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Moralischer Partikularismus

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Handbuch Angewandte Ethik
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Zusammenfassung

Die Geschichte der normativen Ethik ist in weiten Teilen eine Geschichte von Versuchen, Prinzipien zu identifizieren und verteidigen, die uns erklären, warum bestimmte Handlungen, Institutionen und Charaktereigenschaften moralisch richtig oder falsch, gerecht oder ungerecht, tugendhaft oder untugendhaft sind. Moralische Partikularisten stellen diese Hegemonie moralischer Prinzipien in Frage. Der Begriff des Partikularismus beschreibt eine Reihe von Positionen, die moralischen Prinzipien und prinzipienbasierter Moraltheorie aufgrund von verschiedenen metaethischen Überlegungen kritisch gegenübersteht.

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Correspondence to Maike Albertzart .

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Albertzart, M. (2023). Moralischer Partikularismus. In: Neuhäuser, C., Raters, ML., Stoecker, R. (eds) Handbuch Angewandte Ethik. J.B. Metzler, Stuttgart. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-05869-0_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-05869-0_13

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  • Publisher Name: J.B. Metzler, Stuttgart

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-476-05868-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-476-05869-0

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