Keywords

Introduction

Across the Middle East, there has been substantial political and academic attention to “citizenship” and “participation,” which has increased over the last decade, in the context of the Arab uprisings which began in 2011 (Kiwan 2018). While not the only participants in the uprisings in the region, youth have played a significant role in contesting traditional notions of citizenship. This contestation has been witnessed in various forms, including street protests, artistic representations and graffiti, social media, and other forms of cultural expression (Kiwan 2015). As such, there is also keen academic and policy interest in the category of “youth” – of particular relevance given the demography of the Middle East region, with over 40% of the population being under the age of 18 (Faour and Muasher 2012). Youth unemployment in the region is the highest in the world, on average 25% (IMF 2012), and high levels of youth alienation and despair are often attributed to poor educational opportunities, high levels of unemployment, and denial of political and civil rights (Teti and Gervasio 2011). The concomitant interest in civic participation and youth comes both from within the region and internationally, through initiatives funded by international organizations, NGOs, and foreign governments. Philanthropic support for civic change in the Middle East and Lebanon which focuses specifically on youth is a significant area of funding in the region. Such funding, especially by international organizations, is often constructed and implemented through partnerships with local NGOs (Kiwan et al. 2014).

A brief historical and socio-political overview provides a contextualization for understanding youth activism in Lebanon. Lebanon is typically characterized as a divided, “postconflict” society, with a “weak” state (Pearlman 2013). The 16-year long Lebanese civil war ended in 1990, with the Ta’if agreement stating as an objective the renouncement of political sectarianism. While this failed to gain approval, the agreement set a basis for modifying the balance of powers between the different sects (Traboulsi 2007). There was an estimated death toll of 20,000, 76,000 people were displaced, and an estimated 1 million people left Lebanon during the civil war (Kiwan 2016a). With the end of the Lebanese civil war, there was an optimistic vision arising in the 1990s that Lebanon could focus on reconstruction, reconciliation, and revision of its political system, yet this has not been realized – in part attributed to regional instability and the hardening of sectarian divisions (Khalaf 2014). With the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri in 2005, and public protests leading to Syria’s withdrawal, sectarian hostility intensified. With the ongoing Syrian and regional crisis, these sectarian tensions continue. Furthermore, Lebanon has undergone significant demographic change, with the influx of approximately 1.5 million Syrian refugees since the start of the Syrian conflict in 2012. This new refugee population is in addition to the preexisting Palestinian refugee population of several generations of approximately 500,000. The majority of these refugee populations are youth, with 75% of the Syrian refugee population being women and children (UNHCR 2014).

Formal education for citizenship in Lebanon typically tends to be delivered didactically and has low status in the curriculum, with an emphasis on knowledge of political institutions and the inculcation of patriotism. There is relatively little opportunity for learner-directed civic engagement. Nonformal civic learning and participation in the form of international and Western initiatives has been framed in terms of democracy promotion, with funding for youth engagement prioritized to local NGOs. There is a common assumption – without empirical evidence in support of it – that Western funding for local NGOs will result in pressure on the government for reform, and that in turn this will result in political transformation. According to this logic, civil society is seen as the “magic bullet against Arab autocracy” (Yom 2005, p. 16). However, the priorities of funding reflect the priorities from the perspective of the donor, rather than priorities from the perspectives of the local population (Altan-Oltay and Icduygu 2012). These global neoliberal approaches rationalize the “responsibilization” of citizens and communities emphasizing compliant and rational behavior (Kennelly and Llewellyn 2011). There is an emphasis on depoliticized identities in postconflict contexts, resulting in the hollowing out of citizenship (Jessop 2002; Staeheli and Hammett 2013). Yet such attempts to “govern” citizens do not necessarily go to plan, in particular in nonformal pedagogical contexts with young people (Clarke 2010; Pykett 2010; Staeheli and Hammett 2013). Pedagogical relationships between educators and learners, and between learners, are fluid and relational, disrupting a straightforward translation of policy into practice.

