (Schütz 2007) one reads the following:

> (…) the social sciences must reject the question of causality as inadequate in regard to the interrelations of their objects. The question of causality refers to the realm of mechanistic world explanations that will indeed – which can be shown a-priori – never be able to solve a single social-scientific problem, be it with the help of neurosciences, theories of psycho-physical parallelisms or any similar theories. (Schütz 2007: 227 – author's translation)

And in *The Phenomenology of the Social World* Schutz states:

> There are weighty objections against the use of the word 'causal' in sociological discourse. For when we formulate judgments of causal adequacy in the social sciences, what we are really talking about is not causal necessity in the strict sense but the so-called 'causality of freedom,' which pertains to the end-means relation. Therefore, one cannot really speak of a causal relation in the general sense postulated by Kries so long as one confines oneself to the external event, the objective context of meaning, and so forth. (Schutz 1967: 231)

Schutz is willing to follow Weber's interpretation of causal adequacy, but not his specific wording. What Weber means by the postulate of causal adequacy, is for Schutz nothing other than "the postulate of the coherence of experience" (Schutz 1967: 232): for every typical construct it must be possible that "according to the rules of experience an act will be performed in a manner corresponding to the construct" (Schutz 1967: 232). Schutz, however, carves out another implication of the Weberian postulate of causal adequacy: The factual action which corresponds to the ideal type must be *iterative*. For the social sciences this means that "what we really have here is a heuristic principle based on the economy of thought" which limits the analyses to those acts occurring with a certain frequency (Schutz 1967: 232). This understanding of the principle corresponds to the concerns of sociology, but not of historical science.

If, however, causal adequacy means that the typical construct of a human act has to be consistent with the entirety of our experience and if every experience of human action implies its embeddedness in a meaning-context, "all causal adequacy which pertains to human action is based on principles of meaning-adequacy of some kind or other" (Schutz 1967: 233). For Schutz, *causal adequacy is only a special case of meaning-adequacy*. Subsequently, Schutz integrated both postulates into the *postulate of adequacy*.

Of course Schutz is correct in saying that it is problematic to speak of a cause-effect relation within the humanities, cultural studies, and social sciences. Without doubt, his concepts of because- and in-order-to motives are more appropriate to human constellations of motives: an in-order-to motive – the goal of an act – is never the effect of a given set of because-motives alone, they merely make up the "conditions of an act" which are themselves interpreted by the actor and still leave open a range of alternative actions to choose from. This holds true for individual courses of action just as much as for social chains of interaction: degrees of freedom always remain which are wiped out in the course of a causal reconstruction. In this sense, the notion of "causal adequacy" is indeed terminologically problematic.

First, what are lost sight of to a certain degree are the *consequences of acts* – which were at the very heart of the accounts of Kries and Weber. Death by lightning, the outcome of the battle of Marathon, a letter of cancelation, and so on are events with concrete effects. Of course those effects are not of a deterministic kind, but the

concrete events limit the flexibility of later actions. Those are the kind of topics that have been discussed in sociology in terms of the differentiation between "culture" and "structure". Secondly, Schutz narrowed the meaning of the postulate of adequacy more and more to that of adequacy of meaning. In 1943, in conjunction with the remarks in the *Phenomenology of the Social World*, he still maintained that

> The postulate of adequacy requires that the typical construction be compatible with the totality of both our daily life and our scientific experience. (Schutz 1964b: 88)

But it is precisely this aspect that he subsequently drops. The final version of the postulate of adequacy (that can indeed already be found in 1940) reads:

> Each term in a scientific model of human action must be constructed in such a way that a human act performed within the life-world by an individual actor in the way indicated by the typical construct *would be* understandable for the actor himself as well as for his fellowmen in terms of common-sense interpretation of daily life. Compliance with this postulate warrants the consistency of the constructs of the social scientist with the constructs of common-sense experience of the social reality. (Schutz 1962a: 44 – emphasis by T.S.E.; analogous Schutz 1962b: 64; 1964a: 19)

The (emphasized) subjunctive makes us hesitate: clearly, only the consistency between scientific and common-sense constructs is addressed, while causal adequacy, that is, the conformity with experience, has been left out of the postulate. Now, the criterion of adequacy is already fulfilled if an action that coincides with the scientific construct *would* be understandable in the course of common-sense thinking – obviously it is no longer important whether this action does in fact occur empirically or whether it remains a mere model.

Schutz therefore reduced the postulate of causal adequacy to meaning-adequacy. This shift of focus, when compared with Weber's concept, can in my view be traced back to his specific view of science which was profoundly influenced by his colleagues from the circle of von Mises who where economists. Mises, a prominent member of the second generation of the Austrian School of Economics advanced an approach to economics which confined itself to a-priori statements and distanced itself strictly from economic history and its exclusive task of the interpretation of empirical data. Schutz, like Weber, saw a-priori social science as merely a naturalistic self-misunderstanding and took sociology's mission to consist in understanding and explaining empirical facts. However, Schutz hardly ever came into contact with empirical research. The impressive work of Fritz Machlup, with whom Schutz maintained close contact, consists mainly of those typical non-empirical economic models which are based on relatively simple assumptions in order to keep the theoretical complexity manageable (see Machlup 1978). If Schutz requires only the postulates of logical consistency, subjective interpretation and adequacy (Schutz 1962a: 43) but not any empirical reference for constructs of homunculi, then even economic models most aloof from empirical data correspond to these methodological principles. Schutz's methodological postulates read like a description of the prevailing self-conception of the economics of the time (see Eberle 1988).

We should note here that Milton Friedman published the so-called Friedman-theorem in 1953 which found wide appeal among economists:

> Truly important and significant hypotheses will be found to have 'assumptions' that are wildly inaccurate descriptive representations of reality, and, in general, the more significant the theory, the more unrealistic the assumptions (in this sense) (Friedmann 1953: 14).

For Friedman, it is not a problem at all if a theory's assumptions are realistic or not – the only thing that counts is the success of the prognoses derived from it. But can a model that is based on unrealistic assumptions comply with the methodological postulate of adequacy? Interestingly, Machlup sides completely with Friedman on this matter, arguing that another great American economist – Samuel Samuelson – wrote his best works whenever he made *unrealistic* assumptions (Machlup 1964: 753). Machlup, however, holds the Friedman-theorem to be in need of development: the assumptions would not need to be realistic, but *adequate* (Machlup 1954: 17). But if mental images which are based on unrealistic assumptions are supposed to comply with the postulate of adequacy, then it must, obviously, be broadly defined. Machlup defines it – with reference to Schutz – in the following way:

> The fundamental assumptions of economic theory are not subject to a requirement of independent empirical verification, but instead to a requirement of understandability in the sense in which man can understand the actions of fellowmen (Machlup 1954: 17).

Schutz's self-conception as a methodologist has always been characterized by modesty: "Methodology is not the preceptor or the tutor of the scientist. It is always his pupil …" (Schutz 1964b: 88) His conception of science was deeply influenced by the "method of imaginary constructions" (Mises 1949: 237ff.) of the Austrian School of political economy. This also holds true in regard to the conceptualization of rationality, in which he, nevertheless, takes the side of Weber against Mises. But the *postulate of rationality* that social-scientific models have to comply with is formulated subjunctively:

> The rational course-of-action and personal types have to be constructed in such a way that an actor in the life-world *would* perform the typified action *if* he *had* a perfectly clear and distinct knowledge of all the elements, and only of the elements, assumed by the social scientist as being relevant to his action and the constant tendency to use the most appropriate means assumed to be at his disposal for achieving the ends defined by the construct itself. (Schutz 1962a: 45 – emphasis by T.S.E.)

Again, the subjunctive indicates that the scientific models form an (objective) possibility from which acts in the everyday world deviate more or less strongly. Earlier, Schutz had extensively elaborated the "paradox of rationality on the level of common-sense action" in the following way:

> (…) The more standardized the pattern is, the less the underlying elements become analyzable for common-sense thought in terms of rational insight. (…) Only on the level of models of interaction patterns constructed by the social scientist in accordance with certain particular requirements defined by the methods of his science does the concept of rationality obtain its full significance. (Schutz 1962a: 33)

The postulate of rationality formulated in the subjunctive, however, can again be fulfilled by all economic models, as long as they are based on the *homo oeconomicus* – even if their assumptions are completely unrealistic. Schutz obviously employs his protosociological analyses of the life-world methodologically primarily in order to explicate

the *differences in orientation* between constructs of homunculi and actors guided by common sense – and therefore the *distance between a scientific model and the social reality experienced in the life-world.*

3.3 Radicalization of the Postulate of Adequacy

I have suggested applying the postulate of adequacy in a stricter sense:

> Complete adequacy has been reached if the concrete orientation of meaning of actors has been grasped appropriately. With this, we declare the subjective perspective of the singular actor to be the *ultimate reference point* for social-scientific analyses. As Schutz has shown, understanding of the other can only be reached approximately; the perspective of the actor can be grasped only partly. Complete adequacy therefore remains an unattainable ideal. With such a radicalized version of the postulate of adequacy, however, it becomes methodologically necessary to account explicitly for the adequacy of scientific constructs (or reconstructions) by referring to phenomenological protosociology. Through this, the structures of the life-world not only serve as a protosociological frame of reference, as a 'mathesis universalis' (Luckmann 1983a, b), but it becomes necessary to reflect the relation to this framework by virtue of the postulate of adequacy. (Eberle 1999a: 115f.)

Social-scientific hermeneutics and interpretative social research approaches that adopted this stricter sense and built upon the world of meaning of the actors more closely (in opposition, for example, to the partly unrealistic models of economists) could be understood to be "more adequate". And *Schutz's structures of the life-world would provide a fruitful frame of reference for assessing the adequacy of scientific constructs*.

With a radicalization of the postulate of adequacy, economic imperialism could be brought to an end. In the *Phenomenology of the Social World*, Schutz calls the pure economics of Mises a "perfect example of an objective meaning-complex about subjective meaning-complexes" (1967: 245), and the law of marginal utility is interpreted as "a stipulation that merely marks out the fixed boundaries of the only area within which economic acts can by definition take place" (1967: 245). Unlike Kaufmann, whom he invokes, Schutz decouples this economic principle from the economic context and generalizes it formally. In this case, however, it can be applied to almost anything: not only to consumer choice, but also to love relationships, organizational relations and behavior within the family; Gary Becker (1991) won the Nobel-price for the corresponding analyses in "Treatise on the Family". If one were to undertake closer empirical research of the subjective meaning connexions of the actors, one would most likely see that not all actors calculate cost-benefit ratios in every situation… Today, even economists argue that a *homo oeconomicus* modeled after a market environment must not be transferred seamlessly to the behavior of members of organizations because this might prove to be a self-fulfilling prophecy, encouraging self-interested behavior while undermining cooperative behavior (Osterloh 2007; Scherer and McKinley 2007).

The fact that Schutz as a methodologist never wanted to elevate himself to the status of teacher or tutor for the economists but rather to remain their scholar could

explain his reluctant formulation of the postulate of adequacy. The matrix of the analysis of the life-world remained the frame of reference within which a descriptive analysis of the economy was feasible, that is, a description of what economists do in their scientific province of meaning. However, Schutz was much more critical in his personal correspondence. In a letter to Adolphe Lowe, he criticized his teacher Ludwig von Mises in no less than three different respects:

1. "the decisive problem involved (in the process of choosing) is just taken for granted by Mises, that is, the problem how it comes that things stand to choice at all" (Schutz 1955b: 5–6);
2. "He overlooks also the difference which seems to be vital for me, namely, on the one hand choosing between objects equally within my reach and, on the other hand, choosing between projects of actions which have to be carried out by me" (1955b: 6);
3. "Mises is trying to develop a general praxeology which he identifies – erroneously, as I think – with the theory of economic action, namely an action according to the assumed scale of preferences of the actor. … If this were the case there would be no human action whatsoever which was not an economic action" (1955b: 3).

The first two arguments point to the process of choosing in subjective consciousness and the third to the differentiation criteria of the subject matter of economics, which Schutz had already identified as being the principle of marginal utility in the *Phenomenology of the Social World*. He dealt with both problems in a longer manuscript in the mid 1940s. In the first part, he examined the act of choosing in everyday situations. In the second part he scrutinized how this act of choosing is constructed in a scientific model, using the example of theoretical economics. After having fallen between two stools with this attempt – "the philosophical part being of no interest to economists and the economic part of no interest to philosophers" (Schutz 1955a: 1) – he finally published the first part separately in a phenomenological-philosophical journal in 1951 (Schutz 1962c) and held back the second part until the end of his life (it was published posthumously by Lester Embree: Schutz 1972).

With his *analysis of the acts of choosing in the life-world*, Schutz hoped to be able to show that the utilitarian representations of acts of choosing are inadequate and that Mises' praxeological model is in need of elaboration in several critical aspects as well (see Eberle 2009). A phenomenological description of the process of choosing must not be based on reconstructions of past experiences, but has to start right in the midst of the stream of consciousness. This prerequisite has been satisfied in the work of Husserl, Bergson, and Leibniz, whose findings Schutz combines for this reason. From Husserl, he takes the constitution of problematic options as the precondition to every possible choice, from Bergson the time perspectives implicated in the process of choosing, and from Leibniz the concurrence of volitional intentions which leads to the final 'fiat' of the decision. On this basis it becomes immediately clear that the utilitarian model of choosing and decision making is just an interpretation scheme for explaining because-motives of foregone actions which lacks the polythetic course of choosing (Schutz 1972: 573f.).

These statements by Schutz suggest that he also took the postulate of adequacy to be more restrictive than his definitions of it make it appear. Indeed, his lifelong effort to achieve a theory of the constitution of the social world would not have made much sense if he had not aimed at *contributing towards a more adequate methodology of social-scientific research*.

However, in his critique of Mises, Schutz persists with a conception of adequacy as a mere adequacy of meaning. With his analysis of life-worldly acts of choosing he wanted to demonstrate that corresponding model constructs have to take a conceptual approach different from that which economists had, until then, taken: The homunculus-constructs should grasp the orientation to meaning of actions in their timeliness and describe not only the because-motives, but also the in-order-to motives of actions. In other words, Schutz criticized those models which account for human action only in terms of the because-motives of foregone actions as being inadequate. His critique of Mises reveals then, that the postulate of adequacy means more for Schutz than just the requirement that the scientific constructs be *understandable* to common sense, they must correspond conceptually to the everyday orientation of meaning.

My radicalized version of the postulate of adequacy, like Schutz's earlier formulations, further requires that the scientific interpretation of meaning be *empirically correct*. With this, the aim of causal adequacy (that scientific statements must be empirically correct) which Schutz abolished, is preserved, but without reintroducing the problem of causal relations. For example, the economists' model that assumes that actors conduct cost-benefit calculations is, in some cases, empirically true. The problem lies rather in the generalized attribution of such calculations, that is, in the procedure of presuming actors' cost-benefit calculations even if the subjective meaning of a concrete action in reality is completely different. According to the radicalized version of the postulate of adequacy, scientific interpretations can only be taken as adequate, *if they are on the one hand designed according to the processes of meaning construction in daily life and if on the other hand they grasp the actual meaning constructions of actors in the concrete situation empirically correctly.* Reformulated like this, the postulate of adequacy could function as a *quality criterion of qualitative social research* and could constructively replace the concepts of validity and reliability which originated in contexts of quantitative research.

4 Life-World Analysis and Interpretative Social Research

I have proposed this radicalized version of the postulate of adequacy several times already (Eberle 1999a, b, 2000), but no one appears overly enthusiastic about it. There may be several reasons for this: first, many social scientists remain unconvinced that the phenomenological analysis of the life-world represents an appropriate and useful protosociology. Second, many question the value of a protosociology as a whole. Instead, as for example with the proponents of a rational-choice theory (Esser 1991), they argue that it is important to design the models as simply as

possible and only as complex as necessary. The necessity for complexity, then, is judged by relevance criteria of scientific model construction (for example the ability to be aggregated) rather than by the "real" diversity of meaning of the everyday world. Third, many take exception to Schutz's action-theoretical premises and the postulated methodological individualism, especially to the postulate of subjective interpretation, which is tightly interwoven with the postulate of adequacy. Instead, they follow different philosophical positions and/or different theoretical presuppositions. Fourth, the question can be raised as to whether the postulate of adequacy actually provides useful reference points for empirical research practice. I will address this final question, in particular, in what follows.

Schutz tied his analysis of the life-world closely to Weber's action-theoretical sociology, and his methodological arguments are oriented by Weber's *Outline of Interpretive Sociology* (Weber [1922] 1978) as well as the Austrian School of the Mises-circle. This is an association by choice, not of necessity. The structures of the life-world are not just compatible with a distinct kind of sociology: First, as a *mathesis universalis* they form a framework in which, in principle, any kind of social science can be located. Second, as Garfinkel (2002, 2006) has shown with his Ethnomethodology, the analysis of the life-world can also be redrafted completely. Since the processes of the constitution of meaning form the core of the analysis of the life-world, they are, however, only compatible with an interpretive sociology and a hermeneutic approach to the social world. By now, a number of approaches to social-scientific hermeneutics (Hitzler and Honer 1997; Schützeichel 2007; Flick et al. 2004) have been developed, of which several return to Schutz's analysis of the life-world in different ways.

But what does it mean to conduct "adequate" (in the sense of the radicalized postulate of adequacy) research in an empirical context? How can the concrete, subjective meaning of an action to the actor be grasped as empirically adequate? What Schutz explicated in detail was exactly how difficult such an undertaking is: he pointed to the manifoldly interlaced interrelations of meaning, to the undistinguishable, diffuse layers of meaning and the implicit horizon of the taken for granted, to the limits of what we are able to remember and the approximate character of the understanding of the other. Finally, he pointed to the "paradox of rationality" on the level of everyday actions which says: the more standardized a pattern of action is the less common-sense succeeds to analytically enlighten the underlying elements by way of rational insight. How can we, to stick to the example of acts of choosing in the life-world, empirically grasp the *petites perceptions* of other actors? Even if the hermeneutic approaches try to build upon the current subjective meaning constructions of everyday actors as closely as possible – complete adequacy remains an unattainable ideal to which only approximations are possible. Within these approaches, too, a certain distance between the subjective meaning constructions of everyday actors and their scientific reconstruction remains. Thus, Schutz's analysis of the life-world rather conveys a fundamental awareness of the complexity of the subjective constitution and social construction of meaning, than instructions for adequate empirical research. No wonder literature offers itself as a welcome solution: the thoughts and experiences of the proponents of *Wilhelm Meister's*

Apprenticeship and Journeyman Years (Schütz 2013) or in *Don Quixote* (Schutz 1964c) are available in detailed description. One gains access to the actors' subjective world through the author's descriptions and can explore it further analytically. The hermeneutical access to the *alter ego* in social reality however proves to be considerably more difficult.

The *structures of the life-world* represent *proto-hermeneutics* which reveal the basic operations of the constitution of meaning and of the interpretation of meaning as well as the fundamental problems of the hermeneutic approach. They do not, however, provide a practical handle to unlock the subjective meaning of social action empirically. Accordingly, the different approaches in interpretative social research begin with rather diverse premises: some rely exclusively on interview data which is then interpreted in a sequential analysis, others only trust audio-visual recordings of action- and interaction-sequences which are subsequently meticulously transcribed. Some reconstruct life-courses from biographical interviews, others regard them as pure narrations and solemnly examine the form of this narration or the structure of the discourse. Some want to research the content of subjective consciousness; others confine themselves exclusively to communicative practices. Some only trust data from focus-groups, others only the data of social processes in "natural" situations. Some swear by 'interpretive' interviews, others by the observation of real-time courses of action. Although Schutz's mundane phenomenology did not bracket the ontological assumptions of the natural attitude in everyday life (unlike Husserl's transcendental phenomenology), it did not provide concrete clues how such different types of data may be assessed and how we can deal with them in our research practice. Just like the accent of reality in a dream cannot be determined by a phenomenological analysis of the constituting function, but only through an empirical-historical reconstruction of social realities (Schnettler 2008: 44), the various approaches of scientific research differ in terms of their ontological, epistemological and value-theoretical assumptions, as well as their theoretical presuppositions. As the examples show, they further differ from certain presuppositions of the actors in the everyday world they examine. How empirical social research can be designed *adequately* is thus not only determined by the *structures of the life-world* but also by the respective additional theoretical premises. The "adequacy" of a study is accordingly judged by Ethnomethodologists[4] according to completely different criteria than those used by proponents of Objective Hermeneutics, for example.

The rich and variegated nature of the *empirical research built on Schutz's analysis of the life-world* is evident today in the volumes edited by Dreher and Stegmaier (2007) as well as Raab et al. (2008). On the one hand, they manifest the enormous difference between today's social-scientific research and the role models that Schutz was oriented by in his era. On the other hand, they both confront us with the variety of empirical approaches to the social world that strive for adequacy. Most of them are ethnographic in character, that is, they conduct empirical field research by way

[4]On the concept of adequacy in Ethnomethodology, see Eberle 2008: 156f.

of multiple methods like observation, ethnographic interviews, or document and artifact analysis. One ethnographic approach that draws heavily on Schutz's mundane-phenomenological analysis of the life-world is the *life-world analytic ethnography* (Pfadenhauer 2008), earlier called "life-worldy ethnography" (Honer 1993), "ethnographic life-world analysis" or "life-world analysis in ethnography" (Honer 2004). On the one hand, in the course of such research, data is collected via participant observation, interviews, and the acquisition of field documents and interpreted hermeneutically, much like in other ethnographic approaches. Data collected in ethnographies is always data objectified in signs, symbols, or texts and thus becomes subject to hermeneutic processes (Soeffner 2004). On the other hand – and this is specific to this approach – the subjective experience of the researcher in the field is used explicitly and reflexively as an "instrument" of data generation and collection (exemplary: Honer 2008). The researchers thus do not rely solely on participant observation for their data collection, but also on *observing participation* in a field-specific role and subject their results to a phenomenological analysis. For example, a certain experience of wellbeing during a rave is not only researched through observation and interviews with other participants, but also through a systematic phenomenological analysis of the personal experience (Hitzler and Pfadenhauer 1998, 2003). The basic idea of this is that the genuine form of the experience is lost once it is brought into an objectified form, for example by transcribing and subsequently interpreting it hermeneutically. As a researcher, one should therefore use the immediate access to one's own subjective experience, for example of a rave, to conduct a methodologically controlled phenomenological analysis of the experienced – that is, the experiences and their correlates – through systematic reductions (or bracketing) (Hitzler 2005). In contrast to other ethnographic approaches, the "native's point of view" is not understood indirectly, but is complemented by an "existential view from the inside" (Honer 2004). The *structures of the life-world* as a *mathesis universalis* are not drawn into question but understood as the basis of sociological analysis through this approach. But the phenomenological life-world analysis is used not as a *method* to gain protosociological insights, but to describe "small social life-worlds", in Benita Luckmann's sense (1970), on the one hand as enclaves of consciousness and on the other as "cultural worlds of experiences" (Hitzler and Eberle 2000; Hitzler 2008).[5]

Yet another approach is the *Ethnophenomenology* developed by Hubert Knoblauch and Bernt Schnettler. In their research on near-death experiences (Knoblauch and Soeffner 1999) and visions (Knoblauch and Schnettler 2001; Schnettler 2004), both researchers realized that the egological analysis carried out by the phenomenologist remains tied to their specific biographic situation:

> Mundane phenomenology can only describe one's own experiences. Therefore, phenomenologists cannot make any analytic statements regarding the constitution of transcendent experiences that they themselves did not have. This explains why the "multiple realities" of Schutz

[5] Here, we can find parallels to the method of auto-ethnography (Ellis 2004; Chang 2008), which – however – does not apply the systematic method of the phenomenological analysis of the life-world and which does not relate those results to ethnographically collected, objectified data, but rather introduces autobiographical accounts of the subjectively experienced.

> remain incomplete… The term ethnophenomenology points to the observation that philosophical laymen are quite able to reflect on their own modes of experiences. (…) The attention of actors to the modes of their extraordinary experiences is called Ethnophenomenology by us. (Schnettler 2008: 145 – author's translation)

The parallel with Ethnomethodology is obvious: ethnophenomenology looks to examine the structures of the actions and experiences of the members of a society empirically and describes the research approach as well as its subject matter. In contrast to Ethnomethodology, it is not methodologically produced, observable communicative acts that are empirically explored but rather non-observable, extraordinary subjective experiences of actors. Schnettler (2004) showed in his study of the experience of visions that, within the interview data, passages with ethnophenomenological descriptions of the form of experiences clearly differed from the descriptions of the content of the experiences – in fact, the content of what was witnessed was often of secondary importance in comparison with the extraordinary *mode* of the experience. Finally, he was able to elicit a number of recurring features of an Ethnophenomenology of visions of the future. Knoblauch and Schnettler carefully differentiated between the different reference levels of mundane phenomenology and Ethnophenomenology: While mundane phenomenology aims at establishing a protosociological general theory with a universal relevance by describing general forms of human experience, Ethnophenomenology sociologically and empirically reconstructs the communicatively conveyed descriptions of extraordinary experiences (for example of near-death experiences) by everyday people in a certain historical epoch and transforms their generalizations into theoretical notions of 'medium range' (Schnettler 2008: 142). By comparing Ethnophenomenology and life-world analytic ethnography, one can see that the former bases its empirical data exclusively on objectified data, that is, on communicatively conveyed subjective experiences. According to the view of life-world ethnography, Ethnophenomenology proceeds hermeneutically and abstains from a direct phenomenological analysis of one's own subjective experience through participant observation. Naturally, there are practical reasons for this as well: only people who experience visions or near-death situations could undertake such an analysis (and this only retrospectively, as in the case of dreams). A phenomenological analysis of such experiences by the researcher is impossible.

A further combination of phenomenology and ethnography is proposed by Maragarethe Kusenbach (2003, 2008) in the form of *Phenomenological Ethnography*. Kusenbach agrees with Maso's (2001) diagnosis that the method of phenomenological reduction represents an unattainable ideal due to the fundamental positionality and historicity of researchers. By trying to develop a phenomenological ethnography, she intended to transgress the boundaries of phenomenology as a purely philosophical discipline and to examine the phenomenological structures of everyday experience empirically (Kusenbach 2008: 351).[6] Having expressed significant reservations

[6]In an analogous way, Psathas (1973, 1989) pledges for a "phenomenological sociology" (see Eberle 1993, 2012).

concerning participant observation as well as ethnographic interview during the course of her ethnographic research practice, Kusenbach recommends the '*Go-Along*' as an alternative methodological procedure. The 'going-along' procedure is a more modest and more selective form of 'hanging-out', in which "field researchers accompany informants on naturally occurring outings and actively try to grasp the stream of experiences and actions by asking, listening and observing" (2008: 352). In this way, filters of perception and relevance structures can be examined in the course of their enactment and transcendent aspects of others' experiences of the environment can be systematically revealed and compared (for instance, biographical experiences which are related to a certain place can be reawakened when one returns to the place). The *Go-Along* method facilitates authentic access to the experiences and practices of others in real places. For Kusenbach (2008), it can contribute to a phenomenological sensitization of the ethnographic research practice and expands the ethnographic "toolbox".

Ethnography, however, is not the only way to combine phenomenology and empirical sociology fruitfully. For example, in a "parallel action" of phenomenological and social scientific research, as it was described by Luckmann ([1999]2007), Jochen Dreher (2008) tries to develop a "protosociology of friendship". Based on concrete empirical forms of friendship in specific cultural and socio-historical contexts, "three protosociological levels of reduction are designed, in which the constitution of the phenomenon of friendship can be described" (Dreher 2008: 402): (1) the socio-eidetic reduction of the constitution of friendship, (2) the structural level of the symbolic constitution of friendship and (3) the reduction level of the sensuous perception of the corporeality of the other. Furthermore, phenomenology has proven fruitful for the empirical exploration of further manifold phenomena, be it in relation to visual phenomena (Raab 2008; Kurt 2008), music (Kurt 2007; Stascheit, forthcoming), odors (Raab 2001) or the orientation of blind actors (Saerberg 2006), to name only a few. Additionally, one has to agree with Endress (2008) that the theoretical-analytical potential of the sociological perspective established by Alfred Schutz and further pursued by Berger and Luckmann (1966) has still not been fully utilized. Although at this stage all talk of a "philosophical foundation" and a "fundament to the social sciences" has ceased and phenomenologists now accept and take into account the reflexivity of their method, the systematic combination of phenomenological analysis of the life-world and empirical sociology has consistently proved to be fruitful. Their relation, however, is no longer perceived as one-sided, but as mutual: phenomenological protosociology and sociology challenge each other alternately (Göttlich 2008). In this reciprocal relation, in which both are continuously engaged in the explication of their own procedures, a truly *reflexive sociology of knowledge* (Endress 2008) is constituted.

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Interpretive Sociologies and Traditions of Hermeneutics

Martin Endress

1 Introduction

The subtitle of Schutz's main work promises "an introduction into Interpretive Sociology" (2004a: 3). In this light, Schutz aligns himself with a certain tradition (Endress 2006a: 42ff.).[1] Reading Schutz in the context of Max Weber is helpful if one wishes to highlight the connection with "Interpretive Sociology".[2] In contrast to other works, the following considerations will focus mainly on the difference between subjective and objective sense. For this purpose, the paragraphs concerning Weber's terms "objective and subjective chance" (§47, 2004a: 423ff.), as well as the difference between "objective and subjective sense" need to be taken into consideration (§49, 2004a: 429ff.; see also: §5 and §27, 2004a: 115ff., 268ff.).

Schutz distinguishes between a systematic and a genetic perspective on his theoretical interest (see Endress 2006a: 67f.). In one chapter of *The Phenomenology of the Social World* (2004a: 438) titled "*Gegenstandsgebiet und Verfahren der verstehenden Soziologie*", he writes:

> The task of this science is initially and foremost [1] the description of processes of interpretation and establishment of sense executed by those living in the social world. This description may be empirical or eidetical, it may take individual or typical phenomena as its object, it may be executed with regards to a concrete situation of mundane sociality or at a high

[1] The contours of Schutz's concept of "Interpretive Sociology" from 1932 are laid out in the fifth part of the "Meaningful Constructions" titled "On problems of Interpretive Sociology" (§§ 42–49), a rather neglected section in discussions of his work.

[2] There are already several studies on the relationship between both works which point out some of the differences between Weber and Schutz, for example, the missing significance of communicative (linguistic) processes or the difficulty of constitution which are not discussed by Weber. Also, questions regarding the problem of the formation of typologies are discussed (see for example Srubar 1979; also Endress 2006b: 31–37).

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> grade of generality. Furthermore, Interpretive Sociology [2] wants to apply the achieved schemes of interpretation on exactly those cultural objects, constituted in those processes of establishment and interpretation of sense in the social world, in order to 'understand' those cultural objects via the interrogation of its constituting sense. (2004a: 438)

This dual strategy of a genetic and systematic development of the main argument is dealt with in the three paragraphs in the middle section and main part of *The Phenomenology of the Social World*. It begins (a) with the *constitutional analysis* of the phenomenon of sense, that is, the analysis of the genesis of structures of sense in the social world, and then shifts to (b) the structural analysis of the social world in order to show the necessary variations in the processes of establishment of sense formed by different social "interpretational perspectives" (2004a: 209).

With regard to the adoption of hermeneutical traditions as well as its reception for the pragmatic interests of research, one has to acknowledge an enormous pluralization within the tradition of Interpretive Sociology. This pluralization results mainly from the selectivity of the various receptions of that tradition, as well as from the compartmentalization of the relevant discussions and contexts of research. Still, we simply cannot review the whole spectrum of social scientific hermeneutics and hermeneutical or interpretational processes of qualitative social research in order to distil its synthesis. Considered against this background, the following reflections will provide a reminder of the fundamentally indivisible composition concerning the profile of Interpretive Sociology at the beginning of its developmental history. The explication of this complex profile of Interpretive Sociology beyond the continued trials of its current segmentation is based mainly on the recourse to Max Weber and Alfred Schutz.[3]

The focus of our inquiry may, therefore, be articulated as follows: we are concerned with the question of the relevance of the resource, the meaning, and the specific relation of subjective, intersubjective, and transsubjective structures of sense for Interpretive Sociology (Endress 2006b).

The continuing importance of analyzing sense structures by recourse to these three dimensions is obvious. It appears to be sufficient for our undertaking to single out four contexts of discussion in which those dimensions are vital:

(a) It is initially valid for the discussion of Weber's opus itself: the systematicity of the "sociological basic terms" in "Economy and Society" and its relevance for practical research; the relation of its tutorial representation to Weber's material studies (Greshoff 2006; Endress 2006b; Breuer 2006);
(b) furthermore, one has to mention the theoretical debate on the question of "transintentionality" which nowadays draws on the analysis of the consequences of action known as non- or unintended (Greshoff et al. 2003; Boeschen et al. 2006);

[3] At the core of the discussion are the manifold hermeneutic disputes between "objective" hermeneutics (Oevermann), "documentary interpretation" (Bohnsack), and the subject-oriented, socioscientific hermeneutics, as, for example, the hermeneutics of the Sociology of Knowledge. Bohnsack explicitly claims a mediating position by using the "documentary method" and thus refers to Karl Mannheim, in contrast to the other two concepts.

(c) the questioning of the relations of these structures of sense is further important for the discussion of the conceptual design of a contemporary Sociology of knowledge (cf. Knoblauch 2005);
(d) finally, the argument above concerning the threefold structures of sense is valid – and this is of especially important concerning the given arguments – for the discussion of the design of qualitative social research and the meaning of the "subjective perspective" which remains highly controversial within this discussion (e.g. Hopf et al. 1999; Hitzler 2000, 2007; Bohnsack 2003; Reichertz 2007).

It was Hitzler who stated that "qualitative social research *grosso modo* is viewed as belonging to the realm of Interpretive sociology, without reflecting that its epistemological grounds concerning methodological as well as methodical standards are not all consented" (2007: [11]).[4] Because of this pluralization one has to ask, what are the efforts of an ongoing fragmentation and conflict-ridden mutual delimitation among qualitative research methods and conceptual orientations within the tradition of Interpretive Sociology. The following discussion is devoted to this question discussing it from the viewpoint of research pragmatics.

2 An Unsolved Problem

In his fundamental criticism of Parsons from the 1960s onwards, it is Schutz's aim to re-orientate the social sciences and even more sociology towards a hermeneutical profile. Since then, Schutz has functioned as a main point of reference for numerous variants of hermeneutic, interpretative or qualitative approaches in empirical social research. Of course, we should emphasize both the internal plurality of hermeneutical orientations within sociology itself and also the fact that the philosophical debate on hermeneutics continues unabated (and not only recently). In doing so, we help to problematize *a priori* monolithic and sometimes even reificational references to *the* 'hermeneutical profile' of *the* Interpretive Sociology.

The design of Schutz's life-world analysis may be described as a "foundation of a phenomenologically based Interpretive Sociology" (Endress 2006a: 8). This conception of Interpretive Sociology profiles itself empirically both as a "structural analysis of the life-world" and as a sociology of knowledge (dito 81ff.). Furthermore, Schutz's analysis of the "structures of the life-world" provides a dual perspective on the term "structure" since it points towards modes of orientation for action in structured contexts of interaction which he analyses

[4] While 20 years ago Matthiesen (1994) claimed that the overstressing of the communalities of the various 'interpretative approaches' serves as a substantially irrelevant mutual profiling, the situation nowadays is one of a forced parceling of the field of 'interpretative approaches' and research methods due to substantial differences concerning methodological as well as methodical aspects.

as compressions of structures of preceding and accompanying processes of habitualization, typification, institutionalisation, and legitimization—notions usually ignored by both subjectivistic abbreviations and objectivistic critics (see Matthiesen 1994: 80). Accordingly, the primary linguistic relation to the world is the analytically relevant starting point for a theory of the life-world.

Thus, already when writing *The Phenomenology of the Social World* (1967), Schutz acknowledged a certain dialectics as a starting point, i.e., the principal entanglement of subjective and social (intersubjective) processes of establishing sense. For Schutz, this central idea, which necessarily involves a cross reference between subjectivity and sociality, initiates the inescapable overlapping of philosophical and sociological analysis, as well as of constitutional analysis, general analysis of social structures, and empirically driven Interpretive Sociology. The simple fact that Schutz's venture proceeds from the intersubjectively structured social world shows that it is not appropriate to simply describe his position as a "methodological individualism".[5]

Schutz continues—in his own way—Husserl's program of an analysis of the life-world and "its general structure" (1970: 139). Husserl knew well that such a "general structure" is constitutive for the life-world "in all its relative features." Therefore, Husserl aimed at the explication of the "concrete life-world" in its "universal concreteness" (1970: 131, 139).[6] *Universality in historical concreteness* might be the formula Schutz has appropriated for his foundational interests of Interpretive Sociology in recourse to Husserl.[7] It is specifically the determination

[5]For Weber, such a classification requires a detailed explanation, but to an even greater extent it conceals the systematic form of Schutz's analyses, whose core lies, according to the position argued here, in the fundamental intersubjectivity of structures of meaning. The usual classification of Weber as well as Schutz as belonging to the perspective of methodological individualism has first of all to be commented on because the concept of methodological individualism (which itself also points to the already mentioned relation of the general to the concrete) has to be differentiated here. The core of the thesis of methodological individualism can be identified in the claim that all knowledge of social phenomena can be and has to be deduced and justified through knowledge about individualities, these being attitudes, interests, and actions of individuals (to follow a more recent usage: actors). Thus, methodological individualism is at the core a heuristic postulate. This methodological meaning of methodological individualism has to be carefully distinguished from any possible ontological meaning. Second, methodological individualism as a heuristic postulate can either be analyzed with a claim to totality (thus, each social phenomenon can be traced back to something individual) or merely in the sense of a heuristic instruction (hence, the "reductionist" endeavor should be emphasized as much as possible). Methodological individualism is not an ontological statement but a methodical, i.e., a research-pragmatic norm.

[6]See also Husserl's reflection in "Experience and Judgment" concerning both the "typical" and "indeterminate generality of anticipation," according to which "every real thing whatsoever has, as an object of possible experience, its general '*a priori*,' a pre-knowledge that is an indeterminate generality but which remains identifiable as the same, as a type belonging *a priori* to a realm of *a priori* possibilities" (1973: 36).

[7]Husserl indeed attempted to thematize "the entire spatiotemporal world" in "the unity of a systematic survey" by "paying constant attention to the relativity of the surrounding life-worlds" (Husserl 1970: 147). Accordingly, this "systematic survey" has to proceed just "in the form of an iterated synthesis of relative, spatiotemporal life-worlds" (ibid.).

of this universality which might contain central problems in the clarification of the self-image of Interpretive Sociology.[8]

It is an elementary and basic sociological insight that "the individual act (*individuelle Einzelhandlung*) is always an integral element of a social sequence" (Oevermann 1986: 57). Or, to put it another way: "the subject is born into a historical and social world" (Reichertz 1988: 220)—who would deny this? This assumption concerning a constitutive sociality should at least be indisputable among "understanding sociologists."

Accordingly, their shared aim is an inquiry into causally adequate contexts of sense. This implies that men "are at all events driven to *interpret* what is going on." Or, put differently, Interpretative Social Research essentially "has to reconstruct the *sense*: to reconstruct subjective sense and objectified sense" (Hitzler 2007: [13]). More contentious, however, are the conclusions that can be drawn from this basic insight promoted by the differing convictions regarding the self-image of Interpretive Sociology.

If we concentrate on the dominant concept, three distinct positions can be identified: variants of qualitative research referring to Schutz, "objective hermeneutics," and, following Mannheim, the method of documentary interpretation.[9] In his recent publications in particular, Bohnsack tries to re-design hermeneutical social research in the triangle of sociology of knowledge, "objective hermeneutics," and documentary interpretation (exemplarily 2003). Speaking plainly and reduced to the juxtaposing of two positions, Hitzler even refers to a "schism between an eventually action-theoretical and interpretative paradigm here and a structure-theoretical and objectivistic paradigm there" (2007: [20]). This present situation bears the unmistakable traces of the history of its origins; this is due to the fact that the profiles of Interpretive Sociology developed independently. Therefore, Mannheim (and his dominant recourse to Marx, Hegel, and Lukács) and Schutz (with a significant reference to Weber and Husserl) are thought to be heading in different directions; although Schutz had not mentioned Mannheim until his later years. According to the usual prejudice in sociology, Mannheim, given his objectivistic tendency in the wake of Marx (Endress 2007), opposes the subjectivistic 'list' of Schutz in the wake of Weber.[10]

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[8] It is therefore questionable whether this "concrete generality" aims at the explication of the world-constituting powers of consciousness and action of the actors (Phenomenology: Schutz, Berger/Luckmann), at the tacit general conventions concerning interactions (Ethnomethodology, analysis of conversation and typification), at the systems of symbols and interactions (Symbolic interactionism, hermeneutic sociology of knowledge: Blumer, Soeffner), at the socio-historical framework and social stratifications (documentary method, biography and generation research: Bohnsack, Hildenbrand, Rosenthal), at discourses and *dispositifs* (discourse analysis: Foucault), or at the sense generating latent structures of meaning (objective hermeneutics: Oevermann) (see also the list of options in Hitzler 2007: [18]).

[9] According to Bohnsack's conception, it is the mediating position of the documentary interpretation (inspired by Mannheim) that is opposite to both the objectivism of objective hermeneutics and the subjectivism of social phenomenology following Schutz, and which therefore presents the only fully valid form of an interpretive approach (Bohnsack 2005).

[10] In this paper I cannot provide an extensive introduction to the respective influences of the works of Weber, Schutz, and Mannheim on qualitative research. For more on this, see my work on Weber, Schutz, and Mannheim (Endress 2006a, 2007, 2011).

Reflecting disciplinary contexts through the lens of theoretical schools, the aforementioned discussions and negotiations are objects of a 'family conflict'. And as this dedramatizing analogy demonstrates – everything is at stake.[11] The determinations and demarcations of these positions are accordingly trenchant. This remains an unsatisfactory situation for theoretical, conceptual, as well as empirical reasons. Thus, the following considerations will provide certain evidence in order to yield a more inclusive understanding. In doing so, the following two sections will, firstly, provide some more theoretical remarks (Sect. 3) which, secondly, will be illustrated by the findings of an empirical case study (Sect. 4).

3 Comparative Aspects

In order to depict the aforementioned variations of Interpretive Sociology, we first need to highlight some of the mutual aspects of reference that appear essential:

1. First of all, every variant of Interpretive Sociology seeks to "reconstruct the references of sense for an action occurring and how that action occurred" as stated by Reichertz (1988: 22). This aim constitutes an early critique of "objective hermeneutics." But such a task cannot be accomplished due to the impossibility of reaching beyond the intersubjective constellations of action and interpretation, as long as only intentionally present references of sense are taken into account. Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann clearly state this in their "Social Construction" (1966: 72): "The typification of forms of action requires that these have an objective sense which in turn requires a linguistic objectification. […] In principle, then, an action and its sense can be apprehended apart from its individual performances and the variable subjective processes associated with it".
2. Again, it is evident that the reconstructive aim of sociology does not aim at a 'clear' consciousness of the carrying out of action, but "that the sociologist is

[11]Concerning the questions of the possibility of socio-scientific interpretation, one can formulate some basic meta-theoretical rules concerning the conflict between Explanatory and Interpretive Sociology, which seem at any rate suitable to the delimitation of a perspective overlapping the objective space of possibility. These can actually be labeled according to their specific origin: *firstly*, as an explaining sociologist one cannot see the specific interpretative profile of Interpretive Sociology *ab ovo* as complete nonsense and at the same time systematically take into account the cultural embedment of any social action, *secondly*, as a hermeneutically oriented sociologist, one cannot argue on behalf of the ever typical character of social acting and at the same time dismiss any generalization in another theoretical language as factually wrong; *thirdly*, as an explaining sociologist one cannot center on the cultural framing of social acting and at the same time skip the theoretical level of the explication of typical structures of interpretation, and fourthly, as a hermeneutically oriented sociologist one cannot emphasize the constitutive relevance of language for the perception of reality and at the same time rule out *a priori* specific (scientific) language play as inadequate.

able to reconstruct ex post, what had meaning for the action" (Reichertz 1988: 220). In the first place, this argument seems to not be a critical stance towards "objective hermeneutics," as Reichertz tries to locate it. The singular view on "what has become meaningful for the actor" (ibid.) is not sufficient for a reconstructive concern. Such a task is only accomplished if the corpus has been exhausted as far as possible, a corpus consisting of the meanings acted out and evinced by everyone involved in a given constellation of interaction or situation of action, co-producing "emergence." Thus, one might say that it is possible to measure out the objective space of possible meanings opened by the course of interaction. Via this thought-experimental unfolding of possible contexts of an articulation (or forms of expression), it is possible to reconstruct the supporting processes of the reproduction of structures of sense, the selections of meanings out of the range of possible variants, and finally the ways by which definite and concrete misunderstandings took place.

3. Especially if one takes the subjective character of all forms of expression seriously, then a solely reconstructive understanding that orients itself towards and searches for the "subjectively meant sense" (of the author) does not suffice. Such a self-conception would in the end suppose a total availability of that sense. Furthermore, it would lead towards a reduction or even elimination of the expressive forms of its objects (e.g. texts) which constitutively exceed the intentionality of each author. By that, it would miss the fact that we are 'told something' by the objects. It would omit what a reference to the "subjectively meant sense" claims: to do justice to the actor.
4. In Schutz's analysis (2004a: 89, 2004b: 285) the inconspicuousness of the 'matter of course' is the starting point for a phenomenologically founded Interpretive Sociology (cf. Endress 2006a: 81f., 66).[12] It is evident that Interpretive Sociology in the phenomenological tradition starts with an elementary process of dissociation; the critical analysis of the "epoché of the natural attitude" is made programmatic (Schutz 2003: 137f., 203ff.). As a result, Schutz's phenomenologically founded Interpretive Sociology does not actually merge with a purely subsequent subscription, a plain description of the 'matter of course'. This highlights the problematic horizon of Interpretive Sociology and ties its project immediately to the different traditions of (philosophical) hermeneutics.

   It may be stated analogously that hermeneutics—as the doctrine of understanding—enlightens the unlikeliness at the heart of everyday understanding, which is only first and foremost taken for granted.[13] This *epoché* connects

[12] See also Husserl's clarification in the "Crisis": "In advance there is the world, ever pregiven and undoubted in ontic certainty and self-verification" (1970: 186–7).

[13] To think hermeneutically, according to Gadamer (1974: 1061), to transfer a context from another 'world' into one's own has always been perceived as a method of translation. Similarly, in Sociology the term has been used well before it came into fashion, as for example by Stephen P. Turner (1980) and Michael Callon (1986).

Schutz's approach with the "objective hermeneutics" so often scolded as a "hermeneutics of suspicion."[14]

5. A process analysis is also common to all the examined perspectives.[15] Even if the analysis of the life-world focuses on the condensation of interaction orders, "objective hermeneutics" only dares to speak of the 'structures' of one case; if the 'history of formation' of the case is successively reconstructed, the development of a case structure hypothesis is formed by a rigorous sequencing in the following of the development of structure.[16] Seen systematically, the theory of the life-world has to remain vigilant to the problem of structure in order to solve the problem of typification. Equally, "objective hermeneutics" has to take into account the individuality of the development of a case structure (and its laws), in order to identify the problem of structure in an analyzed case.[17]
6. Guided by such a concept of "structures of interpretation," social research, as understood in "objective hermeneutics", is of a certain interest from a Schutzian perspective: **s**tructures of interpretation are framed in "objective hermeneutics" as interpretations of problems of action (that is because "objective hermeneutics" departs from the insight into a dialectic of both constraints of decision and obligations of reason).

Taking all the aforementioned aspects into account, Schutz's life-world theory, as well as the basic notion of Interpretive Sociology, seems to provide the contours for empirical research. Hence, qualitative social research adequately transforms the basic methodological insight concerning the sociality of the social into a method.

Regarding the introductory qualification of the aim of Interpretive Sociology with respect to unveiling the universal in the historically specific, we may state: Weber's construction of a historical phenomenology of structures seeks to analyze using the methodological instrument of ideal (typical) constructions of concepts; Schutz looks to uncover the structures of life-worlds in their types; and the "objective hermeneutics" of Oevermann reconstructs the "inner context" of one case, referring to its individual structure or case structure (Fallstruktur).[18]

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[14]Here, we are obviously dealing with the 'backstage', introduced by Goffman (1959) in a still concretistic manner. It would be nonsense, however, to use qualitative social research with the too far reaching and constrained idea that on each 'backstage' or 'behind the facad' is a hidden and supposedly 'true' reality which is constantly and fraudulently concealed and/or veiled by the front stage. Especially because such presumptions at once would have to assume strong (manifest) intentions they really should have been reduced in the tended process of distancing. But the contrary assumption of an in principle manifest reality is, given the afore-mentioned reasons, also not tenable.

[15]I omit here the call for and the practical recourse to sequence-analytic methods in Oevermann et al. (1979, 1980; Oevermann 1986), Luckmann (2007) and Soeffner (1989: 185ff., 1991a) as well as Bohnsack (1999: 35) and of course also Strauss; compare Soeffner (1991b: 5f).

[16]Matthiesen speaks of "a fundamentally dual, genetic structural concept" (1994: 83).

[17]Compare in the following the question of the concept of rule which is drawn on for the idea of a "generalization of structure in singular cases" by Oevermann.

[18]It has to be studied separately to what extent the difference of a reference to "implicit knowledge" and "objective (latent) structures of meaning" is relevant here (see Matthiesen 1994: 97f.).

4 Exemplary Empirical Analysis

Before we can draw conclusions concerning the variants of qualitative research, we would like to illustrate the presented conceptual considerations with an example of empirical research.[19] Beginning with a few remarks concerning the procedure of qualitative social research in general, some findings of a case study regarding fraternities will be presented to demonstrate the effect of housing arrangements on maintaining individuality versus developing a communal identity.

The explanatory claim of any approach in the tradition of Interpretive Sociology articulates itself in a methodologically reflected circle of (1) exemplary case constructions in order to gain a primary interpretation in relation to the leading interest of explanation, (2) typological condensations based on sequential analysis, (3) contrasting typologies regarding these typological condensations and (4) an explication of the 'case structure'. My suggestion of a four-step-procedure may be explained for a case of text data in general as following:

Ad 1. On the basis of, for example, guided open interviews, single passages are chosen for each documented interview on the basis of an interpretative rating. Such a 'case-related' procedure is based on the objective data reconstructed out of the available material as well as of interview passages which, in the first place, are considered significant for the guiding research interest. Both sets of data are transferred for further orientation of research into a closed condensed text form called "anamnesis." This step of analysis only operates with internal relations towards contrasting text sequences.

Ad 2. Based on first typifying characteristics of the cases analyzed, further passages classified as relevant or significant are selected and interpreted in a separate sequential analysis[20] in order to gain a condensed case interpretation particularly focussing on the "solutions" for the explanatory problem of actions articulated in singular cases.[21]

Ad 3. Those "solutions," derived from the singular cases, are then typologically sharpened by contrasting them with the rest of the material. This is done in order to draw an ideal (typical) tableau of differentiated, objectively possible "solutions" which may occur while different actors are trying to solve a shared problem of action in the light of diverse life-world experiences and patterns of orientation.

Ad 4. In an intensive scan through the empirical data one may explicate the objective problem of structure related to the explanatory interest motivating the

[19] For that purpose I will use a study concerning students in a city in the South of Germany who became members of a fraternity. The following empirical data about the students comes from a 2-year qualitative as well as quantitative research practical training at the University of Tuebingen.

[20] A method of sequential analysis is methodically adequate insofar as a "meaningful construction" of a social world is to be reconstructed in detailed analytical steps.

[21] In order to validate the assumption of a case structure imprinting every interview sequence, singular text passages considered less relevant are analyzed in a case-intern contrasting.

research. But this explication may only offer a temporary answer—related to the current research interest as well as the manageable depth of the interpretation of the material at present. The cases examined can be understood as typical variants of a "solution," meaning the coverage of the objective structural problem.

The exemplary case concerns the meaning of joining a present-day student fraternity. The analysis aimed at the student's management of the theoretically substantial and empirically observable tension between the demands of self-actualization in an 'individualized' society, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the rather intensive praxis of communal relationships ("Vergemeinschaftung") typical of fraternities. The leading research question was to identify the structural problem of action the actors are confronted with in their daily life, and how they consider this problem resolvable?

Based on a pre-orientation in the field and on the comparisons between the conditions of living and everyday life in a fraternity and a shared apartment, the guiding hypothesis was – students have to tackle the problem of the tension between long lasting "life alliances" (as an intensive praxis of communal relationships (*Vergemeinschaftung*) and an only temporary life form (shared apartment/*Wohngemeinschaft*)) Therefore, the central empirical research interest may be formulated as follows: which types or structures of management of the tension between 'life alliance' and 'shared apartment' are identifiable on the level of the singular cases in the sample?

Not only is it assumed that the act of joining a fraternity is typically in need of legitimacy *vis a vis* other students, it is further assumed that such an institutionally fixed and permanent commitment as a life form involves a necessity of legitimacy for the students in shared apartments. In both respects one has to consider the strategies for coping as well as problem solving. The need for legitimacy may be illustrated as an ideal typical contrast between these two types of "fraternity" and "shared apartment":

Fraternity	Shared apartment
Relatively high degree of institutionalization	Relatively low degree of institutionalization
High degree of commitment ("honor")	Low degree of commitment ("functionality")
Trans-generational life form	Group of peers
Hierarchical ("*Alte Herren*," "*Burschen*," "*Füchse*")	Egalitarian
For the whole duration of studies	Temporary (change between shared apartments typical)
Network (e.g., concerning careers)	No networking context
Type: life alliance	Type: temporary community life (pragmatic arrangements)

In the single case analysis (steps 1 and 2) carried out with regard to the research question, different types of patterns of problem-solving and coping were identifiable: (a) a first type undergoes a process of conversion when entering a fraternity. While the student re-organizes his way of living ("a new life"), the frat serves as a substitute family with all indications of an over-identification with

this institution, leading to a life crisis when members are strongly criticised (and have to fear punishment). This type could be called "the censured child". (b) A second type de-dramatizes the institutional order and accentuates the potential of design for the members of the fraternity. In its consequences, this de-institutionalisation leads to a radical subjectification (for example of the concept of "honor") and therefore to a re-interpretation of its obligating character. (c) For a third type, the difference between "life alliance" and "shared apartment" disappears by the equation of frat membership and association of friendship. Here, the institutional character is counteracted by an analogy with friendship understood as private, voluntary and based on diffuse obligations. (d) A fourth type reacts by referring to everyday life. Here, fraternity life is only a special challenge 'life in general' confronts one with. Therefore, this type is highly unspecific. In this mode of distancing, a pragmatic 'sporting' attitude and a 'pride' in confronting challenges prevails – "the sportsman."

During the third step of this analysis, that is the external contrasting of types, an institutional solution for the problem of action could be identified for two types (a and c), the other types could be described as an 'individual' coping form (b and d) for this problem—a problem which could not be taken to be present in the subject's consciousness.

With the identification of the case related (internal) typological densification as well as with the adjoining (external) contrast, four forms of coping with a specific social action (entering a fraternity) and its 'objective' problem (reducing the tension between life alliance and shared apartment) could be reconstructed, enabling the structural explication of the phenomenon in question (step 4). A pragmatic research approach was taken whereby the specific potentiality of a hermeneutically operating sociology is documented: its research interest in uncovering the latent structures of sense, i.e., structures hidden for the actor. However, this approach does claim a final analysis only until further notice, since there may be more solutions than the four types identified.

The use of the four step procedure introduced at the beginning of this section for analyzing the empirical data just presented yields a number of results: following the first two steps, the material allows us to identify four types, i.e., typological densifications of case-specific realized (subjective) solutions of how students cope with a housing arrangement in relation to maintaining their individuality, on the one side, and developing a communal identification (cf. "the censored child" and "the sportsman"), on the other. Furthermore, the analysis, in its third step, generates 'objective' solutions to cope with the tension between striving for individuality and the quest for communal integration: the variants of over-identification and the distancing dissolution have been identified as typical patterns of coping between the pole types. Finally, in the fourth and last step the 'objective' structural problem of the ambivalence of linking "life alliances" with "shared apartments" is identifiable beyond the self-perception of the actors involved who in their subjective understanding of this situation identify an analogy.

The presented typification of the case structures helps us to understand the kind of hermeneutical tradition this type of interpretive sociology belongs to in two

ways: firstly, it is more than descriptive and goes beyond documenting first order types. Secondly, the typological densifications are formulated in reference to the everyday repertoire of interpretation (the "censored child", "the sportsman") and are therefore providing the plausibility of the interpretation. In other words, they meet Schutz's criterion of linking scientific interpretations back to the horizon of everyday interpretations. It has to be seen as one dimension by which interpretive sociology documents its roots in socio-cultural life-world experience, i.e., to the lived experience of people in general.

5 Final Discussion

The two sections above tried to show the methodologically reflected circle central for a research strategy within the tradition of Interpretive Sociology and to demonstrate its fruitfulness with reference to an empirical case study. The findings supply starting points for a concluding critical discussion of one-sided readings of and pragmatic alignments with the approaches of Weber, Schutz, and Oevermann. These have been discussed before as three positions within the highly pluralized field of Interpretive sociology, superficially representing three ways of handling the dialectic entanglement of subjective and social (intersubjective) processes of sense-constitution.

5.1 Against a Subjectivist Reading of Weber

Besides Weber's rejection of collective terms (see Weber 1968: 13f.), which in my opinion is a posture shared by Schutz (Endress 2006a: 32), Weber's emphasis on the orientation of Interpretive Sociology towards the "subjectively meant sense" is especially relevant here.

Against an excessively exclusive interpretation of Weber's sociology, it must be acknowledged that Weber had to deal with objective contexts and orders of sense throughout his historical-sociological studies.[22] Hence, a one-sided predefinition of Weber's sociology as exclusively "methodological individualism" is simply an abbreviation. A mere positioning in this tradition fails to do justice to the complex profile of Weber's sociology, as it is led too exclusively by the exposition of the "fundamental terms of sociology" in "Economy and Society" and does not recognize sufficiently the implications regarding social relations, intersubjectively shared bases of definition for social action, social shapes, and legitimate orders (see Endress 2006a: 23f., 37f., 42f.). Weber—like Schutz—assumes a basic intersubjectivity of social structures and

[22] See exemplary the 'protestantic ethics', Weber (2002); for a revised interpretation cf. Endress (2008b: 199–207).

structures of sense, a constitutive context of references of sociality and subjectivity (see Endress 2006a: 69).[23] Those hints alone suffice to repudiate the accusation of subjectivism in Schutz's work (see Bohnsack 2003: 550). Respectively, Schutz's approach has to be appropriately termed intersubjectively informed methodological individualism (Endress 2006a: 32, 45, 69).

5.2 Against a Subjectivist Reading of Schutz[24]

The critique of a supposed subjectivistic-intentionalistic abbreviated profile of Schutz's Interpretive Sociology is not only found in authors like Habermas (1981. II: 194ff.) or Giddens (1976: 31, 33), but in Oevermann and Bohnsack, too. Bohnsack, for example, argues that in Schutz's work and in those of his successors "second-order" constructions remain "descriptive" and hence "uncritical towards the common sense" (Bohnsack 2003: 559). Because of this, Bohnsack further argues (2003: 560) that the phenomenological sociology of Schutz and Berger/Luckmann gains "no access to the *praxis* of action" since it "remains to a large extent inside the matter of course of the common sense," unable to reconstruct the implicit knowledge of the "milieu-specific knowledge of orientation" (ibid. 562). Such a critique may, however, only address certain alignments of Schutz's work in the context of different sociological hermeneutics.[25]

Regarding this last critique, we already mentioned that for Schutz, the elemental dissociation of the object of research was obvious (and by this a certain closeness to Mannheim's highlighting of a process of dissociation remains necessary for the social scientist). Moreover, it was evident to Schutz, too, that the

[23] Breuer (2006: 8) emphasizes by referring to recent contributions (see Endress 2006b; Greshoff 2006) that "Weber's Sociology also includes other dimensions beyond the subjectively meant sense" and "the actions of the concerned persons": the universe of 'social relationships' (1968: 26ff., 40ff.) which are grounded on intersubjective (mutual) dispositions and should be understood as self-contained structures; the sphere of 'legitimate systems' (1968: 31ff.) which are built upon 'trans-subjective' or even objective dispositions and lastly also the whole aggregate of non-intended, 'trans-intentional' consequences of action.

[24] In this context, the converse critique of a virtually latent objectivism in Schutz and Berger/Luckmann has been ignored because of the special meaning of the processes of typification, see Hahn (1994: 21, 108f., 162, 193ff., 356f.). Giddens' accusation of determinism concerning Berger/Luckmann goes in a comparable direction (1976: 96 connected to 171: note 6).

[25] See, for example, Kurt (2004) who promotes a subjectivistic-intentionalistic reduction of Interpretive Sociology adhering to Weber in the tradition of social phenomenology in an almost exemplary way. This positioning orients itself towards the goal formulated by Soeffner, according to whom the object of discussion is the "interpretation and understanding of the singular in respect to its typical and typifiable relations to general structures" (1989: 7ff., 66ff., 98ff.; also: 1991a). Lastly, this results in a surprising proximity of subjective, socially scientific hermeneutics and "objectivistic" as well as "epistemological" (methodological) positions like, e.g., in Emilio Betti, who, in contrast to Gadamer, sees understanding as a "recognition and reconstruction of sense" as originally intended by the author (Betti 1962: 11ff., 27f.).

social world is not produced by intentional consciousness (as Giddens (1976: 31) obviously implies in his hypothesis). This insight is the reason for the change of perspective following the second chapter of *The Phenomenology of the Social World* (2004a: 219f.). The fact that Schutz directs his analytical interest at the 'subjective' side of social reality is due to his preference for a definite research direction; he regularly analyzes the conditions of action, seldom their (intended or non-intended) consequences (with Giddens 1976: 31f.). Therefore, what is often identified as a lack in Schutz's analysis does not necessarily imply conceptual or analytical deficits; it is rather caused by a prioritization in his analytical interest. Schutz sticks quite closely to the classical task of Interpretive Sociology, stating that it "primarily has to analyze the description of the interpretation and generation of sense, carried out by those living in the social world" (2004a: 438). We should emphasize, however, that Schutz says "primarily", he did not write "exclusively"! This, he states, is because "beyond that […] Interpretive Sociology wants to […] get to the cultural objects which constitute themselves in the processes of generation and interpretation of sense in the social world, and 'understand' those cultural objects by inquiring back into their constituting sense" (ibid.). This second genetic task of Interpretive Sociology indicates the 'objectivity' of the social world being constituted through the effects of reciprocal relations. This objectivity is documented on the level of "imposed relevances" for social action (Schutz 2004b).

Extending this argument, it may be said, that in two further prominent variants of interpretative sociologies (both suspicious for their subjectivism, too)—in "symbolic interactionism" as well as in "grounded theory"—the subjectively meant sense (or the intentions) of the actors plays a primary or even constitutive part for the understanding of the action or interaction process. And, at least for Strauss, the work of Schutz was of crucial importance. In "symbolic interactionism" (mediated via Mead 1987), this orientation is marked by the secondary relevance of the "I," as well as by the importance of the "generalized other". In "grounded theory" the basic figures of "interaction patterns," the "trajectories", as more or less coordinated processes of the actions of multiple subjects, as well as the phenomenon of group participation, may be mentioned (Strauss 1997: 46ff., 150ff.; Soeffner 1991b: 10ff.).

5.3 Against an Objectivistically Sharpened Critique of "Objective Hermeneutics"

"Objective hermeneutics" makes the reconstruction of the aforementioned 'objectivity' its main research goal. Following "objective hermeneutics," the "methods of understanding, action-theory based sociology […] cannot consist in usual reproducing-hermeneutics and its central category of subjectively meant sense," but needs to be founded "in a […] type of reconstruction of objective sense" (Oevermann

1993: 108).[26] We already dealt with the first objection through our recourse to the founders of Interpretive Sociology Weber and Schutz. Regarding the plea for a reconstruction of 'objective sense' we may still ask: why is this plea made and which form should this plea take on in research?

What does the recourse to the "reality of objective or latent structures of sense, constituted by texts and its generating rules" mean? What does it mean "to determine" the sense of an "act in an objective way by valid rules of generating sense" (Oevermann 1993: 112f.)? The critique of "objective hermeneutics" refers to those positionings: either the concept of "latent structures of sense" or the concept of "rule" is criticized. This critique finally culminates in the accusation that "objective hermeneutics" are some kind of metaphysics (e.g. Reichertz 1988, 1994; Soeffner and Reichertz 2004: [6]). Does this critique remain?

Oevermann's reference to rules, types of rules, and systems of rules (e.g. 1980: 23, 1986: 26) necessarily leads us to the question of what is meant by "rule"—the central problem. Oevermann (like Habermas) makes use of a 'hard' notion of rule, referring to criteria of clear identification as well as the fundamental possibility of justification. But if one starts with the notion that rules are always realized *in praxi* (context of usage), the following consideration will be plausible: actors rarely apply rules directly, but they have typical dispositions—their socio-historical *apriori*, if you like. Those dispositions enable repetitions of action (see Schutz's idealisation of the "I can always again") and, thus, make it possible that "the free action detaches itself [from the deciding subject] like an overripe fruit" (Schutz 2004a: 168, citing Bergson). Viewed in this light, it does not make sense to play dispositions (habitus) off against rules.

