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Die politische Kontrolle des Militärs

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Militärsoziologie – Eine Einführung
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Zusammenfassung

Im Zentrum dieses Beitrags stehen die Fragen nach der politischen Kontrolle des Militärs. Diese beschreibt den Zustand in den politisch-militärischen Beziehungen, in dem politische Entscheidungsträger (insbesondere in Regierung und Parlament) prinzipiell die volle Entscheidungs- und Kontrollgewalt über alle regelungsbedürftigen Aspekte des Verhältnisses von Staat und Streitkräften besitzen. Die Unterordnung des Militärs unter den Primat der Politik ist für alle Regimetypen relevant, auch wenn sich die konkreten Herausforderungen innerhalb und zwischen unterschiedlichen Formen politischer Herrschaft teils deutlich unterscheiden. Der Beitrag führt ein in die theoretischen Ansätze und Erklärungsmodelle zur politischen Kontrolle des Militärs und fasst zentrale Forschungsbefunde zu politisch-militärischen Beziehungen in Autokratien sowie etablierten und jungen Demokratien zusammen.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Wenn es im 21. Jahrhundert in demokratischen Systemen zu Putschen kommt, dann meist in institutionell schwachen und jungen Regimen mit massiven Problemen politisch-motivierter innerstaatlicher Gewalt, Ungleichheit und Armut sowie einer starken Tradition politischer Einflussnahme durch das Militär (Haggard/Kaufman 2012). Der Anteil dieser schwachen Demokratien an allen Demokratien weltweit hat im Zuge der ‚Dritten Demokratisierungswelle‘ zugenommen.

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Kuehn, D., Croissant, A. (2023). Die politische Kontrolle des Militärs. In: Leonhard, N., Werkner, IJ. (eds) Militärsoziologie – Eine Einführung. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-30184-2_3

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