There is an active civil society in Lebanon, where civil society organizations, on the one hand, protest against government, but also often take over the role of the state’s welfare provision. A most recent example of this was in 2015–2016, referred to as the “trash protests.” Protests began when a landfill just south of the capital Beirut was closed as it had reached capacity, and the government did not extend the contract of the private company in charge of trash collection and no alternative landfill or trash collection company had been found. The protests that followed were not only about a problem of waste management, but were an expression of people’s despair with political corruption, business interests, and sectarianism (Kiwan 2017). However, civil society organizations often reflect the sectarian divisions within society, rather than necessarily being opposed to sectarian politics. Given the relationships of funding between international organizations and local civil society organizations, NGOs have become highly bureaucratized, reflecting the “NGO-ization” of civil society (Jad 2011).

This chapter challenges traditional constructions of youth and activism, illustrating the critical importance of taking account of the Lebanese context. The chapter demonstrates the need for socio-political and historical contextualization through the illustration of examples of different forms of activism engaged in by youth in Lebanon. The chapter concludes with the consideration of possible futures for youth activism in Lebanon.

Conceptions of Youth

Youth is a socially constructed category, and as such is contested (Roberts 2012; Threadgold 2011; Wyn 2011). It is used to signify an intermediate phase of the lifecycle between childhood and adulthood; however, in terms of age, there is no standard agreement and the designated age range often varies, from 14 to 25, 16 to 24, or 18 to 30, for example. Bray-Collins (2016), in her research on youth politics in Lebanon, operationalizes the category of youth in terms of marital status, rather than chronological age, where youth corresponds to the unmarried. There is a cultural expectation and common practice that young people live at home until they are married, and are commonly considered to be “youth” up until this time. Mulderig (2011) proposes that youth in the Arab world are being “denied” their adulthood due to the socio-political realities of poor educational opportunities, high levels of unemployment, delayed marriage, and delayed sexuality. For example, the social expectation of marriage and raising a family is a significant economic cost, and with increasing marriage costs, people are marrying later, which has been referred to as “waithood” (Joseph 2011). While reflecting a dominant heternormative discourse in society, this is being challenged by youth – both through individual youth practices breaking dominant moral codes and through youth activism on LGBT issues. Such challenges to accepted norms of sexuality and sexual behavior illustrate a challenge to the authority and the status quo of the state.

Tracing the historical development of youth movements in the Middle East usefully illustrates the organized and nationalist origins of youth activism. Joseph (2011) notes that from the 1920s, when nationalist movements were mobilizing for independence, youth organizations were set up in Lebanon and Syria modelled on fascist German and Italian youth movements. In the 1950s and 1960s, governments in the region promoted youth organizations with the policy aims of promoting economic development. As such, youth represented hope for the future. With the failure of various nationalist projects in the region and the Lebanese civil war in the 1970s, antigovernment movements, often using force, have arisen involving youth. Since 2000, with 9/11, the war on terror and the “Arab Spring,” Arab, and in particular Muslim youth have been conceived of globally as a risk in public discourse as well as in international and national policies.

In methodological terms, the dominant approach to the study of youth since the nineteenth century in the West has been psychological, although increasingly sociological literatures exploring youth and social media/technology, education, and economics are developing. A review of conceptions of youth between 1964 and 2009 in the United States illustrates changes in the use of language used to denote the idea of youth (Lesko 2013). “Adolescents” as a term was commonly used between the 1960s and 1980s and continues to be used in disciplines aligned to psychology and medicine, while “youth” is the term used more commonly in education and the social sciences. Sociological literatures are increasingly challenging constructions of youth as a chronological age-based population, with the particularistic characteristics of middle-class, white and male masquerading as universalistic characteristics (Lesko 2013).