An enforced weighting of situational constellations over justification may open "objective hermeneutics" productively for contexts of action and processes of structuring (temporality). This would historically absorb the downright uncompromising reference to "rules" and sensitize "objective hermeneutics" for the typological level of empirical research as an adequate level of generalisation of Interpretive Sociology. Such an aperture might additionally be supported by a further methodological consideration. Despite Oevermann's multiple explanations of the methodological self-understanding of "objective hermeneutics," one might still argue that an objective space of possibilities which is developed quasi-playfully by a group of interpreters via "thought-experimental variation of contexts" (Oevermann et al. 1979: 417f.) may necessarily only be hypothetically valid. That is because such a claim for

[26]The German original reads as follows: "*Die Methoden einer sinnverstehenden handlungstheoretischen Soziologie können nicht in der üblichen Nachvollzugs-Hermeneutik mit der zentralen Kategorie des 'subjektiv gemeinten Sinns' bestehen, sie müssen in einem der objektiven Hermeneutik entsprechenden Typ der Rekonstruktion von objektivem Sinn fundiert sein*". From my point of view, the hermeneutics of the sociology of knowledge does not do justice to this when it is argued that "the sociology of knowledge […] has to work historically reconstructive […] with the single aim to establish the mechanisms of choice which are developed by the actors to reach certain goals" (Soeffner and Reichertz 2004: [24]). In my opinion, the same is also applicable when this position is argued: "The subject of the sociology of knowledge is societal knowledge … as far as it is expressed by subjects and can be reconstructed" (ibid. [28]).

validity is firstly made at a given point in time and secondly framed by a specific group constellation. The reference to an "assumed system of rules" (Oevermann et al. 1980: 23) is contingent in its temporal as well as in its social (hence factual) dimensions.[27] And this might be valid especially for constellations of urged social change by which Sociology tends to characterize the present. Yet, especially under such conditions, "objective hermeneutics" might be conceived as a theory, methodology, and method that tries to ascertain what Luckmann, among others, called a "socio-historical *apriori*": a trial to reconstruct the elements or aspects of systems of order or systems of sense; a reconstruction based on existing empirical (textual) data in which a "symbolic world of sense" is sedimented, out of which this data descends and by which its meaning is given.

These indications also provide the opportunity to argue against those critiques orientated to what they call the "hermeneutics of suspicion." Talking about a "hermeneutics of suspicion," Ricœur (1974: 99, 148, 331) aims at an exposition of the hermeneutical venture rooted in Schleiermacher, who considered misunderstandings to be constitutive for any hermeneutics. Foucault makes the same argument when, following Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud, he addresses the infinity and incompleteness of all interpretation and highlights the insult to the human mind that the structural infinity of perspectivalism represents (Foucault 1967: 730, 736). Since Foucault not only neglects Schleiermacher as a reference but retains a peculiar negativism that prevents him from seeing the optionality and potentiality of this infinity, we have to object to his account. Moreover, critiques of "objective hermeneutics" arguing in this tradition (e.g. Bohnsack 2003: 554ff.) fail because they equate its concern with Habermas's insistence on supplementing hermeneutics with a critique of ideology. Instead, with his "hermeneutics of suspicion", Ricœur wanted to identify a strategy of interpretation which not only suspects any immediate understanding of sense, but also attributes it to an unconscious will to power. Hence, Ricœur (1974: 18, 148ff.) shows no interest in Schleiermacher, but like Foucault (1967) focuses on Nietzsche ("will of power"), Freud (unconscious drives), and Marx (interests of classes) as representatives of a "hermeneutics of suspicion." This focus, however, misses the specificity of "objective hermeneutics," which seeks to position itself beyond both "Critical Theory" and "hermeneutics of depth." This is also the reason why "objective hermeneutics" distances itself from the conclusions drawn by Habermas in his critique of Gadamer. In this critique every process of passing down from generation to generation (*Überlieferungsgeschehen*) is regarded as a result of "domination" and "force." This is the reason why "maturity", not "consent", should function as the *telos* of understanding and why an appropriate "emancipatory epistemological interest," i.e. hermeneutics in Gadamer's sense, has to be supplemented by a critique of ideology (Habermas 1971a, b). This critique is definitely not the problem of "objective hermeneutics," however, thus, the (honorable) title of a "hermeneutics of suspicion" does not apply.

[27] A critique however that is, following to the already mentioned arguments, not adequate to devalue this method of interpretation in toto, yet this seems to be Bohnsack's opinion (2003: 555, 558).

5.4 Comparative Considerations

The previous considerations may be summed up as follows: there is a triad of knowledge forms at work in the inner core of the discussed variants of Interpretive Sociology or qualitative social research methods:

(a) Documentary interpretation aims at an "a-theoretical," "conjunctive knowledge" that is to be reconstructed in order to analyze the process of "an acted-out and experienced construction" of reality (Bohnsack 2003: 562). This reconstruction centers around the "orienting frame" of actors, i.e. on "what" they say and "how" they say it (ibid. 563).[28]
(b) The different variants of life-world analysis originating from Schutz primarily orient themselves towards a descriptive, typologically condensed explicit knowledge of acting in order to narratively depict the historical concretion of the cases via a reconstruction of motives, attitudes, and self interpretations.
(c) "Objective hermeneutics", conversely, aims at the explication of knowledge of rules, particularly, on the designation of case constitutive universal rules. But, and this is essential for the discussion here, the case has rules, too, which help to typically cope with the dialectics between the force to decide and the obligation to predicate. To reconstruct this case specificity as "case typical" rules deviating from 'universal' rules serves to identify the concrete life praxis. Finally, "Objective hermeneutics" is concerned with the definition of principles of selection. Sequential analysis wants to show that a case "at every point in the sequence neglects and does not realize the principally open possibilities of the other in a characteristic, recognisable and predictable way" (Oevermann 1991: 280). The context of objectively reconstructable possibilities of action and the action actually chosen both form the center of the analytical interest of "objective hermeneutics" (see Hildenbrand 2004: 188) in a specific case typical way.[29]

Considering the difference of intended and non-intended effects of action, we may illustrate the different analytical foci of life-world theory and "objective hermeneutics" as follows: whereas hermeneutics as informed by the sociology of knowledge aims at the reconstruction of intended effects of action, "objective hermeneutics" enquires into the genesis of non-intended effects of action by identifying the objectively possible horizons of sense (latent sense structures) (see Matthiesen 1994: 85f.). It is made clear, too, that the focus on genetic reconstruction might be the

[28] Bohnsack includes Mannheim's concept of social bearings and the focus on socialization of historical phenomena in his analysis here (see 2003: 562).

[29] In these three forms of knowledge, the different structures of meaning can be specifically identified; thus, the documentary interpretation aims at the uncovering of intersubjective and 'transsubjective' structures of meaning, the phenomenologically oriented analysis of the life-world at the identification of subjective-intersubjective structures of meaning and objective hermeneutics at the analysis of subjective-trans-subjective structures of meaning.

primary task of "objective hermeneutics" compared to life-world theory.[30] And we may consider here (see Endress 2006b: 42f.) that the different accentuations in research pragmatics evolve from different contexts: approaches following Schutz's operative method descend out of a theoretical context grounded in intentionality, the competence of actors, as well as in the analytical difference of acting out and action, while "objective hermeneutics" emerged out of contexts of empirical research, motivated by the "experience of a structural force, canalizing processes of education" (Matthiesen 1994: 89).

6 Historical Perspective

Viewed historically, the analyzed difference between "objective hermeneutics" and approaches of social research following Schutz's interest in the subjectively meant sense reproduces the difference between hermeneutics following Schleiermacher on the one hand, and on the other hand the hermeneutics of Georg Friedrich Meier in his "Attempt at a General Art of Interpretation" of 1757 (Meier 1996). The latter relies on the principle of "hermeneutical equity (*aequitas hermeneutica*)" which declares what the author wanted to say to be the scale of interpretation. Viewed against this background, Meier's hermeneutics appears as the precursor to similar considerations on the "anticipation of perfection" or a "principle of charity" elaborated by Gadamer, Quine, or Davidson.

On the contrary, Schleiermacher's pragmatic orientation towards "speech" can be comprehended as the intersection of (objective-general) language and (subjective-individual) speaker. It is only in this mutuality of "grammatical" and "technical-psychological" interpretation that understanding—in the sense of an open (and therefore principally infinite) spiral movement—might be realised in order to "understand the speech equally as well as its author, finally even better than him" (cf. Schleiermacher 1977: 94, 104, 325, and 1985: 1308).[31] Schleiermacher argues with a "stricter praxis" of hermeneutics by which "misunderstanding will resolve itself and understanding has to be wanted and sought for at every point" (1977: 92).

The difference between Meier's primacy of comprehensibility and Schleiermacher's priority of misunderstanding (resp. incomprehensibility) is identified as the historical origin of the aforementioned controversies concerning the form of Interpretive Sociology. Because Schleiermacher makes misunderstanding the

[30] See in contrast to this the Grounded Theory which cannot be discussed here because of pragmatic reasons (for example Hildenbrand 2004: 178).

[31] Insofar as Schleiermacher sees general hermeneutics as having the double duty of grammatical as well as technical psychological interpretation and thus with handling the relation between the outside-totality of language use inside a language community on the one hand and the proof of an individual soul as an expression of the inner on the other hand. Oevermann's objective hermeneutics thus follows a remarkable tradition. This is particularly correct because a dialectical understanding is seen as constitutive for a mutual relation of postulates for Schleiermacher as well.

sword of Damocles above the head of anybody working hermeneutically, every understanding has to start methodologically: "The business of hermeneutics has to start well before understanding gets uncertain—i. e., at the very beginning of every attempt to understand speech, because understanding usually gets uncertain insofar it is neglected before" (1985: 1272). This reflection should be read as a plea not to wait for the crisis but to anticipate it reflexively in the process of understanding. Therefore a sufficient reflexive type of Interpretive Sociology following the works of Weber and Schutz (see Endress 2008a) does not fall behind Schleiermacher's insight that "misunderstanding will never resolve itself completely" (1977: 328).

Following this postulate, the foregoing analysis understands itself as self-reflective and historical. Yet, it does not aspire to this in the trivial sense of the structural incompleteness and tentativeness of any individual authorship, but rather in a systematic sense that remains conscious of the unavoidable infinity of scientific debates (Dilthey already spoke of an "infinite task" of understanding), whose renunciation would amount to an act of arbitrariness. Yet, this methodological status should by no means be understood to undermine its own claim of credit. Against the dominance of the temporal dimension of the past in Gadamer's (1960) figure of a historically effective consciousness, the present has to be rehabilitated systematically—in the sense of a primacy of the present towards the past, both in a hermeneutical and a pragmatic respect. To understand the historically sedimented inventory of meaning, which surpasses a pointillist understanding of the present, in a factually adequate way means to identify the implicit structures of sense in a methodologically controlled way—not only regarding the enunciations of an author in an interview, but likewise regarding those of the observing, interpreting, and understanding sociologist.

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Alfred Schutz and a Hermeneutical Sociology of Knowledge

Hisashi Nasu

1 Introduction: Schutz's Work and a Sociology of Knowledge

Schutz's contributions to the social sciences can be roughly classified into three categories or fields: (1) the methodology of the social sciences, (2) pure theory, and (3) empirically oriented theory. These categories are interrelated *in a dual sense*: First, while his methodological work is inspired and directed by his pure as well as his empirical theoretical work; his purely theoretical work is grounded upon his methodological work yet inspired and directed by his empirically grounded theory, which is, in turn, grounded upon his methodological and purely theoretical work.

Second, the bulk of Schutz's work is founded on and pervaded by his conception of "relevance." "Relevance" is a theme which occupied him throughout his life, and is, in my judgment, a key concept that underlies almost all of his writings and connects them with one another. He wrote in an earlier handwritten manuscript, simply titled "Relevanz," that "the concept of relevance is the central concept of sociology and of cultural sciences. However, the basic phenomenon of relevance reaches beyond them into every life: it permeates our existing, our living and recognizing experience" (Schutz 1996a: 3–4). In a later handwritten manuscript[1] he also wrote

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[1]It is unclear what the purpose of this undated manuscript (Schutz 1957), which was translated from German by A. Gurwitsch and has appeared as "Some Structures of the Life-World" (Schutz 1966), originally was. Although Wagner suggests that "Schutz had written [this German manuscript] in 1957 for a possible but unrealized presentation at an International Congress of Phenomenologists" (Wagner 1984/1985: chap. 35, 30–31).

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that "without a theory of relevance, no foundation for a science of human action is possible. The theory of relevance is therefore of fundamental importance for the social sciences" (cf. Schutz 1966: 131).

According to Schutz, "the basic problem of relevance concerns a selection from the totality of the world which is pre-given to life as well as to thinking" (1996a: 4). In this sense, and this will become clearer in the latter part of this essay, relevance refers to the organization of experience at the pre-predicative as well as the predicative level, and therefore to the construction of objects and events as well as the organization of the stream of consciousness and the definition of the situation. Relevance is a regulative principle of reality construction in the sense that it is a regulative principle of knowing and experiencing objects, events and the subject as well as a regulative principle for defining the situation in which objects, events and the subject are located (cf. Srubar 1994; Nasu 1997, 1999).

Such an idea leads to a perspective for doing sociology, i.e., for exploring individuals, their social actions, the social relations among them, and the social phenomena founded on their social actions and relations *in terms of knowledge*. Such a perspective can be called a 'sociology of knowledge,' or better, a hermeneutical sociology of knowledge, and insofar as the sociological phase of Schutz's work is concerned, he might be called a 'sociologist of knowledge.'

Schutz, however, did not develop his own arguments under the title of the 'sociology of knowledge.' Nonetheless, he sometimes spoke of a 'sociology of knowledge.' There are two kinds of 'sociology of knowledge' found in his writings. Schutz criticizes one kind of them as a "misnamed" or "an ill-defined discipline," as opposed to another which "understands its task" or "is aware of its true task," and therefore "does not misunderstand its task" (cf. 1962a: 15, 1962c: 347, 1964a: 121, 1964b: 249, 1966: 121). According to Schutz, the former ("misnamed" sociology of knowledge) approaches the problem of the social distribution of knowledge merely from the angle of the ideological foundation of truth in its dependence upon social and economic conditions, or from that of the social implications of education, or the social role of the man of knowledge or indeed simply takes for granted the social distribution of knowledge upon which it is founded. The latter (which "understands its task") is a new field for theoretical and empirical research which is opened up for investigation by the problem of the social distribution of knowledge upon which it is founded (cf. Schutz 1962a: 15, 1964a: 121).

Schutz did not identify whose sociology of knowledge is the former, nor did he develop his criticism. Judging from his description just given, however, it might be surmised that his attention was directed, among others, to Mannheim's 'sociology of knowledge.' As is well known, Mannheim's 'sociology of knowledge' seeks to explain or interpret ideas and thought through "relating" them to their socially existent conditions, is concerned mainly with the ideological "distortion" of knowledge, and is deeply interested in education and the man of knowledge (the so-called "*intelligentsia*").

Mannheim defined the sociology of knowledge concisely:

> as theory it seeks to analyze the relationship between knowledge and existence [die sogenannte "Seinverbundenheit" des Wissens]; as historical-sociological research it seeks to trace the forms which this relationship has taken in the intellectual development of mankind. (Mannheim 1931: 237)

Mannheim's 'sociology of knowledge' has already been the subject of criticisms, most typically: it is flawed by some epistemological confusion; it fails to specify the type or mode of relationship between social structure and knowledge; key terms of his arguments, e.g., "*Gebundenheit*" or "*Verbundenheit*," are fundamentally ambiguous; it fails to resolve the paradox of relativism; and it is committed to *reductionism* based on the dichotomy between existence without consciousness and consciousness without existence (cf. Merton 1941; Elias 1971; Sawai 1992, 1995a, b). As for Schutz's attitude toward the prevailing type of 'sociology of knowledge' (especially Mannheim's), judging from his criticisms of Hayek's theory of knowledge (cf. Schutz 1996b) as well as from his description of a "misnamed" sociology of knowledge mentioned above, it can be strongly surmised that he would criticize it, not least when one considers his disappointment with Mannheim's reductionistic approach to knowledge (cf. Nasu 2008).

2 Some Attempts to Re-interpret Mannheim's Sociology of Knowledge in Terms of Hermeneutics

In the late 1970s, some scholars attempted to re-interpret and revive Mannheim's sociology of knowledge, rejecting the earlier criticisms of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge for its putative reductionism or the so-called "*genetic fallacy*." They studied Mannheim's texts more carefully, extracted many of his hermeneutical passages and tried to characterize his method as hermeneutic rather than reductive in intent.

A. P. Simonds, for example, tried to defend Mannheim's sociology of knowledge against some earlier criticisms. His arguments deal with many topics but this essay focuses on four of them in particular. The first is Simonds' insistence that the 'sociology of knowledge' is concerned with grasping historical facts and events *authentically*, which is to say, *in terms of their meaning*; hence, Simonds argues, Mannheim adopted *primarily* an *interpretive* method. Such a task, Mannheim allegedly believed, can be performed adequately

> *in two different directions*: the first, to the specific intentional act by which meaning was conferred upon the work by its author, and the second, to the larger (but still historically specific) socially constructed and shared context of intersubjective meaning which that intentional act reflected and also presupposed. (cf. Simonds 1975: 83, 1978: 21, 37, 112)

Mannheim's view was that the sociology of knowledge should investigate the content of a meaningful social action as a *text*, and such an investigation is possible only after its *context* of meaning has been grasped (cf. Simonds 1978: 113). His sociology of knowledge, Simonds concludes, can be characterized as hermeneutic rather than reductive.

Second, Simonds writes that nowhere does Mannheim speak of 'classes having opinions or ideas' nor does he deny that disagreement may be found within any social group. Rather, according to Simonds, Mannheim argues that what is important for the sociology of knowledge is the distinction between imputing to a group

(or to a social location) a common *content* to its members' expressions and imputing to them a common *context* of shared meanings. The notion of shared meaning is, for Mannheim, not the same as that of consensus, and the context of shared meaning was conceived of not as a common content but as a *conceptual framework of presuppositions* in thought and expression (cf. ibid.: 18, 25–32, 123). Mannheim's notions of "*Dokumentsinn*," "*Denkstil*," "*Aspektstruktur*," and "*Weltauslegung*" can be listed here as such conceptual frameworks.

The third point to be mentioned here concerns Simonds' characterization of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge *in reflexive terms*. He writes that it is absolutely essential to Mannheim's method that the sociology of knowledge treat as problematic not only the social context of the author of the expression to be understood, but also the social context of the observer who is seeking to understand. Furthermore, according to Mannheim's position, Simonds insists, the observer's understanding of the social context can be accomplished adequately not by absolutizing it but by making it subject to critical scrutiny and open to a dialogical relationship with whatever 'other' the observer would claim to understand. Mannheim's conception of the sociology of knowledge is, therefore, "not dissimilar to the idea of a 'fusing of horizons' which Hans-Georg Gadamer conceives of as the task of 'the effective-historical consciousness'" (cf. Simonds 1975: 100–101, 1978: 92).

Finally, there is Simonds' literal *re*-interpretation of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge, which he characterizes as an interpretative method. This characterization leads him to say that the "sociology of knowledge must be considered not as a special field or sub-discipline, but as a claim respecting the nature of social science itself" (Simonds 1975: 99) even though Mannheim himself conceived of the 'sociology of knowledge' along with the sociology of economics, of law, of religion, of literature, of art, of language, and of education as "*Bindestrichsoziologie*", that is, as a subset of sociology (cf. Mannheim 1932: 15).

S. J. Hekman is another scholar who tried to re-interpret and revive Mannheim's sociology of knowledge along the same lines as Simonds. She, like Simonds, insisted on a re-definition: "the sociology of knowledge is not a subset of the larger discipline but defines social science itself" (Hekman 1986: 10). There are, of course, several differences between Heckman and Simonds; e.g., Hekman spends more time in comparing Mannheim's sociology of knowledge with Gadamer's hermeneutics. Furthermore she criticizes Simonds' arguments concerning the "doctrine of semantic autonomy" (ibid.: 85). And, although I do not have the scope to discuss these topics in detail here, it is worth noting that Hekman both illuminates and emphasizes Mannheim's epistemological position. Hekman observes that Mannheim lays the groundwork for an anti-foundational social science by defining the task of the social sciences as the analysis of the relationships between thought and existence and by calling into question the 'absolute Reason' of the Enlightenment. Hekman concludes then that Mannheim is a "forerunner of anti-foundational social science" (ibid.: 79).

As implied in Hekman's observation, the movement to re-interpret Mannheim's sociology of knowledge in terms of hermeneutics can be thought of as being led by

or accompanying the transformation in the theories of knowledge, of truth, and also of science in the 1960s. This transformation was supported by several streams of thought. Although there are various and serious differences between them, they share some ideas, e.g., that experience in the life-world is the fundamental basis for evidence for scientific knowledge, and that scientific knowledge is an intersubjective production among a community of scientists. It is obvious that these ideas are founded on a basic intention to break away from Enlightenment assumptions about absolutely and universally valid knowledge or truth which science should seek by depriving commonsense and subjective knowledge of their "ideological distortions." A Japanese philosopher of science designated theses new trends in the philosophy of science as a "hermeneutics of science" (Noe 1993).

The central concern of these authors was about scientific knowledge, in particular, natural scientific knowledge, but the range of this transformation went beyond the (natural) scientific field and led to a transformation of the notion of knowledge in general. Knowledge, regardless of whether it is scientific or commonsensical, is a social and historical production, and therefore should be considered in its social and historical contexts. If this is the case, since "knowledge" is the subject of the sociology of knowledge, the basic principles of the sociology of knowledge would be affected by such a transformation. This is the intellectual and historical context from which attempts, like Simonds' and Heckman's, were made to re-interpret Mannheim's sociology of knowledge in terms of hermeneutics.[2]

3 Schutz's Theory of Relevance

Now let me turn my attention to Schutz's theory of relevance. As shown above, Schutz argued that "the basic problem of relevance concerns a selection from the totality of the world which is pre-given to life as well as to thinking." He started his arguments in the 1947 draft on relevance with the fundamental tenet that "any perception itself involves the problem of choice" (Schutz 1970: 16). We perceive *innumerable* objects and events at any given moment, and these objects and events have, in turn, *innumerable* aspects or phases. But we *always and already* perceive *selectively* – we perceive this or that, or these or those object(s), event(s), and their aspect(s) or phase(s) as such and such. "There is no pure representation existing in our mind" (ibid.: 19), and "there are no such things as facts, pure and simple. All facts are from the outset facts selected from a universal context by the activities of our mind" (Schutz 1962a: 5). It is the *selective function of the mind* that preserves the *unity of experience* and *simultaneously* the *delineation* and *coherence of objects*.

[2] As far as the prevailing sociology of knowledge is concerned, two movements emerged corresponding to the transformation of a general view of knowledge; one involves an attempt to re-interpret Mannheim in terms of hermeneutics, and the other is from Merton's sociology of science leading to a "sociology of scientific knowledge."

Schutz inquired into the problem of *choice* between alternatives or "problematic possibilities" in which several interpretations of the same percept compete with one another; *furthermore* he examined the problem of *selection,* i.e., asked how the alternatives themselves might be *constituted* within an "unstructured whole of contiguous configurations" or "open possibilities" (cf. Schutz 1970: 23) by describing the process of our perceiving-knowing experiences as topic-constituting-interpreting activities in terms of *relevance* and the interdependence of the systems of relevance, focusing on the relation and the change between the "*theme* and *horizon*." His arguments, furthermore, proceeded by exploring

> the sedimentation processes of previous experiences that lead to a particular typicality of the sediment itself and by which the stock of knowledge at hand becomes constructed, and also the structure of our stock of knowledge at hand, describing the various dimensions of it at any given moment of the individual consciousness. (cf. ibid.: 75–76, 133–134)

Schutz's description of these themes is very careful and detailed, and has so wide range and long span that his theory of relevance is of crucial importance for his social theory in general. The bulk of his descriptions, however, involve the unrealistic assumption that our knowledge of the world is private and that, consequently, the world we are living in is a private world, a limitation that Schutz himself clearly recognized (cf. ibid.: 134). However I can accept the Husserlian principle that "analyses made in the reduced sphere are valid also for the realm of the natural attitude" (Schutz 1962d: 149), and therefore I can also persevere with Schutz's arguments concerning the sedimentation processes of previous experiences into the stock of knowledge and the structure of our stock of knowledge with a view to making his rather implicit idea on a sociology of knowledge explicit. A separate essay would be needed to trace and discuss his arguments about these processes fully; for the purposes of this paper, I will restrict myself to enumerating several of Schutz's relevant insights.

I want to begin with some ideas related to the sociology of knowledge that appear in Schutz's conception of relevance. Schutz writes that "the category of relevance – topical, interpretative, motivational – establishes merely a correlation between two terms having reciprocal import as regards one another" (Schutz 1970: 48). This means, for example, that establishing the motivational relevance between two terms has nothing to do with which of them is chronologically prior, nor which is the efficient cause of the other. The three systems of relevance are but three aspects of a single set of phenomena and are concretely experienced as inseparable, or at least as an undivided unity. Their dissection from experience into three types is merely "the result of an analysis of their constitutive origin" (cf. ibid.: 66, 71). We cannot, therefore, bestow a privileged position upon one of the three system of relevance. Any one of them may become the starting point for bringing about changes in the other two, and in this sense they are in a *circular relationship*.[3]

[3] Jorge Garcia-Gomez (1982) has already discussed extensively the circular relationship among the three types of relevance.

As shown above, Schutz actually speaks of the "unstructured whole of contiguous configuration," the "unstructured field of unproblematic familiarity," and the "unarticulated field of consciousness which by experiencing topical relevances may be structured into thematic kernel and horizontal material" (cf. ibid.: 23, 26, 28, 34). But, as he himself clearly states, "there is no consciousness conceivable without structurization into theme and horizon. It was, therefore, a merely pedagogical but entirely unrealistic assumption when we spoke […] of an 'unstructured' field of consciousness" (ibid.: 34). Our consciousness is always and already structured into theme and horizon. Furthermore, the intersubjective world of everyday life, in which we live and within which and upon which we act, existed before our birth, was experienced and interpreted by others, our predecessors, as an organized world. This world is, therefore, conceived "from the outset as grouped under certain types, which in turn refer to atypical aspects of the typified objects of our experiences" (ibid.: 57). The world in which we live is also, in this sense, always and already structured.

Another point on which I want to touch is a corollary of the previous point. Schutz said that "there is no *primordial* experience upon which all subsequent knowledge could possibly be founded" (ibid.: 75; italic is added). Our stock of knowledge at hand has its history, but we are never led to a "first experience (first in the chronological sense or in the sense of foundation) which would be constitutive for all following experiences" (ibid.). It is really meaningless to search for a chronologically first theme of our thinking. It is rather "the whole setting – locally, temporally, autobiographically, and that in which the object to be interpreted appears – which will determine, on the one hand, the moments of this object (its perceptual phenomena) and, on the other, the elements of my stock of knowledge at hand which are interpretatively relevant with respect to one another" (ibid.: 37).

Schutz's important insight regarding an "existential element of all human knowledge" should be referred to briefly. He writes that "the breaking up of our questioning is founded on the conviction of the *essential opacity of our lifeworld*. We cannot penetrate with the light of our knowledge into all dimensions of it; we may succeed in making some of them semitransparent, and only fractions of the latter translucent" (ibid.: 148; cf. 130–131, 152). The totality of this world remains to us *fundamentally incomprehensible*, and there will always be, of necessity, regions of the "unknown." Schutz uses the phrase "vacancies (*Leerstellen*) of our knowledge" to refer to regions of the "unknown" which are possibly knowable and which in addition, are worth knowing in terms of our actual autobiographical circumstances (ibid.: 131). Vacancy is, therefore, an *essential* element of our knowledge.[4]

Finally, although this has already been shown implicitly above, I want to direct separate attention to Schutz's penetrating insight into the interrelationship between the organization of our stock of knowledge at hand and the structurization of the lifeworld (cf. ibid.: 97, 136f., 140). The lifeworld is open in the dimensions of

[4] "Vacancy" is a very important notion for Schutz. His draft on the theory of relevance devoted several pages to "genuine vacancy," "the problem of vacancies anticipated," and "the theory of vacancy." In addition, he added the subtitle, "*hic egregie progresum sum*," to the "Philosophie der Leerstelle (vacancy)" in the draft on the theory of relevance written April 3, 1951.

space, *time*, *society*, and also in terms of "*levels of reality, or finite provinces of meaning*," and our knowledge of this world correspondingly has various degrees which refer to the structurization of the lifeworld into several provinces. Moreover, our knowledge of objects and events is "*spotty*" in the sense that there are gaps, *enclaves of the "unknown,"* in the midst of the known (ibid.: 151–152). This insight leads to Schutz's structural analysis of the stock of knowledge at hand, which is partly developed as a description of "the dimensions of the lifeworld" (ibid.: 135ff.). It is nearby to read in such a line of arguments Schutz's intention to elaborate his theory of knowledge in order to explore the organization of society.

4 Schutz's Sociology of Knowledge and His Conception of the Social Distribution of Knowledge

As suggested above, Schutz's theory of knowledge is concerned primarily with how experience and its sedimentation occurs, that is, how objects, events and the world are perceived and known, how the "unknown" remains, how experience is organized into the stock of knowledge, and how previous experience is lost. His concomitant arguments are founded on the fundamental tenet that there is no such thing as an isolated experience. Any experience is experience within a meaning-context that is the sedimentation of the various factors determining the unit structure of our experiences, under which our stock of knowledge at hand is grouped (cf. ibid.: 87, 97).

There is no space left here for demonstrating this process step by step, by citing all the relevant passages. Yet I hope that the foregoing has shown that there is some clear affinity between Schutz's theory of knowledge (leading to his social theory) and Mannheim's hermeneutical sociology of knowledge as it has been re-interpreted.[5] If that is the case, and if Schutz's disappointment with Mannheim's sociology of knowledge is only about its reductionism, could Schutz's sociology of knowledge be dissolved into Mannheim's hermeneutically re-interpreted sociology of knowledge? The answer is "no." There are serious differences between them, of which only two can be indicated briefly here.

First, Mannheim proposed to analyze the "relationship between knowledge and existence," and was primarily concerned with knowledge, or better, the production of knowledge, or much better, the *distorted* production of knowledge in terms of the existing society and existential factors. It is precisely over this point that more recent interpreters of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge took issue with existing criticisms of Mannheim's reductionism. They insisted that Mannheim's hermeneutical sociology of knowledge attempted to *interpret* knowledge as the *text* in relation *not*

[5] As for the comparison between Schutz and Mannheim, see Psathas (2003, Reflections on the sociology of knowledge: Mannheim, Schutz, Berger, Wolff. Paper read at the colloquium at Waseda University, 7 March 2003, unpublished), Endress (1999).

to *concrete* existing factors *but* to the *context* of shared meaning as a conceptual framework of presuppositions. But such a conceptual framework itself was not directly analyzed but simply assumed as given. And if Mannheim's hermeneutical sociology of knowledge exclusively treats knowledge as the text without exploring the context itself, the possibility remains that it is still open to a kind of reductionism, even if not quite a reduction to some concrete existing factors but to, for example, a *Weltauslegung* (cf. Mannheim 1929).

Schutz's aim, like Hayek's, was to examine knowledge in order to explore the organization of the life-world (cf. Nasu 2008). This is shown, for example, in a document Schutz prepared for students in his course, "Problems of a Sociology of Knowledge" at the New School for Social Research in 1952. He suggested "Type of Knowledge and the Social Order" as one of the term paper topics for his students (Schutz 1952).

As a matter of fact, he described both experience of perceiving and knowing itself and the sedimentation process of experience into the stock of knowledge as guided by systems of prevailing operative relevances of different kinds. He declares that the "genetic features of the history of our knowledge are of decisive importance for the *structurization of the world* in which we live" (Schutz 1970: 97; italic is added). He also states that our lifeworld is pervaded by the *essential opacity*, that there are always and already vacancies in our knowledge, and furthermore that "the constitution of the stock of experience […] is disclosed as a succession of the filling-in of vacancies of what is still not known, but these vacancies are always typically predelineated through the contour-lines of what is already known" (ibid.: 160). Schutz's theory of knowledge, therefore, can be said to be a "genuine sociology of knowledge" (Schutz and Luckmann 1984: 222), since he conceived of relationships between knowledge and the structure of the world in their *mutual grounding relationship through experience*, and his conception of knowledge leads to the "essentialization of relativism" (Barber 1986: 63). The relationship between theme and horizon can vary not only according to which side of the Pyrenees one is on; it can be also changed "(a) in terms of the immanent time-structure of experience, (b) as the outcome of polythetic steps which are monothetically grasped, (c) as Gestalt configurations, (d) as the flying stretches and resting places of the pulsations of our consciousness, or (e) as the unit originating in the project of our action" (cf. Schutz 1970: 86–97). Relevance is, as R. J. Sullivan said (Sullivan 1974), the fundamental category of Schutz's sociology of knowledge. If that is the case, his sociology of knowledge may have been designed to overcome the dichotomy between the immanent and the external, and therefore between the subject and the object.

The second feature in terms of which Schutz's sociology of knowledge stands against Mannheim's is his special concern with the phenomenon of the social distribution of knowledge. I agree with the idea that "it is plausible that the entire corpus of Schutz's work has been defined as a sociology of knowledge" (Hekman 1986: 27) and also recognize that "a sociology of knowledge" in this passage does not refer to a subfield of sociology but to a perspective of social science itself. Schutz himself, however, wanted to reserve the name "sociology of knowledge" for special research

on the social distribution of knowledge, and called the prevailing sociology of knowledge as "misnamed" because it took for granted that social distribution or failed to treat it adequately.

The social distribution of knowledge is one of three aspects of the socialization of knowledge. The other two aspects are "the reciprocity of perspectives or the structural socialization of knowledge" and "the social origin of knowledge or the genetic socialization of knowledge" (cf. Schutz 1962a: 11–14, 1962b: 61). "The reciprocity of perspectives" refers to the foundation of "we" and to "the thought objects of my and my fellow-man's private knowledge of the world" (1962a: 13). "The social origin of knowledge" refers to "constructs of a typified knowledge of a *higher* socialized structure" (ibid.; italic is added). But it focuses exclusively on knowledge handed down by others, that is, knowledge qua "social heritage." The social distribution of knowledge refers directly to the structurization of our life-world, since it refers to the fact that each individual knows merely a sector of the world and common knowledge of the same factor varies individually as to its degree of distinctness, clarity, acquaintanceship, or mere belief, and, therefore**,** not only does *what* an individual know differ from what the other knows, but also *how* both know the "same" factors (cf., Schutz 1962a: 14–15, 1962b: 61).

If the description of the social distribution of knowledge is broken off here, the particular significance which Schutz attached to this conception cannot be understood adequately. Schutz writes that

> [m]any phenomena of social life can be fully understood only if they are referred to the underlying general structure of the social distribution of knowledge […] This resource alone makes possible a sociological theory of profession, of prestige and competence, of charisma and authority, and leads to the understanding of such complicated social relationships as those existing among the performing artist, his public, and his critic, or among manufacturer, retailer, advertising agent, and consumer, or among the government executive, his technical adviser, and public opinion. (Schutz 1964a: 123)

What I should point out here is that Schutz conceived of the social distribution of knowledge and the attempt to overcome this parcelling out of knowledge by communication as a "counterpart" in the paramount reality of the world of working to the *essential opacity* of the totality of this world (cf. Schutz 1970: 130–131). For Schutz, the social distribution of knowledge determines the particular structure of the typing construct, for example, the assumed degree of anonymity of personal roles, the standardization of course-of-action patterns, and the supposed constancy of motives, and it in turn is determined together with "its relativity and relevance to the concrete social environment of a concrete group in a concrete historical situation" by the heterogeneous composition of the stock of knowledge at hand of common-sense-experience or the structure of typifications of common-sense thinking (cf. Schutz 1962a: 38–39, 1962d: 149). Only by paying attention to and exploring these relations between the social distribution of knowledge and the essential opacity of the world, the structure of typifications of common-sense thinking, and the concrete social environment of a concrete group in a concrete historical situation, can it be amply understood why Schutz attached particular significance to and wanted to preserve the social distribution of knowledge as a specific topic for his sociology of knowledge.

Dealing primarily with the social distribution of knowledge makes it possible to establish a 'sociology of knowledge,' not as a perspective on the social sciences itself, but as a special field of sociology.

5 Concluding Remarks

As indicated in the previous pages of this essay, Schutz did not develop his own arguments under the heading 'sociology of knowledge.' Notwithstanding, that is not to say that he did not develop his arguments within the field of 'sociology of knowledge.' On the contrary, he actually wrote a theoretical paper on the social distribution of knowledge (Schutz 1964a), and published a paper in the field of the 'sociology of knowledge.' His paper titled "Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World" (Schutz 1964b) is, in my judgment, clearly a contribution to the 'sociology of knowledge.' Hence, Schutz can be thought of as a 'sociologist of knowledge,' or better, a hermeneutical sociologist of knowledge.[6]

Schutz's 'hermeneutical sociology of knowledge' is not entirely dissimilar to Mannheim's 'sociology of knowledge' re-interpreted in terms of hermeneutics. But unlike Mannheim, Schutz explored the process of *experience* and its sedimentation into the stock of knowledge seriously and intensively in relation to the dimensions of the lifeworld and in terms of relevance, paying serious and strict attention to the fundamental tenet of the *essential opacity* of the lifeworld and the *essential vacancy* of our knowledge. His related analyses about, for example, "social role" led him to the insight that social role is "the decision to want to consider only elements of a certain typical contour as appropriate. […] This is a 'convention' […] However, the 'convention' […] has its own history, its social motives: it is itself [a] contour [and] vacancy to be filled" (Schutz 1970: 162). It follows that social roles can be explained not as an expression of existential order but in terms of the "socialization of knowledge," especially in terms of the social distribution of knowledge (cf. Schutz and Gurwitsch 1989: 154–155). "Social role" is one of the most important terms in sociology, and we must recognize the fundamental difference between Schutz's and T. Parsons' conceptions of social role (cf. Parsons 1951: 38–39; Parson and Shils 1951: 190). Here one of Schutz's outstanding contributions to the sociology of knowledge can be found.

Schutz's contributions to the 'sociology of knowledge' are significant, and many of them have already been made explicit through P. L. Berger and T. Luckmann's masterpiece (1967). My essay is an attempt to address some of the topics they treated in insufficient depth. It, however, can establish only the starting point and suggest some further directions for the exploration of these topics. The dialogue with Schutz must be continued if we are to finally reach a "fusing of horizons."

[6] As for the hermeneutical turn in the social science and the sociology of knowledge, see Tänzler (2007), Soeffner (2004).

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The Interpretationism of Alfred Schutz or How Woodcutting Can Have Referential and Non-referential Meaning

Lester Embree

1 Introduction

It is unusual that I know when a line of inquiry began for me. The present one, however, began when my old friend Joseph Kockelmans claimed Alfred Schutz for hermeneutical phenomenology at the Bielefeld Gurwitsch-Schutz meeting back in June 1981. I was not especially familiar with the tendency that Joseph advocated, but I did know that there was nothing in Schutz about hermeneutical circles, which was the "hot topic" for that tendency in that time. Joseph's chief point, however, was that interpretation was central to Schutz's research. Hermeneutics of course focuses on interpretation and associated things such as understanding and meaning. In the many times that I looked into Schutz since Bielefeld there has been confirmation of that centrality, but I still take Schutz at his word when he characterizes his research as "constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude," which is not at all incompatible with a focus on science-theoretical, substantive scientific, and commonsense interpretation, something our common friend and the leading phenomenological theorist of hermeneutics, Thomas Seebohm, has recently shown (cf. Seebohm 2004). Accepting the invitation to this conference, however, I could not avoid either the question of Schutz's relation to the tradition of hermeneutics or, more significantly, that of his interpretationism, i.e., whether he should be considered a strict, moderate, or extreme interpretationist. Differently put, I am here venturing an interpretation of what "interpretation" signifies for Schutz.

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2 'Understanding' and the Method of Electronic Searching

Before taking up these questions, let me comment on a component of my method. I do not recall precisely when, but Ilja Srubar once remarked to me that one could scan all of Schutz into a computer and then search the oeuvre for things of interest electronically. I had already seen the works of David Hume accessed that way at a friend's house and a couple of years ago, when I was having difficulty getting clear on what Schutz meant by "postulate," I had my assistant scan the writings in English into my machine. Altogether, this scan is 692,221 words and 2,928 double-spaced pages long and includes the original book, part, and section titles as well as page numbers. To allow for variation in suffixes, I then performed a search-and-replace of "postulat" with "POSTULAT," an operation that can be reversed in order to have again the total scan without the words thus emphasized. It turned out that Schutz uses that expression 230 times, far more than I expected, and I was able to decide what the word signified for him (Embree 2006, 2009).

But this approach can also produce solid but disappointing results. Thus, it seemed plausible for the present research that "understanding" and "*Verstehen*" be closely connected with "interpretation" and might shed light on it. (These words are italized in the next few quotations, but not after that.) After all, Schutz does write that "The word *Verstehen* is generally used for the *interpretation* of both the subjective and objective meaning-contexts of products" (Schutz 1967: 218) and in response to articles by Carl Hempel and Ernst Nagel he asserts that "The whole discussion suffers from the failure to distinguish clearly between *Verstehen* (1) as the experiential form of common-sense knowledge of human affairs, (2) as an epistemological problem, and (3) as a method peculiar to the social sciences." (Schutz 1962: 57, cf. 62–3, 138) Beyond this, that one can *understand* music, language, the meaning of propositions, definitions, descriptions, the pregiven world, cultural objects (but perhaps not how a telephone works), manifested fragments of the actions of others, motives, group self-*understanding*, action patterns, and the situation of the returning soldier from war, all quite Schutzian topics, are mentioned, but actually little is said directly about what the understanding of them itself is.

Somewhat more interestingly, intentionality is said to be mis*understood*, (Schutz 1962: 241) while the incommensurability of inner and outer time is *understood* (cf. Schutz 1964: 171). A few other passages are yet more interesting, but ultimately say nothing that will not be seen to be said directly about "interpretation," i.e., "I have—in order to *understand* another—to apply the system of typifications accepted by the group to which both of us belong." (Schutz 1964: 237) Then again,

> Max Weber has shown that all phenomena of the socio-cultural world originate in social interaction and can be referred to it. According to him, it is the central task of sociology to *understand* the meaning which the actor bestows on his action (the "subjective meaning" in his terminology). But what is action, what is meaning, and how is *understanding* of such meaning by a fellow-man possible, be he a partner of the social interaction, or merely an observer in everyday life, or a social scientist? (Schutz 1962: 145)

Finally, "we want to *understand* social phenomena and we cannot UNDERSTAND them except through the scheme of human motives, human means and ends, human

planning—in short, by means of the categories of human actions." (Schutz 1996: 22) Since all of these points are also made about interpretation, the understanding of "understanding" is of little use for the interpretation of "interpretation."

In general, the strength of electronic searching is that it finds most passages of relevance, but the chief weaknesses are the labor involved the missing of relevant passages in which a key word does not occur, and the difficult-to-resist tendency to answer questions with quotations, a vice frequent in my other studies of Schutz.

3 Schutz and the Tradition of Hermeneutics

What of Schutz's possible relations with the tradition of hermeneutics? There is nothing about the ancient and medieval hermeneuticists in his oeuvre and, while there might have been references to Theodor Birt, August Boeckh, Johann Gustav Droyson, or Friedrich Ernst Daniel Schleiermacher, there also are none.[1] Wilhelm Dilthey does receive a dozen references. Most of these are in his reflection on Mozart, but the reference to the previous 50 years that opens §1 of the *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt* (1932) seems an implicit allusion to Dilthey's *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften* (1883). Schutz then explicitly objects to some interpretations of Dilthey by others and the one time that he actually uses the word "hermeneutics" it is in relation to Dilthey (Schutz 1996: 92), but he also asserts that Dilthey opposes rational science (Schutz 1967: 240) and he does not refer to any of Dilthey's writings on hermeneutics. There are thus no explicit connections of Schutz with what Kockelmans calls "scientific hermeneutics."

As for the so-called "new hermeneutics" or "hermeneutical philosophy" of Martin Heidegger, Hans Georg Gadamer, Paul Ricœur, and Kockelmans, Schutz died before the works of these three became prominent as hermeneuticists in the USA during the 1960s. There are some 30 references to Heidegger that might anchor a short comparative study, although hermeneutical method is not referred to in them, perhaps because Schutz recognized that Heidegger asserted in *Sein und Zeit*, §32 that, in Seebohm's words, "The circle of understanding is not a methodological scientific principle in any sense."[2] In sum, Schutz does not connect historically with the hermeneutic tradition new or old, which of course does not at all preclude comparative study.

Let me insert something here. A friend once objected to a paper of mine that I thought it sufficient to imply strongly my thesis rather than to state it. Remembering that correct objection, let me say that I do actually find the germ of hermeneutics in Schutz: One can say that there is hermeneutics when there is interpretation, interpretation being a movement in thought from one meaningful thing to another, for

[1] On these figures, see Seebohm (2004).

[2] Seebohm (2004: 166). I am grateful to Professor Seebohm for pointing this out to me in conversation.

example, from hearing a speech or reading a text to an equivalent restatement of the whole or part of it in the same or a different language. Thus translating is interpreting, as is paraphrasing, and much else. What I have found in Schutz is, however, rather primitive and perhaps as primitive as one can get in this connection.

4 Interpretation in the Narrow Signification

This brings us to the question of Schutz's interpretationism. Does "interpretation" in Schutz have merely a narrow signification, does it have a broad but still limited signification, or are all encounters with things interpretive for him?

The narrow or strict signification of interpretation focuses on texts and Schutz did produce a number of interpretations of the works of others, his three studies of Max Scheler being together the most extensive. In this connection, he does recognize two disciplines that many consider hermeneutical.

> [These are] sciences which are interpretive in the narrow sense, namely, philology and jurisprudence. In philology it is always a basic question whether what is being studied is the objective meaning of a word at a definite time within a definite language area or, second, the subjective meaning which the word takes on in the usage of a particular author or of a particular circle of speakers or, third, the occasional meaning which it takes on in the context of discourse. Again, every student of law is familiar with the distinction between considering a point of law as a proposition within the legal system in accordance with philological and juridical canons of interpretation, on the one hand, and asking, on the other hand, what 'the intention of the legislator' was. (Schutz 1967: 138)

Schutz was trained in the philosophy of law and has many remarks about interpreting linguistic expressions, e.g., "the language of the poet confers upon each unit of language, even upon each term, a meaning in addition to that which a unit or term would have if it were used in colloquial conversation or scientific discourse" (Schutz 1996: 244). This type of interpretation does not need to be discussed further for its own sake here. Some things will be mentioned below comparatively however. It is worth remarking, however, that the present study is an interpretation of this narrow sort.

5 'Interpretation' and 'Meaning'

Does Schutz use "interpretation" in one or more broader significations? To use electronic searching in order to pursue other significations of "interpretation" in Schutz, a decision is needed concerning which words to search for. Needed is a crucial passage with a set of key words. The beginning of the "Fragments toward a Phenomenology of Music" (1944) appears best for this purpose:

> A piece of music is a meaningful context. It is meaningful to the composer; it can be understood as meaningful by the listener; and it is the task of the interpreter to bring about the

> correct meaning. Applied to music, the terms, "meaning," "context," "understanding," and "interpretation," are used, however, in a specific way which is different from other meaningful systems such as languages. To be sure, language is also a meaningful context. Each term within the system of a particular language has its specific semantic functions. (Schutz 1996: 243)[3]

On the basis of this passage, I have searched and replaced the following key words, sometimes without endings, with capital letters and found the following numbers of occurrences in the American English oeuvre.

context	669
interpret	1,859
understand	920
meaning	2,501

I disregarded the *Phenomenology of the Social World* and other Austrian writings because the English translation of at least the former is sometimes defective and there is a huge question of the German and English equivalents that I wish now to avoid. Thus the present study is almost entirely based on the writings of Schutz that he composed in American English during the last two decades of his life.

With reference to the crucial passage just quoted, "understanding" has already been discussed. "Context" is usually self-evident, but one sentence is worth quoting: "In speech as in music, the meaning-context … is destroyed if a phrase is broken down into the words (sounds) of which it is composed even if the single detached words keep their significance as meaningful sounds (Schutz 1970: 96)." This leaves the questions of the significations of "interpretation" and "meaning" and how they relate to be focused on.

With reference to the crucial passage in the "Fragments toward a Phenomenology of Music," a distinction can be made between what I shall call "referential meaning" and "non-referential meaning"; these are not Schutz's expressions. (I was tempted instead to speak of "representational" and "non-representational" meanings, but generalizing from the referentiality of language seems better.) "Referential meaning" is better than expressions including "semantic" because Schutz almost always restricted the semantic to cases of language, although he does say that musical notation has a "semantic system" "of quite another kind than that of ideograms, letters, or mathematical or chemical symbols." (Schutz 1964: 165, cf.160–1) So there is non-linguistic as well as linguistic referential meaning.

What I am calling "referential meaning" and also what I am calling "non-referential meaning" can be clarified in reference to Schutz's views of various arts.

[3] Already one might recognize that "meaning" is equivocal in Schutz and has the broad signification that the mature Husserl, for example, sought to express with "*Sinn*" and the narrow signification related to language that he sought to express with "*Bedeutung*."

With the exception of so-called "program music," e.g., "Donkey Serenade," music is non-referential and this helps us begin to understand how he could tell Aron Gurwitsch "I like to think through phenomenological problems in terms of the states of affairs of music and of human action in the social sphere." (Gurwitsch and Schutz 1989: 193) Also non-referential is the meaning of abstract painting, sculpture, and what can be called abstract dance and mime:

> In so far as they are abstract, that is, without any relation to a religious or social ritual, or represent occurrences in daily life, they constitute meaningful patterns without reference to a conceptual scheme. (Schutz 1996: 246)

In contrast, there is representational meaning in poetry, the novel, drama, and of course representational painting, and one can add photography. Something ornamental, such as a Persian carpet, is referential if it contains the shapes of plants and animals or religious and cultic symbols, but otherwise it is not (Schutz 1996: 245). I would say that the same holds for song and opera, where the words are referential but the music is usually not. And then there is the meaning of signs on a map (Schutz 1964: 66), which mostly seem referential.

6 'Interpretation' and 'Meaning', Continued

If this is sufficient to clarify Schutz's sometimes implicit distinction that I am expressing as between referential and non-referential meanings, it can now be asked how meaning relates to interpretation in Schutz. By the crucial passage quoted above, there is interpretation beyond the narrow signification relating to language. First of all, it relates by implication to the non-linguistic referential meaning of, e.g., representational painting.

The search for passages in which "interpretation" and "meaning" are directly related was, however, frustrating. Schutz seems to take it for granted that a reader will relate them. Most of the relatively few times when he does actually use the two expressions together involve a social situation, e.g.,

> It appears that all possible communication presupposes a mutual tuning-in relationship between the communicator and the addressee of the communication. This relationship is established through the reciprocal sharing of the Other's flux of experiences in inner time, by living through a vivid present together, by experiencing this togetherness as a "We." Only within this experience does the Other's conduct become *meaningful* to the partner tuned in on him—that is, the Other's body and its movements are *interpreted* as a field of expression of events in his inner life. Yet not everything that is interpreted by the partner as an expression of an event in the Other's inner life is meant by the Other to express—that is, to communicate to the partner—such an event. Facial expressions, gait, posture, ways of handling tools and instruments, without communicative intent, are examples of such a situation. (Schutz 1964: 178, emphasis added)

This passage does not necessarily involve language. Another passage that includes "meaning" and "interpretation" does involve language as well as non-verbal expressions, so that meaning of both types can be given together:

> I talk to my partner and he listens to me: My talk, the *meaning* of the words uttered by me, are open to my partner's *interpretation.* So are my facial expressions, the inflections of my voice, the involuntary gestures that I make. (Schutz 1996: 32, emphasis added).

In sum, there is a broader signification of "interpretation" that can be said to involve interpretation of non-referential "traces" as well as referential "texts," although Schutz does not use the words "texts" and "traces" in this connection.

7 Interpretation in Everyday Life and Sciences

Something needs to be included here about the extensiveness of the use of interpretation in Schutz, for whom it seems involved from the bottom to the top of mental life. It the *Reflections on the Problem of Relevance* the foundations of interpretation are described in terms of what can be called "prepredicative interpretation":

> We have to choose within the perceptual field those elements which may become in Husserl's terms thematic and subject to "interpretations." Such interpretations do not necessarily have the form of predicative judgments. The passive syntheses of recognition, similarity, identity, dissimilarity, likeness, and so on, are interpretative events happening in the prepredicative sphere. The recognition of an object as the same or as the same but modified, or the recognition of its modification, are the outcome of such prepredicative syntheses. (Schutz 1971: 16)

As for the world of everyday life, Schutz writes that it is

> the intersubjective world into which we are born and within which we grow up. This world existed before we were born; it is given to our experiences and interpretation. At any age we have at our disposal a certain stock of knowledge of this world; it has been constituted by our own actions of interpretation, by learning from others, by habits formed and traditions handed down from parents and teachers and from teachers of our teachers. This stock of acquired experiences functions as our scheme of reference. (Schutz 1996: 26; cf. Schutz 1962: 306, 312; cf. Schutz 1996: 258)

In "Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action" (1953), he can then say that

> All our knowledge of the world, in common-sense as well as in scientific thinking, involves constructs, i.e., a set of abstractions, generalizations, formalizations, idealizations specific to the respective level of thought organization. Strictly speaking, there are no such things as facts, pure and simple. All facts are from the outset selected from a universal context by the activities of the mind. They are, therefore, always interpreted facts, either facts looked at as detached from their context by an artificial abstraction or facts considered in their particular setting. In either case, they carry along their interpretational inner and outer horizon. (Schutz 1962: 5)

And where the sciences are specifically concerned,

> It is up to the natural scientists to determine which sector of the universe of nature, which facts and events therein, and which aspects of such facts and events are topically and interpretationally relevant to their specific purpose. These facts and events are neither preselected nor preinterpreted; they do not reveal intrinsic relevance structures. Relevance is not

> inherent in nature as such, it is the result of the selective and interpretative activity of man within nature or observing nature. The facts, data, and events with which the natural scientist has to deal are just facts, data, and events within his observational field but this field does not "mean" anything to the molecules, atoms, and electrons therein.[4]
>
> But the facts, events, and data before the social scientist are of an entirely different structure. His observational field, the social world, is not essentially structureless. It has a particular meaning and relevance structure for the human beings living, thinking, and acting therein. They have preselected and preinterpreted this world by a series of common-sense constructs of the reality of daily life, and it is these thought objects which determine their behavior, define the goal of their action, the means available for attaining them—in brief, which help them find their bearings within the natural and socio-cultural environment and to come to terms with it. (Schutz 1962: 5–6)

Perhaps this suffices to show the role of interpretation not only in prepredicative experience but also in the naturalistic as well as the cultural sciences.

8 Meaning and Interpretation Exemplified

More needs to be said about meaning and interpretation and for that an example will be useful. Schutz takes over from Max Weber the example of a woodcutter. The movements of the other's body and of the ax against wood are the object of "observational understanding." (Schutz 1967: 24) Yet one can still wonder what the other person is doing. Is she laying in a supply of fuel for the winter or is she exercising? Is she a country girl come back from the city on vacation and engaging in nostalgia for childhood tasks? Set aside the possibility from a cheap novel whereby she is signaling the guerillas in the hills to attack the police station or some such thing, what motivates her? The bodily movements are indications of mental processes and beyond that we can guess or we can simply ask the woodcutter what she is doing. In that way we can learn about the meaning for her of her action, including in the latter respect her purpose and the causes behind her effort. (cf. Schutz 1967: 110 ff.)

This example illustrates Schutz's model of so-called objective interpretation (or meaning) of subjective interpretation (or meaning):

> It was Max Weber who made this distinction the cornerstone of his methodology. Subjective meaning in this sense is the meaning which an action has for the actor or which a relation or situation has for the person or persons involved therein; objective meaning is the meaning the same action, relation, or situation has for anybody else, be it a partner or observer in everyday life, the social scientist, or the philosopher. The terminology is unfortunate because the term 'objective meaning' is obviously a misnomer, in so far as the so-called 'objective interpretations' are, in turn, relative to the particular attitudes of the interpreters and, therefore, in a certain sense, 'subjective.' (Schutz 1964: 275, cf. 227)

[4] "The concept of Nature … with which the natural sciences have to deal is … an idealizing abstraction from the *Lebenswelt*, an abstraction which, on principle and of course legitimately, excludes persons with their personal life and all objects of culture which originate in our practical human activity. Exactly this layer of the *Lebenswelt*, however, from which the natural sciences have to abstract, is the social reality which the social sciences have to investigate." (Schutz 1962: 58)

This late statement is interesting in several respects. More than action is recognized as meaningful, there is recognition of the philosophical as well as the everyday and the cultural-scientific standpoints, and both "meaning" and "interpretation" occur possibly synonymously. After considering whether these are synonyms or not, we can ask whether the meanings involved are referential, non-referential, or somehow both.

In the oeuvre written originally in American English, "subjective interpretation" occurs 28 times. The German equivalent seems to occur in Weber (Schutz 1967: 199). In the American writings it is first used in "The Social World and the Theory of Social Action" (1940):

> Motives are never isolated elements but grouped in great and consistent systems of hierarchical order. Having grasped a sufficient number of elements of such a system, *I* have a fair chance of completing the empty positions of the system by correct conjectures. Basing my assumption on the inner logical structure of such a motive system, I am able to make, with great likelihood of proving them right, inferences concerning those parts which remain hidden. But, of course, all this presupposes interpretation from the subjective point of view, i.e., answering the question 'What does all this mean for the actor?'
>
> This practical attitude is adopted by us all in so far as we not only observe a social situation which does not touch us but are actors and reactors within the social world, and this is precisely the reason why the subjective point of view must be accepted by the social sciences too. Only this methodological principle gives us the necessary guarantee that we are dealing in fact with the real social life-world of us all, which, even as an object of theoretical research, remains a system of reciprocal social relations, all of them built up by mutual subjective interpretations of the actors within it. (Schutz 1964: 16)

Already "subjective interpretation" seems to denote some sort of an activity rather than what is built up by it. Then the "postulate of subjective interpretation" is first introduced in a way that involves constructing and attributing:

> The social scientist has to ask what type of individual mind can be constructed and what typical thoughts must be attributed to it in order to explain the fact in question as a result of mental activities in an understandable context. (Schutz 1996: 22)

Hence, it is no surprise that he repeatedly mentions in "Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action" (1953) "the 'subjective interpretation of meaning,'" (Schutz 1962: 24) and devotes many pages to it (cf. Schutz 1962: 34 ff., 43), finally saying,

> What is really meant by the postulate of subjective interpretation is that the actor understands what he is doing and that, in daily life as well as in science, the observer who wants to grasp the meaning of an action observed has to investigate the subjective self-understanding of the actor. Strictly speaking, it is only the actor who knows where his action starts and where it ends. The observer sees merely the segments of the ongoing course of action which became manifest to him, but does not know the span of the projects within which this ongoing course of action occurs. (Schutz 1997: 138)

If this suffices to establish that "subjective interpretation" is an activity of constructing and attributing that is correlative with "subjective meanings," we can now ask about the types of subjective meaning involved in the example of woodcutting. Assuming that there is no intent to communicate with the guerrillas in the hills, the woodcutting action has non-referential meaning and has it originally for

the woodcutter herself as well as less completely for her partner, the observer in everyday life, the cultural scientist, and the philosopher. But when interviewed, the woodcutter expresses referential meanings in speech and any referential meanings expressed from the other four standpoints can refer to these as well as to the original non-referential meaning of the woodcutting action.

In sum, "to interpret" centrally includes going from one meaning to another and does so whether the meaning begun from is a text or a trace. Besides focusing on interpretation, Schutz is hermeneutical in this respect even though he does not characterize this fundamental operation with that expression.

From this point one can delve deeper into Schutz's position, but here only a statement of some further questions he asks will be offered:

> How is it possible that man accomplishes meaningful acts, purposively or habitually, that he is guided by ends to be attained and motivated by certain experiences? Do not the concepts of meaning, of motives, of ends, of acts, refer to a certain structure of consciousness, a certain arrangement of all the experiences in inner time, a certain type of sedimentation? And does not interpretation of the Other's meaning and of the meaning of his acts and the results of these acts presuppose self-interpretation of the observer and the partner? How can I, in my attitude as a man among other men or as a social scientist, find an approach to all this if not by recourse to the stock of pre-interpreted experiences build up by sedimentation within my own conscious life? (Schutz 1962: 117)

9 Schutz's Interpretationism Not Extreme

Finally, while the interpretation of non-referential and referential meanings is central for Schutz, the question of whether he is an extreme interpretationist needs to be asked. Simply put, is interpretation *always* involved in human experience for him? It has been implied above that it is not, but the decisive support for this denial consists in some explicit passages to this effect.

To begin with, there are the "essentially actual experiences" as described in "On Multiple Realities" (1945), but there is a better description in the earlier draft of that essay:

> Performances of spontaneity without meaning for the performer, without project and without the intention to realize anything. In so far as these performances are connected with bodily movements we may call them *mere doing*. To this class belong mere physiological reactions provoked by physiological stimuli, so for instance blinking <of the eyelids> or reflexes of the <patella>, etc. Moreover, facial expressions and other expressive gestures occur during movements accompanying working acts without being noticed separately; thus they remain unperceived. Furthermore, there are the indiscernible small perceptions which remain unstable and elusive. Being what they are, they can neither be apperceived nor recollected by the performing individual. (Schutz 1996: 28)

The final version of this passage also includes knee jerks, blushing, gait, and "certain characteristics of my handwriting open to graphological interpretation." (Schutz 1962: 210) While such will have meaning and indeed a type of referential meaning for the partner, observer, scientist, and/or philosopher, they do not have meaning of any sort, Schutz contends, for the actor in whose body they occur.

Then early in *Reflections on the Problem of Relevance* Schutz contends that "within a given field of our consciousness, several configurations (perceptual or fancied or otherwise) compete with one another for our interpretative assent":

> The Gestaltist, too, assumes as given an unstructurized common field and seeks to prove that by an act of interpretation the selective capacity of the mind structurizes this field into what is background and what stands out (that is, it is the Gestalt) from such a background. (Schutz 1971: 23)

By the reference to perceptual and fancied objects, this is not merely about some of the events for the subject in whose body they occur and they do seem to be things prior to any interpretation of them. Thus not all things are always interpreted for Schutz and he is not an extreme interpretationist.

***

There is a great deal of interpretation in Schutz's thought, which is to say cognitive movement from one meaningful thing to another, often from one referentially meaningful thing to another on various levels and from various standpoints in science and philosophy as well as everyday life, but ultimately the movement is from non-referential meanings found constituted in such things as art, music especially, and also action, social or not, as well as in pre-predicative sensuous experience.

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Part II
Theoretical and Conceptual Reassessments

Pragmatic Theory of the Life-World and Hermeneutics of the Social Sciences

Ilja Srubar

1

Although the present volume is devoted to Schutz and hermeneutics the choice of topic is not exactly straightforward. In the first place, Schutz hardly ever refers to hermeneutics directly, although he does state in "The Stranger" that he would follow a "general theory of interpretation." (Schutz 1964: 91) Secondly, hermeneutics occupies a somewhat precarious position in contemporary discourse, which is markedly shaped by deconstruction and postmodernism. Postmodernists and deconstructionists see hermeneutics as corrupted with the residual influence of Western metaphysics and, therefore, obsolete. Derrida's charge of "logocentrism" (Derrida 1967) is leveled against the fundamental principle of Gadamer's hermeneutics which says: "Being that can be understood is language." (Gadamer 2007: 162). Derrida's criticism then seems to point to the limits that are imposed on hermeneutical access to the meaning structure of human reality. One could make the further claim that hermeneutics perpetuates the subject-object scheme, and that it thus privileges the position of the interpreting subject. Hermeneutics' claim that it illuminates a universal mechanism of human access to the world, namely the act of understanding, is, then, the subject of serious criticisms. Some might posit that the figure of the subject is to be regarded as the result of specific discourses of power (Foucault 1986) or that the very idea of universal mechanisms of reality construction should be debunked as a residual element of the "grand récits", incompatible with the postmodern worldview, insofar as the latter prefers a rhizomatic structure of autonomous discourses running parallel to each other (Deleuze and Guattari 1980; Lyotard 1985).

Given the potency of these criticisms, it may seem surprising that in the social sciences, (and particularly in sociology) a "hermeneutics of the social sciences",

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which draws in particular on the work of Alfred Schutz, has been developed and cultivated. This is not because social scientists are ignorant of these philosophical concerns, rather the need for a hermeneutics of the social sciences results from a conception of the object of social science that has, as it were, won acceptance across a whole variety of theoretical approaches. In the language of recent systems theory, for instance, this conception may be expressed in the following pithy formula: 'social systems are systems processing meaning' – which is, incidentally, a feature that they share with all living systems**.** Granted, the nature of such a social processing of meaning as well as the latter's specific human mechanisms are an area of contention within the social sciences. But regardless of whether we take social reality to be a meaningful action-context (Schutz 2004) [Handlungszusammenhang], a subject-less communication (Luhmann 1984), or a symbolic space of lifestyles shaped by habitus and capital structure (Bourdieu 1979), the necessary presence of meaning as a constitutive structure of social order remains undisputed.

The subject matter of the hermeneutics of the social sciences then consists of a universal mechanism for the construction of social reality and the existence or non-existence of such a mechanism in no way depends on the interpretive skills of an observer. Since hermeneutics is looking for this mechanism, its claims can gain a general character. Of course, whether or not these propositions are generalizable depends on the manner in which they are obtained and justified. Hence, the hermeneutics of the social sciences must proceed in two ways: first, hermeneutics must grasp understanding as a general process of interpretation, i.e. it has to reconstruct it (Soeffner 1989). Secondly, it has to say something about the processes of the subjective and social constitution of meaning that transcend and frame the sphere of understanding, and that thus make possible hermeneutical interpretation.

The first concern is of a methodological kind: the understanding of understanding requires the self-control of the interpreter who must account for the way he has "constructed" his data as well as the methods he employs in order to analyze – to interpret – this data. The hermeneutics of the social sciences has to subject its observational data to a repeated process of translation. The actual methodological problem here consists in the fact that everyday action, speech, indication, etc. in its concrete performance and context, which stood at the beginning of the process of translation, has to be represented/configured as a text in order to be hermeneutically processed. Thus, the social scientist's interpretation initially draws on material that is reduced to linguistic and scriptural features. Hence, the hermeneutics of the social sciences, and its results, are, as Soeffner sardonically noted, like "a living half-lady, married to the commensurate interpreter,… both living in a text archive…, but without a life-world." (Soeffner 1989: 91). In order to avoid these shortcomings, the hermeneutics of the social sciences must apply and attune its methods and procedures to processes constituting meaning in the broadest sense. The latter are understood by such a hermeneutics as processes of the construction of the life-world. Hence, it requires a theory of the life-world. Following Schutz, I will try to sketch such a theory conceived as a pragmatic theory of the life-world.

