

REFERENCE

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Editors

The Palgrave Handbook of Citizenship and Education

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With 27 Figures and 14 Tables

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Preface

The terms “citizenship” and “citizenship education” remain quintessential contested concepts. While the scope of “citizenship” and of what the “citizen” comprises scope rightly been widened from limited status-based notions, critical questions remain about *whether* and *how* the concept of the citizen is understood, constructed, and practiced within and across contexts. Central to such critical questions is whether the concept of “the citizen” is of any positive value at all, fundamentally compromised as it may be by colonizing and subjugating historical and contemporary practices. Given the contestation and debate, there are new serious questions for citizenship – and by extension citizenship education – being raised by the intersections between localities and various forms of globalization, cosmopolitanism, and transnationalism.

This major reference work – *The Palgrave Handbook of Citizenship and Education* – brings together a large number of chapters of tertiary literature (i.e., literature directed towards compilations or digests of available primary and secondary sources) to examine and explain how various theorizations of citizenship, civic identity, and participatory democracy are, and could be, operationalized within educational theories, educational debates, educational curricular, and pedagogic practices. Readers should note that the Handbook is a *living* handbook. First, there are no hard limits on the focus and number of chapters to be included. Below, we separate the chapters into five parts, but these parts are best understood as broad umbrellas rather than neat categories. In addition, all of the chapters were published online first as and when they were written, meaning that this collection has grown over the last several years. Second, as editors we intend to commission and publish many more chapters in the coming years to expand the scope of those available online and, if we reach that point, to publish a second hard copy of these further chapters. In addition, we will ask authors of the chapters contained in this book if they wish to revisit their chapters, updating and refreshing them at appropriate periods.

In working with authors, we have consciously allowed for and encouraged wide definitions of the concepts of “citizenship” and “education”. For this reason, the chapters include critique and advocate for a multitude of ways in which citizenship is constituted in within various contexts. Furthermore, the attention of the chapters

flow across a range of educational settings, structures, and processes as relevant and as appropriate to the age of the “learners” under consideration.

Truly international and diverse in its scope – though not universal (see below) – this Handbook is structured around five parts. Part One – **Foundational Thinkers on, and Theories of, Citizenship and Education** – includes 12 chapters which explore the ideas of key historic and contemporary thinkers on, and theories of, citizenship and education. Part Two – **Citizenship and Education in National and Localized Contexts** – comprises 20 chapters that each explore the operation of citizenship and education within particular contexts. In these chapters the various authors explore the particular nuances of scholarly ideas associated with citizenship and democracy in educational settings within national and sub-national localities/communities that impact on and shape the implementation of citizenship and education. Part Three – **Citizenship and Education in Transnational Contexts** – contains 13 chapters that explore the operation of citizenship and education as shaped by transnational factors, including migration, cosmopolitanism, neoliberalism, global technologies, and global identities. The 12 chapters in Part Four – **Youth Advocacy, Citizenship and Education** – focus on (changing) constructions of youth and youth identity, and the ways that these interconnect (converge and/or disrupt) notions of citizenship/citizenship education. Part Five – **New Directions in Citizenship and Education** – includes 9 chapters in which the authors survey existing literature to develop particularly novel insights on citizenship and education.

One final note for this introduction. In any edited collection, even one as large as this, there will be notable gaps in content and coverage. We are conscious of these gaps and we hope to fill them in the next wave of chapters.

Birmingham, UK
Queensland, Australia
Adelaide, Australia
August 2020

Andrew Peterson
Garth Stahl
Hannah Soong

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Second, we owe a debt of gratitude to our colleagues at Palgrave. We thank Eleanor Christie (now at Open University Press) for bringing the possibility of a handbook on citizenship and education to our attention. Eleanor Gaffney and Ruth Lefevre have given the project a steady hand, guiding us where needed and helping ourselves and the authors to navigate the online system. Eleanor and Ruth have always been on hand to answer our questions and requests, and have done so with patience and kindness – we are very grateful to them both.

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


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Part I

**Foundational Thinkers on, and Theories of,
Citizenship and Education**



A Confucian Conception of Citizenship Education

1

Charlene Tan

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Abstract

This chapter examines a Confucian conception of citizenship education by focusing on Confucius’ teachings and actions as recorded in the *Analects* (*Lunyu*). Confucius’ belief in the historicity and potential of human beings motivates him to emphasize the inheritance, acquisition, critical reflection, and appropriation of traditional knowledge for citizenship education. He balances teacher directiveness and student autonomy by foregrounding human beings as both recipients and creators of their own culture. Three main characteristics of a Confucian worldview of citizenship education are highlighted in this chapter: first, that the goal of citizenship education is to nurture *junzi* (exemplary persons) who perform their social roles and participate actively in their communities in accordance with *zhengming* (rectification of names); second, that a Confucian citizenship education curriculum reflects a “thick” conception of human good through a substantive framework of beliefs and values that centers on *dao* (way); and, third, that a recommended pedagogical approach, as demonstrated by

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Confucius, is dialogue to foster reflective citizens. A Confucian conception of citizenship education as outlined in this chapter debunks the perception that Confucius and Confucianism necessarily promote authoritarian leadership, unquestioning obedience to authority, passive citizenship, and political indoctrination.

Keywords

Citizenship education · Confucius · *Dao* (way) · Dialogue · *Junzi* (exemplary person) · *Zhengming* (rectification of names)

Introduction

A core identity in our modern world is that of citizenship. Broadly speaking, citizenship in a democracy comprises the following: “(a) gives membership status to individuals within a political unit; (b) confers an identity on individuals; (c) constitutes a set of values, usually interpreted as a commitment to the common good of a particular political unit; (d) involves practicing a degree of participation in the process of political life; and (e) implies gaining and using knowledge and understanding of laws, documents, structures, and processes of governance” (Abowitz and Harnish 2006, 653).

Education of/through/for citizenship has become a primary concern in many countries in their endeavors to nurture citizens who possess the capacity to address local and global issues rationally (Gilbert 1996; Crick 1998; Criddle et al. 2004; Noddings 2013). A survey of the developments in citizenship education for the past few decades reveals a shift from state formation and patriotic education to wider conceptions such as supranational, multicultural, critical, and cyber citizenship (Kerr 1999; Johnson and Morris 2010). Citizenship education is a general, contested, and evolving term that encompasses, inter alia, civics, democratic education, national education, and political education (Carr 1995; McLaughlin 1992; Amadeo et al. 1999; Kerr 1999). The specific definitions of and pedagogical approaches to citizenship education depend on a host of contextual factors such as historical tradition, geographical position, sociopolitical structure, economic system, and global trends (Kerr 1999). Different writers have devised various concepts, models, frameworks, and analytical tools to explain citizenship education (e.g., Galston 1989; Carr 1995; McLaughlin 1992; Cogan and Derricott 1998; Kerr 1999; Westheimer and Kahne 2004; Johnson and Morris 2010). In their literature review, Abowitz and Harnish (2006) identify seven distinct but overlapping frameworks, with the “civic republican” and “liberal” frameworks being the two most influential in shaping current citizenship education.

Citizenship education may be predicated upon a “thin” or “thick” conception of human good or perfection (McLaughlin 1992). These two conceptions reflect the extent to which a citizenship education approach stipulates specific substantial frameworks of belief and value for citizens. Citizenship education that adheres to a

“thick” conception of human good provides a comprehensive account of human life and how it should be lived; such a conception is invoked to constitute, support, and justify the notion of the public good (McLaughlin 1992). A “thin” conception of human good or perfection, on the other hand, requires the state to be neutral on matters of private good. As explained by McLaughlin (1992):

What is needed for this purpose is a ‘thin’ conception of the good, free of significantly controversial assumptions and judgments, which maximize the freedom of citizens to pursue their diverse private conceptions of the good within a framework of justice. An example of an aspect of a ‘thin’ conception of the good is a commitment to the requirements of basic social morality. The label ‘thin’ here refers not to the insignificance of such values, but to their independence from substantial, particular, frameworks of belief and value. (240)

It should be clarified that these two interpretations are not the only two approaches to citizenship education, nor are they mutually exclusive. Instead, a plurality of interpretations exists along the spectrum with overlaps among them.

Besides understanding citizenship education in terms of its relationship with human good or perfection, it is also important to identify the ideological and cultural underpinnings of citizenship education. A review of literature published in English shows that the existing citizenship education frameworks are largely premised on Western/Enlightenment histories, traditions, developments, and presuppositions. The term “citizenship” is a Western concept that originates from Athenian democracy (Carr 1995). Abowitz and Harnish (2006) point out that the dominant citizenship discourses of civic republicanism and liberalism are both “Enlightenment-inspired” (654). The “Western imagination” – the Enlightenment settlement, its values, practices, and institutions – has been exported to the rest of the world as objective and universal worldviews (Kennedy 2004). Relatively little attention has been paid to non-Western conceptions of citizenship and citizenship education, especially East Asian viewpoints. Although there is a growing body of literature on Confucian perspectives of citizenship and citizenship education, these works are primarily concerned with aspects of citizenship such as democracy, liberalism, human rights, civil society, equality, and individuality (e.g., Shils 1996; Nuyen 2001, 2002; O’Dwyer 2003; Ackerly 2005; Kim 2010; Yung 2010; Spina et al. 2011; Shih 2014; Wang 2016; Zhai 2017). There is, to date, no systematic presentation of a Confucian conception of citizenship education based on the teachings and actions of Confucius himself.

This chapter introduces a Confucian conception of citizenship education through a textual analysis of the *Analects* (*Lunyu*). A Confucian canon, the *Analects*, compiles the sayings and conduct of Confucius and his disciples. The concept of citizenship is defined broadly in this chapter to refer to a practice through which humans actively participate in their communities, negotiating their range of identities as they do so (Peterson and Brock 2017). The methodology of this chapter, it should be added at the outset, is theoretical rather than empirical, with a focus on the philosophical basis for citizenship education as advocated by Confucius. The next section elucidates the key features of a Confucian conception of citizenship education based on relevant passages from the *Analects*.

A Confucian Conception of Citizenship Education

There is no historical record of Confucius (551–479 B.C.E.) discussing the membership status and political identity of citizens or the legislation, systems, and processes in a nation-state. Such an omission is not surprising since these concepts and practices did not exist during his time. But we should not thereby conclude that citizenship education and issues related to citizenship are of no significance to Confucius. On the contrary, Confucius has much to say about citizenship education in terms of an individual's commitment to the common good and active participation in one's community (Abowitz and Harnish 2006; Peterson and Brock 2017). Confucius states that a person takes part in government simply by being a good son and brother (*Analects* 2.21). Clarifying Confucius' position, Shils (1996) writes, "Confucius means that maintaining the family is a contribution to maintaining public order or social harmony and hence is a contribution to the work of the government" (49). We could identify three main characteristics of a Confucian conception of citizenship education from the philosophy and conduct of Confucius, and these will now be considered.

***Junzi* (Exemplary Persons) and *Zhengming* (Rectification of Names)**

First, the goal of citizenship education is to nurture *junzi* (noble or exemplary persons) who perform their social roles and participate actively in their communities in accordance with *zhengming* (rectification of names). The term "junzi," literally "son of a lord," was already in circulation during Confucius' time and denoted members of the aristocratic society. Confucius borrowed this term by extending it to all human beings: anyone can and should be a *junzi* by becoming a morally noble person. A *junzi* is exemplary as such a person is distinguished by humanity or benevolence (*ren*): Confucius observes that a *junzi* "does not leave *ren* even for the space of one meal" (*Analects* 4.5; all citations are taken from this text and translated to English by the author, unless otherwise stated). *Ren* encompasses all virtues such as reverence, sincerity, empathy, tolerance, trustworthiness, diligence, and generosity (see *Analects* 12.1, 17.6) (Tan 2017). While all human beings are encouraged to become *junzi* (although not everyone will eventually succeed in doing so), a person who aspires for political office and leadership must be a *junzi*. Confucius identifies five virtues of a *junzi*-ruler: "The *junzi* is generous without being wasteful, works the people hard without their complaining, has desires without being covetous, is at ease without being arrogant, and is awe-inspiring without being fierce" (20.2). As a *ren* (humane) leader, a *junzi* follows the footsteps of sage-kings such as Yao and Sun "to cultivate oneself in order to bring peace to the multitude" (14.42). Rather than imposing authoritarian rule, an office bearer is a *junzi* who is sensitive to the needs of the common people (1.5, 12.20, 20.2). An example is Zichan who is a minister praised by Confucius for being a *junzi* in performing his duties: "He had the way of the *junzi* in four respects: he was reverential in the way he conducted himself, respectful in serving his superiors, generous in caring for the

common people, and appropriate in employing the services of the common people” (5.16). Calling for active citizenship, Confucius envisions himself and his disciples assuming political leadership so that they could eliminate the oppressive regime and enact humane policies for the common good.

How then should one perform one’s social roles – whether as a ruler or the ruled – and contribute to the larger good? The answer, according to Confucius, is to conduct oneself according to *zhengming* (rectification of names). The *Analects* records an episode where Duke Jing of Qi asks Confucius about governance (12.11). Confucius replies, “Let the lord be a true lord, the ministers true ministers, the fathers true fathers, and the sons true sons” (translation by Slingerland 2003). Upon hearing Confucius’ response, the Duke says, “Indeed! If the ruler be not a ruler, the subject not a subject, the father not a father, the son not a son, then even if there were grain, would I get to eat it?” Another passage in the *Analects* illuminates the principle of *zhengming*:

When names are not correct, what is said will not be used effectively; when what is said is not used effectively, matters will not be accomplished; when matters are not accomplished, ritual propriety and music will not flourish; when ritual propriety and music do not flourish, punishments will miss the mark; when punishments miss the mark, the people will not know what to do with themselves. (13.3, italics added)

The expression “names are not correct” refers to not living up to the expectations that are associated with one’s name or social role, be it as a ruler, subject, father, or son (Tan 2013a). Confucius’ point is that one’s name conveys not just descriptive content but also normative force. As Lai (1995) elaborates, “individuals have to live appropriately according to the titles and names, indicating their ranks and statuses within relationships, by which they are referred to” because these terms “prescribe how values upholding the various roles are to be realized within the fundamental reality of the lived human world” (252). A ruler has a “correct name” when such a person fulfills one’s calling as a true ruler, i.e., becoming a *junzi*-ruler who is marked by *ren*. The words of such a ruler will then “be used effectively,” i.e., his or her policies will accomplish their goals. To put it another way, the ruler excels in demonstrating and upholding wisdom, benevolence, and ritual propriety (15.33), promoting virtuous officials and keeping immoral persons at bay (12.22), and winning the hearts of the multitude by modeling qualities of reverence, tolerance, trustworthiness, diligence, and generosity (17.6). By the same argument, a subject is a *junzi* who lives up to one’s name by being loyal to one’s ruler and performing one’s multiple roles in society, whether as a mother, sister, colleague, friend, and neighbor. It should be added that the subject’s loyalty to the ruler is not unconditional as Confucius discourages unquestioning obedience to authority. Confucius himself critiques the officeholders during his time as “petty bureaucrats” (13.20) and announces his vexation with political rulers for their immoral and oppressive behavior (3.26, 3.1, 3.2). Rather than a blind allegiance to those in power, Confucius advises those serving one’s lord to be honest and speak up for what is right at an opportune time (14.22). In his exchange with Duke Ding on what causes a state to perish, Confucius observes:

If what the ruler says is good, and no one opposes him, is this not good? On the other hand, if what he says is not good, and no one opposes him, does this not come close to being a single saying, that can cause a state to perish? (13.15, translation by Slingerland 2003)

With reference to 13.15, the standard for determining what is good or otherwise is not the prevailing norm espoused by the ruler or the masses. Instead, it is *dao* (way), which brings us to the next characteristic of a Confucian conception of citizenship education.