Youth studies in the Middle East context is largely framed in relation to socio-political and economic institutional concerns, for example, education and training to meet the needs of the labor market (Joseph 2011). These foci can be understood given the region’s recent history as well as the central place of the family unit and the instrumental economic and social roles the family fulfills within Middle Eastern cultures (Joseph 2011). In addition, a major challenge faces policymakers in the region given the mismatch between the potentiality of a large young labor force, and being the region with the highest youth unemployment rate in the world (currently at 25%). The “mismatch between the skills accumulated through public investment in education on the one hand, and the available economic opportunities on the other” (Campante and Chor 2013), has been hypothesized to play a critical role in leading to political instability. The relationship between unemployment and the phenomenon of many educated, overqualified, and frustrated young people is significant here (Kiwan 2014). These points also relate to Joseph’s (2011) notion of “waithood” and adulthood being on hold.

Key concepts associated with youth globally include the notion of potentiality for the future in economic and developmental terms (Joseph 2011). On the other hand, there is a literature and dominant international public discourse of the “dangers” of youth (Beck 1998), associated with “moral” conceptions of citizenship where youth reflects a notion of “deficit” (Kiwan 2008). Other conceptions include the concern of the exclusion of youth and youth’s “vulnerability.” These varying albeit inter-related conceptions are reflected in international and national youth policies in a wide range of policy domains from health policy, to education policy, immigration policy, and well as community cohesion initiatives. The idea that youth is associated with “risk” or “danger” (Wyn 2011) is also evident in public discourses in Lebanon. Writing about youth in Lebanon in a postmodernist frame, Khalaf and Khalaf (2011) reflect on how youth identity “acquires a defiant posture” (p. 12). Yet at the same time, they note that a sizeable number of young people suffer psychological/behavioral disorders, as well as engage in risky activities or practices. Although defiant, youth also “need the comfort and solace of religious faith” (ibid., p. 13). Bayat (2011, p. 13) calls this “creative inbetweenness” in order to describe how youth attempt to reconcile their “youthful desires… within the existing moral order” (p. 13). This conception reflects the point made by Bray-Collins (2016) that youth activism is not always progressive – a common assumption – and that in fact, in the Lebanese sectarian context, youth actually contribute to the reproduction and renewal of sectarianism. The following section examines how activism is conceptualized in Lebanon, situated in relation to the socio-political context, and how this shapes understandings of youth and youth practices.

Conceptions and Practices of Activism

This section highlights the multiple and intersecting sites for activism in Lebanon, how activism is practiced through the lens of sectarianism and what counts as “politics,” and the effect of citizenship status on forms of activism. As noted in the introduction, there is a dominant international dimension to activism in Lebanon and the region. Western governments and international organizations have worked through local NGOs in promoting democracy through youth and gender participation initiatives. Research conducted on mapping philanthropic support for civic change has illustrated that civic change in the Arab world is also increasingly being supported by business leaders and transnational/disaporic organizations, as well as through Western governments and international organizations (Kiwan et al. 2014). While there is a growing literature on grassroots protests and movements, as well as more organized forms supporting civic change, the resilience of authoritarian, sectarian, and corrupt practices in politics is also well documented in the Arab world and Lebanon specifically (Pearlman 2013). The resilience of formal politics and its associated institutions can in part be attributed to disregard for electoral rules, co-opting of business elites, and the strength of state security institutions. Emigration has also been highlighted as playing an important role in perpetuating the structure and practice of politics in Lebanon, with over 25% of Lebanese nationals living outside of the country, and about 45% of Lebanese households having a family member who has emigrated abroad (Pearlman 2013). Effects on national politics and movements can be seen through the mechanisms of remittances – which contributes up to a quarter of Lebanon’s GDP, return migration and the shaping of ideological movements (Pearlman 2013). Pearlman (2013) proposes that emigration contributes to the resilience of existing politics and practices in Lebanon through ameliorating socio-economic hardship through remittances. In addition, local challenging conditions and the possibility of emigration provide an “opting out” option for disengagement, as opposed to local conditions contributing to agency and an impetus for change. Emigration is also a form of “brain drain.” In addition, the diasporic community directly props up the status quo through contributing financially to political parties.