2

The hermeneutics of the social sciences is based on the sociology of knowledge. Thus, it begins with the basic assumption that actors in everyday life, in their interaction and communication, construct a meaning-structured reality, the meaning structure of which in turn orients the actors' actions. Social reality can thus be understood as a self-generating, self-referential context, with no rules external to itself. It is, therefore, a meaning-generative context, circular in principle, within which one must always dwell.

In terms of the 'form' of this meaning-generative context, from the merely analytical vantage point, we can identify four distinct levels:

1. To begin with, there is the level of the subjective constitution of meaning, including the acts of consciousness (time-consciousness, intentionality, etc.) as well as corporeality in the sense of lived experience.
2. We then have the temporal, spatial, and social structure of the field of action, including its pragmatic variations as well as its transformations into various layers of multiple realities and provinces of meaning within the life-world.
3. There is the level of signs, their systems, structures and realizations in different semantics and mediums.
4. Finally, there is the level of communicative interaction and discourse.

Before discussing these levels in depth, I would like to summarize the meaning-generative context as a whole, and highlight its pragmatic moments:

The intentionality of the stream of consciousness as well as the acts that sustain it, and through which we perceive the world, would be, as it were, without any mundane localization, if conscious processes were not anchored to the world through our corporeality. The body-oriented experience of the world can be traced back to the working [*Wirken*][1] of the body in the world – i.e. to action. The contribution of pragma, i.e. of the practical acts [*Handlungsakte*], to the constitution of reality sustains meaning to the same extent as consciousness itself. Working [*Wirken*] in the world means interaction with objects and with others (interaction with others understood as communication). Thus, actions don't just generate reality, but also acquire the character of signs, which makes reality construction social and bestows a complex semiotic order on it, an order, which is based on sign systems. Sign systems for their part are tied to different materials and means that serve their realization – they realize themselves in different mediums. Pragmatically generated knowledge, which is objectified in sign systems and mediums, is always perspectival due to its genesis, as the pragmatic relevances of individual and collective actors take different shapes. The result of this is not only a plurality of forms of culture, but also a

[1] TN: The German word "*Wirken*" has various connotations. It could also be translated as the working or the acting of the body, in the sense of having an effect on and interacting with the world. Kurt H. Wolff, in his review of Ilja Srubar's *Kosmion*, translates it as "gearing into the world" Wolff 1991: 498.

form of knowledge production, where, on the one hand, knowledge is permanently generated, and where, on the other hand, legitimate, socially approved knowledge is distinguished from its illegitimate variants. The discourses (of power), in which this takes place, hence also constitute a formal mechanism of the structure of the life-world. In this mechanism the empirical shape of cultural worlds is generated. One could also say that on the level of discourses the pragmatic and the semiotic mechanisms of the constitution of reality mesh with each other. What becomes apparent in this brief sketch is the essential import the pragmatic moment has in the reality construction of the life-world.

Even if what has been argued in the foregoing seems compelling, one might still wonder as to the relevance of all of this in terms of Alfred Schutz. One may well be willing to grant the importance of consciousness, intentionality, embodiment, action and signs and yet wonder as to how different semantics, discourses and mediums may be relevant to a Schutzian theory of interpretation?

It is my contention, however, that Schutz' theory of signs, as he argues in "Symbol, Reality and Society" (Schutz 1962), allows for the integration of precisely these items into a theory of the life-world. Schutz's general scheme for a semiotic system that he calls "system of appresentation" consists of four levels:

1. The scheme of apperception refers to material "objects," which can carry a meaning.
2. The scheme of appresentation stands for the indicating quality of the sign (the signifier).
3. The scheme of reference refers to that which is indicated by the sign (the signified).
4. The framing scheme or scheme of interpretation keeps the meaning relation between (2) and (3) temporarily stable, i.e. it establishes a certain interpretation of a sign for a certain time.

The complexity of this scheme, I would submit, demonstrates that Schutz was not only thinking of a theory of signs, but rather of a theory of the semiotic order of the life-world. For Schutz, the semiosis is thus the constituting force of the life-world, through which the different realities of the life-world as well as their constitutive levels are related to, and interwoven with, each other. The pragmatic theory of the life-world proposed here, demonstrates beyond all doubt that there is a prelinguistic (i.e. cognitive and pragmatic) constitution of meaning and knowledge on the part of the subject. At the same time, one must concede that these prelinguistic 'levels' already contain preconditions of the semiotic constitution of meaning. Of foremost importance here are the appresentative acts of consciousness as well as the transcendence of the other and of the world that is experienced in pragmatic action. Appresentative practice is obviously employed transculturally in order to overcome temporal, spatial and social transcendences – namely in the form of communication and sign -systems. Thus, the capacity for the creation of signs is clearly linked to the appresentative function of consciousness and yet, simultaneously, depends on pragmatic, knowledge-generating processes.

Schutz's theory of signs tries to take into account this multilayered character of the sign's function. Schutz's approach goes beyond the traditional Saussurian semiotic structure of signifier/signified (Saussure 1979), by adding two moments that are indispensable to the meaning-constituting functions of sign-systems. For Schutz, every sign system is also composed of a specific "material" to which he assigns the concept of a scheme of apperception. This is the level of the material substrata of sign systems, i.e. of the artefacts, which are possible signs, or are the material upon which the sign is inscribed. Thus, as regards the meaning-constitutive function of sign systems, it is always also the material level of the medium – through which the sign's signification is realized or conveyed – that is a co-determinant of this function. This has significant ramifications for the analysis of concrete life-worlds: if the materiality of signs is a basic condition of semiosis, the differences in the realization of sign systems via mediums also constitute differences between forms of culture. Another of Schutz's essential extensions of the sign structure consists in the insight that we need an instance through which the semantic values of a sign system (i.e. the reference of signs related to their content) are kept relatively constant. This constancy is not inherent in the semantic value of the sign itself, but represents a separate level of the semiotic system. Schutz refers to this level as the "general scheme of interpretation." It has roughly the same pragmatic function as the "interpretant" (Peirce 1984) through which the sign context that bestows meaning is determined and (relatively) given permanence. In my view, Luhmann's conception of semantics, in the sense of a stabilizing scheme of communication, similarly aims at this function.

However, if we follow Schutz's line of reasoning, then the concrete form of this general scheme of interpretation depends on pragmatic contexts where the stock of knowledge contained in this scheme is produced. Because of the pragmatic differentiation of life-world realities and their corresponding knowledge systems (provinces of meaning), the structure of the life-world involves the co-existence of several such general schemes of interpretation. Notwithstanding, they are often incompatible and come into conflict with each other (Berger and Luckmann 1966: 112ff.). The parallel existence of such schemes of interpretation then generates discourses of power and their often conflicting semantics.

Thus, the process of semiosis and its inherent selectivity, as outlined above, achieve moments of power that affect the process of reality construction and its meaning-oriented praxis. As a result of this particular attribute of semantics, actors/agents frequently look to secure control of the process of semiosis which, in turn, becomes an object of power in its own right. Notwithstanding, the action-orienting effects of various semantics should not be understood as a kind of determinism. Their orienting function consists first and foremost in their selectivity, through which they recommend certain meaning preferences and, thereby, leave others unarticulated. As a result of this process of discrimination and determination, semantics exert a power that opens up certain semantic spaces and, by the same token, spaces of action, while it closes others. Of course, actors can be interpretatively receptive towards these offers or they can act dismissively. This is one of the reasons why the power of definition over the interpretation of reality is supported by a semiotic means of communication which aim at corporeality, for example, violence.

We turn next to consider the different levels of the meaning-generative context that has been hinted at above from which the pragmatic theory of the life-world takes its bearings.

2.1 Consciousness and Embodiment

The human approach to the world generates knowledge which is objectified semantically and materialized pragmatically. It presupposes consciousness in its dynamism and plasticity. The variety of cultural forms rest on the interactive and communicative formation of consciousness. However, such formation would not be possible without the basic structure of the acts of consciousness as identified in Husserl's phenomenology.

The plasticity of consciousness and of its constructions spring first and foremost from the temporality of intentional acts through which consciousness constitutes our reality. The discrete moments of which the perceived objects consist are conflated in time through the synthesizing temporality of consciousness. The objects of consciousness are thus temporal objects, whose meaning is therefore changeable in the time. On the other hand, if the constitution of meaning is temporal then the acts that lead to the determination of meaning are sequential. This sequentiality plays a crucial role for the regularity [*Regelhaftigkeit*] of meaning constitution, on which the hermeneutics of the social sciences rests.

Another form of intentionality relevant in this context is appresentation. This faculty combines what is present with that which is absent or not immediately perceivable to perception. It is the precondition for the symbolizing capacity of consciousness, i.e. for semiosis as the process of constituting reality by means of creating and employing signs.

The meaning-constitutive acts that pertain to the subject are not limited merely to acts of consciousness. The body and bodily access to the world play a role in the process of meaning constitution that is as essential as that of consciousness itself. Corporeality mediates between the inner and the outer world of the subject. Thus, it carries in itself a moment which guarantees the evidence of reality. Furthermore, the body is the centre of spatial awareness. It is the ultimate site where we live the difference of our own particularity [*des je Eigenen*], which sets itself apart from the strict otherness of the external world [*vom außerweltlich Fremden*].[2] One might be inclined to believe that thoughts are sometimes interchangeable but one could never confuse the touch of another body with the reflexive kinaesthesis of touching oneself.

[2]TN The German *fremd* or *Fremde* is usually translated as strange, alien or foreign. Even though *fremd* here certainly also has connotations of these latter expressions – connotations which we might perhaps refer to as those of the uncanny –, it is in the first instance a more neutral or objective description of that which is simply external to myself. We could say that when we experience the alienness of the world distinct from our self, we have become strangers (On the special case of the experience of being a stranger facing a foreign human community with its constitutive "truisms" (501), cf. the abovementioned Schutz-essay "The Stranger").

The reality and identity constituting function of corporeality (Merleau-Ponty 1945) has a number of implications in terms of the constitution of culture: The body is the medium both of the work [*des Wirkens*] in the world, as well as that via which the world affects the subject. Phenomena of power (Foucault 1975) as well as of interaction and communication in general are bound to the embodiment of the subject. At the same time, these phenomena represent the cultural processes which form the body. The materiality of the body helps determine the structure of the field of action and of the system of pragmatic relevances as well as their semiotic representation. It also forms the structure of the mediums which must refer to the sensory functions of body.

2.2 Action, Materiality of the Object, Communication

In order to clarify the life-world's mechanisms of constitution and differentiation, it is not sufficient to only consider the levels of consciousness and corporeality. In dealing with or acting towards objects as well as in communicating with others, we generate a stock of knowledge with its systems of relevance and typicality.[3] My knowledge of the meaningful projects that guide my action bestows the character of signs on actions performed by others, and vice versa. In reciprocal relations the subjective streams of consciousness are related to each other. In this way, communicative modifications of the subjective consciousness and its schemes of experiences are generated. These modifications are possible due to the plasticity of temporal consciousness as demonstrated above. This brings us to the crucial question of hermeneutics par excellence, namely: how shall the interpretation of something 'other' be adequate, if it is carried out in self-interpretation through exclusive recourse to my own particular experience? What we begin to see here, however, is how that adequacy works: the interpreting self can, on the one hand, rely just on its own schemes of experience, which, are, nevertheless, modified through a reciprocity with the other in the process of communication. This is the basic structure of the autogenerative construction of human reality, in which the temporal plasticity of consciousness and the communicative construction of intersubjective knowledge result in the self-interpretation's reliance on social constructs.

The fact that the subjective as well as the collective stocks of knowledge are dependent on action leads to the assumption that it is pragmatic relevance, which, on the one hand, determines the general form of reality construction and, on the other hand differentiates the relevance- and typicality-structures of the respective forms of culture and life (Schutz 2003: 135f, 182 ff; Srubar 1988: 132 ff). As we always encounter the life-world through the performance of the practices constituting it, a

[3] TN: For a detailed discussion of these concepts cf. chapter III ("Knowledge of the Life-World. Relevance and Typicality") of vol. 1 of Schutz's *The Structures of the Life-World* (Schutz and Luckmann 1973).

performance, which in each case leads to reality constructions of a different kind, we construct our reality in relation to specific times, spaces and social relations. For the same reason we also always encounter the life-world as a variety of cultural life-forms. Consequently, due to the pragmatic relevance, the life-world as a cultural world is always divided into a plurality of heterogeneous realities, which transcend each other and may well be mutually unfamiliar.

2.3 Sign Systems, Language, Semantic Systems, Mediums

From what has been said above, it is already clear that an examination of the meaning-generative mechanism cannot begin merely at the level of semiosis, but must begin at the more fundamental levels of consciousness, corporeality and action. Consequently, reality so constructed cannot be understood purely semiotically, i.e. not only as a text.

From this standpoint, semiotic praxis appears to be a result of the need for action-coordination. Sign systems in their appresentative function then, not only serve to overcome the transcendence of others and the world, but, in addition, serve the semantic construction of reality by transporting collective knowledge in the form of typicality and relevance. Reality-constructs that are generated pragmatically here become reflected in different semantics, which are conveyed in different communicative genres as well as in different mediums. The semiotisation of knowledge thus rests on selectivity and on the creation of differences as features of sign systems – features, which, at the same time, are presuppositions for a creative semiotic praxis. It is this selectivity embedded into the sequential constitution of meaning that legitimates the hermeneutic assumption that semiotic constructs are principally endowed with regularity.

2.4 Discourses

Social processes look to control semiosis because of its capacity to construct and determine reality. For Schutz, these processes look to control the influence which definitions exercise over legitimate means of producing and reading signs, understood in the broadest sense. This results in discourses where a separation takes place between legitimate and illegitimate knowledge or between ortho- and heterodoxy. These discourses likewise belong to the meaning-generative complex of social reality as they result from the pragmatic and semiotic character of the latter's construction. The social malleability of meaning generation and its reference to the body endow these discursive processes with moments of power, which can be operative at different levels and induce a wide range of effects ranging from moral admonishments to violence.

3

Against the backdrop of the meaning-generative context sketched above, we can go one step further and ask what tools the approach described affords us in terms of the empirical reconstruction of concrete cases.

The decisive question here is whether the conceptual means provided by the approach described allow for interpreting data in a controlled manner such that this interpretation can lead to the complete explication of a particular case in the course of its realization. I would argue that this should be possible since all the particular levels of the meaning-generative context are characterized by a selectivity which leads to a regularity inherent in social reality. Hermeneutics, too, must be seen as subject to this regularity, since it is subject to the same contextual conditions. In short, one must reconstruct the immanent rules of a case by means of the regularity appearing in the structure of the meaning-generative context. This must happen in such a way that any competent agent within the cultural life-form at hand could in fact understand this reconstruction. In doing so, we would satisfy Schutz's postulate of methodological adequacy (Schutz 1964).

Which moments of formal regularity in the structure of the meaning-generative context of social reality can serve the hermeneutics of the social sciences as a guideline for interpretation?

1. Without a doubt, the temporality of the constitution of meaning, i.e. its sequentiality, is one of the most important mechanisms in the regularizing of meaning constitutions in all their semiotic/pragmatic genres. This is due to the selectivity of the interactive or, as it were, "syntagmatic" junctures, by which the realized possibilities of meaning are separated from those that have not been realized, such that they produce a "structure of the case."
2. Meaning constitution bound to the body makes the basic structures of the lived social space appear as regulatory instances as regards action and interpretation. The condition and vulnerability of the body form the backdrop for the understanding of everyday systems of preferences as well as the basis for the experience of the world's transcendence.
3. Pragmatic, i.e. action-related, processes of meaning constitution stand as a rule-principle [*Regelprinzip*] for the necessarily actor-related perspectivity of the typicality- and relevance-systems of everyday action-orientation. These processes also stand for the necessary variety and variation of these systems. The everyday type-formation and the type structure of everyday knowledge allow us to use the type-formation and its regularity for procedures of interpretation pertaining to the social sciences as well.
4. The selectivity of the sign systems, on which the semiotic meaning constitution rests, makes regularity appear as the experienceable creation of meaning differences in semantic systems, communicative genres and mediums.
5. The pragmatic genesis of interpretation variants as well as the potency of the symbolic formation of meaning lead to the competition for power over

interpretation. Furthermore, it leads to the creation of readings of a different "power," the different configurations of which can determine the "rule" of the case.

Of course these five points alone don't quite allow the hermeneut to envision the "missing half" of his "half-lady-object" in all its concreteness. Nevertheless, I hope to have shown that one can develop a hermeneutics through Schutz, which is more than simply proto-sociological and which is capable to meet the postmodernist's reservations.

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Media Structures of the Life-World

Ruth Ayaß

Alfred Schutz, from a variety of perspectives, described the structures of the life-world of individuals as they interacted on a day to day basis. He focused in particular on their spatial and temporal situation, the agent's structures of motivation, the boundaries of everyday reality and the adjacent finite provinces of meaning.

> The world of everyday life is the scene and also the object of our actions and interactions. We have to dominate it and we have to change it in order to realize the purposes which we pursue within it among our fellow-men. We work and operate not only within but upon the world. (Schutz 1962a: 208f.)

The everyday world is the world within my reach, the paramount reality. Its borders are defined by the segments of time and space that ego and alter share with one another. For Schutz, this face-to-face encounter is *the* fundamental encounter; the encounter in which ego and alter share time and space and reciprocal visual and acoustic perception is possible. In his texts, therefore, he only ascribes marginal importance to different types of media as constituent parts of our daily life. Apart from sporadic brief references to print media, Schutz barely alludes to modern forms of media at all. His lecture on the sociology of language, in which he discusses the relationship between language, space and time in great detail, does briefly touch upon the topic of the media:

> The different dimensions of the technical media, the telephone, the radio, and the television, allow a unilateral and quasi-discourse, such as the letter. The result is that the writer of a letter takes certain things for granted [while the addressee might not share his opinion,

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> which causes] misunderstandings in the correspondence that would not occur in face-to-face relations. (Schutz 2003: 246)[1]

Schutz's reasons for giving so little weight to the role of the modern mass media can be speculated about more or less plausibly. And yet one cannot ignore the fact that some analysis of modern media would have been clearly relevant to a number of his abiding concerns, for example, his analysis of the social distribution of knowledge. Schutz's essay on "The Stranger" (Schutz 1964a) would also have benefited if he had considered the issue of media, not least given that not long before its publication, Robert E. Park had shown that for the stranger, or as Park called him, the "marginal man," the media, especially the daily newspapers, played a hugely significant role. This was largely due to the social situation of immigrants.

> One reason why immigrant people read more in America than they do at home is because there is more going on that they need to know. There is more novelty and more news. (Park 1922: 9)

Strictly speaking, the only essay in which Schutz explicitly discusses the importance of the media is "Making Music Together," as we see, for example, in the passages that examine the relationship between the performing musician and his audience. Schutz uses the example of a radio performance to emphasize that "the relationship between performer and audience is subject to all variations of intensity, intimacy, and anonymity" (Schutz 1964b: 174). The essay concludes:

> It is hardly necessary to point out that the remarks in the preceding paragraph refer to communication within the face-to-face relationship. It can, however, be shown that all the other forms of possible communication can be explained as derived from this paramount situation. But this, as well as the elaboration of the theory of the tuning-in relationship, must be reserved for another occasion. (Schutz 1964b: 178)

This occasion never materialized.[2] Thus, taking these considerations as our cue, I will pursue a twofold argument in this essay. First, I will show that Schutz's terminology describes the role of the media in our everyday environment most effectively. Secondly, I will demonstrate that the world of everyday life is saturated with numerous types of media. After all, the media did not suddenly emerge in late modernity or even in the middle of the twentieth century, as modern media studies would have us believe. In fact, the desire for media is an integral part of human nature, due to the spatial and temporal limitations of the life-worlds of

[1] This citation comes from Schutz's lecture on the sociology of language at the New School of Social Research in 1952/1953. The lecture notes, taken by Helmut R. Wagner and Fred Kersten in English, are (slightly edited) published in German language in the ongoing (new) edition of Alfred Schutz's Completed Works (Alfred Schütz *Werkausgabe*) at the Constance University Press (Schutz 2003: 221–299). The quote is our *re*translation of the German passage, based on the original (English) notes of Wagner and Kersten. The notes are held in the *Sozialwissenschaftliches Archiv* at the University of Constance.

[2] It was eventually another immigrant from Austria who, in his new home country, largely devoted himself to the role of the mass media: Paul F. Lazarsfeld.

everyday human existence. The relation of humans with their everyday world is shaped and influenced by the media so fundamentally, that one can legitimately speak of the *media* structures of the life-world. My definition of media therefore needs to serve both purposes. I refer to 'media' as the communicative means used by human beings to shift, blur, or redraw the boundaries of their everyday life.

1 The Media as Elementary Parts of the Life-World. Writing Systems. Cave Paintings

The various forms of media and their uses, ever since their inception, have been linked to the social distribution of knowledge. The Egyptian and Mesopotamian cultures, the first to cultivate (clearly defined) writing systems, were responsible for the first instances of the professional scribe. Illiteracy, according to our contemporary understanding of the word, was not really possible at that point in time: the vast majority of the population was precluded from the very possibility of becoming literate, a privilege reserved for a small number of scribes. In the main, two types of documents from these regions have survived: religious texts and economic documents. The main function of these documents was to record economic transactions and religious customs, affording them a certain permanence as opposed to the highly transient character of such activities and practices hitherto. One of the oldest written documents, a clay tablet from Mesopotamia, records a list of names and quantities of cattle on its face (cf. Földes-Papp 1987: 51).[3]

Writing represents the first fundamental change in the structures of the life-world, inasmuch as it allows communication beyond the existing borders; through writing, communication is possible even if the criteria of reciprocity and immediacy, which are unique to the communication of the everyday world, are unfulfilled. Writing affords the scribe access to human beings who are not within his immediate reach. Never was the phrase "in the beginning was the word" more appropriately applied than to the case of writing. In particular the pictographic elements of the first forms of writing suggest that the cave paintings, preserved for instance in Lascaux or La Pasiega, are more than mere artistic expression. Referring to the well-known drawing of the dead hunter and the injured bison in the cave of Lascaux, Elling writes:

> Even millennia ago, there were images that rather told a story than conjured something, although they were rare. The image of the bison in the cave of Lascaux is one of them. The animal is badly injured, its guts are spilling from its abdomen, and it is whipping its tail in

[3]The caption of the image in Földes-Papp reads "'booking tablet' (clay) from Uruk IV, one of the oldest written records (around 3200 B.C.). The front shows personal names with quantities of goods (cattle). The summation of goods on the back is – except for the numerical values – purely pictographic and can therefore be read even without knowledge of the Sumerian language: '54 bulls and cows'." (Földes-Papp 1987: 51; our translation)

> agitation or fury. The hunter, whose spear presumably wounded the animal, is lying on the ground; his head closely resembles the totem bird in the foreground of the image. Whatever the painter's intention may have been, the image tells a story. And stories mark the beginning of the development of writing, since, in a story, the communicative intention outweighs, if not replaces, the magical one. There are more examples of early versions of pictographic stories, although sometimes the images seem to be mere mnemonic aids for the teller. (Elling 2005: 1; our translation)

Archaeologists estimate the drawings in the cave of Lascaux to be 17,000 years old, and the drawings in the cave of Altamira to be 14,000 years old. The most spectacular finds, discovered in 2006 at the Vogelherd cave in the Lonetal region in Baden-Württemberg, Germany, are believed to date back to the glacier period 35,000 years ago.[4] They are considered remarkable since they contain the oldest fully-preserved pieces of art. What purpose the delicately designed ivory mammoth or the lion served remains unclear. However, the miniature statuettes must have had a tremendous symbolic value. From the earliest cave paintings and the first carvings, communicative structures of the life-world have been aiming for mediality. The basic function of the media, to serve as "extensions of man" (McLuhan 1964), is a feature ascribed by McLuhan exclusively to broadcast media (a much more recent form), but applies equally at this formative stage. Human beings transcend their reach spatially and temporally by means of the media and this process is as old as "civilized" mankind.

Arnold Gehlen coined the often-quoted depiction (based on Herder) of man as a "Mängelwesen"—a being of needs. Humans are beings of need since—according to Gehlen—they are "[p]oorly equipped (…) with sensory apparatus, naturally defenseless, naked, constitutionally embryonic through and through, possessing only inadequate instincts" (Gehlen 1980: 3). Human beings are in need of technical aids in order to overcome their insufficiency and thus make use of the biface, the spear, and furs to replace and enhance their natural organs; but since their origins, humans, in addition to these, have also used media. Among the oldest man-made objects known today are not only bifaces, but, interestingly enough, flutes, wall paintings, and tally sticks. The depictions of the hunter and the bison in the cave of Lascaux, and the ivory mammoth in the Lonetal region testify to the human desire to break the boundaries of their biologically defined reach by any and every 'means' available. Faßler calls this the homo sapiens' "self-empowerment through media" (Faßler 2003: 32; our translation). We might go so far as to characterize the creation and the use of media then as basic anthropological needs. The fact that writing developed independently in areas such as the Indus River Valley, Mesopotamia, China, and Latin America provides further evidence that humans have always relied on forms of media to compensate for the inadequacy of their natural capacities, and to pursue more complicated matters of everyday and religious life.[5] Beyond the

[4] Cf. Bolus (2008).

[5] The hypothesis of the polygenesis of writing systems applies to the following areas "in order of origination: southeast Europe (Ancient Europe) – Egypt – Mesopotamia – Indus River Valley – China (Ancient China) – Middle America (the Olmec culture)" (Haarmann 2002: 34f.; our translation).

impoverished state of human instincts, Gehlen's remarks (based on Scheler and Plessner) on the "world-openness" of man are relevant here.

> Man's long perceived poverty of senses is connected to his lack of specialization as closely as to his cosmopolitanism. After all, what are instincts, ultimately, but the hereditary coordination of movement, of which such an organically poor being has but very few. And inasmuch as instincts can only be of higher utility, if they respond to very specific, adjusted stimuli of environment, man cannot be a being of instincts, for his living situation does not guarantee that he even encounters these signals—being, as he is, exposed to the open sphere. However, he possesses a surplus of unharnessed drive that only needs to be directed when dealing with the world, and exceeds by far the quantum necessary for a lifetime. (Gehlen 1983: 62; our translation)

The drawings in the cave of Lascaux and the discoveries in Lonetal's Vogelherd cave indicate the ways that this "surplus" manifested itself and to what degree "dealing with the world" resulted directly in the artistic process of shaping it through the media. Human beings, in other words, can use the media to exceed their area of influence both temporally and spatially—first through drawings on cave walls or parchments, and later through writing, printing, fax machines, modems, telephones, answering machines, the radio, and the television. Through these means, humans, by overcoming the boundaries of time and space, transcend their original zone of operation as determined by the limitations of their organs.

Overcoming time and space, the media change not only the reach of human beings, they also change the world within that reach.

2 Leaving the Cave: Writing, Printing, Reading. Media Change the World Within My Reach

The media are essential to human nature. Yet, (even today) they are not equally accessible to everyone. Up until the modern era, access to the media had been a question of both the social distribution of knowledge and expertise. In the (European) Middle Ages, access to books and writing was the exclusive privilege of monks. The (manually) replicated books that constituted the first libraries were, almost without exception, kept in monasteries. Umberto Eco's novel "The Name of the Rose" is an impressive literary depiction of the enormous significance of the library in the monastic world and the books it stored. In a process that lasted years, monks painstakingly transcribed copies of books. At that point, one of writing's most important functions was preservation. Due to the small number of copies and the large amount of labor that was necessary to reproduce them, the use of books to disseminate knowledge was neither feasible nor a priority. Hence, only a small number of people acquired knowledge through books. All of this changed with the emergence of the printing press:

> Again, it is well to observe the force and virtue and consequences of discoveries, and these are to be seen nowhere more conspicuously than in those three which were unknown to the ancients, and of which the origin, though recent, is obscure and inglorious; namely, printing, gunpowder, and the magnet. For these three have changed the whole face and state of things throughout the world. (Bacon 1986: 114)

Before the invention of the printing press,'writing' predominantly denoted the creation of copies. The copying process in the scriptoria of the middle ages chiefly served the purpose of replicating religious writings. These scriptoria were text manufactories and each created copy was unique. It was not until the technology of Gutenberg's printing press allowed the mechanical production of text documents that this classic process of manual copying was made obsolete. What made these copies so tremendously significant for early medieval culture (sixth to twelfth century) was the double function they fulfilled. Since writing allowed the storage of knowledge, monasteries grew into centers of erudition, as the first libraries emerged. Apart from storing knowledge, the copies—although less importantly at first—were also used to distribute knowledge. Each copy being a duplication, they contribute—however minimally—to the distribution of the copied text.

The initial impact of Gutenberg's invention was most visible in terms of the duration and costs of production. Granted, it took Gutenberg three years to print the first bible;[6] in the long run, however, thanks to the art of printing, books were increasingly used to spread rather than simply to preserve knowledge. Unlike for instance, letters made of wood, the new letters, made of lead, were more durable and therefore—most importantly—reusable. Printing with movable letters allowed mass reproduction of the original, which, for the first time, offered the possibility of mass production.

The new function of the book to serve primarily as a multiplicator also had an impact on its reception. Up until the invention of the printing press, and even beyond, the word 'reading' had typically meant reading out loud. It is thus a long-term consequence of the invention that the very meaning of the term 'reading' has changed. With the dissolution of the clerical privilege, reading, as a cultural technique, was democratized. In addition, the printing press further changed the function of reading: the possibility of silent reading allowed solitary, individualized reception of literature in isolation—be it at home or secluded in nature. There are countless artistic depictions of withdrawn human beings engrossed in the act of reading. Pierre-Auguste Renoir's reading women, Franz Marc's "Reading Woman in the Greenery," and Ernst von Barlach's "Reading Monk" are some noteworthy examples. The omnipresence of people reading—absorbed by a book, withdrawn, and secluded from the world—is revealed in this recurring theme. The reading figure ignores its' observer as well as the whole environment. The human being sunk into the book, although 'there' physically, is not part of this daily life. And it's observer is 'visibly' left with a lasting impression.

The evolving reading culture foreshadows one of the most influential factors of the subsequent use of media: as books grow smaller, lighter, more affordable, and more portable (for instance *pocket* books), the reception of the medium is more and more individualized. One can read almost anywhere. Eighteenth-century descriptions show how the act of reading had a profound effect on everyday life and even the street scenery:

[6]The printing process of the Gutenberg Bible began in 1452 and resulted in 180 copies with 1,282 pages. Of this so-called 42-Line Bible 140 copies were printed on paper, 40 on parchment. 48 copies remain worldwide.

> Everyone in Paris is reading … Everyone, but women in particular, is carrying a book around in their pocket. People read while riding in carriages or taking walks; they read at the theatre during the interval, in cafés, even when bathing. Women, children, journeymen and apprentices read in shops. On Sundays people read while seated at the front of their houses; lackeys read on their back seats, coachmen up on their boxes, and soldiers keeping guard. (Wittmann 1999: 285)

Depictions of this kind demonstrate the ubiquity of media in everyday life. Through the art of printing, the media, for the first time, are *domesticated*, inasmuch as their use now becomes an everyday phenomenon, affecting daily 'domestic' customs. Objects of great marvel at first, the media undergo a domesticating transformation into elements of inventory and furniture. It is, however, equally essential to almost all media that soon after this transformation, they lose their shell (or strip it off). Soon after this the media begins to 'mobilize,' as we can see initially, for example, with the book—as it travels beyond the monastery walls—this process is mirrored subsequently with other forms of media as the television slips out of its chest, the radio begins to 'walk' (the walkman), and the telephone breaks loose from its booths and hall stands. Becoming portable, the media no longer have fixed locations and thus increasingly turn into omnipresent elements of daily life.

3 Humans Changing Their Reach. Broadcast Media. Contemporaries. Radio. Television

Notwithstanding before the media become mobile, they do have a fixed location. This is true for the library book before it becomes a handy paperback edition; and, essentially, this is true for traditional broadcast media, such as radio and television, broadcasting (at first) from local stations. The recipient of this type of 'broad'-casting becomes one of the numerous 'addressees' to which this transmission (a message or delivery of sorts) is directed. Broadcast media place physically absent people into the indirect reach of the station (in a sense, the 'sender'). Sender and addressee, here, are not acting under the conditions of reciprocity. The sender manages to draw contemporaries into his reach, but not vice versa.

Schutz's descriptions of the world within actual reach help enormously in understanding the changes broadcast media effect in our ordinary, everyday existence. Schutz's chief interest involved situations in which the agents confront each other on a *reciprocal* basis. In this "vivid present," a situation greatly determined by reciprocity, we are presented to the Other immediately, and perceive the Other as being here and now. In these face-to-face situations, the counterpart is presented to the agent in a "vivid present," and vice versa. The actions of the agents in these situations often orient themselves by one another, a social situation which Schutz called "we-relationship" (Schutz 1962b: 17; Schutz and Luckmann 1973: 75ff.). In its immediacy, this encounter is "the most originary and genetically important social relation," and it constitutes the intersubjectivity of the world we live in (Schutz and Luckmann 1973: 69). In social encounters, agents continuously orient themselves

by their counterpart. This world of everyday agents is limited both temporally and spatially. Schutz uses the term "reach" to refer to that portion of space upon which and within which a given human being can act. This reach is limited by the biological constitution of human beings: If my voice is not strong enough to cross a certain space, I can raise it, or whistle in order to transcend my original zone of operation. However, without the use of additional 'means,' my reach is limited by the capacities of my organs. Apart from the "world within actual reach"—to which a given human being has access in his concrete spatial situation—there is the "world within potential reach," sectors of the world that are, in principle, accessible, for instance if I change my location (which means I do not have to shout anymore). To turn this world within "restorable reach" or within "achievable reach" into the world within actual reach, however, human beings have to allow for spatial alterations, and, frequently, temporal delays. I have to move from A to B to avoid having to shout, and that may take time. The world within actual reach, on the contrary, is the world which humans can influence through direct actions. If humans want to communicate, while being out of each others' actual reach, they need media. But if alter is not within the actual reach of ego, he can no longer be experienced directly, only indirectly. There are numerous transitions between the direct and indirect experience of the Other. However, it is not through the immediacy of the we-relationship that I experience most of the "Others." Schutz refers to them as "mere contemporaries" (Schutz and Luckmann 1973: 69ff.). Contemporaries are not experienced the same way as consociates. The features of spatial and temporal immediacy—fundamental for the constitution of a we-relationship—are missing. The phrase that Schutz coined for these kinds of social conditions is "they-orientation." Contemporaries are grasped by way of derived typifications; their experience is necessarily indirect, mediated, and more or less anonymous. It is the communicative relation with these contemporaries where media gain their high importance. The media generate various types of contemporaries. The aforementioned multiple transitions between direct and indirect experience of the Other pertain to human beings that, hitherto, were within my immediate reach. I can now maintain my relationship to others by means that help to span the great distances between ego and alter. The mail service, in particular, is one of those space-conquering institutions whose history ranges from the stagecoach (covering also the pneumatic post and the pony express) to the mailman, who currently delivers what is known as "snail mail." The ability to traverse great expanses is shared by postcards, telegrams, letters, phone calls, i.e. by a whole spectrum of media that—although not broadcast media themselves—manage to bridge the distance between two places. Some media even permit human beings, overcoming the limitations imposed by the passing of time, to communicate with themselves (a diary, a grocery list, or a post-it note on the refrigerator reminding us to "buy milk").

Most importantly, the media allow us to relate to contemporaries who have never been and never will be within our actual reach. It is, in fact, the media that generate these contemporaries. These are flesh-and-blood people, our contemporaries, (presently) encountered chiefly through the broadcast media: politicians, athletes, musicians, news presenters. It is solely through the media that we have knowledge of

their existence. Contrary to face-to-face encounters, there is no reciprocal abundance of symptoms in these situations. Classic broadcast media function unidirectionally, which results in an abundance of symptoms on one side only: I have knowledge of the hairdo of the German chancellor, while she is unaware of mine (although she likely knows of the existence of voters that have hair). The medium dictates which particular 'symptoms' I have access to. The print media fail to convey the voice; the radio does not transmit the outer appearance. Television communicates both, yet, showing motions and sound, it does not transmit scents. As a recipient of the media, I have the option of terminating the 'connection' to these contemporaries rather abruptly: I can turn off the radio, put the newspaper aside, or switch off the television. I cannot, however, act upon them in the manner of a face-to-face encounter. In Schutz's terms, these people are contemporaries who, due to the medium, are within my potential reach, although I am not equally within theirs. While I have a certain "symptom knowledge" of them, my contemporaries' image of me, is in turn, highly anonymous and typified. I am for them but a certain type of voter (listener, viewer, etc.).

Through the media, we know of contemporaries we may not wish to know or that we may never meet. Moreover, they contribute greatly to the knowledge we have of our ancestors, which greatly enhances our knowledge of the past. Of course, what we know about the Aurignacian culture is based less on the media than on items we have found, the mammoth from the Vogelherd being only one of the many examples. Yet, ever since antiquity, the media have been an important source of knowledge concerning our ancestors, for example, the Rosetta Stone, Herodotus' travelogue, or Caesar's "De Bello Gallico." We know, for instance, from Juvenal's satires that even in ancient Rome, it was possible to have abominable neighbors. By and large, these texts were not originally addressed to 'us' and yet, the very nature of storage media means that simply by being preserved, they can potentially be distributed. They can be found and read by people the original author never had in mind while writing. Since storage media can thus develop a life of their own, as it were, they also carry a certain risk. We read diaries even though the original author had intended to keep them private (Malinowski), we print manuscripts whose author wanted them destroyed (Kafka), we listen to messages on answering machines left by people unaware of our presence, etc. Currently, we emphasize the interactive benefits of the World Wide Web, which at the same time, is turning out to be one gigantic memory (and thus a storage medium), storing information and making it accessible from the most remote corners of the planet. When applying for a prominent position, photos taken at a graduation party 15 years previous can be 'informative' in ways that the person they depict might be uncomfortable with. And still, they are virtually indelibly imprinted on the 'memory' of 'the web.' So-called "global social networking websites," like Facebook and MySpace, show that the common user might not be a recipient anymore, as was the case in the days of the classic broadcast media. Yet, he is oftentimes too inexperienced to fully appreciate the medium's mechanisms of both storage and distribution. The act of forgetting is unknown to the internet; hence its potential to greatly harm both contemporaries and ancestors alike.

4 Humans Creating Finite Provinces of Meaning Through Media. Fiction. Dualism of Worlds

The history of the media further reveals that when they are first introduced, many forms of media were (and still are) experienced as a threat. The ways society deals with the media have two distinct features: firstly, the division of media into "good" and "bad" and, secondly, the evolution of "bad" or sometimes even "dangerous" forms of media into respectable cultural goods. In the contemporary world, for instance, it is scarcely conceivable that reading books, especially novels, was once strongly pathologized. And yet, at one time there was a proliferation of vehement diatribes against the reading of novels by women (so called "reading mania" or "narcotic reading"). Lending libraries were considered the "the main breeding grounds of this vice" (Wittmann 1999: 307) and were thus the frequent targets of efforts to ban and prohibit. In Austria, for instance, lending libraries were closed down and banned from 1799 to 1811. The apparent reason was the fear that readers might withdraw entirely from social control. What they read (novels like Flaubert's "Madame Bovary" 1857, Tolstoy's "Anna Karenina" 1877/78, Fontane's "Effi Briest" 1895), and even how they read were the subject of severe criticism. People who read were part of another world, or at least they were not 'here.' Moreover, although, it was mostly the idleness of the readers that was criticized, sociomedical arguments were sometimes offered as well:

> the obligatory position, the lack of all physical movement when reading, combined with the violent alternation of imaginings and feelings [create] limpness, bloatedness and constipation of the intestines, in a word hypochondria, which has a recognized effect on the genitals of both sexes, particularly of the female sex [and creates] coagulations and defects in the blood, excitation and exhaustion of the nervous system, as well as conditions of languor and weakness in the whole body. (Wittmann 1999: 301)

Sociomedical arguments against novels and female readers were later used against movie theaters (people feared the potentially deleterious effect of movies on the morality and decency of viewers), and also the radio (the so-called 'radio mania'); they are still used (by many) against the television, and, most recently, against the use of computers. It is frequently observed that pathologizing a given medium targets its user group. What in the past was a group of young girls and women reading books is now a group of (mostly male) children and adolescents, using computers. Children, it is said, spend too little time playing outside the house, and too much time on their computers, watching television, etc. Being on the computer, people maintain, eliminates communication and is a form of a-social behaviour while violent video games lead to violent and/or anti-social behaviour.

The media are pathologized because the individuals villified in the ways described above appear to withdraw from the social universe; it is in fact quite astonishing to see what evils are generally blamed on the media. There is no doubt that the demonization of the various types of media is a reaction by those who are threatened or offended by them because they do not (cannot, or do not want to) participate in them. Strikingly, the representatives of the 'old' media are always the first to target the new media with verdicts and bans. In doing so, they are often guilty

of blatant errors, such as the comparison between video games and reading. While engrossed in a book, the reader is genuinely 'silenced.' By contrast, users of computer games, especially users of so-called "Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games," are positively chatty.

The resistance to new media appears to be particularly strong where media are perceived as finite provinces of meaning. The media, although part of daily life, nonetheless create finite provinces of meaning. Schutz's examples of finite provinces of meaning are dreams, imagination and fancy, art, religious experience, but also (child-like) playing (cf. Schutz 1962a: 232ff.). Many of these subuniverses can be accessed through, or communicated by the media. It is true that I can enter the world of fantasy without the media, but the media offer limitless opportunities for 'fantastic' experiences. The passage into a finite province of meaning is only possible by way of a "leap," which either completely or partially, suspends reality. Schutz emphasizes that the specific provinces of meaning have specific correlating tensions of consciousness:

> To the cognitive style [of these different subuniverses] belongs, thus, a specific tension of consciousness and, consequently, also a specific *epoché*, a prevalent form of spontaneity, a specific form of self experience, a specific form of sociality, and a specific time perspective (Schutz 1962a: 232).

Media (perhaps along with intoxicants) can be interpreted as instruments of access, par excellence, to finite provinces of meaning. The readers absorbed by their books and the players absorbed in their game, although still physically present in this world, experience little, if any, of their environment; they forget agreements and appointments and, if attempts are made to talk to them, react (if at all) in a disquieted manner. The subuniverses provided by and accessible through the media differ in permeability with respect to passages between the various subuniverses and the world of daily life. One of the two most important features here, is the media's degree of omnipresence. The readers, for instance, engrossed in their books and observed by their consociates, as they are publicly 'available,' run the continuous risk of being interrupted or 'awakened,' as it were, from their reading. Another important factor is the sense of reality involved and the willingness of the recipient to accept this accent of reality as relevant. The world of the media and its recipient can have very diverse relations with one another. The worlds of fantasy have hitherto tended to enthrall and capture the imagination of recipients—Jules Verne's 1872 novel "Le tour du monde en quatre-vingt jours" was a best-seller. Schutz himself makes explicit reference to the fairy tale, the fable, the myth, and poetry (1962a: 234), all of which, originally were genres that emerged from the oral tradition before being subsequently written down and read (out) from books. Today, the list of media that communicate the fairy-tale-like, the fabulous, etc., (apart from that which is read or read aloud) includes films and video games. The characters who occupy these worlds I participate in (by entering their subuniverse) can vary. They can be people living in a world very much like my own, even though they never existed (Emma Bovary). As I am reading, the world I am imagining can be in the past, or alternatively, the narrative can describe present or future fictional events. This world can even be populated by fictional creatures (elves, dragons, talking cats), or its human characters can have supernatural powers (the ability to cast spells, fly, or to

live for hundreds of years). According to Schutz, these subuniverses are radically distinct from one another and can be reached only through the "leap," suspending, each time, the accent of reality of the other. However, these finite provinces of meaning can leave detectable traces in our daily lives, which can be irritating and, even in the bracketing of the natural attitude, give rise to doubts as to whether this world really always is what it appears to be. There are people who, during a boring meeting at their university, look for an 'escape key,' for others pollen reminds them of Tinker Bell, and others shudder at the sight of two ravens sitting close together. These people know the 'traces' other subuniverses can leave; they know the subtle fissures which the accent of reality of the everyday world can have and they know how frequently smaller or larger windows open to other provinces of meaning. In these situations, the accent of reality is not always instantly clear. Indeed, they can as easily irritate, as, for instance, in the case of déjà vus, and, to people who experience them, they often present themselves as thoroughly hybrid situations. If moments of this type are prolonged, the affected person will be subjected to a certain dualism of worlds.

The player of a computer game more complex than, say, Solitaire, experiences a certain spatiality and temporality, which he shares with *other players* in the subuniverse of the game, but not with others in his more 'immediate' environment. These others are other human players, but there are also so-called non-player characters, figures that unlike the players, are not controlled by humans but by computers.

Another contributing factor to the escalating anxiety in the face of new media and the resentment of their genres stems from the novelty of the hybrid situations they create. The allure of these 'imaginary' situations is incomprehensible to observers; they fail to grasp the structures of the medium or the genre, they don't understand the communication among the players and feel excluded from the sense of community that exists between participants and their virtual teammates, which can offer an (attractive) alternative to the everyday world. Third-party individuals, however, often do not have access to these worlds.

The various forms of media reach and connect people who are separated by significant physical distances and who do not therefore share the same physical environment. Yet the media can also draw boundaries within the world and create enclaves. Those within these enclaves tend to withdraw from the 'real' world. New media can thus appear threatening to many because they create new subuniverses that are alien and inaccessible to them, remapping the boundaries between the everyday world and the subuniverse.

5 The Omnipresence of Media. The Media as a Part of Daily Life. The Radio

The uncertainty concerning new media is also reflected in the ways they are used, which often follow the customs of older types of media. The example of the television most effectively demonstrates this. Television undergoes a very interesting

transformation from public reception into a private medium and back. Long before the number of "receivers" had increased sufficiently to speak of the private viewing of the television, the reception of television broadcasts was a public affair. In the 1930s, television was watched in so-called public television rooms, and television programmes were viewed much like film or theatre, i.e. as a public performance. The seating, the arrangement of the viewers in rows, the darkened room, and the special type of clothes are modalities of reception borrowed from the dispositif of other media. There are photographs from the 1950s displaying electric shops attracting the crowds while the earliest major media events turned televisions into magnets, for example, the coronation of Queen Elizabeth II in 1953, the FIFA World Cup in 1954, the Moon Landing in 1969, the "Rumble in the Jungle" in Kinshasa in 1974, etc.[7] Before the increasing number of television sets in private households turned it into a medium of individualization, the television created collectives. The custom of viewing soccer games on gigantic screens in public, widespread during the FIFA World Cup 2006 and the UEFA European Cup 2008, continues the tradition of the collective reception of television, which in truth had never been dead (e.g. soccer nights, Super Bowl parties, quasi-public in pubs, sports bars, etc.). Through these customs, television unified contemporaries otherwise unknown to each other, living through a shared vivid present and connected in the same time dimension.

The media do not necessarily provide finite provinces of meaning. Monika Elsner and Thomas Müller have coined the German phrase "*angewachsener Fernseher*"—"the television as part of the human body." It is not, however, part of the body in the sense that it is an omnipresent extension of our selves like the cellular phone. It is part of the body insofar as it determines the perception of reality and thus becomes a part of our daily routine.

> There is no turning back from television; central areas of modern societies' social knowledge are constituted through 'worlds' communicated by the television. The television as part of the human body can, collectively, no longer be switched off. (Elsner and Müller 1988: 393; our translation)

According to Elsner and Müller, characterizing the reality character of television as distinct from our immediate experience of the 'real world' is impossible since the

[7] In truth, the FIFA World Cup 1954 was chiefly followed on the radio. Herbert Zimmermann's famous German coverage of the World Cup final 1954 became the stuff of legends simply because millions were listening to it on the radio. In his narrative, "*Der Sonntag, an dem ich Weltmeister wurde* (The Sunday I Became World Champion)," F.C. Delius shapes the event in a literary fashion. The narrative is a tribute to this unparalleled reception, this act of 'only' hearing that it is raining, that no one is staggering in Wankdorf Stadium, that Rahn should shoot from deep. Zimmermann's German commentary "*Sechs Minuten noch im Wankdorf-Stadion in Bern. Keiner wankt. Der Regen prasselt unaufhörlich hernieder. […] Aus dem Hintergrund müsste Rahn schießen! Rahn schießt!*" translates into "Six minutes to go here at Wankdorf Stadium in Bern. No one is staggering. The rain is beating down relentlessly. […] Rahn should shoot from deep! Rahn shoots!" The ecstatic, dramatic narration and the importance of the acoustic backdrop are quintessential features of the live radio broadcast.

television is an integral mode through which we experience what we understand to be our real world. In this sense, the television is far from being a finite universe of meaning inasmuch as it does not open a new reality, does not make other universes accessible, and does not extend the reach. Not only is it part of the world of daily life, but, blurring the line between daily-life and the world of the television, it also determines its perception.

Elsner and Müller primarily apply the metaphor of a medium as an extension of the human body to the television. There is however another medium that, before the television, penetrates daily life like no other medium: the radio. The radio establishes a media relation with reality that the other major broadcast media of its time fail to create: the temporal simultaneity of event, report, and reception through the media. The radio allows live reporting; an entirely new form of reporting which soon becomes the characteristic feature of the new medium. Radio broadcasting is the "medium of now" (Faulstich 1981: 36; our translation). A comparison with printing shows how important the storage function of the book was back then and is now, and how fugacious radio reporting is: a radio broadcast can be missed, not so a book. Live broadcastings (most notably of political events and sports) help the radio establish itself as a *medium of being part*. Although clearly, listeners are not 'part' in the physical sense, they become ear witnesses of the events reported. The live nature of the radio broadcast synchronizes reception and event. It creates a link between the time structure of the recipient and the time structure of the event broadcasted and it incorporates the events into the inner time of the listener, his 'durée' (Bergson). The listener thus, through the mediation of the radio, is connected to the event in the same time dimension.[8] Specific time and simultaneity as key characteristics of the radio are visible also in other qualities of the medium. It is the radio that parses the day into hours and gives it a 'program.' (It thus replaces the church tower: the *radio mast* becomes the highest building in town and determines its appearance.) The radio first becomes an electronic guest, later an electronic companion. As a portable radio or as a transistor, it accompanies its owner to the beach, the picnic, and to the swimming pool. The accompanying function of the radio is perhaps most visible in the technology of the car audio. Being stationary but movable, the car audio institutionalizes the radio's mobility, as do more recent cellular phones featuring the reception of radio stations. The radio penetrates daily life like no other medium.[9] It is the radio that inaugurated forms of broadcasting that even today shape the television programming, for example, quiz programs and serials.[10] Adaptations of this type of reporting, as early as the 1930s, demonstrate the extent to which the radio was perceived as a medium of the 'now' and as a medium of live

[8] Schutz on making music: "The beholder, thus, is united with the composer by a time dimension common to both, which is nothing other than a derived form of the vivid present shared by the partners in a genuine face-to-face relation […]." (Schutz 1964b: 171f.)

[9] It is not for nothing that the radio was the focal point of the emerging field of media sociology, a tradition forgotten later due to the emergence of communication research. In the United States, under the direction of Lazarsfeld and Merton, early radio research was developed at the "Office of Radio Research." Cf. the early examinations of the radio: Lazarsfeld and Stanton (1942, 1944).

[10] Cf. Hertha Herzog's examinations (1940, 1941, 1944).

reporting. On November 30, 1938, panic ensued among many of the listeners of a radio broadcast in the United States. The subject of the program was a dramatic performance of H.G. Wells' "War of the Worlds" (1898), broadcast over the airwaves. Orson Welles' adaptation of the novel was broadcast that evening on American radio. (Significantly enough, it was indeed a live broadcast from the Mercury Theatre studios.) The transmission reported the landing of alien objects in a fictional place near New York City, using all the standard techniques of live reporting. These techniques include switching live to the scene of the events 'out there,' excited speech, background noises, on-scene interviews, authentic sounds and voices, etc. The number of those who fled their homes or volunteered at the nearest military base was, in truth, rather small. (The New York Times wrote, "Many flee homes," which, for Cantril were "thousands.") These listeners believed themselves to be 'witnesses' to a real event. They received and interpreted the radio drama with the same live-ness typically encountered in all its reports. The listeners, as was their wont, believed the radio to have the reality accent of daily life (even though, in this case, its reports were entirely fictitious) (cf. Cantril et al. 1966; Faulstich 1981). However distinct from the the normal world, it is the reality accents of the subuniverses—presented to us so plausibly—that especially attract us to many types of media (films, games, novels).

6 Where Are You? Interactive Media. Cellular Phones

The radio, the broadcast medium par excellence, was originally conceived as an interactive medium. According to Brecht's radio theory, radio broadcasts should have been democratized to the extent that "the audience is not only to be instructed but also must instruct" (Brecht 2001: 43). Brecht believed that radio stations should not only send but also receive—the listeners themselves functioning as 'senders':

> And now to say something positive, that is, to uncover the positive side of the radio with a suggestion for its re-functionalization: radio must be transformed from a distribution apparatus into a communications apparatus. The radio could be the finest possible communications apparatus in public life, a vast system of channels. That is, it could be so, if it understood how to receive as well as to transmit, how to let the listener speak as well as hear, how to bring him into a network instead of isolating him. (ibid.: 42)

The history of media, here, takes a peculiar turn. The very medium that was originally designed solely to be received (e.g. music broadcasts), viz. the telephone, is the very medium that later turned into a medium of relation, as Brecht had demanded of the radio. The telephone facilitates availability and thus 'eliminates' the distance between two people in different locations. The two people talking on the telephone share the same time, but not the same space. Unlike face-to-face communication, the telephone does not present them to one another with an abundance of symptoms. (They cannot see, smell, or touch each other.)

At first, the location of telephone communication is fixed in terms of its location. The telephone is bound to a certain place (a living room, a corridor, and, if it is

public, a booth). The telephone transfers communication from the exterior into the private sphere and allows communication, despite spatial distance, whether it is located on a table, a wall, in a corridor, or a booth. The change is brought about by the technology of the cellular phone. However, it is not a sudden, but incremental change (the keypad replaces the dial plate, the wire grows longer and longer until it disappears entirely, telephones become portable up to a certain connection range, etc.). The cellular phone carries private conversations into the public while permanent availability now becomes expected and obligatory. As with other media, the cell phone first has to develop its customs of usage. At first, private conversations held in public caused irritation (and they still do). There is a violation of Goffman's principle of "civil inattention," that is, rules of politeness and intimacy concerning interaction in public. Travelers, passers-by, or outsiders, become unwitting and often unwilling witnesses to confidential information or gossip, a form of enforced witnessing fittingly described as "coerced eavesdropping."[11] In accordance with Simmel (1908: 305ff.), this process can be described as a communicative crossing of two generally separate social spheres. The first cell phone weighed 800 g and was 33 × 4.5 × 8.9 cm in size, roughly the same dimensions as a common brick. Offered at the prohibitive price of $3,995, it had enough battery power to sustain about one hour of conversation. It was inevitable that the relevant technology would undergo the process of miniaturization and mobilization, just as with previous media technologies. However, it could hardly have been predicted that a medium of orality (the telephone and the telephone conversation) would turn into a medium of literacy (the mobile phone and the text message). A medium of synchronous communication grows into a medium of asynchronous communication. If radio and television are media of secondary orality, i.e. an orality based on literacy (cf. Ong 1982), the cellular phone develops into a medium of secondary literacy, i.e. a literacy based on orality.

Location turns into the subject of mobile communication. Locational identification replaces personal identification. "Where are you" (and "what are you doing") is often the most common topic of mobile communication. The cellular phone thus mirrors the mobility of its users and the insecurity about the situational and locational context of the other person. It also offers the possibility of "remote mothering," monitoring and controlling, as well as deception. Most importantly, it allows and amplifies what Malinowski (1972), quite some time ago, had called "phatic communion," conversation for conversation's sake. Text messaging and ICQ are nothing but phatic communion in Malinowski's terms. The process of domesticating the media, the integration of their usage into daily life, the mobilization of their devices—all that can hardly be better described by the contact calls sent back and forth in text messages and ICQ chats, bearing a marked resemblance to the twitter of Konrad Lorenz' graylag geese.

* * *

[11] Ling (2004: 140) on the basis of Goffman.

In a press release, the German Union for Nature Preservation stated that birds increasingly imitate the ringtones of cellular phones, but also other sounds of civilization such as radio jingles and the ringing of the streetcar bell. The birds imitate these sounds with such accuracy that even biologists and bird experts fail to distinguish the bird sounds from the original.

Translated by Ruben Bieker and Mahon O'Brien

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The Musical Foundations of Alfred Schutz's Hermeneutics of the Social World

Andreas Georg Stascheit

In 1956 a Baltimore newspaper published an article entitled "Mozart Authority to Lecture" announcing that Alfred Schutz was to give a lecture ("Mozart and the Philosophers") in the North Hall of Peabody Conservatory.[1] To introduce the lecturer to the potential audience, the article presented the following concise statement:

> His principal fields of endeavor are philosophical interpretations of the social world through language and the arts, especially music.

A search for the origin of this notable précis of Schutz's intentions as a philosopher of the social sciences in the Alfred Schutz archive at Beinecke Library leads to the correspondence between Schutz and Reginald Stewart, then director of the Peabody Conservatory and former conductor of the Baltimore Symphony Orchestra. Stewart had invited Schutz to present his Mozart paper in the renowned "Peabody Lectures" series.[2]

[1] Newspaper clipping [1956]. *Alfred Schutz Papers*, Beinecke Library, Yale. Series I/ Box 14/ Folder 271, p. 13019. Probably the article was published in the daily newspaper *The Baltimore Sun*. Even though "Mozart and the Philosophers" has received much less attention than "Making Music Together", the author seems not to exaggerate when characterizing Alfred Schutz as a "Mozart authority": Schutz's Mozart essay is listed in the catalogue of the world's most comprehensive library on Mozart, the Bibliotheca Mozartiana at Mozarteum in Salzburg, under the section "Philosophical Reflections".

[2] The Ralph Waldo Emerson lectures "On Imagination and Poetry" 1872 and the "Igor Strawinsky Lectures" 1946 pertain to the eminent contributions to the "Peabody Lectures". – Alfred Schutz's invited lecture probably resulted from his presentation of "Mozart and the Philosophers" at a meeting of the Musicological Association in New York in 1956. The first public presentation of the paper had taken place in spring 1956 in the General Seminar of the New School in New York. The philosopher Hans Jonas and the musicologist and initiator of musical iconography, Emanuel Winternitz were among the participants in the discussion that followed the presentation.

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Of course the above statement is not only relevant in terms of discussing Alfred Schutz's phenomenology in the context of hermeneutic traditions. The wording makes perfectly clear that Alfred Schutz's approach does not consist in analyzing music and music making from the perspective of and with the concepts of social theory. On the contrary, it is the "philosophical interpretation of the social world", the theoretical approach to the social, which is achieved *through* music. A first outline of some perspectives and implications of this very specific orientation is sketched in the present article.

In his famous paper "The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl" (1957) Alfred Schutz probed the limits of the transcendental approach with regard to the theoretical understanding of the genesis of social relationship and intersubjectivity, i.e. the genesis of the difference that separates *and* connects my life and the Other's life. In order to clarify the "immediacy of understanding by which the existence of the Other is apprehended in shared situations" (Schutz 1966: 55) Alfred Schutz in the above paper proposes an approach that is grounded in the phenomenological analysis of temporality, referring to the "question of the simultaneity of the ego with Others, of the common Now as a presupposition for differentiating a Here and a There" (ibid.: 88). In the discussion that followed the presentation of the paper at Royaumont, Schutz therefore stated: "The problem of simultaneity, taken not merely as a common Now in objective time but also as a community of two inner flows of time – [as a community of] 'durée' in Bergson's sense – seems to me to be of the greatest significance for the problem of intersubjectivity, and that not only in regard to transcendental but also to mundane intersubjectivity" (ibid.).

Evidently this line of thought pertains to the very core of Schutz's work. It goes back to the outstanding and lasting influence of Bergson's book *Durée et simultanéité. À propos de la théorie d'Einstein*, first published 1922, and to the corresponding debate between Bergson and Einstein.[3] A comparative reading of Schutz's annotations[4] and comments provided in his own copies of Bergson's works reveals the

[3] See "Discussion avec Einstein" (Bergson 1972). Jimena Canales' article "Einstein, Bergson, and the Experiment That Failed: Intellectual Cooperation at the League of Nations" (Canales 2005) provides an outstanding historical reconstruction along with an evaluation of the Bergson-Einstein debate as an important milestone in the history of science. "Einstein claimed that no overlap existed between psychological conceptions and physical conceptions of time. He, therefore, did not see a role for philosophy in matters of time. Bergson gladly granted that psychological conceptions of time differed from physical ones. Knowledge of this, he bemoaned, was hardly new. Henri Pieron, an experimental psychologist, joined the debate by reminding listeners of the problem of the personal equation that arose in astronomical determinations of time: 'For a long time now, astronomers have known that it is impossible to base precise determinations of physical simultaneity on psychological simultaneity…' This example clearly illustrated the difference between psychological and physical conceptions of time. If the enormous speed of light had caused this realization to arrive slowly for physicists, the slow speed of nerve transmission had made it evident a long time ago for physiologists, psychologists, and astronomers. They had long known that perceptions of simultaneity differed from physical simultaneity. Legend had it that most scientists had learned this lesson as early as 1795. Relativity, in this respect, had only rediscovered what had already been known" (ibid.: 1176).

[4] The collection of Schutz's personal library and transcriptions of Schutz's annotations is held at Social Science Archive Konstanz and at Alfred Schutz Archive, Waseda University.

crucial relevance of *Durée et simultanéité*. Together with the concept "simultaneity", the notions "synchronization" and "tension" gain essential importance for Schutz's phenomenology of the social world. Although all of these are concepts of Henri Bergson's philosophy, Schutz is far from a mere adaptation. Schutz is rethinking Bergson through the music-centered gaze.

The biographical background of such a unique approach has been characterized by Schutz's friend Emanuel Winternitz:

> Even in his student days, his knowledge of the theory and history of music would have done honor to any musicologist. His interests and his tastes were catholic, and reached from Pachelbel and Heinrich Schutz to Alban Berg's 'Wozzeck'. He knew by heart J. S. Bach's Passions, most of his Cantatas and the Goldberg Variations; he was equally at home with Mozart's Masses and operas and the chamber music of Brahms […]. He played the piano with little technique, but the form and emotional content were magically conjured up by his enthusiasm. We played four-hand music throughout all the years of our friendship […]
>
> We often discussed the experience provided by music, and analyzed the nature of flow, succession and time and their relation to Bergson's duree, and the musical structure as a model of the role and function of memory as creator of form and flux. Alfred Schutz's concern with the phenomenon of music deeply influenced his philosophy. It will be a task for his philosopher friends to explore this connection and to continue his work. (Winternitz 1971: 270–1)

The reinterpretation of Schutz's oeuvre as "philosophical interpretations of the social world through language and the arts, especially music", explicitly proposed by Emanuel Winternitz, can be pursued via two complementary directions of analysis: First by exploring correlations between Schutz's theoretical positions, his own musical practice and musicological reflections and second by reconstructing the influences of the Nietzsche-Wagner and Bergson-Einstein debates on Alfred Schutz's thought, which can be traced throughout the *cantus firmus* of his oeuvre: the nexus of time, action, and the plurality of rationality.

The crucial "through" is adequately understood if music and literature are considered the source of *operative questions* and, with *counterpoint* being one example, *operative concept*s (cf. Fink 1957), as it is clearly revealed by Schutz himself in a letter to Aaron Gurwitsch on December 4, 1952:

> A difference—and I hope not an opposition between us—lies in the fact that you take perception or mathematics as the point of departure and model in all of your works, whereas I like to think through phenomenological problems in terms of the states of affairs of music and of human action in the social sphere. In all of these spheres there are certain abstractions on a non-perceptual basis, though surely of the same type of sedimented inner horizons you describe and compare to Piaget's *schème*. I would like to suggest deriving formal logic from the laws of counterpoint, which are laws of sense [*Sinngesetze*] dependent on the tone material and its perception just as much, but no more, than the content of this letter on the sheet of paper covered with ink marks. (Schutz and Gurwitsch 1989: 193)

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Which theoretical aspects may have motivated Alfred Schutz to take "music matters" ("Sachverhalte der Musik") as a starting point for the inquiry into philosophical and sociological questions? This undertaking was fuelled not by some marginal theoretical concerns, but by a question that touches the very foundation of the social sciences: "The problem which has to be investigated", as outlined by Schutz in the

preliminary sketches to "Making Music Together", "is the following one: Is the communicative process really at the origin of social relationship or is there a preceding layer"?[5] Music possesses the potential to provide access to this preceding layer, that is, to the pre- and extra-linguistic dimensions of meaning, together with and through the exploration of the temporal structures of experience and sociality.

In this context Schutz started from posing the question how the relationship between language and music can be adequately understood, probing the phenomenon of rhythm as potential anchorage. To this end he turned towards the Greek conception of *mousikē* and the works on rhythm by Aristotle's student Aristoxenus, who had provoked an epistemological revolution by first claiming that specific musical qualities rather than numerical ratios are essential to music.

Rhythm also represents the conceptual hinge with regard to Schutz's pivotal thesis: the principal relevance of temporal structures for genesis and understanding of social relationship. The focal temporal concepts in Schutz's work – "simultaneity", "tension", and "synchronization" – are not adequately interpreted if regarded as mere adaptations of concepts of temporality from Bergson, Husserl and James. Rather these concepts epitomize the results of a dialogue nourished by phenomenological reflection on the experience of music from the standpoint of the practicing musician that is initiated and put forward by three cardinal issues:

1. The first issue arises when studying the temporality of experience in the context of analyzing the lived experience of polyphonic music. It can be titled the problem of the coherence of a multiplicity of distinct flows, that is: experienced multiplicity as "multiplicity of interpenetration" as opposed to "multiplicity of juxtaposition".[6]
2. The second cardinal issue emerges when the inquiry into the coherence of multiple streams is transposed into the realm of intersubjectivity: The performance of chamber music tells us about the practical possibility to establish a mutually shared (or at least compatible) temporal articulation: synchronized tempo. How can synchronization of tempo be apprehended from the point of view of phenomenology, and how can this exploration contribute to the understanding of intersubjectivity and sociality?
3. Given that "music is a meaningful context" (Schutz 1964: 159) while at the same time it is self-evident that music does not have a predicative structure, how can we conceive of the constitutive hinge that screws together temporality and meaning in music ?