A “Thick” Conception of Human Good Through *Dao* (Way)

The second feature of a Confucian framework of citizenship education is the centrality of *dao* (way) that comprises a substantive framework of beliefs and values. Such a framework reflects a “thick” conception of human good or perfection. Recall that a “thick” conception of human good provides a comprehensive and normative account of human life that constitutes, fortifies, and substantiates the notion of the public good (McLaughlin 1992). A “thin” conception of human good, in contrast, is devoid of ostensibly controversial assumptions and judgments; this conception maximizes the freedom of citizens to pursue their diverse private conceptions of the good within a framework of justice (McLaughlin 1992). *Dao* (way) refers to the way of sage-kings such as Yao, Shun, and Yu in ancient China. Confucius teaches that “it is human beings who are able to broaden *dao*, not *dao* that broadens human beings” (15.29). To broaden *dao* is to “make and remake appropriate ways of living” through the conscious efforts of human beings (Kim 2004, 123). A *junzi* is “anxious about *dao*” (15.32) and “learns in order to reach that *dao*” (19.7). So important is *dao* for a *junzi* that he or she is prepared to take up an official position on the condition that doing so advances *dao*. The *Analects* records Confucius praising Qu Bo-yu who is “prepared to hold an office only when *dao* prevailed in a state” (15.7). Confucius hopes to nurture a community of *junzi* who broaden *dao* by transforming society’s political structure from rule by law and punishment, to rule by virtue.

It is important to locate Confucius’ perspective on citizenship education within his worldview of the historicity and potential of human beings. Such a belief motivates him to give weight to the inheritance, acquisition, critical reflection, and appropriation of traditional knowledge. On the one hand, Confucius’ cognizance of the condition of human beings as historical beings leads him to respect the inheritance and acquisition of cultural knowledge as part of citizenship education. Confucius’ assertion that he “transmits but does not make; trusts in and loves antiquity” (7.1) reveals his wish to transmit the *dao* of the sage-kings as epitomized in the Zhou culture. He advises his own son to learn the poems from the Book of Songs (16.13) and teaches his students the ancient “arts” (7.6) that comprise ritual propriety, music, archery, charioteering, calligraphy, and mathematics. What qualifies as “good” and “right,” for Confucius, emanates from and is continuously shaped by Chinese history, cultural tradition, and epistemology. Hall and Ames (1987) shed light on the cultural embeddedness of knowledge for Confucius:

For Confucius, knowledge is grounded in the language, customs, and institutions that comprise culture. Culture is the given world. Thinking is cultural articulation that renders this givenness effective. There is no knowledge to be gained of a reality which precedes that of culture or transcends its determinations. The 'world' is always a human world. (67)

A Confucian citizenship education curriculum, therefore, should not be primarily derived from and organized by the students' own views of the world. Instead, it should include the history, norms, and cultural practices of one's tradition (Tan 2017). This means, for example, introducing the music of the Zhou dynasty to students for them to appreciate the Confucian ideal of harmony, rather than letting students choose or compose their own music in whichever way they like.

Confucius' attention to cultural inheritance does not imply that he endorses a wholesale transmission of traditional knowledge. Instead, he supports a selective adoption of the normative tradition that showcases the ability of human beings to change the world of history. Although human beings are entrusted with the mission to extend *dao*, *dao* is by no means fossilized and unchanging. Instead, *dao* "consists of the process of generating an actual order in the world rather than an already fixed order" and "human beings have to set boundaries for themselves and for other things as they move forward in the world" (Li 2006, 594). A content mastery of cultural knowledge does not mean that human beings are predetermined and mere objects. On the contrary, Confucius' conviction that human beings are subjects in the historical process prompts him to propagate a critical reflection and appropriation of received knowledge. Confucius cautions against accepting conventional wisdom and social norms unconditionally, since the wisdom and norms are situated in their own historicity. Confucius himself does not subscribe to any preconceived ideas of what is permissive or not (18.8). Instead, he arrives at his own conclusions through a critical awareness of the object of the knowledge.

Confucius' disregard of popular opinion is evident in his decision to give his daughter in marriage to Gongye Chang, who is a convicted criminal. At first glance, this decision is puzzling since most fathers would object to their daughters marrying someone who has transgressed the law. But *Analects* 5.1 informs us that Confucius has prior knowledge that Gongye Chang is "not guilty of any crime." By assessing Gongye Chang's character, Confucius concludes that he "will be a suitable choice for a husband" (5.1). Confucius' judgment therefore goes against conventions and is based on facts and a person's moral attributes. In another episode, when asked what he thinks of a person who is liked by all the villagers, other than praising such a person, Confucius asserts that it is better "for the good villagers to like that person and those who are not good to hate that person" (13.24). Confucius' point is that we should strive to be moral persons who make good judgments that would attract like-minded people to us, rather than seeking to please everyone. The implication is that the learning of one's normative tradition in citizenship education does not entail that the tradition should be accepted unconditionally or that such learning should take place uncritically. On the contrary, as I have argued elsewhere, learners within a Confucian framework are encouraged to critique the cultural traditions and knowledge they have received:

As part of the reservoir of information, tools, and resources for praxis, at least one normative tradition from within the learners' culture should be introduced to the learners. The objective is two-fold: to provide the learners, especially children, with the cultural coherence and an initial framework for them to acquire a substantive set of practices, beliefs, and values; and to prepare the learners to subsequently critique the normative tradition itself and develop their own views. (Tan 2017, 10)

In short, citizenship education from a Confucian viewpoint is enacted through comprehending and realizing the reading of the text (normative tradition of the way and passed down through classic texts) and reading of the context (the prevailing social and political oppression in China).

The Utilization of Dialogue to Foster Reflective Citizens

The third characteristic of a Confucian conception of citizenship education is the recommended pedagogical approach of *dialogue* to foster reflective citizens. Confucius eschews indoctrination by stating that a person who can recite 300 poems but is unable to perform an official duty and exercise one's initiative when sent abroad has wasted one's effort in memorizing the poems (13.5). He also cautions against merely repeating what one has heard without verifying the truth for oneself (17.14), stressing instead the primacy of fostering reflective thinking. Reflection is premised on the love of learning (1.14, 17.8) and the harmonization of learning and reflection (2.15). Underlining active learning, Confucius avers, "I do not know what to do with a person who does not say, 'What should I do? What should I do?'" (15.16) He also highlights the need to ask questions (19.6) and inquire into a matter deeply. As he puts it, "When the multitude hates a person, you must examine the matter yourself; when the multitude love a person, you must examine the matter yourself" (15.28). Confucius also supports flexibility and openness by replacing dogmatism with contextual understanding (4.15) and discretion (9.30). Underscoring the importance of adjusting one's responses in accordance with the other person's readiness to listen, he teaches: "If someone is open to what you have to say, but you do not speak to them, this is letting the person go to waste; if, however, someone is not open to what you have to say, but you speak to them anyway, this is letting your words go to waste" (15.8, translated by Slingerland 2003). Reflective thinking equips individuals to abide by *zhengming* as the former guides a person to self-examine one's role performance as follows: "Have I done my best in my undertakings on behalf of others? Have I been trustworthy in my interactions with friends? Have I failed to put into practice what was passed to me?" (1.4). Through reflective thinking, Confucius aims to nurture citizens who exercise their agency by participating purposefully and ethically for the public good.

A defining teaching approach propagated and modeled by Confucius is dialogue. The *Analects* is essentially a compilation of "ordered sayings" of Confucius that can be traced to his discourses with people around him (Slingerland 2003). The conversations provide a platform for Confucius to instruct his disciples by engaging them in real-life personal, social, and political issues. Yang and Yang (2016) assert that

“there was no separation between classroom and society, Confucius’s classroom was the entire world ‘under the sky or heaven,’ and the process of his teaching was life itself” (110). An interactive form of teaching encourages his disciples to critically reflect and discuss the political and social state of affairs against the standard of *dao* and the practical steps they could take to redress the prevailing unrest. Using the analogy of a square with four corners, Confucius sees the teacher as providing only the basic content (“one corner”), and the students are expected to make their own inferences (“the other three corners”) (7.8). In the process, mutual teaching and learning take place, where the teacher is both an instructor for and fellow-learner with the student.

Two passages in the *Analects* shed further light on Confucius’s employment of dialogue to foster an environment where the teacher and students teach and learn from each other. The first passage is taken from 3.8:

Zixia asked, “‘Her entrancing smile with dimples, Her beautiful eyes so clear, Unadorned upon which to paint’. What does this mean?”

The Master replied, “The plain base comes first, then the colors are applied.”

Zixia said, “Just like ritual propriety that come after?”

The Master replied, “Zixia, you have stimulated my thoughts. It is only with someone like you that one can discuss the Songs.”

In the above exchange, Confucius and Zixia are discussing a line from the Book of Songs. After Confucius replies to Zixia’s first question, the latter responds with a second question. This time, Zixia ingeniously relates the meaning of the poem to an ethical question on the relationship between the concepts of ritual propriety (colors) and rightness (plain canvas). Such an inference between two topics is not planned nor expected by Confucius, prompting him to remark that Zixia’s comment has stimulated or awakened his understanding of the topic. The above dialogue is an instance where the student arrives at his own conclusion while the teacher gains new insights from his student.

The second passage is taken from 17.4 where Confucius, through a dialogue with another disciple, is corrected of his own mistake (translation by Slingerland 2003):

When the Master went to Wucheng, he heard the sound of stringed instruments and song. Smiling gently, he remarked, “Why use an ox-cleaver to kill a chicken?”

Ziyou replied, “In the past, Master, I have heard you say, ‘If the gentleman learns *dao* he will be able to care for others, and if the commoners learn the Way they will be easy to manage.’”

[Addressing the disciples who had accompanied him to Wucheng,] the Master said, “Take note, my disciples! What Ziyou says is true. My earlier comment was meant only as a joke.”

In the above passage, Confucius appears to despise Ziyou’s effort to educate the masses in Wucheng by teaching them the music of the sage-kings. Confucius holds that it is not fitting and a waste of time for Ziyou to promote fine music and songs to the uneducated commoners. But Ziyou replies by reminding Confucius of the latter’s exhortation for everyone, including the commoners, to learn the *dao* of the sage-

kings. This prompts an apology from Confucius who clarifies that his comment is only a joke and that what Ziyou is doing is correct. We see here how the teacher, in this case, Confucius, is not one who always knows all and the student is not one who knows nothing. Instead, the teacher is able to learn from the student in an open and mutually beneficial relationship. Making the same argument, Elstein (2009) asserts that Confucius is not presented in the *Analects* as infallible or authoritarian; neither are his students portrayed as completely submissive and accepting of Confucius' opinions all the time.

A challenge for democratic societies in furthering citizenship education is how to produce loyal, responsible, and united citizens without indoctrinating them or handicapping the development of their rational autonomy (Callan 1991; Tyack and Cuban 1995). It is pertinent that research shows that citizenship education in Confucian heritage cultures tends to encourage and perpetuate passive, responsible, rule-following behavior rather than one's rights, entitlements, and status (e.g., see Hill and Lian 1995; Cummings 2001; Thomas 2002; Lee 2004a, b; Roh 2004; Sim and Print 2005; Tan 2007, 2008). Kennedy (2004), for example, maintains that "the emphasis for citizens is not so much the rights they enjoy but the responsibilities they have towards family and the community" (15). Researchers have also noted the prevalence of teacher authority, a hierarchical relationship between the teacher and students, didactic teaching, and passive learning in countries such as China, South Korea, and Japan (e.g., Kim 2009; Han and Scull 2010; Tan 2013b; Guo and Guo 2015; Chou and Spangler 2016; Dawson 2010). The nature of citizenship education programs in Confucian heritage cultures has given rise to a perception that Confucian approaches to citizenship education necessarily promote unquestioning obedience to authority and suppress rational autonomy of citizens.

Here it is important to distinguish the conception of citizenship education as advocated by Confucius and the formulation of citizenship education as practiced in Confucian heritage cultures. As expounded in the foregoing, Confucius' belief in the historicity and potential of human beings motivates him to put an emphasis on the inheritance and acquisition of cultural traditions *and* the critical reflection and appropriation of traditional knowledge. Confucius would understandably repudiate any citizenship education program that is targeted at stifling the independent thinking and agency of the learners. That said, Confucius also foregrounds human beings as recipients of their own culture, situated within and dependent on particular social and political formations in ancient China. Therefore, a balance is sought in a Confucian conception of citizenship education between cultural transmission and the development of rational autonomy – a task that poses a considerable challenge for policymakers and educators.

Conclusion

This chapter has outlined a Confucian conception of citizenship as advanced by Confucius – one that synthesizes the goal of producing committed citizens and developing their critical faculties. An accent on cultural transmission and role

performance does not mean that critical reflection and civil engagement are necessarily imperiled in citizenship education. The condition of humans as historical beings explains Confucius' preference for "traditional innovation" where his novel teachings are circumscribed by prevailing sociocultural realities. At the same time, he fosters learner freedom by encouraging his students, as subjects and makers of history, to reflect and transform society, thereby broadening *dao*. Confucius subscribes to a "thick" conception of human good in the form of *dao* (way) that provides a substantive and normative framework of human life and the public good (McLaughlin 1992). A citizenship education program, from a Confucian standpoint, should be one that develops a generation of *junzi* who perform their varied social roles and participate actively in their community. Guided by *zhengming* (rectification of names), all members of the society are inspired and equipped to broaden *dao* as a public good. Overall, a Confucian citizenship education debunks the perception that Confucius and Confucianism definitely support authoritarian leadership, unquestioning obedience to authority, didactic teaching, and mechanical learning.