In order to analyze the multiple and intersecting sites for activism in Lebanon, how activism is practiced, and what counts as “politics,” this chapter examines discourses and practices of sectarianism as a key lens through which to examine youth activism in Lebanon. While in political terms, sectarianism refers to political power-sharing between the dominant sects, it can be understood more holistically as a discourse arising out of a particular history and socio-political context which pervades contemporary Lebanese society. Bahlawan (2014, p. 28) describes “sectarianism” as being “political, institutional and affective,” best understood as a “practice” (Makdisi 2000). Antisectarian movements have utilized the concept of “secularism” to denote politics separate from religion, and in this context is conceived as the means by which Lebanon can reach unity rising above “primitive” and “tribal” loyalties. Yet the assumed opposition between sectarianism and secularism is not so straightforward. Rather than being ruled by religious elites, Lebanon can be seen as a “secular oligarchy deriving its monopoly in politics and economy from the religious divisions” (Bahlawan 2014, p. 30). The content of sectarianism, as such, is not fixed, but can be thought of as a category with fluidity, that can be transformed over time.

Bray-Collins (2016) examines youth activism in three domains: on university campuses, as youth-led civil society movements, and in youth wings of political parties in Lebanon. She illustrates how youth contribute to the reproduction and renewal of sectarianism in politics, arguing against the idea that the resilience of sectarianism is due to elite manipulation. While activism is typically constructed as challenging the status quo within a progressive framework, the study of more “illiberal” forms, as with Bray-Collins, arguably complicates our conceptions of activism. While certainly there exists progressive forms of youth activism exist in Lebanon, Bray-Collins (2016) argues that such forms tend to capture the attention of scholars and the popular press. However, the reproduction of the status quo is not an exact copy of what has come before, but rather it is adapted to suit the interests and changing contexts of young people themselves. Even when the university campus context prohibits sectarian political parties from operating, student politics is organized very much through the structure of sectarian politics, using various strategies to work around these rules (Bray-Collins 2016). This sectarianism is also evident in youth-led civil society movements, where in fact an antisectarian framework was adopted which paradoxically served sectarian interests. Furthermore, the scope for autonomy is relatively more restricted within the youth wings of political parties where youth have been frustrated from introducing more substantive change (ibid., 2016).

Related to the contestation between sectarianism and secularism is the issue of what counts as politics. In public discourse, youth are often described as being politically apathetic, but this is often asserted in relation to narrow definitions of what counts as politics. In Lebanon, an antipolitics stance is typically equated with being against sectarianism and corruption (Kiwan 2017). Acting as an individual – as opposed to being an NGO or political party – is often also a part of this conception. Antipolitical approaches are criticized by some as avoiding the challenging issues and instead taking an instrumental or more technicist approach (Kiwan 2017). More positive accounts of civil society “apoliticality” in the Asian context, in contrast, propose that it can be understood as a response – usually under repressive regimes – to addressing social problems and bringing about social change under these conditions (Heaton Shrestha and Adhikari 2010). Here ethics is given primacy over politics, not merely that “apoliticality” is avoiding the real issues (Kiwan 2017).

After the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri in 2005, there was a surge of youth activism calling for reform and participatory democracy (Khalaf 2014). The trend of heightened youth engagement subsequently waned, which Khalaf (2014) attributes to the dominance, intransigence, and corruption of formal politics. There is a wider pattern in the region of youth exclusion, as well as the exclusion of women from formal politics, where politics is typically controlled by family-based elites, authoritarian political parties, or the military (Joseph 2011; Kiwan 2015). Khalaf (2014, p. 99) describes as one response to this exclusionary politics how a hedonistic youth culture of defiance has developed in the form of the themes of “recreation, pleasure, self-indulgence, having fun and emigration” (Khalaf 2014, p. 99). These activities can also be seen as defiance of formal politics and the status quo, an example of the “antipolitical” stance discussed above. Concerns have been expressed of the dangers of such youth exclusion from formal politics; it has been argued that this creates a vulnerability which coupled with poor socio-economic prospects provides motivation and incentive to recruitment to extremist movements.