In what follows let us try to re-enact the phenomenological significance of these cardinal issues by way of an experimental phenomenological study.

Why does the context of 'making music', when it is the origin of phenomenological reflection upon musical experience, give rise to the first cardinal issue? The pianist, as part of his everyday working practice, finds himself confronted with

[5] *Alfred Schutz Papers*. Beinecke Library, Yale. Series I/ Box 6/ Folder 106, p. 3090.

[6] See John Durie's introductory remarks in (Bergson 1999: vii).

the need to develop what is frequently called "the independence of the hands", that is: to establish coherence of a multiplicity of distinct simultaneous streams in the realm of animate bodily movement. This particular requisite of piano playing, programmatically represented by Johann Sebastian Bach's *The Well-Tempered Piano* and *Goldberg Variations*, pertains to the specific features of keyed instruments, the history of which is closely linked to the idea and art of polyphony in the sense of multi-part music.

Although, in practice, the so-called "independence of the hands" – i.e. polyphonic bodily movement – is not just naturally given to the pianist as a matter of course, but presents a fundamental problem and continuous challenge. Consequently, the protocols of Alfred Schutz's daily piano practice, kept in his *Nachlass* at Beinecke Library, contain notes related to this problem: Schutz reports detailed procedures of the separate practice of left and right hand that precede the simultaneous activity of both hands: "Put parts together very slowly",[7] he notes on his handwritten practicing schedule.

Thus the piano, through its physical and instrumental structure and typicalities of sound-production, provides access to the experience of polyphony as experience of the moving animate body. For Alfred Schutz 'the pianist', this experience formed the basis for his understanding of Bergson's concept of simultaneity.

From a point of view that is not centered in piano playing experience, which is probably the case for most readers, a reconstruction of the phenomenological significance conveyed through the exercise of developing "independence of the hands" is possible by way of an elementary experimental study. It is performed using the fundamental musical instrument, the faculty of auditory experience, while following Bergson's approach towards reflection upon the "nature of time" in *Duration and Simultaneity* (Bergson 1999: 30):

> A melody to which we listen with our eyes closed, heeding it alone […]

Note that Bergson uses the verb "to listen", i.e. he refers to a type and style of auditory perceiving quite different from that represented by the verb "to hear". When listening is performed "with your eyes closed" (ibid.: 34), chances are that one succeeds in giving heed alone to what is audibly presented. In this specific state of auditory attentiveness, following Bergson, "no longer juxtaposing on paper or an imaginary keyboard notes which you thus preserved one for the other, which then agreed to become simultaneous and renounced their fluid continuity in time to congeal in space" (ibid.: 34), the "melody to which we listen […] comes close to coinciding with this time which is the very fluidity of our inner life" (ibid.: 30). Thus "you will rediscover, undivided and indivisible, the melody or portion of the melody" (ibid.: 34).

Although, following Bergson, we might succeed in giving heed to the melodic flow alone while listening with our eyes closed, the experience of music will only bring us "close" enough to allow for *durée* – "the very fluidity of our inner life"

[7] *Alfred Schutz Papers*: Op. cit. I/14/271, p. 13021.

(ibid.: 30) – to be given as immediate lived experience (*anschauliche Erfahrung*), because:

> we must first efface the difference among the sounds, then do away with the distinctive features of sound itself, retaining of it only the continuation of what precedes into what follows and the uninterrupted transition, multiplicity without divisibility and succession without separation, in order finally to rediscover basic time. Such is immediately perceived duration, without which we would have no idea of time. (Bergson 1999: 30)

Obviously, to put these didactic clues into praxis is not at all simple and straightforward. The requisite particular attitude towards which is audibly given is not easily established, even though listening with our eyes closed proves to be a valuable bodily measure to motivate an alteration of the state of auditory consciousness, To put it into an Husserlian context: The above exercise confronts us with the 'I can'[8] as opposed to the 'I cannot':

> In experience, the 'I can' is distinct from the 'I cannot' according to their phenomenological characters. There is a resistanceless doing of things, i.e., a consciousness of an ability that meets no resistance, and there is a doing as an overcoming of resistance, a doing that has its 'against which,' and a corresponding consciousness of an ability to overcome the resistance. (Husserl 1989: 270)

Now in order for a musical experiment to allow us access to the experience of multiplicity as "multiplicity of interpenetration", polyphonic music has to be chosen for the experiment, ideally, the most elementary form of polyphony, diaphonia. Any two-part music, provided there is sufficient difference between the two voices and the overall complexity is adequately limited, may serve, be it a traditional song like "Sur le Pont d'Avignon" or the recording of a suitable work of music. Regarding the latter, the two duets for violin and viola by Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart (G major, KV423 and B flat major, KV424), particularly the second and third movement from KV423 in G major (Adagio and Rondo) can be recommended as a highly appropriate reference for the performance of the Bergsonian experiment described below. As many recordings of these famous duets have been published, it might also be useful to point towards an acclaimed recording, which also includes an institutional link to Alfred Schutz: the performance by violist and Peabody Conservatory alumna Kim Kashkashian and violinist Gidon Kremer, published by Deutsche Grammophon.[9] Another impressive performance (1990) of the duo G major KV423 by Oleg Kagan (violin) and Yuri Bashmet (viola) has been preserved by an amateur video-recording; a part of this recording – the third movement (Rondo) – is available online.[10]

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[8] In the context of Husserl's phenomenological analysis of subjectivity, the notion "I can" attains focal relevance. As Alfred Schutz has pointed out in his review of "Edmund Husserl's Ideas, Volume II": "The I as a unity is a system of faculties of the form 'I can'" (Schutz 1966: 32).

[9] *Mozart. Chamber Works*. Gidon Kremer (vin); Kim Kashkashian (via); Valery Afanassiev (pno). Deutsche Grammophon, DG digital, (October 25, 1990). Quick access to this recording is possible via Apple's iTunes music platform.

[10] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ytKuPDLXImA

When performing the musical experiment, a sequence of different stages should be followed: First, let us listen to the recording just like we are used to listen to music in our daily life. In the second stage, take up the perspective of either one of the two instruments, as if you were one of the two musicians, by continuously paying heed to one of the two parts, i.e. persistently tracking its flux without digression. Please try to commit to memory the specific motion related qualities that characterize the part selected, the different temporal qualities and dynamics exhibited, and how these differences become manifest on the musical level as a specific musical *Gestalt* that differs from its counterpart. Note that the characteristic musical meaning of either consistent *Gestalt* is revealed by its memorability, which becomes evident in the course of reiterated practicing of the second stage exercise. At this point, we also note that it makes a lot of sense to limit our study to a limited excerpt of the Adagio. The first 50 s of the Adagio that encompass two distinguishable parts (around 30″ and 20″ respectively) do serve very well for the performance of this study.

As a result, the first two stages of the experiment reveal that what has presented itself as a unity in 'naïve' listening is given as *two* different meaningful processes in stage two. Here, the two flows differ with regard to musical meaning (both processes appear as musically meaningful, but not in identical ways) as well as with regard to the dynamics of the musical movement and the corresponding temporal qualities; both parts are being experienced "as movement", but as movement differing in terms of dynamics, mode and *Gestalt*.

With respect to the modi operandi, listening to music as we typically do in everyday life is characterized by the focal role of resonance: listening in *resonating mode*. By contrast, when listening to music while persistently paying attention to one part without digression, the '*I am doing*' becomes the focus of attention along with its two correlative dimensions '*es zeigt sich*' and '*ich erlebe mich*', with the respective temporal horizons and directions of description (*Beschreibungsrichtungen*). In particular, the '*I am striving to intentionally direct my listening towards*' turns to be a focal moment of experience, since, due to the continuous co-presence of the entire musical flux, the auditory perceiving activity needs to be equipped with a strong analytical intention especially when paying attention to the lower voice, i.e. the viola. The described analytical mode of listening thus can be termed *intentional mode*.

Let us now proceed to the final stage of the experimental study: Try to deliberately alternate between the modes of listening – *resonating mode* and *intentional mode* – while explicitly deciding ad libitum when to change between the two.

As a result of this exercise, the two flows – in our example the parts of violin and viola respectively – are given to me as a single flux, if I decide to listen in resonating mode, or as two discrete separated flows, if I persistently attend to one part without digressing in intentional mode. Finally, a third mode of listening comes into play: listening in *co-performing mode*. A performer's perspective certainly is centered in the respective part performed, at the same time being immersed in the flux of music *and* directed towards the approaching that comes down towards him in a "retrograde movement *in futuro*" (Merleau-Ponty 2001: 18). Although – at one and the same time – the performers are required to be directed towards the ongoing flux of music as a unity, i.e. to "divide their attention without cutting it in two"

(Bergson 1999: 35), if not to let the performance of a duo result in two solos, i.e. discrete monologues.

At this point let us again take a fresh look at *Durée et Simultanéité*, focusing on a passage that Alfred Schutz quotes in "Scheler's Theory of Intersubjectivity and the General Thesis of the Alter Ego" preceded by the following statement: "We use the term 'simultaneity' in the same precise sense as Bergson in his book, Durée et Simultanéité. A propos de la théorie d'Einstein, Paris, 1923, p. 66" (Schutz 1962: 173)[11]:

> I call two flows 'contemporaneous' when they are equally one or two for my consciousness, the latter perceiving them together as a single flowing if it sees fit to engage in an undivided act of attention, and, on the other hand, separating them throughout if it prefers to divide its attention between them, even doing both at one and the same time if it decides to divide its attention and yet not cut it in two. (Bergson 1999: 35)

Clearly, this passage not only explicates Bergson's concept of simultaneity with regard to the coherence of a multiplicity of distinct flows, but also contains in nuce the essence of the above experimental phenomenological study performed via listening to music "with our eyes closed". As a consequence, the musical notions *polyphony* and *counterpoint* as conceived from a phenomenological point of view are presented as implications of Bergson's idea of simultaneity, which brings to light their powerful significance as operative concepts that fuel Alfred Schutz's theoretical approach.

> The problem of simultaneity, taken not merely as a common Now in objective time but also as a community of two inner flows of time . . . seems to me to be of the greatest significance for the problem of intersubjectivity, and that not only in regard to transcendental but also to mundane intersubjectivity. (Schutz 1966: 88)

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When the problem of the *coherence* of a multiplicity of distinct flows is transposed into the thematic field of intersubjectivity, the second cardinal issue brought forth by phenomenological analyses of the intertwining of temporality and sociality becomes evident: synchronization of time-as-experienced (*temps durée*).

As a matter of fact, synchronization of time-as-experienced is possible. This is revealed by practices that form part of everyday life, like "dancing", "making love" und "making music together", to quote three of Alfred Schutz's favorite examples. Although, everyday practice also reveals that synchronization is not entirely naturally given, but rather has to be established and maintained. This not only implies the possibility of failure, but implies further that it is anything but a matter of course that an established harmony of perfect synchronization is attained.

In order to evaluate whether in the context of "philosophical interpretations of the social world" the phenomenon of synchronized *temps durée* might open up

[11] Alfred Schutz quotes his own English translation of the referenced passage on page 66 of his copy of *Durée et Simultanéité*. As far as the archived holdings of his personal library reveal, Schutz did not possess a copy of Leon Jacobson's English translation first published in 1922 and reprinted as part of the edition prepared by Robin Durie (1999), which is referenced in the present paper.

productive theoretical insights let us again refer to the 'making music together' of a small chamber ensemble playing without director, e.g. a string quartet, which provides an excellent exemplary situation for analyzing the problem of synchronization.

To start simultaneously and in a common tempo pertains to the elementary as well as demanding requirements of ensemble performance, and it is almost equally difficult to maintain a common, perhaps commonly modified tempo throughout the whole piece of music.

The synchronization of tempo is neither established nor maintained automatically with the flux of music. At the same time, arranging the attunement of tempo in the form of a *consensus* or a planned *project of action* is impossible. Moreover, the movements and gestures of the musicians cannot provide the foundation of synchronization. The cue of the primarius only presents a single temporal pulsation in spatial form, which consequently can only approximately indicate the definite tempo that is to be played *in futuro*. And finally, every attempt to react in response to a communicative action embedded in the flux of music results in breaking the synchronization of tempo, as the reaction always comes "too late" (as musicians use to say).

Rather, the foundation and precondition for establishing a common tempo has to be specified as a common level of *bodily attention*, rooted in and expressed through the animate body via the correlative *tension* of the flesh. The intensity of this "tension of consciousness" determines the density of the temporal intervals that function as the meter according to which the ongoing flux is structured and experienced as a succession of "steps". With regard to the metrics of temporal structuring, the phenomenological study of making music together also corresponds to Bergson's philosophy of temporality. Let us have a look at the following passage in *Matière et mémoire. Essai sur la relation du corps à l'esprit*:

> The duration lived by our consciousness is a duration with its own determined rhythm […], which can store up, in a given interval, as great a number of phenomena as we please. (Bergson 1911: 272)

When employing the concept of tension in the context of analyses of temporality, the history of philosophy invites us to go back to Augustine of Hippo, who used several derivations of *tendere* und *tensio*, particularly in his reflections on time and time consciousness. Baumgarten adverts to the psychological concept of tension when discussing the foundations of the *impetus aestheticus*. Finally, in the field of musicology the works of Ernst Kurth have to be mentioned, where tension is analyzed as constitutive with regard to music as experience as well as to music as form of art.

The famous Schutzian notion *Tuning-In Relationship* (Schutz and Luckmann 1989: 229) is a result of reflecting upon the experience of making music together, while Bergson's thought on time and time consciousness provided guidance in the sense of a *fil conducteur*. *Tuning-In* is set in motion by the mutual intentional orientation towards the establishment of a shared level of tension of the flesh founded upon a correlative intensity of bodily attention, thus giving way to the possibility of sharing the 'rhythm of *durée*'.

In Alfred Schutz's thought the idea of a *Tuning-In Relationship* (also: *Einstellungsbeziehung*), after 1955, acquired an outstanding position as the constitutive origin of the "We". While working on the drafts of "Making Music Together" (probably written 1951/52) Schutz still declared with regard to the foundational relevance of *Tuning-In*: "The problem which has to be investigated is the following one: Is the communicative process really at the origin of social relationship or is there a preceding layer?"[12]; in the "Seelisberger Notizbuch" (1958) the *Tuning-In Relationship* is definitely understood as the foundation of sociality, as it "must precede the establishment of all social relationships, including language" (Schutz and Luckmann 1989: 226).

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After the exploration of the first two cardinal issues has been dedicated to a discussion of aspects of the interrelatedness of temporality and sociality through the phenomenological analysis of musical experience, what does music tell philosophy about pre-predicative, pre-linguistic constitution of meaning (*Sinn*), given that "music is a meaningful context" (Schutz 1964: 159) that does not have a predicative structure?

How the aspect of meaning and the aspect of temporality are screwed together becomes understandable if we refer, like Schutz repeatedly did, to Husserl's distinction of "two different modes in which the sense of past experiences can be 'grasped'" (Schutz and Luckmann 1973: 53). Husserl first introduced the distinction between polythetic and monothetic modes in volume 1 of *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology* in 1913 and took the topic up again 1938 in *Experience and Judgement*. In this work, Husserl analyzes experience as becoming originarily constituted step by step, resulting in a polythetic unity:

> In streaming forth in a linear continuity, the act of contemplation would become a simple fixed view if it did not disengage itself and pass over into a chain of individual apprehensions, of individual acts, in a discrete succession of separate steps which, bound internally to one another, form a polythetic unity of the individual theses. (Husserl 1973: 112)

Now, many cases allow for a transformation of such a discrete succession of separate steps into a "one-rayed" object, which can be "grasped" monothetically. "Every such many-rayed (polythetic) constitution of synthetic objectivities – which are essentially such that "originally" we can be aware of them only synthetically – possesses the essential law-conforming possibility of transforming the many-rayed object of awareness into one that is simply one-rayed, of "rendering objective" in the specific sense and in a monothetic act what is synthetically constituted in the many-rayed object" (Husserl 1931: 336).

But, Schutz holds, the transformation of a "many-rayed" into a "one-rayed" unity of experience is impossible in the case "of those experiences whose meaning is essentially contained in the polythetic structure of its elements, that is, experiences of so-called temporal Objects." Therefore, if I want to attempt to grasp the meaning of the experience of a temporal object in retrospect, I must "reflectively realize the polythetic building up of this experience" (Schutz and Luckmann 1973: 53).

[12] *Alfred Schutz Papers*: Op. cit. I/6/106, p. 3090.

Indeed, music in many ways is essentially and indispensably dependent on the "discrete succession of separate steps, which, bound internally to one another, form a polythetic unity of the individual theses". "When it concerns the meaning of a musical theme […] I must carry out polythetically, […] what has been built up polythetically. […] In order to grasp the sense of a composition, I must reproduce it, at least internally, from the beginning to the last measure" (ibid.: 54).

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Correlating with its exclusively polythetic organization, music lacks a conceptual or semantic scheme of reference. But although it is self-evident that music does not have a predicative structure, it is equally self-evident that "music is a meaningful context" (Schutz 1964: 159), as Alfred Schutz concisely states in "Making Music Together."

As a temporal context whose meaning is given as non-predicative meaning, music confronts musicians, composers, critics and listeners with the problem of interpretation. The musician has to deal with this problem as he is required to model the relationship between the musical work and its concretion; critics and journalists attempt to reconstruct and evaluate this relationship; the composer – frequently faced with what appears to him as a failure to understand – finds himself more or less helpless in the face of what musicians and critics are doing; and finally the recipients, in the course of conversations about music frequently encounter difficulties in communicating about what has been an evident and meaningful lived musical experience to them.

Evidently, interpretation poses problems in music. After what has been said before about the pre- or non-predicative structure of music, these problems are no surprise. "Music as a meaningful context" confronts us with the task of a hermeneutics of pre-predicative and extra-linguistic dimensions of meaning. This at least is a challenge, if not an imposition, a "borderline experience of western thought", as Thomas Schieche has put it in the title of his monograph on musical hermeneutics (Schieche 1998).

Alfred Schutz's essay "Mozart and the Philosophers" is dedicated to sound precisely this difficult scenario. To this end, Schutz takes a playful journey through some relevant chapters of the history of philosophy, with Schopenhauer's thought on music as point of departure starting right with the essay's title. By drawing the connection between "Mozart" and "the philosophers" Schutz alludes to Schopenhauer's variations on Leibniz' famous dictum on music as hidden arithmetical activity of the soul not aware that it is calculating: "*Musica est exercitium arithmeticae occultum nescientis se numerare animi*" (ibid.: 331). Schopenhauer, in *The World as Will and Idea*, replaces arithmetic with metaphysics:

> Consequently the saying of Leibnitz quoted above, which is quite accurate from a lower standpoint, may be parodied in the following way to suit our higher view of music: *Musica est exercitium metaphysices occultum nescientis se philosophari animi* (ibid.: 342).

Alfred Schutz continues Schopenhauer's parodying play on words when in the essay's introduction he announces: "I shall close with a consideration of the purely musical means by which Mozart solved the problems of the philosophers in his own

way, thereby proving himself to be the greatest philosopher of them all" (Schutz 1966: 179). Finalizing the parody at the end of the essay, Schutz draws the conclusion: "If Schopenhauer is right, and I believe he is, then Mozart was one of the greatest philosophical minds that ever lived" (ibid.: 199).

In *The World as Will and Idea* the problem of interpreting musical *Sinn* as a problem of a hermeneutics of the pre-predicative and extra-linguistic dimensions of meaning is addressed, in Schopenhauer's philosophical language, by the following passage:

> For, as we have said, music is distinguished from all the other arts by the fact that it is not a copy of the phenomenon, or, more accurately, the adequate objectivity of will, but is the direct copy of the will itself, and therefore exhibits itself as the meta-physical to everything physical in the world, and as the thing-in-itself to every phenomenon. We might, therefore, just as well call the world embodied music as embodied will ; and this is the reason why music makes every picture, and indeed every scene of real life and of the world, at once appear with higher significance, certainly all the more in proportion as its melody is analogous to the inner spirit of the given phenomenon. It rests upon this that we are able to set a poem to music as a song, or a perceptible representation as a pantomime, or both as an opera. (Schopenhauer 1910: 339–40)

Written against the background of Schopenhauer's, Dilthey's and Kierkegaard's works, "Mozart and the Philosophers" takes up questions Schutz had been engaged with since the time of writing his first manuscripts between 1919 and 1925: Bergson's critical attitude towards language, Nietzsche's questioning of the primacy of the word and the controversy between Nietzsche and Wagner are co-present through the whole discussion. Interpreted against this background and read along with Schutz's works on sign and symbol, "Mozart and the Philosophers" reveals its relevance with regard to a Schutzian genealogy of meaning, inviting further exploration into how Nietzsche's thoughts on music and the musical dimensions of language have migrated into the sociology of knowledge (cf. Berger and Luckmann 1967:17) via the Schutzian analysis of "communication in the life-world" (Schutz and Luckmann 1989: 148ff.). It is also in the context of these late manuscripts, eventually published by Thomas Luckmann as *The Structures of the Life-World* (Schutz and Luckmann 1989), that Alfred Schutz conceives the *Tuning-In Relationship* – the mutual intentional orientation towards the establishment of a reciprocal level of attentive tension of the flesh that gives way to "a growing older together" through the shared 'rhythm of *durée*' – as foundation of sociality that "must precede the establishment of all social relationships, including language" (Schutz and Luckmann 1989: 226).

Following this line of thought, we find evidence of the constitutive interrelatedness between the temporal constitution of sociality and the temporal constitution of meaning, which explains why, in "Mozart and the Philosophers", Schutz advances the thesis that the topic of Mozart's music "is the metaphysical mystery of the existence of a human universe of pure sociality". Thus, the Mozart essay reveals its relevance not as an essay in musicology or philosophy of music, but as an etude in "philosophical interpretations of the social world" through music:

> I submit that Mozart's main topic is not, as Cohen believed, love. It is the metaphysical mystery of the existence of a human universe of pure sociality, the exploration of the

> manifold forms in which man meets his fellow-man and acquires knowledge of him. The encounter of man with man within the human world is Mozart's main concern. (Schutz 1964: 199)

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Part III
Explorations of the Practical World

Scientific Practice and the World of Working. Beyond Schutz's *Wirkwelt*

Daniel Bischur

1 Introduction

My own work concerning the treatment of animals (Bischur 2006, 2008) in an immunology laboratory draws heavily on Alfred Schutz's concept of *Wirkwelt* (the world of working). This concept provides a foundation for interpreting the practical treatment of these animals, their transformation, manipulation and sacrifice, and a framework for describing how scientists deal with the moral and emotional implications of their day-to-day working practices. Schutz's concept has had a profound impact on sociological studies of scientific practices. Michael Lynch (1988a: 71), for instance, identifies Schutz's analysis of the temporal order of action and the structure of common-sense reasoning, in particular, as hugely influential for many of the current work in science and technology studies, although he notes that the findings of laboratory studies are often at odds with Schutz's considerations of scientific reasoning. In the hope of resolving these differences, this paper will attempt to develop a conception of scientific practices as a particular type of the *world of working* which goes beyond what Schutz himself had to say on the subject (cf. List 1988: 238). Schutz distinguishes between *scientific theorizing* and the *scientific Wirkwelt* and thereby emphasizes the distinction between scientific and common-sense reasoning. Michael Lynch, however, criticises this distinction from the Science and Technology Studies (STS) point of view (Lynch 1988a). Empirical

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findings from STS indicate that the scientists' theoretical activities are not divorced from their everyday concerns but that such theorizing occurs in the midst of their everyday, practical activity which happens to be laboratory work. Conversely, I will argue that this distinction *does* allow a valuable conceptualization of the scientific world of working, one implied by Schutz but not elaborated by him in any detail.

Lynch writes (1997: 134):

> Although, as I argue, Schutz acknowledged that science was a pragmatic activity performed in specific social circumstances, he drew strict demarcations between scientific theory and scientific practice and between scientific and commonsense rationality.[1]

Lynch's critique is based on the evidence to the effect that scientists' *theorizing* cannot be separated from their practical and social activities, which constitute scientific labour but occur in the midst of their everyday, practical activities, i.e. laboratory work (Lynch 1988a: 85). A theory of the scientific *Wirkwelt* has to describe the specific background of the scientific world of working by taking as its point of departure Schutz's own remarks on science as being part of social and practical activities. This allows us to grasp the pragmatics of scientific action. However, how scientific reasoning is actually connected to the pragmatic activities of scientific action still needs to be examined.

Schutz makes it clear that contemplative thinking occurs outside of science as well. People sit down and consider problems:

> But all this contemplative thinking is performed for practical purposes and ends, and for this very reason it constitutes an 'enclave' of theoretical contemplation within the world of working rather than a finite province of meaning. (Schutz 1945/1971: 245)

Schutz saw a clear possibility for forms of contemplation integrated into the world of working that can be distinguished according to different kinds of attention. Hence, it does not form a closed province of meaning when such thinking is performed for practical purposes and ends. Reading Schutz against his avowed intentions means using his notion of an "enclave" of theoretical contemplation within the world of working to explain the ways scientists think while engaged with the practical activities that are laboratory work and that are performed for certain practical purposes and ends.

This essay begins with a discussion of Schutz's notion of scientific theorizing and of the scientific *Wirkwelt*. It will describe the main elements of the world of working. Secondly, selected observations of scientific work in a biology laboratory and results from STS will illustrate the scientific world of working. It will end with an outline of a theory of the scientific world of working based on Schutz's concepts and will describe the process of theorizing in science.

[1] Lynch (1997: 134ff) describes the efforts toward a philosophical grounding of social sciences in the Vienna of the 1920s and 30s as being the historic background of Schutz's considerations of methodological and epistemological issues. In this Schutz especially has been influenced by his friend Felix Kaufmann (cf. Zilian 1990; Helling 1984) and by dealing with the concepts of the "Wiener Kreis" (for a phenomenological critique of epistemology, cf. List 2007: 7–34).

2 Schutz on Science and the World of Working

Whenever we consider scientific practice, we must always consider the differences between epistemological and sociological perspectives on the sciences. They are fundamentally different. The sociological point of view starts with the practices involved in the production of knowledge to explain those activities. Epistemology is not interested in the practices but in evidence or the possibility of evidence of the reliability of knowledge. Although different, these tasks are interrelated and neither can claim priority over the other. The evaluation of science rests on both claims, and hence may be understood as reliable knowledge produced by social practices. For the sociologist, this means examining the association of social *with* epistemological claims within scientific practices. Alfred Schutz's concept of multiple realities provides a good starting point for such an approach toward scientific practices as both practice and episteme. Unfortunately Schutz limits himself to some remarks on the scientific practice as a world of scientific working and is more concerned with his thoughts on scientific theorizing. Scientific theorizing is a certain kind of phantasying. It is distinguished from other kinds of phantasying as it is concerned with phenomena and things of the "real world" and, hence, cannot be detached totally from the social world. Moreover, scientific thinking generates products which have to work in the *life-world* (Schutz 1936/2003: 64–66; 1937/2003: 154–162; 1945/1971: 245–259). In contrast, the *Wirkwelt* (world of working) is the reality with the highest standard of attention. In this reality, you are present, you are standing in it. It is characterised by the pragmatic motive which enables us to act, to be active and to have an effect on this world (Schutz 1945/1971: 208f). Like Husserl (1950: 57–63; 1954: 105–138; 1999: §§ 24, 58, 61), Schutz explains that this lifeworld is based on intersubjectively constituted belief, which supplies unquestioned certainties as a basis for action (Schutz 1932/1972: §19; Schutz and Luckmann 1979/1994: 25–29). If scientific practice actually is a specific life-world, in which scientists are theorizing and are actively acting upon the things of the world, then we should be able to identify the ways scientists oscillate between these two different attitudes toward the world.

Schutz's discussion of the world of scientific theory (1945/1971: 245–259) starts with a strict distinction: "Scientific theorizing is one thing, dealing with science within the world of working is another." (1945/1971: 246) and explains in more detail that "theoretical cogitations are not acts of working, that is, they do not gear into the outer world" (1945/1971: 246; cf. Luckmann 1992: 40–43). By saying this, Schutz clearly states that two views of science are required, since doing science cannot be reduced only to theorizing. Theorizing, necessarily, is "*based upon working acts*". Scientific theorizing is special as it is not mere phantasying, but has to be related to the world. Theoretical cogitations are based upon acts of working – "such as measuring, handling instruments, making experiments" – and they need to be communicated by acts of working – "such as writing a paper, delivering a lecture". As Schutz emphasizes, "All these activities performed within and pertaining to the world of working are either conditions or consequences of the theorizing but do not

belong to the theoretical attitude itself" and, therefore, he claims that "*they can be easily separated*" (Schutz 1945/1971: 224). For the moment, I will refrain from challenging the last claim. Phenomenological perspectives have to draw this distinction as both are connected to different attitudes of consciousness: the solitude of thinking on one hand and the pragmatic activity in the world out there, on the other. Nevertheless, empirical studies of the production of scientific knowledge in laboratories demonstrate that contemplation and acts of working cannot *easily* be separated in practice (cf. Lynch 1988a: 85). Obviously we are confronted with a problematic distinction. Schutz insists that scientific theorizing depends on all the pragmatic activities in a scientific *Wirkwelt* and thus includes the world of scientific working as being an intrinsic part of science.

Reading Schutz on science with such connotations supplies us with a foundation for a theory of scientific practices by using the common description of the life-world. In this sense Schutz wrote: "insofar as scientific activity is socially founded, it is one among all the other activities occurring within the social world" (1953/1971: 37); and explains, "considered purely as a human activity, scientific work is distinguished from other human activities merely by the fact that it constitutes the archetype for rational interpretation and rational action" (Schutz 1943/1971: 69; cf. Embree 1988). Scientific activities, then, are based on cooperation between scientists, as they are influenced by teachers and the teachers of their teachers. Scientists communicate and make up their research-plans in the scientific world of working (Schutz 1943/1971: 69). By distinguishing between scientific theorizing and the scientific *Wirkwelt* in the sense of Alfred Schutz, the characteristics of Schutz's *Wirkwelt* can be observed in the actual work of scientists in the laboratories, as described by several laboratory studies of STS. However, before presenting a sketch of the scientific world of working, some additional remarks on the *Wirkwelt* in the work of Schutz need to be examined.

At first Schutz states that the *Wirkwelt* is a world of physical things. It is the world in which I do have physical presence with my body. I can move and I can perceive bodily movements and emotions in this world (Schutz 1945/1971: 226f). In it we touch, move and manipulate physical things. Our activities have an affect on it and change it (Schutz 1945/1971: 209 and 227). At the same time, we are confronted with resistance in this world.

> By my working acts I gear into the outer world, I change it; and these changes, although provoked by my working, can be experienced and tested both by myself and others, as occurrences within this world independently of my working acts in which they originated. (Schutz 1945/1971: 227).

In other words, we share this world and its physical things with others, with whom we communicate and through which "the interplay of mutual motivation becomes effective" (Schutz 1945/1971: 227). The paramount world of working is governed by the pragmatic motive. We modify the world by our acts and the world modifies our acting (Schutz 1945/1971: 209).

The pragmatic motive structures our stock of knowledge at hand, which has been built up by traditions, by heritage and through education, in our habits, experiences

and reflections on or about them. It is automatically at hand, as Schutz explains, and entails many different kinds of knowledge:

> Clear and distinct experiences are intermingled with vague conjectures; suppositions and prejudices cross well-proven evidences; motives, means and ends, as well as causes and effects, are strung together without clear understanding of their real connections. There are everywhere gaps, intermissions, discontinuities. (Schutz 1943/1971: 72f)

In everyday life we usually are not concerned with validity. We are satisfied by fulfilling purposes, for which we use the rules, principles and habits that experience shows to work.

> Our knowledge in daily life is not without hypotheses, inductions, and predictions, but they all have the character of the approximate and the typical. The ideal of everyday knowledge is not certainty, nor even probability in a mathematical sense, but just likelihood. (Schutz 1943/1971: 73).

Schutz labels this knowledge of typical sequences and relations as "cook-book-knowledge":

> The cook-book has recipes, lists of ingredients, formulae for mixing them, and directions for finishing off. This is all we need to make an apple pie, and also all we need to deal with the routine matters of daily life. (Schutz 1943/1971: 73)

This knowledge supplies us with general accounts of the way in which we usually reach certain purposes and defines standardised and mechanized acts of routine.

In his book on the *Problem of Relevance* (Schutz 1970) Schutz develops a coherent theory on structures of problem solving. The *attention à la vie* structures the conscience as it defines what is of thematic relevance. Resistance to and problems for succeeding in achieving goals, demand attention and thereby change our thematic relevances. They require us to interpret those resistances in order to be able to overcome them. Those interpretations, for sure, are based on our personal stock of knowledge, from which we develop solutions in response to those themes. This structure organizes our activities and motives. Such interpretations in daily life are limited by pragmatic motives, as we are usually satisfied with any solution to a problem as long as it helps us to achieve our purposes or fulfil our goals.

Now if we take Schutz's statement, that scientific activities are part of the world of working, as our starting point, we can apply those characteristics of the *Wirkwelt* to the interpretation of scientific practices. According to the pragmatics of the life-world, the scientific *Wirkwelt* can be described by the following three aspects. (1) Firstly, scientific practices are located in a physical world – the laboratory – in which people effect, modify and manipulate objects with their bodies in order to realize tasks and purposes. Thus, resistance has to be overcome in order to realize those plans. (2) Secondly, our interest serves to organize the scientific world of working into different levels of relevance. And (3) thirdly, even scientists regularly rest on a heterogeneous stock of knowledge, including specific scientific knowledge as well as vague ones and taken-for-granted, cook-book knowledge, to cope with their working routines.

3 The Pragmatics of Scientific Working

In the 1970s the new social studies of science started to explore the actual work practices of several scientific disciplines inside laboratories.[2] Measuring, operating machines and tools, and experimenting are shown to be activities set in a specific setting, the laboratory. The laboratory, then, is a place in which scientists contextualize and reconfigure objects taken away from their "natural" spaces of occurrence by using specific sets of practices (Knorr Cetina 1988, 2002b: 45ff). Investigating a topic scientifically needs to rest upon a particular *Wirkwelt*. This entails a group of specifically trained people who transform objects of the world into observable phenomena, which can be rendered as scientific data by inscription-devices (Latour and Woolgar 1986; Latour 1987). To give an example, immunological research typically involves working with model-organisms (like the "mouse-model") as their central object of transformation. Mice are produced industrially as pure inbred stems and bought in quantity by research organisations (cf. Amann 1994; Birke 2003; Birke et al. 2007; Kohler 1993; Rader 1998, 2004). Occasionally researchers breed their own transgenic mice with special qualities (missing enzymes, fluorescent cells, etc.). Inside the laboratory, the mice get stimulated physiologically in order to develop particular reactions (allergies, tumours, viral or bacterial infections). Different groups of mice are subject to interventions when blood can be taken and analyzed, the growth of tumours, the functioning of the lungs, and similar things may be measured. At the very end of the experiments the mice are "sacrificed", i.e. "killed", so that sections of the relevant organs (like the lungs, spleen, lymph nodes, and skin) can be taken. The organs are cut into small pieces, digested biochemically and washed to develop pure cell-cultures followed by the colouring of the cells of interest with fluorescent antibodies enabling the counting and measuring of the cells with a flow-cytometer (Herzenberg et al. 2002). The mathematized data produced by such processes then represent the extent of immunity produced by the treatment during the experiment. Throughout the process the mice act as a living model for the epistemic object, a biochemical reaction in a living organism (cf. Amann 1994; Birke 2003; Birke et al. 2007; Logan 2001; Lynch 1985, 1988b).

Each of those activities can be observed, described and analysed, as being a special realm, in which people effect, modify and manipulate objects in a physical world – the first aspect of the *Wirkwelt*. There are several steps through which researchers produce effects within the physical world of the laboratory in order to advance scientific knowledge. Observing those acts of working is to watch a typical series of bodily movements, simultaneously identified with a set of material arrangements. These movements belong to routines which become habitualized through practical activities in the laboratory (learning by doing). That the researchers do not concern themselves with these aspects of corporality is not surprising. It is the stranger's view, the sociological observer who invades the

[2] For a recent summary of the laboratory studies, cf. Park Doing (2008).

lab, who recognizes those step by step corporal activities. The following example, taken from my field-notes, describes how a researcher actually works on a Chrome-Release-Assay:

> P. takes off the rest of fluid with a pipette. Then he mixes it by taking and leaving it. He does this five times in a row. Then he moves each sample from the plate into a tube. He takes a new tip for each sample; holding the plate in his right; holding it up a little bit; holding the pipette with his left hand; taking the fluid from the plate and releasing it into a tube. The arrangement of the tubes in the holding device mirrors that of the samples on the plate. After all samples have been removed into tubes he signs each tube.

To my question, "What were you doing?", he responded: *"I am preparing a chrome-release-assay."* This is a method in which lymphocytes taken from the spleen of treated mice react with antibodies, which, in turn, have been marked with radioactive chrome. If the lymphocytes in the samples have the right receptors for these antibodies, there will be a reaction and the antibody will attach to them. A photometer can, then, measure the grade of each sample's radioactivity. These measures, then, are indicators of progress of the immunization of the mice. The field-note above gives a reference to a certain step in this method, although this is already a slightly shortened version of what the observer actually has been watching. A more detailed reconstruction of the observation would read like this:

> A person named P. is sitting in front of a bench. He holds a pipette and a plate filled with samples of fluids is standing on the bench. I watch him as he moves his hands and fingers. He is holding the plate in one hand and lifting it up a little bit. He puts the pipette into the plate and sucks one fluid sample with it. He releases the fluid back into the plate and repeating these movements five times. He turns his arm to the side and flips the tip of the pipette into the dustbin. He sticks the pipette into the box with the new tips to take a new tip and turns back to the plate. Then he starts to repeat all of those movements with the next fluid sample on the plate […]

There are now three different descriptions of the same activity. Each of them is correct. An abbreviated description is found in my own field notes; the meaning of the action of which this activity is a part, is given by the actor; the third is a detailed description of the locomotive details of this activity. The scientist himself will refer to the second only, which might be reproduced in a scientific presentation or article (cf. Knorr Cetina 2002a: 210ff). Moreover, it is part of the inherent logic of scientific activities that the performative and bodily aspects of those activities are not mentioned and that the scientific world of working remains undisclosed and "dethematized" outside of its place of occurrence (cf. Schmidt 2006: 307; Kutschmann 1986). In fact, the scientific world of working in the laboratories consists of activities rooted in bodily knowledge (Knorr Cetina 1988: 99). Learning to use tools like pipettes, plates, tubes is inscribed into a knowing body. The body knows what to do. It is "tacit knowledge" (Polanyi 1985), which also includes the temporal order of activities as well. "[…] The sense of what the instructions *instructed* was found by turning to the lab bench and bodily engaging a complex of equipment to *perform* chemistry's events" (Lynch et al. 1983: 212). Those corporal activities at the lab bench are parts of biochemical reasoning (cf. Lynch et al. 1983: 225–229). To hold and use a pipette relies on volitional movements of the knowing body (the body

knows when it is the body of one who knows). They are part of volitional intentions and cannot be separated from the social situations in which they occur. They are part of the temporal order of social activities.

It is of great importance to stress that each of these single activities is embedded within a context of action. Although the single activities can be observed, described and be understood as meaningful activities their meaning is related to one step within a series of activities in an action with which certain goals and purposes are associated (cf. Schutz 1932/1972: §4 p. 27). Mixing biochemical substances by using a pipette can be described as a meaningful activity. However, the meaning of this activity remains attached to the plan of preparing a Chrome-Release-Assay for the production of scientific data within a scientific research project (cf. Knorr Cetina 2009: 80). These activities are actions which are an intrinsic part of a program of action negotiated and developed in the communicative actions of research teams for different purposes. Knorr Cetina (2002a: 32f) analyzed the ways by which a research team chooses between new research projects and proceeds to design experiments. She emphasizes that the factors which are considered in those communicative acts of deciding, are derived from different provinces of meaning. The relevance of each of these factors is related to the specific location (the laboratory and its equipment), the scientists' practices (their specific know-how in using materials and equipment) and the scientists' interests (their scientific and career plans and opportunities). Decision-making in science rests on pragmatic reasoning, not principally different to that of any life-world (Knorr Cetina 2002a: 43). This statement should not, however, be misunderstood as claiming that methodological and epistemological considerations are not of importance. They do have a significant impact on the design of research projects as they are part of "the state of the art" of scientific research and have been internalized within the "in-group" of the scientific specialty. What this means is that, besides epistemic reasoning, economic (Can we raise funding for this project? Can we finance the materials and equipment for it? Can we do it with the equipment we already do have?) and pragmatic considerations (Which know-how do team members possess? Which equipment and materials are at hand? Which techniques can we make use of?) are also a concern. Hence, scientists decide within the *epistemic* as well as the *trans-epistemic field*. Beside the immediate colleagues of the research team and the members of the scientific community – the *scientific field* – members of other social groups like politicians, entrepreneurs, companies and ethics' commissions – the *trans-scientific field* – do take part in the decision-making of scientific research projects (Knorr Cetina 2002a: 154ff). The decision, for example, to use a certain stem of mice as the model-organism rather than one of rats, rabbits or apes, is reached for a variety of reasons. Given this, not all of them refer to the same province of meaning. In other words, the decision-making in science refers to an assemblage of reasons rooted in a variety of provinces of meaning. Although the decision must be meaningful in epistemic terms but it is only one of many necessary conditions.

> The value of an organism as an experimental tool, or in field studies, depends not only on various features of the organism, but also on the problems to be addressed and the available experimental and field techniques. Indeed, even when some organism is 'the' right one for

> a theoretical job, its rightness is temporary and more or less local or regional. It depends not only on the job, but also on the techniques employed and the social or institutional support system for doing the job. (Burian 1993: 351f).[3]

4 Strata of Relevances in Scientific Practices

Scientific work, as shown above, focuses on implementing working constructions of models. The performative aspect of scientific practices is the time-consuming activity that goes into making an experiment work. An observer records the efforts of a research team over several weeks or months to complete a series of smaller experiments to discover, what works – what is regularly the case – how and why useful or expected results are not obtained. This culture of the laboratory is characterized by manipulations and transformations where the investigated materials are treated as working models. In microbiology, those materials are animals, cell-cultures, enzymes, proteins, DNA, or RNA, that becomes subjects of the cultural system that is a biology-laboratory with its theories, materials, equipment, tabs, graphics and texts (cf. Latour and Woolgar 1986; Latour 1987). Model-organisms become part of specific experimental-systems and are transformed into data. Scientific data are mathematized graphs and diagrams on which scientific statements on biological processes rest (cf. Amann 1994; Knorr Cetina 1988, 2002b; Latour and Woolgar 1986; Lynch 1985; Rheinberger 2002). However, the material used is variable and contingent. Its transformation into scientific data often meets resistance. Most of the day-to-day business of researchers is concerned with resistances and efforts to overcome it by adapting experimental-systems. This *fine-tuning* as part of experimental work has been described by Andrew Pickering as the dialectic of resistance and accommodation, of human activity and passivity – in other words "the mangle of scientific practice":

> The practical, goal-oriented and goal-revising dialectic of resistance and accommodation is, as far as I can make out, a general feature of scientific practice. And it is, in the first instance, what I call the mangle of practice or just the mangle. (Pickering 1995: 22f)

Resistance occurs at a variety of different levels in scientific activity. Besides theoretical and methodological problems there are economic and ethical ones as well as problems of the work place and the skills being employed there. To give an example of problems in the laboratory as work-shop, during their coffee break biologists discussed things like how and with which tool the lung of mice might be

[3] Lederman and Burian thematized "The Right Organism for the Job" at the congress of the "*International Society for the History, Philosophy, and Social Studies of Biology*" 1991 – published in "The Journal of the History of Biology" vol. 26, n. 2 (Lederman and Burian 1993; Lederman and Tolin 1993; Summers 1993; Zallen 1993; Kohler 1993; Holmes 1993; Clause 1993; Burian 1993) – 2 years after the organization of the discussion of "The Right Tool for the Job" by Clarke and Fujimura (1992).

minced. Why? In order to analyse allergic reactions in the lungs, the researcher needs to cut the dissected lungs of mice into the smallest pieces possible in order to source the cell-cultures, which can be biochemically transformed. However, the lung flesh is difficult to cut and so the researcher has to crush it. But, are there better ways of doing it? What other techniques would be more effective? Which kind of kitchen-tool might help? A mesh for example; but is it fine enough? … The concern was not about the how-to-do of crushing the material, but that too many of the relevant cells might be destroyed by the process. The concern was practical, in the sense that a better way was being sought. The concern was an epistemic one; namely, not to lose too many relevant cells when transforming the lungs into the data of allergic reactions. The practical problem arises as part of an epistemic concern, which has thematic relevance, while interpretive relevance refers to the common-sense reasoning about the use of kitchen-tools in the dissection process.

Regularly scientists discuss unexpected data. Do those data correspond to real effects, which must – and hopefully can, be explained? Are those data an expression of artefacts of the data-production that can be explained and might be easily corrected? Is something basically wrong with the experimental process? Or is it simply the result of a mistake in the implementation of the experimental process or working practice? These discussions amount to classifications of the data as being good or bad data, as usable data or mere artefacts. Artefacts of research are distortions in the data derived from the instrumental conditions of the experimental setting. They occur during the research process in connection with substances and techniques (cf. Lynch 1985: 81). Artefacts are a problem as they may appear to conceal the "natural" phenomena. Inside the laboratory they are of concern because their status has to be identified and classified as occurring by chance in the preparation of displays or of measurement. Real problems arise when unexpected phenomena remain unidentified, because the scientists fail to identify the reasons for their occurrence. Do strange data represent something "real" or are they simply the result of errors in implementing the research technique? Hence, Lynch draws a distinction between "positive" and "negative" artefacts. Positive artefacts are defects and distortions of an object, as a result of the techniques used for their production, readily noted. They are disturbing but not annoying, as they can be explained as by-products of the technique and, hence, they do not question the experimental-system or the techniques used (cf. Lynch 1985: 90ff). Negative artefacts, on the other hand, occur, if something appears in the data to be missing, where the mistake cannot be identified, but, nevertheless, the provided data look reasonable. These artefacts are problematic for the research process and have to be explicable and to be resolved in order to be able to proceed (cf. Lynch 1985: 107f). Whenever results do not match scientists' expectations, activities are hectic in the laboratory while scientists nervously search for the problem. They flick through laboratory-notes and re-evaluate what they have done. When a miscalculation is found which accounts for a dose of substance which explains the bad results, relief runs through the laboratory. Although such mistakes are annoying in terms of loss of time and material, the experimental-system as such remains intact. By repeating the experiment correctly, the error can easily be repaired and the problem solved. As can clearly be seen, scientific activities in the

laboratory are not only corporeal activities of modification and manipulation of a physical world, but those physical activities are embedded into the pragmatics of a certain kind of problem-solving. It is concerned with material resistances that have to be overcome.

A special kind of resistance occurs within the scientific world of working with the treatment of lab-animals. While the logic of scientific research transforms animals into objects, degrading them to potential analytical data (Lynch 1988b), the animals, while they are still alive ask the scientists to perceive them as "natural animals" as well. Mice bite, run away and jump out of their cages. They behave as mice and by doing so evoke emotional reactions from the scientists. Time after time they force the scientists to drop their scientific attitude, marked by emotional distancing, and respond to them as living animals. The perception of lab-animals as being "natural animals" – which is just the way we know pets in our every-day life-world – remains latent in the laboratory where those animals live as "analytical animals" – objects of mathematizable data (Lynch 1988b: 269; cf. Birke et al. 2007; Birke 2003; Bischur 2008). "While the 'analytical animal' is a creature in a generalized mathematical space, the 'natural animal' is a phenomenon in the commonsense life world" (Lynch 1988b 267). Simply its quality of being a living animal means that there remains a latent potential of resistance inherent in the lab-animal. This kind of resistance is manifested in a series of breaks within the scientific day-to-day working routine. It is a kind of shrewd opposition to animals' utilization in scientific practices, as the following example illustrates:

> Two researchers are injecting a series of mice, which react with restlessness. As there is another mouse which violently resists its treatment, scientist A. holds it tight so that L. can give it the injection and excuses herself:
>
> A. "I am sorry for that"
> L. "Are you talking to me or the mouse?"
> A. "To the mouse."
> L. "Aw – c'mon!"

Two scientists are forced by the resisting mice to concern themselves with them as "natural animals". They try to calm them and show signs of certain empathetic feelings towards the animals. A. apologizes for holding the mouse so tightly while L. asks her to get back to the distanced working attitude. It is the behaviour of the lab-animal which forces the researchers to change their system of relevances for a moment as they must cope with it as a living and "natural" animal. Only after the animal had been caught and calmed down can the scientific activity – giving an injection – continue.

In terms of Schutz's language of the problem of relevances all these different kinds of resistance within the scientific world of working are imposed thematic relevances (Schutz 1970: ch. II.C). These are interpreted by the scientists by resorting to their special stock of knowledge and are resolved by designing new plans of action specified in their research plan. In some cases, this may even require redefining research goals. To give an example, after it had become obvious that Langerhans cells did not to fulfill the theoretically expected function within a specific immune-response, the

scientists abandoned their research on techniques of immunization and began a series of experiments seeking to refute the original hypothesis. According to Rheinberger (2002: 24–30), this is a shift in the epistemic object. He distinguishes *epistemic* from *technical objects* of research. The epistemic objects are the actual objects of research, those processes, structures or matters of interest; which a research-team works to provide and know about. The technical objects are those things which enable scientists to develop and establish an experimental system. These are known techniques, established theories and knowledge as well as model-organisms, substances, equipment, and tools of the laboratory. Rheinberger's historical reconstruction of the finding of protein-biosynthesis and its utilization as an in-vitro system tells the story of such a shift of epistemic objects. Paul Zamecnik and his research team had originally been interested in mechanisms in the uncontrolled growth of tumour-cells and the role of protein synthesis. The early results made them shift their interests from cancer-research towards pure research on protein-synthesis (Rheinberger 2002: 45). Instead of providing new knowledge on the cell-growth of tumours they finally discovered – after a series of shifts due to their research findings – the transfer-RNA and, hence, established knowledge about one of the basic puzzles of microbiology (Rheinberger 2002: 32). The epistemic object had been transformed in a technical one (Rheinberger 2002: 27; cf. Lynch and Jordan 1995: 231). In other words, the thematic relevances of scientific research are exposed to pragmatic shifts arising from resistances and from researchers' efforts to resolve and overcome them.

We see that the culture of scientific practices, like the life-world, is characterized by strata of major and minor relevances – the second aspect of the *Wirkwelt* – as Elisabeth List following Schutz states:

> Wenn man Wissenschaft als konkreten Prozess analysiert, werden ihre besonderen Relevanzstrukturen, die in der Routine des alltäglichen wissenschaftlichen Handelns als das Selbstverständliche unthematisiert bleiben, sichtbar. Lebensförmig ist wissenschaftliches Wissen im philosophischen Sinne also deshalb, weil es wie alles Wissen auf der Trennung von thematisch Relevantem und von unbefragt Vorausgesetztem beruht. (List 2007: 37; cf. List 1988).[4]

Harry Collins (1992) showed while reflecting on the development of the TEA-Laser that the crucial skill of scientists is to be able to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant details of an experimental-system which are practically acquired as tacit knowledge, remain dependent on local practices and experiences and cannot easily be transferred from one laboratory to another, or from one context to another. Moreover, scientific actors are not always aware of this knowledge and build local, taken-for-granted laboratory life-worlds, although this may not constitute a formal system of knowledge. "His hunches were better than mine but, as troubles developed, that is, as the laser continued to refuse to work, shadows of uncertainty began to creep in." (Collins 1992: 71)

[4]My translation of this quote from List is: "By analysing science as actual process its specific structures of relevance, which remain the taken-for-granted casualness within the routines of scientific day-to-day activity, become visual. Therefore, scientific knowledge is *life-situated* in a philosophical sense, because it rests, as any knowledge does, on the distinction of the thematic relevant from the unquestioned taken-for-granted."

5 The Pragmatic Structure of Knowledge in Scientific Practices

The pragmatics of scientific activity continues in the structure of the stock of knowledge scientists rely on in their efforts to make experiments work. Molecular-biologists regularly speak of their laboratories as "kitchens" and of their day-to-day work as "cooking". This analogy is understandable when we consider the typical equipment of the laboratory: their packed refrigerators, gas burners, incubator devices and sinks (cf. Lynch 2002: 205). Within the experiment, biochemical processes follow protocols like cook-book recipes providing vague instructions. There are two different kinds of protocols: standardized, industrial manufactured biochemical "kits" are bought from companies and come with the protocol (cf. Jordan and Lynch 1992: 80). Some scientists write down their own protocols in their laboratory-notes and regularly rely on these notes whenever repeating the activity. Written protocols look like cooking recipes containing lists of substances, correct doses, necessary tools and the step by step sequences for carrying through preparation and analysis (cf. Lynch 2002: 204). Nevertheless, these are not exact descriptions but rather indications intelligible to experts arising from their practical experiences which need to be accommodated to local conditions and requirements.

Observations of the scientific world of working in laboratories provide a revised image of the specific stock of knowledge available to scientists. This stock of knowledge is both specific and generic. It entails a specialist scientific knowledge of the specialty and a systematic, clear knowledge of the discipline – both acquired during the socialisation of the scientist and requiring knowledge of the canon. On the other hand the scientist undergoes practical training in the laboratory, where they acquire specific practical skills (e.g. as how to use a pipette, a flow-cytometer, and so on). These skills can only be learned through the performance of the activity in the laboratory and involve a personal practical knowledge, skill and experience in using material, tools and the laboratory devices (cf. Mody and Kaiser 2008). Scientists then rely on each of these different segments of their knowledge stock in order to carry through and solve problems in the day-to-day affairs of their research work. The knowledge used for designing, carrying out and classifying experiments and data is not always clear, distinct and rational. Although clear, distinct and rational knowledge certainly is relevant as the theoretical basis for scientific action, scientists rely on unclear, diffuse and unconsciously acquired "tacit" knowledge as well (Polanyi 1985). Moreover, the use of several devices stimulates and reproduces the theories inherent in them (Hacking 1992), which is why Latour (1987: 131) calls techniques and devices "black-boxes". They are even used without a complete understanding of their functioning. It is sufficient to know what they produce. The observation that scientists, now and then, rely on practices that achieve expected results which they do not always fully understand and cannot be explained, can be found in more than just the use of devices. Lynch (1985: 108f) refers to techniques used regularly within the laboratory, whose functioning cannot be explained and talks – in a symbolic sense – about "superstitions". These remain

somewhat "mysterious" as no-one knows how or why but, nevertheless, they often produce reliable results. Though scientists clearly prefer techniques, which can be explained rationally, such "mysterious" effects remain an inevitable part of scientific work.

> For my own part, I can testify that laboratory researchers who were kind enough to allow me to hang around their laboratories were able to go on at length about matters that they themselves identified as non-rational, not governed by rules of method, and even magical and superstitious. These testimonies described ad hoc practices which are not governed by familiar formalisms; practices for dealing with uncertainties that arise in day to day situations. (Lynch 1997: 341; cf. Lynch 1985; Jordan and Lynch 1992)

Moreover, vague concepts may become part of the corpus of scientific theory as Ilana Löwy (1993) demonstrates by referring to the history of the development of immunology. The concept of the "self – non-self – distinction", which had become central for immunology, assumes that the immune-system itself is distinguishing between "own" and "alien" in order to combat the latter. This conceptualization enabled scientific communication between chemistry and medicine. Around this vague notion they established a common language for those two different systems of meaning and, thereby, mobilized resources and structures for the new "think-collective" Immunology. However, the success of this vague notion has not been dependent on the verification of hypothesis or a demonstration of the functioning it was built on. One might say rather that these descriptions of scientific activities demonstrate the third aspect of the Schutzian *Wirkwelt* – a heterogeneous stock of knowledge, including specific scientific knowledge as well as vague ones and taken-for-granted, cook-book knowledge – as being characteristic for the daily scientific activities in laboratories.

6 Towards a Theory of the Scientific Wirkwelt

Contemporary social studies of science have shown how scientific practices constitute a specific kind of activity (*Wirken*), a world of working implementing aims and goals by producing effects from experimental objects (the first aspect of the *Wirkwelt*). Scientists have to react to various kinds of resistance and overcome them by drawing on a stock of knowledge, which can be structured and systematic or vague and unclear. Scientific practices build up a series of more or less explicit routines which rest on unquestioned recipe-knowledge (the third aspect of the *Wirkwelt*). Scientific work is structured by strata of relevances, which set themes within scientific practices (the second aspect of the *Wirkwelt*). This needs further exploration. This would provide a basis for plans of action, which guide scientific work (cf. Embree 1988: 257). Descriptions, resistance, stocks of knowledge, routines recipes, themes – located in Schutz's concept of the *Wirkwelt* – can be conceptualized as a specific kind of *Wirkwelt.*

In order to estimate the fruitfulness of Schutz's concept of a scientific *Wirkwelt* in the analyses of scientific practices, we need to consider the relation between scientific practice and scientific theorizing:

> Plainly Schutz views science, which is to say theoretical science, in two different ways, namely, as part of practical life and as disembodied, non-social, and desituated theorizing. The latter is immediately presupposed in his methodological discussions, […] At this point, however, it seems well to ask how the theorizer, while theorizing, can relate to the world of practical life and what, contrariwise, society does with science. Both questions are dealt with by Schutz in relation to communication. (Embree 1988: 262; cf. Schutz 1945/1971: 255f)

The question remains as to how communication contributes to the intersection of theory and practice within practical scientific life. The production of knowledge through scientific activities has been characterized by Lynch et al. (1983): 206) as the occupation of scientists in the local production of action and in mundane reasoning. This reasoning is embedded within an order of intersubjective details: in spoken utterances between different parties to a conversation; in produced orders of manipulated materials on the work-bench of a laboratory; or within the transitive order of written materials on a page of text.

The following example illustrates the importance of communication for the understanding of the relation between scientific practice and theorizing. In this shop-talk the typical way of reasoning with actual data is illustrated in a communicative action, in which scientists define what certain data are. The objectivity of scientific products is a result of communication, as Lynch demonstrates in detail in several examples (Lynch 1985: 203). In this example, two scientists talk about what is seen and what is meant while observing the preparation of the epidermis of mice's ears under a microscope. It deals with the meaning of research materials (cf. Lynch 1985: 217ff):

95 G: Yeah: the colouring is beautiful.
96 P: Yes?
97 [1.5]
98 P: but not gone?
99 G: But not gone.
100 P: mh
101 [3]
102 G: And, you can, you can't say anything with that load of cells.
103 [3]
104 G: Hang on.
105 G: If they went down.
106 [2]
107 G: That were daring.
108 P: No, no. That must
109 G: This or that?
110 P: That must – exactly.
111 [1.5]
112 G: This or that?
113 [2]

114 P: As long as you can't see it [at once, it doesn't count.
115 G: [no:
116 G: No:, no ((incomprehensible))

G. is sitting in front of the microscope und observes preparations of the epidermis of mice's ears with coloured langerhans-cells. The goal of the mice's treatment has been to get the langerhans-cell into abductosis, hence, they should not be seen in the epidermis of the ear. At the beginning of this sequence G. finds that the colouring of the cells works "beautifully", but that the cells have not disappeared (95–100). Then follows a consideration if at least a reduction of cells can be seen (104–105). This, however, is rejected as P. defines "what counts" (108–112). Later on in this shop-talk the subject of the communication shifts from the definition of what can be seen towards a negotiation about whether this experimental process can accommodate acquiring data to adequately serve their research interests.

149 G: but they aren't gone.
150 [7]
151 P: Do we have the same point of time?
152 [6]
153 G: Well, I think; P. I think, what did not happen in-vivo after twenty-four hours,
154 did not happen after eighty-four hours either.
155 P: No.
156 G: Now, we've kept twenty-four hours.
157 G: What – twenty-four [hours has been
158 P: [That's not what I mean
159 P: That's not what I mean
160 P: Just that we know, if it's working in principle. [As it has been
161 G: [yes
162 P: described
163 G: that
164 P: by Schwarz.
165 G: That's what I meant yesterday by saying "Let's do a time-row."
166 "Let's treat a couple of more mice." But this, I think, hereby we didn't meet,
167 Hereby we did not meet.
168 P: I would, mh ((clearing his throat)), I would have said anyway: "It's not
169 worth it"; cause then we've had a lot of treated mice and if it had worked,
170 it would have been in vain, wouldn't it?
171 G: yes
172 [1]
173 P: but, but now it would have been of interest, wouldn't it?
174 [2]
175 P: Now, a time-row would be interesting.
176 G: yeah
177 P: Now, we maybe should do it.
178 G: yeah
179 G: ah – the light.

This sequence starts again with the definition of what can be seen: *"But they are not gone."* (149). Here is a starting point, marking the start of a negotiation, as to the origin of the mistake. What have we actually done (151)? How can this be related to a publication, on which the experimental design partly rests (164)? Finally the shop-talk ends with an agreement to make a time-row – meaning to treat several groups

of mice, to "sacrifice" them, and analyse each group consecutively in order to find out when the desired results have emerged. Thinking about the experiment becomes a communicative act, in which the research colleagues negotiate discursively about possible solutions to the resistances arising during the research process. At first, these negotiations are concerned with defining an intersubjective interpretation of the experimental situation. What can be seen? Seeing the object turns out to be a debate between colleagues in relation to the state of the art in this speciality and leads to a reflection on the actual production of data. The series of activities that have been carried through within the local conditions of the laboratory are compared with actual results, with the design of the scientific action, and the motives for the design in order to reach an accommodation on the experimental design. Reasoning, as observed in scientific shop-talk and shop-work is subordinated to actual goals and aims, which are the motives of scientific work. But can these kinds of scientific reasoning be interpreted in relation to reasoning in the everyday world as an "enclave" of theoretical contemplation?

In Schutz's work "enclaves" of theoretical contemplation within the *Wirkwelt* are mentioned twice in his essay "On Multiple Realities" (1945/1971). In the first paragraph of his chapter on the world of scientific theory, we read:

> In restricting the following analysis to the world as object of scientific contemplation we intentionally disregard for the present purpose the many forms of contemplative attitudes which we frequently adopt amidst our working activities and which in contradistinction to the practical attitudes of working could also be called theoretical attitudes. If we 'sit down' in a major crisis of our life and consider again and again our problems, if we draft, reject, redraft projects and plans before making up our mind, if as fathers we mediate upon pedagogical questions or as politicians upon public opinion – in all these situations we indulge in theoretical contemplation in the wider sense of this term. But all this contemplative thinking is performed for practical purposes and ends, and for this very reason it constitutes an 'enclave' of theoretical contemplation within the world of working rather than a finite province of meaning. (Schutz 1945/1971: 245)

Earlier on, Schutz had introduced the notion of an "enclave" of theoretical contemplation within the world of working in order to be able to explain a problem with his concept of "finite provinces of meaning". Since he characterizes each province of meaning as being closed, as radically different to "the attitude of the consciousness", he needs to explain the fact that contemplation does not constitute its own reality only but rather is a necessary condition for any plan of action as well.

> There is, furthermore, the problem of 'enclaves', that is, of regions belonging to one province of meaning enclosed by another, a problem which, important as it is, cannot be handled within the frame of the present paper, which admittedly restricts itself to the outlining of a few principles of analysis. To give an example of this disregarded group of problems: any projecting within the world of working is itself, as we have seen, a phantasying, and involves in addition a kind of theoretical contemplation, although not necessarily that of the scientific attitude. (Schutz 1945/1971: FN 19 on p. 233)

Contemplation in the world of working in Schutz is distinct from scientific theorizing in the scientific attitude. Schutz talks of "enclaves" in one case and a "closed province of meaning" in the other. The first cannot be separated from practical purposes and ends within the world of working. Schutz insists, however, that

scientific theoretical activities *do not serve any practical purpose* and do not *aim to master the world* (Schutz 1945/1971: 245). Science aims to observe, understand and explain the world (Schutz 1945/1971: 246). Since scientific theorizing is taken to be separated from practical purposes and ends, it constitutes its own province of meaning, although it is still necessarily related to the world and its objects (and rests on activities and is communicated in social activities). Moreover it produces outcomes, which can be used within the world of working (1945/1971: 246). According to the insight that scientific contemplation is embedded in the scientific world of working, the statement that scientific theoretical activities do not serve any practical purposes and do not aim to master the world, has to be reconsidered. We have seen that scientific activities are planned and those designs rest on a variety of interests. Scientists design experiments and are under pressure to achieve publishable results quickly and with minimal costs. This secures their scientific careers and enables them to apply for patents that can finance future research.