Cross-References

- ▶ [Aristotle on Citizenship and Civic Education: The Central Role of Political Participation](#)
- ▶ [Dewey and Citizenship Education: Schooling as Democratic Practice](#)

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Aristotle on Citizenship and Civic Education: The Central Role of Political Participation

2

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Abstract

This chapter examines and summarizes Aristotle’s views about citizenship and education. Aristotle defines citizenship functionally, rather than by birth or status, and he understood participation and political authority to be essential to citizenship. Aristotle’s definition of citizenship is tied tightly to his theory of the good human life and to his ethics of virtue. A good citizen in the ideal state is identical to the fully ethically virtuous person. For Aristotle, the virtues of living a good human life are the same as those needed to rule and be ruled in turn. Because of the link between ethics and politics of the person, Aristotle’s (admittedly

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incomplete) program for civic education is connected to his program for ethical training. This makes the civic educational process intensive and somewhat foreign to modern conceptions of civic preparation. Despite this somewhat foreign idea of education, a number of influential thinkers today have drawn on Aristotelian ideas of citizenship to develop their own theories of governance for modern states today. Social democrats, communitarians, and others looking to revive the link between civic education and participatory communities have all looked explicitly (and sometimes implicitly) to Aristotle for guidance.

Keywords

Aristotle · Virtue · Human nature · Citizenship · Participation · Education

Introduction

Even the most sterilized discussion of Aristotle will undoubtedly be controversial to interested scholars. After upwards of 2000 years of a rich and detailed commentary tradition beginning with the generation directly after Aristotle himself, any and every choice made about philosophical interpretation (including which works to cite) will be open to some measure of reasonable criticism. Given the extent to which Aristotle's writings and thought have drawn different interpretations, readers of this chapter are encouraged to consider additional bibliographical and literature review sources to gain a deeper understanding of the complexity of Aristotle's works as well as of subsequent interpretations. (The most comprehensive for Aristotle's ethical and political works are by Oxford Bibliographies (Lockwood 2013a, b). Excellent starting points for the more casual reader are the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy articles on Aristotle (Shields 2016; Miller 2017; Kraut 2018). For a good introductory overview of the historical context in which Aristotle was living and writing, see Cartledge (2000). For a longer and more comprehensive read, see Hansen (1991). Good and brief introductions to Aristotle's political philosophy can be found in various political companion collections (Taylor 1995; Schofield 2000). Especially excellent overviews of Aristotle's *Politics* are by Reeve and Lord in their respective introductions to each of their translations of the text (Reeve 1998; Lord 2013.) Unfortunately for those seeking to understand his position on citizenship and education, Aristotle himself spends no time (in his surviving works) attempting to give a separate and comprehensive treatment of these topics. To make matters more difficult, what he does say is not, as one might expect given its focus on political constitutions, confined solely to his *Politics*. Instead, to understand Aristotle's views on citizenship and education, it is necessary to draw on discussions sprinkled throughout his works, including *Nicomachean Ethics*, the neglected *Eudemian Ethics*, *Rhetoric*, and *Politics*. As a result, this chapter will be organized thematically rather than textually and will have four main sections: (1) background (2) what a good citizen is like, (3) how to become a good citizen, and (4) contemporary uses of Aristotle on citizenship and education.

Before getting to the main discussion of Aristotle's views on citizenship and education, it is worth sketching in brief some useful background on Aristotle, his philosophical method, and the interlocking concepts that are central to his ethical works and so are essential for understanding his views on education and citizenship.

Background

Life and Method

Aristotle lived most of his life in Athens, but he was born in Stagira and was Macedonian rather than Athenian. When it comes to facts about his life most relevant to citizenship and education, the most interesting was his residency status. Despite being one of the earliest sources to discuss the definition of citizenship, and to organize his theory of governance around the concept, Aristotle himself never really lived the life of a participating citizen. This was true in both the official role and duties of citizens in Athens at the time (he was not allowed to participate in assembly, hold offices, etc.) and with respect to his own philosophical definition of (good) citizenship. Aristotle's own nonparticipation as a citizen is particularly fascinating given his seeming commitment to the idea that participation in politics is a necessary part of the good human life.

The other important thing to note about Aristotle's life was his education. At the age of 17 or 18, Aristotle came to Athens and immediately took up in Plato's school, the Academy. He remained under Plato's tutelage for the next 20 years, until Plato's death in 347 BCE. Acknowledging Aristotle's time spent under Plato's wing is crucial for understanding Aristotle's philosophy. In many ways it is clear that his own thought is a direct (and often critical) response to Plato's thought, as is certainly the case for Aristotle's *Politics* and *Ethics*, which frequently make reference to positions Plato held.

Aristotle is one of the more difficult historical philosophers to read and understand, mainly because he has a precise philosophical method, writes in a clipped style, and rarely explains himself in great detail. For this reason, even a more cursory investigation of Aristotle's philosophical thought such as this chapter requires something to be said about Aristotle's preferred method of investigation. In the first place, and in direct contrast to Plato, Aristotle's ethical and political thinking (as well as much of his other philosophy) is guided by an ironclad commitment to integrating pure theorizing with vigorous empirical study of the world. One of the major and striking contrasts between descriptions of Plato's and Aristotle's ideal states is Aristotle's insistence on building physical and spacial constraints into his ideal. Even more influential for nearly all future political theorizing up to the present day, Aristotle is strongly committed to the thought that politics is informed, guided, and constrained by human nature. Although many later philosophers have disagreed with him about the precise conception of human nature, few have challenged the more general view that political philosophy is dependent on particular views about human beings. Today, this might feel like a trivial point, but it is worth remembering

that it was Aristotle who was one of the first to frame thinking about politics in this way.

Delving a bit deeper into Aristotle's philosophical method, especially with regard to his ethical and political works, it is important to understand that Aristotle usually begins each new topic and subtopic by outlining the views of others, both philosophers and nonphilosophers alike. Without an understanding of Aristotle's method, this procedure can be a bit disorienting and distracting. The main thing to note here is that Aristotle believes that philosophy makes progress by gathering together the reputable beliefs that have already been expressed on a topic. The idea is then to aim for a philosophical position that can stay true to the core components shared by these reputable beliefs. If no reasonable philosophical theory can meet this standard, then the aim is to choose the theory that does the best job accommodating as many of the core components as possible (see *NE* 1145b2-7 and *Topics* 100b21-23, 104a10-11, 104b31-36; see Reeve 1998, pp. xviii–xxv for a good politically oriented discussion of Aristotle's method).

Recognizing Aristotle's method makes it easier to read through the text of both the *Ethics* and *Politics*. *Politics* especially often encourages confusion as Aristotle usually introduces a topic by describing the many different positions other thinkers hold on a subject without offering a clear statement that these positions are not his own. Noticing that Aristotle's method recommends consideration of these theories as part of the process of coming to his own position helps to cut through some of this confusion. Understanding that Aristotle's philosophical method involves examining a range of possible views on the matter at hand also explains why Aristotle often ends up adopting a position that falls somewhere in between the positions of his predecessors on a given topic. In the history of philosophy, this fact has often led thinkers to deride Aristotle as a philosopher of common sense, but this derision is based on a serious misunderstanding of what Aristotle considers good philosophical truth-finding to involve (for more on Aristotle's philosophical method and dialectic in the secondary literature, see the good overview in Bostock 2000).

Major Texts and the Link Between Ethics and Politics

As mentioned above, understanding Aristotle on citizenship and education requires noting that Aristotle gives us no definitive textual treatment of either topic. Instead, his discussion of these topics is scattered throughout his ethical and political works. For this reason, it is unreasonable to view Aristotle's views on citizenship and education as existing separately from his ethical position. In other words, to understand Aristotle's response to the questions "what is a citizen?" and "what makes a good citizen?" we must first know something about his response to the question "what is an ethical life?" The two most studied of Aristotle's texts are his *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics*. Of these, *Nicomachean Ethics* is by far and away the more well-traveled by scholars. This focus on *Nicomachean Ethics* is no doubt because *Politics* feels like a more incomplete text, and there are a number of ongoing disputes about whether the text we have was meant to be a complete whole

at all or whether it is actually a composite of separate texts. There is also much debate about which order the books (sections) of *Politics* should go in (for a good survey of these textual issues, see Lord 1981).

For the purposes of thinking about citizenship and education, it is worth keeping in mind that much of what Aristotle says about education is to be found in *Nicomachean Ethics*, despite there being a brief, but sustained discussion at the end of *Politics*. Citizenship as a concept is in the reverse situation. The bulk of Aristotle's discussion appears in *Politics* book 3.1-5, while *Nicomachean Ethics* holds a few, scattered important nuggets about his views on citizenship. That citizenship and education are distributed among both the ethical and political elements of his works is due to Aristotle's conception of ethics and politics as fundamentally connected subjects. Unlike many modern-day thinkers (and laypersons), Aristotle (and the Ancient Greeks generally) did not see the two as distinct from one another. For Aristotle, ethics is the study of how human beings should live, and understood this way, it is not hard to see why he would therefore think that organizing government and the social order would be part and parcel of a complete picture of the good human life. See, for discussion, Adkins (1991).

Essential Concepts for Understanding Aristotle on Citizenship

To flesh out the connection Aristotle sees between ethics and politics a bit more, it is necessary to consider three core concepts in Aristotle's philosophy: Virtue, The Good Life, and Human Nature.

The virtues, for Aristotle, are the central mode by which human beings are conceived of and assessed ethically. In simple terms, the virtues are those states of character that human beings develop and then use to act and live their lives well. For Aristotle, there are a number of distinct virtues, each including its own unique constellation of emotions, kinds of thinking, domains of application, and nuances of behavior (e.g., courage and generosity). To be a good person, in Aristotle's view, one must develop the virtues to the proper extent avoiding an excess or deficiency of the given virtue (his doctrine of the mean). Acting in accordance with the virtues, according to Aristotle, requires extensive training, some of which is controlled by the individual. To be a good person, in Aristotle's view, one must develop and enact the virtues to the right extent (i.e., the mean between excess and deficiency), which will require extensive training, some of which is controlled by the individual and some of which must be initiated at an early age by society and the individual's parents.

More generally, the virtues are those character traits that make a human being an excellent instance of its kind. In this more general sense, we might speak of the distinct virtues of a knife, a car, a hippopotamus, or a person. According to Aristotle's function argument, which appears at the beginning the ethical works (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1.7), the characteristic activity of human beings, and what sets them apart from other creatures, is the ability to use reason.

The completed story is more complex than this, of course, and this becomes clearer when the concept of the good life is examined, including how the good life and virtues are related. For Aristotle, the virtues are not just the generic pieces that make a thing a good example of its kind. After all, we can ask: “a good example of its kind relative to what purpose?” For Aristotle, the virtues are the distinctly human answer to the non-relative purposive question: “What is a good human life?” (Answer: a virtuous life).

On this more specific understanding of the virtues (see Curzer 2012), the virtues are those character traits that uniquely identify human beings as distinct from other types of creatures (the ability to reason) while at the same time serving as the keys which enable a human being to live a good life *as a human being*. In this way, Aristotle’s understanding of a good human life is fundamentally ethical. Unlike many modern thinkers, Aristotle would resist the thought that we can carve out a clear distinction between what is good for a person (well-being) and what one should do ethically speaking (morality or ethics). Aristotle does not connect well-being and ethics merely as a motivational connection but as a metaphysical one tied to human nature. The connection is not meant to be an answer to the amoralist’s question: “Why be moral?” Instead, the connection between well-being and ethics is a deeper truth about the nature of human beings. For Aristotle then, ethics is inseparable from questions about living a good life.

In much the same way, Aristotle viewed ethics as linked inexorably to politics. For Aristotle, the first thing to think about when we do political philosophy is to think about the purpose of the state. In his view, the aim of the state is to make sure that the people living within it have lives that are good. Aristotle’s focus here on the formative role of the state is one of the places where he reacts directly and critically to Plato’s view of the state. For Plato, the best government does not aim to make every individual within it happy. Aristotle, by contrast, believes that the entire purpose of having a government is to facilitate the good life for individuals.

Aristotle expresses this view in a couple of key statements: “Every city-state exists by nature” (Politics 1.2 1252b29-30), “anyone who is without a city-state, not by luck but by nature, is either a poor specimen or superhuman” (1.2 1253a4-5), and “a human being is by nature a political animal” (1.2 1253a3-4). There is quite a lot of debate about what these statements mean precisely, but for the purposes of this chapter, the main thing to note is that Aristotle draws a tight link between human nature and the existence of the state. (For further discussion of these three claims linking nature, the city-state, and human aims, see the canonical Keyt (1991). It is worth considering dissenting views such as Chan (1992) and Kraut (2007).) In his view, living in a community of this form is part of the definition of the human species. Human beings as groups and individuals could not reliably satisfy their natural goals without creating the state as part of this process. In other words, Aristotle views the state as a necessary component of a complete (good) human life. (For elaboration on this view, see Cooper (2010). For a more conflict-oriented, and less communal, interpretation of human nature in Aristotle, see Yack (1993)).

In short, Aristotle’s vision of ethics and politics is that both are fundamental parts of human life. This intimate connection between ethics and politics sits in fairly stark

contrast to much of modern political thought, in particular social contract theory beginning with Hobbes, which holds that that state is not part of the natural order but is instead an artificial construct that human beings choose to enter into. On the more modern conception, the purpose of the state is not to play its proper part in satisfying the aims of human nature but is instead an agreement between sovereign and separate individuals who choose to create the state to solve a problem of individual safety and security. For Aristotle security and safety, while provided by the state, are not its main reasons for existence.

To get a full understanding of Aristotle on citizenship and education, then, we do not necessarily have to agree with him about virtue, the good life, and the nature of politics, but we must recognize that on his view, citizenship and education play a core role in his theory of human life, since citizens and their character are central to his understanding of politics and the political state. Unlike today, where we can ask seriously whether or not the education of citizens is a central task of a well-functioning political system, for Aristotle, the answer is based on his understanding of the nature of the state and the good human life. We might say that for him, the character of citizens is the central cog in the functioning of the state. Not only that, but education for citizenship is part and parcel of becoming and being a good person.

The Characteristics of Aristotle's Good Citizen

Most of what Aristotle has to say about how to define a good citizen can be found in *Politics* Book 3, Chaps. 1–5. There he provides us with both a general definition of a citizen as well as an account of what citizens are supposed to be like in respect of different political regimes. In the process of outlining these definitions of citizenship, Aristotle also seems to make some broader statements about what an ideally good citizen is like. These three compressed tasks have led commentators to disagree over a number of issues related to what it means to be a (good) citizen (see Johnson (1984), Morrison (1999), and Frede (2005)).

Aristotle's General Definition of Citizenship

For Aristotle, unlike in most governments today, citizenship is defined by political participation and authority, not by one's official status in a city- or nation-state. In contemporary terms, citizenship is usually granted by birth or through a political process of naturalization and imparts on residents a status that allows them to then participate in the political system in ways relevant to that system (this was also the case, for the most part, in Ancient Greece). In Aristotle's view of citizenship, a person might well be a "citizen" in the sense of residency, without thereby being a citizen in its proper sense. For example, on the modern view, a person could be a citizen in a monarchy without also having participation rights and privileges. According to Aristotle's definition of citizen, it is unclear whether a person living

in a monarchy could really properly be called a citizen at all (Morrison 1999; Riesbeck 2016).