Activism through education in Lebanon – both formal and nonformal – is increasingly being recognized as a critical one for socio-political transformation and civic change (Kiwan 2014). Youth initiatives are a significant domain for funding, as already noted. With regards to initiatives for refugee youth, the United Nations Relief Works Agency (UNRWA) has been the main education provider for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, with UNRWA operating 69 schools in 12 camps across the country (UNRWA 2013). Fincham (2013) has examined constructions of citizenship for Palestinian youth living in the UNRWA refugee camps in Southern Lebanon, where she highlights how Palestinians are typically educated through the Lebanese curriculum, yet they are invisible in this curriculum. However, through the hidden curriculum, Palestinian identity is made visible through symbols such as maps and flags, as well as rituals, clothing and school activities. Beyond formal schooling, the mosque, the local community, and social media are nonformal sites for citizenship learning and activism. Youth encounter the contradictions between formal education for citizenship with an emphasis on peace-building and promoting unity and informal learning within divided communities in Lebanon as a postconflict society. The ongoing Syrian refugee crisis has resulted in over 300,000 Syrian school age children out of school in Lebanon (Watkins 2013). Educational programs offered through NGO initiatives for refugees are framed in terms of an “education in emergencies” paradigm typically focusing access to schooling, psychological counseling, and community integration.

Examples of Youth Activism

As previously argued, examining youth activism within its socio-political context is critical in contributing to situated understandings of youth activism, and further our understanding more universally of youth activism. This section outlines four examples of contemporary youth activism in Lebanon, across a range of domains. These include: (i) gender justice work, (ii) trash protests, (iii) environmental protests, and (iv) bloggers/social media commentators. These examples illustrate the need for socio-political and historical contextualization in nuancing conceptions of youth and activism in Lebanon.

Gender Justice Work

“Nasawiya” was set up as a feminist collective, made up of a range of people from different backgrounds, united through their marginalization, including students and professionals, single mothers, refugees, migrant workers, sex-workers, those of nonconforming genders and sexuality. The collective describe themselves as a “group of young feminists who are working together to recreate a world free from sexism, and all other forms of exploitations and discriminations that collaborate with it: classism, heterosexism, racism, capitalism, etc. We see all these problems as interrelated and equally oppressive, yet we insist on addressing them from a progressive grassroots feminist perspective” (Nasawiya 2018). Nasawiya has engaged in a range of initiatives such as training programs for women to learn how to bring about social change, whether through legal reform, grassroots campaigning, or becoming involved in formal politics. Another program focused on ICT in promoting women’s careers in technology, as well as learning how to use ICT in support of feminist change. Resources such as “Sawt al Niswa” is a web-based resource to pool knowledge, while “Feminist House” provides a physical space for women to meet for various activities, and the Women’s Resource Centre holds documents, newspapers, and online resources. Nasawiya is also known for its sexual harassment awareness-raising campaign called “The Adventures of Salwa” in the form of a series of videos. Nasawiya also takes part in International Women’s Day and the annual march for secularism.

Trash Protests

In Beirut in July 2015, a landfill just south of the capital Beirut closed as it had reached capacity, and the government did not extend the contract of the private company in charge of trash collection. As trash piled up on the streets with no solution in sight, protests erupted. These protests were not only about a problem of waste management, but were an expression of people’s despair with political corruption, business interests, and sectarianism. The trash protests illustrate a tension in approaches, where some actors focused on the technicalities of waste management, framing their activism as “nonpolitical.” In contrast, others argued that the trash problem is the embodiment of the failure of the political system in Lebanon.