From the point of view of a theory of scientific practice as being scientific work in Schutz's sense we must recognize that the production of scientific knowledge is a specific practical activity, in which data are manufactured in the specific world of the laboratory and are systematized in communicative acts. Of course these activities are guided by actual and methodical considerations as they are by practical experiences. Scientific investigations integrate reflexive interpreted knowledge as well as the vague kinds of knowledge found in the *Wirkwelt*. Scientific working is structured by specific, socially defined conventions, which are habitualized scientific practices (cf. Lynch 1988a: 86). Schutz insists on the distinction between scientific activity and scientific theorizing, although both are related to each other. The latter sets the rules to be followed by the former, while the former produces the data, which the latter interprets, rationalizes and systematizes. In contrast Schutz argues that scientific practice represents a scientific way of working and that the *Wirkwelt* is dependent on a specific goal-oriented form of reasoning. This does not constitute a closed province of meaning but is rather a contemplative "enclave" within the life-world. Putting these two statements of Schutz together, we arrive at two different kinds of scientific reasoning. Pragmatic reasoning is where scientific activities of data-production are designed and solutions to occurring resistances are developed. Even though this kind of scientific reasoning follows certain rules, resting on the ideals of epistemological theory, it does not constitute a separate province of meaning within the world of scientific practice. It is directly associated with certain purposes and ends of the practical activities within the world of the scientific laboratory, forming a Schutzian "enclave". The second kind of reasoning, which Schutz refers to as "scientific theorizing", is separated from the purposes and ends of the world of practical scientific activity. Rather it resembles, as Michael Lynch (1988a: 84) states, the philosophical attitude – "perhaps even a limited and mundane version of Husserl's phenomenological reduction". Scientific reasoning is in one case a process of thinking that ultimately is linked to the practical activities of the laboratory and therefore cannot constitute a closed province of meaning, but must be understood as an enclave – in Schutz's sense. However, this does not

justify the conclusion that the other kind of scientific reasoning must also to be rejected. As Lynch (1988a: 85) explains:

> Although ethnographic studies of scientific practice do not exclude the possibility that phenomenological investigations by competent scientists of their own theoretical work would support some of Schutz's characterizations, they do demonstrate that to a great extent 'theorizing' occurs in the midst of the various practical and social engagements that make up day to day scientific practices.

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Hermeneutics of Transcendence. Understanding and Communication at the Limits of Experience

Annette Hilt

> In Auschwitz the intellect was nothing more than itself and there was no chance to apply it to a social structure, no matter how insufficient, no matter how concealed it may have been. Thus the intellectual was alone with his intellect, which was nothing other than pure content of consciousness, and there was no social reality that could support and confirm it. (Améry 1980: 6)

Hermeneutics of Transcendence begins with an experience of both the constitutive and restrictive limits of social, shared reality: a reality where experience receives a typological meaning, but also where this typology can fail. Here, on the grounds of confirmation regarding understanding, hermeneutics searches for a meaning and expression for particular and foreign experiences.

Yet there, where closed areas of meaning no longer offer possibilities for the development of meaningful modes of understanding, and where openness loses its position as intersubjective action-space (*Wirkwelt*), a phenomenological-hermeneutic problem arises between the solitary Ego and its socially constituted meaning in which horizon this Ego both develops a self and actively as well as passively experiences this self-constitution. The solitary ego – understood as an intimate person who has to transcend her immanence to express her self-sufficiency– no longer finds an outer world that allows her to prove her own reality to herself; she further lacks a world to transcend the ambiguously irreal reality of her solitariness in order to get some perspective, to understand and reflect on it. The transcendence of the limits of a rigid, everyday meaning allows for the experience of the solitary ego, with its capacity for suffering and immediately real, inward turmoil. The analysis of the experience of borders and limitations is therefore not so much concerned with the constitution of shared social meaning as it is with the recovery of the possibility of regaining meaning in the socio-pathological structures of life in light of the 'fragility of human affairs' (Arendt).

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There are four stages to the exposition of the scope of the *hermeneutics of transcendence*: exposition of the problem, analysis, intelligible interpretation and a comprehensible transformation of the borderline situations (*Grenzsituationen*), Jaspers – which find themselves in conflict with theory and lived experience. This tension will be explored through a dialogue between Alfred Schutz's analytical categories and Imre Kertész's literary expression of a life lived at the edge of the social sphere – a dialogue on both phenomenological and hermeneutical grounds.

The Hungarian writer Kertész, as an adolescent survivor of the Nazi concentration-camps, tries to 'relive' his past; given that his 'own' history is inaccessible to others, however, he places his story within the explanatory frames of the political fate of European Jews and others who opposed fascism (Kertész doesn't feel like he 'belongs' to either group). He lives this past life anew by fictionalizing an alter ego who experiences internment and the constant threat of elimination. Nobody who suffered the everyday reality of threat, cruelty and murder had knowledge of motives for it – a prerequisite which Schutz's concepts for comprehending our intersubjective actions space essentially draws on. Without any rules or reasons for their experience of what is happening , the interns at the camps try to constitute their own finite province of meaning. Yet following liberation the irreducible uniqueness of experiencing this struggle was neglected. For the collective record of memory the Hungarian communist regime stratified the individual experience into collective and typological narrations of the resistance fighters' righteous political commitment, giving them a fate understood as the necessity to endure and survive while ignoring the cases of all the other victims as though they were anonymous.

Kertész restages his isolation in his novel *Fateless* as he appears as a solitary ego within a dubious reality; initially the drafts and then eventually the entire manuscript remain sealed in his desk-drawer for an indeterminate time since nobody wants to publish it. He achieves freedom not through interpreting his very intimate reality, but through his role as author, giving an account of the life of his alter ego experiencing both the total loss of recognition in a shared reality and ways of constituting a working-space of the everyday within the borderline-situation of the camps as well as the inner emigration afterwards.

The very act of making yourself into someone else creates ideas "that 'really' are 'more real' than reality," in that they create reality (Kertész 1998: 121–2). The fictionalization becomes, therefore, a *change in the perception of reality* which, like the fictionalization of personal experience, transcends the everyday horizon – and tries to re-establish intersections with an everyday life in order to emphasize the conflicting realizations of reality (cf. Waldenfels 1978). Unlike Schutz's great trancendences' of delusion and dream, imagination and fiction do not irretrievably lead out of the lifeworld, but rather create a free space *within* a lifeworld in which the solitary – as opposed to the transcendental-solipsistic – ego can find itself. It does this through strategies of aesthetic, social and political practice (this list is not ordered in terms of importance). The usefulness of the transcendences of life-world(s), or the 'transcendences of the everyday' ('*Transzendenzen des Alltags*') as Schutz and Luckmann have defined it, must first be recognized for its potential: (1) as a subjective expression of the realities of experience and of a pathological

deviance, and (2) in those extreme situations where understanding fails in the face of a social reality, and where failure itself becomes a reality on the edge of experience (in the sense of meaningful configuration) and not only as pathological delusion.[1]

With his poetological account of solitariness and the fateless, Kertész not only exemplifies Schutz's solitary Self as constitutive ground for a lifeworld which provides irreducibly real (and finite) provinces of meaning, but also challenges Schutz's implicitly ethical notion of constituting meaning by transcending one's solitary experience – not to a common horizon of pragmatic knowledge, but to ways of understanding the non-typified. Rather, fictionalization refuses the anonymous factual typology and accepts only the exemplary value of the testimonial, the inward norm of remembered experience, the experience of a (fictive) 'intimate personality' (Scheler) as the next step, in that it preserves the absurdity and a strong notion of this absurdity's inaccessibility to understanding. In so doing, narration proves itself to be an attempt to win the upper hand; it becomes a refugee's backwards glance, disdainful and lucid (cf. Kertész 1996: 15).

It is not so much a question of being opposed to 'acting in concert' with others, but rather of trying to make one's life an irreducibly individual one with a problematic identity and meaning; the concept of the 'solitary ego' is not an autonomous, self-defining, totalizing self as Levinas defines it in the first part of *Totality and Infinity*, or as the 'early Schutz' has been regularly accused of doing in a critique of the transcendental-phenomenological approach to the construction of meaning. It is, rather, to come back to the opening citation, an 'I' (maybe no longer a self) reduced to the "pure content of consciousness" (Améry) on the edges of comprehension and the search for meaning – when there is neither a 'Thou' nor an 'Us', and thus the concept does not neglect the inter-subjective, structural dimension as a condition for the creation of meaning in lifeworld.

This 'solitary ego' is not necessarily worldless and solipsistic; it is anchored firmly in a world as the origin of individual expression. This also means, however, that it is vulnerable to worldly entanglement, which allows for the experience of different realities other than a radically subjective inner world or the socially recognized everyday. It becomes vulnerable through a 'totalisation' of the world in relation to the singular, through a 'social solipsism' that confines individual expression.

Highlighting possibilities for the transcendence of the social life-world in favor of an individual, rational life with its subjective meaning and its relevance is not only a task for comprehensive analysis with adequately constructed frameworks,[2] but also for a phenomenology of experience that searches not just for the essence of meaning in consciousness, but also in the whole of life, in its affective qualities of unfathomable happiness and suffering, and for the threshold between meaning and meaninglessness.

[1] For an interpretation of Schutz transcending himself the concept of paramount reality as action space in analyzing the contemplative style of knowledge and other sets of relevancies – within the literary sphere and their function for interpreting aspects of daily life when the unity of the acting self is broken – cf. Barber (2010).

[2] As Schutz requires by his methodological postulates of relevance, logical consistency, subjective interpretation, adequacy and rationality (cf. Schutz 1971a, 1972b).

To exemplify the testimony of such existential constituting of meaning, I will use Imre Kertész's literary form of the subjective formulation of the lifeworld and its reality as a point of departure for a further reading of Schutz's *Interpretive Sociology*. For there is a 'radical subjectivism' that is unveiled by the inhabitant of two totalitarian life-worlds and which can not be affronted so easily by a conceptual critique of the solitary ego. This radical subjectivism is exemplified in Kertész's attempt to remember that reaches *beyond* understanding and coalesces with the accompanying alienation of the 'solitary ego,' so that otherness is present in the 'solitary ego – yet not as a transcendence towards the world.' In dissociating, in being split by this otherness, the vitality of the solitary ego paradoxically comes to its very own right**.** And this, in turn, allows the self and the socially alienated ego the freedom to understand and cope with the loss of meaning and its construction.

Imre Kertész ends his novel *Fateless* with the perspective:

> I am here, and I know full well that I have to accept the prize of being allowed to live. I have to continue my uncontinuable life. […] There is no impossibility that cannot be overcome, naturally, and further down the road, I now know, happiness lies in wait for me like an inevitable trap. Even back there, in the shadow of the chimneys, in the breaks, between pains, there was something resembling happiness. Everybody will ask me about the deprivations, the 'terrors of the camps', but for me, the happiness there will always be the most memorable experience, perhaps. Yes, that's what I'll tell them the next time they ask me: about the happiness in those camps. If they ever do ask. And if I don't forget. (Kertész 1996: 190–1)

This subjectivity, which has been reduced to the memory of a singular solitary self, confronts common knowledge (or rather, common opinion) with the "resemblance of happiness" in order to preserve the last stance of a safe and integral province of meaning. This subjectivity puts Schultz' categories to the test, if, that is, the demand for an inter-subjective objectivity is part of an anomic fabric of social understanding and if the banal closes itself off from the extraordinary in favor of totality.[3]

I will begin with a refinement of Schutz's theory of foreign understanding and experience, in that I will apply it to: (1) the experience of limitations between personal and foreign experience, where (2) the problem of foreign experience shows itself to be one of time, or more specifically, a question of the constitution of personal and foreign time-consciousness. These will then (3) be expanded through Kertész's process of memory and autobiographical expression (which itself involves a change in emphasis within his own memory and dis-organized experience of time) to questions of workable hermeneutics, guidelines for a practice of interpretation. Kertész's typologies run counter to the pragmatic conclusions of daily life, in that his reflections on the experienced life exist within their own reality of individual experience. This, in turn, stems from his own bracketing of the 'natural attitude' in the construction of narrative meaning, as well as his own personal, twisted experience of time.

[3]On the account of the social world being indifferent toward the individually experienced, damaged life, Jean Améry writes: "The social body is occupied merely with safeguarding itself and could not care less about a life that has been damaged. At the very best, it looks forward, so that such things don't happen again." (Améry 1980: 70) – cutting himself off the painful relevance – and dignity of his past experiences.

Schutz's analysis of the transcendence of boundaries in the 'middle' and 'great transcendences' in everyday life, which he identified as merely other dimensions within the construction of meaning and its biographical categories, should (4) offer a *theoretical* starting point for the handling of the fundamental differences within the field of social inter-subjectivity. This challenges *hermeneutics of transcendence* (5) to pay attention to subjective testimonies and their forms of expression – in order to search for the possibility of an ethical attitude and aspire towards the 'conceptual transformation' of transcendence at the edge of experience and on the other side of social norms. This is a practical extension of the Schutzian theory of the construction of meaning in the everyday's challenges: i.e., in terms of transcending the typologized-typologizing conventional lifeworld as its validity is shattered by individual experience**.**

1 Experiencing Limitations: The Conflict Between Personal and Foreign Meaning

Schutz's departure from the 'inner experience' of the solitary ego enjoys a certain amount of plausibility in those exceptional situations where the paramount reality and actual intersubjective constitution of meaning break down, when one finds oneself and can only realize oneself as solitary and must regain provinces of meaning through revealing 'problematic horizons' of the paramount reality.[4] The *absolute* inaccessibility of personal experience through a 'you' (or a 'you all'), the situation of a man "who can no longer say 'we'" (Améry), and the exclusion of self from foreign experience (collective experience) can be restated as a *constructive* difference between ego and alter. This difference points to possibilities of transcending closures of meaning and acquiring 'actual foreign understanding.' One can glean at least the pathologies of an objectifying, typologizing and anonymous horizon of social meaning from this difference by means of a progressive analysis of the origins of the layers of foreign and personal meaning. Such personal and foreign constructions cannot, however, follow a 'natural attitude' along with the certainty that accompanies the everyday horizons of meaning, in which the anomic 'naturally' folds itself into the order of the normal. Waldenfels writes that the "constructive phenomenology of a natural attitude" forgoes an extramundane standpoint from which one can derive the ultimate criteria for a critique of concrete daily worlds. For Schutz, therefore, the everyday remains a labyrinth without exit or window. "There

[4]Heinrich Rombach outlines the theoretical counterpoint of his own structural-phenomenological theory of society and confronts Schütz with the following: "*Würde das Individuum substantialistisch und unmittelbar dem gesellschaftlichen System als Ganzem gegenüberstehen, so würde dies zu keiner lebendigen Struktur, zu keinem freiheitlichen sozialen Leben führen*." (Rombach 1994: 21). This is an appropriate description of a circumstance in which the openness of the life-world confronts an individual as a totality and reduces the individual's self to an essence that is excluded from the "us"-relation. What is left over from this self is the solitary Ego as a pariah-existence.

are systems, but no 'court of appeals.'" (Waldenfels 1978: 26). This tension of an extreme constellation must be resolved along those borderlines where and when subjective and solitary reality is displayed, expressed and transforms itself into transcendence. The several dimensions of expression within this problem must, then, be differentiated from one another, beginning with Schutz's analysis of foreign understanding.

'Intended meaning' is essentially subjective and principally tied to the self-interpretation of experience. Intended meaning is not an experience fulfilled in itself, but rather the genesis of experience**,** when the river of experience pours into the basin of perceptions and discontinuous segments and attitudes change. Schutz writes:

> Even the fact that I become aware of the meaning of an experience presupposes that I notice it and 'select it out' from all my other experiences. (Schutz 1972a: 41)

Neither foreign nor personal experience is directly accessible; it can only be indirectly, through signs or signals of the experience. The fulfilment of experience is therefore inaccessible to a 'you' outside of a reclusive, reflexive intentionality which "is no longer primarily a loss of sight of the subject" (Waldenfels 1979: 3), no longer a part of an inter-subjective *Wirkwelt*. This 'reclusive intentionality' can better be described as the refusal of *direct* expression.[5] In *The Phenomenology of the Social World,* Schutz points out that the patterns for the interpretation of experience are only useful for self-interpretation when the unknown cannot lead back to the known:

> The picture of self-explication […] seems to be at variance with the fact that there are lived experiences which are unique and *sui generis*. […] there are lived experiences which because of the degree of their intimacy cannot be comprehended by the glance of attention. […] This presupposes a reference back to the schemes we have on hand, followed by a 'failure to connect'. This in turn throws the validity of the scheme into question. Whenever a phenomenon turns out to be unexplainable, it means that something is wrong with our scheme. (Schutz 1972a: 84)

And concerning the criteria by which one seeks out and selects the patterns of meaning for a personal interpretation of an experience:

> "Paradoxically it could be said that the lived experience itself decides the scheme into which it is to be ordered, and thus the problem chosen proposes its own solution." (ibid., 85) – and this scheme is constituted in negative experience, in a failure to meet or constitute meaning within the schemes of the natural attitude characteristic of the pragmatic working world, and without relevant types of experience of its own.[6]

According to my thesis, the critical anchor of self-explanation leading to this 'decision of schemes' lies in the 'Intimate', in the '*Hidden,*' what Schutz calls only gradual peculiarity, or the development *in and with* time of a unique style of

[5] This theme of Kertész's method of remembering will be more deeply analyzed in part III. Schutz refers to the difference between indirect and direct communication as Kierkegaard introduced it in his essay on *Multiple realities* (Schutz 1971b: 280; 292–298). Cf. also Waldenfels 1999.

[6] With Gadamer such negative experience is a constitutive motif for the process of experience, where new experiences are not subsumed under typical schemes, but rather become de-typified in order to become an exemplary experience (cf. Gadamer 1965: 335).

expression.[7] Expressing this 'intimate person' (Scheler) in a self-reflective, different and new way creates a difference between experience and memory, in which meaning can be constructed and further fleshed out within the realm of an inter- and trans-subjective memory event in the vein of a Schutzian action space.

Subjective meaning is the testimony and bond of a special experience by the ego, an opposing alter ego and a remembering partner, whereas the objective meaning of a predetermined 'commodity' is in no way thought to testify to a particular experience by a particular you (cf. ibid.: 133). Subjective meaning must first give rise to its own cohesion of meaning (cf. ibid.: 188) – in the process of its constitution. This happens through a "change of *attention à la vie,*" through which "something that is taken for granted (is) transform(ed) into something [problematic]," (ibid.: 74) and – one has to add – finds particular expression, is testified to, in ways and in schemes that overrule those which characterise the interpretative attitudes towards what we take for granted. This we find in the subjective, inner consciousness and in the ways by which it seeks expressive and interpretative schemes for itself as we will see with Kertész later on.

2 Construction of an Inner Awareness of Time – Change of the *Attention à la Vie*

"Essentially actual experiences" that are bound to a certain temporal point in inner consciousness are, occurring to Schutz, deprived of even reflective access (Schutz 1972a: 52).[8] "They are characterized by their affiliation with, or proximity to, the most inner core of the ego, which Scheler called the 'absolutely intimate person'" (ibid.).[9] Such experiences[10] distance themselves from the contextualizing actions of memory and re-membrance; Kertész illustrates this as he tries to find equivalent sensual experiences to those he realized and typologized in his immediate surroundings in the camp without the context of a self-supporting working space – for example, he tries to recall the smell of the leather-glove he was beaten with.

A personal interpretation of experience is just as impossible through these events as it is through the intended meaning of an alter ego. In fact, what is required both here and there is the signifying recollection and repeated realization of the

[7] Cf. Srubar (1979: 49ff.): "Vermittels der Selbstauslegung, der Rückführung von intersubjektiv gültigem Sinn auf einen subjektiven, wäre alltagsweltliches und reflektiertes Fremdverstehen möglich."

[8] For the purposes of demarcation I would read this as 'lived experience' (*Erleben*) in contrast to experience taken for granted and symbolized in concepts (*Erfahrung*). 'Abgrenzung'; what about 'differentiation'?

[9] This is closed to the witness as well as to personal reflection - a memory only captures the 'that' of experience but not the 'how' of the act in its continuance and in its appearance: between the pathic and the gnostic method of perception (Erwin Straus) there is a hiatus in the experience of time.

[10] Exemplary for Schutz here are moments of embodiment, pain and passion, moods, feelings and affects.

experience, for the ego is itself a foreign body that can only be captured (remembered) and brought under the sign of 'meaning' through modification and symbolization, even ambiguous symbolization.[11] Only through a change in the experience of the self can the unquestionable existence of our experiences be brought into question (cf. ibid.: 74). How, though, can this change be brought about so that one can communicate reflectively between lived and experienced time?

The interpretive 'logging' of these 'intimate experiences' becomes itself, as an act, problematic and therefore a subject of self-interpretation. In self-reflection these experiences become a special 'attentive mood' of the ego. Such attentiveness serves as a first step to find a way to express oneself; it is a spontaneous activity of the ego in its very here and now, in this problematic situation (cf. ibid.: 85). Yet that which is categorized as intentional, as 'intended meaning' is merely an approximate value, an "unending process" (cf. ibid.: 109), whose origins must be retraced. Yet, this poses the further problem of whether and how this retracing differs from the lived experience and how the "unending process" can gain an orienting value, a relevance (cf. Hilt 2009); for Kertész this will mean putting this process into the medium of fiction, separating meaning from the process of its constitution in the narration of his memories.

The subject of foreignness as an effect of a diachronic experience of time and the consequence of the social mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion is only briefly broached in *The Phenomenology of the Social World*; however, Schutz treats it as a special case[12] in his two 1944/45 works, the detailed descriptive-phenomenological studies in *The Stranger* and *The Homecomer*.[13] A good example of the Schutzian theory of foreign understanding in the framework of his comprehensive sociology is the following section of *The Phenomenology of the Social World*. The grasping of something unknown, of something outside myself as present, is a "a perception which is signitive," for "I apprehend the lived experiences of another only through signitive-symbolic representation, regarding either his body or some cultural artefact he has produced as a 'field of expression' for those experiences" (Schutz 1972a: 100). For Schutz, a sign of the Other's intended meaning is to be seen, above all else,

[11]For example, for Kertész "something resembling happiness" as "the most memorable experience" of his hardships. For him, this serves as a symbol to capture his attempt to re-live and to testify his constitution of a solitary province of meaning which is self-supportive in spite of the irregularities in the camps had to come up to (cf. also my reflections above).

[12]See Schutz's short remarks on the constraints of collective experience (life-world): "Furthermore, as just a marginal note, a breaking off, or even just a radical restriction, of the continual confirmation of this character of the world has grave consequences für the normal development of its intersubjectivity. The component of self-evidencies which is the underpinning for the lifeworld to which we are accustomed is, for instance, endangered in solitary confinement, even often demolished. The technique of brainwashing appears very probably to turn this circumstance to good account" (Schutz/Luckmann 1974: 68).

[13]The boundaries of foreign-understanding are denoted in the following characterizations: "the homecomer is not the same man who left. He is neither the same for himself nor for those who await his return" (Schutz 1945: 375). As a homecomer he finds himself within a world he no longer belongs to.

in the movements of a foreign body, for the body is an open field for expression. No longer merely an object of observation, it is a medium through which we ourselves are pointed toward foreign experiences, yet one that narrows perspective to the once non-participatory observer (cf. ibid.: 101).

Nevertheless, I watch foreign experiences as they unfold. The duration of my foreign and personal experiences differs, but such experiences are in a certain sense simultaneous, insofar as I experience my own actions not only in relation to but in unity with the foreign experience. The duration of the experience of the Other synchronizes, so to speak, the duration of my own experience with his; we are in a world of time, we *age* together, we experience change and alienation in time, a perspectivation of an experience whose interrelationship is anything but self explanatory.

However, it is in Schutz's 'unity of a synchronously consummated event of meaning' that the difference between expression and its ways to a fulfilment of meaning in understanding, symbolization and the ability to interpretatively transcend it again is lost; and with this, the enrichment, redefinition and change of meaning. As such, constitution of meaning itself is schematized, particularly the individual differences that protect and ultimately ensure the safety of the 'intimate personality' from being misinterpreted by the world, others and socially constructed foreign meaning: it 'simply happens.'[14]

Schutz's definition of expressive acts highlights this difficulty:

> By an 'expressive' action [to be distinguished from an 'expressive movement'] we mean one in which the actor seeks to project outward the contents of his consciousness, whether to *retain* the latter for his own use later on (as in the case of an entry in a diary) or to communicate them to others. (Schutz 1972a: 116; my italics, A.H.)

For me, it comes down to the '*retaining*' that Schutz lays out in all its varying subjective forms. He writes: "Expressive acts are always genuine communicative acts which have as their goal their own interpretation, be that through the self or the Other" (ibid.: 117). In light of this "explanatory communication", one must take something or other as given; but if one no longer needs to question it, why is a personal analysis of singular experience even necessary? This is the very problem inherent in trying to understand testimonies that deprive themselves of the synchronized unity of a mutual horizon. Schutz himself did not attempt to define this more precisely.

Schutz's theory of socially-based, 'prior' knowledge (on the basis of which he claims that "all expressions […] have for both user and interpreter, over and above their objective meaning, a meaning which is both subjective and occasional") comes up short here. The theory must be widened and expanded, for one can no longer presume that the signals one uses to communicate with another will have a particular, individual meaning attached to it "that has its origin in the unique character of the experienced act", and that it will be mutually meaningful (ibid.).

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[14]One would think of Robert Musil's '*seinesgleichen geschieht'* ('the likes of him come to pass'): his equals in a perfidious anonymity that no longer lets itself be separated into an 'I' and a 'Thou', instead, it becomes a general type.

Schutz takes as his starting point the simultaneity of a genuinely foreign understanding of a continuously existent space-time in which concepts of action are possible; the possibility of foreign understanding is based on a strong concept of activity, where intention and its realization follow each other immediately without any instances of 'inner passivity', without an epoché of retraction where individual expressions and their individual projections in a possible future activity are shaped; and this happens separately from any activity towards a public space in its role-patterns. Simultaneity implies a constancy of activity; but when does the 'constant' become the repetition of "it happen(ing) again and again", with "every step lead(ing) to the next", transforming the subject into the passive object of the definition of meaning? This is where the subjective act of remembering the past (a past no longer to be enacted in uninterrupted constancy and in immediate reactions) intervenes in the unreal and fictive mood that attempts the impossible, "Absurdly, it demands that the irreversible be turned around, that the event be undone" (Améry 1980: 68).

In order to emphasize the subjective side in the configuration of meaning, the hermeneutical and ethical relevance of a 'solitary ego' should be brought to the forefront. There is indeed the potential for an analysis of the subjective forms of expression in the separation of the **'I'** and **'**Thou**'** as Schutz expresses it in *The Phenomenology of the Social World* through his theory of foreign understanding. At the same time, the parameters and limitations of this theoretical model should be defined. This should be done in order to constructively expound upon Schutz's phenomenological indication of the problem of the individual expression of meaning, and this also offers the opportunity to go beyond his thesis to explore the inaccessibility of the inner self by means of socially constructed norms.

In the following, I will investigate the peculiar expression "how to be attentive" with the help of Kertész's works, and how this relates to personal experience. This model for action is only a schema of foreign understanding and the creation of meaning structures for, among other things, the process of a transformation of attention. More often, other models of experience intersect with and even precede it; lived and recounted meaning contains its own dimension of self understanding even before its expression through works or actions.

3 The 'Foreign Understanding of the Self' – Kertész's Fictionalization of Subjective Reality

Kertész gives voice to the interpretation of foreign experiences based on the comprehension of one's alter ego in his book *Fateless* – through the life of György Köves, the alter ego of Kertész's own memories. It is his *alter Ego* – not himself – that can no longer confirm his identity, which first finds expression through differing strategies of comprehensive interpretation. "I could" he writes, "imagine such a character's language, being and world of ideas as fiction, but [I] was no longer identical with it" (Kertész 2006: 78–9.)

Who is Kertész writing for? First and foremost he is writing for himself: having lived through the failed Hungarian Revolution of 1956, the beginning of the communist Kadar-system, having taken the decision to become a writer, only for his novel *Fateless* to be rejected by the censors and he himself denounced for a defeatist representation of historic incidents and denounced for mental instability – for a person who had endured all this – writing meant to live, to not collaborate and lose yourself (oneself) in a language that is defined by social types – be they from the past or the future – that had to be either self-contained, significant or functional. It meant to withdraw from society as a 'private man,' to become invisible and forgotten, to be without public life. The 'returned stranger' (no longer a 'homecomer') from Buchenwald and Birkenau in 1945 was not just a stranger, an Other; he was *no one*! Neither Jew nor communist resistance fighter, he was a survivor, or merely that which his social world saw. He, however, wrote: "in order to not appear to be what I am" (Kertész 1999b: 77).[15]

> Kertész speaks of the "feeling of the untenable life," the "feeling of foreignness" that "has its roots in our reality, in the reality of our human situation […] that life suddenly assumes the picture, the form, or more precisely, the formlessness of the most complete uncertainty, so that I can am no longer sure of its reality. I am gripped by a total mistrust of the experiences that portray themselves through my senses as reality, especially of my own 'real' existence, and the existence of my surroundings, an existence […] that is bound to my life and that of my surrounds by only the thinnest of threads, and this thread is my mind, and nothing else. (Kertész 1999b: 82ff.)

Kertész's aim is to understand not only how one can appropriate and assimilate reality, but how one can form reality through determination? This is fatelessness, the non-tragic without the illusion of a 'teleological plan of freedom' which, in the end, will strike back on the integrity of suffering a fate in gaining an exemplary experience from it.

> I define fatelessness as the experience of reality as a self-imposed determination, instead of a necessity that stems from our own personal – relative – freedom. […] Two possibilities of protection: we transform ourselves, to a certain extent from own free will, into our determination and try to modify the foreign determination of our fate, or we revolt against it and become victims of our own determination. Neither of the two is a true solution, for we are forced […] in both cases to conceive of our determination as *reality*, while the determining force, this absurd power, triumphs over us. (Kertész 1999a: 77)

To own a fate would mean, first of all, to have freedom of choice and to believe, even in failure, in that tragic situation where freedom holds no promise of success, but where everything seems possible in a positive sense because even death and the end have substance and meaning, that freedom is ultimately possible. The functional

[15] All citations from Kertész – except his novel *Fateless* – are direct translations from the German edition of his works, translated by Brandon Winter.

system and the 'functional man',[16] a consequence of social 'typologizing,' however, stand in opposition to this, as they functionalize this very freedom of displaying what this "experience of reality as self-imposed determination" means for my own subjective experience; self-imposed determination – the poetology of Kertész's writing, the way his alter ego Köves testifies what he experiences – becomes typological necessity as it is interpreted as a therapeutic way of assimilating traumata or as the abnormal, constrained habit of 'a survivor'.

The loneliness that arises from *suffering* the world[17] leads, together with the *fear* of personal loss and the *doubt* that accompanies it, to a break with apparent reality. This, in turn, leads to a radical change in the alignment to reality, where fiction comes to be the reality of personal experience, and where one progresses (again) to a gnostic attitude (Straus), an attitude constituting one's own province of meaning, but which shields itself from being taken for granted. Its commemorative and inventive perception as well as its experience at a remove from immediate experience and its typologized snares comes close to what Schutz has in mind with "expressive action" and its retaining quality (cf. above). Kertész himself takes his fateless man out of an inter-subjective world, with its illusions of individuality and progressive development; he is, as a consequence, a functional element in the totalitarian closure of reality, his own object of description, separate from the first person perspective capable of intentional projection. Writing and imagination create – unlike pure autobiographical memories of the finished past – a piece of the world that transcends this (our) piece of the world in the involuntarily memorized flow of time.

The fateless man is a self-propelled, changing perspective, not an active hero. He loses the fixed point of his own perspective in the world, a fact that shows itself in his ongoing identification with foreign experiences. In the beginning this seems to be embodied naively in the figure of György Köves, but it develops, in the course of the tale, a dynamic of understanding, of the flow of his inner, reflexive personal time, in which the reciprocity of a lack of understanding[18] culminates in doubting the goal of a meaningful and understandable end of the experienced event. Yet this perspective of the 'other than myself' wins symbols for his experience of doubting reality; doubt of the authenticity of experience becomes the basis for a possible reality, of a reality in absurdity that shows its resistance in that very absurdity.

The possibility for a 'normal world,' whose experience could somehow be valid in the cosmos of the camps, is negated with every new step into the functionality of

[16] "[T]he hero of a tragedy is the creator and cause of his own downfall. The man today only conforms. […] The reality of a functional man is a pseudo-reality, a life-replacing life […]. Indeed, his life is mostly a tragic process or error, but without the necessary tragic consequences, or a tragic consequence without the necessary tragic 'back story' since the consequences were not inflicted through the personal lawfulness of character and action, but rather through the desire for balance in the social order. This is absurd for the individual. […] No one lives his own reality that way, only his function without the existential experience of his life, without his own fate. This could mean the subject of work for him." (ibid.: 8–9.)

[17] 'Pathically', not 'gnostically' experiencing it.

[18] In this case between the homecomer and those who remained in the old lifeworld.

the machinery of selection and annihilation. Adapting the ego to the world is no exchange between the ego and the world, just the breaking of the ego by the world.[19] György Köves experiences as naively as the child that he is, as a man with trust in the world who, until the moment of his deportation, could not believe in the camps. And every one of his explanations for an ever increasing improbable normality fails, deceives him or is a foreign meaning that assumes the perspective of the selection officers and affects his own personal, objective view of itself.[20]

Two things happen within the techniques of narrative construction, or in Kertész's case, narrative composition: the first person 'narrating ego' recalls the memories of himself (the alter ego), and he reflects the experience of his alter ego, always pending between different levels of perspectives: both an observer bracketing any previous knowledge (as György Köves does not have any common knowledge of what is awaiting him), as participating observer and as observing participant. He does not subjectify the objective self on the level of experience, but introduces modes of distancing on the narrative level and indicates these break lines in a growing awareness of the possibilities fictionalizing opens towards a grasp on reality. The narrator or the narration do not portray the ego himself, but rather the automatism (the only visible and portrayable thing) in which the self is lost, and from which it must withdraw (cf. Kertész 1999a: 139).

This narrative perspective (remembering a view taken in a personal diary), which is necessarily belated, forces the reader, as a kind of alter ego himself, to participate in this chronological successiveness, forces him to participate in experiencing this mechanism of the totalitarian world. It is not possible to enjoy a play at a distance where one does not know one's role, in which one loses one's fate as a hero in a tragedy, a fate that gives life meaning. One must go through and experience the cluelessness of immediacy again. Yet once this is experienced, time fully and successively unfolds, so that the tale does not shatter with the singularity of the experience. This sets the attempt at a radical subjectivity against the assimilated mind**'**s deadliness **–** in an attempt at a narrative appropriation of the recounted interpretation of the personal, **'**foreign experience**'** and its memory.

What does this mean for the act of remembering? Kertész writes in *Dossier K.* that "the experience of the death camps becomes a general human experience where I come across the universality of experience" (Kertész 2006: 78). He comes across the

[19]Cf. The following describes Kertész's attempts to communicate this incoherence between self and world: "Kertész läßt sein Ich an dem Vokabular der Zivilisation festhalten und die Wirkung ist vertrackt. Mal wirkt das in diesen Wörtern Präsentierte wie wattiert oder durch milchiges Glas gesehen, manchmal bekommen die Kommentare durch dieses Vokabular eine schmerzliche Schärfe und Präzision, und endlich wird in ihm vorgeführt, wie sich der psychische Anpassungsprozeß vollzieht, der – im Dienste des Überlebens – als Anpassung an eine mörderische Umwelt, der eigene Beitrag zu ihr ist: Selbstzerstörung." (Reemtsma 2003: 231)

[20]"I was incredibly surprised because I saw for the first time in my life – at least from close – real prisoners, in striped suits … the round hats of the guards. I immediately backed off to get by. […] Their faces were also not inspiring confidence: pulled back ears, lunging noses, deep set, tiny eyes that craftily glared. Actually, they looked like Jews in every respect. I found them suspicious and completely outlandish" (Kertész 1998: 89).

universality, but not the standardization, he comes across the *universality of possibility* as an exceptional and anomalous existence (cf. ibid.: 80). The ambiguity of the reality of writing, of the reality in writing, is whether or not only facts and the possibility horizon are an objective reality for the imaginary. The imperative of facts becomes contingent, for they are arbitrary. "It could be different," they say and produce, at least in thought, the form of possibility, the "categorical subjunctive" (Helmuth Plessner), an objection as subjective resistance of thought and fantasy, but without pathos.

This reality is random and arbitrary. "There exists", says Kertész in his *Nobel Price acceptance speech* in 2002,[21] "only the one reality, but I am this reality, my life, […] which unknown, foreign powers had seized, nationalized, determined and sealed, and which I had to get back from the story, this terrible Moloch, because it belongs to me alone and I had to deal with it accordingly." The reality of writing becomes that worldly reality in which subjective and solitary (re)experience, and finally life, become possible: Life gains the possibility of transcending closed provinces of reality and meaning. The perspective of subjective reality constitutes remembered experience from the beginning into a linear path of knowledge, a perspective that refrains from cutting down opinions and morally classifying the world, especially into the categories of victim and perpetrator. György Köves is no victim – the recounted "atrocities" do not befall him, he does not provoke them in contact and confrontations with others, he creates them, rather, by simply being there, by taking part. 'The likes of him come to pass' without even the possibility of conceptualizing or endowing meaning, or of possessing those actions that protect it.

The meaning of this individual existence resists not only foreign interpretation, but also operational understanding, for "understanding means in reality something like: 'to take possession of' (otherwise it wouldn't be important). Is there a kind of understanding I don't want to possess, with which I don't want to empower myself? For example: when I give myself up to a narrative and stumble into an ambush and am taken prisoner […] Isn't my life that kind of story? How could I put this kind of story into words?" (Kertész 1999a: 71). As a narrative reality, individual experience becomes the trigger for the constitution of meaning and a motif for the doubting of meanings taken for granted by the social world, of the momentum of a self-maintaining rationality.[22] It does this as a fundamental experience and evidence of individual experience, instead of the "pseudo-objectivism, the cautious, deliberate balancing act through which everything personal dies off and its place is ceded to the alarming schizophrenia, whose very character has established an outer totality in lieu of the suppressed subjectivity" (Ibid.: 87).

Returning to Schutz, I would like to address the ‚border regions' or 'thresholds' (*Grenzbereiche*) of his theory of *lifeworld*,[23] to not only experience, but to express

[21] http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/literature/laureates/2002/kertesz-lecture-e.html

[22] Cf. Srubar 1988a, 18f. on the limits of constitution of meaning through universal and self-contained systems of knowledge.

[23] Unfortunately, this last chapter – *Grenzen der Erfahrung und Grenüberschreitungen: Verständigung in der Lebenswelt* – is not contained in the English edition of *Structures of the Lifeworld*. Thus, I will cite and refer to these texts from the German edition of *Strukturen der Lebenswelt* (Schutz and Luckmann 2003).

and put into words the transcendences of lifeworld and its forms of life in order to expand the theory, to show the fulfilment of a transformative understanding of the lifeworld(s) in *hermeneutics of transcendence*.

4 Deconstruction and Reconstruction of the Social World

The quality of singular, gnostic and pathic experience should once again be reconquered as a natural attitude which has a reflective value in constituting meaning as it can reach back to intimate experience. It must be retaken from those who remember, and from those, who encounter this memory. This cannot happen directly face to face, but rather through attentiveness to the character of a problem. This can, in turn, be gleaned indirectly from a fulfilment of understanding, its transcendence and transformation, through the transcendence of facts to a province of imaginary meaning – and back to an altered reality of attentiveness.

The transcendence of subjective meaning, its embeddedness in social categories of meaning and their limitations is neither the outflow of transcendental constitution of meaning, nor is it inevitably the 'functioning' of trans-individual, pragmatic and mundane structures of typologized meaning typologies. In fact, it opens a structure of foreign understanding: this is the structure of a private, completely subjective stratification of meaning construction and the processes of communication in its *symbolic*, fragmentary expression. As such, the transcendence of symbols as a medium withdraws from the dichotomies of outward-inward, physical-psychic and personal-foreign (cf. Schutz and Luckmann 2003: 593); symbols open the distance of space and time for transcendences. Schutz writes in the *Structures of the Life-World* that "self-explanatory assumptions about the conditions of experience, (but also) the limits of action and the borders of life constitute every piece of background information that one might call 'knowledge of transcendence'." (Ibid.: 593) Yet, this 'knowledge of transcendence' is not 'simply' given. It expresses itself, rather, in the forms of transcendence that must be attained, held tightly and conveyed as a plurality and difference in the structures and coherence of life, and transformed through the appropriation of symbols into a personal context of expression.

These symbols receive their potency, as we saw in Kertész's works, when they do not refer to an experience in synchronicity, but when the time dimension of experience and remembering (which first must be constituted in a subjective space of experience) define the distance between any intended meaning and a world. Symbolic difference first makes movement possible between finite provinces of meaning, but it also allows for the transfer of memory and translation processes between them. Provinces of meaning are not born solely through sociality and the social mechanisms of a dictated, outer *lifeworld*, they are also initiated spontaneously through *subjective acts*. They are not just the products of acting in accordance with the underlying precepts of public action, but also, according to Schutz, through memory, the area of insurmountable subjectivity where the restraints of memory and closed lifeworlds become porous and passable.

In *Structures of the Life-World*, Schutz distinguishes between the 'small everyday transcendences,' the 'middle transcendences in the encounters with others' and the 'large transcendences between the everyday and other realities.' Knowing the edges of a lifeworld, knowing the borderlines of transcending its closedness in favor of a broader, more open horizon of perspective, is not simply a given, but it is fulfilled in experience in its transcendences. The middle and large transcendences stand, in my opinion, in a reciprocal exchange: especially in cases where 'reality' is more strongly bound to the subjective alignment and analysis of meaning than Schutz articulates it. In this sense, I see both of these areas not as separate, but rather as being united in a mutual dynamic of meaning constitution.

The limits of lived – immediate – experience are set through the experience of the passing of time, i.e., knowing that I once did not exist and that at some point I will no longer be, that my fellow men age with me, that they will die before me, that I have *memories* of the past and a view of the future – even of a time after my life. I recall my memories, experience myself in changing perspectives and have to find ways to express these as mine, giving rise to fulfilled transcendences in action and expression out of the finiteness of these experiences.

Finiteness and its references to transcendences *connect* and *isolate* me from others. For Schutz, the experience of transcendence is the basis for a distinction between ego and alter; it can be attributed to the achievements of consciousness, in which the ego's sphere of authenticity, which classifies ego and alter ego, builds and stratifies meaning and constructions of meaning (ibid.: 594). Everything that appears as a given leads to something else, to memory, expectations, fantasy, and can be see as a shift in attention. No experience is self-contained, for it can become questionable with distance; there is no evidence of other dimensions of experience or reality, yet it can become alien nevertheless. This is how the limits we meet in life appear to us, "as moveable and misplaceable" (ibid.: 591), as constraints and limitations from outside that only unlock negative knowledge. They are, however, transcendable limitations that border on other possible positive experiences.

They must open themselves in a prospective time and prove themselves to be a reality of experience. This experience must first constitute itself in the **'**hermeneutical mood**'** of ambiguous symbols, which mood is transcendence itself in its own right and logic. The transcendence of limits happens over time, through a dimension of expression in and through which we agree on these limits, or still better, where we arrange them into a horizon of meaning that gives movement to space and time, through memory, narrative and writing **–** regaining an experience that no longer can be simply taken for granted now as it provokes a contrast with an everyday experience as a commodity of the working world.

As such, the contents of experience are always fundamentally subjective, yet they can acquire the status of 'intended meaning' through a change of attention and an embedding in the context of another reality. There is, however, still the possibility for the radical subjectivity of 'pathological meaning,' just as Schutz interprets it as an indication of the great transcendence of dream. This would be, then, a radical, monadic and autistic deviance from a normative form of self-expression. Transcendence always presupposes a break with the natural attitude, that is, a breaking out of a

socially self-contained world in times of doubt, or even to break it open with personal expression, style or testimony. One could take this further in the vein of the 'middle transcendence' and its corresponding change in attention[24] or fictionalisation of events, and develop it into an autobiographical memory with a concerted effort at expression.[25]

With this realignment of the Schutzian stratification of transcendences, the focus now shifts to thematic fields; the question is no longer 'how does my experience show itself,' rather it becomes: '*who* expresses himself in the experience, who changes within it and constructs himself into a self, both new and different?' How do forms of expression develop out of the intimate personality that discovers and finds a world of understanding through self-expression, instead of being silenced and concealed through social interaction?

The 'who' in question here, is György Köves in his narrated reality of broken memory. It is in the narrative reconstruction of Kertész's other, recounted self, his recounted ego, that past experiences become meaningful symbols embedded in an individual, and therefore social story, which is itself embedded in the experienced reality of an individual's biography. A comprehensive understanding must answer this expression, accept it and transform it, along with understanding itself.

5 Layers of Memory and Structures of the World: Indications of Problems in Schutz's Study of the Ego and View of *Hermeneutics of Transcendence*

Schutz summarizes the output of consciousness in the transcendence of meaning horizons as follows:

> All of them, signs, markers and symbols communicate the limits of immediate experience in that they, in some way, transcend everything that is thematically, interpretively and motivationally relevant to present experience. […] Symbols announce the presence of everyday reality – or report the everyday as that everyday which opens with distance. All these media create a fundamental activity of the consciousness, mutual presence. (Schutz and Luckmann 2003: 634ff.)[26]

Schutz and Luckmann only managed to come to a narrow and perhaps insufficiently nuanced definition of the subjective processes of the exchange of historical

[24]The concentration camp is only to be experienced as fictionality, never as a reality; not even – and maybe then not at all – if we experience it (cf. Kertész 1999a: 253). Art mediates experience: experiences of the world in their ethical consequences (cf. ibid.: 239).

[25]Trancendences of the everyday where one cannot take much with one self and from which one can return even less – except memories of references and references to memories (cf. Schutz and Luckmann 2003: 619).

[26]This is my direct translation from the German edition of *The structures of the Life-world* 1999a: 253.

world-time and individual life-time.[27] They argue that the categories of biographical expression are not actually categories of inner continuity; they are inter-subjectively defined (Schutz and Luckmann 2003: 95). Yet, they also state that "my situation consists of a story of *my* experience" (ibid.: 96). The most important and unique autobiographical aspect, as standardized as it may be, is the progression of the experience of my inner continuity (cf., ibid.: 97). This bias might illustrate the hardships of autobiographical memory, trying to testify its meaning in front of and against the passage of time, in front of and against its own experiences neither shared nor for sharing with others, in front of and against those provinces of meaning which exclude this memory.

Kertész's poetology of the fictionalization of reality searches for, above all else, *a frame of expression* for the survivor's experience which insists on the uniqueness of his memory in the face of the public interpretation of events – as a testimony which objects to being typologized. Kertész writes out of the loneliness of persecution and the 'snares of assimilation.' He tries, through his fictionalization of memory, to express the survivors' 'twisted and insane' sense of time "for it desires two impossible things: regression into the past and nullification of what happened" into a single expression for these experiences (Améry 1980: 68). Here we are dealing with the vexing problem of how subjective meaning can be expressed, and of how the foreign interpretations of the everyday make the excluded the object of comprehensive acquisition.

The biographical articulation of meaning structures constitutes a superordinate experience of time over against the everyday, or everyday life (cf. Schutz and Luckmann 2003: 95). They are not yet in an interchange of objective historical time, collectively-remembered time and the uniqueness of personal experience processes; they do not yet provide interconnectedness of experience, which can neither be articulated in intersubjective-typological, nor in scientific-objective terms. For Schutz and Luckmann, the main focus remains on the social categories of biographical expression, which are particular and predetermined as a part of a relative-natural worldview, and they belong to the typological system that opens into the social structure "in the form of a typical biography" (ibid.: 95).

There is, however, a point where biographical 'categories of the self' become important – in the movement away from a comprehensive and cohesive social meaning. "The historicity of the situation is imposed; it is an ontological, general prerequisite of being there. The relative-natural worldview, the social categories of biographical expression that unfold within it, are, in contrast, experienced by the individual as something that must be coped with in the lifeworld. Categories of biographical expression are, therefore, not a fundamental prerequisite of the life situation, but rather the possibility for leading a life in the situation itself" (ibid.: 94). This possibility allows for the (re)interpretation and change of the situation's contours;

[27] Cf. Srubar (1988b: 271). For a life-historical meaning of appresentative relationships see Schutz and Luckmann (2003: 639).

lifeworldly structures are put at a distance, creating new room for action, and above all else, room for reflection, wider fields of transcendences.'

It is here that once again one can gain access to a world shared with others: through memory and its mediatisation in the narrative – if effective action is not possible. "I can coordinate the past phases of the conscious life of these Others with past phases of my own conscious life. This means, above all, that in hindsight I can follow along in its inner duration the step-by-step construction of the subjective meaning-contexts under my attention" (ibid.: 88). Indeed, world is in the consciousness of a solitary ego, or more precisely, 'the concept of the world' is bracketed off for use in the future; yet at the same time, it contains the ground and the space on and in which we can experience and recognize one another in our biographical testimony as an 'I,' always in a doubtful distance as another. This would mean a comprehensive and attainable transformation of understanding, of ways back and forward into mutual lifeworlds, into worlds of action and interaction.

The fragility of this world is expressed in *Fateless* where we read "that certain statements only achieve meaning in their immanence [in the novel]" and that "values are immanent in novels. Hate, happiness, certain words lose their usual meaning in a novel, in much the same way that one needs bricks to build a cathedral and we, at the end, marvel at the towers and the structure that took shape through them" (Kertész 2006: 96–7.). This does not happen through immediate empathy in an already existing world. It is done through the gradual constitution of a subjective temporal world for experience, aging, and a world of symbols whose goals are not the contents of experience, but rather the 'how' of these experiences (which are no longer or are not yet anchored to social meaning), and through constituting a world of symbols that refers to that which is absent.

Such a subjective experience never becomes an easily shared collective one, but in transcending the everyday, on the outer reaches of understanding and communication, it shows the Other(s)' worlds in all their intimacy. These worlds should perhaps only be known under the heading of 'strategies which subvert reality' for they must remain the testimonies of individuals in order to refer to that which can only appear as an anomic order of everyday life. In their transcendence of a historical and social scientific definition of understanding and explanation, these worlds testify something that can never become a synchroneous present.

This absent as 'remembered' and 'recounted,' as the witnessed past, will not be made absolute as the object of understanding; it will open again in the awareness of understanding, but it will also be transformable for the future without the past merging with it as testimony. It remains erratic in the narrative's borrowed horizon of meaning, which almost demands its own limits so that the memory can live on. It demands free passage so that it can perhaps win the freedom of its own (and then also shared) social lifeworld(s) on the borders of a meaning-horizon's experience of inner freedom. We must further define our categories of meaning, the processes of meaning constitution and our understanding of it along with its limitations and in its transcendences by focussing on individual testimonies, their construction in and with time, and a hermeneutic of forms of expression within its character of transcending reality.

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Alfred Schutz's Practical-Hermeneutical Approach to Law and Normativity

Ion Copoeru

The term "normativity" is used by Alfred Schutz exclusively in connection with Talcott Parsons' theory of social action (Schutz 1978, 1996b). Nevertheless, even if it is not an essential term in the Schutzian lexicon, the term is still crucial to an understanding of the originality of the Schautzian approach to the social and legal worlds. Given that it encompasses all phenomena that involve a reference to what we *ought* to do (the imperatives), normativity offers us a vantage point from which ethical questions become relevant.[1] My hypothesis is that the Schutzian understanding of normativity opens a path for a phenomenological approach to law and legal practices in a modern judicial society. In this context, the task of the philosopher of law is to describe the law and its functioning in such a way that the entire normative system of a society becomes amenable both to individual and collective actions and susceptible to change according to a certain historical dimension of the principles of justice. In order to succeed, this phenomenological description has to be complemented by a practical-hermeneutical approach. Although legal hermeneutics pertained to the core of legal practice, i.e. the interpretation of legal texts as more or less indeterminate meanings (Kress 1992: 200–218), the aims of legal hermeneutics, as far as the practice was concerned, remained modest[2] and were basically confined to a point of view

[1] Recent investigations made it clear that we cannot speak any more of an absence of ethics in his philosophy, as the intellectual confrontations with Voegelin or Gurwitsch had suggested (Barber 2004: 121–130). Michael Barber (2004: XI) noticed that "Schutz was all too aware of how moral codes and ethical theories can be used to bolster an in-group's folkways and further exile outgroups." However, his understanding of the social interactions and of the normativity embedded in them kept him away from ancient versions of ethics, based on a form of imposition. Once the genuine power of subjectivity is (phenomenologically) disclosed, such ethical theories are condemned, together with any other imposed order of relevances.

[2] "Hermeneutics is well suited to make a modest contribution to the reconstitution of legal education. Attention to subjects such as philosophical hermeneutics would not only change legal education in a positive way but also, perchance, change the contribution of lawyers to public life" (Leyh 2009, 290).

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outside the practice of law. That is to say, the point of view of practice is nonetheless incumbent to any hermeneutical perspective and the aim of any interpretive or theoretical activity is finally to shed new light on the practice in the respective area. Dealing with the interpretation of legal texts cannot therefore exclude the interrogation of texts as burdened with a special kind of validity expressed in an eminently practical lived context. It is my belief then that a legal hermeneutics which is sustained by a (phenomenologically disclosed) subjective practice of reason is able to generate the internal point of view of the law and to illuminate thus what is inherent in the very act of judging (as both interpreting legal texts and reasoning in legal terms). To demonstrate this, I will deal in the first section of this paper with the topic of reason and subjectivity, more precisely with the topic of reasoning as subjective-phenomenological practice. The second section will focus on the task of reconstructing law from a practical-hermeneutical point of view.

1 Reason as Subjective Practice

Schutz refrains from talking about ultimate ends and values. This might be the mere exercise of prudence in the face of insufficiently clarified philosophical terms and a sort of methodological self-limitation. However, it does not mean that Schutz did not continue to examine their nature. A deeper analysis shows that this restrictive attitude is primarily the consequence of adopting and maintaining a *"subjective" point of view.* Speaking of Parson's "normative values", which in his terms are a "system of motives", Schutz insists that they are "above all a function of the life of the human mind in time, i.e. in the '*durée*,' to use a Bergsonian term. All genuinely subjective description must refer to this fact, which on the other hand is hardly compatible with the conception of ultimate values or ultimate ends, or with a normativity which can only temporarily be complied with" (Schutz 1978: 36). The ultimate level, if there is one, is for Schutz the "continual shift of interest, of relevance, and of attention" (Ibid.), open to a phenomenological description.

Schutz rejects any conception of normativity that relies on the assumption that there is an actor on one side and some objective or objectified values on the other. He sees the term "volition", therefore, understood as implying "an effort on the part of the actor to accommodate his role as an agent to the teleological value pattern" (Schutz 1978: 27), as insufficient for the description of social action and also finds the name "voluntaristic" that Parsons gave to his theory a rather "strange" (ibid.) one.

Contrary to those who took a neo-idealist or a neo-realist path and objectified the meaning *per se*, Schutz renounced in a radical yet unnoticed philosophical gesture any theory involving the transcendent ground(s) of a pre-formed order (Schutz 1996c: 224). Schutz adopted an anti-essentialist point of view and his attention was drawn instead to "the nature of the relations which, according to Weber, are characterized by the 'probability of the repeated recurrence of the behaviour which corresponds to its subjective meaning' […]" (Schutz 1964a: 39). The understanding of the objective social world depends thus on its potential accessibility to my direct

experience. But the access to my direct experience is not a goal in itself. The pragmatic motive comes to the fore here: "Here, too, acting < is measured according to > success and failure; here, too, the validity of the interpretative scheme of the type of reality is tested by its purposiveness" (Schutz 1996a: 76).

By bracketing the metaphysical question regarding the source of normativity, Schutz was able to focus on the phenomenological question concerning the contexts in which *ordinary people* experience imperatives in the interplay of subjective and objective group membership and of imposed systems of relevances and typifications (Schutz 1964b: 265). Besides the objective interpretation of group membership, Schutz envisions a type of normativity which is expressed in the form of mutual exchange of perspectives. As a consequence, the metaphysical concept of normativity, previously seen as neutral, and responsible for a set of objectively valid norms, is now related to a subjective although not strictly individual source; everything that we used to call "objective meaning" is related to some particular attitude of various individuals who judge, evaluate, and interpret a situation from their own points of view. This is why "global" or "universal" normativity suddenly becomes localized, fragmented. "A norm" – warns Schutz – has a certain meaning

> for the norm-giver and the norm-addressee. Any law means something different to the legislator, the person subject to the law (the law-abiding citizen and the lawbreaker), the law-interpreting court and the agent who enforces it. Duty has a different meaning as defined by me autonomously and as imposed on me from outside. (Schutz 1964c: 276)

Bridging genetically and typologically subjective and objective meaning, Alfred Schutz criticized the supposed objective (impartial) point of view of the (social) scientist, as well as any form of objectivity as being an imposed relevance. He revealed not only the constitutive operations of mundane subjectivity as socially meaning-structured, but also the realm of social intersubjective life as one in which imposed and intrinsic relevances are continuously transformed into each other.[3]

Schutz's basic thesis is that the life-world of the individual in the modern age is not fully understandable, neither to the individual himself, nor to his or her fellow human beings. The motives for her or his actions remain beyond their control. This situation prompts the individual to undertake a process of internal clarification, which necessarily leads her or him to put in question other people's motives of action together with the relevances that they are imposing upon her or him. A deeper analysis would lead to an investigation of the field of the passive sphere of experience and the ways in which relevances can be imposed. Once taken into account, the immanent reality of the actor's life is thus eminently *practical*. "Even the deepest level of the stream of consciousness of the solitary Ego to which the reflective glance can penetrate is pragmatically determined", writes Schutz (1964a: 74).

This is not without consequence for the internal epistemic validities of the ego. The (social) scientist, as well as the ordinary man, brings to observation phenomena

[3] "They-relations that are from the outset characterized by a relatively low degree of anonymity" – writes Schutz – "can be transformed by various transitional phases into a We-relation" (Schutz 1964a: 56).

which are considered natural or objective, i.e. not founded in subjective constitution. Their validity remains, therefore, uninterrogated and it is taken for granted as equally natural or objective. The phenomenologist's approach consists in reflectively adopting a subjective point of view – for Schutz – the point of view of the social actor. He or she thus reconfigures the given phenomenon in its typicality as a meaningful social event. By having a practical subjective meaning it is shown in fact that the action or series of actions, together with their respective motives or justifications, can at any moment be a subject of examination, of approval or rejection, by those who observe them or by the actors themselves.

At this point, it might be helpful to briefly examine how Schutz envisions the interplay of epistemic and practical validities. First of all, he rejects "the analogy between the scientific investigator and the actor in ordinary practical activities" (Schutz 1996b: 7).[4] In comparing his point of view with that of Parsons, Schutz sees fit to emphasize and specify the particularity of the theoretical level in contrast to the other strata of our experience of the social world. He does not begin the description with a prefabricated definition of rationality. He describes instead the actions and thoughts of the ordinary man, who naively lives in the social world, among his fellow men. We can see how, with a simple gesture, Schutz places the problem of rationality in the interplay of the subjective points of view of the researcher and of the ordinary man. This allows him to see that the categories of meaning interpretation and the conceptual schemes of action change dramatically in the passage from one level's point of view to another (Idem, 8). "With the shift in our point of view – notes Schutz – new problems and factual aspects emerge while others disappear even though before they had been in the center of our problematic. This fact alone suffices to initiate a thorough modification of the meaning of all the terms used on the former level. Therefore careful control of such modifications of meaning is indispensable in order to avoid the danger of naively transposing terms and propositions from one level to the other although their validity is essentially limited to one level and its implicated suppositions." (Ibid.: 11) Schutz introduces here a "controlled" correlation between epistemic validities and practical interests corresponding to points of view and opens the way to a phenomenological[5] investigation of "the phenomenon of the modification" (Ibid.) itself.

[4] Schutz adds: "The starting point is that of conceiving the actor as coming to know the facts of the situation in which he acts and thus the conditions necessary and means available for the realization of his ends. As applied to the means-end relationship this is essentially a matter of the accurate prediction of various possible ways of altering the situation (employment of alternative means) and the resultant choice among them. Apart from questions relating to the choice of ends and from those relating to 'effort', where the standard is applicable at all, there is little difficulty in conceiving the actor as thus analogous to the scientist whose knowledge is the principal determinant of his action in so far as his actual course conforms with the expectations of the observer who has, as Pareto says, 'a more extended knowledge of the circumstances'."

Based on these principles, Parsons developed his theory of *"the rational unit act"* which is described as "a concrete unit of concrete systems of action. It is a unit which is, within the framework of the general action scheme, arrived at by maximizing one important property of unit acts – rationality." (1996b: 8–9)

[5] In the paper under discussion he prefers nevertheless to use the more accessible version of a theory of subjective modifications, namely, that of William James.

The description of knowledge in the world of ordinary life reveals a form of rationality, which offers us practical yet consistent ways of making a decision. Let's first examine, however, the basic ingredients of the knowledge situation within which the actor finds him or herself. His or her experience "embraces the most heterogeneous kinds of knowledge in a jumbled and confused state. <…> Everywhere there are gaps, intermissions, discontinuities. <…> Nowhere do we have a guarantee as to the reliability of all the assumptions which govern our conduct. <…> We are not interested in a "quest for certainty". We are satisfied with having a fair chance to realize our purpose on hand. " (Ibid: 15) It is no wonder then that the "ideal of everyday knowledge is neither certainty nor probability in a mathematical sense but just likelihood." (Ibid.) But Schutz does not aim here at just weakening ideal-formal rationality, but wants to replace the naturalness that it presupposes and continually reinforces when applied to social relations with typicality of actions. What is essential in this shift is that typicality may lose its semblance of naturalness and, in a moment of reflection, be questioned and possibly changed.

> Anticipations of future states of affairs are conjectures about what is to be hoped for or feared or at best about what reasonably can be expected. Later, when the anticipated state of affairs has taken form in actuality, we don't say that our prediction has come true or was proven false, or that our hypothesis has stood the test, but that our hopes were or were not well-founded. The consistency of this system of knowledge is not that of natural law but that *of typical* sequences and relations. (Ibid.)

As a result of introducing a practical motive into the reasoning, Schutz delineates the basic coordinates of a practice of rationality. They include reasonableness, deliberation, planning, predictability, likelihood, and choosing between two or more means (ibid.: 16–20). But the most important precondition of this practice is *substitution*, i.e., the capacity of the individual to "make up his mind and replace himself as the center of this world by another animate being…" (Ibid.: 20)[6]

Schutz's phenomenology has the capacity to make laws, norms, ordinances, etc., more "familiar." If we develop Schutz's ideas concerning the reciprocity of perspectives, we discover that norms and laws are more than objective meanings, they are also subjective perspectives. For Schutz, freedom resides in our capacity to shed our disguise, dropping a role, reordering our orientations in the social world. He invites us to keep being subjects, i.e. centres of spontaneous activities, and actors (Schutz 1996b: 20–21).

Schutz brings forward in this way the topic of the practical level of exchanges among individuals. Also, it prevents us from accepting situations and events that are imposed upon us as relevant, but which are not connected to interests chosen by us, which do not originate in acts of our discretion, and which we have to take just as they are, without any power to modify them by our spontaneous activities except by transforming the relevances thus imposed into intrinsic ones. While that remains unaccomplished, we do not consider the imposed relevances as being related to our

[6] In this text Schutz refers himself to the ideal type of "the observer", but in anticipating the second Section of my paper, I notice that we can easily replace him with any other person who maintains an 'objective' point of view (a judge, for example).

spontaneously chosen goals. Due to the fact that they are imposed upon us, they remain "unclarified and rather incomprehensible" (Schutz 1964b: 127). He convincingly argues that the imposed relevances reveal themselves in a phenomenological analysis as the sediment of previous acts of experience – my own acts as well as of others – which are socially approved. It is not the rigor of formal rationality that is shaping the destiny of man in modern times, but the turn towards its subjective powers and the enhancement of its capacity to take reasonable decisions.

2 The Practical-Hermeneutical Reconstruction of Law

In his introduction to a special issue on the continental philosophy of law, Nick Smith noted that "modern law seems antithetical to the sensibilities of many continental philosophers [among whom the phenomenologists are counted today – my note, IC]. Law generalizes, reduces, commensurates, and operates in a binary framework of guilt and innocence. It lacks the patience and resources to engage the nuances of concrete particulars" (Smith 2009: 2). Continental philosophy of law can therefore seem like a paradox unless conceived as "an almost entirely critical undertaking" (*Ibid.*). Phenomenology adopted from the very beginning a critical attitude towards various forms of positivism and their expressions in modern life (Ibid.). However, the phenomenological approach has been weakened by an ambivalence to date: on the one hand, it acknowledges the subjective meaning character of the "objective" social world and provides the premises for a critique of any sort of formalism and instrumentalism; on the other hand, it follows the interest concerning a region of the (pre-reflective) constitution of social objects which positions itself as normatively prevalent and finally indubitable. Through a possible blockage of the constitutive processes through which imperatives come about in social life, phenomenology did not offer enough warrants either against "decisionism" or moral or legal conformism. It has been ineffective therefore in attempts to solve the crisis of meaning that has formed the background of the widespread practice positivism that we can find in several aspects of modern life, especially in legal and political practices.

This is why the task of phenomenology today should rather be framed in terms of its possible contribution to the reconstruction of the meaning of law in Modern society. The author cited above maps the few places where continental philosophy meets the *theory and practice of law*, among which the most important are the reflection on concrete particulars and the theories of alterity. However, I think that the points in which phenomenology can infiltrate law and legal practices and transform them have remained largely uncharted. It appears to me that phenomenology as analytical practice is particularly well suited to unsettling the appearance of any absolute conviction which reigns over any kind of impersonal procedures, for which the judicial ones are exemplary. In particular, Alfred Schutz's original phenomenology of human (social) behaviour seems well adapted when it is attempts to describe practices in a determined society and thus address the practical consequences of our actions in a way that makes them transparent to the social actors and susceptible to change.

In modern society, professional activities have become highly specialized and codified and their content consists basically in explicit rules impersonally applied. The rise of bureaucratic efficiency transformed professional life into a series of quasi-mechanical acts and tended to eliminate any reference to what Max Weber called "value-rationality." Accordingly, it tends to eliminate any reference to personal or substantive values held by the professional. There probably is no other profession than the legal one in which positivism has become a full-fledged doctrine and a sort of professional ideology; it is therefore deeply embedded in current practices.[7] Any attempt at a diagnosis of the judiciary in contemporary societies, either democratic or engaged in a process of democratization, cannot but acknowledge a huge series of negative symptoms, ranging from the ineffective formal constraints of an administrative State to informal and illegitimate pressures. Formalism, legalism (law understood as an autonomous repository of just principles) and moral rhetoric are widespread, not to mention dullness and bureaucracy, as features of the system that remain all too prominent.[8]

Is it still possible to instil some basic "values" in a machine-like bureaucratic administrative system? Can we imagine laws other than as walls and barriers? Can law proceed in a way that may make room for genuine moral values? Phenomenology may help answer these questions affirmatively by re-configuring the field of normative practices in a way that limits the effects and the influence of positivism.

