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Wahrheit

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Wittgenstein-Handbuch

Zusammenfassung

In den »Aufzeichnungen über Logik« ist die »Bedeutung eines Satzes [...] die Tatsache, die ihm wirklich entspricht« (NL 1984, 189). Diese Auffassung gibt W. bald zugunsten seiner Bild-Auffassung von Sätzen auf (vgl. Diamond 2001). »Die Frage, wie ist eine Zuordnung von Relationen möglich, ist identisch mit dem Wahrheits-Problem« (TB 24.9.1914): Hier nimmt er Korrelation-als-Projektion und Modalität (Möglichkeit) in seine Konzeption von Wahrheit auf.

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Floyd, J. (2022). Wahrheit. In: Weiberg, A., Majetschak, S. (eds) Wittgenstein-Handbuch. J.B. Metzler, Stuttgart. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-05854-6_84

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-05854-6_84

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