Fundamentally, then, for Aristotle, citizenship is primarily defined by political participation. A citizen is defined by what they do (and are meant to do) and the type of political authority they have to participate in governance and in making the laws. Aristotle states his final general definition of citizenship at *Politics* 1275b12-20. Aristotle says: “We can now say that someone who is eligible to participate in deliberative and judicial office is a citizen in the city-state.” (See Johnson (1984) for a good discussion of the complications Aristotle discusses in coming up with a final definition of citizenship. See also Khan (2005) for a good overview of the current state of the literature on Aristotle’s definition of citizenship.)

One way of thinking of this participatory definition of citizenship is directly parallel to how Aristotle comes to the definition of the good human life in his ethical works. In the *Nichomachean Ethics*, Aristotle ultimately defines the human good life by considering what the function of a human life is. Citizenship is defined in much the same way. What is the function of a citizen? A citizen is someone who participates in governance within the state.

Aristotle expands on this general definition by explicating participation. Citizens can participate in two ways: by participating in ruling and by being ruled. Aristotle then ties these two participatory tasks to a division based on the types of labor involved in each and by the kinds of virtues needed to do each of these labors well. He also establishes a hierarchical order between the two types of participation, where ruling is superior as an activity to being ruled. This mirrors exactly the hierarchy of value he outlines regarding the virtues of the good human life. For Aristotle, the superior virtues are the virtues of the intellect (such as practical wisdom), while the inferior virtues are the virtues of character (such as generosity and courage). According to Aristotle, practical wisdom is the virtue that is needed to rule well, while the virtues of character are necessary for being ruled well. Although both types of participation seem to be part of being a citizen, there is a clear rank order such that ruling is a superior activity and is associated with superior virtues, to being ruled and its associated inferior virtues (see Aristotle’s discussion of better and worse parts of the soul in *Politics* 7.14 1333a16-30). Although there is dispute about how to understand the relationship between “superior” and “inferior virtues and parts of the soul in Aristotle, there is virtually no dispute that this is how his value hierarchy works at a metaphysical level. For the canonical discussion of the different ways in which a person might relate to this hierarchy of value, especially with regard to the so-called natural goods, see Cooper (1985). It is also helpful to consult the final chapter of the *Eudemian Ethics* 8.3.

What this means is that Aristotle’s definition of citizenship allows for a neat and visible categorization schema for identifying better and worse citizens. True exemplars of citizens are those involved in the process of ruling, while citizens who are only involved in the activity of being ruled are, in some sense, not fully citizens. Or at least, they are not ideal examples of citizens (just as a dull and rusted knife is not a good example of a knife).

Because the types of participation are linked to the virtues and because the virtues are excellent character traits, we can also see that on Aristotle's picture, citizenship is meant to be understood as a success and competence definition. Strictly speaking, according to Aristotle, a citizen is a person who possesses the virtues of ruling and being ruled (or being ruled but not ruling). This means that we can easily identify noncitizens: These are individuals who do not have (or are not capable of having) the virtues (Frede 2005). This brings into focus one of the darker moments of Aristotle's *Politics* (discussed mainly in 1.13). On his view, there are quite a lot of individual persons who are not really capable of being full citizens since they are not really able to develop the virtues. In the first place, natural slaves are persons who by nature cannot really develop the virtues at all except by having traits that approximate virtues in non-slaves. They are therefore excluded from being citizens (Aristotle is convinced that many non-Greek ethnicities and races meet his definition of natural slaves). Likewise, women are only capable of having some part of virtue and so are, on Aristotle's picture, incapable of being citizens in the fullest sense, since they cannot develop the virtues of intellect. Finally, and emphasized most directly in his discussion of citizenship, are manual laborers (*banauoi*) who are incapable of developing the virtues in roughly the same vein as slaves. For this reason, they are also excluded from the citizenry (although this appears to be due to how they spend their time and not so clearly because they are incapable of developing virtue because of their natures. For discussion see Smith (1991), Spelman (1994), Lockwood (2007), and Deslauriers (2009)). It is worth emphasizing that the disparagement of labor by Aristotle does not seem to play an essential role in his theory of value but instead acts as a kind of peripheral vestige of the racist, sexist, and classist views of his time. For this reason, contemporary Aristotelians tend to vehemently reject these sorts of biological, non-egalitarian claims.

With these categories of participation organized in terms of the virtues associated with them, Aristotle brings us quickly to his neat division of different types of political systems. One dimension of this division is in terms of "correct" and "deviant" regimes (while the other is a three-place division based on how many rulers a state has: one, a few, or many). Relying on these distinctions, Aristotle makes it clear that "correct" regimes are those where the citizens have at least some part of virtue. He cites the Spartan system as an example of such a "correct" system, since the Spartans are said to have the virtues of character (the virtues of being ruled), but not full virtue. Part of the rationale for dividing things up this way is that, for Aristotle, "correct" regimes are so because the laws and citizens of those systems aim at the common good of the individuals living within the state, while "deviant" regimes and rulers aim only at their own benefit, often at the expense of other persons living within the regime. This alignment of aiming at the common good and possession of the virtues is not a coincidence. For Aristotle, part of being virtuous is having the right goals, aims, and motives. As a result, individuals who do not aim at the common good are failing to be citizens on the strictest definition (since this shows that they do not really have the virtues). Notice what this means for Aristotle's definition of citizenship. In an important sense, a person cannot really be a citizen

unless they possess the virtues in full. All individuals with imperfect virtue, or no virtue at all, are not, strictly speaking, citizens. In this way, Aristotle seemingly collapses the concepts of “citizen” and “good citizen.”

Different Political Regimes, Different Types of Citizens

This definition of citizenship, though, is complicated by the fact that Aristotle speaks at length about citizens in “deviant” regimes. He also discusses the idea that the definition of citizenship is relative to the type of political regime the citizen lives in. A good citizen in a democracy is not a good citizen in a monarchy. A good citizen in a “correct” regime is not a good citizen in a “deviant” regime.

This connection between citizenship and regime type leads to some confusion about what Aristotle’s definitive understanding of citizenship really is. Scholarly debates are wide-ranging on this issue (see Johnson (1984), Morrison (1999), Khan (2005), and Riesbeck (2016)). On the one hand, it looks like Aristotle is strongly committed to the idea that citizenship, strictly speaking, is a static concept across regime types. On the other hand, he seems to want to leave space for the thought that one might be a citizen even without possessing virtue (or some, but not all of, virtue). For the purposes of this chapter, it is not essential to take a stand on how to solve this tension within Aristotle’s discussion of citizenship, since scholars disagree on this issue. Instead, it will be sufficient to lay out a few of the other central puzzles associated with Aristotle’s definition of citizenship that are discussed in the literature.

Puzzles About Citizenship

The first puzzle has already been alluded to in the previous section; namely, whether or not Aristotle’s definition of citizenship – which is based on political participation and having political authority – will be too narrow for certain types of governments such as monarchies, tyrannies, oligarchies, and aristocracies. In these systems, some residents will not really be political participants, which seem to imply that they will not count as citizens by Aristotle’s stricter definition. This fact looks especially problematic in one-ruler systems, since it looks like in such systems Aristotle will have to say that these regimes only have one citizen within them, namely, the monarch. (For a good survey of the literature and a novel solution to the puzzle, see Riesbeck (2016).)

A second puzzle, much less frequently discussed, is the question of fully virtuous individuals living in “deviant” political systems. A number of scholars (Garver 2005; Keyt 2007) have been interested in the question: “Will a fully virtuous person be able to be a good citizen in a bad regime?” The puzzle arises when considering Aristotle’s more relativized citizenship definitions, as it seems at least possible, if not plausible, that the behaviors required of citizens in a “deviant” regime will be antithetical to the behaviors required of a good person. If this is so, scholars have

asked, “then how could a virtuous person live under such a system without losing their virtue or becoming a “bad” citizen?”

A third issue, perhaps less of a puzzle and more of a dispute among scholars, is the question of whether the ideally good citizen living in the ideal regime must live the life of a philosopher. Aristotle himself discusses both sides of this issue but remains obscurely aporetic enough to create space for scholarly disagreement on this point. The issue extends to other areas of concern; since if the ideal citizen must be a philosopher, then this will have implications for how we evaluate citizens in less than ideal conditions (they are not really good citizens but only good relative to their imperfect regimes). A philosophical requirement for good citizenship will also draw a tighter evidential link in debates about the role of philosophy in the good ethical life, which is a major dispute among scholars focused on understanding Aristotle’s ethical system separate from politics (c.f. Roochnik 2008; Depew 1991).

Combined with these three major puzzles, disputes about how to define citizenship in Aristotle continue to be fruitful for scholarly investigation. Let us now turn to Aristotle’s views about how to *become* a good citizen.

How to Become a Good Citizen

The first thing to understand about Aristotle on becoming a good citizen is that this is not a separate question from becoming an ethical person. Since individual virtue is so tightly connected to good citizenship, education for one will be education for the other, at least when discussing the ideal definition of citizenship. The second thing to keep in mind is that citizenship education (and so also education for virtue) will be largely a state responsibility (see Curren (2000) and *Politics* 7.1). One of the striking things about Aristotle is that he is an emphatic advocate of universal and egalitarian publicly funded schooling. This commitment to public schooling fits neatly with Aristotle’s conviction that part of becoming virtuous is the training one gets before a person is truly an agent able to make choices for oneself. Both parents and society as a whole have a responsibility to lay the necessary groundwork in the young in order that they might have the opportunity to develop full virtue. Without the proper early training, the window of opportunity will close, and no amount of ethical commitment or effort will be able to lead the ill-educated back to the path to virtue.

Virtue Education

Since citizen education is not separable from ethical (virtue) education, it is worth sketching out Aristotle’s general thoughts on how to develop virtue. Most of the comments Aristotle makes on this subject are strewn about his ethical works and have to be pieced together into a narrative form like the one offered now.

To be virtuous, a person must act well and in character. But in order to hit the right action standard (which is set by the virtues and with reference to the good human life), much more is required. In addition to acting correctly, a person must need to

think about the good life to be virtuous (*Nicomachean Ethics* 6.5 1140a25-8 and 1140b4-6). The ability to reflect about the good life (accurately) is not some capacity we are born with or that some people have and others simply do not. Instead, it is a capacity that needs to be developed (*Politics* 1.13 1260a13). Developing the reflective capacities needed begins with biology (Leunissen 2012; 2013) but continues to develop in better or worse ways depending on our early-stage exposure to people, experiences, and our surroundings (*NE* 10.9 1179b31-5). Because we need the ability to think about the good life, and this is an ability that must be developed from an early age, a person needs help from others to become virtuous. We need guidance so that we can develop habits that will help us follow the correct path (*NE* 1.4 1095b4) until we can develop enough to be responsible for our own ongoing development (*NE* 3.5 1114b22-3). For Aristotle, then, becoming virtuous is a mix of nature, habit, and reason (*Politics* 7.13 1332a39-40). It is worth pausing to note, here, that when Aristotle says “habit,” he does not mean the sort of mindless habits we so often develop (intentional or unintentionally). Instead, for him, habit as part of virtue is a cognitively deep state that is framed and held up by reasons for action. Not only that, but habituation for virtue must be connected to the right motivational structures. With respect to civic virtue, habits must be connected causally to the laws of the state, and those laws must be constituted properly (Hitz 2012). In addition to the development of the right habits, virtue requires methodical teaching and discussion if it is to manifest correctly (*NE* 10.9 1179b23), since this is how any character trait is acquired, according to Aristotle (*NE* 2.1 1103a15; see Kraut (2012) for elaboration).

The Specifics of Civic Education

In the final book of *Politics*, Aristotle lays out his rather strict early education program for musical training and its presumed role in citizenship and virtue education. Unfortunately, we do not have a full account of the specifics of Aristotle’s citizenship training program, but what we do have suggests that Aristotle had a regimented and demanding program in mind. In addition, this program would have been comprehensive in that it includes many elements that seem potentially tangential to citizenship and ethical training to modern ears. In the discussion we do have, Aristotle focuses on the importance of musical education and physical fitness, both of which he clearly believes are crucial to the proper development of children, not just as people but as virtuous citizens. While this might be surprising from a modern perspective, this fits quite neatly with Aristotle’s conviction that virtue is a comprehensive sort of human excellence and not just a domain-specific sort of thing to learn. In this same way, citizenship for Aristotle has to be seen as a concept with broader applicability than in modern states. To be a good citizen for Aristotle is to be a person of sound education not just in depth but also in breadth. Frustratingly, what we do not know about Aristotle on education is perhaps the most tantalizing: we do not have much by way of direct discussion of what is required to become a good person. Instead, we have a partial description of early-stage education components,

and of those, we have discussion of the elements that seem only distantly related to questions about how to develop the virtues. (Scholarship on this issue ranges widely, since most of it must be somewhat speculative. For thoughts about how music relates to virtue training, see Drefcinski (2011). For questions about whether musical education plays a role in developing the intellectual virtues, see Depew (1991) and Koeplin (2009). For a rejection of the idea that musical training is meant to be a step in the development of full philosophical virtue and is instead part of the way in which non-philosophers can partake in a contemplation-like virtue, see Destrée (2013).)

At the very least, it can be agreed that what specifics we do have from Aristotle on citizenship education are on the one hand too general and on the other hand too specific to be of a great deal of help to those seeking concrete guidance in thinking about modern civic education. Lacking specifics, of course, does not preclude developing an Aristotelian view of citizenship and education. That is, in fact, what a number of contemporary scholars try to do.

The Contemporary Uses of Aristotle on Citizenship and Education

There are a number of different ways that contemporary scholars and thinkers use Aristotle's philosophy of virtue, citizenship, and education to help us to think about those issues in our contemporary context. There are those who are neo-Aristotelians, and there are those who are inspired by Aristotle, but are not self-proclaimed Aristotelians. (For some examples of neo-Aristotelian scholars, see Nussbaum (1990), Frank (2005), Collins (2006), many of the essays in Goodman (2012), and Curren (2013). For an example of a scholar influenced by Aristotle, but who is not an Aristotelian, see Sandel (1998).) In both cases, it is important to keep in mind that no scholars argue that we should take Aristotle's theories on any subject and apply them wholesale to contemporary issues we face today. Always, there is some amount of philosophical maneuvering that must take place, where key decisions will be made about which pieces to abandon and which to hold on to. The main difference between different scholars interested in Aristotle's ethical and political project is in how much of his framework they aim to adopt in their own theorizing.

There are two main areas where scholars are most interested in using Aristotle's philosophical ideas to supplement their thinking on contemporary issues: education for citizenship *as virtue education* and theorizing about social democracy using Aristotle's general political framework. Focusing on these two areas illustrates both the enduring interest in Aristotle's ideas and also how they have been updated to account for their expression in the contemporary context.

Citizenship Education as Virtue Education

The most general insight taken from Aristotle when it comes to ethics and politics is the concept of virtue. A number of scholars are inspired by Aristotle to pay more

attention to development of the traits and skills necessary for good citizenship. This is in direct contrast to much modern discussion of citizenship education both by policy-makers and by social scientists, who have tended to focus on imparting political knowledge as the main aim of citizenship education. Aristotelians, by contrast, and as part of their wider focus on character education, have argued that education should include the inculcation of the civic virtues.