The subjective-objective non-coincidence, as well as the whole complicated underlying dialectic of the subjective and the objective meaning, serve not only to reframe the question concerning the fundamentals of normativity, but function as an effective tool in overcoming legal and political positivism. The positivist tradition had a politically motivated aversion to any inquiry concerning the "subjective" nature and to the specific ways in which law functioned. Beginning in the 1960s, the account of adjudication became central for the description of the ways in which law was working and it was integrated into the general theory of normativity. The new basic question was whether judges should adopt an empty instrumental understanding of legality and law's authority or a principled vision of legality. The contemporary normative practices, particularly the legal ones, are striving to integrate both values and goals in order to cope with the exigencies of a multi-differentiated society. Law cannot be envisioned anymore as an object in itself, as a pure epistemic object; it is an object which defines itself by its practical consequences, as well as in the modes of reasoning and in the types of rationality that it presupposes**,** if put to work. When dealing with norms and laws we should dismiss the perspective that consists in applying rules to facts and adopt another one, consisting in making decisions and searching for possible solutions. This entails an important change in the meaning of law, namely a shifting from an epistemic to a pragmatic meaning of law.

[7] A discussion on practice positivism in legal professions can be found in Copoeru (2008a).

[8] For an analysis of the judiciary in the context of the democratic transition in post-1989 Romania, see Copoeru (2008b).

But how is it possible to integrate into the core of the legal (normative) reasoning references to purposes and objectives without bringing prejudice to the objectivity of the reasoning itself? And is it possible to integrate into the structure of the law something that is external to it without dismantling the law itself?

In a Schutzian approach, laws are not only objective meanings, but primarily subjective perspectives. Schutz's phenomenology undoubtedly has the capacity to make laws, norms, ordinances, etc., more "familiar". But they are also the product of a subject, more precisely, of a free subject as a centre of spontaneous activity and social action (Schutz 1996a: 20–21). A theory of adjudication, for example, cannot pass rapidly over this essential circumstance whereby the judge at work, like any other professional, should manifest him or herself as a free subject. But what exactly does it mean for a judge to act freely? Wouldn't she or he thereby cease to function as a judge? The judge administers his office in accordance with the limitations of the profession and its goals. I am not speaking here of a judge's freedom of expression or privacy, but of the freedom which lies at the very core of her or his activity, *i.e.* presiding over a courtcase.

How a judge rules in a case is, again, a matter of interpretation. Many decades ago, a famous judge defined the methods of decision as following: "the rule of analogy or the method of philosophy; the method of evolution along the line of historical development; the method of tradition along the lines of justice, morals, and social welfare, the mores of the day; and the method of sociology or ‚the judge as a legislator'" (Cardozo 1921: 30–31). As Charles E. Clark pointed out, Cardozo recognized that the "majority of cases have predictable outcomes, but in the statistically few, though important, original cases presenting novel issues, it was undoubtedly the last method, in which the judge must stand alone as legislator, that was outstandingly important. This would seem to be as it should be; for these are the cases which are the (legal) world shakers, the cases to be remembered and cited and recited by judges and lawyers to shape the law of the future, and at the same time they are cases in which the authoritative guides are weakest" (*Ibid*.). In any of these two situations, a case which fits into a majority and an original one, Schutz's ideal-type based methodology is apt to describe what the judge is doing. One can identify, therefore, two paradigmatic examples: (1) when the judge applies the law to an individual case, her discretionary powers being drastically limited, and (2) when the judge "creates" the law, her discretion being fully recognized.[9]

For both practitioners and for theoreticians of law, the second example is more interesting. The question which arises almost automatically is: on what basis can or should the judge exercise this power? H. L. A. Hart, the founder of contemporary legal positivism, situated these cases in the penumbra of legal rules and stated that such discretion could be exercised on the basis of a theory of political morality (Hart 1961: 123). Generally, positivists do not agree that judges should decide in these

[9]It is a matter of controversy too, if the judge has discretion or not. For some, the judge is choosing between two possible solutions, while for others such situations do not exist. However, even if it exists, judicial discretion is always limited by procedural and substantive restrictions.

cases on the basis of their own beliefs about morality or politics. The question as to what governs the decision of the judge is complex, and a complete treatment is beyond the scope of this paper. However, at least one point can be made on this occasion referring to how the Schutzean methodology can help in understanding this phenomenon. While Schutz would certainly not agree that "judges are likely to determine how to engage in construction based on their own views," (McGinnis and Rappaport 2009: 783) he would nevertheless stress that a judge's individual freedom is paramount. This emphasis on the judge's freedom is not meant to suggest that the judge would be acting arbitrarily. Schutz's concept of freedom is embedded in an inter-subjective context and founded on the dynamics of ideal-typical interpretive schemes. What the judge actually does in the few particular cases which change jurisprudence can be described in terms of changing the "*basic norm* by means of which the scheme that interprets them < – the legal acts – > is produced" (Schutz 1967: 246).[10] So, what the judge does consists in "ordering of subjective meaning-contexts within an objective meaning-context. According to Kelsen, writes Schutz further, the subjective meaning which the individual legal acts have for those enacting or performing them must be ordered within an objective meaning-context by means of what we should call ideal-typical constructions on the part of the interpreting science of jurisprudence" (Schutz 1967: 247).[11]

Throughout this kind of operation, phenomenological methodology, especially in its Schutzian version, provides a fertile way of reintroducing reflection to the practice of law. It does this by redirecting the focus on objectivity and concentrating on the role of subjectivity in law. It is often said that the subjectivist phenomenological approach exalts the importance of personal experience and that of the immediate moment (see Gabel 1980 and 1984). But subjectivity is not only about this kind of immediacy, but about a practical decision. Adopting and developing a "sociology of knowledge"; Schutz explains that

> [it] is a stock of knowledge theoretically available to everyone, built up by practical experience, science, and technology as warranted insights. But this stock of knowledge is not integrated. It consists of a mere juxtaposition of more or less coherent systems of knowledge that themselves are neither coherent nor even compatible with one another. On the contrary, the abysses between the various attitudes involved in the approaches to the specialized systems are themselves a condition of the success of the specialized inquiry. (Schutz 1964b: 121)

The judge often faces an abyss while confronted with heterogeneous frameworks. For example, does the feeling that a legal rule "should" be interpreted in a particular way come from our intuitions about the "intent" of those who wrote it or from the structure of legal consciousness? (Boyle 1991). There is no way of solving this problem if we do not treat it as a practical one. In the practical realm we are

[10]Quoted from Kelsen (1925), p. 129, the italics belongs to Schutz.

[11]Given the dynamics of jurisprudence, of which Schutz was apparently not aware at the time when he wrote that text, I would say that we should rather speak of the *re-ordering* of subjective meaning-contexts within an objective meaning-context.

never bereft of possibilities. As practitioners, in the worst case scenario, we can simply follow a routine. This is the lowest level of judgement, of course, when it becomes merely a matter of blind decision. Or the judge can adopt a form of *practical* or *provisional rationality* and renounce the idea of judging on the basis of universal and unquestionable schemes. In any case, as Schutz convincingly argues, the transposition of schemes of formal rationality from other fields of knowledge to the areas of practical decision seems to be the worst solution of all.

3 Conclusions

I have tried to argue in this paper that Schutz's introduction of a *pragmatic motive* in the phenomenological analysis of consciousness, together with the *dialectics of subjective and objective* (imposed) *meaning*, reveal an original dimension of normativity which allows us to reconstruct the concept of law. I raised the question of how the Schutzian phenomenological approach to normativity and rationality, only roughly sketched in this paper, is helpful in reconstructing the meaning of law. Alfred Schutz has never been equalled when it comes to illuminating the role of "subjective" meaning in the socio-cultural world. He offers us ways not only to understand what is really a common practice of social meaning construction, but also to challenge it from the point of view of subjective operations. Thus, the denaturalization of social phenomena that Schutz successfully provides the researcher with the tools required for tackling legal practices and the corresponding fictions that they engendered. The discourse of law must not only be complemented by a critical phenomenology, but also by a reconstructive one.

The act of affording subjectivity (transcendental or otherwise) a central place in the constitutive phenomenological reconstruction of legal practices leads us to acknowledge "a doubt in the core of meaning" (Kennedy 1997: 177) and allows us to deal with the problem of dedifferentiation (Schlag 2009) and practice positivism in the modern world.

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Everyday Morality. Questions with and for Alfred Schutz

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In Husserl's *Crisis*, the restitution of the everyday world and the rehabilitation of the "despised doxa" are directed against the ontological hubris of the natural sciences and against a psychology emulating them; at the same time, Husserl attempts to recover the forgotten fundaments of the sciences. Because the aim is to establish a foundation one can understand why, in the description of the structures pertaining to the life-world, everyday practice recedes into the background vis-a-vis cognitive achievements. The fact that theoretical research is itself a form of practice and that it has undeniable practical consequences belongs, however, to the central theme of a crisis in the sciences. Schutz's point of departure is a different one. He is primarily concerned with the attempt to establish the grounds of experience for the social sciences. This endeavour draws him increasingly into the orbit of a pragmatics with a social character since, as was already the case with Max Weber; interpretive sociology is understood not only as a science of meaning, but also to a large extent as a science of action. One could be forgiven for supposing that morality and the law, in the form of an everyday morality, would lay claim to a central place in the social life-world. However, there is a marked absence of any trace of moral concerns in Schutz's account, more so than one finds even in the work of the theoretical luminaries that influenced him: Bergson, Husserl, and Weber. This conspicuous dearth is not without cause, but it has significant consequences. The pragmatic turn that Ilja Srubar has worked out so convincingly in his book *Kosmion* (1988) threatens to end in an everyday pragmatism. Moreover, it is the status and function of everyday morality itself that raises a number of questions.

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1 Prologue: The Stranger and the Refugee

Let us begin with a dispute between friends that goes to the heart of the matter. In a letter from July 16th 1944, (from the correspondence published by Richard Grathoff. Schutz & Gurwitsch 1988: 127–129), Aron Gurwitsch responds to the essay "The Stranger", which Schutz had sent to him shortly after its publication. The issue was not so much the problem of 'strangeness', per se, which I have discussed in detail elsewhere (cf. Waldenfels 2003), but rather its moral implications. Gurwitsch readily concedes the relative legitimacy of a formal sociological analysis of everyday practices, and yet, at the same time, he reproaches Schutz with uncharacteristic vehemence for failing to diagnose the limitations of this approach. He describes Schutz's efforts as comparable to lecturing a starving individual on matters concerning nutrition. Gurwitsch offers three decisive objections. First, he emphasizes that they are both, like many others, no mere immigrants that enter a strange world and can, at will, return to their own world, rather they are *refugees* or *exiles* that obey violence and continue to be attached to the world they have been exiled from. He writes as one affected employing an inclusive "we", a 'we' that encompasses the countless victims of a history of expulsion that has endured for several millennia. Gurwitsch eschews any notion of conforming to the *consensus communis* or the *opinio publica* at the expense of one's own rational insight. Using Latin terms, he invokes older traditions standing behind public spirit and everyday rationality that conflict with the notion of conformity without further ado. Finally, he champions the outsiders, the *fools* and *martyrs* like Thales and Socrates that inaugurate the tradition of Western philosophy. The thrust of his objections is quite Platonic. For Gurwitsch, insight into the good is decisive. As in Husserl, it is not the scientific episteme that soars beyond the pure doxa, but the philosophical episteme of a science of the life-world.[1]

Schutz takes a year to issue a reply, yet in a debate with Eric Voegelin, he addresses these criticisms directly. Discussing the dispute at length in his biography, Michael Barber (2004, Chap. 7–8) advocates the necessity of a methodical bracketing in favor of Schutz. Moreover, he argues that the moral integrity which Schutz displays as scientist as well as citizen and family man represents a tacit commitment to morality. Schutz's character may well be beyond reproach, but we cannot simply allow biography to substitute for theory and argument. Composed in the ideologically incendiary vocabulary of the time, the title of the chapter "Schutz, a Nihilist?" sounds almost absurd today. Let us confine ourselves therefore to a more sober approach that examines the methodological questions.

That every science must bracket certain aspects of experience is uncontested; the problems arise over how that bracketing is implemented. In his *Theory of Communicative Action,* Jürgen Habermas reproaches Schutz with a "culturalistic abridgement" of the concept of life-world to which essential aspects fall prey (1981, vol. 2: Kap, VI, 1). In his own conception, he complements the dimension of

[1] I refer to my discussion of this debate in the essay "Die verachtete Doxa" (Waldenfels 1986).

cultural understanding with the dimension of social integration and the socialization of the personality. The pathologies which afflict the life-world include not only the loss of meaning, but a lack of solidarity and psychical personality disorders. This critique coincides with Gurwitsch's insofar as the latter maintains that the exiles have not only been exiled to a new world, but that their own world has been "shattered." The hermeneutics of the life-world degenerates into "hermeneutical idealism" (as Habermas reiterates in reference to Albrecht Wellmer (ibid.: 223)) if interpretive sociology treats the conditions for meaning-formation, meaning-prevention, and meaning-extinction (and consequently also power and violence themselves) as meaningful.

Gurwitsch, however, goes further when appealing to the "philosopher Schutz." Philosophizing does not begin by providing ultimate justifications but by asking fundamental questions; questions that are not simply left for others to answer as if philosophy itself were merely a sub-discipline. Between the sciences and philosophy, between everyday life and philosophy, there exists a methodical, yet not subject-matter related division of labor; after all, Thales and Socrates did not live in a world different from that of the Thracian milkmaid or the Athenian citizens. In a further sense, to which Kant adheres in his conception of metaphysics and morality, one cannot avoid philosophizing, just as, according to Watzlawick, one cannot avoid communication. Even Max Weber philosophizes when he complements the postulate of value-neutrality inherent to science with decisions and options without which the postulate would remain ineffective. One cannot simply leave questions themselves unexamined; otherwise all that would remain would be the naïveté of those who practice science in the natural attitude. Even Barber who strives to give a well-balanced account notes Schutz's "lack of commitment" when it comes to explicitly ethical statements, citing Thomas Luckmann: "He (Schutz) was not an ethicist." Yet, at the same time, Barber credits Schutz with an implicit ethics, e.g. as seen in the debate on questions of equality and participatory democracy (Barber 2004: 192f.). One might recall the dispute between Merleau-Ponty and Sartre and the post-war debates in which the demand for political engagement loomed like an existential imperative. Yet an engagement that has substance does not spring from declarations, but from becoming involved with what the issues demand. With Schutz, the theoretician, this occurs rather incidentally; the question of what one is to understand by an everyday morality remains to a large extent open.

2 The Ambiguous Status of Everyday Morality

The expression 'everyday morality' might be taken to imply that everyday life is straightforwardly moral or amoral. But this would be no better than regarding everyday language as moral or amoral. Not only is there no everyday morality, there is no moral act, as such. Morality is nothing more than a point of view from which we evaluate actions and ways of acting. Other points of view include purposiveness, practicability, predictability and comprehensibility. Morality makes an appearance

in everyday life in the form of praise and reprimand, of demands, of reproaches and complaints, of social acceptance or rejection. The question concerning the form of morality's justification and codification is, at first, not a question for morality. There are things that one simply does not do just as there are things that one simply does not say. Everyday acting without an everyday morality would be akin to an everyday language without rules governing that everyday usage; it would be a pure distillate. Gurwitsch is right insofar as he takes a stand against a pure pragmatization of everyday life. One who would fob off exiles with: "Adjust yourself!" comports herself like someone who would advise a victim of theft to simply buy herself a new watch or another car. The antithesis to an everyday morality is not to be found in purposiveness, but in arbitrariness, violence, and deceit. Taking recourse to preferences and relevancies, by means of which Schutz proves himself a docile student of the Austrian national economic school, does not offer an alternative thereof. When Schutz insists, in his dispute with Voegelin, that relevance constitutes the widest possible category within which all value-schemes defined in terms of happiness or virtues are included (Barber 2004: 125), he simply misses the issue at stake. We are not simply differentiating here between general and particular criteria for action, but with different points of view. In making the judgment that something is 'better', it simply does not follow that the object of preference is *good* in itself. Even the Nazis responsible for the expulsion and persecution of Jewish fellow citizens had their preferences and relevancies. One can certainly argue that this day discussions of morality tend to underestimate the role of relevance without which the formation of fields of action, speech, and research would not occur, as if one were dealing with empirical ingredients that one could safely leave to the sociologists and psychologists. The same applies to the selection mechanism of experience, e.g., the orientation of our attention which has undeniable ethical significance. Nonetheless, morality and the law play their own role in the constitution of everyday life. Accordingly one has to distinguish between pragmatics understood in the narrowest Kantian sense that limits itself to the mere use of means, a more broadly conceived pragmatics of everyday life that includes the ethical (e.g. an Aristotelian account) and a complete pragmatization that includes all action in the horizon of what one generally does and what is to be expected with statistical probability.[2]

Yet even if we understand morality as one qualification amongst others and resist the moralization of everyday life as well as its pragmatization, everyday morality retains something ambiguous. We have to distinguish between an *everyday morality* and *morality in the everyday*. If one ascribes to morality a quality of everydayness, one implies that it amounts to nothing more than what is repeated day after day, the habitual, the customary, what is handed down from one generation to the next, not as a partial *know-how*, but as a kind of *live-how*. Everyday morality would then correspond to what we refer to as 'morals', *mores* (*mœurs*, *Sitten*). It would be a conglomerate of types of actions, motivational forces, maxims and patterns of behaviour

[2]For a distinction and evaluation of the different ordering factors that determine the field of action, I refer to *Order in the Twilight* (1996: Chapter B).

that is derived from personal preferences and social conventions. It would be more or less identical to the doxa that Plato characterizes as the epistemic and practical life of the cave-dwellers in the Allegory of the Cave. The inhabitants of the cave would lack the capacity to make informed, reflective decisions; they could follow criteria but would not be able to give an account (*logos)* of them. All virtues would merely be 'popular virtues' (cf. *Phaidon* 82a: *ὁρετή δημοτική*). Even if one adhered to the ascription of traditionally determined acts to individual agents and not to a collective One, the good and the just would coincide partly with individual, partly with collective preferences reflected in changing traditions, convictions, and life-styles. The injunction not to kill would be no more binding or absolute than the rules of etiquette that proscribe the use of one's fingers when eating at a table. Gurwitsch and Voegelin oppose such an abridgement of practical reason, one by relying on universal reason, the other by bringing transcendental inspirations into play. The danger of reducing morality to mere relativism seems to be avoided if we follow the second alternative and understand everyday life simply as the site where the effects of morality as well as of science, technology, art, religion, and all other spheres of culture unfold. The morality that issues norms in the everyday world would not itself have the character of everydayness. Against this kind of moral absolutism, however, we have the skeptical arguments of Nietzsche in his discussions of the genealogical nature of morality or what Bergson calls the "Sources of Morality".

3 Separation Between an Everyday Pragmatic Approach and a Moralistic Approach

If one locates the sources of morality in the interiority of everyday life, one ends up with a conformist, common-sense morality tied to an established community and dependent on the preferences or conventions of the prevailing social order. It makes no difference whether this order is embedded in old traditions, or whether it is governed by functionalist directives. This fact remains unchanged by the technological nimbus of the functional. If, in contrast, the sources of morality are sought outside of everyday life, then everyday life and morality diverge. We invoke a practical dualism that is not only on par with the well-known dualism between mind and body, but is co-determined by it. A description of everyday practices and a prescriptive account of actions part ways. It would be excessive to crudely speak of an everyday life without morality, of a morality without everyday life; the former could not offer a platform for consensus while the latter would not be viable. Yet despite manifold intersections, a permanent tension persists that is problematic for both.

Let us begin then with a pragmatics of the everyday. In an analysis of everyday life that is decisive here, Schutz takes all of his examples from the realm of neutral acts and roles. Many are *basic practical actions* linked to typical expressive and bodily movements and based on typified perceptions. The businessman wonders whether he should sell, the surgeon whether he should operate, the politician how he should vote. They all are concrete representatives of a vocation; the ideal shines

through the ideal-typical because there is no trace of corruption or misuse of power. Letters are posted and read, but it remains open to question as to whether the letter entails a notice of termination or an order of eviction, not to mention mail bombs. Taxes are paid, not evaded. Information is exchanged, but without mendacity, not even for diplomatic or therapeutic reasons and if there is an instance of deception, then it becomes a question of identifying which indicators help one to recognize the lie as such. This quotidian existence in the everyday world is sterile, like a well run hospital. Courts, especially tribunals, are practically redundant. Wittgenstein considers an unvariegated 'diet' to be one of the main causes of philosophical disease proclaiming "one nourishes one's thinking with only one kind of example" (1960, No. 593). But why should one extend this list of examples to include difficult conflicts when the basic structures of everyday actions as well as the corresponding body mechanisms are the same everywhere? Something similar holds for the distinction between "multiple realities." One of the merits of Schutzian social phenomenology is that it takes seriously the fissures in experience, the discontinuity between different forms of meaning, the formation of enclaves but also the border traffic between heterogeneous provinces of meaning. Hence, Husserl's reduction to pre-predicative experience can be complemented by a reduction to a pre-normative action. The phenomenological approach is thereby enriched by *lebens-philosophie*, existential-philosophical and pragmatist motifs. More subtle conflicts, however, such as the aestheticization of politics, the politicization of science or of religion come into view only indirectly. The critique of the "colonization of the life-world" restricts itself to a consideration of the aggrandizing nature of science, hence, the pathologies of everyday life remain a marginal phenomenon.

The background is provided by hermeneutics as an all-round method that allows not only for the interpretation of texts, but also for investigating the application of rules, the use of interpretive patterns, or the definition of situations. The hermeneutics of reading translates into a hermeneutics of action, similar to the way in which a hermeneutics gains momentum in Helmut Plessner. This is another virtue of Schutz's social theory but the hermeneutic method also introduces the idiosyncrasies of a hermeneutical philosophy, which aims at going beyond a pure methodology and at universalizing hermeneutics. Already in Wilhelm Dilthey, hermeneutics comes into the inheritance of the *Moral Science*, which in the Anglo-Saxon world follows a very particular moral-theoretical and political tradition. When later in Gadamer the understanding of meaning goes hand in hand with agreement in understanding in a shared world, one is dealing with a more conciliatory form of the approach, one that looks to avoid normative conflicts.[3] To a certain extent, this might be due to the role of the concept of 'meaning'. The nineteenth century saw a dramatic expansion in the scope of the term from the

[3]On the contrary, Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, in their work *Die gesellschaftliche Konstruktion der Wirklichkeit*, by no means evade conflicts, but appealing to the power of the legitimators (1969: 117), they provide a solution from which Schutz obviously shies away. Nothing would be easier than appealing to the "normative force of the factual" in a legal-positivistic way. Cf. my article "Im Labyrinth des Alltags" (Waldenfels 1985: 161).

simple meaning of words and phrases to the meaning of life, wavering between the attribute of *sinnhaft* (e.g. a meaningful sentence) and *sinnvoll* (e.g. a meaningful deed). This conception of meaning is a weak derivate of the true and the good. It allows for endless oscillation between the Aristotelian *good in itself* and *good for us*, as is typical for hermeneutics and its half-hearted Hegelianism. In the world of meaning, no philosophical fools or martyrs exist because it is the world on a continuing basis, *in the long run,* that is the whole. As Gurwitsch tellingly observes, Schutz is reticent on this point. Everyday pragmatics resists being channeled into the stream of a tradition-based reason. This would be a maelstrom, which would pulverize the concerns of social pragmatics.

As in the case of Hans Kelsen, an expert in constitutional law, and another warrantor for Schutz, normal abstinence barely penetrates into the description, interpretation, and systematization of norms. Almost inevitably, it prompts moral over-reactions. From the perspective of morality, an everyday morality appears as merely a moral *preliminary stage* because it springs from the sources of social conventions, or as a moral *stage of decay* as soon as practical reason withdraws from conventions. Everyday morality is dwarfed by a form of high morality, almost in the same way that sophisticated language soars above the lowlands of idioms and dialects. Gurwitsch embraces a Platonist inspired perspective when focusing upon participation in universal reason. Habermas, in contrast, sticks to Kant. On the plane of everyday life, he gives free rein to preferences and particularities; in cases of conflict, when things become serious, universal norms are provided that free themselves from the narrow context of changing traditions. The discursive filtering of life-worldly resources sustains a connection between everyday life and morality; morality, however, draws its strength from laws that obtain, not from actions that we plan and execute. Morality is, in the first place, a concern of the legislature, in the second of the executive, and the judiciary sees to it that this hierarchy is complied with. This universal morality suffers from motivational atrophy; for the absolute validity of laws does not possess any inspiring or motivational force. Morality is a morality for moral people, it is therefore quite weak in cases of emergency. Perhaps this is why Schutz shows such disdain for moral-philosophical flights of fancy, almost as if they originated from a kind of "poultry farm" that produces "high-flown thoughts" (Musil 1978: 358).

4 Everyday Ethos and Everyday Morality

Before we consider the possibility of a localized everyday morality, a clarification of terms is required. In *Schattenrisse der Moral* (Waldenfels 2006), I draw a clear distinction between morality and ethics. When I refer to 'morality', without any qualifying remarks, I am referring to a morality of law, the core of which is constituted by universal and unconditionally obtaining *prescriptions for action*. Like the Categorical Imperative or the Golden Rule, these imperatives do not command a specific action, but a *manner* of acting: "Act in such a way that …!"

By ethos, on the other hand, I understand a general *attitude to life* or a specific *vocational attitude* in line with concrete objectives. Morality's fundamental concern is with distinguishing right from wrong while the notion of ethos' relates to the difference between good and bad. In a consideration of objectives and goods, the afore mentioned preferences come into play, but theirs is merely an auxiliary role in the formation of a relief of objectives. Ethos goes further than morality since practicing a lifestyle *includes* the observation of rules, whilst the observation of norms of action merely *presupposes* certain types of actions and relations of actions. Put in Hegelian terms, ethos is the concrete universal, in which the particular is realized, whereas morality is the abstract universal to be applied to particular cases. Viewed in this light, applied ethics would seem an absurdity. With respect to everyday life, we must distinguish then between an everyday ethos and an everyday morality, in the same way the we distinguish between a work ethos (*Arbeitsethos*), (including joy of work and craftsmanship) and a work ethic (*Arbeitsmoral*) measured in relation to an obligatory workload. In the Western cultural sphere, one encounters this dual form of practical order and practical reason in its prototypical or even ideal-typical expression in two philosophical approaches still operative today, namely, *Aristotelian Ethics* on one side and *Kantian Morality* on the other.

If we are going to proceed with this fundamental distinction, we must, strictly speaking, also distinguish between an *everyday ethos* and an *everyday morality*. A strict division, however, raises difficulties. Whereas the different spheres of meaning interpenetrate in the life-world of traditionally constituted societies, they diverge in modern, rationally controlled societies. It is only in the latter that everyday life gains its own status as an unspecific sphere of life, as a place for exchange of meaning, but also as the arena of different conceptions of life. Everyday life as we know it today is, therefore, subject to a mixed constitution. This manifests itself in difficult scenarios and sources of conflict, when cracks form in the practical order such that the ethically oriented life, which again includes traditional and innovative elements, battles with normative regulations for the power to decide the issue at stake. The morality of the law bears heavily then on formal law. Since Kant, there has been a propensity to take something of a forensic approach to morality with a concomitant forensically conceived rationality that acts as a universal court of justice. Invariably, this one-sided orientation, which I have problematized in *Schattenrisse der Moral*, leads to countertendencies. The newer *ethics of value* precariously positioned between ethics and moral philosophy is an example of this. Values are understood to depend upon subjective appreciation, they cannot be understood independently of the influencing role played, for example, by economics. Nietzsche famously draw the philosophical consequences of this kind of approach, discussing, for example, the idea of a transvaluation of all values. Max Scheler, who takes up this suggestion, attempts to make his value-theory capable of morality. Nevertheless, when working out a material value-theory, he reverts to an a priori value-feeling that opens the door for a practical intuitionism. Although in his later essays Scheler also deals with ethics, several factors prevent him from entering the realm of

metaphysical ethics.[4] We can clearly see then just how complicated the field in which everyday morality belongs actually is.

5 Embodiment of Morality in Everyday Ethos and Vocational Ethos

The question remains as to how much of morality is to be granted to everyday life and how the latter is to be anchored in everyday life. In a previous work (*Der Stachel des Fremden*. Waldenfels 1990, Chap. 12), I characterized everyday life as the "melting pot of rationality" and perhaps we could characterize morality similarly. Even if moral incentives have more than simply an everyday character, it does not follow that everyday morality should be understood as simply a rudimentary stage of morality, as one might, for example, consider the counting of one's fingers as a rudimentary stage of arithmetic.

If we begin with everyday ethos, we see how its directedness toward certain goals along with the observance of directives for appropriate action leads to an *embodiment* of practical reason. Aristotle explains the reason for this with characteristic lucidity: one learns to be just by acting justly, just as one becomes a kitharist by playing the kithara (*Nic. Ethics* II, 1). Practicing a certain ethos is itself already a moment of the ethical life. Something similar applies to obeying the voice of law or of one's conscience, which represents a crucial moment of moral action and, for Kant, precedes every procedure of justification. On this point, the emergence of the ethos and the process of moralizing resemble the acquisition of language, which takes place in the form of hearing someone speak and repeating in the language. Thus, the smile with which the infant greets his mother already has an ethical tinge; it is no more value-free than awakening someone's attention and paying attention to someone, or being considered in road traffic. There are indifferent elements in life, but there is no indifference of life except in its clinical margins. When Levinas defines the ethical as a form of "non-indifference," he has something similar in mind (cf. Waldenfels 2006: 45–49). If accountability is a responsibility for what one says and does, it does not demarcate a special area; it marks a flexible threshold within life that is determined in a forensic way as the possibility of giving an account, or also in a life-economic way as life-style. Experiences initiated on this side of the threshold of responsibility are therefore not ethically neutral. If something like an ethical sensitivity or *moral sense* exists, then they are congruent with life itself. Accordingly, the basic tenet of classical ethics is: to live means to live well. When some neurologists believe in their philosophical exuberance that they can read human evolution in the phases of brain development, they slip in a morality that can no more be described in the language of sparkling neurons and connecting synapses as a sonata by Mozart.

[4]Concerning the dubious conditions of a phenomenological philosophy of values, I refer to my critical study "Wertqualitäten oder Erfahrungsansprüche?" (Waldenfels 1995).

An embodiment of morality in everyday life amounts to two things. It implies that morality *springs from* the background of everyday behavior and that it *returns* to everyday life in the form of bodily habitualization and material sedimentation. Hence not everything of ethical relevance is subject to normative regulations. A pre-normative or post-normative ethos exists that could be compared to pre- and post-predicative experience in the Husserlian sense. The ethos of a person, a group, or a society manifests itself in the way in which individuals take care of one another, greet one another, ask and thank each other for something, help the other, or apologize to her, but also in the way in which they treat things carefully and gently, keep memories alive, use their time and take their time, and in what they dream of. "Everyday efforts" not only can be more effective than "heroic feats", but also more significant because they spread in an ant-like manner (cf. Musil 1978: 12f). Playing music together, an activity to which Schutz – drawing on personal experience – has dedicated essays,[5] contains many elements that could be called ethomorph, such as listening to the voices of the other musicians, which is not itself altruistic, but grows entirely out of the "mutual tuning-in relationship" (Schutz 1964: 173). When, with political thoughts at the back of his mind, Daniel Barenboim puts together an orchestra in which Jews and Palestinians perform together, then these political thoughts owe their force to nothing but what occurs in the music.

The pressure of a predominantly forensic morality of law necessarily leads to a weakening of those ethical impulses that inhabit the everyday life. What remains in the end are emptied manners, etiquettes, a code of behavior that has further lost its vigor because of dwindling class distinctions. If no other authority can replace the traditonal court, not much remains of politeness. Indeed, one can give up mere banalities without losing much. The "flattening out of everyday life" that Max Weber deplores (Weber 1968: 507) results in a weakening of ethos and morality. Crimes seem like black wonders, in which the breeding grounds of everyday life are left aside and the alarming truth of statistics is overlooked. Everyday morals and everyday morality, everything that has been so abundantly brought to light by researchers of the everyday such as Philippe Ariès, Norbert Elias, or Erving Goffman, when bereft of its ethical impulses, drifts off into the cupboard of rarities. The proclivity to give all this over to *pure* sociology, psychology and therapy testifies to the trend of leaving experts to comprehensively attend to the life-world. Yet the rehabilitation of everyday experience and everyday action with which Husserl, Schutz and others were so intensely concerned remains a mere patchwork without the rehabilitation of an everyday ethos and an everyday morality, a mere collage of cognitions, practices, and techniques. The acts of moral indignation that erupt again and again when things are going badly are of little use.

The different kinds of vocational ethos present us with similar problems. Each vocational sector and each cultural sector possess a specific everyday life; this holds for the health service, the judiciary, or the business sector just as for art, religion, or science. The vocational ethos also wastes away if it descends into a conglomerate of

[5]The exemplary rank that music occupies in social theory is demonstrated by numerous single studies the publication of which is currently being prepared by Andreas Stascheit.

vocational duty, calculation, and routine. With all due respect for the Hippocratic Oath, whoever adheres to it must not do so for the well-being of the patient, it is sufficient that she act in accordance with the law. On the other hand, vocational ethos cannot be equated with a surplus of moral obligation, as if the doctor, the judge, the teacher, or the pastor should be a better human being. Morality cannot be delegated to morality experts without turning it into a specialization. If a vocational ethos exists that transcends legal demands, the practicable, and the technically possible, then it has to unfold in the process of the diagnosis of the illness and its curing, in the process of finding and administrating justice, and also in the market behavior of producers, distributors, and consumers. The pure *homo oeconomicus*, on whom Carl Menger and Ludwig von Mises declared war and whom Schutz, one of their students, trimmed to an ideal-type (cf. Barber 2004: 48–60), is as ethical or moral as a chess figure. One thinks of the line from Gurwitsch's letter to Schutz: "I will never accept that for man the important thing is a well-oiled operation (*Betrieb*), that it is all a matter of making a smooth functioning possible via *adjustment*." Heidegger also spoke of science deprecatorily as a mere "ongoing activity" (*Betrieb*), yet he only has a depraved form of everyday working life in mind; with his distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity, he obstructs his own view of the fruitful moments of everyday life, in which the single individual does not stand out, but nevertheless "satisfies the demand of the day."[6]

6 The Everyday and the Beyond-the-Everyday

If one relies upon *total order*, everyday life is eclipsed by all illuminating reason. Standing beyond the everyday, this reason is, however, incompatible with the contingency, selectivity, and plurality of our life-worlds and forms of life. The whole is forced because there is no general measure for life. This explains the reluctance to accept grand solutions that Max Weber and also Schutz displayed. Invoking a general *basic order* has a different effect. Subjected to the spotlights of the laws, only dim light is thrown onto the everyday. What does not fall under the general laws is deemed merely subjective. The everyday only receives its own illumination and weight if it is more than the mere everyday. The same holds for the vocational everyday. The everyday is, indeed, not restricted to a permanent stock of meaning, it is not merely an inventory of resources, as Habermas envisages it, but the everyday has to be thought of as a process. It forms in a process of becoming everyday (*Veralltäglichung*) and it forms around a process of ceasing to be everyday (*Entalltäglichung*). What is endowed *with* an everyday constitution *is* not *of* everyday constitution. The everyday loses its deficient character, if it brings with it *an*

[6]In these words, Schutz refers to *Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship*, cf. Barber (2004: 145). Concerning the important role of vocational attitude, cf. not only the two grand speeches on vocation by Max Weber, but also Husserl's *Crisis*, § 35, where the vocational worlds are analyzed as particular worlds of the life-world.

excess of what is beyond the everyday. This beyond-the-everyday does not descend from a 'higher' world – it would be meaningless without the everyday that it transcends. It tends to remain in the background; it becomes present in recurring rituals and during festive days; it emerges on its own in times of crisis, catastrophe, or upheaval, in which what is valued in everyday life loses its self-evidence.

The crossing of frontiers that lead one out of the cave of everyday life and pierce through its mantle emerge again and again in the work of the discussed authors, sometimes in stronger, sometimes in weaker form. The manner in which it occurs shapes the respective conception of the everyday. As is well known, Max Weber sets the extraordinary and affective powers of *charisma* against legal and traditional forms of authority. In his lecture "Science as a Vocation" (Weber 1967: 14), he concedes a specific passion even to the scientist; it comes close to the Platonic mania, the intoxicating force, without which nothing of significance could arise. The spirit of science transcends the methodical control mechanisms and thus breaks through scientific everyday life. The weakening of the concept of reason, on the other hand, entails that the disenchantment of nature does not only encroach upon society, but also rips open a normative vacuum. This vacuum demands dramatic decisions as in Carl Schmitt, or long-term options such as the work ethic promising salvation in early Protestant capitalism. Decay products arise: on the one side an "iron cage" clamped together by an instrumental rationality, on the other a soft, exuberant mysticism that spreads into the realm of religion and a social-ethical fraternity. We thereby approach the alternative of an everyday without morality and a morality without an everyday. Since this kind of moral-pragmatic schizophrenia is hard to bear, the susceptibility to alternative syntheses increases. For many, the outbreak of the First World War came just in time. Then even such a prosaic social theoretician as Max Weber reaches for the ideological crutches. Even he seeks refuge in dubious surrogates of meaning such as a search for one's "own nature" recognized in one's "own ancestors" that engenders a "responsibility before history" (cited after Marianne Weber 1926: 230f.). The momentum of the extraordinary is borrowed from one's own nation; the latter has to replace the vanished "universal horizon." Marianna Weber does not spare feelings when she praises the breakout of the war as "the hour of depersonalization (*Entselbstung*), of integration into the community" (ibid.: 526).

In Henri Bergson, the partition of the everyday and its beyond finds its systematic form in his work (1961) *The Two Sources of Morality* published in 1932. The French author discovers one of the sources in the anonymous pressure to conform to *society*, the other in the personal aspiration of *religion*. Here, the "cage" is also pried open from the exterior or above. As far as I know, Schutz has never commented at length on the mentioned escapades, even though he rarely tires of invoking Weber and Bergson.

Let us turn to Gurwitsch once more. Instancing Thales and Socrates as two marginal philosophical figures, he evades a strict dichotomy between everyday life and the 'beyond' of the everyday life. The stumbling Thales shares a world with the laughing milkmaid and the stars, just as Don Quixote and Sancho Panza live in the same world, but their experiences of it are not the same. To the philosopher, her

wonder about the regulated course of the heavenly bodies opens up the world and lifts her out of an everyday pragmatics. For the pragmatist, the philosopher is a *fool* who does not manage to "get over things." Plato, by the way, integrates this rise above the realm of the useful into the public education system; the entrance into the pure sphere of arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and harmony, which he sketches in the seventh book of the *Politeia*, bears certain traces of an initiation. The inscription above the academy's entrance: "Let no one unversed in geometry enter here" could be complemented by the apodosis "There is no geometry without wonder"; the rest would be mere arithmetic and techniques for measuring, the meaning of which, as Husserl claims, would be reduced to mere game-meanings. Socrates, the second figure that Gurwitsch refers to, was a normal citizen of Athens; he shared the common everyday with his fellow citizens, attended to his duties, even military. Yet as *Atopos*, as the stranger without a place, as Plato has called him, he does not fully belong; he represented a *nuisance*, an inconvenience, he contradicted what seemed secured by consensus, and he was extremely *successless.* Gurwitsch chooses too lofty a term, perhaps, when speaking of *martyrs* echoing Kierkegaard's "truth-witness," but it is in any case safe to say that Socrates did not concern himself with the relevances, preferences, and meaning offers of the Athenian everyday, when he followed the voice of his daimonion. Here, the wondrous combines with the dangerous. Before all weighing of risks, risk lies in knowledge itself (*Phaidon* 114 d), truth is dared, hence Nietzsche's echo.

Finally, a comment on Husserl. For him, the rehabilitation of the doxa only represents one side of a critique of science, the other side constitutes, as already mentioned, a life-world science as a universal episteme enabling us to ultimately account for our knowing and doing. Schutz was well aware of the difficulties of a transcendental universal science that aims to rescue in one stroke both the relativity of our experiences and the universality of an order, and that, moreover, ought to entail all intersubjective, intercultural, and historical differences. Yet he seems to overlook that Husserl's teleology of reason included practical reason. Here, the renunciation of a transcendental foundation also tears holes that cannot be filled by a "phenomenology of the natural attitude," or by a kind of "epistemological reflexivity," which Th. Luckmann uses as a basis for his conception of the everyday (Luckmann 1973: 153). The pure description and examination of the everyday stays on the level of everyday morality, which is interspersed with all forms of everyday immorality.

Understanding the phenomenological epoché also as an "ethical epoché," Husserl subjected morality to a much more radical investigation. For him, the ethical epoché extends "to all acts that refer to an absolute ought and to everything that is relevant in this respect in the universal practical field."[7] I have my doubts about an absolute ought that leaves all relativities behind. Yet without the introduction of an ethical epoché, which abandons the ground of what we practically take for granted, we will left with either the conformism of a Common sense-ethics or a moral 'faith'. But what can a Common sense-ethics mean? What distinguishes it from a "herd

[7]Mentioned in *Erste Philosophie* (Husserl 1959: 319); cf. Waldenfels, *Schattenrisse der Moral* (Waldenfels 2006: 48).

morality"? A Common sense-ethics is either part of the common sense, similar to the "natural reflection," which Husserl saw as part of the natural attitude, or it needs a place outside of the everyday, which allows the grasping of foreign and communal demands as such. It is significant that the agitation that Socrates spreads does not spring from what he says or declares, but from the vexing fact that he does not let self-evident matters rest. Agitated by the Socratic questions, the initially naively adopted doxa threatens to transform into an orthodoxy that stands up against a possible heterodoxy; the same applies to the respective forms of heteroaesthesia, heterology, and heteropraxis. The emergence of *anomalies* play a central role not only in Husserl, but also in Schutz. Anomalies are, as it were, the salt of experience; they show that no order is without joints and cracks. The possibility, however, that things *can* turn out differently by no means implies that they *should* turn out differently. A pure theory of anormality is incapable of filling the ethical vacuum. As Kierkegaard already reminded us, the pure play of possibilities does not transcend the threshold on the other side of which ethical decisions are made, regardless of how one might describe or justify these decisions.

A way out of this dilemma provides the remark that we are always already and always again faced with *beyond-the-everyday demands*, that is, demands that go beyond existing goals, rules, and benefit calculations. The extraordinary would then be a form of radical strangeness that concerns everything that eludes the particular order. Such ethical surplus is only comprehensible to the stock of meanings and rules that it overshoots. To show these beyond-the-everyday surpluses, a special kind of ethical epoché is required, namely a *responsive epoché*, which, starting from what we intend, goes back to the demands to which we respond when we say or do something. Elsewhere under the title *Antwortregister* (Waldenfels 1994), I have extensively developed this form of responsive phenomenology. It might suffice here to point out that such ethical demands already emerge in everyday situations and contexts and not only in large-scale moral actions. The everyday ethos is, in an elementary way, embodied in gazes, gestures, assistance, or appeals. As an inconspicuous example, I mention the *Après vous, Monsieur* (or *Madame*), with which one lets someone go ahead without arguing. For Levinas, who uses this example (Levinas 1974.150/1981, 117), ethics begins in the lowlands of the everyday. We could dismiss utterances such as a greeting as an empty phrase, or treat it as an everyday gift that has more than the character of everydayness, occasionally, however, enforced or poisoned. In the midst of the everyday, we hit upon a threshold that separates the everyday from the beyond-the-everyday and simultaneously connects them. Thus the everyday is more than the mere everyday.

7 Witness and Observer

The question remains how the beyond-the-everyday can be comprehended without turning into the everyday. In contact with the stranger, we are faced with the same question. In both cases, my response is the same. One can only talk *about* the

beyond-the-everyday and the strange when one speaks *from its perspective*, or else one would lose it, as in the fairy-tale, merely by naming it. This speech that starts from the perspective of the strange and extraordinary cannot gloat over having a special language: all esotericism would transform the strange into a secret possession. In our shared language, we speak about what goes beyond it. This requires an indirect manner of speaking and perceiving that unites with the indirect form of communication.[8] The language in which we speak about the extraordinary is not a foreign language, but it leads to the language becoming foreign, just as wonder and fright can cause our experience to become foreign. If this assumption applies, then it would also relate to the vocational everyday and to the everyday of science. Hence ethics ought to be understood as an *indirect ethics*, an ethics that leans on everyday and vocational performances.

Therefore, the road leads us to the third as a figure that disrupts the immediate social exchange. We encounter the third in various types. In the social sciences, the *observer* ranks first who considers herself neutral because she does not share the aims, relevancies, and rules of those she observes, because she "does not participate," as Husserl puts it simply. The distinction between the perspective of the participant and of the observer is connected to neurology with the first and third person perspectives, whereas the second person perspective, seen as a mere reversal of the first person perspective, usually does not play a special role. Moreover, the fieldwork of ethnography has produced the transitional figure of the involved observer; one participates in the game, but only to find out what is being played.[9]

The figure of the *witness*, however, stems from the realm of judicature and historiography. Witnesses reproduce what they saw, heard, or experienced on their own or what only a few saw, heard, or experienced, so that it eludes direct verification. If one takes autopsy as the standard case as Plato already did (cf. *Theaetetus* 201 b-c), the testimony appears as a mere surrogate. Amongst the many problems that an evaluation of testimonies raises,[10] two are of particular importance for our context. Being a witness results from an occurrence, not from one's own decision. One *becomes* a witness because of what occurs in front of one's eyes, unlike observations which one makes at one's own discretion. On the other hand, being a witness does not only entail reproducing something, but also *answering for something*. The lack of insight gives particular weight to one's credibility that is further increased by the ritual of the oath.[11] The entanglement of the witness in the event that is to be

[8]The distinction between direct and indirect forms of communication goes back to Kierkegaard's *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*; Schutz refers to it in his essay "Über die mannigfachen Wirklichkeiten" (Schutz 1962: 243–4, 254–98) Cf. moreover the author's *Vielstimmigkeit der Rede* (Waldenfels 1999: Preface: "Indirekte Rede").

[9]On the problem of representation, cf. the author's *Vielstimmigkeit der Rede* (Waldenfels 1999: Chap. 6).

[10]Cf. Waldenfels (2002: 156–164); in reference to authors such as Levinas and Ricœur: Liebsch (1999: Chap. VI).

[11]With the high degree of specialization of research, reliability and concomitantly ethics, also gain in importance in science.

testified to reaches even further. The demanding character of some cases does not allow the switching over from the position of witness, in which we find ourselves having no hand in the matter, to the position of uninvolved spectator. Such cases include emergency situations that spring from natural or social forces. The withdrawal to the position of mere observer is in these cases classified as a denial of assistance, it is not only morally condemned, but even prosecuted under certain conditions. Here we encounter the demands of others whose inescapability puts us in practical *zugzwang*. The demand of the other does not expire if we do not respond to it, just as a law does not become invalid if we do not abide by it. We encounter things beyond-the-everyday that disrupt the course of the everyday because they do not belong to the order of the day. We are given a striking literary example in Dostoevsky's *The Dream of a Ridiculous Man*, where the cry for help of a girl bursts the absolute indifference of the world-weary protagonist, and the memory of it awakens the dream vision of another world. The other's plea, the other's gaze, the other's address do not always bear the degree of urgency that arise from emergency situations, but they are comparable in their inescapability and the fact that they demand a response. As demands of others, they exceed the scope of our own possibilities; as situational demands, they undermine the traditional opposition between facts and general norms, between what is and what ought to be. The common action and speech theories that self-evidently presuppose an actor and a speaker must therefore be corrected by taking into consideration the pathetic forms of occurrences. Even the social sciences cannot pass carelessly without missing important moments of the social life. The "imposed relevance" that Schutz takes into account points in this direction, but it requires further differentiation and gradation.

8 The Inconspicuousness of Morality

Initially, there is something inconspicuous about everyday morality. Just as Michael Polanyi talks about *tacit knowledge*, we could talk about *tacit morals*. This silence is only broken when things stand particularly good or bad and when others respond with praise or reprimand. Praise or reprimand appear more frequently in the educational phase because the correct behavior has not yet become one's second nature. Even education, however, occurs mostly as *tacit education* that commences like language acquisition with imitation and participation. Too much noisy talk about morality is less a sign of an enhanced morality but rather a sign of an insecure or vanishing morality. We are alarmed by blatant examples that stand out from common or gradually apparent crime such as violent infanticide, a fit of cannibalism, or assault on foreigners. Anomias render eloquent, which is not to say that no nomos existed previously. We find out more about everyday morality in novels than in treatises of ethics or moral philosophy because in the former morality is treated rather casually and because the colorfulness of the context of action remains preserved, unlike in the obligatory examples of handbook morality. Aside from this, a lot can be found in old confession lists, newer books on etiquette, court files, crime

statistics, and news in the press. Foucault's work in the archives is also beneficial to the study of lived morality. We do not only need an indirect ethics, but an ethics from below that allows a genealogy of morals.

9 Epilogue with Musil

By way of conclusion, let us turn to an author who was as familiar with the Viennese milieu as Alfred Schutz. Robert Musil's novel *Man Without Qualities* comprises innumerable samples of diagnostic phenomenology and represents a rich source for our topic.[12] I will single out a passage that will shed glaring light onto the precarious status of the newer morality. After Ulrich, the novel's protagonist, has witnessed in the notorious Moosbrugger process how morality became a scandal and how in court the legal and medical experts play into one another's hands like secret co-conspirators, he creates a "utopia of exact living" (Musil 1978: 244–247). He recommends enhancing life to the utmost by keeping silent when one has nothing special to say. This also means to minimize "moral expenditure" and "to satisfy ourselves with being moral only in those exceptional cases where it really counts, but otherwise not to think differently from the way we do about standardizing pencils or screws." Thereby, the "washed-out prints" that develop from the pallid resemblance of our actions to the virtues would disappear. In their place we would have "intoxicating fusion in holiness. In short, from every ton of morality a milligram of an essence would be left over, a millionth part of which is enough to yield an enchanting joy." What Musil has in mind here in an experimental way is "morality's capacity for intensification" that effects human life and vocational life and that has more to do with imagination than with police regulations (ibid.: 1028). Without the intensification of the beyond-the-everyday, everyday and morality, vocation and ethos would drift apart hopelessly, and everyday morality would merely be of everyday character, without glamour and force.

Translated by Alina Vaisfeld

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[12]The essay that Peter Berger has dedicated to Schutz and Musil (Berger 1983) touches upon our topic in the form of Musil's opposition between everyday and "the other state," yet it does not contribute much to the question about an everyday morality in Schutz.

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Part IV
Investigations into Multiple Realities

Goffman and Schutz on Multiple Realities

George Psathas

Erving Goffman, one of America's most widely read and influential sociologists, offered his own critique of Schutz's conceptualization of multiple realities and developed his own framework in its stead. Goffman, who was born in Canada in 1922 to Jewish emigré parents and died in the U.S. in 1982, was, according to a number of commentators, one of the major figures in American twentieth century sociology. Tom Scheff (2006) writes:

> Goffman is perhaps the most widely read sociologist in the history of the discipline. […] not to take away from Durkheim, but to call attention to the diversity of his audience, which includes vast numbers of laypersons. Perhaps almost as widely cited, his work has been noted throughout the social sciences and humanities.

Trevino (2003) notes:

> Erving Goffman, the twentieth century's pre-eminent sociologist of the structure of face-to-face interaction – what he termed 'the interaction order[1]' – established his own unique domain of inquiry and methods of research. His books – written in an accessible and engaging style, and thus widely sold not only in college bookstores but in commercial bookstores as well have been received as part of the canon in micro-sociology, and in particular symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology, phenomenology and conversation analysis. Goffman's work is also regarded as one of the fundamental references for the wider community of scholars, most notably in cultural anthropology, psychiatry, social psychology, and sociolinguistics.

[1]He defines the interaction order primarily in his last paper (1983) but throughout his writings it appears to have the following characteristics (G.P.): two (or more) persons share time and space, are engaged in a mutual activity generally involving verbal communication; are mutually aware of one another and aware of each others' awareness; are already socialized; can be described from an observer's perspective; the meanings of their actions can be decided/inferred by an observer; and their activities, motives, intentions, etc. are those decided or seen by an outside observer using categories, conceptualizations, descriptions and terminologies which the observer has formed while also taking into account those used by the participants themselves.

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> Moreover, many of the colorful and captivating words and phrases that he coined – impression management, stigma, passing, total institution, presentation of self, to name only some of the more widely circulated – have now become part of our common parlance.

Alfred Schutz, born in Vienna in 1899, emigrated to the United States (as a Jewish refugee) with his family in July, 1939, lived in New York City, taught at the New School part-time, worked full time in banking and conducted an enormous correspondence with many other scholars of his day as well as carrying on his own writing projects.

By 1932, Schutz published his first book, *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt* (translated into English, 1967), and approximately eight papers (published in English), primarily in philosophical journals. He published two further papers in the *American Journal of Sociology*, which was based in Chicago, in 1944 and 1945 ("The Stranger" and "The Homecomer") and all before Goffman began his graduate studies (1945–1953). The first volume of his *Collected Papers* did not appear in English until 1962 and was subsequently followed by two more edited volumes in 1964 and 1966 (cf. Schutz 1962, 1964, 1966). Studying at Chicago, Goffman[2] would have had ample opportunity to become acquainted with Schutz's work (who, between 1945 and 1959 published some 15 additional papers in English) and certainly with German sociology (Goffman 1959).

Regardless, there seems to have been no direct influence on Goffman from the direction of Schutz nor any indication of an awareness by Goffman of Schutz's writings until he published *Frame Analysis*, 1974. Goffman's extensive anecdotes, examples and illustrations in footnotes in all of his writings prior to this time would give some clue to this matter if it had happened. But as far as I know, there is no mention of Schutz in Goffman's writings until 1974 in *Frame Analysis*.[3]

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[2] If we examine Goffman's writings we find that he does not include a references section or index in any of his books except for *Relations in Public* (1971) and *Forms of Talk* (1981a). The latter also provides a References section. Hence, all of his footnotes and texts would have to be examined carefully to see if he has cited or mentioned any particular author.

[3] In an interview with Verhoeven (1980: 232), Goffman answers the question of whether Schutz was an influence on him in the following exchange:

JV: "I have two other questions, to conclude. The first one – you mention at a certain moment [Alfred] Schutz. What is the meaning of Schutz for your work?"

EG: "Well, again it was a late sort of thing, but the last book on *Frame Analysis* (1974), was influenced by him. (Gregory) Bateson quite a bit, but Schutz's 1967 paper on multiple realities was an influence. (This is a later edition of "On Multiple Realities," most likely an edition of *Collected Papers, Vol. 1* which Goffman acquired. The publication of the first edition of the *Collected Papers* was in 1962; the original publication date of the article is 1945 when it appeared in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* which Goffman also cites in *Frame Analysis*. G.P.) Schutz is continuing to be something of an influence. His stuff on the corpus of experience and that sort of thing. There are some ways in which he impinges upon sociolinguistic concerns, but I can't profess to be a close student."

"Again I think Schutz has wonderful leads, but that Schutz himself doesn't carry one very far in any one direction. I part strict company with scholars who take one book as central and then see all other books, all other writings, as not as – as falling short upon the basic treatment. This has recently become very strong in American Sociology. [Ludwig] Wittgenstein gets to be a writer

1 Opportunities to Meet

As I have argued elsewhere (Psathas 2004), Schutz's position as a part-time faculty member at the New School (he became full-time in 1956), his training in the European tradition of scholarship, and his teaching at a school not prominent in American sociology undoubtedly restricted his intellectual network , his influence in academia, and certainly his influence on American sociology.

Although the University of Chicago, dominating the mid-west, was receptive to German sociologists, such as Simmel, Schutz was not among those accepted. It is indeed likely that Goffman was influenced by G. Simmel[4] and Goffman has, in turn, been called "America's Simmel" by some American sociologists.[5] Phenomenology in general, however, was not widely known and its acceptance at Chicago was minimal.

Goffman's contact with German sociology can only be surmised since there is no evidence of his reading or studying the subject at the time he was at Chicago. Undoubtedly the acquaintance and awareness of Simmel by many of the faculty had reached Goffman though he does not cite Simmel specifically either in his 1980 interview or in his various papers but only in his dissertation. His thesis adviser, Everett Hughes, was a major translator of Simmel's work and advanced Simmel's ideas in sociology. As for Schutz,[6] we find no evidence of any correspondence with

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whose writings are held up as the touchstone for what ought to be done. It seems to me there is no way that Wittgenstein could know anything about the organization of an occupation, or things like that. Schutz has come to have something of that status, of course, for ethnomethodologists….

"But this tenor of analysis of where the whole analysis consists of showing how a current writing departs from and falls short of what, say Schutz said, well I don't think Schutz said enough to inform any particular study sufficiently. That is, it's just a set of leads, of possibilities. So also with William James, or anybody else you can go back to, or Gregory Bateson. I think that's plain bad hero worship…"

[4] In the introduction to his doctoral dissertation he starts with a lengthy quote from Simmel (1950); in his first book printed in the U.S. he starts with a lengthy quote from Santayana (1922).

[5] We can note here some of the ways that Goffman resembles Simmel; for example, he writes essays; his essays are not cumulative and deal with different topics; his books are generally collections of previously published essays; he is formalistic in the sense that he stipulates a form and offers an ideal-typical description of it; finds forms that are 'in the world', there, not constructed or created by individuals; he is not explanatory; he does not infer or deduce from forms; he doesn't claim forms are exhaustive; he proposes types and subtypes after using forms to identify the shape of an activity; he is critical of society and offers descriptions and/or concepts as criticism; and uses a perspective by incongruity (presumably acquired from Kenneth Burke while Simmel's approach is identified as (*als ob*) or "as if") which can provide an ironic twist to some of his analyses. Simmel, however, had a much broader range over ethics, metaphysics, arts, religion, logic and social psychology, was "truly eclectic" and was a philosopher primarily. Smith (1989) They both seemed willing to "extract universally valid principles from the most insignificant phenomena. As Goffman said in his final paper (Goffman 1983: 17). ("F) or myself, I believe that human social life is ours to study naturalistically, *sub specie aeternitatis*." (i.e. under the aspect/appearance of eternity)

[6] I am grateful to Hisashi Nasu for searching the Schutz files to determine whether Schutz corresponded with Goffman or vice versa. As noted in Psathas (2004): "His various articles and papers could not become widely known in sociology. Though they eventually achieved widespread recognition and

Goffman or any other contact. Whether Goffman discovered Schutz in one of Garfinkel's first papers, dated 1959, is not known. (I mention this paper in particular since I was first introduced to Schutz and Husserl through Garfinkel's footnotes.)

Goffman's journeys and studies took him to Chicago, the Shetland Islands, Paris, Washington, D.C., and Berkeley, California; he did not settle on the East coast until his appointment at the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia in 1969. By this time, Schutz was deceased some 10 years. Therefore, it would appear that Schutz and Goffman never met.

2 Schutz and Multiple Realities

Schutz first published "On Multiple Realities" in 1945 and it also later appeared in his *Collected Papers Vol. 1*, published in 1962 (Goffman cites a 1967 edition). He considers several aspects of multiple realities while focusing on the world of everyday life (the paramount reality). He cites James, (particularly *Principles of Psychology* (James 1950)) but also Dewey and Mead at the outset of the paper and uses James' terms "sub-universes" or "orders of reality" (Schutz 1962: 207) in his analysis of the "style of existence" of various orders of reality. Schutz aims to consider the "subjective meaning bestow(ed) upon certain experiences […]." and examines the relation between various "realities," something which he says has not been fully explored. His use of "scientific contemplation" will also require an analysis of this order of reality as he brings it to bear on the relation between various orders of reality. His approach, therefore, is more theoretical than empirical and aims to clarify meanings and uses of "reality" as well as the relation between "realities."

3 Goffman and Frame Analysis

In this book, possibly for the first time, Goffman attempts to distance himself from phenomenology and to contrast it with his own approach. He had been associated with phenomenology by others though he never claimed this position. Heretofore he had concentrated on empirical studies of the interaction order but here he proposes to develop a more theoretical position regarding interaction. It may be characterized

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acclaim, they were originally published primarily in philosophical journals, e.g. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Review of Metaphysics*, and the *Journal of Philosophy*, or the more eclectic New School journal, *Social Research*, which was oriented to social and political research (All of these papers were finally collected in the three volumes of his *Collected Papers*, Vols I, II, and III, edited and published posthumously, in 1962, 1964 and 1966.). Thus, of the total number of 26 articles he published between 1940 and 1959, only two (The Stranger in 1944 and The Homecomer in 1945) were published in a sociological journal – *The American Journal of Sociology*; 11 were published in philosophical journals; 7 were published in the journal published by the New School, *Social Research*, and 6 were published in edited books of contributed papers."

as his own version of "multiple realities" but it takes a distinctively different turn. His concepts will include keys, keying, footing, lamination, transformations, frames, and frameworks. At the outset, however, he discusses James and Schutz, whom he characterizes as leading the way to the study of "multiple realities."

Goffman's first objection is that phenomenology has not conducted extensive empirical studies of persons' activities in the world of everyday life. With regard to the kinds of ordinary interactional events which Goffman regarded as important, phenomenology did not provide a rich description or analysis. His focus, he says, is on the 'interaction order' (see Footnote 1 for an extensive description of this concept.) and he states this in his final paper (1983), published posthumously, as well as in his earliest work (his dissertation in 1953). His training led him to believe that empirical studies of ordinary activities were *the* specific domain of sociology.[7]

Goffman accepts, seemingly without question, the world of everyday life, the world of working, the "paramount reality", as simply given and in no further need of analysis. His approach has been called 'naïve realism', nevertheless, the everyday life-world is the chosen domain for his studies.

Goffman further says too close a reading of Schutz, or any attempt to follow him in the direction of (more philosophical) examinations of the ordinary would be a distraction. Schutz, he believes, has "hypnotized some students" into treating his "pronouncements" as "definitive rather than suggestive." This point addresses what he considers a failure on the part of Schutzians to think past that which has been said or outlined by the master.

The reader will note recurring themes in the material that follows: the importance of rules; rules and meaning; world and worlds; the role of shock; frame and frameworks; and additional formulations. The focus will be on Goffman's critique and his ensuing offer of an alternative view of multiple realities.

Goffman begins *Frame Analysis* by saying that the 'line' that gives great credence to the writer/analyst about "perception, thought, brain, culture, a new methodology or novel social forces" and thinks it can "lift the veil" so that persons may see more clearly what is going on is "pathetic" because it gives too much credence to the writer and what he writes. Goffman further believes that "if men define situations as real they are real in their consequences," this is one of the major doctrines of social psychology based on W. I. Thomas, a doctrine moreover which is "true as it reads but false as it is taken." Persons may negotiate aspects of the "arrangements under which (they) live" but, once settled, they then act routinely. He argues further that definitions of the situation may matter but are hardly significant in contributing to the "events in progress." Thus it is not that participants "create" the definition of the situation, even though their society may in fact "create it", but that they act appropriately in a situation, taking it for granted once they are settled – and continue routinely

[7] In his 1980 interview, particularly considering his experiences at Chicago, he says: "If I had to be labeled at all, it would have been as a Hughesian urban ethnographer." The Chicago approach emphasized participant observation ethnography in real world activities and events without regard for political implications (though liberal and underdog in its main preconceptions).

(mechanically) as though things had always been settled. On occasion, we may have to wait until events are almost over before we discover what they had been about – or we can delay any decisions as to how we describe what we have been doing.

Goffman contends, in the tradition of William James as he sees it, that using the term 'reality' leads us to focus on what participants think and feel is real, and like James, asks the question "*Under what circumstances do we think things are real?*" This would lead to a focus on the conditions under which such a thought is generated and not on asking what reality is for the particular persons being studied. This emphasis may be what has led some to consider Goffman's approach phenomenological, i.e. the focus on the subject's experience, but as I shall argue below, his approach is not really phenomenological.

Goffman says that although the analysis of social reality "has a bad name" he will still focus on it; however, and as we shall see, he adds his own particular meanings and approaches to the problem and avoids, as much as possible, the use of the term "reality."

William James (1950: Ch. 21, 283–324) in his approach, stresses such factors as "selective attention, intimate involvement, and non contradiction by what is otherwise known." He sought to differentiate the different "worlds" which could be made "real" by virtue of attention and interest. These are "possible subuniverses" or "orders of existence" (Garfinkel 1964) and would include such worlds as: "the world of the senses, the world of scientific objects, the world of abstract philosophical truths, the worlds of myth and supernatural beliefs, the madman's world, etc.", each having its own "special and separate style of existence" and each being "real after its own fashion." With a lapse of attention, reality would also lapse.

One problem, says Goffman, was that James, in using the word "world" "implied that it was more than one person's world" (or "reality") which would lapse after it was no longer attended. Nonetheless, Goffman insists, even though James took this "radical stand," he ultimately "copped out"[8] and afforded a privileged position to the world of the senses which he judged to be the "realest reality," "the one before which the other worlds must give way" (Goffman 1974: 3). The "cop out", presumably, is James's failure to live up to his responsibility and to treat all of these realities as deserving of equal attention, if not equal in themselves.

Goffman did not accord such prominence to any one reality and saw a weakness of phenomenology here in that he himself tried rather to distinguish between one "reality" and others rather than accept one as more important or significant than any other. Any subworld can have its own "special and separate style of existence" and each world, *whilst it is attended to* (E.G. italics) is real after its own fashion; only the reality lapses with the attention" (Goffman 1974: quoting James, p. 3). Thus, "world" was not meant as "the" world but a "particular person's current world", and perhaps not even that. He accuses James of "opening a door and letting in wind as well as light" (ibid.: p. 3), i.e., the wind may bother our eyes and hamper our ability to discern clearly; but the light will illuminate.

[8] "Cop out" in Webster (1933) refers to backing out of an unwanted responsibility or to avoid or neglect problems, responsibilities, or commitments.

