Zusammenfassung
Philosophische Konzeptionen von Wahrheit zielen auf die Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Wahrheit? Hinter dieser kurzen Frage steht allerdings eine Vielzahl von Fragen in der Metaphysik, Sprachphilosophie, Erkenntnistheorie und Logik, zu denen Wahrheitstheorien Stellung bezogen haben. Es hilft, vier Fragen zu unterscheiden.
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1)
Wesensfrage: Was ist das Wesen der Wahrheit, das was allen und nur wahren Dingen gemeinsam ist?
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2)
Gebrauchsfrage: Welchem Zweck dient unser Gebrauch der Worte ›wahr‹ und ›falsch‹?
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3)
Wertfrage: Hat Wahrheit selbst einen Wert und wenn ja, welchen und warum?
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4)
Logikfrage: Wie ist mit semantischen Paradoxien — etwa der Lügnerparadoxie — umzugehen, und was sagen sie uns über den Wahrheitsbegriff?
Traditionelle Wahrheitstheorien beantworten seit der Antike gewöhnlich die Wesensfrage. Deflationäre Theorien werten seit Beginn des 20. Jh.s die Wesensfrage ab und rücken die Gebrauchsfrage in den Vordergrund.
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Kindermann, D. et al. (2015). Ausdrücke und ihre Funktion. In: Kompa, N. (eds) Handbuch Sprachphilosophie. J.B. Metzler, Stuttgart. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-05362-6_4
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