Some scholars have focused in on particular Aristotelian virtues, such as practical wisdom (Curren 2013; Kristjánsson 2016), while others have focused on the more general idea that virtue education is the sort of education for citizenship that we need today (Frank 2005; Collins 2006). Discussions of civic virtue are diverse and wide-ranging with little agreement on what the virtues are, how to understand what virtue consists in, and how to train citizens to become virtuous. Different accounts of each borrow different parts of Aristotle's own theory about virtue and education for it.

Aristotle as a Social Democrat

In addition to a renewed contemporary emphasis on virtue, scholars have also drawn from Aristotle a focus on particular elements of social democracy. Some have gone so far as to argue that Aristotle himself endorsed democracy (Frank 2005). For those thinkers aiming to make an argument primarily about how Aristotle's general political framework and thinking can be useful for us today, Martha Nussbaum has perhaps been the greatest champion (Nussbaum 1988, 1990, 1992, 1995, 2000). Across her work, Nussbaum emphasizes the connection between Aristotle's theory of the good human life, good human functioning, and how these ideas ought to influence political institutions. In Nussbaum's view, the state is tasked with creating meaningful opportunities for all citizens to meet their full human capabilities. Achieving this common good requires a state which supplies material and educational goods to all citizens equally. Nussbaum (see also Franks (2005) and Collins (2006)) adds to this insight the further thought that the state will provide these goods to citizens so that citizens will be able to *choose* themselves whether or not to pursue and develop any particular capabilities they have as human beings. In this way, the idea of the common good linked with Aristotle's theory of the human good as human functioning can be developed into a theory of social democracy. (A good recent overview of the scholarly views on Aristotelian ideas and contemporary democracy can be found in Zuckert (2014). A survey of how Aristotle and Aristotelian thought relates to the US Constitution can be found in Biondi (2007).)

In addition to scholarly attempts to connect Aristotle with social democracy, much work has been done in the so-called "communitarian" tradition to bring Aristotle's thoughts on the good life and political community to the attention of contemporary thinkers (MacIntyre 1984; Sandel 1998; Taylor 1985). These thinkers have focused less on social democracy and more on the notion that there are goods intrinsic to the political community that cannot be satisfied on a highly individualized concept of persons. Scholars of this leaning tend to position their theories as opposing forms of liberalism that emphasize separateness of persons and individual

autonomy, two concepts absent from Aristotle's theory of citizenship, education, and politics.

Conclusion

Although Aristotle himself does not give us the easiest primary materials by which to "read-off" his theory of education and citizenship, his deep theory-building in ethics and politics is full of insights and provides a fruitful place to look for inspiration on these issues. At times, his views look quite dated and immoral (slavery, women), and at others, they seem surprisingly useful as a foil against which to compare our own modern thinking. As with most historical texts, the key is to locate those parts of his framework which are essential to the philosophical program and not get overly distracted by the components which are present, but not fundamental. When we do this, Aristotle is a particularly interesting figure when it comes to civic education due to his focus on the development of virtue and the centrality of character traits to his account of the good citizen. He is surprisingly modern in his thinking when it comes to public, equal-access education and his call for the state to focus on improving the lives of its citizens. In addition, like most popular calls in democracy today, Aristotle emphasizes the importance of political participation in a well-functioning state.

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Political Liberalism, Autonomy, and Education

3

Blain Neufeld

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Abstract

Citizens are politically autonomous insofar as they are subject to laws that are (a) justified by reasons acceptable to them and (b) authorized by them via their political institutions. An obstacle to the equal realization of political autonomy is the plurality of religious, moral, and philosophical views endorsed by citizens. Decisions regarding certain fundamental political issues (e.g., abortion) can involve citizens imposing political positions justified in terms of their respective worldviews upon others. Despite citizens' disagreements over which worldview is correct, "political liberalism" claims that there is a form of political autonomy that is realizable within pluralist societies. (Political liberalism differs from "comprehensive liberalism" by, *inter alia*, being "free-standing" vis-à-vis citizens' different worldviews.) Citizens can be politically autonomous if they enjoy equal political power and justify its exercise with "public reasons." A political liberal education would aim at ensuring that all students can become politically autonomous citizens by teaching them how to exercise their democratic rights effectively and how to engage in public reasoning. Some political and educational theorists, however, argue that teaching students how to be politically autonomous amounts to teaching them how to be "comprehensively" autonomous. If this is so, then the distinction between political liberalism and comprehensive liberalism collapses, at least with respect to education. This chapter outlines the main elements of political liberalism, summarizes the main requirements of a political liberal citizenship education, and surveys three arguments in support of and against the thesis that a political liberal education amounts to an education for comprehensive autonomy.

Keywords

Autonomy · Citizenship · Civic education · Democratic citizenship · Liberalism · Political autonomy · Political liberalism · Public reason · Rawls · Reasonable pluralism

Introduction

Within a legitimate political society, Jean-Jacques Rousseau contends, "the words 'subject' and 'sovereign' are identical correlatives, the meaning of which is brought together in the single word 'citizen'" (Rousseau 1968, p. 138). Rousseauian citizens possess what later philosophers refer to as "political autonomy" (e.g., Rawls 2005). Leaving aside the idiosyncrasies of Rousseau's account, the general idea of political autonomy is that citizens are politically autonomous insofar as they are subject to laws that are justified by reasons that are acceptable *to* them and are authorized *by* them via their political institutions.

An obstacle to the realization of political autonomy within contemporary liberal democratic societies is the plurality of religious, moral, and philosophical views

endorsed by citizens (e.g., Buddhism and utilitarianism). This pluralism cannot be eliminated without the exercise of politically oppressive power, something that liberalism's commitment to toleration rules out. Yet accommodating this pluralism seems to prevent the realization of all citizens' political autonomy. This is because decisions regarding certain fundamental political issues – for instance, what the laws should be concerning abortion or physician-assisted suicide – can involve citizens *imposing* political positions justified in terms of their respective worldviews upon others. If this is so, then not all citizens can be politically autonomous: many will be subject to laws that are justified by reasons that they cannot accept.

Despite citizens' disagreements over which worldview is correct, "political liberalism" – the account of legitimacy and justice developed most famously by John Rawls (2001, 2005) – claims that there *is* a form of political autonomy that is realizable within pluralist societies. Citizens can be politically autonomous if they enjoy (roughly) equal political power and justify the exercise of that power vis-à-vis fundamental political matters with "public reasons." A political liberal educational system would aim at ensuring that all students become politically autonomous citizens. Educationally, this would involve teaching students how to exercise their democratic rights effectively and how to engage in public reasoning.

Can students be taught to be politically autonomous without teachers and schools *also* cultivating within them a "comprehensive" form of autonomy, that is, a form of autonomy that encompasses not simply political matters but all or most dimensions of persons' lives? If not, then political autonomy may not be achievable for many citizens after all. This is because comprehensive autonomy is an *ideal* that many citizens reject (for instance, those who endorse certain kinds of religious views). Such citizens will find it difficult if not impossible to support an educational system that inculcates or promotes that ideal in their children. If teaching political autonomy *necessarily* involves teaching comprehensive autonomy, then political liberalism's accommodation of pluralism may be quite limited.

This chapter surveys the debate concerning political liberalism, autonomy, and education. The focus will be on Rawlsian political liberalism. (Similar versions of political liberalism are presented in Cohen 1994, 2008; Larmore 1987, 2008; Nussbaum 2011; Quong 2011; Watson and Hartley 2018.) The core elements of political liberalism are outlined in §I. The main requirements of a political liberal citizenship education are summarized in §II. Three arguments that such an education amounts to an education for comprehensive autonomy are considered in §III, along with replies to those arguments. Concluding remarks are in §IV.

Political Liberalism

Reasonable Pluralism

A central claim of political liberalism is that citizens living in societies that respect basic liberal rights, including liberty of conscience, invariably will subscribe to a range of incompatible philosophical, moral, and religious

“comprehensive doctrines” (e.g., Islam, secular humanism, etc.). Such doctrines apply to most or all aspects of persons’ lives. Rawls calls this the “fact of reasonable pluralism” (Rawls 2005, pp. 36f, 441). This pluralism can be eliminated only through the exercise of political oppression (Rawls 2005, p. 37).

A Political Conception of Justice

In order to accommodate the fact of reasonable pluralism while respecting citizens’ equal standing, Rawls holds that society should be organized by a “political conception of justice.” Such a conception satisfies what may be called the “basic structure restriction” and the “freestanding condition.” According to the basic structure restriction, a political conception of justice applies directly only to society’s “basic structure”: its main political and economic institutions, understood as an overall system of cooperation encompassing all citizens. “Voluntary associations” like religious institutions may organize themselves internally in other ways – their governance, for instance, need not be democratic – but they cannot violate the rights of citizens that are secured by the basic structure, including those of their members. A political conception of justice satisfies the freestanding condition by being formulated in terms of distinctly “political” ideas (concepts, principles, ideals, and values). Such political ideas do not presuppose the truth of any particular comprehensive doctrine. Instead, they are construed as implicit within the public political culture of democratic society, namely, the conceptions of citizens as free and equal, and society as a fair system of cooperation. Hence a political conception of justice is *compatible* with (and ideally integrated into) the different comprehensive doctrines endorsed by citizens (Rawls 2005, pp. 11–16, 374–76). A “comprehensive” conception of justice, in contrast, is based upon a particular comprehensive doctrine (say, utilitarianism) and/or applies directly to areas of life beyond the basic structure.

Consider the conception of justice that Rawls defends as the most reasonable one: “justice as fairness.” This conception consists of two principles, the first of which enjoys “lexical priority” over the second (Rawls 1999, pp. 132, 266–267, 2001, pp. 46–47). The first principle secures a set of “basic liberties” – freedom of association, the political liberties, and so forth – equally for all citizens. The second principle consists of two sub-principles: (a) the “fair equality of opportunity” principle, which regulates the distribution of unequal positions of authority, wealth, and income, and (b) the “difference principle,” which concerns (inter alia) society’s overall distribution of income and wealth. (see Rawls 2001, pp. 42–43.) An account of the stability of a society that complies with these principles is advanced in Part III of *A Theory of Justice* (Rawls 1999/1971). This account, however, violates the freestanding condition: it presupposes elements of a comprehensive doctrine. Hence it is a (partially) comprehensive conception of justice (Rawls 2001, pp. 186–87; see also Weithman 2010). In contrast, the *revised* version of justice as fairness is a political conception, as its account of stability satisfies the freestanding condition (see Rawls 2001: Part V; 2005: Lecture IV).

Citizens as Reasonable Persons

A core idea of political liberalism is that of citizens as capable of being *reasonable* persons. Reasonable persons acknowledge the fact of reasonable pluralism and share a commitment to satisfying what Rawls calls the “criterion of reciprocity” when justifying fundamental political decisions to one another (Rawls 2005, pp. xlv, 16, 49–50, 54). The criterion of reciprocity is the “intrinsic (moral) political ideal” of political liberalism (Rawls 2005, p. xlv). In order to satisfy this criterion, citizens must justify their proposals concerning “constitutional essentials” and “matters of basic justice” (Rawls 2005, pp. 214–15, 227–30, 235) in terms that other citizens – or at least those similarly committed to the criterion of reciprocity (see Lister 2018) – find acceptable. The reasonableness of persons expresses itself in what Rawls calls the first “moral power” of citizens: their capacity to form and act upon a “sense of justice” (Rawls 2001, pp. 18–19, 196).

Civic Respect and Public Reason

One way to understand how citizens can be reasonable persons is to see reasonableness as involving a form of mutual respect (see Edenberg 2016). Given its political context, this conception of mutual respect can be termed “civic respect” (Neufeld 2005, 2019). Civic respect has four features:

1. Civic respect requires that citizens acknowledge the fact of reasonable pluralism.
2. Civic respect is a form of “recognition respect” (Darwall 1995, 2006). Recognition respect, roughly, is that respect which is owed to persons in virtue of some characteristic that they possess. This characteristic grants such persons a certain *standing* in their relations with others. Civic respect is the form of recognition respect that is owed to persons in virtue of their standing as free and equal citizens. One expresses such respect by taking this standing into account when deciding fundamental political questions in concert with one’s fellow citizens.
3. Because civic respect is owed to persons qua citizens, it is limited in its scope to relations among citizens within the basic structure of society.
4. Civic respect requires that citizens decide political questions regarding constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice in a way that satisfies the criterion of reciprocity – that is, given the first three features of civic respect, in accordance with the idea of “public reason.”

“Public reasoning” is the form of reasoning that Rawls maintains citizens should use when deciding fundamental political questions. The idea of public reason should be understood as “part of the idea of democracy itself” (Rawls 2005, p. 441). The terms of public reason – particular “public reasons” – are provided by the family of “reasonable” political conceptions of justice endorsed by citizens. A “reasonable” political conception of justice is one that, in addition to satisfying the freestanding

condition and the basic structure restriction, also satisfies the criterion of reciprocity. In order to satisfy this criterion, that conception must give priority to securing the basic rights and liberties of democratic citizenship equally for all and, moreover, ensure that all citizens have adequate resources to exercise effectively those rights and liberties over the course of their lives (Rawls 2005, p. 450). Rawls holds that justice as fairness is “the most reasonable conception because it best satisfies these conditions” (Rawls 2005, p. xlvi). Public reasons also may include the methods and conclusions of transparent forms of inquiry (such as those of logic and the sciences).

Decisions concerning constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice made via public reasoning satisfy the “liberal principle of legitimacy” (Rawls 2005, p. xliv, 137). Such decisions have normative authority for citizens (Rawls 2005, p. 19). This is because the public reasons that are used to justify those decisions are acceptable to all reasonable citizens.

The Duty of Civility and the Public Political Forum

When citizens use public reasons to decide fundamental political questions, they realize what Rawls calls their “duty of civility” (Rawls 2005, p. 444). This duty applies primarily to public officials within the “public political forum.” This forum is where national political issues are debated and authoritative decisions regarding them are made. It consists of three parts: “the discourse of judges in their decisions, especially of the judges of a supreme court; the discourse of government officials, especially chief executives and legislators; and [...] the discourse of candidates for public office” (Rawls 2005, p. 443). Other citizens, however, are not exempt from the duty of civility: they fulfill it by holding public officials to the idea of public reason when evaluating their performance within the public political forum, especially (though not exclusively) when voting (Rawls 2005, pp. 444–445).