Likewise Schutz would appear to be guilty in Goffman's eyes because he calls the reality of the world of everyday life, the "working world," the "paramount reality" and also gives it preferential status if not priority. Schutz, at least, he says, paid attention to the "possibility of uncovering the conditions that must be fulfilled if we are to generate one realm of "reality," one "finite province of meaning." Schutz further incorporated the notion of a "shock"[9] as persons move from one world to another. Although in placing emphasis on the "working world" he was more "reserved" than James about its "objective character" since he gave priority to persons rather than the views of the observer/theorist, e.g. Schutz says, and he quotes: "We speak of provinces of *meaning* and not of subuniverses because it is the meaning of our experience and not the ontological structure of the objects which constitute reality" (Schutz 1962: 230).

Goffman takes this to mean that Schutz differs from James in that he consistently gives priority to the participants. Each subuniverse has a particular "cognitive style," a phrase which he prefers to that of saying that each is "generative (according to) of certain structural principles" (Goffman 1974: 5). Actors may be bodily involved in their participation and each may be affecting and "be affected by the everyday world." But for Goffman the preference is to consider the many in contrast to the singular – and any intimation of a unity or singularity is avoided by him. That is not to say that this is Schutz's position but we'll soon see how Goffman construes James and Schutz in this manner.

3.1 Excursus: Shock

In an extended quote of Schutz, Goffman (1974: 4) takes the use of the term "shock" (or "leap" accompanied by a "shock experience which radically alters the tension of consciousness") to indicate a shift of the participant's attention from one reality to another. In his view this transition is characterized much too abruptly. It signals a major shift as though the person could not hold more than two realities simultaneously or easily shift from one to the other without difficulty. In his view, transitions are readily accomplished by shifts or "transformations" and several layers, or laminations of different "meanings" are possible; the individual would have no difficulty in transitioning from one to another. The word "shock" connotes something major whereas "shift" or "transformation" seems more cognitive/intellectual, than one involving bodily involvement. His disagreement with Schutz on this issue is resolved through his use of the terms "key", "footing" and "lamination," his own concepts which, in part, describe how one can move easily from and between different "keyings."

In addition, Goffman holds that multiple keyings (or re-keyings), virtually simultaneous, are possible, modifying the Schutzian notion of an entry or exit marked by a more "radical" movement of attention. Goffman opts to focus on the subject's

[9]This matter of 'shock' will be taken up explicitly by Goffman who sees the shift from one 'reality' to another as much more fluid and straightforward. See below.

"cognitive style," a term from Schutz which he favours along with "provinces of meaning" and it is clear that he wishes to focus on the subject's view and experience rather than "the ontological structure of the objects which constitute reality." Goffman would appear to accept a phenomenological stance when he makes statements like these, no matter that he may go off in another direction or contradict himself when he continues. Notwithstanding, in *Frame Analysis,* the focus is on the "organization of experience" and here, presumably, he means the *subject's* experience.

Goffman is concerned not only with "shock" but other issues with which he does not agree and uses Garfinkel to support his interpretation.[10] Garfinkel's work, Goffman argues, "extended the argument about multiple realities by going on to look for rules which…allow us to generate a "world" of a given kind. Presumably a machine designed according to the proper specifications could grind out a reality of our choice." (Goffman 1974: 5) Thus, Goffman sees the determination of a "reality" as looking for the rules that generate it – the analysis thus consisting of a search for the rules —— and the results would be equivalent to those which a "properly specified 'machine' could produce" and as we may choose.[11]

For Goffman then, (1974: 5–6) reality is "a choice" for the person who specifies "the rules." What Schutz delineated as the several features of a particular reality, e.g. fantasy, dream, the play, became for Goffman an arbitrary selection of "rules" to describe it. Here he does not see the characteristics of a particular "multiple reality" or "cognitive style" as emerging from the careful (inductive) analysis and description of "reality itself." For Goffman, any number of "additional assumptions" might be delineated by those who are describing/analyzing it. The process is virtually mechanical since he proposes that a "machine" could "grind out the reality of our choice." Note, however, that the machine is external to the situation and may not be a part of it just as the observer may be analyst and not participant. In a similar way, meaning depends on the set of rules – any analysis of social life would require examining such rules – and the task of the sociologist becomes one of uncovering and discovering the rules.

Furthermore, Goffman argues, although James and Schutz are "convincing" with respect to the difference in organization between the "world" of dreams and the world of everyday experience, they are less convincing when it comes to indicating how many different worlds there may be or in showing how the "rule-produced plane of being" of everyday, wide-awake life can be seen this way, if seen at all (p. 7).

Constitutive rules, then, also become a game, according to Goffman (1974: 6) and "any number can play forever." And, since he equates realities or worlds with each having distinctive constitutive rules, one would suppose that there would be as

[10] Here he attributes to Garfinkel, incorrectly, the desire to find the "rules" which underlie a particular form of activity. It is not clear, since there are no citations, which of Garfinkel's works he had in mind but the major thrust of ethnomethodology is not a search for "rules." It was Goffman, rather, who sought to find the 'rules' governing activities and the characterization of Goffman as a structural functionalist or Durkheimian is in part based on this aspect of his analysis. (Possibly it was Garfinkel's (1963) paper which was, in part, on constitutive rules in games which proved a distraction for Goffman.)

[11] "Rules," in Goffman's view, are capable of being produced by routinized, machine-like processes.

many "realities" described as there would be interests among analysts. Goffman says (p. 6) "players usually come up with five or ten rules (as I will), but there are no grounds for thinking that a thousand additional assumptions might not be listed by others." The "rules" may be virtually infinite – or run well into the thousands at the very least – and may focus primarily on what individuals may "be engrossed or carried away by" i.e. with the individual's sense of what is real. The result can be that they claim reality for what they are only engrossed in. Goffman's objective is to focus on experience and feeling or the sense of what is real; engrossment is not a necessary condition but may actually be a distraction.

Goffman thinks that we would be left with the analysis carried out by others, neglecting the perceptions, interests and attention given by participants. There may be "structural similarities" between the world of everyday life and other "worlds" but we would not know how such a relationship should "modify our view of everyday life." That is, it is incumbent on analysts of "finite provinces of meaning" to show how interconnections or relations might modify their view of everyday life. Clearly Goffman believes they do not provide such connections and he seems to hold this as a criterion they should aspire to. Why they should is not clear; he merely offers the stipulation. He is only addressing tangentially here the question of the relation between "worlds" – a matter which we shall have to return to later. Goffman's critical comments show a lack of understanding of "multiple realities" as formulated by Schutz.

It is in this section of his text that Goffman extensively quotes Schutz, offering a lengthy footnote (Goffman 1974:6, fn 11) which provides Schutz's delineation of the six characteristics of the "cognitive style" of everyday life:

1. a specific tension of consciousness, namely wide-awakeness, originating in a full attention to life.
2. a specific epoché, namely suspension of doubt
3. a prevalent form of spontaneity, namely working…
4. a specific form of experiencing one's self (the working self as a total self)
5. a specific form of sociality (the common intersubjective world of communication and social action)
6. a specific time perspective (the standard time originating in an interaction between dureé and cosmic time…)

These are at least some of the features of the cognitive style belonging to this particular province of meaning. As long as our experiences of this world – the valid as well as the invalidated ones – partake of this style we may consider this province of meaning as real, we may bestow upon it the accent of reality (Schutz 1962: 230–231).

And at this point Goffman ends[12] his consideration of the James/Schutz "line of thought" saying merely that subsequently others have picked it up even though their

[12]It seems to me that what Goffman is doing is setting aside the major thinkers/writers on "multiple realities" so that he can proceed to offer his own account; in other words, "frame" would replace "reality" in the course of his investigating/describing the world of everyday life. His schema would have to address some of the same issues that James/Schutz address, e.g. transitions involving "shocks" in going from one reality to another; the description of a "reality"; etc. But once set aside, he can proceed in his own way to delineate the different realities.

"initial stimulus came from sources not much connected historically with the phenomenological tradition" (Goffman 1974: 6–7). He gives no indication of who he might mean here – unless he has the authors mentioned immediately afterwards in mind. Here he places the "theater of the absurd" as found in the plays of Luigi Pirandello, the work by Gregory Bateson (*A Theory of Play and Fantasy*) in which a "usable" notion of bracketing is introduced (whatever this means); the realities of a play and non-play ("the real thing") are examined – and – most importantly, the term "frame" – in a manner Goffman describes as similar to his own – is used.

Goffman also mentions as relevant sources the work of John Austin, Ludwig Wittgenstein, D.S. Schwayder (*The Stratification of Behavior*, 1965), Glaser and Strauss "Awareness Contexts and Social Interaction" (1969) as well as the "linguistically oriented disciplines which use the notion of 'code' as a device to include all events within its boundaries." Even though he concedes that he has "borrowed extensively" from all of these he is clearly proceeding to produce his *own* account with his own particular focus. Despite these earlier explorations of a variety of perspectives – including James and Schutz – Goffman declares that he will "assume the right to pick (his) point of view, (his) motivational relevancies," with the sole limitation being that his selection is "one which participants will easily recognize to be valid" (Goffman 1974: 8–9).

In the development of this perspective[13] we find a procedure that Goffman has followed in his other writings: upon finding fault with other approaches, he will indicate what his own stance will be, justify it as having good grounds and even as being in agreement, in (most) (some) respects with the understandings which participants have – and as yielding important "insights." He will use in his argument numerous relevant examples, illustrations and anecdotes drawn from a variety of sources. The amalgamation or synthesis will be one which suits his purposes in the analyses to come though it is not necessarily one which he will use again.

In *Frame Analysis* Goffman's self professed overall aim is to isolate "basic frameworks of understanding available in our society for making sense out of events and to analyze the general vulnerabilities to which these frames of reference are subject." (p. 10) Frame analysis would enable us to find the basic framework being used in a particular instance. (Later he will talk of "primary frameworks." Presumably other frameworks are secondary or derivative.) Thus, the task is one of finding a relevant framework, the framework of understanding which will be used to make sense of what the world is for the participant. And, though the term "frame" is not clearly defined, if even defined at all, his mission seems to be to proceed as far as he can, to be selective, and to offer as many examples as will enable him to claim firm grounds for his notions.

[13] In his interview with Verhoeven he offers this self-description of his approach and that of others in Chicago with whom he was associated: "It would be more accurate to call them sociologists of small scale entities like occupations, things like that, with a Hughesian, qualitative, ethnographic perspective. So if we had to choose a label, Hughesian sociology would be a more accurate one than symbolic interactionism. But it was all one group in terms of friendship links and origins at Chicago and that sort of thing."

As in his other studies, Goffman privileges the viewpoint of the observer – although as was noted, this book is concerned with the organization of experience and, thus, one must presume, the viewpoint of the participants. This is clear when he says, "one thing may momentarily appear to be what is really going on, *in fact*, what is actually happening is plainly a joke, or a dream, or an accident, or a mistake, or a misunderstanding, or a deception, or a theatrical performance, and so forth" (p. 10). This would clearly indicate that the participant may *think* he 'knows' and yet be mistaken. The observer would *know*; the participant merely *thinks* he knows. (G.P. my phrasing) This alternation is consistently Goffmanian and represents his take on sociology using frame analysis, i.e. the observer/sociologist is capable of knowing more clearly or with greater certainty (though *he* may at times also be confused) "what is *really* going on."

Goffman proposes to offer basic or elementary terms for the subject even though they may be abstract and fail to meet the "standards of modern philosophy" (p. 11). He asks the reader to afford him a certain latitude and to read with charity in order that he may proceed smoothly instead of labouring under a cloud of critical suspicion.

4 Responses by Schutz

We should take stock here of the various criticisms which Goffman makes in these few pages and briefly respond, as Schutz might, though not in his more characteristic deliberate and tempered fashion. It is Schutz's position that:

1. Phenomenology *is* interested in the careful, detailed and systematic study of empirical instances of interactional phenomena.
2. Phenomenology *is* interested in careful, detailed and systematic analyses of finite provinces of meaning or 'cognitive styles' as these operate for persons. Please note that I say "careful, detailed and systematic" because there are phenomenologically inspired studies that may not meet these criteria. Nevertheless, such instances do not obviate Schutz's position just as a few misguided practitioners do not outweigh the legitimate efforts of the majority.
3. "Paramount reality" may be held to be paramount by many (most) phenomenologists but it does not necessarily detract from the effort to delineate other and varied realities as these engage the participant.[14]
4. Schutz does not pay close attention to how easily or rapidly transitions may occur, except to say that "shock" occurs frequently in daily life and reminds us that the world of working is not the sole finite province of meaning. On this matter of transitions Goffman may have a point.

[14]Note that Schutz (1962: 231) says that "(the experiences of shock) show me that the world of working in standard time is not the sole finite province of meaning but only one of many others accessible to my intentional life."

5. Schutz does *not* attempt to enumerate or even hint at how many "worlds" or "cognitive styles" there may be nor does he suggest that his enumeration has done anything more than point in the direction that may be taken by others.
6. His analyses of multiple realities *is intended to begin* their study and in no way is he claiming to be complete or definitive.[15]
7. Phenomenology *does* represent a different approach within the social or human sciences and cannot simply be added to or amalgamated with any number of other approaches as it may suit the researcher. In this sense phenomenology is an approach and perspective which needs to be explored/followed/utilized by the empirical researcher and not simply read in order to glean insights without regard for the methods and means whereby its results were achieved. Goffman was a "reader" of many different studies/approaches and it would appear that, in this case, he is "reading" phenomenology, not "doing" it.
8. He *is* concerned with the "world of daily life" and is quite explicit that this world is engaged in while one is in the natural attitude. Goffman *assumes* the natural attitude as that which persons adopt but makes no mention of it.
9. Schutz *assumes* that the "world of daily life' means an 'intersubjective world which existed long before our birth, experienced and interpreted by Others, our predecessors, as an organized world." "Worlds" are not the result of creative efforts or the development of constitutive rules ("analogous to alchemy" as Goffman says) such that any number can play. Goffman is *incorrect* in his interpretation and confuses one of Garfinkel's papers with Schutz's position.
10. Goffman *never considers the natural attitude*, does not identify it, refer to it, or make use of it in any of his analyses. It can be argued that Goffman works within the natural attitude (and the world of everyday life) and does not question it or subject it to examination nor does he seem to be aware of its features (Schutz orig. 1962, 1971: 208–209). One could say the same with respect to the notion of "bracketing" which he does not seem to understand. He does not comment on the pragmatic motive with which persons in the natural attitude in the world of daily life operate and only indirectly praises the idea that people are bodily enmeshed in the world of working.
11. Schutz's concern with meaning differs from Goffman's interpretation. Goffman says that meaning is "dependent on a closed, finite set of rules."
12. The difference between different worlds or finite provinces of meaning can be ascertained by comparing and contrasting them but the analyst is not thereby obliged to specify how many different worlds there may be (Goffman 1974: 5) This is a demand which Goffman makes.
13. Neither does the analyst have to show, as Goffman demands, "whether everyday wide awake life can actually be seen as but one rule produced plane of being, if so seen at all" (Goffman 1974: 5). Here Goffman's misinterpretations led him to raise questions which a careful study might have enabled him to answer.

[15]Schutz (1962: 208) says: "The following considerations, fragmentary as they are, attempt to outline a first approach to some of them with the special aim of clarifying the relationship between the reality of the world of daily life and that of theoretical scientific contemplation." His view is indeed tentative and initial.

14. Schutz particularly wants to consider the world of scientific contemplation and how it relates to the world of everyday life. This is an issue which Goffman does not address.

In contrast then to Goffman, Schutz's analysis of multiple realities would lead to studies of the constitutive features of any reality; the work of analysis cannot be said to have been concluded, therefore, but only begun. Goffman's criticism that all of the many realities have not been delineated represents his desire for completion whereas Schutz, beginning in 1945, shows that the task has just begun.

In short, Goffman's misinterpretations and selective readings lead him to dismiss James/Schutz and any possible relevance which a phenomenological approach might have for his project. His misreadings, I would claim, enable him to be dismissive, a tendency which he undoubtedly had from the start, while at the same time professing an interest in and awareness of the works of others who have studied social interaction.[16] In his interview with Verhoeven in 1980 he goes so far as to say that he was influenced by Schutz. As he continues *Frame Analysis* it becomes clear that he had his own schema in mind and primarily wished to show that certain frames are (what Schutz might call) "imposed relevances," i.e. are already in the world and are not "created" or "negotiated" by participants, e.g., ceremony, ritual, drama, game etc. He does cite Schutz once on issues of motivation or relevance (Goffman 1974: 5) but does not consistently use even his own set of concepts as he proceeds.

5 What Are Frames?

The terms Goffman will focus on in this book are frame, footing, strip, keys, keying, laminations, transformations, example or illustration, and reflexivity among others – each taken up briefly or offhandedly, awaiting fuller explication in subsequent chapters. As we shall see, Goffman does not necessarily use his own concepts – consistently or frequently – and is generally intent on using examples and other sources to illustrate and emphasize his positions. For him, analysis consists of collecting and arranging – in providing insights rather than in systematic exposition.

"Frame,"[17] and Goffman says he uses the term similar to the way Bateson does, becomes the definition of the situation as it is built up with "principles of

[16]In our lengthy paper, we (Psathas and Waksler 1973) offer a number of criticisms of Goffman's approach to the study of social interaction including his lack of an awareness of the relevance of Schutz.

[17]Thomas Koenig says that "frames are basic cognitive structures which guide the perception and representation of reality. On the whole, frames are not consciously manufactured but are unconsciously adopted in the course of communication processes. On a very banal level, frames structure which parts of reality become noticed." Gitlin (1980) says "frames are principles of selection, emphasis and presentation, composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters." Then, Koenig states, "the trouble starts when it comes to the identification and measurement of frames precisely because they consist of tacit rather than overt conjectures, it becomes difficult to identify frames."

organization which govern (social) events and our subjective involvement in them…" (Goffman 1974: 10) He offers this as his definition of frame and states that it will include as many basic elements as he can identify. Thus, for Goffman, "frame" is not clearly defined but rather is a "slogan," as he says, to refer to how he goes about examining the organization of experience.[18]

Scheff (2006: 77) is just as explicit. He says frame is not explained. The definition of frame is both "casual and vague" and, Scheff argues, Goffman fails to explain what the problem is that frame analysis is "intended to solve." As a result of these shortcomings, Scheff contends that there are no compelling reasons to subscribe to Goffman's use of the concept.

Later, however, it seems clear that Goffman is proposing a way of including context in his analysis and Scheff goes on to say that frame analysis is a term that refers to the definition of the situation and, more broadly, the context as it is received and "made sense of" by participants. In this way, Goffman can criticize conversation analysis (or ethnomethodology) for not including "the larger context" and claims that he is aware of this omission and is able to rectify it in his own studies.[19]

Context, of course, is another of those important but vague terms that plague the social sciences. Nevertheless, Scheff, for one, is convinced that Goffman is "unpacking' the idea of context in this book and focuses his own comments on what he considers this important aspect of the book.

"Strip" is used by Goffman to refer to "any arbitrary slice or cut from the stream of ongoing activity, including here sequences of happenings, real or fictive, as seen from the perspective of those subjectively involved in sustaining an interest in them. A "strip" will refer to "any raw batch of occurrences (of whatever status in reality) that one wants to draw attention to as a starting point for analysis" (Goffman 1974: 10).

By this stage in his Introduction to *Frame Analysis*, Goffman has abandoned the notion of "multiple realities," James/Schutz, and indeed phenomenology itself in order to advance his own views. Although Goffman's views here seem similar to those espoused in earlier publications, at least as far as his methods are concerned, there is one significant departure – he says that he is interested in the "organization of experience," by which he presumably means the subjective experience of the participant in the situation. This would seem to involve a serious inquiry into what is subjectively experienced, *not attributed* to the experiencing participant. To this

[18]Trevino (2003) calls it a metaphor and states: "[…] Goffman suggests that social experience is structured by "frames", schemas of interpretation, that guide us in defining the multitudinous social situations we find ourselves in. Social interaction is made meaningful because frames help us to make sense of what is going on. The frame metaphor informs all of Goffman's work from 1974 on, this includes *Frame Analysis*, *Gender Advertisements*, "The arrangement between the sexes," *Forms of Talk*, and "Felicity's condition.'"

[19]This book has been considered by some (see Smith 1999: 13), to be his answer/critique of Garfinkel's *Studies in Ethnomethodology* (1967a, b).

end, a method involving more than direct observation would seem necessary, and yet, that is not the preferred method which Goffman will follow.[20]

Goffman argues that concepts and themes will be developed as they appear necessary and/or relevant. He will hold to no specific sequence because, as he says, conceptual introductions are generally circular rather than linear – their introduction and use is more important than their meaning. Too heavy a reliance on concepts or words or frames would force him to "re-apply in every chapter […] a term that has already been applied" and would make the study "more entangled" since repetition becomes necessary (Goffman 1974: 11).

Even discussions about frame would then require discussions about the frame used to analyze the frame. Goffman's preference is to proceed along the lines of commonsense assumptions that "ordinary language and ordinary writing practices are sufficiently flexible to allow anything that one wants to express to get expressed." (Goffman 1974: 11) Similarly, the analysis of his methods of using illustrations, examples, and cases in point to get at "folk theories (which … use) such devices" would also require the use of examples and illustrations thus "vitiating the analysis."

With respect to dealing with reflexivity Goffman then claims that ordinary language will be adequate, that the "reflexive problem" need not displace other inquiries and he can point out when he is considering reflexive issues. He believes that his readers will understand (in the same way he does) by virtue of the context of use, and may not be able to explicate just how such understanding is achieved (Goffman 1974: 12). Similarly, he argues, the term "real" can also be understood if used "carefully," until such time as an analysis of it may be needed.

As an additional thought, which functions here as a disclaimer, Goffman adds that "there are lots of good grounds for doubting the kind of analysis [he himself presents]. … It is too bookish, too general too removed from field work to have a

[20]I should say here that I fully agree with Richard Lanigan who wrote, in 1990, that Goffman is *not a phenomenologist*; the person or participant, is not put first but rather the society is. Lanigan (1990: 100) writes "I should be following Goffman's 'phenomenological' methodology in a very precise manner as a sufficient theory. Systematic description would have occurred, but our desire to understand cultural meaning, and, to recognize the exercise of social power in communication would remain undisclosed. Instead, I have taken Goffman's frame analysis into the theoretical arena of phenomenology proper by providing both reduction and interpretation steps to his description step of method. In so doing, I illustrate how the phenomenological theorist can improve on the legacy of Erving Goffman. Yet, I am also forced to conclude on theoretical grounds that Goffman is *not* a phenomenologist in the traditional and usually accepted meaning of that name because I insist on cross-checking his research conclusion with persons in their lived world, not that world formed (even at the micro-level) by the naïve realism of the researcher! Thus to reverse Goffman's paraphrase of his own perspective and, thereby, state the phenomenologist's perspective, I am suggesting that as a phenomenologist 'I personally hold the person to be first in every way and any of society's current involvements to be second, this essay deals only with matters that are first.' In this reversal, we are motivated to keep the theoretical applications of desire and power straight. Communicated messages are evidence of a subjectivity (desire) that is coded as intersubjectivity (power) which is, of course, the provocative original thesis of the founder of the reflexive theory and method of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl." (Note: Gofffman says in *Frame Analysis* that he holds that society is first.)

good chance of being anything more than a mentalistic adumbration" (Goffman 1974: 13). His self-deprecations confirm his awareness of these issues as well as his desire to adopt a humbler stance in dealing with them. His claim is that "nonetheless, some of the things in this world seem to urge the analysis." Here, his "compulsion" can be seen as an answer to this insistence, and, although he may handle the job "badly", at least he will proceed to attempt it.

In this fashion Goffman excuses in advance any problems or insoluble matters he may concern himself with. The claim is reduced to an "at least I tried" attitude and is thereby designed to absolve and reward himself at the same time.

As another disclaimer Goffman says that he is not concerned here with the organization of society – with social organization or social structure – but with the "structure of experience" (Goffman 1974: 13) which persons may have at any "moment of their social lives." Society is first, he says, and the individual is second, but his study will nevertheless deal with the second. This stance leaves him open to the criticism that he is politically conservative, (see also Psathas 1977) since he is not focusing on the differences between those who have and those who have not. He can admit this is true, but turns to address others and says *they* would need to try to awaken those who are in the sleep of "false consciousness." He claims that he is not so much lulling people to sleep ("providing a lullaby") but rather watching the "way they snore." This justification (excuse) allows him to proceed as he wishes – granting his critics their point – but not yielding to it.[21] As for the kinds of data and observations[22] he employs he states that he is aware of his repetitions and liberal use of footnotes but is only trying to "order his thoughts" (Goffman 1974: 14).

There may be little value in anecdotes and newspaper stories since they do not cover the ordinary and usual. Nevertheless, in their way of providing "unity, coherence, pointedness, self-completeness and drama" they "typify" events rather than "facts" and this makes them eminently suitable. These stories and anecdotes are presented as "clarifying depictions," as frame fantasies which offer a view of the way the world works and a celebration of beliefs rather than a questioning of them (Goffman 1974: 14–15).

[21] It is interesting to note that philosophers are expected to provide detailed arguments to strengthen or support or refute a particular position whereas Goffman can be dismissive and simply waves off possible criticisms, alludes to them if he chooses and then proceeds as he wishes. Goffman himself seems to be aware of this when he says he is not doing philosophy. This is also an indirect swipe at James/Schutz.

[22] Goffman's methods deserve fuller study but we can at least point to his major approaches to the study of the interaction order (and some interesting similarities in various places with Simmel (see footnote 5)): he does field work; he is qualitative and shuns all quantitative approaches; he uses participant observation in doing what is called ethnographic studies; he is naturalistic in his observations using all manner of observation, interviewing, overhearing, quotes from fiction, novels, etc. in order to catch the details of occurring events; he uses made up 'data' which closely conform to what he has read or observed; and, very rarely, uses actual recordings of spoken matters. His methods of data collection are distinctly different from those of conversation analysis which relies consistently on video and/or audio taped recordings of naturally occurring interaction and shuns any artificial, contrived or quoted and reported sayings.

Collected over the years, for a variety of purposes, Goffman is aware that he is not engaged in "systematic sampling" and will even add to this collection such materials as cartoons, comics, novels, the cinema and the stage (Goffman 1974: 15). They are readily available to anyone and his use is in no way intended to be exclusive or even original. Writers and journalists have used them, sometimes to find out more about the nature of society. (We might note that phenomenologists have argued that it is possible to find essences by examining particulars but Goffman does not say this.) His approach is simply to use what is "easy to hand" and their ready availability can also indicate that others are familiar with the issues they raise. In this sense he can be reasonably confident that others are already familiar with matters about which he may choose to write.

Goffman then goes on to comment on the writing of Prefaces and Introductions, matters which I will not take up except to say that his reflexive comments on these display acuity and verbal flexibility. He is, in these short passages, again displaying his unique approach and adding to the current discussion of frame analysis by, in a sense, using different frames (and footings) without necessarily referring openly to these.

6 Conclusion

Thus, with regard to both Schutz and later the ethnomethodologists and conversation analysts, Goffman chose his own way, critiqued others, read them continually, but never really agreed with them. His uniqueness as an ironic critic of society and his many different writings cast him as a well-read and original writer/analyst of social interaction. But his insistence on his own approach led him to be less interested in achieving integration with the approaches of others. His contributions, deprived of the advocacy of students or successors, resulted in his being less recognized than might otherwise have been the case. His efforts to distance himself from other analysts in the social sciences, e.g. Schutz, led him to prefer to work alone. His writings thus became distinctive in their insightfulness and in no way indebted to any particular analytic schema. His conceptual researches enabled him to identify what to him was a distinctive "interaction order" and to draw attention to the importance of studying it.

His differences with the work of conversation analysts and ethnomethodologists led him to be critical of these approaches rather than trying to find points of agreement which might advance his own formulations or to discover additional ways to study the interaction order. He examined and discarded Schutz, James and others and, we might add, phenomenology. Notwithstanding, his criticisms are often mere statements of preference rather than carefully developed critical arguments. One frequently has the impression that he merely wanted to show that he was different and favored his own conceptualizations. He appears not to have been open or accepting to formulations by any other major contributors to the study of meaning or "reality.", e.g. James, Schutz, Garfinkel, and others.

Schutz, on the other hand, remained consistent and analytic in his study of "multiple realities" or "finite provinces of meaning."[23] He tried to build upon the work of his predecessors rather than critiquing them with a view to substituting his own formulations for theirs. Each of the various realities which he identifies may be analyzed, at least to begin with, by using the conceptual framework which he introduces. By opening new fields for the study of meaning his analyses succeed in presenting many different realities (finite provinces of meaning) and point to an infinite number of worlds. His continuing focus on the world of everyday life leads him to consider how it retains its dominance or priority even though other realities may be entered into. In contrast to Goffman, he sees such movements as more transformative, as his discussion of 'shock' demonstrates, whereas laminations, for Goffman, not only allow for easy transitions from one reality to another but imply their coexistence and a non-radical transition from one to the other.

Goffman's reliance on a common-sense understanding of his work is further indication of his preference for less theoretical or abstract ventures. It is the empirical study which attracts his interest and it is such studies that he sees as primary, certainly less philosophical and abstract than the work of James and Schutz. Goffman's work remains original and unique but cannot be said to add very much to our understanding of "multiple realities." Instead, his original formulations (frame, footing, strip, keys, keying, laminations, etc.) may be understood as offering a different approach to the study of the meaning of "reality."

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[23] Schutz presents a beginning analysis of the worlds of phantasms, the world of dreams, the world of scientific contemplation and shows their varying relation to the world of everyday life.

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Literature and the Limits of Pragmatism. Alfred Schutz's Goethe Manuscripts

Michael D. Barber

1 Schutz's Pragmatism

Ilja Srubar's (1988) *Kosmion* revolutionized Schutz scholarship through a painstaking examination of the entirety of Schutz's corpus, including the unpublished 1936–1937 manuscripts entitled "*Das Problem der Personalität in der Sozialwelt*," highlighting the prevalence of pragmatic themes in Schutz's work, and illustrating "*dass die Untersuchungen zur pragmatischen Genese der sozialen Individuums und der sozialen Wirklichkeit ein Hauptanliegen des Schützschen Ansatzes waren noch lange bevor er den amerikanischen Boden betrat*" (Srubar 1988: 133).[1]

Srubar acknowledges at the end of his book that several finite provinces of meaning (e.g., science, phantasy, and dreams), which are modifications of the work-world,

[1]The traditional interpretation of Alfred Schutz's work took him for a phenomenologist, who, in his 1932 *Phenomenology of the Social World*, focused on acts and their objects, at least until he fled to the United States after the 1938 Austrian *Anschluss*. There he supposedly encountered American pragmatism, and, in attempting to enculturate philosophically, incorporated pragmatic concerns in his own work, as is evident particularly in the account of the everyday world of "working" (or bodily engagement with the outer world) that is to be found in his 1945 essay "On Multiple Realities" (Schutz 1962: 211–212).

Indeed, for Srubar, pragmatic themes persist throughout Schutz's work in his discussions of Bergson's treatment of memory, action, and bodiliness; the intersection between inner and outer time; the acting ego and theory of action in contrast to Husserl's perception-based theory; the selectivity of reflection; the identity of the social person; the philosophical-anthropological rather than transcendental founding of the social sciences; the significance of space and time; the preeminent reality of the world of working; the functioning of preconscious Leibnizian *petites perceptions*; the possibility of mastering (*beherrschbar*) the present "now" and the future; the overcoming of the uncertainty of death through working (*Wirken*); the constitution of the life-world and our access to it; and the appresentation systems through which we overcome transcendencies. See Srubar 1988: 57–58, 85, 98–101, 110, 114, 116, 129, 130, 133–140, 143, 144, 146–147, 162–163, 180, 184, 188, 190, 191, 205–207, 230–235, 239, 255, 259, 263.

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display a non-pragmatic style of knowledge and motivation; that pragmatism cannot be an ultimate philosophy; and that the relationship among these provinces of meaning need not be pragmatic. Even though pragmatic working does not structure other finite provinces of meaning, it has, nevertheless, affected the construction of these provinces; its acts underlie them, and it is still present in some form in all of them (cf. Srubar 1988: 154–155, 220, 278–279). Indeed, expanding on Srubar's novel interpretation of Schutz, critics have argued that "*distanziert er [Schutz] sich zunehmend von der transzendentalphilosophischen Anlage von Husserls Bewusstseinsanalyse*" (Endreß and Renn 2004: 43) and even that he does not go far enough in breaking from Husserlian phenomenology and embracing a pragmatic orientation (cf. Renn 2006a: 1, 5–7, 10–12, 13–16, 2006b: 199, 211, 214, 216, 220, 221).

One finds evidence for Schutz's pragmatic turn throughout the personality manuscripts, which, as Schutz himself admits, surpass the *Sinnhafte Aufbau* in their analysis of working in the constitution of self and world. According to Schutz, the *ego agens* constitutes the primary instituting experience of the self from which all other aspects are derived as modifications. In acting, the ego experiences itself as unitary, and it is only reflection on that ego that isolates aspects of the self, splitting it into partial selves. Moreover, I am the center of the world that surrounds me and presents itself through a perspectival articulation as a world of contemporaries, successors, and predecessors with adumbrations of near and far; intimacy and strangeness; past, present, and future; and what is relevant or irrelevant. But my position in the centre of my world is not stable, since Schutz construes the Husserlian idealization ("I can always again") pragmatically, insofar as the past becomes potentially "reactivatable" in the present and future, i.e., I can retrieve what happened or what I did in the past as a guide to acting now or in the future. Not only can an earlier *hinc* become an *illinc*, but, depending on my interests, I can access the world that had previously merely been within my reach, whether that world includes interests I might adopt or persons whose viewpoints I might understand or appropriate. Through this capacity to convert what had been beyond me into something which I can make use of or control, I exhibit the freedom and pragmatic power of my body. My body is distinct from all other phenomena in the world by virtue of the fact that I hold sway over it as nothing else, and, through it can access other worlds. It is hardly surprising to find then that Schutz sees the consummation of the pragmatic turn in Leibniz's equation of spontaneity with "*dem Bestreben […] zu anderen Perzeptionen zu gelangen*" (Schutz 2003a: 59; Translation 29). *In brief, the acting self (1) is unified, (2) stands at the center of its world, and (3) is capable of bringing within reach what is beyond it* (cf. ibid.: 49–51/19–20; 56/26; 58–59/28–29; 71/41; 95/47; 98/49; 111/60; 120–121/67; 132/75; 132–133/76; 139–143/82–84).

It is important to note, however, that when Schutz discusses multiple realities beyond the world of working, it is not that these realities are merely free of pragmatic motives and volitions or that they merely bracket such moments or contain them in weakened form. Nor is it merely the case that these non-everyday multiple realities exhibit a distinctive contemplative knowledge style or a set of relevances that differs from those of working. Rather, the literary sphere of reality, as described in Schutz's two 1948 manuscripts on Goethe's *Wilhelm Meisters*

Wanderjahre and *Lehrjahre*, involves a positive *opposition* to the pragmatic motivations of everyday life and illuminates everyday aspects counterpoised to such motivations. The closest Srubar comes to recognizing this tension between these multiple realities and the world of working occurs near the end of *Kosmion* when he speaks of the capacity of the contemplative subject "*andere, nicht durch wirkbezogene Relevanzen strukturierte Wirlichkeiten mit ihrem kognitiven Eigenrecht zu konstituieren*" (Srubar 1988: 279). This insistence on alternative realities' distinctive lawfulness and relevances, however, does not quite capture how literature contravenes everyday pragmatism, explores dimensions frustrating its hegemony, and makes room for the transcendental-philosophical concerns typical of the Husserlian framework (cf. ibid.: 151, 152, 278, 279).

2 The Literary Sphere as a Critical Counterpart to Pragmatic Everyday Life

The literary counteraction to pragmatism takes two forms: the constitution via an *epoché* of the literary sphere itself as well as the specific themes in Goethe's writings that Schutz concentrates on. Schutz's treatment of the literary sphere focuses on the novella, "The Man of 50 Years," which occupies chapters three to five of Book II of the 1829 version of *Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre* in which a 50-year old Major is flattered to find his son's lover, Hilary, in love with him, while his son has in turn become enamored with an older widow. As the story unfolds, Hilary falls back in love with the son, and the widow and the Major begin a relationship. In chapter seven, Goethe returns to the novel's main action and depicts Wilhelm visiting the homeland of a young girl who had died in the *Lehrjahre* and suddenly longing to meet up with Hilary and the widow, characters from the novella, who are traveling on a nearby lake. Schutz, contrasting this 1829 version with the 1821 edition of the *Wanderjahre*, highlights a number of technical problems. For instance, in the early version, Hersilie, a friend of Wilhelm's, sends him the story of "The Man of 50 Years," informs him that Hilary and the widow are traveling together, and provides him with a map – an arrow on the map indicating their location; in the later edition, however, all of these 'interventions' are omitted, and the narrator simply narrates everything to the reader. In the later edition, however, one has to wonder how Wilhelm himself knows that the two women are traveling, or how he ever received the map with an arrow. Of course, the major problem arises from the fact that two characters in a novella suddenly appear in the main action of the novel. As a result, critics have taken the second edition of the *Wanderjahre* for a hastily patched together work of an ageing poet which would not have survived for posterity had its author not been so illustrious (cf. Schutz 1948a: 889, 918–924, 937).

Against these criticisms, Schutz defends Goethe, especially against his critical literary executor, Johannes Eckermann, and the defense considers diary entries, literary texts, and speculations about what motives could have been ascribed to Goethe. But immediately after discussing the technical problems, Schutz resorts to

another kind of defense, explaining away the technical improprieties of the 1829 edition on the basis of his theory of multiple realities. He writes:

> Alle diese Fragen werden hier sinnlos. Die vorwaltende Motivation ist nicht dem Realitätszusammenhang des täglichen Lebens zugehörig und nicht in dessen Logik kommensurabel. Es ist eine Motivation ganz anderer Art – die Motivation, die der des Traumerlebnisses ähnelt, in dem sich die Traumbilder vermischen, verschieben, in einander übergehen, ohne dass derartige Phänomene zu erstaunter Fragen nach dem Wie, Woher, Warum, Anlass geben. Ein Kärtchen mit Pfeil, von dem der bisherige Trauminhalt nichts wusste, ist hinreichendes Motiv für den Träumer, Zusammenhänge zwischen im realen Leben nicht kompatibeln Gehalten herzustellen. Es gibt eine Logik des poetischen Geschehens, die der des täglichen Lebens ebenso zuwiderläuft wie der des rationalen Denkens, wie es in der Sprache der Lyrik grammatische Kategorien gibt, die der Grammatik der Umgangssprache zuwiderlaufen.[2]

Schutz then cites various literary examples to show that the imaginary is not bound to the limits imposed by the conventional requirements of everyday life: Homeric and Virgilian deities interrupt the ordinary course of events, lilies sing of the sorrows of those who visit the stream where they are growing, and nouns can function as adverbs (as "emeraldy" in Goethe's poem "*Vollmondnacht*" [Goethe 1957: 90–91]). Even though it flies in the face of commonsense, there may be a "*tugendhaftes Dreieck*" (e.g. the Trinity), and Goethe's line from *Faust* may make literary sense: "*Grau, teuer Freund, is jede Theorie und grün des Lebens goldner Baum*" (Schutz 1948a: 935; Goethe 2005: 211[3]). In fact, through his theory of multiple realities, Schutz argues that when characters from the novella suddenly appear in the main action of the novel, Goethe has in effect removed the brackets separating the novella from the main action of the novel, with the consequence that "*was immer in der 'praktischen' Welt des täglichen Lebens als notwendiger und relevanter Zusammenhang des Geschehens interpretierbar und integrationsbedürftig wäre, erweist sich innerhalb der 'Realitätswelt' des Romans als restlos unerheblich*."[4]

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[2] Schutz 1948a: 934–936: "All these questions here become meaningless. The governing motivation is not that belonging to the reality context of daily life and it is not commensurable with its logic. There is an entirely different kind of motivation, which resembles that of dream experiences, in which dream images blend together, displace each other, and pass into each other, without such phenomena giving access to astonished questions about how, where from, or why. A map with an arrow, of which the previous dream content made no mention, is sufficient motive for the dreamer to present the relationship between contents that are not compatible in daily life. There is a logic of the poetic event which runs counter to (*zuwiderläuft*) that of daily life as well as that of rational thinking, as in the language of lyrical poetry there are grammatical categories which run against (*zuwiderlaufen*) the language of everyday life." See also ibid: 957–963 and Schutz 1962: 229–234.

[3] "All theory, my friend, is grey, But green is life's glad golden tree" (Goethe 1949: 98).

[4] Schutz 1948a: 924, see also 934–936. As Schutz writes at the end of p. 924, "Here there is no more room for actions in the outer world and the motivation systems of daily life." Cf. Letter of Alfred Schutz to Aron Gurwitsch, December 24, 1950 (*Schutz and Gurwitsch* 1989: 125–126). Schutz here uses the same examples only now to show the constraints that formal logic places on the more creative life-world. He remarks: "But it is always a matter of formal logic, which has forgotten that is based on the life-world." (ibid.: 126)

One might object, however, that "On Multiple Realities" *emphasizes* that the world of working is "paramount," that its demands press upon us most forcefully, and that all other provinces are "modifications" of it. Schutz suggests that we *begin*, temporally, with everyday life and observe the diminishing tensions of consciousness as we turn away from every day life and immerse ourselves in different realities. This would seem to confirm the derivative character of these other provinces of meaning. Certainly the diminished tension of consciousness in phantasy and dreaming, the first two finite provinces of meaning discussed after the world of working, are experienced as passively undergone and parasitic upon the world of working whose constituents they seem to simply rearrange haphazardly. Schutz further accentuates the derivative nature of phantasy in his essay "Don Quixote and the Problem of Reality," but—and this should be emphasized—this essay is not directly about the sphere of literary reality, while the Goethe manuscripts are. Schutz repeatedly speaks of the "tragedy" of Quixote and affirms that common experience teaches us "that our only hope and guidance is the belief that we will come to terms with this world for all good and practical purposes" (Schutz 1964: 157). Schutz gives the final word to Sancho Panza, "who in spite of all the temptations of the transcendental, remains deeply rooted in the heritage of common sense" (ibid.: 158). So much, it would seem, for the claim that other realities mount a serious challenge to the pragmatically governed everyday realm (Schutz 1962: 226–227, 230, 233; 1964: 136, 139, 141, 149, 155).

Something new happens, however, in the Goethe manuscripts, which in contrast to "On Multiple Realities" do not begin with the world of working as the starting point from which other spheres are derived. Schutz clearly privileges the autonomy of literary reality; but, unlike the realities of phantasy or dreams, it is a reality constituted by the *deliberate* activities of author and reader acting in concert. Indeed, within this literary sphere, author and reader inhabit a domain where one can dismiss as irrelevant everyday questions, such as those about whom, where from, or why. In fact, Schutz accuses Goethe's literary critics here of being so uncritically immersed in the everyday pragmatic world, of being so bewitched by it, that they are not even conscious of how its expectations distort their reading and literary appreciation and prevent them from understanding the very literary sphere which they purport to understand in great depth. Not only that, but Goethe and other authors are free to flout everyday conventions (e.g., that a character in a novella should appear in the main action of the novel) and the customary rules of every day language (e.g. that one shouldn't say contradictory things or that nouns are not to be used as adverbs). In other words, the literary sphere (as Schutz conceives of it) calls for a deliberate recognition of and detachment from our typical, regulated experience and even allows a kind of antagonism toward it as is seen from the repeated use of the term *zuwiderlaufen* above. In contrast to the multiple 'realities' of dreams and phantasy, from the perspective of the literary sphere, it is the practical world that appears to be a place of mindless conformism to habitual

ways of doing things. The everyday world could be characterized as almost lazy when contrasted with literary reality.[5]

3 Thematizing Aspects Disconcerting to Everyday Pragmatism

Not only is the literary sphere counterpoised against everyday life, but the themes that Schutz concentrates on in Goethe's texts deal with dimensions of everyday life that are particularly disconcerting for the *ego agens* characterized as unified, as being at the center of its world and capable of reaching beyond its current boundaries. The literary sphere constitutes a privileged site for considering those dimensions of everyday life that thwart pragmatic efficacy and that pragmatically motivated persons are less likely to attend to. Maurice Natanson describes these constants of mundane existence as commonplaces—until in art they are elevated to recognition—and as phenomena "fugitive to cognition but naggingly persistent in our daily lives" (Natanson 1970: 118; 1998: 10).

One such dimension is that of the flow of time. In accordance with the subtitle of *Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre*, *Die Entsagenden*, Wilhelm, who had found the love of his life, Natalie, at the end of the *Lehrjahre*, is now separated from her. He stands under a never fully-explained mandate from the *Lehrjahre* "Society of the Tower" to move from place to place, never to stay more than 3 days under one roof, and not to return for a year. For Schutz, what is at stake is a metaphorical wandering in the symbolic sphere and the motif closely connected to it – renunciation: time passes, one does not stand still, what one clings to dissolves or disappears before one's eyes. Later in the *Wanderjahre* manuscript, when Schutz defends the inclusion of "Vermächtnis" and "Schillers Reliquien" at the end of books 2–3 of the novel, he spends a good deal of time citing a series of Goethe's poems that treat of "*die Unmöglichkeit des Beharrens im Sein*" (Schutz 1948a: 968) – the central theme of these two *Wanderjahre* poems and an idea intimately linked to the wandering and renunciation basic to the whole novel. The poem "Dauer im Wechsel," cited by Schutz, captures this Heraclitean theme:

> Du nun selbst! Was felsenfeste
> Sich vor dir hervorgethan,
> Mauern siehst du, siehst Paläste

[5] Although the theoretical-contemplative sphere also limits the incursion of pragmatic motivation onto its turf, it resists everyday pragmatism in a seemingly less forceful manner than the literary sphere in the Goethe manuscripts. This may be due to the fact that scientific-theoretical reality appears at the end of the essay "On Multiple Realities," after a sequence that begins with the world of working and shows how other realities, starting with fantasizing and dreaming, are derivative modifications. The literary sphere in the manuscripts is discussed independently of that pattern of articulation, more as a free-standing domain, less characterized by the derivativeness and passivity that accrue to the non-everyday multiple realities in the essay. Furthermore, the polemical defense of Goethe against detractors ends up stressing the autonomy, deliberateness, and liberating potential of literary reality with reference to everyday life (see Schutz 1962: 213n.8, 245, 246, 250).

Stets mit andern Augen an.
Weggeschwunden ist die Lippe
Die im Kusse sonst genas
Jener Fuss, der an der Klippe
Sich mit Gemsenfreche mass.[6]

The Major, the Man of 50 Years, quintessentially illustrates how the passage of time induces wandering and renunciation, since he entertains a Faustian hope that he can overcome the process of ageing when a younger woman becomes enamored with him, but "*Erlebnisse mannigfacher Art—der Verlust der kosmetischen Kammerdieners, der Verlust eines Vorderzahns—machen den Major zu einem Entsagenden*."[7] Throughout the *Wanderjahre*, Schutz notes instances where what is static and definitive is undermined through the passage of time that results in wandering and renunciation: Odoardo's deteriorating domestic situation leads him to immigrate within Germany; the sadness of those compelled to emigrate overseas reminds Schutz of the line from "The Homecomer"—"*Partir c'est mourir un peu*"; literary-cultural figures such as Odysseus and the wandering Jew are emphasized; and though Wilhelm finally discovers his vocation as a surgeon, his prior life consists in continual digressions (e.g., his dalliance with the theater in the *Lehrjahre*).[8]

Although the pragmatic self in the world of working experiences itself as unified and mobilized in the pursuit of it projects, literature undermines that pragmatic resolution with depictions of an acting self that is decaying from within and is unsure of what the future may hold. Even within the philosophical manuscripts on personality, Schutz discusses in a paragraph how the accumulating dead partial selves reveal that the phenomenon of death does not transcend life but is immanent to it (cf. Schutz 2003a: 125–126/71–72; see Natanson 1986: 120–121). Literature, however, goes further by furnishing striking images that reveal the implications of temporality that afford phenomenological insights, which, according to Maurice Natanson, exemplify the metaphysical implications of such basic Husserlian concepts as the transcendental ego and internal time-consciousness. The Goethe manuscripts confirm Natanson's observation that Schutz continued to recognize the value of these concepts and phenomenological philosophy:

> It would be quite misleading to say that because Schutz is not a transcendental phenomenologist, philosophy is absent from his work. Deeper and stronger: It would be a violent error to conclude from the fact that Schutz did not accept Husserl's transcendental argument respecting intersubjectivity and that Schutz had grave reservations about the possibility of *any* transcendental proof for the existence of the Other that he rejected the legitimacy of phenomenological philosophy. (Natanson 1986: 121)

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[6] Schutz 1948a: 966. "You yourself! What fixed and steady/Seemed unalterable to you—/Walls and palaces already/Change before your very view/Gone the lips and all their blisses/That in kissing once were tense,/Gone the foot at precipices/With a chamois's insolence."

[7] Ibid.: 930: "Experiences of many kinds—the loss of his cosmetic servant, the loss of his front teeth—make the Major a renunciant."

[8] Ibid.: 891–892, 895, 961–971. On the connection of the two poems to the novel see 963, and on the connections between these two poems and Goethe's other poetry see 964. On the examples of renunciation: see 919, 920, 945–946, 979–980, 981, 990, 1006.

In Schutz's juxtaposing of the literary sphere with pragmatic, everyday life, one finds phenomenology alive and well and one discovers other significant motives for Schutz's continued commitment to phenomenology, despite his pragmatic turn.

In addition, Schutz frequently singles out instances in Goethe's novels where eros is out of sink with expectations, though he does not develop the implications of these discrepancies for pragmatic motivations. For instance, in the *Wanderjahre* when Lenardo finally finds Suzanne, whom he has spent the entire novel searching for, she cannot give herself to him because the memory of her recently deceased spouse has left her emotionally paralyzed. Even when it seems clear to the reader that the union of these people would be perfect for them both, eros simply cannot be marshaled in their service. Eros is also unpredictable, as Goethe shows when he delicately depicts the unexpected stirrings of erotic urges, as when Hilary looks longingly upon Flavio's fingers as he sleeps or when reading poetry with him—even though both of them are romantically involved with other people, she with the Major and Flavio with the widow. Because eros arises unexpectedly, and despite previously existing arrangements, it produces a *Verwechslung der Gefühle* (confusion of feeling), a pattern so frequently occurring in Goethe's works that he designates it as a "schemata."[9] Such confusion is found in the many examples where one woman finds herself torn between two men (e.g., Hersilie between Wilhelm and Felix), in the double exchange of partners in the *Man of 50 Years*, and, in general, in "*diesem wunderbaren Finden, Widerfinden, Trennen, und Vereinigen*" (Schutz 1948a: 895; Goethe 2005: 399/transl. 1981: 53.) of partners. This volatility of eros leads Schutz to speculate as to whether only Natalie, Makarie, and perhaps Suzanne escape "*die Verringerung ihres Wesens*" (Schutz 1948a: 1012) that appears in the depiction of erotic intimacy in the "The New Melusine." Literature, explores disruptive forces (in this case eros), forces not easily mastered or predictable, and at times almost denucleating the *ego agens* bent on pursuing its pragmatic purposes.[10]

Pragmatic efficaciousness is also stymied by the unintended, unforeseen consequences of actions. Schutz discussed unintended consequences in economic writings where he warns against *hysteron proteron*, which occurs, for instance, when

[9] Schutz 1948a: 1007–1008, 1035. Of course, the quintessential confusion of feeling happens in the novella of "The Man of Fifty Years" when lovers exchange partners twice. The changes of affection occur so rapidly that by the end of the story no commitments are made, and Hilary and the widow become wanderers and renunciants together, traveling to Italy. Upon meeting up with the painter and Wilhelm, separated from his wife and travelling the world, they strike up a friendship, in which all are "*von den Bundesgliedern des Entsagens aufs freundlichste in die Mitte genommen und durch liebevolle Behandlung wo nicht geheilt, doch getröstet zu werden*" (Schutz 1948a: 941; Goethe 2005: 253/transl. 1981: 81) Though the painter and Hilary begin to become attracted to each other, the women depart and leave a letter instructing the men neither to follow them nor to visit them anywhere, to conscientiously avoid contact. The friendship that heals the abrasions of eros seems to require its own renunciation.

[10] Ibid.: 907, 909, 926, 928, 930, 939, 941, 998. Other scenarios involving a woman torn between two men occur in the *Lehrjahre*: between Philine and Friedrich and Wilhelm and between Theresa and Lothario and Wilhelm. Another place where the unmanageability of eros appears is when men and women who seem destined for each other end up falling in love with someone else, as occurs in the novella "Who is the Betrayer?" in the *Wanderjahre*.

economists retrospectively judge an agent's action (e.g. investment) as irrational without taking the agent's historical, political and cultural context into account. If one considers the agent's viewpoint, it may turn out that they acted perfectly rationally since she could not have anticipated the subsequent sequence of events. Schutz identifies this motif in the novella "The Dangerous Bet" in the *Wanderjahre* in which students play a prank on an elderly man who is so hurt by his unavenged mockery that the event is taken by his son as having contributed to his death. This passage reminds Schutz of scenes in the *Lehrjahre* in which Wilhelm dresses up in the clothing of a count who has left home, but the count, returning early, thinks he sees himself sitting at his writing table, takes this for a sign of his impending death, develops a stricter conscience, and joins the Moravians. In another episode, Wilhelm embraces his countess and presses a broach into her breast, which, he later finds out, causes an irritation that she takes to be a form of cancer and succumbs to life-long melancholy. As Schutz inquires, "*Und sind nicht auch in den Wanderjahre kleine Ursachen unmotiviert, und doch, in tieferen Sinne eindeutig mit bedeutendsten Folgen verknüpft*?"[11] Here it is not so much a matter of undermining the unity of the *ego agens*, but rather, in these cases someone other than the agent sees the unexpected consequences of an action from the temporal downstream. This enhanced perspective displaces the self acting in the present from being the center of its world since another exterior, subsequent perspective, to which it has no access, will be taken on whatever action it implements. Furthermore, instead of the pragmatic self being able to bring within its ambit what lies beyond it—the third feature characterizing such a self—literature elucidates the "beyond-one's-reach" which accompanies every action (Schutz 1996: 98; Schutz 1948b: 7316).

The flow of time also has an interpersonal dimension; Wilhelm, for example, looks upon the significance of his earlier action from a viewpoint external to the one he occupied earlier, as if he were, like the count, another person observing himself. Of course, in the novel other characters can discover the meaning of the agent's actions, as when the son of the distinguished gentlemen in "The Dangerous Bet" recognizes that what seemed like innocent fun for the pranksters resulted in the death of his father. Indeed in reading a novel, the reader becomes another interpreter of the events experienced by the characters, and the characters in turn subsequently reflect on both themselves and on other characters who engage in reflections of their own—thereby constituting a rich panoply of interpretive perspectives. For instance, when Wilhelm tells Natalie about the drowning of his childhood friend Adolph, who could have been saved had a doctor been present, he sees this event as being partly responsible for his

[11] Ibid.: 1014 ("Are not also in the *Wanderjahre* little causes seemingly unmotivated, and still, in a deeper sense clearly bound up with the most significant of events?"). Another example occurs when the Society of the Tower from the *Lehrjahre* commissions Lenardo to investigate mountain populations which relates to his childhood interests in technology, and, to his surprise, on this expedition for reasons having nothing to do with his love for Frau Suzanne, he chances upon the Frau herself, the nut-brown maiden, whom he has been seeking from the opening of the novel. See ibid.: 998–999. See how Wilhelm raises this same issue in Schutz 1948b:7310; see Goethe 2005: 73/transl. Goethe 1959: 64.

much later decision to cease wandering in order to pursue his vocation as a surgeon. However, when Wilhelm uses his surgical training to save his own son injured in the very last chapter of the novel, it is the *reader* who sees an unanticipated outcome resulting from both Adolph's death and the surgical vocation that ensued. A later significance often alters or enriches the meaning conferred on earlier events. It is not only the passage of time that extends beyond my reach, casts new light on events not understood in the present, and displaces me from being the center of my world, but there are also other personal interpretive perspectives beyond my reach, to which the meaning of my deeds are entrusted. As Emmanuel Levinas writes "The work is destined to this alien *Sinngebung* from the moment of its origin in me […] this destination of the work to a history that I cannot foresee […] is inscribed in the very essence of my power" (Levinas 1979: 127; see also Schutz 1948a: 953).

Of course, the idea that someone else (with a more comprehensive grasp of the unfolding of time) understands the significance of life-events in a way the agent can't appreciate, leads naturally enough to speculation as to whether there might be a divine providence or impersonal fate governing one's life, despite its seeming, according to the pragmatic outlook, that actors control their own destinies. Schutz cites several places in which Goethe describes characters speculating on this possibility, such as the antiquarian in the *Wandejahre* who encourages Lenardo's so far fruitless search for Nacodine, referring to a providence that "*hat tausend Mittel, die Gefallenen zu erheben*,"[12] just like the wintry tree, whose sad appearance offers no hope of blossoming but nevertheless blooms in the spring. In the *Lehrjahre*, the narrator raises the possibility of a power beyond ourselves when he has Wilhelm, carrying the parchment given to him by the Society of the Tower, think to himself "*dass er in so vielen Umständen seines Lebens, in denen er frei und in verborgenen zu handeln glaubte, beobachtet, ja sogar geleitet worden war*."[13] Finally, in one of the several commentaries on *Hamlet* in the *Lehrjahre*, Schutz mentions Wilhelm's view that the drama by illuminating the deterministic power of fate calls self-governance into question.

> Es gefällt uns so wohl, es schmeichelt so sehr, wenn wir einen Helden sehen, der durch sich selbst handelt, der liebt und hasst, wenn es ihm sein Herz gebietet, der unternimmt und

[12]Schutz 1948a: 915–916; Goethe 2005: 156/transl. 1981: 128 ("for Providence has a thousand ways of raising the fallen").

[13]Goethe 2005: 530/transl. 1959: 474 ("that in very many actions of his life, in which he had conceived himself to be proceeding freely and in secret, he had been observed, nay, guided."); see also 414, 477; see also Schutz 1948b: 7310–7311, 7324, 7329. In addition, Schutz in his manuscript traces throughout the *Lehrjahre* a dialogue between Wilhelm and other interlocutors as to whether fate or divine providence or oneself is in control. At one point of this book-long dialogue on fate and freedom, the mysterious Stranger argues for self-determination and concludes "*hier ist nur die Frage, welche Vorstellungart zu unserm Besten gereicht*," [("the question here is what mode of viewing [things] will profit us the most?") Goethe 2005: 73/transl. 1959: 64]. Schutz finds the formulation "*merkwürdig pragmatisch*" [("notably pragmatic"), see Schutz 1948b: 7310]. It contrasts with Wilhelm's response (which represents a counter-position to pragmatism) namely that unexpected events bring us to a point we had scarcely contemplated and ought to teach us obedience to destiny.

> ausführt, alle Hindernisse abwendet und zu einer grossen Zwecke gelangt. Geschichtschreiber und Dichter möchten uns gerne überreden, das ein so stolzen Los dem Menschen fallen könne. Hier werden wir anders belehrt, der Held hat keinen Plan, aber das Stück ist planvoll.[14]

The question concerning the origin of governance remains ultimately unresolved in Goethe, and in the works of Shakespeare, of whom it can be said (according to Wilhelm) that it seems as if "*uns alle Rätsel offenbarte, ohne dass man doch sagen kann: hier oder da ist das Wort der Auflösung*."[15] Nevertheless, the question as to whether someone *else* might apprehend meanings not visible to me at my moment of acting, whether there might be an ultimate standpoint that decenters me from myself, is clearly related to Schutz's comment in *Der sinnhafte Aufbau* to the effect that "*Jedenfalls ist die Problematik des subjektiven und objektiven Sinns die Eingangspforte zu jeder Theologie und Metaphysik*."[16]

Last but by no means least, literature raises questions about the true motivations for our pragmatic projects. In the *Lehrjahre* (Goethe 2005: 289/transl. 1959: 264–265; Schutz 1948b: 7320), Wilhelm wonders whether it was his devotion to Mariana that bound him to the stage or love for the stage that drew him to her; he then wonders whether the outlet that theatre offered him was anything other than the diversion of a restless, disorderly, and disobedient boy, defying the family that encouraged him to pursue a career in business. In this text, singled out by Schutz, one sees Wilhelm wondering whether the in-order-to motive of engaging in the theater might really have been the mere consequence of a repressive past which prompted his interest in the theater in the first place. Or, alternatively could his decision to pursue a career in theater have been a consequence of the earlier event of having fallen in love with Mariana? Or is his in-order-to love for her determined by his acquired enthusiasm for the stage? The unity of the *ego agens*, experienced in the present as the following of future-directed motives, may in fact be governed by hidden, past motives, discoverable only in retrospective reflection on oneself, as if one were an observer of oneself. Literature leaves us wondering whether the self is either as unified as it believes it is or as in control of itself as the confident pursuit of its future goals might suggest.

In summary, the world of literary reality is at odds with the pragmatism governing the world of working; literature provides a setting for highlighting dimensions of everyday life that are disconcerting for what we have identified above as the particularly pragmatic features of everyday life: the unity of the acting self, its being the center of its world, and its power to bring within reach what was beyond

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[14]Goethe 2005: 264/transl. 1959: 243: "It pleases us, it flatters us, to see a hero acting on his own strength, loving and hating at the bidding of his heart, undertaking and completing, casting every obstacle aside, and attaining some great end. Poets and historians would willingly persuade us that so proud a lot may fall to man. In 'Hamlet' we are taught another lesson: the hero is without a plan, but the play is full of plan."

[15]Goethe 2005: 198; transl. 1959: 182 ("It seems as if he cleared up everyone one of our enigmas to us, though we cannot say, Here or there is the word of solution."); see Schutz 1948b: 7332.

[16]Schutz 2004: 275/transl. 1967: 138 ("the problem of subjective [an actor's] and objective meaning [from the viewpoint of an observer] is the open door to every theology and metaphysics").

it. These disconcerting dimensions include the passage of time, the instability of eros, unintended consequences, the availability of actions to re-interpretation by others, and the indeterminacy of motivation. If, as Schutz suggests, the fundamental anxiety over death prompts persons within everyday life to attempt to control the world, to overcome obstacles, to draft and realize projects, perhaps one of literature's functions is to draw attention to that fundamental anxiety and to accentuate what Schutz and Luckmann call the many transcendencies that jeopardize our pragmatic coming to terms with things (Schutz 1962: 228; see Schutz and Luckmann 1983: 99–130).

4 Final Comments

Though Schutz juxtaposes the literary sphere with the pragmatic world of working and represents it as free of its constraints, there are limits as to how far it can diverge from everyday practical reality before it loses any sense of credibility. For instance, if characters from a novella within a novel suddenly appear within the novel and if one is a literary critic intent on proving the novel's artistic value, it is not enough simply to claim that literature is not bound by conventional rules that govern reality. A literary critic would have to show that such divergences from everyday life *also* fulfill certain *literary purposes*—a task Schutz suggests in his manuscripts but without developing in any great detail.

For instance, when Hilary and the widow, wounded by the tumultuous relationships in the "Man of 50 Years," become party to Wilhelm's own wandering far from Natalie, in the main action of the novel, it could be argued that Goethe is suggesting that just as novella characters can become companions of characters in the novel, so literary characters within the novel can become *our* companions, consoling us by sharing with us the wounds of their own wandering. Such an interpretation would fit with Goethe's frequent strategy of embedding literature within literature, the Hamlet play within the *Lehrjahre*, and novellae within the *Wanderjahre*. Just as the embedded literature illuminates the action of the literature within which it is embedded, so literature in general can illuminate our life-world within which that literature itself is embedded. I propose this example not so much as a possible answer to the question of the artistic merit of the literary divergences from everyday life in Goethe, but as an example of the kind of argument that would have to be made to show that such divergences are not arbitrary, but serve literary purposes.

Literature, indeed, raises questions about the pragmatic motivations governing everyday life, and the refusal of Goethe and Shakespeare to provide "solutions" may be part of literature's general tendency to pose rather than answer questions. Nevertheless, literature, as Goethe's works also suggest, affords imaginative possibilities that one might "try on" in one's own struggle to come to terms pragmatically—perhaps on a higher level—with everyday life. For example, Goethe at times proposes a kind of Kantian solution to the question of how one should live with seemingly meaningless tragedies when his characters suggest that in the absence of

any guaranteed, favorable metaphysical outcome, one should still shoulder one's responsibilities and meet *die Forderung des Tages*.[17]

Finally, a biographical note: Schutz authored these manuscripts in 1948, when he was returning on business to Europe after the war and the full extent of the devastation suffered by his friends and colleagues was becoming clear. Against this background, it is not surprising that he should conceive of literature as highlighting aspects of everyday life in which the unity of the acting self is fractured, in which it is displaced from the center of its world, and in which its power to bring what is beyond reach within reach is circumscribed. Through bitter concrete experience, Schutz had come to know only too well that time's passage involves loss, that plans can be thwarted by factors beyond one's control, that the unfolding of events blocks intended consequences, and that one's actions are vulnerable to what others do. One can only hope that, in reading and studying Goethe on his trip to Europe and back, Schutz found himself consoled by the companionship that Goethe and Goethe's characters afforded him in his own wandering.

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Life-World Analysis and Literary Interpretation. On the Reconstruction of Symbolic Reality Spheres

Jochen Dreher

> Truth as identical with the divine can never be directly attained by us. We can only catch its reflections by way of example and symbol. We are aware of it as life beyond comprehension and yet cannot abdicate the desire to grasp it all the same.
>
> Johann Wolfgang von Goethe ("Attempt at a Doctrine of Weather", 1825)

1 Focus of the Analysis

Alfred Schutz's theory of the life world**,** developed in the interface between phenomenology and sociology, provides specific instruments for interpreting the meaning structure of literary work. The most famous example of Schutz's self-realized life-world theory interpretation is his study of "Don Quixote and the Problem of Reality" (Schutz 1964), in which the stratification of manifold realities of the life-world serve as the starting point for the analysis of Miguel Cervantes Saavedra's work. Less well known are Schutz's as yet unpublished writings on Goethe's "Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship and Journeyman Years" in which a specific interpretative approach in the framework of literary analysis can be observed.[1] Schutz's interpretation of both of Goethe's works illustrates how a

[1] The following reflections refer to Schutz's interpretation of the "Journeyman Years", which is part of an extensive handwritten article with the title "*Zu Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahren*" from 1948. Schutz himself, in a letter to Frieda Wunderlich, mentions that this manuscript contains "more or less notes". Nevertheless, his analysis demonstrates the specific relevance of Schutz's theory of the life-world for the interpretation of literary texts. Schutz's Goethe interpretations will be published in Vol. VIII of the German Alfred Schutz Work Edition (Alfred Schütz Werkausgabe) (Schutz 2013).