Individual activists, NGOs working on gender and LGBTQ issues, refugees’ rights, youth participation, artists, and ordinary members from all social classes of the general public protested in a variety of creative and emotive ways, including cultural production, the use of social media, as well as hunger strikes, artistic interventions, political cartoons, and political songs (Kiwan 2017). Interviewing activists on their understandings of social change, particular emphasis was given to the notion of protest as a process with no quick results. The idea of contributing to social change and activism was also conceived of as a way of living rather than a discrete activity (Kiwan 2017). In addition, many activists viewed a range of social justice issues as interconnected and stressed the concomitant importance of raising awareness and changing attitudes as well as working within formal structures for reform. Activism was not solely viewed as acting to ensure a demand is met, but to redefine how issues are publicly understood – a contribution to the production of knowledge (Kiwan 2017). The emotional nature of protest was emphasized as playing an important role, evident in a range of public artistic interventions, for example, the “Beirut Wall,” so dubbed in reference to the Berlin Wall which was erected on 24th August after the street protests of the 23rd August. This was mocked across social media, and in addition, the artist Philippe Farhat responded by painting pictures of people with their mouths taped shut with the names of the political parties on the tape (International Business Times 2015).

Environmental Activism

Environmental concerns are a significant area of activism in Lebanon since the end of the civil war. Activities include nature conservation, youth hiking and camping, and campaigning for public access to green spaces. Environmental discourse in postcolonial contexts reflects both anticolonial resistance and attempts at neo-colonial control. Nagel and Staeheli (2016) examine how environmentalism in Lebanon is informed by Western-educated activists working in international NGOs. They highlight how green space is theorized as a neutral site for promoting intersectarian cohesion and therefore is seen as promoting national cohesion and citizenship. For example, there has been a campaign to open “Horsh Beirut” one of the few green spaces in the city. Yet the history of “Horsh” during the civil war has been a specter over the campaign, with Nagel and Staeheli (2016, p. 255) noting on interviewing activists that “the park was reportedly used as a dumping ground for bodies during the civil war, and many of the trees were destroyed during the war for use as fuel. After the war, the French government sponsored reforestation efforts, but the park has remained mostly inaccessible to the public, except for occasional, planned events.” Horsh Beirut is now imagined as a nonsectarian space. Yet similar to the arguments made by Bray-Collins (2016), Nagel and Staeheli (2016) suggest that Lebanese environmentalism cannot stand outside of the frame of sectarianism, despite efforts (in some cases) to dismantle it. Environmental activists typically frame their activism as “nonpolitical,” as also seen in the discussion on the trash protests. This attempt to dissociate from the sectarian political system idealizes the environment as a nonsectarian domain. Yet activism in this field becomes contested by a range of actors, the government, activists themselves, and foreign funders, and as such is highly political in that it is proposing a new political vision (Nagel and Staeheli 2016). Rather than overcoming sectarian politics, environmental activists are enmeshed in its political dynamics.

Bloggers/Social Media

Blogging is a relatively new phenomenon in the region, with blogging taking off in Lebanon after 2005 following the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri and a second wave of blogging after the Israeli war of 2006 (Riegert and Ramsay 2012). In their study of bloggers in 2010 and 2011, Riegert and Ramsay (2012) identified several well-known and popular bloggers and found several common themes, notably the criticism of the sectarian political system, violations of human rights, and challenging Lebanese social and religious norms relating to gender, sexuality, and the environment. Also of note are the intersecting sites at the local, national, and transnational levels, with key transnational themes identified relate to the Palestinian cause, critiques of Arab leaders as lacking legitimacy, and environmental activism. In addition, the blurring of entertainment/humor and politics characterizes many of the blogs. Riegert and Ramsay (2012) propose these blogs construct an “alternative” or “counter” public allowing for the expression of civic activism. Bloggers describe their motivations as creating a space to express themselves and expressing frustration with mainstream media, typically aligned with the different political parties/sects.