Political debates need not employ public reasons alone. Reasons drawn from particular comprehensive doctrines can be introduced in the public political forum, so long as what Rawls calls “the proviso” is satisfied. The proviso is satisfied if “proper political reasons—and not reasons given solely by comprehensive doctrines—are presented that are sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines introduced are said to support” (Rawls 2005, p. 462). For instance, a utilitarian legislator could explain her support for a law permitting physician-assisted suicide on utilitarian grounds (arguing, roughly, that such a law would maximize overall utility), so long as she *also* provided a justification in terms of public reasons (say, that the law in question best respects citizens’ equal freedom to control their own lives). Moreover, political debates *outside* of the public political forum – discussions within civil society, what Rawls calls the “background culture” – need not use public reasons (Rawls 2005, pp. 442–443). Nonetheless, the duty of civility requires sufficient public reason justifications for all *decisions* concerning constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice.

Citizens as Rational Persons

Citizens also are characterized in political liberalism as capable of being *rational* persons. Citizens' rational nature includes what Rawls refers to as their second moral power: the capacity to form, revise, and pursue conceptions of the good. A conception of the good "is an ordered family of final ends and aims which specifies a person's conception of what is of value in human life or, alternatively, of what is regarded as a fully worthwhile life" (Rawls 2001, p. 19). Rational persons determine for themselves what kinds of lives have value, and they pursue or revise their life plans in accordance with those determinations over time.

Citizens' Higher-Order Interests

Citizens' opportunities to exercise effectively their two moral powers – their capacities to form and act upon conceptions of justice and the good – over the course of their lives constitute their "higher-order interests" (Rawls 2005, pp. 74–75, 106). Moreover, citizens' reasonable nature, their sense of justice, constrains their rational pursuit of their conceptions of the good. (For more on the reasonable and the rational, see Rawls 2001, pp. 6–7, 81–82, 191.)

This conception of citizens, Rawls stresses, "is meant as both normative and political, not metaphysical or psychological" (Rawls 2001, p. 19). It is an ideal that most persons with adequate education and resources are *capable* of realizing in their lives (at least well enough to be considered equal citizens). Reasonable political conceptions of justice are formulated with reference to this conception of citizens: principles of justice are those that citizens can support freely given their higher-order interests (their interests in being able to exercise the moral powers). This normative political conception of citizens, moreover, is freestanding in nature and hence compatible with different comprehensive doctrines.

Full Political Autonomy

When citizens are committed to interacting with one another on the basis of civic respect, it is possible for them all to enjoy and exercise "full political autonomy." There are two elements to citizens' full political autonomy, what can be termed "institutional autonomy" and "justificatory autonomy."

Institutionally autonomous citizens possess the rights and resources that enable them to take part as (roughly) equal contributors to their society's main decision-making processes. Citizens exercise institutional autonomy "by participating in society's public affairs and sharing in its collective self-determination over time" (Rawls 2005, p. 78). Hence the equal political liberties – including the rights to vote and run for public office – must be part of any reasonable political conception of justice.

Citizens enjoy justificatory autonomy when fundamental political decisions are made using reasons that they find acceptable (Rawls 2005, p. 77). Public reasoning makes possible citizens' justificatory autonomy despite the fact of reasonable pluralism. But although public reasons are acceptable to all, citizens may reach different conclusions concerning particular political questions. It is to be expected that individuals will give different weights to different public reasons and, moreover, interpret them in somewhat different ways. As Rawls says, "this is the normal case: unanimity of views is not to be expected" (Rawls 2005, p. 479). Even when they disagree over which political positions are the most reasonable, though, citizens possess justificatory autonomy insofar as the positions selected are supported by public reasons.

Public reasoning, then, "is the form of reasoning appropriate to equal citizens who as a corporate body impose rules on one another backed by sanctions of state power" (Rawls 2001, p. 92). Such citizens are simultaneously "subjects" and "sovereigns." They are politically autonomous by exercising their political liberties to help decide fundamental political decisions via public reasons (see Rawls 2005, p. xlv; for discussion see: Neufeld 2019; Watson and Hartley 2018; Weithman 2011, 2017, 2018).

Political Liberal Citizenship Education

Educating Students to Become Reasonable and Rational Persons

A political liberal education for citizenship would teach students the skills, concepts, and virtues necessary for them to become capable of being reasonable and rational persons as adults. Teaching students how to be rational persons would involve ensuring that they know how to use their rights and resources to form, revise, and pursue conceptions of the good. Cultivating reasonableness in students would involve teaching them how to interact with others on the basis of civic respect. Students consequently would learn how to be fully politically autonomous and respect the political autonomy of others. This is because they would learn how to exercise their democratic rights effectively (institutional autonomy) and how to justify to others their positions regarding fundamental political matters with public reasons (justificatory autonomy).

Political Versus Comprehensive Autonomy

Rawls distinguishes between political autonomy and comprehensive autonomy – the latter often also is referred to as "ethical" autonomy (the terms "ethical autonomy" and "comprehensive autonomy" will be used interchangeably hereinafter). Comprehensive autonomy (inter alia) applies to the whole (or most aspects) of persons' lives. While political liberalism "affirms political autonomy for all," Rawls claims that it "leaves the weight of ethical autonomy to be decided by citizens severally in light of their comprehensive doctrines" (Rawls 2005, p. 78). Democratic citizens are to help to determine the laws to which they all are subject; whether

to value and exercise autonomy in the *other* dimensions of their lives is to be left to them.

Does this distinction between political and comprehensive autonomy have educational implications? Rawls thinks that it does. In *Political Liberalism* he briefly considers the scope of the “requirements the state can impose” on the education of children belonging to “religious sects [that] oppose the culture of the modern world and wish to lead their common life apart from its unwanted influences.” Comprehensive liberal approaches to education, Rawls explains, “may lead to requirements designed to foster the values of autonomy and individuality as ideals to govern much if not all of life.” By contrast, “political liberalism has a different aim and requires far less” (Rawls 2005, p. 199). Because it aims only at political autonomy, which is limited in its scope to society’s political decision-making processes, Rawls holds that a political liberal educational system can accommodate the beliefs and practices of the members of the religious sects in question.

Comprehensive Autonomy: Substantive Autonomy

Before considering the relation between political and comprehensive autonomy, a clearer understanding of what the latter involves is needed. There are many “conceptions” of the “concept” of autonomy – Rawlsian political autonomy is an example of a particular conception. (On the distinction between “concepts” and “conceptions,” see Rawls 1999, p. 5; for discussion of this distinction with respect to autonomy, see Dworkin 1988, pp. 9–10.) Which conception (or family of conceptions) does Rawls have in mind when he distinguishes ethical autonomy from his conception of political autonomy?

When he refers to ethical autonomy, Rawls seems to have in mind something like what Gerald Dworkin calls “substantive” autonomy (Dworkin 1988; see also the discussion of “autonomy” in Benn 1988). A life lived autonomously, in this sense, requires that persons critically reflect on their deepest ends and beliefs and display a kind of “independence” by not deferring (at least not usually) to others, including authorities (e.g., religious or community leaders), on such questions. Substantive ethical autonomy also may involve a willingness to explore, or at least seriously consider, alternative ways of life (projects, life plans, and the like). According to Rawls, citizens can be politically autonomous even if they are not substantively (ethically) autonomous (say, by accepting their religious views on the basis of faith and community, and not through independent rational reflection).

Political and Comprehensive Autonomy: For and Against the Convergence Thesis

Some political liberals defend Rawls’s claim that an education for political autonomy differs from, and is generally less demanding than, one for comprehensive autonomy (Davis and Neufeld 2007; De Wijze 1999; Ebels-Duggan 2013; Neufeld

2013). This position, though, has been challenged by a number of theorists who have written on this topic. Some political liberals maintain that political liberalism requires a form of education for citizenship that is much more demanding than that suggested by Rawls (Costa 2011; Macedo 2000; Schouten 2018). And some comprehensive liberals contend that teaching Rawlsian political autonomy amounts to teaching comprehensive autonomy (Callan 1996, 1997; Gutmann 1995; Kymlicka 2001: Chap. 17). This section presents three arguments in support of the claim that an education for political autonomy “converges” with an education for comprehensive autonomy – hereinafter referred to as the “convergence thesis” – as well as some replies to those arguments.

The First Moral Power Argument for the Convergence Thesis

The first kind of argument in support of the convergence thesis focuses on the educational goal of creating reasonable citizens, specifically, the goal of ensuring that students acquire, and learn how to exercise effectively, a sense of justice (the first moral power). This requirement involves ensuring that students know how to engage in the public life of their society in order to promote the political values and principles of justice that they judge to be the most reasonable. According to some defenders of the convergence thesis, the goal of teaching students how to be effective democratic citizens amounts to teaching them how to be comprehensively autonomous, even if this is not the explicit *goal* of such an education.

Amy Gutmann, writing from a comprehensive liberal perspective, maintains that despite the *theoretical* soundness of Rawls’s distinction between political and comprehensive autonomy, there is no *practical* difference between them, at least when it comes to educating future citizens. This is because, according to Gutmann, “most (if not all) of the same skills and virtues that are necessary and sufficient for educating children for citizenship in a liberal democracy are those that are also necessary and sufficient for educating children to deliberate about their way of life, more generally (and less politically) speaking” (Gutmann 1995, p. 573). In practice at least, teaching citizens to become politically autonomous amounts to teaching them to be comprehensively autonomous. (See also Kymlicka 2001: Chap. 17; Reich 2002: Chap. 2.) (Gutmann (1995) also advances an argument in support of the convergence thesis based on a shared commitment among political and comprehensive liberals to teaching *mutual respect* to students. Davis and Neufeld (2007, pp. 53–60) contend that Gutmann’s argument fails because the conception of civic respect differs from – and has less demanding educational requirements than – the comprehensive liberal conception of mutual respect endorsed by Gutmann.)

Gutmann’s argument for the convergence thesis finds indirect support in the account of citizenship education advanced by the political liberal Stephen Macedo. Macedo calls his version of political liberalism “civic liberalism” and holds that it is committed to a “transformative project”: liberal institutions must “mold *people* in a manner that ensures that liberal freedom is what they want” (Macedo 2000, p. 15,

Macedo's italics). Furthermore, Macedo defends what he calls "civic autonomy," according to which students are "provided with the intellectual tools necessary to [...] formulate their own convictions, and make their own way in life" (238). "[P]romoting [...] core liberal values," Macedo writes, "will probably have the effect of encouraging critical thinking in general." Consequently, "Liberal civic virtues and attitudes will spill over into other spheres of life"; indeed, a liberal society's institutions and practices must "work to transform the whole of the moral world in the image our most basic political values" (Macedo 2000, pp. 179, 151).

Macedo characterizes civic liberalism as a form of political liberalism by appealing primarily to the freestanding condition (Macedo 2000, pp. 166–174). The basic structure restriction, in contrast, does not seem to be part of civic liberalism. Macedo claims that the liberal distinction between public and private life is only "superficial" in nature: "In a deeper sense," he maintains, "liberal institutions and practices shape all of our deepest moral commitments" (164). Hence while "[p]ublic educational institutions should not promote comprehensive ideals of life as a whole [...] that does not mean that public schools are limited to a narrowly political agenda." This is because, according to civic liberalism, "Our civic ideals are not narrowly political" (239). Consequently, the requirements of a civic liberal citizenship education include promoting in students a capacity for civic autonomy and a willingness to exercise that capacity in most if not all domains of social life. Macedo, then, ultimately seems to concur with Gutmann that political and comprehensive liberals converge (for the most part) on the same demanding account of citizenship education, differing only in their distinct *rationales* for that account.

Both Macedo and Gutmann, in short, hold that teaching students how to be effective democratic citizens – how to exercise their first moral power – involves teaching skills and concepts that invariably spill over into other areas of students' lives, thereby teaching them a comprehensive form of autonomy.

Against the First Moral Power Argument

Those who defend the distinction between political and comprehensive autonomy do not deny that teaching students to become politically autonomous might lead some (perhaps many) to come to value and exercise a more comprehensive form of autonomy (Rawls 2005, pp. 199–200). Nonetheless, they maintain that the kinds of spillover effects described by Gutmann and Macedo do not demonstrate that teaching political autonomy and teaching ethical autonomy are *indistinguishable* in practice. Davis and Neufeld hold that convergence in educational practice is neither conceptually nor practically inevitable – there exists a "gap," in both theory and practice, between teaching students the political ideas necessary for free and equal citizenship and teaching students a form of comprehensive autonomy (Davis and Neufeld 2007, p. 60, n.41; Neufeld 2013). Classes that aim to teach students how to be politically autonomous, roughly, teach them about their rights and liberties as citizens, the political virtues, and how to participate in the political

decision-making processes of their society. Such classes differ from those that aim to teach students to be ethically autonomous. The latter kind of classes would encourage students to reflect critically on their comprehensive beliefs and values, including their religious ones, as well as those of other students.

A pedagogic strategy for teaching students how to be politically autonomous – in particular, how to interact with others on the basis of civic respect – is described by Davis and Neufeld (2007). Students would participate in formal debates concerning a range of fundamental political issues. Such issues could be both historical (concerning, say, pivotal constitutional issues in the history of their county) and contemporary in nature (regarding distributive justice, marriage, physician-assisted suicide, abortion, alternative electoral systems, and the like). After explaining to students that they live in a society characterized by persistent disagreement over a wide range of religious and moral questions, the rules of the debate would be introduced. The key rule would be that students defend their positions concerning fundamental political issues with public reasons. Positions defended without sufficient public reasons would be ruled inadmissible. Students would be encouraged to rise on “points of order” in order to help them identify arguments that violate the duty of civility. (For instance, an argument offered in support of same-sex marriage based exclusively on utilitarian considerations would be ruled inadmissible; an argument that appealed to the free and equal status of citizens, in contrast, would be admissible.) Through their participation in such debates, students would learn how to employ public reasons when deciding fundamental political questions. (But these debates need not exclude comprehensive doctrines altogether – recall Rawls’s proviso. Hence students could provide nonpublic reasons for their positions so long as they *also* provide sufficient public reasons.)

Such exercises would teach students how to exercise political autonomy without necessarily exposing their comprehensive beliefs and values to rational scrutiny. Davis and Neufeld (2007) concede that some students may choose to scrutinize their comprehensive doctrines as a result of their participation in such debates (and similar educational exercises) and thereby come to value and exercise comprehensive autonomy. Such broader critical scrutiny, though, is *not* necessary or unavoidable.

The Burdens of Judgment Argument for the Convergence Thesis

Eamonn Callan advances another argument for the convergence thesis (1996, 1997). Callan’s argument focuses on reasonable persons’ acceptance of the fact of reasonable pluralism, specifically, on Rawls’s idea of the “burdens of judgment” (Rawls 2005, pp. 54–58). Rawls sketches six factors – such as the indeterminacy of many of our moral concepts and citizens’ diverse life experiences – that make up these burdens. The idea of the burdens of judgment is advanced by Rawls to help *explain* the fact of reasonable pluralism, that is, why people reasoning well nonetheless may come to endorse different comprehensive doctrines.