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phenomenological-socio-scientific conceived life-world theory can serve as a basis for literary analysis. Schutz's basic assumption was that "art, among other things, is the conscious reinterpretation of structures of relevance in the life-world". Beyond that he was also of the opinion that the "imagined […] is not bound to the borders, that are connected to the demand of enforceability in everyday life" (Schutz 1948: 49/936).

The theory of the life-world and the Schutzian theory of symbol as a central element of it, serve to identify and differentiate the different levels of reality in literary works as well as to reconstruct the interplay between them. By uncovering these and deciphering the symbolically established relations between these levels of meaning, the aesthetic work – in this case the "Journeyman Years" – can be reconstructed as a whole. The aim is not to determine whether Schutz's literary analyses are a success or not, or whether he was capable of defending Goethe against his critics. In the case of "Wilhelm Meister's Journeyman Years" it is assumed that it is a text that Goethe (under pressure from the publisher demanding an immediate publication of the work) composed of fragments with little in common and that his talents as a writer are not exemplified by these fragments in particular. It needs to be emphasized that Schutz's interpretative approach, based on his theory of the life-world and the symbol, is especially suited to the analysis of aesthetic forms, as it is capable of comprehending the area of tension between the author, the artistic work and the recipient. Having said as much, the Schutzian approach exhibits an affinity with the literary position of reception theory which also developed out of phenomenology. This line of thought also emanates from the triangular relationship between author, work and audience, where the audience is not to be viewed as passive; without the active participation of an addressee, literary work would not be possible. Only with the help of readership's engagement does the work step into the horizon of the experience of a continuity, in which a production exceeding established aesthetic norms through active reception takes place (compare Jauss 1982: 4).

The specificity of Alfred Schutz's literary interpretations can be determined with reference to the methodology of recently developed socio-scientific hermeneutics. In the first part of this paper the main features of this school of hermeneutics will be illuminated. This school of hermeneutics in particular shall be reconciled with Schutz's literary analysis. In the second part, Schutz's interpretation of Goethe's "Wilhelm Meister's Journeyman Years" will be presented in which the perspective used in the analysis of "Don Quixote" will be broadened. This will be followed by an extensive interpretation of "Journeyman Years", wherein a symbol-theoretically guided analysis of an excerpt concerning reverence and religious motives will be presented.

2 Socio-scientific Hermeneutics and Literary Interpretation

It is generally assumed that recent socio-scientific currents of hermeneutics, in particular, can serve to frame life-world theoretical interpretations shaped by both phenomenological and sociological currents. From a hermeneutic perspective it is crucial that human perception and action on principle are accompanied by

interpretation; due to the biological ambiguity of human behavior, humans are forced to compare different possibilities of interpretation with one another. A conception created by exterior perception is always a mixed product which consists of impressions developed in perception and an indefinite number of elements of recollected images; in this sense, perception and analysis are always connected with each other (cf: Soeffner 2004: 114). Based on these considerations, hermeneutics is understood as technique, capability and methodology of interpretation of symbolic human expression and product of action. It can be seen as a scientific method or a scientific art form of the analysis based on an elaborate writing system and texts transmitted in written form. Hermeneutics has to concentrate on the carving out of the typical and the distinctiveness of individual cases. Strictly speaking it is about the reconstruction not only of interaction and products of interaction, but also the reconstruction of pre-scientific, 'everyday' accomplishments of comprehension (ibid.: 119). In the broadest sense these basic assumptions can be used for the analysis of literary aesthetics.

In general, socio-scientific hermeneutics, in connection with literary analysis, deals with the following features: first of all it concentrates on the interpretation of documented human utterances with the goal of reconstructing these in a concrete socio-historic self-, reality- and world-interpretation context; secondly it is concerned with the analysis of social accomplishments of comprehension and the acts of comprehension; thirdly the focus is on a methodization of hermeneutic doubt (this means the examination of rationality and universality claims of hermeneutics) and, fourthly, the aim is to reflect upon the hermeneutic dialectics of comprehension and doubt, which is directed towards knowledge. This knowledge is gained through doubt and is constantly re-exposed to doubt. In a nutshell, it can be argued that the goal of socio-scientific hermeneutics is to reconstruct the interplay or interrelation between the author, the text and the recipient in the process of interpretation. The actor in a specific socio-historic context, as the producer of the "text", has to be included in the interpretation procedure, just as comprehension itself as well as the recipient have to become objects of interpretation – from this point of view, hermeneutics is self-reflective. Schutz, for example, uses Geothe's autobiography "Poetry and Truth" to reconstruct the author's perspective as the creator of Wilhelm Meister's Journeyman Years and he also broaches the issue of the recipient's perspective to the extent that he insists that the reader distances him/herself from his/her life-world relevance in order to understand "Journeyman Years". Furthermore he develops a scheme of different appresentation levels within the frame of his symbol-theoretical considerations, with which perspectives of the symbolization of the work of art can be gradually traced.

Socio-scientific hermeneutics aims to hypothetically reconstruct an action or problem situation. The interpretation of a concrete case lays claim to objectivity in two ways (cf. Soeffner and Hitzler 1994: 111): firstly in terms of its verifiability, this means the disclosure of the interpretative procedure and the interpreter's detailed previous knowledge as well as examination duty; secondly in terms of the analysis of the socially "objectively" effective. In doing so, social institutions important to this case are developed as well as their historically valid meaning as determinants of action and their possibly "latent" structure of meaning of action for the actor (Oevermann et al. 1979). The specificity of the case, its 'subjectivity', consists in the social cosmos of

the objectively possible in the selective establishment of one of the objectively given worlds. Interpretation reconstructs this exact world, its principles of design and interaction-structural and historical reasons relevant to the actors (cf: Soeffner 1982: 18). Having said this, literary interpretation can reconstruct the specific socio-historic situation of the respective authors and incorporate it into the equivalent interpretations.

This interpretative method is especially suited to socio-scientific reflections because it is aimed at realizing the typical, both typical action and the knowledge connected with this as well as typical everyday comprehension (cf. Soeffner and Hitzler 1994: 128f). Observation and elucidaton of the social are not the only important aspects of socio-scientific hermeneutics. Rather it simultaneously attempts to address the social aspect of typical, historically changing patterns of awareness and articulation as well as the purposes of observing, identifying, realizing and elucidating.

> So hermeneutics is a method of data production for a section of the subject of social sciences, so to speak. But above all, it is a different form of theoretical assessment in a specific human way of being, namely the historical way (cf. Luckmann 1981: 522, my own translation, J.D.).

The concept of text that forms the basis of this hermeneutic approach encompasses everything which can be addressed as interpretation, which means everything that is viewed as meaningfully postulated and emblematically represented, especially human forms of utterance, appearance and portrayal, in other words, speech, gesticulation, actions, products, clothing, pictures, photos etc. The universal claim to coordination in hermeneutics can be explained with reference to the concept of "milieu" which is borrowed from phenomenologically oriented social philosophy or protosociology. The tangible surroundings of humans, the entirety of what they experience and realize as effective, regardless of the question of "objective" influence, is described by the concept of "milieu" (Gurwitsch 1979: 58, quoted in Soeffner 1982: 19).

On the one hand, hermeneutics, as a constantly enforced and thus also a scientifically re-constructable and approachable, interpretable human access to the world and human existence within it, claims to be 'universal'. On the other hand however, because of the dependency of the interpreter, the interpretation and the object of interpretation in their respective embeddedness in milieus, history, stories and interpretive associations, the respective results of hermeneutic coordination are "relative" (cf. Soeffner 1982: 20). However this "relativity" of interpretative results is not arbitrary; within scientific hermeneutics its validity is secured through controlled inspection procedures that have to be intersubjectively communicable.

2.1 Hermeneutics and Literature

How can deliberations on socio-scientific hermeneutics be used in the interpretation of literary texts, that is, specific aesthetic products? As Hans-Georg Gadamer

argued, the art of literature can only be grasped through the ontology of the artwork and *not* the aesthetic experiences that develop in the process of reading (Gadamer 1988 [1975]: 142). Thus, reading is an intrinsic component of the literary artwork. According to his argument, the form of being of literature has a unique and incomparable character. Hence, the transformation of this form of being into understanding turns out to be a difficult task. It is the *script* which is strange and at the same time needs to be understood in its distinct form. Even the face-to-face encounter with a stranger who does not speak the same language cannot be compared to the bewilderment and the strangeness conveyed by script. "The written word and what partakes in it – literature – is the intelligibility of mind transferred to the most alien medium. Nothing is so purely the trace of the mind as writing, but also nothing is so dependent on the understanding of the mind" (ibid.: 145). Hermeneutics is the classic discipline concerned with the art of understanding texts. Any artwork – not only the literary one – must be understood just as a text is understood. Consequently, hermeneutic awareness surpasses aesthetic awareness; aesthetics must merge into hermeneutics, whereby understanding must be recognized as part of the event of meaning. According to such a comprehensive understanding of hermeneutics, not only our knowledge of texts and intellectual products, but all knowledge must be based on an understanding which is explained and articulated in an interpretation of our knowledge. Thus, Gadamer considers hermeneutics "not […] a methodology of the human sciences, but an attempt to understand what the human sciences truly are, beyond their methodological self-consciousness, and what connects them with the totality of our experience of world" (ibid.: xiii). This conception, which describes hermeneutics as an art of interpretation and a model of understanding, appears to be associated with the phenomenological and socio-scientific tradition of theory characterized by Alfred Schutz. His theory of the life-world offers crucial links to the – above all socio-scientific – school of hermeneutics since it is assumed that signs and symbols, as components of the life-world of an individual, make communication within social relationships possible. Signs and symbols enable understanding between the individuals involved in communication, especially in relation to everyday trancendent experiences, for example, religious or aesthetic experiences. The symbols which are used in aesthetic communication and in the context of a literary artwork enable "bridging" between everday transcendent levels of reality (cf: Srubar 1988: 247), which are thus shared with other individuals in intersubjective contexts making them experienceable for all.

Through Schutz's Goethe analyses, we will show how life-world-theoretic deliberations are mutually related to hermeneutic processes of understanding and interpretation. The reconstruction of the specific socio-historic context of the "Journeyman Years" as well as the inclusion of biographical data regarding Goethe allow an interpretation that follows the principles of socio-scientific hermeneutics. Our reflections above concerning socio-scientific hermeneutics as well as those on hermeneutics and literature serve to frame the following interpretations of a literary text, namely, Goethe's "Wilhelm Meister's Journeyman Years." The "logic of the poetic event" can be reconstructed through the Schutzian interpretation with a reference on his theory of the life-world including hermeneutical ideas which enable

us to capture the triangular relation between author, recipient and literary work. Schutz's theory of the symbol specifially serves an interpretation based on the principles of socio-scientific hermeneutics since it makes it possible to establish a connection between the subjective experience of the literary work and a reference to diverse expressions of objectified everyday transcendent meaning. The following paragraphs examine these hermeneutically inspired interpretations of "Wilhelm Meister's Journeyman Years" starting from life-world theoretical reflection which specifically profits from a social phenomenology of the symbol.

3 Schutz's Interpretation of "Wilhelm Meister's Journeyman Years"

Schutz's interpretation of the novel "Wilhelm Meisters Journeyman Years" illustrates how the theory of the life-world enables a specific approach to literary texts, especially when these texts are fragmentary and difficult-to-approach, and function as a literary unit on the basis of complex interwoven levels of meaning.[2] As Schutz notes, the "Journeyman Years" are to the "Apprentice Years" what part two is to part one of "Faust". According to Schutz, the development of the problem, the main motifs and the manifold plots do not follow a concrete reality; the basis of reality in this work, while not abandoned, has been stripped of its own meaning. What is decisive is that everything happening in the real world is only sign, code for a secret meaning. Again and again reference is made to – as Goethe says – "a little book like ours, reserve and secrecy may be no unseemingly qualities" (von Goethe 1904 [1829]: Chap. XVII) –, that all that is real remains only as suggestion and fragment (Schutz 1948: 1/866). This consequently applied feature of the novel – provided it should be assigned to this literary type – is expressed by several artistic means.

First, according to Schutz, the fiction is sustained that this novel is only an editing of numerous papers of a more or less fragmentary nature, barely (if at all) portraying large stretches of the storyline, while in other parts merely reflecting the internal conditions of the protagonists. In addition, sections of the storyline are transported into complete, seemingly interspersed narratives, whereby the protagonists of these enclaves suddenly appear in the main storyline. For instance, in the final revision of the first draft of "Journeyman Years" from 1821 the final loose note was left out, which would have explained how Wilhelm Meister knows the main female protagonists of "Man of 50 Years" – Hilaria and the beautiful widow – and why he searches for and finds them in Mignon's childhood landscape (ibid.: 1/886). Schutz identifies the deliberate alternation between first-person and third-person narrator as another artistic device that allows the different spheres of reality and unreality to interweave,. For example, Wilhelm tells his friends in the first-person

[2]Schutz's "Journeyman Years" essay is a 142-page long handwritten manuscript composed in German in 1948 on a sea passage from New York to Amsterdam (in: Schutz 2013).

narrative about his efforts to train as a surgeon including his acquaintance with the old sculptor who prepares anatomical models. Suddenly and without any apparent external reason, the narrative switches to third-person with the sentence: "Wilhelm, who was next in line, was likewise summoned…" (von Goethe 1995 [1829]: Book 3, Chap. 1; Schutz 1948: 2/887). As is generally known, the "Journeyman Years" have often been considered a loose collection of novellas mixed with philosophical, didactic pieces, frequently seen as a typical late work lacking in consistency, which would scarcely have been seen as a literary work without Goethe's established name. Some critics – according to Schutz – by way of defending their hypothesis concerning a loosely knit arrangement of the whole, refer to the radical rearrangement of the final edition compared to the 1821 version. Yet, as Schutz argues, precisely this rearrangement should fill the attentive reader with awe and admiration. To grasp the structure of the work as a whole, one must consider that Goethe arranged the sections of the novel the same way the paintings are arranged in the hall of the "Pedagogical Province". This becomes apparent in the following words by Goethe: "As you see" says the "Eldest", who leads Wilhelm through the hall, "that on the socles and friezes we have introduced another series of transactions and occurences, not so much of a synchronistic as of a symphronistic kind; since, among all nations, we discover records of a similar import, and grounded on the same facts. Thus you perceive here, while in the main field of the picture, Abraham receives a visit from his gods in the form of fair youths, Apollo, among the herdsmen of Admetus, is painted above in the frieze. From which we may learn, that the gods, when they appear to men, are commonly unrecognized of them." (von Goethe 1995 [1929]: Book 2, Chap. 1). Schutz sees this passage as the key to the novel's technique since it shows that an order of different fragments of the work structured according to thematic relevance is chosen "symphronistically" rather than relying on a chronology of successively constructed narratives. There is no target-oriented narrative coherence with a causally motivated spatial and chronological succession in the "Journeyman Years"; the life-world-relevant structures, which are assumed for the protagonists of the novel, have been "opened up" in this respect. Specific motifs, such as, for example, journeying, renouncement, awe, religiousness, resignation, Eros, action, asceticism or rational life appear in the manifold reality spheres of novella, fairy tale, poem etc. and establish an internal context across the thematic areas of the entire work.

3.1 The Logic of the Poetic Event

One crucial passage from the second book of "Journeyman Years" is significant for Schutz's analysis of the interplay of the spheres of reality within Goethe's text and the reconstruction of a specific logic underlying this work:

> And now, at last, to any third party who had watched our friends it must have been apparent enough that their mission was, in fact, accomplished […]. Indeed, Wilhelm himself now felt that their special purpose was attained; yet he could not deny that the wish to see Hilaria and

> the fair Widow must also be satisfied if he wished to leave this country with a free mind. His friend, to whom he had imparted their story, was no less curious […] accordingly, they now cruised to and fro, watching the points where strangers are wont first to enter this paradise. Their hope of meeting friends here had already been made known to the boatmen; and the search had not lasted long when there came in sight a splendid barge; which they instantly made chase of, and forbore not passionately to grapple with, on reaching it. The dames, in some degree alarmed at this movement, soon recovered their composure as Wilhelm produced his little piece of chart, and the two, without hesitation, recognized the arrow which themselves had drawn on it. The friends were then kindly invited to come on board the ladies' barge; which they did without an instant's delay. (von Goethe 1871 [1829]: 286–7).

With this passage, which is identical in the 1821 and the final version, Schutz shows where the borders of the spheres of reality of novella and main novel have been overstepped. This passage ‚makes clear that any attempt to locate rational-causal motivation in the sphere of reality must now appear meaningless. According to Schutz, the following questions arise for the reader: "How does Wilhelm even know about Hilaria and the widow? How does he know their story? How can his skipper introduce him to the promise of encountering friends? What is the meaning of the card with the arrow which moves the somewhat concerned dames to an inivitation?" (cf: Schutz 1948: 48/934). And even in the 1821 version, Schutz continues, a realist's rational logic will ask: Why do Hilaria and the widow, who barely hardly knew of each other previously – the narrative of the interspersed novella broke off much earlier – now continue together in the world? Why did they show Makarie, why Hersilie, why did she reveal to Wilhelm with card and arrow their travel plans, why did their travels bring them to Mignon's childhood landscape? All these questions become meaningless in view of a stringent causal development of plots within the spheres of reality created in the text. The dominant motivation, according to Schutz, is not intrinsic to the reality context of daily life and is not commensurable with its logic. Instead, an entirely different motivation becomes apparent that resembles that of a dream experience, whereby dream images mix, switch and slide into each other without giving rise to questions concerning how, whence or why. Schutz sees a card with an arrow, which had not yet occurred as part of a dream, as a sufficient motive for the dreamer to establish correlations between real life and non-compatible contexts.

> There is a logic of the poetic event which runs contrary to both everyday life and rational thinking, just as there are grammatical categories in the language of verse that run contrary to the grammar of colloquial speech. (cf. Schutz 1948: 48/935f., my own translation, J.D.).

Based on his theory of manifold realities, Schutz here reconstructs the spheres of reality of the literary work with the respective style of experience. Hence, an inherent rationality, created by Goethe for his work of art, develops. In this context, Schutz accuses the Goethe critics of being unable to reconstruct Goethe's chosen "logic of the poetic event". It may be argued that in order to decipher the text and its symbolism, a life-world-theoretic interpretation is required that enables reconstruction of the rationality on which the author based the literary text. Here, it is important that the author as acting subject works out a technique, specific motif

contexts, storylines etc., which he presents in a conglomeration of styles such as novella, fairy tale, poem, travel report, diary and so forth. Thus, the interpreters of the literary work must "decipher" the ciphers of the artwork's secrets as created by the author. And this is exactly where Goethe's critics obviously fail. One might even go so far as to say that he was possibly ahead of his time with this avant-garde work. Hence, the "formal logic" or the "logic of poetic events" are variations from a horizon of possibilities and cannot be seen as absolutes. For the literary work –"Journeyman Years" – it is therefore crucial that Goethe, the author, purposefully "opens up" or "blurs" life-world borders. In particular, the causalities of the "world of working" (*Wirkwelt*), the world of everyday life of the novel's protagonists, which is ruled by the pragmatic motif, are purposefully invalidated by Goethe. The "dream contents" of the manifold provinces of meaning come to the fore and quasi develop into "paramount realities". To be able to understand the novel, the logic established by the creator of the artwork must be reconstructed in detail; the symphronistic layout of the mentioned key motifs of renouncement, asceticism, awe, action etc., definitely incomprehensible with the rationalities of everyday life, must be reconstructed by the interpreter.

4 Reflections on a Life-World-Theoretic Analysis of Literature

Schutz's theory of symbols, as an essential part of his theory of the life-world, is especially suitable for a hermeneutic interpretation not only of aesthetic phenomena. In this context, it will be shown that Schutz's deliberations on symbolic appresentation are specifically useful for Goethe interpretation since they provide tools for the reconstruction of the "logic of the poetic event". According to Srubar, symbols have a "meaning clip function" (cf: Srubar 1988: 247), i.e. they can present and communicate everyday transcendent ideas and visions within everyday life. Thus, with symbols, the life-world is maintained as a meaningful whole, and, for example, even literary spheres of reality can become part of an individual's life-world (cf. Dreher 2003). In addition, it must be noted that symbols also have a meaning clip function within the literary sphere of reality – as created, for example, in "Journeyman Years" – since they establish a connection between the different domains of meaning and their enclaves.

When the functionality of symbols is elucidated from a phenomenological point of view, it is ascribed to the ability of the subjective consciousness for "appresentation", an epistemological term, borrowed from Husserl by Schutz in a modified form. Husserl describes "appresentation" as a fundamental process of consciousness for the constitution of intersubjectivity and the co-realization of the other as part of the experience of the other (Husserl 1999 [1950]: §20). Schutz, on the other hand, uses "appresentation" to describe analogue associations in which through perception of one object another is brought to mind – e.g. as memory, fantasy or

fiction (cf. Schutz 1962 [1955]: 294ff.; Dreher 2003, 145). In particular for the functionality of symbols it is now important that these as object, fact or event of the everyday life – also as fictionally described everyday occurrence – "appresent" or symbolize an idea which transcends our everyday experience, i.e. which belongs to another reality sphere outside everyday life (cf. Schutz 1962 [1955]: 331, 343; cf. Dreher 2007: 467ff.). Regarding aesthetic symbolization processes, symbolic appresentation is of particular importance, for which appresentation references of a higher order are relevant. Furthermore, the four schemes described by Schutz which are contained in all appresentation references must be mentioned – he distinguished between schemes of apperception, appresentation, reference and interpretation (cf. Schutz 1962 [1955]: 297ff., 338ff.). It is essential to the aesthetic work that author and respective recipient can always chose a specific scheme as standard, which in turn reflects the other schemes as merely arbitrary or accidental. When a common communicated environment is to be constructed for the interpreters, the identity, according to Schutz, or at least the similarity of the interpretation schemes applied by the interpreters is of utmost importance. Thus, a manifold interpretation structure, based on different symbolization levels, emerges which is ultimately responsible for the respective aesthetic quality of the artwork. The artwork as such, and in this case especially the literary artwork, "functions" on different symbolic levels which may be registered according to a respective applied appresentation scheme. Based on these symbol-theoretic reflections and using once again Goethe's "Journeyman Years" it will be shown beyond the Schutzian reflections by way of example how such symbolic contexts of meaning can be reconstructed in a literary work. In the description of events in the "Pedagogical Province" in the second book of "Journeyman Years", Wilhelm and his son Felix, who is to be admitted to a boarding school, meet children living there and are greeted by them. This meeting with the boys is described as follows:

> […] all the children, how employed soever, laid down their work, and turned with singular, yet diverse gestures, towards the party riding past them; or rather, as it was easy to infer, towards the Overseer, who was in it. The youngest laid their arms crosswise over their breasts, and looked cheerfully up to the sky; those of middle size held their hands on their backs, and looked smiling on the ground; the eldest stood with a frank and spirited air; their arms stretched down, they turned their heads to the right, and formed themselves into a line; whereas, the others kept separate, each where he chanced to be. (von Goethe 1995 [1829]: 243)

The meeting with the boys and their rituals of greeting described in this passage identify manifold levels of appresentation of symbolic contents of meaning, which must be reconstructed based on the schemes established by Schutz. The account of the meeting with the children is symbolically charged to a high degree, whereby the expressed symbolism functions on very different levels of meaning. The *apperceptional scheme* is of no importance here as it merely explains how printer's ink turns into signs. In simple words from everyday language, the movements, gestures and greetings of the children received by Wilhelm and Felix, are portrayed with specific indication character. When the *appresentational scheme* is selected as the fundamental attitude of experience and interpretation of the event, the depicted movements of the children indicate the fact that this is a greeting of the arriving persons;

it becomes apparent that greeting rituals are depicted. Within the literary work, different *reference schemes* are established: The children's movements which point without use of language to the directions "above us", "below us" and "beside us", establish a universal symbolism originating from the ordinary human situation. In this context, the human being is at the center of a coordinate system in which he can arrange the objects of his environment according to the categories of "above and below", "front and back", "left and right" (cf. Schutz 1962 [1955]: 334f.). A dichotomic symbolism responding to natural events, referring to above and below, heaven and earth, day and night, brightness and darkness, alertness and sleep, life and death, yin and yang in the Chinese imaginary world etc., allows human individuals to evoke the incomprehensible and uncontrollable powers of nature.

In Goethe's depiction of the greeting boys, the view upwards points towards heaven and the divine, the view downwards is to the earth where creatures have their roots. The light shines onto the earth, onto matter; the area where heaven and earth meet is where we in fact are living. Once human beings comprehend the light and earth, they comprehend the proper view of him- or herself, a creature of the intermediate realm; the third greeting gesture points therefore to human beings as one's own kind. Human beings only know about light because they also know darkness and can only conceive infinity because they can conceive of finitude and that is earth. We are simultaneously of light and of earth, divine and diabolic, as described by the big world myth in Goethe's *Poetry and Truth* at the end of the eighth book – we are in an intermediate realm, we are earthly, mortal, half-wise and always provisional (cf: Trunz 1982: 603).

When at a higher level of symbolism, different interpretation schemes are examined, the specific association between appresentation scheme and reference scheme is always emphasized. These interpretation schemes are a section of the interpretation horizon which is exhibited in its entirety within the novel "Journeyman Years". Thus, from the depiction of the children's gestures of salutation – taking into account the respective context knowledge – the *doctrine of awe* as well as *religiousness* may be derived, already expressed by the brief portrayal of this meeting. Hence, the "looked cheerfully up to the sky" points to awe of what is above us and belief in God, the "looked smiling on the ground" refers to awe of what is below us and belief in those glorified in suffering. Finally, the "look" to the others symbolizes awe of that which is like us and belief in the wise and good. The salutations are used in a profane manner by the children to greet their teachers. It is crucial that with these salutations the religious is carried into everyday life and that life as such (in relation to one's own, for example) becomes religious.

In this passage, the close relationship between awe and the religious is especially obvious. When directing one's attention to God alone, awe is not sufficient for meeting him as he is unreachable and overpowering. When directing one's attention to men alone, awe is excessive and inappropriate. Goethe describes a significant intermediate realm with specific symbolization processes; where the divine shines through in the earthly realm, where the profane itself becomes parable and life itself is lit up by divine light, awe is at exactly the right place. This is why parents, teachers or superiors are interpreted as references to a highest ruler, who is portrayed and manifested in them (cf. Trunz 1982: 603). In many passages of "Journeyman Years"

reference is made to awe originating from the realm between the earthly and the divine, especially when the development of awe is to be seen as "the business of all true religions" (von Goethe 1871 [1829]: 250) and as accomplished by favored people with especially distinct awe and who "on this account too have of old been looked upon as saints" (ib.). Later on in the third book, Makarie is identified as such a "saint" (ib.: 91f), belonging to the realm where the divine and the human meet (cf: Trunz 1982: 603f.). The proper attitude towards Makarie must be "reverential" (von Goethe 1871 [1829]: 160). The central theme to be embraced by the term awe is the experience of the infinite within the finite (cf. Trunz 1982: 604) – this is a crucial problem which Goethe continuously tackles in literature as well as scientific thought.

Regarding the experience of the infinite within the finite, a contradiction in terms is expressed; such a religious experience can only be formulated as paradox and comprehended with the help of symbols. Significantly, Goethe uses the term "awe" to characterize the specific religious awe which combines paradox meanings. The German term for "awe" is "*Ehrfurcht*", a compound noun meaning "honour" and "fear". The German term itself is paradoxical, simultaneously combining contradictory meanings; it characterizes freedom and contingency or approach and distance, respectively, at the same time. The paradoxical phrase "*Ehrfurcht*" is closely connected to portrayals of our religious existence based on the demarcation of two realms: "at once our littleness and our greatness" (von Goethe 1871 [1829]: 207), "middle stage between despair and deification" (ib.: 208), "apparent secret" (ib.: 286), the visitor's attitude towards Makarie – "confidential and reverential". With symbols and symbolic actions – as in the example of the boys' salutations – these contradictions are expressed, while at the same time, they are also mastered and resolved. According to Hans-Georg Soeffner, symbols can assimilate and combine differences – "they represent a selective contradiction and the overcoming process of this contradiction at the same time" (cf: Soeffner 2000: 199). From a sociological view point, acting with symbols has therefore a specific social function:

> The solutions embedded in symbolic actions and interpretations contain problems and contradictions as well as their harmonisation and the 'super-elevation' of the solutions: establishing collective beliefs (cf. Soeffner 1997: 156, cf. also Dreher and Figueroa 2004).[3]

A multitude of the symbolizations developed in "Journeyman Years" facilitate the treatment of the fundamental paradox of the religious experience of the infinite in the finite. Thus, the theme of awe and religious experience as a motif appearing in different areas of meaning of "Journeyman Years" "symphronistically"

[3] While the symbol of the Christian cross as stake epitomizes death, it also symbolizes resurrection and the overcoming of death. Thus, in this context it enables believing Christians to deal with the existential fate of death. With the effectiveness of the cross as a collective symbol with conflicting meanings, death and resurrection can be harmonized allowing individuals to 'cope' with the unimaginable, inconceivable with the help of religious symbolism.

establishes an internal context of manifold narratives whereby the "logic of the poetic event" is developed.

The description of the boys' salutations witnessed by Wilhelm and Felix conveys a statement on religious experience per se, which Goethe does not consider to be linked to a specific religion. There are no clerics in the "Pedagogical Province" and religious instruction is undertaken by wise teachers; no church is mentioned. The big religions originating from the culture of the modern age are mentioned in the narrative. There are Christian as well as classical Jewish and classical Greek pictures in the "sanctuary" of the "Pedagogical Province". The religions are not presented as historical facts, but function as symbols of innermost religious experience which will all be overcome on a higher level of symbolization. In the end, there is only humankind on its way to the absolute (cf. Trunz 1982: 604f.), not some almighty, inaccessible God. It is not about the portrayal of objective contents of faith, but only about religious experiences. The religious is initially experienced as perception of the world ruler, then as perception of our relativity and smallness, and next, perception of the similarity in moral life with others. The ideas conveyed in this passage are followed by the scheme of the doctrine of the threefold awe (von Goethe 1995 [1829]: Book 2, Chapt. 1): On the first level of meaning the boys' gesture (**"**their arms crosswise over their breasts, and looked cheerfully up to the sky"**)** expresses "awe of what is above us" establishing a relationship with faith and God and thus with "ethnic religion", which in turn is associated with the depicted paintings of the Jewish and the Greek religions. Regarding the second level of symbolization, "their hands on their backs, and looked smiling on the ground" refer to "awe of what is below us" and connect with belief in those glorified in suffering, whereby a bond is forged with Christianity which in turn is supplemented by the painting of the passion of Christ. The third level of meaning starts with "their arms stretched down, they turned their heads to the right, and formed themselves into a line" and refers to "awe of what is like us"; this ties in with belief in the wise and good and represents "philosophical religion" signified by the painting of Jesus' path of life (cf. Trunz 1982: 605).

The greeting gestures are characterized by Goethe as symbolic gestures expressing, in connection with the doctrine of the threefold awe, a worldly religiousness specific to Goethe. This opens a scheme of interpretation which communicates a religiousness which is specific for the author Goethe and which, while itself differing from those of other religions, also ties on to many elements of these religions. Considering the triangular relationship between author, work and reader, such a scheme of interpretation can be reconstructed with socio-scientific motivated analysis. Overall, on a higher level of symbolization, based on the non-verbal greeting gestures of the "Pedagogical Province", a world-view is symbolized that Goethe shares with Kant, Schiller and Hölderlin**,** whereby not the Hellenic looking up to the gods and not Christian humility, but a development of both comes to the fore. An image of the human is created who finds within him- or herself the way to the absolute, which appears to him or her in the world as parable (cf. Trunz 1982: 608ff.). The pedagogues combine the three religions to form a "true religion" (von Goethe 1871 [1829]: 251), the three awes merge to "reverence for one's

self" (ib.). "Reverence for one's self is reverence for God within us and the secret of life" (cf: Trunz 1982: 609).

What is this interpretation meant to clarify? It shows that the motifs represented in the literary work can be reconstructed with the use of Schutz's schemes of symbol interpretation. This is of central importance for a hermeneutic life-world analysis. In order to understand "Journeyman Years" as a meaningful text and to comprehend the "logic of the poetic event" of this work, the main motifs – as could be shown with the example of awe and religiousness – must be identified on the different symbolic levels of interpretation within the respective areas of meaning. Only then can the – as Goethe terms it – "symphronistic" or "concordant" layout of "Journeyman Years" be reconstructed. This method enables identification of the thematic relevance according to which the main motifs within the manifold literary types of this work are arranged and relate to each other. Hence, chronological narratives can be ignored. This will illustrate how the life-world borders of "Journeyman Years" are blurred, dream realities appear, the pragmatic motive disappears, causalities of action become reduced to absurdity and everyday reality becomes mystified through an invading infinity.

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Image Worlds Aesthetic Experience and the Problem of Hermeneutics in the Social Sciences

Dirk Tänzler

> When I read a book, I feel even today that it is much less important to understand it, than to create a mental picture of what I have read.
>
> Orhan Pamuk (2005: 31)

1 Hermeneutics and Social Science

For some, hermeneutic experience is simply that of being-in-the-world, which is at bottom, of course, a being-toward-death. Far less dramatically, others see hermeneutics as an art, not any the less strange for the uninitiated, who see nothing in it besides a kind of esoteric discipline. This must relate back to the progenitor and patron of this secret society: Hermes is known as the messenger of the Gods and also as a trickster – and hermeneutists will retain elements of this equivocal calling until the end of time, such that no real scientist quite trusts them along the way. Plato, the founder of philosophy as scientific exploration, already denied mantic – the prototype of hermeneutics – any acknowledgement of wisdom.

Of course, hermeneutics itself does not profess to be a scientific method. But does this relegate it to the world of tealeaf reading? Everyone will recall Odo Marquard's *bon mot*, "Hermeneutics is the art of extracting from a text what does not lie within it: why? – because you still need it even if you have the text" (Marquard 1981:1, translation by the author). Hermeneutics is not only conceived ontologically and anthropologically as an answer to the question of being and the historicity

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of mankind, but it is also a phenomenon of modernity. We need it as a civilizing cultural technique, as an instrument of enlightenment. Schleiermacher used it as an art, in order to liberate Bible reading from the hands of orthodox dogma and to transform the absolute text into pure literature and thus an object for critical reading. The underlying premise for pluralizing, literary hermeneutics is the discursive sociability of never-ending conversation, which allows everyone to have their say without a time limit or the compulsion for agreement.

In the same way, objective and sociological hermeneutics are similarly conceived as sequential analysis,[1] the praxis of unconstrained conversation where the only requirement is for better argumentation, not consensus. According to Hans-Georg Gadamer, hermeneutics, as perfect scepticism – even with respect to oneself – breeds "tact" (Gadamer 1975: 16f.), and opens a perspective towards new horizons. This happens because in every interpretation act, the immemorial foundation of all interpretation, the language that has become our home, is drawn into the discourse to be experienced in its uncanny familiarity (c.f. Gadamer 1975: 340).

These remarks culminate in the problem to be considered here: how can we make the incomprehensible in hermeneutics comprehensible, that is, make understanding understandable, particularly with respect to the question we are posing in this instance about the possibility of a hermeneutics of the image, which raises the level of difficulty even higher. In Gadamer's aphoristic formulation, a fundamental tenet (perhaps *the* fundamental tenet) of hermeneutics is: "…Being that can be understood is language" (Gadamer 1975: 432).[2] This question can be narrowed down in the following way: are images (in the broadest sense of mental representations, including dreams, paintings, photography, film, and videos) and aesthetic forms at all accessible to hermeneutic endeavours? And what does hermeneutics have to do with sociology? What is specific and what is sociological in the sociological hermeneutics of the image?

The ancient Greeks understood *ερμηνεύειν* as meaning not only to interpret but to lay out, to translate and to demonstrate, a process that involves three participants: one speaks, writes or otherwise expresses something, a second understands it, and a third is unable to understand, because he was not present for its exposition, or is unfamiliar with the gestures, language or script that was employed. In hermeneutics, understanding always ultimately means understanding, interpreting and translating what is foreign. Unmediated self-understanding, if one may formulate it in this way, is pure experience in the very midst of life. Reflective self-understanding is thus already understanding the foreign, in that it requires an act of identification: I impute

[1] The founder of objective hermeneutics is Ulrich Oevermann (c.f. Oevermann et al. 1987), and the driving force behind sociological hermeneutics is Hans-Georg Soeffner (c.f. Soeffner 1989). The author of this paper has worked together with both of them for years and attempts to situate himself between these poles.

[2] Vattimo clarifies this sentence as a "translation" of a sentence from Heidegger's *Being and Time*: "Being (not entities) is something which 'there is' only in so far as truth is. And truth is only so far and so long as Dasein is." (Vattimo 2000; cf. di Cesare 2002, translated by the author).

to myself (as the Meadian "I"), what I (as the "social Me") did and thus experienced (c.f. Mead 1986). There is always a fundamental difference between the always already (pre)-understood and interpreting what is understood. Using this difference between understanding and interpretation, we will also try to cross the bridge between textual hermeneutics and the hermeneutics of images.

Wilhelm Dilthey defines "interpretation" (*Auslegung*) as "the artful understanding of life manifestations objectified in written form" (Dilthey 1973: 217, trans. by the author) in order to differentiate it from understanding as reliving or retracing what is strange or what has passed. A prerequisite for interpretation is thus the "fixation" or *objectification* of meaning within a medium so that interpretation can then be performed in language. In this Schleiermacherian tradition, the subjects of hermeneutics are texts. Paul Ricœur (1973) subsequently generalized the textual model for the analysis of action and all cultural objectifications on the basis of structural linguistics. He also rejects the concept of reliving and additionally formulates understanding in a far more scientific – one might say positivistic – way, as the reconstruction of meaning. This attempt to resolve the exasperating debates between explanation and understanding, the natural sciences and the humanities, and thereby reconcile hermeneutics and science, is epitomized in the formula, "the world as text." Ulrich Oevermann used it as the foundation for his objective hermeneutics (Oevermann et al. 1987). Although as a sociologist, Oevermann pragmatically based his conception of sense and meaning on social behaviour,[3] he falls into the snare of semiotic reduction of symbol and image to their sign-value. Moreover, this sign-being becomes ontologically charged when he resorts to reading "the world as text" into the romantic theory of expression (cf. Garz 1994). As we will show in what follows, the image and aesthetic experience are not understandable within this model of the "world as text." Language undoubtedly provides something like the infrastructure of understanding; however, language and the image share a common foundation in imagery. Gadamer's theory of images, which will help to guide us, explicates the understanding of image in our culture that, in its essentials, goes back to Plato and Christianity. It is already clear that hermeneutics is not pure art, but instead is more like the genetic constitutional analysis of experience and its objects.

2 Sign, Symbol and Image

A sign functions by referring towards something beyond itself. Signs have a schematic and an abstract element in their referential function. The symbol, by contrast, refers to something contained within it. A symbol does not merely refer; it makes

[3] C.f. his commentary on Pierce's Theory of Abduction in Oevermann (1991: esp. 330 ff.) See also Soeffner's comparison of Husserl's *appresentation* with Pierce's *abduction* as non-formalizable primordial conclusions, which owe their being to an act of turning towards a phenomenon (Soeffner 2000: 189ff).

something present by representing it. The Latin *repraesentare* originally means, "to make present what is not apparent." The symbol allows something to emerge that basically was always present, but not apparent, for example, God on the cross or in the church, nation in the flag. Since the symbol – the cross or the flag – makes present what is unapparent, unlike the pure sign, it can itself become an object of adoration as a pure fetish, even if it is actually valued for the thing that it (re)presents. The sign does not represent, it *appresents* (Husserl 1992: §§ 50–51; c.f. Schutz and Luckmann 1989: 131–157; Srubar 1988: 242). The signifier, to follow Jacques Lacan (1975), is separated from the signified by a barrier or a bar. As part of a chain of signifiers, the sign can only refer to other signs, and never refers to the Real that may impart it with an identity-forming character. By contrast, the symbol breaks through this barrier, steps beyond one level of reality to another and bridges them, in that it creates a metaphysical representational connection between what is visible and what is invisible, between appearance and essence. The organization of sensory phenomena and transcendental meaning does not take place after the fact in an empirical-practical way within a historical context as it does with signs (c.f. Benveniste 1966: 49–55), but is instead contained logically in the concept of the thing itself. The symbol and what is symbolized constitute an inner unit that remains eternally pending, since the representation of essence in appearance always remains inadequate, a mystery – the cross is the symbol of God becoming a man, dying, and being resurrected as a God – but this is precisely the logically irresolvable riddle.

The image is located somewhere between the sign and the symbol. Although it constitutes a sphere of its own, it mediates between the semantic and symbolic order. Like a sign, a portrait refers to something that is not itself, but something it also represents, like a symbol. Different from the pure sign, the image attracts particular attention to itself, and thereby makes something explicit about the portrayed person that had not previously been manifest, namely his/her nature. Since the reproduction brings forth an appearance – and this is the ontological function of imagery – it acts retroactively, turning the one depicted into an original, i.e. into the bearer of an essence. The image shows something that would never have existed without the reproduction. This dialectic between the original and the image elevates the image above the symbol, which is also representational, but does not have a relationship of identity with what is symbolized. The symbol remains a proxy representation. It is the image that first brings about the representation of identity. Sign and symbol remain ensnared in the play between differences, which the identity-fostering image transcends. The image is constituted by the indeterminability of the difference between it and what it depicts. In reality, these levels of the sign, the symbol and the image are intertwined. In particular, the symbol always returns to being represented once again as an image, since this marks the border that the image transgresses. But, symbolism and imagery also disunite, for example, religious and aesthetic experience.

3 Aesthetic Experience and Image Understanding

We are indebted to Georg for a vivid depiction of the relationship between essence and appearance, based upon the dialectic between original versus (after) image governing all representation. In his essay, "The Aesthetics of the Portrait", he states, that

> from the whole person in which the ordinary understanding includes his outer appearance as well as all we know about his spirit the portrait peels off his visibility: bringing the meaning of his appearance – not the meaning behind his appearance – into pure presence is the primary function of the portrait […]. Whether we are acquainted with the original or not: we now discover that this mouth has to be just so if that nose sits right there, that these eyes are only possible next to this particular formation of forehead and cheeks. Thus, the surface elements reciprocally justify each other. (Simmel 1986: 321ff) (Translated by the author)

Simmel's "law of the merely intuition" requires a unifying principle, which cannot be found in the insurmountable separation of bodily phenomena, but only in the soul. "Thus, the unity of features consists of nothing more than their being pulled by a soul, identified or mediated by the beholder, who accomplishes this unification or ensoulment, for the form of the artwork has aroused his own soul to the most concentrated aliveness and integration of the elements of his vision." (Ibid.: 327, translated by the author). The image is a presentation of something for another, thus it is bound to its reception through an act of ensoulment, in keeping with Mead's formula: the meaning of the stimulus lies in the response. The premises of a receptionist aesthetics burst through the limits of the semiotic textual paradigm.

The theory of imagery presented here in relation to the work of Gadamer and Simmel may be readily applied to so-called non-representational or putatively abstract painting. In the context of his analysis of Piet Mondrian's "Composition with Colour Areas", Oevermann's student, Bertram Ritter, very appropriately remarks

> The scandal of art falsely labelled as 'non-representational' (or worse yet, 'abstract'), whose subject cannot be seen independently at all outside the image or without the image, because it only appears in the image, by no means has a subject, but rather that it manifests the same for "representational" art: no matter whether the image refers to a so call independent object or not, the determination of the visual subject is only created by the image itself. (Ritter 2003: 296; translated by the author).

Max Imdahl's interpretations of the Josef Albers drawing "Structural Constellation" and the Jasper Johns painting "Flag" illustrate this concept (Fig. 1).

The structural constellation consists here of the fact that every line, every angle, and every directional value appears twice in inverse symmetry, for example, on the upper left, and reversed, on the lower right. This evokes a sensation of space that the eye cannot grasp. From the perspective of art history, what is (also) interesting about Albers' composition is that its sense of perspective is not an abstracted form, as has been virtually obligatory since the Renaissance, but has instead become a concrete form: the two-dimensional projection has no extra-iconic spatial equivalent that can be experienced or represented in the mind outside its projection (c.f. Imdahl 1996: 412). The subject of the projection in contrast to conceptual seeing is visual seeing, the capture of visual actuality. As in the example follows, the pictorial subject is constituted here by the dialectic between form and content (Fig. 2).



Fig. 1 Josef Albers, structural constellation 1957/1958, drawing

Fig. 2 Jasper Johns, Flag, 1954, oil and collage on canvas

In its microstructure, Jasper Johns' painting with the title "Flag" *is* recognizably informal: an oil painting composed of a collage of newspaper clippings that *depicts* the American flag. As John Cage pointed out, however, since it lacks a frame, we are not merely dealing here with a representation, but (also) with an actual flag. Jasper Johns' painting *is* what it *represents*: and flags are themselves symbols (Imdahl 1996: 382ff).

Based on the difference between the symbol and the image that we have previously explored, we can not only grasp the sense of this painting more incisively, but also expand upon it. Thanks to its representation of identity with the flag, the painting places itself in unmediated unity with the flag; but, precisely as a result of this, the difference between the flag as a symbol and what it symbolizes becomes apparent. The materiality (informal structure and collage technique) is irrelevant for its flag-ness, but not at all for the painting. Its materiality constitutes its singularity, and thus, to follow Walter Benjamin, its cultural value and fetishist character. Duchamp had already made use of this in his 'Readymades,' to which the collage of

newspaper clippings in Jasper Johns' painting alludes. In the painting, the artifice and the profanity of "flag-ness" are made apparent, and thus its sanctity is destroyed; on the other hand, in the identification of the painting *as* a flag – thanks to the missing 'categorical' frame – it is reproduced once again. This irritation is constitutive for the painting "Flag", but not for a real flag. To approach this question in its most general sociological application, such an "unmasking" through conceptual art is not abstract and theoretical as it might be in an ideological critique, but instead becomes a concrete, objective experience, and is thus both unconditional and compelling.

The aesthetic encounter with a painting provides a fundamental model for knowledge if, as taught by hermeneutical sociology, we consider it as a form of case-based understanding. Following Gadamer, the epistemological relevance of aesthetic experience consists of the fact that it does not represent one experience among many, but instead the way of being for all experience, or as Oevermann expresses it, the archetype of experiencing the new, and therefore the model for every search for discovery and new hypotheses (Oevermann 1991: 317f, 324). If we understand explanation as subsuming the individual under a general, and reducing particularity to a simple instance of a rule, then hermeneutics serves to redirect us towards another kind of mediation between the general and the particular, which is expressed in the Humboldtian and Hegelian concept of formation process (*Bildung*).

Gadamer defines this relationship as being one characterized by tact: tact as a function of an aesthetical and historical formation process is a "general sense of proportion and integrity in relation to oneself, and thus an elevation beyond oneself to universality. […] Being able to see oneself and one's private goals from a distance does indeed mean seeing them as others see them. […] Educated consciousness only transcends the natural senses insofar as they are enclosed within a particular sphere. It is energized in all directions. It is *universal sense*". This universal and social sense achieved through formation is not merely a "way of understanding," not something achieved through the study of tradition, but instead, this requires "receptivity for the otherness of the work of art or the past." Formation is thus to be seen as a "way of being" – in short, tact. The receptivity for the universal perspectives acquired through formation is not a question of technique, but rather a sign of evolved being. (Gadamer 1975: 17f.)

The search for the universal moment in the individual, as opposed to his subsumption as a case under a general rule, is the constitutive principle behind humanistic or cultural sociology, which does not confine itself to so-called "higher values", but also draws attention to everyday culture (rules of conduct, handling of objects, techniques of manipulation etc.). What Gadamer refers to as 'tact' transcends the apparent contradiction between his thesis of the representational character of the image and Max Imdahl's requirement that object-centred seeing be overcome to achieve authentic aesthetic experience.

Like the hermeneutic idea of 'the understanding of understanding,' one might even speak of Imdahl's picture-theory of visual seeing as 'the seeing of seeing'. This theory treats seeing as a subject for autonomous art and thus opens the path towards a scientific analysis of aesthetic experience that does not bring meaning to the image, but rather elicits meaning from it. In contrast, non-hermeneutic social

scientific interpretations in the realm of iconography continue to rely on the search for a real referent for every layer of appearance (phenomenological meaning, significance, documentary meaning à la Mannheim or Panofsky and Bourdieu). Thus, according to the art historian Gottfried Boehm, "[iconography] …turns the self reference of a painting into the facticity of a case, according to the ontological model of language" (Boehm: 1978: 452, translated by the author). On this view, images are seen as discursive concepts incorporated in fictitious pictorial appearances from which interpretation seeks to liberate them. In other words, there is an original interpretive schema – for Bourdieu, somewhat like the socially constructed habitus of social dispositions (Bourdieu 1984) – that is applied to the images. Here it is not the painting that is analysed, but its socially codified pictorial perception. Aesthetic experience is thereby dismissed as a class-specific perceptual convention regarding works of art. In what follows, the inadequacy of this approach will be clearly demonstrated through a philosophical and sociological analysis of photography.

There is a widespread belief that painting lost its representational function with the discovery of photography. But as Gernot Böhme notes, the realism of the photograph does not depend so much on an exact isomorphism between the original subject and the copy (Böhme 1999: 111), but rather on the nature of photographic vision (ibid.: 119), which is, of necessity, culturally determined. Realism and recognition are only possible through the application of the entire art of photography, and are thus the result of artistic manipulation. The realism of a photo, says Böhme, "does not depend so much on what it depicts, but rather on what it permits. An image has the effect of reality if it leaves room for fantasy, allowing us to recapture the object in the fullness of its possibilities.[4] Gombrich would say that the image becomes realistic precisely by means of an illusion. (…) The photograph shows the reality of something by shrinking its possibilities and enlarging its verisimilitude. In this respect, the photograph has a tendency towards surrealism. (…) [We are] socialized in a particular way by our extensive use of photographs (…) finally, we end up seeing reality the way it is presented to us by photographs" (Böhme 1999: 126f, translated by the author). The same is true of film and television. Film and television do not copy or mirror, but constitute sur- or hyper-reality. What does this mean? In the following section, we will analyse a television program that exemplifies how the media constructs what could be called a "collective identity".

4 The "GDR-Show" – A Case Study

In summer 2003 there were many Ostalgia-shows on German television. The most successful was the so-called "GDR-Show" on RTL network, watched by six and a half million Germans, or 20 % of all TV-households in the country. It was the last in a string of similar shows in the so-called retro-format, presenting retrospectives of

[4] C.f. the quotation from Orhan Pamuk's volume about Istanbul that prefaces this paper.

Fig. 3 Intro to the "GDR-Show"

West German popular culture from the 1970s and 1980s. The popular culture of Eastern Germany was assimilated to this blueprint. Reasonably prominent people took the stage; interrupted by media flashbacks, they reported their own experiences from former times. The TV-format acted out by the compére forced the show's guests to distance themselves from their former lifestyles in an ironic way. In the following we demonstrate how ironic dissociation was a basic principle of the actors' performances in the "GDR-Show".

For a systematic analysis we chose the intro to the "GDR-Show". The intro is played at the beginning, following each commercial break and at the end of the show, and functions like a bracket keeping the communication together. During the show, the intro mutates into a shibboleth of the TV-serial and – as the following analyses will demonstrate – it represents form and content of "Ostalgia" in a nutshell. Thus, an interpretation of this short piece as a condensed model of the Ostalgia affords us an insight into the structure of the whole phenomenon. This first hypothesis has to be proved by the sequential analysis of a second key scene of the show (Fig. 3).

What we see here is a modification of the GDR emblem. Immediately, we realise that the hammer and compasses, the core elements of the emblem, are missing from it. The hammer, symbolising the working class, and the compasses, representing the technocratic avant-garde, both elemental to the socialist state, have vanished. Only the garland of corn in a streamlined design remains as a reminder of the pastoral component of the GDR. Finally, the symbolic character of the emblem is depoliticised into the trademark of a commodity. The circle of the garland and its glance still arouse the imagination of an aura. The garland casting its shadow on the red background, and the rolling radiants coming from the centre behind the garland emphasise enchantment. In the next frame of the sequence we see letters flying around and then arranging the token 'DDR' in an unusual styling in the centre of the garland. These jumbled letters evoke the blurring of the aura. An "in-between" state of interplay between numinocity and profanity is established. The emblem symbolizes the virtual reality of the show. Then the three letters break rank, the spotlight



Fig. 4 Spotlight on 'D'

Fig. 5 Keyhole view

falls in the middle of the letter 'D', and the camera zooms in on the inner blank space of this letter (Figs. 4 and 5).

At this moment of being "in-between", the stage is revealed and the show starts. The symbol, functioning as "a bridge to transcendent realities" (Schutz and Luckmann 1989: 143), is transformed into a frame of a virtual sphere of action and this transition marks the end of the sequence in question. In this sequence we hear "Prinzen", a well known pop-band in the GDR and now in the reunified Germany, singing "*Das alles ist Deutschland. Das alles sind wir*" ("*All this is Germany. All this is us*"). Each single phrase is a statement of simple facts. The conjoining of the sentences transforms them into normative imperatives, demanding identification. Each sentence taken on its own is immediately followed by the expressive phrase "oh-oh-oh" as a comment. The meaning of the "oh-oh-oh" is ambiguous. It might be an expression of admiration or an indication of a delicate issue.

Fig. 6 Katharina Witt as Young Pioneer

In the analysis of the first sequence we found a distinct pattern, determined by three binary oppositions: (de)politicisation – commercialisation, auratisation – profanation, admiration – reservation. In the following we try to show that these binary oppositions define the framework of the GDR show as an experimental setting in which the actors have to establish themselves as the avant-garde of a new collective identity construction that was still a cultural lag in the politically and economically reunified Germany at that time. Both, the actors' improvisations and the construction of a collective identity will be reliable if all the conflicting elements fit together in one figure (Fig. 6).

The compére introduces Katharina Witt, a well-known figure skater, as an Eastern star, a Western star and in the end as a World star. When the World star comes down the big steps of the stage in the uniform of a "Young Pioneer", dressed like a member of the communist youth organization, the audience is surprised. The discrepancy in Witt's appearance is emphasised by the ambiguity of the phrase "oh-oh-oh" in the theme song. The compére alludes to the discrepancy in Witt's appearance when he opens the talk with the remark "fesch", which means 'fresh' (*frech*), or 'bold' (*kühn*), but also 'smart' (*elegant*) or 'sexy'. By describing her as 'fesch' he expresses his admiration for Witt's attractiveness, but also for her courage to wear a costume that would be considered taboo in reunified Germany. The ambiguity of the first comment is stressed by the second statement referring to the uniform ("*Jungpioniersuniform*"), which indicates the compére's reservation with Witt's outfit and his political correctness.[5] This contradictory evaluation of Witt's appearance by the compére defines the limits of the space, "in-between" Witt has to prove herself as a competent actor and World-star. She must overcome the contradiction in her appearance by performing a role in which the contradictory tokens 'admiration' and 'reservation' fit together.

[5]The choice of the compére's term "fesch" as an expression for Witt's attractiveness is motivated by her uniform. In German "fesch" is an idiomatic expression for the appeal of somebody in uniform.

Reservation arises from the fact that the uniform is a communist symbol originally worn by children. Used as a requisite for the self-performance by an adult woman the uniform is transformed into a fashion accessory and therefore loses its political meaning. Witt ratifies the compére's remark with the words: "Yes, I am coming as a Young Pioneer today. So to speak". In the German sentence the parenthesis "so to speak" and the adverbial phrase "today" mark her distance from and the fictitious character of her role as Young Pioneer. She refuses the meaning of the uniform as a symbol of uniformity, suggesting that she now lives in a "multi-optional world" (Gross 1994). But her attitude of distance from the socialist past is undermined by her posture, her gestures and her facial expression. Sitting up straight she proudly displays her scarf by pushing up the lappets. Finally when she pronounces the words "Young Pioneer" with affection, she closes her eyes narcistically. In this way her body language indicates a regressive identification with her former role as a Young Pioneer and ratifies the compére's comment "fesch". By demonstrating her personal identification with the role of a Young Pioneer she solves two problems of presentation: the contradiction between girl and woman and between being smart and appearing in a traditional communist outfit.

But there is one element in Witt's performance that still does not fit with our interpretation thus far: Witt holds her hands on her knees which are closed together, which forces her to sit up straight and gives her an attitude of reservation. This gesture is a reaction to the compére's phrase "fesch". It is not a comment to the outfit but a compliment to the person wearing this outfit. With her gesture Witt rejects the sexual allusion that is implicated in the compére's compliment. Then, moving her hands to the scarf, she reacts to the compére's second statement referring to the uniform and diverts attention from her body to the defining accessory of the costume as a uniform. Proudly presenting the lappets of her scarf she brings out the attractiveness of the uniform and at the same time she gives the situation an erotic timbre.

Summarizing the scene, we can say that initially Katharina Witt gave infantile innocence back to the depoliticised uniform transforming it into a profane commercial commodity. In a second move she imbued this commodity with a fresh charm. Transforming it into the outfit of an idol of the international entertainment industry, Witt supplied the costume with attractiveness again. We find all three binary oppositions realised: (de)politicisation and commercialisation, auratisation and profanation, admiration and reservation. But reservation is still expressed with reservation. Let's have a look upon the scene again. Although indicating reservation by putting her hands on her knees in reaction to the compliment and sexual overtones of the compére, Witt confirms the erotic and sexual allusions in the interaction with her next gesture, that is, by lifting the lappets, but – and this seems to be crucial – she defines the eroticism of the situation by *herself*. Generally speaking sexual attractiveness for an actor is a chance to become a media-star, but also a high risk to loose one's face, one's authenticity, her or his 'real' identity. The compére's compliment puts Witt in a risky situation. She solves this problem opting for coquetry. She transforms the seduction of the compére in his double role as a talk-master and a man into an erotic interplay dominated by the woman. Coquetry is the reversal of

the classical situation of seduction that follows the cultural definition of passivity as a distinctive quality for a female and activity as a distinctively male characteristic. The seduction that a man tries to initiate as a representative of hegemonic male culture and in his dominant role of as a show-master is transformed into coquetry by the woman. Through this redefinition of the situation, Witt's regressive identification becomes the mask of her sovereignty and the attempt to prove herself as a self-confident woman *and* as an Eastern German citizen as well. Following Georg Simmel, coquetry is a state that lies "in-between" the flirt and the beginning of sexual intercourse. It is an ironic interplay acted out by two equal antagonists of different gender**.** From this perspective the play of coquetry is a metaphor for the newborn collective identity, which stands for an ironical state "in-between" Eastern and Western Germany.

5 Conclusion

We have reconstructed the objective content of a television program, that is, the cultural meaning that a member of German society might by means of an ideal type construction ascribe to this document. When we speak about the objective meaning of a media product, we are not referring to an analysis of the aesthetic, ideological or economic intent of the show's producers. Neither such intentions on the part of the producers nor the reconstructed objective meaning of the media product have any social relevance in and of themselves. As a symbolic order, in Ernst Cassirer's formulation, the media are their own reality (Cassirer 1955–57). The viewers can only confer a pragmatic significance on the fictional media creation by means of their own perception. Following Alfred Schutz, media products acquire social relevance only if their recipients accord them value in the perspective of their social behaviour in the paramount reality of everyday life. What is decisive here is the widespread belief in our culture that television is the truly relevant reality: we automatically attribute historical relevance to what happens on television. How is this to be understood?

By identifying with the objective meaning – here in the truest sense of identifying simply with a role played on television – Katharina Witt or any television viewer can make it his or her own, or to what George Herbert Mead calls the "me" or the "social self", which is nothing but a collection of social roles or masks (Mead 1986). Clearly media self-presentation does not represent the 'real' Katharina Witt but is rather a mask. The mask (or Latin *persona*) can at most become that part of the self, which we call a public persona, the unique face of an individual that we can identify with. If a person identifies with this facial mask that is placed upon him/her –what Erving Goffman calls the "image" – then the mask represents a self. Behind the mask we expect a face, but the face is itself the social construction of an image. Goffman explains the social process of presentation of self in everyday life in analogy to the theatre model (Goffman 1959). In the following we will use Alfred Schutz's sociology of the symbol to analyse the theatricality of television as a

reality of its own and, finally, to explain television as a factory of social reality, i.e. of collective identity. In our analysis we combine Schutz's definition of sign, symbol and image with Panofsky's differentiation between a pre-iconographic description of natural subject matter, an iconographic analysis of conventional subject matter and the iconological interpretation of intrinsic meaning in analogy to the semiotic trias of semantics, syntax and pragmatics.

An attractive woman appears on stage as young pioneer. At first glance, in a pre-iconographic perspective of common sense realism, if you like, we, the audience, take for granted, what we see: she *is* a young pioneer, i.e. a communist. On paying closer attention to the details and the framing of the event, we recognize the function of the uniform as a mask or a vehicle for a conventional role and interpret it *symbolically* as part of a play.[6] In accordance with the retro format of the TV show the iconographic analysis reveals the irony of the performance as the "subjective intention". Witt is not a communist. She merely plays a role. The role distance (Goffman) allows her to identify herself with her past in the Communist youth organization and society while virtualizing their political character. But we can go a step further. The "real meaning" and "deeper truth" of her performance becomes evident if we enter the iconological level of the analysis. Beyond realism (being communist) and symbolism (irony), we finally grasp the intrinsic meaning of the pictorial reality of television, the objective cultural meaning ("*Kulturbedeutung*") in the sense of Max Weber. For the sociologist the cultural meaning is not necessarily facticity as Panofsky suggests; it is real possibility. Referring to such a hyper-reality people imitate a media star as a representational instance and as founder of an elected community or in-group**.** The appearance no longer confirms or fosters the individual's conflict (as a communist from Eastern Germany) with Western culture and society but transcends it toward the utopian vision of an egalitarian social world. What is represented, the hyper-reality of a utopian egalitarian social world, now legitimates the formerly stigmatized phenomenon as real presence or truly real.

It is critical for our analysis of Witt's self-presentation in the medium of television that it is presented as a solution to a central social problem, namely, identity conflict in a culturally divided society of a reunited Germany. At the very least, it is a gesture towards overcoming the clash of culture between East and West. Regarding fine arts Schutz makes an interesting point: "a work of art", Schutz says, "is created as an interpretation for Others. (…) [W]orks of art (…) can be interpreted as 'objectivations' of subjective knowledge, but of a knowledge that represents attempts to solve the problems transcending the everyday life-world" (Schutz and Luckmann 1974: 277). This argument sheds new light on our problem.

[6]For Panofsky an image is a symbol. Thus, he reduces the intrinsic meaning of an image to its pragmatic use (the social relation between artist and costumer etc.). Schutz differentiates between symbol and image. Only the image constitutes an identity between the representing and the represented entity. In this paper we argue that identification (and representation) is not a copy but a mode of social construction of another reality, in the case of the image, the construction of a pictorial reality (see Simmel's theory of the portrait).

The retro format of the TV-show demands that the actor present an episode from her life in the former GDR in an ironic manner, giving her the chance to break a taboo. Identifying with her past in the former GDR Katharina Witt attempts to integrate the depoliticized symbol of the communist regime as a legitimate requisite to the stock of collective memory of reunited Germans. The public's acclamation can be understood as an acknowledgement of Witt's deconstruction of a taboo. If events that are taboo in everyday life, i.e. treated as nonexistent, appear in a movie or on television they then become public, real and an ingredient of normality.[7] In this respect, we are dealing with circular logic – with a self-fulfilling prophecy. Marcel Mauss calls this kind of magical causality "induction a priori" (Mauss 1966: 90): magical judgment, here regarding the historical relevance of a media event, precedes magical experience, in this case, identification. "This belief is what allows the subjective ideas to be objectified and individual illusions to become generalized (Mauss 1966: 88, translated by the author)." Mauss's theory of magic provides an explanatory model for the problems of public opinion and collective identity that are in the view of the Durkheimian School at the core of sociological reasoning.

Hence, I want to close with an observation regarding the expression 'collective identity'. The categories used by sociologists originate from the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. For Kant, identity belongs to the category of representations that "rest on a mere delusion by which they hypostatize what exists merely in thought, and take it as a real object existing […] outside the thinking subject" (Kant 1933: 335). In accordance with this critique of an essentialist understanding of collective concepts like 'collective consciousness' (Durkheim) or 'collective identity', Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1966) claim that real is only the identification of a person with a social typecast, as is so widely disseminated by today's media, especially the key medium of television. Collective identities are social constructions, generated by rituals as a specific form of social communicative action. Rituals are the primordial media for delivering society and its members with images of self-representation and identity. In complex societies, it is not possible to fabricate generally binding constructions of collective identities through rituals requiring face-to-face-communication, the presence and participation of community. Today only medial communication provides near ubiquity, reaching as many people as possible. In this way, the media achieve the condition for the construction of collective identities and are bound only by the rules of media receptions and not by political participation. Witt's medial performance enriches the collective identity of the politically reunited Germans by commanding respect for her memory as member of the communist youth organisation.[8] The removal of the taboo on her memory that is

[7] Shortly after Witt's performance as Young Pioneer in German television Canadian Girls wear the uniform on the occasion of a state reception for the German Ambassador in Canada.

[8] In his novel *Ein springender Brunnen* (1998) Martin Walser made a similiar attempt to remove the taboo on the memory of his generation's childhood under the Nazi regime.

representative for the remembrance of all citizens of the former GDR immediately makes all Germans' collective mind susceptible to the promise of fraternization shared by bourgeois and socialist partisans.

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