Youth-generated media is another arena of youth activism in Lebanon. Focusing on the July 2006 war with Israel, Khalil (2012) examines how youth blur traditional and newer forms of media creating their own narratives challenging dominant political, religious, and social institutions. These include Facebook, Twitter, blogs, graffiti, songs, and videos. Khalil (2012) argues that these forms go beyond the concept of “citizen journalism” to provide a medium for collective youth activism.

These examples illustrate a range of dynamic forms of youth activism in Lebanon. While a dominant theme of the trash protests and of environmental activism more broadly use a discourse of anti-sectarianism, activists cannot stand outside of the political frame of sectarianism in Lebanon, even when appealing to “secular” politics. It is also evident that activism often takes an intersectional form, with a range of different interest groups joining forces, and a range of new media and technology are utilized in challenging dominant discourses, often with humor. In considering young people’s responses to a restrictive political order, another dominant theme can also be seen in the discourse of “antipolitics,” evident on the one hand in actors focusing on technical solutions to societal problems, while in other cases, youth seemingly rejecting politics for leisure, material consumption, and risky acts of “defiance” (Khalaf 2014).

Concluding Thoughts

This chapter has examined youth activism in Lebanon, taking into account the wider regional context of the Arab uprisings, Lebanon being a postconflict divided society, having a large youthful population, as well as a large population of Palestinian and Syrian refugees. Recognizing the socially constructed nature of the concepts of “youth” and “activism,” this chapter argues for a historically, socially, and politically contextualized examination of youth activism in Lebanon. As such, this approach challenges understandings of youth constructed purely in terms of chronological age. In addition, given that formal education for citizenship in Lebanon emphasizes knowledge of political institutions and the inculcation of patriotism, the chapter highlights that there is more scope for learning about active citizenship through nonformal contexts in civil society. Yet rather than Western democracy promotion youth initiatives being the “magic bullet against Arab autocracy” (Yom 2005, p. 16), such attempts to pedagogically “govern” citizens do not necessarily go to plan (Clarke 2010; Pykett 2010; Staeheli and Hammett 2013). Young people use the skills gained through such initiatives and are self-directed in applying this learning to domains of concern to themselves, as exemplified for example in the campaigning for civil marriage initiative (Staeheli and Hammett 2013).

While not always conforming to traditional constructions of “activism,” some of the activities discussed in this chapter can be understood as forms of agency in resisting the political status quo. Such acts also can challenge commonly accepted understandings of what counts as “politics.” An expanded construct of politics refers to those “acts” through which young people construct their subjectivity in the public sphere, rather than indicating political apathy. Highlighting the importance of understanding the transnationality of activism, the assumption that youth is associated with progressiveness is also highlighted in this context.

The contextualized examples of youth activism challenge dominant approaches to the study of politics, political action, and activism in the Arab world which has largely been through the lens of democratization or “transitology” – where events are interpreted as developing in a linear fashion from authoritarian rule towards liberal democracy (Cavatorta 2012). The study of youth activism in Lebanon contributes towards the challenge of this paradigm. Indeed, it is being argued that a new political subjectivity is emerging, characterized as “reflexive individualism” (Hanafi 2012), distinct from neoliberal conceptualizations of individualism “predicated on anti-patriarchal, anti-tribe, anti-community or anti-party sentiments” (p. 198). Both Khalaf’s (2014) and Bray-Collins’ (2016) work illustrate this reflexive individualism. In addition, new paradigms of “citizenship after orientalism” offer innovative ways of thinking about how citizenship is understood outside of Western contexts (Isin 2008, 2012). Isin (2008, 2009) challenges traditional constructions of citizenship in purely legalistic terms, through his concept of “acts” of citizenship, whereby those who are socially and legally excluded, such as marginalized youth, refugees, or illegal immigrants, “act” in the public sphere whereby they constitute themselves as political actors (Kiwan 2016b). Through a lens of “acts of citizenship” that challenges traditional notions of citizenship defined solely in terms of legal and political membership and traditional forms of civic participation, the contextualized examples of youth activism in Lebanon challenge our understandings of youth engagement in the public sphere.

Cross-References