Rawls's distinction between political and comprehensive autonomy can be seen to be "bogus," according to Callan, "once we reflect on the educational task of securing active acceptance of the burdens of judgement" (Callan 1996, p. 21). An education designed to secure such "active" acceptance is indistinguishable from an education designed to foster ethical autonomy. This is because, Callan contends, "nominal assent to a list of abstractions is not enough; the relevant acceptance must rather be an active and onerous psychological disposition, pervasively shaping the beliefs we form and the choices we make" (Callan 1996, p. 15; see also 1997, pp. 34, 180f, 217f). Callan concludes: "the psychological attributes that constitute an active acceptance of the burdens [...], such as the capacity and inclination to subject received ethical ideas to critical scrutiny, also constitute a recognizable ideal of ethical autonomy" (Callan 1996, p. 21). Hence educating students to actively accept the burdens of judgment – as part of educating them to be reasonable persons – amounts to educating them to be ethically autonomous.

Against the Burdens of Judgment Argument

In presenting the idea of the burdens of judgment, Rawls denies that it requires that citizens become "hesitant and uncertain, much less sceptical, about [...] [their] own beliefs" (Rawls 2005, p. 63). Drawing on recent work in epistemology on peer disagreement, Fabienne Peter (2013) defends a view similar to Rawls's concerning the relation between acceptance of the fact of reasonable pluralism and citizens' confidence in the truth of their comprehensive doctrines. On the question of how to teach students to become reasonable persons, Kyla Ebels-Duggan (2013) proposes that students can be taught to accept the fact of reasonable pluralism and acknowledge that other comprehensive doctrines can be endorsed by reasonable persons, without *also* teaching them to question or doubt the truth of their own comprehensive doctrines. Davis and Neufeld (2007, pp. 60–67) explicitly defend Rawls's modest interpretation of what acceptance of the burdens requires of citizens; they use possible lessons on the history of religious conflicts to defend their view with respect to educating students about the fact of reasonable pluralism. (See also Edenberg 2016.)

Even if Callan's interpretation of the burdens of judgment is correct, though, political liberals could respond by claiming that students do not *need* to be taught to accept the burdens in order to become reasonable persons (see Strike 1996; Wenar 1995). The burdens of judgment may not be the *only* way to explain the fact of reasonable pluralism. So long as students learn how to interact with others on the basis of the principle of civic respect, including how to use public reasons to decide fundamental political questions, they can learn to be reasonable persons. Such a response still requires that students learn how to be politically autonomous, but because it does not require the acceptance of the burdens of judgment in the way presupposed by Callan, it does not seem to involve the necessary cultivation of ethical autonomy.

The Second Moral Power Argument for the Convergence Thesis

The two arguments for the convergence thesis discussed above focus on teaching students how to be *reasonable* persons. But what about the goal of teaching students to be *rational* persons, specifically, persons with the capacity to form, revise, and pursue conceptions of the good? The argument for the convergence thesis advanced by Gina Schouten (2018) rests on the purported instrumental value of autonomy for securing students' future interests with respect to the second moral power. Schouten calls this a "student-centered" argument for the convergence thesis, as it has to do with the future ability of all students to live good lives, rather than their future roles in promoting and maintaining the justice of their society's basic structure.

Schouten's argument focuses on what is needed for citizens to exercise effectively their rights and resources vis-à-vis their second moral power. Rawls calls the rights and resources necessary for citizens to exercise their two moral powers – things such as the basic liberties, income and wealth, and so forth – "primary goods" (Rawls 2001, pp. 57–61). All reasonable political conceptions of the justice secure for all citizens (at least) sufficient primary goods for them to exercise effectively their two moral powers over the course of their lives. With respect to citizens' second moral power, the primary goods are used to form, revise, and pursue conceptions of the good. Basic liberties like liberty of conscience and freedom of association, along with resources like education, income, and wealth, enable citizens to determine and act upon their plans, commitments, relationships, and the like.

Schouten points out that different conceptions of the good are suitable for the flourishing of different people: "There are perfectly good lives that some can live well while others cannot" (Schouten 2018, p. 1090). If this is so, then persons must be able to use the primary goods that they have available to them as citizens in order to *figure out* which conceptions of the good have value – are a "good fit" – for them. But this capacity, she contends, *just is* a "basic capacity for robust autonomy" (Schouten 2018, p. 1090). An education for robust (comprehensive) autonomy, then, is justified on political grounds as a kind of "safeguard" to ensure that all citizens – if necessary – will be able to identify and pursue conceptions of the good that are appropriate for them (even if not all citizens will need to do this). The capacity for robust autonomy, then, helps *ensure* that students will not end up living lives that are not good fits for them because of factors outside of their control, such as the communities and families within which they were raised. (A similar claim is sketched in Brighouse 1994.)

Against the Second Moral Power Argument

Political liberals sympathetic to the Rawlsian position can point out that Schouten's argument fails to distinguish adequately between "conceptions of the good" – the concern of citizens' second moral power – and "comprehensive doctrines."

Some political liberals do not distinguish clearly between these ideas (e.g., Nussbaum 2011). In Rawls's later writings on political liberalism, though, these ideas play distinct roles. A conception of the good is not itself a comprehensive doctrine. Rather, "[t]he elements of such a conception are normally set within, and interpreted by, certain comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral doctrines in the light of which the various ends and aims are ordered and understood" (Rawls 2001, p. 19). So, for instance, two people might endorse conceptions of the good that include artistic excellence and rich family relationships. Yet one person might interpret this conception from within a Jewish perspective, while the other does so from within a utilitarian perspective. Consequently, their understandings of these elements will be quite different.

This distinction threatens Schouten's argument. Citizens who adhere to different comprehensive doctrines often will exercise their second moral power in quite different ways, according to different evaluative criteria and drawing on different resources. For instance, the evaluative criteria and resources that a devout Catholic will employ when deliberating about which life plan to pursue will be quite different from those employed by a secular humanist – among other things, faith and the pronouncements of relevant religious authorities will play a role in the former's deliberations that they do not in those of the latter. The exercise of the second moral power, then, does not seem to require the exercise of robust autonomy any more than it seems to require the use of faith – the appropriate roles of robust autonomy and faith in citizens' exercises of their second moral power are *shaped* by their respective comprehensive doctrines. Of course, citizens are free to change their comprehensive doctrines, and students must be taught "that liberty of conscience exists in their society and that apostasy is not a legal crime" (Rawls 2005, p. 199). But learning these things does not require more than learning to understand and exercise *political* autonomy. Schouten's argument, then, arguably presupposes a comprehensive liberal interpretation of what exercising the second moral power necessarily involves.

Conclusion

This chapter outlined some of the main arguments in support of and against the convergence thesis. Opponents of the convergence thesis hold that Rawls is correct in claiming that teaching political autonomy requires "less" than teaching ethical autonomy. Consequently, opponents of the convergence thesis conclude that, *ceteris paribus*, the kind of citizenship education required by political liberalism is compatible with a range of educational options for students and families that reflect the reasonable pluralism of their societies. In other words, opponents of the convergence thesis generally are sympathetic to forms of educational choice for families that accommodate citizens' diverse comprehensive doctrines while at the same time ensuring that all students learn how to become rational and reasonable persons (see Davis and Neufeld 2007; Ebels-Duggan 2013; Edenberg 2016). In contrast, defenders of the convergence thesis, because they contend that

all students need to learn to become ethically autonomous, generally are less sympathetic to any decentralization of citizenship educational requirements, at least with respect to curriculum content and pedagogy. These are general tendencies, however, as political liberals who agree with Rawls readily acknowledge that in certain social circumstances – say, in societies threatened by instability, or that suffer from class or race inequality and segregation – securing political justice and legitimacy may require that students share schools and curriculum irrespective of their wishes or those of their parents (see Davis and Neufeld 2007; Neufeld 2013).

The political liberal conception of full political autonomy, and the role of public reason with respect to the realization of that conception, can be interpreted as an account of how a version of Rousseau’s ideal of a self-governing citizenry might be realized in contemporary pluralist societies. A pluralist society in which citizens are equal co-sovereigns is a “realistic utopia” (Rawls 2001). Realizing the political liberal version of this ideal has significant educational implications. Students must be taught to be capable of being reasonable and rational persons. Whether such an education necessarily involves teaching students a form of comprehensive autonomy has been debated since the publication of *Political Liberalism* – and continues to be debated by political and educational theorists.

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Civic Republicanism, Citizenship and Education

4

Geoffrey Hinchliffe

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Abstract

This chapter provides a brief introduction to civic republicanism, providing a historical overview, and focusing in particular on the work of scholars of modern republicanism in the last 30 years. It shows why liberty is the cornerstone of republican theory and discusses two types of liberty – liberty as nondomination and participative liberty. Following this, the chapter sets out the differences between instrumentalist republicanism and intrinsic republicanism. The nature of sovereignty and the relation between a republican polity and the nation state are also discussed. In the final section, the implications for civic education are considered. Here, a discussion of civic education in England is provided as an illustrative case, and it is suggested that while the National Curriculum for civic education has a communitarian bias, it also has features that are welcome to civic republicans. Finally, it is proposed that central to civic education, from a republican perspective, is the need for a clear narrative of liberty which has both a historical and a contemporary dimension.

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Introduction

Civic republicanism designates a type of political arrangement – broadly, a community of independent and free citizens who participate in self-rule. Central to this civic republicanism is a view that this community is a *political* community and that its citizens are attached both practically and emotionally to the republic. From a civic republican standpoint, politics is seen as something which concerns everyone and in which each citizen participates. The term “republic” derives from the Latin – *res publica* – which designates “public affairs” and so, unsurprisingly, the history of republicanism reaches back into antiquity. However, the idea of “republicanism” should not be confused with the contemporary use of the term “republic.” Central to republicanism is the idea that citizens are not beholden to other citizens or to the state and that this freedom is something to be supported and cherished. From this viewpoint, without one’s freedom one is scarcely a person at all; without freedom one is unable to fashion any kind of identity worth having. Thus, a state that proclaims itself a “republic” in which its citizens are not free is not republican in its true sense. And, in case there is any confusion, it should be said that adherents of civic republicanism do not have any particular attachment to the Republican Party of the United States, and while civic republicans in Britain might, ideally, prefer that the monarchy be abolished, this commitment does not usually feature very prominently in their concerns.

Although, as previously stated, republican ideas stem back to antiquity, it is only within the past 40 years or so that the idea has gained fresh ground, at least in Britain. A number of philosophers and historians have engaged in both recovering and developing the concept of republican liberty. Prominent among these are Quentin Skinner (1998, 2002, 2008a, b), J.G.A. Pocock (1975), and Philip Pettit (1997, 2012). Pocock was, in some respects, the pioneer in his quest to excavate seventeenth century English republican thought in his *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law* (1987, first published in 1957). In his book *The Machiavellian Moment* (1975), Pocock outlines more fully the development of republican concepts of liberty in Northern Italy during the Renaissance of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, paying particular attention to the works of Machiavelli, especially his *Discourses* (1960). Pettit, whose ideas will be referred to throughout this chapter, gives the topic a more contemporary, analytical treatment. A number of other books also contain worthwhile introductions of the historical development of republicanism, notably those by Iseult Honohan (2002) and Andrew Peterson (2011).

Possibly the most accessible and scholarly historical account of republicanism is to be found in Quentin Skinner’s short book, *Liberty before Liberalism* (1998). In this book, he suggests that before the mid-seventeenth century, there was both a

historical experience of, and in some instances a practical engagement with, liberty (including in ancient Rome, the Italian city states of the fifteenth century (especially Florence before the Medici) and seventeenth century England). However, in the eighteenth century, there developed the idea of a “commercial” republic (Honohan 2002, p. 84) signaling the end of what might be termed the “heroic” period of republicanism as the more quotidian (and peaceful) pursuits of trade and commerce assumed greater prominence in the lives of citizens. But while the emergence of an independent republic in the United States in 1783 served to enhance the attractiveness of the idea of republicanism, the bloody terror in France in 1794, following the revolution of 1789, encouraged a revulsion against all things republican, especially in England. Arguably, it is only now, more than 200 years later, that republican ideas may once again receive a proper hearing.

Before elaborating the ideas of republicanism in more detail, it might be worth noting how republicanism differentiates from other leading political ideas. It differs from liberalism because of the importance placed on self-rule and the desirability of participation in governance. For republicans, it is not enough that freedom consists of absence of interference; rather freedom must be exercised in an active and political manner if it is to be preserved. Furthermore, republicanism differs from communitarianism, however, because it insists that the community is never prior to the individual; instead the community is made of free individuals and it is the job of the community to protect that freedom. And finally, republicanism differs from socialism because the criteria of social justice do not merely consist in fairness or greater egalitarianism but, for republicans, the aim of social justice is to enhance liberty. It is true that republicans think that gross inequalities in societies are to be avoided but this is not because inequality is somehow unfair per se but because inequality risks the more powerful diminishing the liberty of the less favored. For civic republicans, then, liberty is the master concept and it is this concept that will be now be explored.

The Concept of Republican Liberty

Much of the contemporary discussion of liberty is influenced by Isaiah Berlin’s essay “Two Concepts of Liberty” and his subsequent considered reflections (Berlin 1969). Even now, over 50 years on, Berlin’s words still resonate and give us pause for thought. Liberty, he says, is “the absence of obstacles to possible choices and activities” (Berlin 1969: xxxix) and this is not to be confused with self-mastery, or what he terms “positive” liberty; rather, liberty consists of that social space within which I am free to be active, to be lazy, to be good or bad and suffer the consequences. This space is not logically dependent on self-government – and although a democratic regime is less likely to threaten this space than tyranny, such protection cannot be assured: “Everything is what it is: liberty is liberty, not equality or fairness or justice or human happiness or a quiet conscience” (p. 125). However, Skinner (1998) contends that there is an older and ultimately more worthy concept of liberty than that of Berlin’s. Skinner argues that the crucial step from republican liberty to

modern, negative liberty was made by Hobbes who, he suggests, was particularly concerned to undermine claims that liberty could only flourish in conditions of self-government. Since, for Hobbes, liberty was signaled by “the absence of external Impediments” (Hobbes 1991, p. 91), it is manifest that the *kind* of government under which one lived was immaterial as to whether one was free: what really counted was the extent to which that government left you alone. Skinner contrasts this with the “neo-Roman” outlook which can be summarized by the view of the historian Livy for whom the possession of *libertas* involved the ability “to stand upright by means of one’s own strength without depending on the will of anyone else” (quoted in Skinner 1998, p. 46).

What Skinner further suggests, however, is that negative liberty is inadequate as a concept of liberty because it is possible to live in a state of dependency even if one is not being interfered with. The mere awareness of dependency can create a situation in which persons behave in such an anticipatory, proactive way that the need for exercising any constraint never seriously arises. Yet such servile behavior and its accompanying dispositions are at variance with what a free person is supposed to be. For we are all familiar with situations in which persons (sometimes ourselves) avoid saying certain things and take care not to stand out or draw attention to themselves because to do so may invite the disapprobation of those in authority or those, especially, who can make things worse for us should they so wish. Occasionally, it may be wise to keep quiet for pragmatic reasons; but if “keeping quiet” develops into a more or less permanent feature of behavior then, from a republican standpoint, one is no longer free. These stratagems are explored in more detail by Pettit (see, for example, 2012, pp. 62–64).

However, the notion of freedom as nondomination is not without its difficulties. For one thing, who is to say what counts as domination? The paradigm example is that of the slave who is treated well by his master and wants for nothing; but since the slave is dependent for their comfortable life on the goodwill of someone else, they are not really free. Yet, it is possible that people may be living in a situation which, for outsiders, appears unfree but for those on the inside it simply does not feel that way. Proponents of republican liberty need to respect persons so circumstanced – or else run the danger of imposing a version of freedom on persons who may think differently. Phillip Pettit suggests that we could perform the “eyeball test” as a way of flushing out potential domination. Here, domination is absent when one can say that “They can look others in the eye without reason for the fear or deference that a power of interference might inspire; they can walk tall and assume the public status. . .of being equal in this regard to the best” (Pettit 2012, p. 84). But while we may have some idea of what Pettit is driving at, the “eyeball test” does seem a somewhat subjective instrument for detecting domination. After all, some people have a natural sense of reserve, modesty, and humility and may fail the test more often than not. However, the “eyeball test” does raise the question of the legitimate scope of intervention to protect nondomination (for a further discussion in relation to education, see Snir and Eylon (2017) and Peterson (2018)).

Another difficulty is that some scholars argue that domination is simply a form of interference; it follows that a description of any relation cast in the form of

domination can be re-cast in the language of interference. This position implies that the negative conception of liberty still stands as the best way of understanding freedom (Carter 1999, p. 59; Kramer 2003, pp. 34–35; Lang 2012). But this objection is not conclusive, because if critics such as Carter, Kramer, and Lang are correct in thinking that domination can be expressed in terms of interference, republicans may still be right to insist that one of the key forms of “interference” is that of domination. All republicans need to do is to acknowledge that certain interferences can be justified (e.g., taxation, laws relating to driving, etc.) but insist that one kind of interference is never justified – namely domination.

There is, however, another view of republican liberty which, while not dismissing the importance of nondomination, prefers to place an emphasis on freedom as participation in public life and government. Iseult Honohan has stated this form of republicanism as follows:

If freedom is understood as an ideal to be promoted, rather than a constraint to be observed, non-domination appears to point beyond itself, not to full mastery, but to participating in determining the conditions of social life. (Honohan, p. 188)

The idea here, then, is that our freedom is best realized through its being exercised and that civic republicanism is best understood in terms of a political freedom which entitles all citizens to contribute both to the long-term goals of the community as well as its day-to-day governance. Participative liberty has an illustrious pedigree which can be traced back to Aristotle, who suggested that all men (persons) are political animals and are necessarily part of not merely a *social* order but a *political* order as well. Allied to this suggestion is the position that there is a human good that can be specified in teleological terms so that this good is best realized through being a part of a polity and sharing in its common good: “the end and purpose of a polis is the good life and the institutions of social life are a means to that end” which is “perfect and self-sufficient existence” (Aristotle 1946: Book 3, Chapter ix, paragraph 13). In other words, we realize our human purposes through being part of a wider community. In this sense, community is not only composed of disparate individuals each with their own purposes and goals in life. Instead, each person shares in a common good which enables human flourishing – and an important part of this flourishing is participation in the governance of the polity.

A particularly rich version of what might be called neo-Aristotelianism was suggested by the political philosopher, Hannah Arendt, who proposes the view that citizens require a public space in which they are able to conduct a life of activity (*vita activa*) orientated to political goals (Arendt 1958). For Arendt, the “active life” is not characterized by mundane domestic and commercial pursuits but through an ability to improvise and innovate in a public domain which enables this kind of activity to take place. In this space all are equal, as citizens, no matter what their personal background might be (Arendt 1973, pp. 35–41). As citizens, all are entitled to put forward views, to listen to others and (crucially) are able to influence matters of public concern. It could be held that currently social media is a splendid example of what Arendt was advocating back in the mid-twentieth century. But there are two

crucial differences. First, for Arendt, in any authentic public space persons must show themselves, without shame. The public domain is therefore a risky place because there is no hiding behind anonymity. Indeed, for Arendt, speech actions that hid behind a mask defeated the entire purpose of action in a public space. Second, Arendt assumed that public deliberations would not merely take place in an isolated fashion with self-selected members of a group but would be open to all. Arendt, therefore, advocated a political freedom with the strong implication that those who confined themselves to domestic or commercial pursuits were not really exercising their freedom at all. Indeed, a preoccupation with such pursuits was emblematic of a kind of modern tyranny aimed at snuffing out independent political activity; hence her interest in more “heroic” periods such as the American Revolution, the struggle of the Florentine republicans and, in the twentieth century, the emergence of citizen revolutions such as the failed Hungarian uprising against Soviet domination in 1956 (Arendt 1973, p. 112).

Just as the concept of freedom as nondomination has its difficulties, so does the notion of freedom as participation. Perhaps the most obvious one comes to light as soon as one asks: “is there a freedom *not* to participate?” The idea that freedom can be exercised in many ways including, for example, the freedom to devote oneself to one’s own private life as much as possible, is at odds with the participatory perspective. Moreover, the participatory standpoint could also be criticized for proposing a “perfectionist” standpoint if it is saying that one can *only* truly “flourish” as a full human being if one contributes and shares in the common good. Arguably, one of the strengths of traditional liberalism is that it recognizes and understands what might be termed “nonpolitical” freedom and, in defining freedom as absence of interference, also recognizes that noninterference gives a person license to pursue whatever aims he or she wants, irrespective of any supposed good that may (or may not) emanate from those aims. This includes, it should be said, the freedom not to have any aims or life-goals whatsoever (see Hinchliffe 2015, pp. 26–30). However, these considerations need not be fatal for the participatory perspective on liberty. For it could be held that as long as participation is advocated as desirable, but not compulsory, then the wishes of those who desire to devote themselves to a private life will be respected.

Civic Republicanism: Problems and Issues

The previous discussion of the two types of liberty is reflected in most of the analyses on civic republicanism to a greater or lesser degree. This has led Andrew Peterson to distinguish between what he terms “intrinsic republicans” and “instrumental republicans” (Peterson 2011, pp. 57–76). Whereas the former see participation in governance and public life as intrinsically worthwhile, the latter see participation as only instrumental to securing liberties, especially nondomination. An instrumentalist will therefore acknowledge the right of citizens not to participate, if they so wish: but would, nevertheless, strongly advise in favor of participation if only on prudentialist grounds. Peterson’s distinction reflects the tension – possibly

an inevitable tension – between community and liberty. Civic republicanism does not so much solve or dissipate this tension but rather provides scenarios in which this tension can be played out in a productive way. One could imagine, for example, a range of different kinds of republic – some in which citizens eagerly participated in public affairs and others in which participation was seen as a burdensome, but necessary, obligation. Possibly, then, one can envisage different “cultures of liberty” in which some cultures will be strongly individualistic and others may be more communitarian. It should not be too difficult, therefore, to envisage different ways in which the practice of liberty could be enacted without there being only one “true” practice.

A useful perspective on the tensions within the republican perspective has been put forward by Honohan. She suggests that we should reject the traditional liberal dichotomy between public and private person and acknowledge that each person has *both* a private and a public identity: “Public and private are not primarily opposed as two separate sphere, but as different orientations within individuals” (Honohan, p. 158). It follows that one of the virtues or dispositions required by republicanism is that of recognizing the public good, and this disposition may grow and develop in an individual. The perspective that “everyone has both a public and a private interest” (p. 159) is helpful because it is something that all civic republicans could recognize – the fact that each citizen has a public interest (and a public identity) as well as a private one. This commitment to the public interest distinguishes the republican from the liberal; for the latter, it is entirely contingent that a citizen has a public identity. For a republican, this is a requirement for each and every citizen, but for the liberal, the public interest can be managed by the state, leaving the individual to pursue her private pursuits if she so wishes.

Should a republic aim at harmony or encourage a more contestatory political culture? There seems to be some measure of agreement here – namely that vigorous contestation should be regarded as the norm of political discourse and activity. In the *Discourses*, Machiavelli praised the willingness of citizens of Republican Rome to engage in conflict if their liberties seemed threatened (Machiavelli 1960, p. 115) and, indeed, stated that the establishment of liberty could only arise from conflict. Pettit takes up this theme with enthusiasm, calling for “contestatory vigilance” (Pettit 2012, pp. 227–278). The thought here is that despots of whatever hue always encourage peace, quiet, and harmony under the guise of the suppression of liberties. However, a flourishing contestatory culture does not seem to be a requirement for republicanism. Instead, it is not too difficult to envisage a republic whose citizens strive to understand different points of view, motivated by the belief that harmony is something worth cherishing.

Therefore, how should republicans understand the issue of sovereignty? Pettit suggests a distinction between the Continental tradition (of whom Rousseau is an example) and what he terms the Italian-Atlantic tradition. For Rousseau, citizens meeting together formed a single body from which authority and legitimacy flowed. Pettit notes that in this respect, Rousseau was following Hobbes in the belief that sovereignty had to be unique and undivided – a single unity (Pettit 2012, pp. 12–18). Pettit goes on to propose that a mixed constitution is to be preferred and here he

follows the American Founding Fathers in their desire to ensure that sovereignty be distributed in a form of mixed government. The following reflections by Madison are as pertinent today as when he first wrote them down in 1788:

...there are particular moments in public affairs when the people, stimulated by some irregular passion, or some illicit advantage or misled by the artful representations of interested men, may call for measures which they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and condemn. (Hamilton 1970, Paper 63, p. 322)

Thus, Pettit suggests that a mixed form of government is necessary, with separate powers for the judiciary, the Executive to be separated from the legislature and for the latter to be divided (for example, a Senate and a House of Representatives) so that any hasty decisions can be reviewed and scrutinized (Honohan, p. 235).

One issue with contemporary relevance is whether the republic should be confined to, and be identical with, a nation state. Pettit suggests that this is preferable since the possibilities of exercising full control over government and the state might otherwise be diminished (Pettit 2012, pp. 160–166). Honohan, however, takes a different view: she argues that a republic is based on interdependence rather than commonality (p. 189). If we envisage a republic as founded on a shared love of liberty then, arguably, this particular tie between individuals is even more important than shared ethnicity or cultural heritage. This particular question is far from being an academic one, as illustrated by the relation of the United Kingdom to the European Union. In principle, there is no reason why a republic should not share sovereignty with other republics for purposes of common defense, foreign policy, and commerce. But from a republican standpoint, the EU could be seen as problematic in two respects. First, the legislature of the EU cannot of itself initiate legislation, although it can review and veto legislative proposals. Second, the limits of EU sovereignty are to be found in the various pieces of legislation but there is no clear, straightforward statement of the extent and the limits of that sovereignty. These two factors combine to give the EU Commission perhaps greater prominence than one would expect from what is essentially a civil service, even though it is ultimately beholden to the Council of Ministers (the elected representatives of each member state). However, whether these reflections are sufficient to justify leaving the EU (as opposed to trying to reform it by giving the EU Parliament powers to initiate legislation, for example) is quite another matter.

It was noted earlier in this chapter that civic republicanism is distinct from both communitarianism and liberalism. Some further remarks can now be usefully made. For some civic republicans, the role of citizenship must be an active one: this is the view not only of Honohan and Peterson but also that of Pettit, who has elaborated at some length the requirements needed so that citizens are able to actively “control” the state, both in its legislative and executive capacity (Pettit 2012, especially Chap. 3). For other advocates of republicanism, a less active role is possible provided the mechanisms and procedures of mixed government are firmly in place (cf. Skinner (2002) and Hinchliffe (2015)). But whatever these differences in emphasis, it would be fair to say that for all civic republicans the concept of liberty

plays a key and central role. In this respect, republicanism can be seen as a “comprehensive doctrine” in the Rawlsian sense. In his work, *Political Liberalism*, Rawls states that a “comprehensive” doctrine encompasses not only the role of political institutions but also morality and which personal goals are worthwhile having. By contrast, political liberalism assumes the fact of a plurality of comprehensive doctrines held by different groups of people: the task is to find a method of ensuring cooperation between them under conditions of fairness (Rawls 1993). Thus the concept of liberty, according to the Rawlsian perspective, could be said to be a “thin” one in that, unlike republicanism, Rawls does not advocate the pursuit of liberty as a key motivating concern for all citizens, whatever other moral or religious beliefs they might hold. While advocates of republicanism certainly acknowledge the fact of a plurality of doctrines in any modern society, the key shared value is a love of liberty. These shared values are what unite the citizens of a republic. The implication, therefore, is that republicanism is closer to a comprehensive doctrine than it is to political liberalism as such.

Implications for Citizenship Education

How might the ideas of civic republicanism translate into civic education? A brief look at the recent history of civic education in England reveals some of the tensions discussed above. The Advisory Group on Education for Citizenship and the Teaching of Democracy in Schools, chaired by Professor Bernard Crick was set up by the UK government after the election of the Labour Party in 1997; its deliberations are often referred to as the “Crick Report,” which laid down the foundations of modern citizenship education in England. In this report, it is stated:

‘Active citizenship’ is our aim throughout. Part One of this report states the case for positive relationships with the local community, local and national voluntary bodies, whether concerned with local, national or international affairs. (Crick 1998, p. 27)

There is increasing recognition that the ethos, organisation, structures and daily practices of schools, including whole-school activities and assemblies have a significant impact on the effectiveness of citizenship education. (Crick 1998, p. 36)

The suggestion throughout the report is that rights are dependent upon the active exercise of duty within a community framework. Although freedom of the press is mentioned several times, nowhere in the report is there a discussion of freedom or liberty as forming the basis of citizenship. The emphasis throughout is on citizens as members of a community. Although the report is presented in terms of civic republicanism a possible criticism of it is that it is more communitarian in spirit.

Bernard Crick himself did comment subsequently that possibly not all members of the Advisory Group may have known that they were proposing an Aristotelian conception of citizenship (see Crick 2003, pp. 21–22) and goes on to suggest that the “case for active, adult citizenship should not be overstated” (p. 23). Nevertheless, it

was a prescriptive Aristotelianism that did prevail and the notion of citizenship was widened in its actual implementation in schools to include work experience, voluntary work, and any kind of community involvement (see the analysis of citizenship education in action in the England by Lee Jerome (2012), pp. 122, 161–163). Citizenship education, according to Jerome, was enthusiastically adopted by many teachers but there was often an emphasis on practical activities aimed at developing a sense of responsibility and maturity at the expense of discussions on political processes and ideas. While there is much in the Crick Report which is very welcome (for example, the clear statement of curriculum requirements in the recommendations), the emphasis on responsibilities and the requirements of “active citizenship” conveys a clear sense that community is prior to the individual. In the report, the term “responsibilities” occurs twice as much as that of “freedom.”

But while it is true that in England citizenship education often takes the form of volunteering and outdoor activities, it is also the case that the initiative established in 2002 has delivered results that are clearly acceptable from a republican standpoint. Thus in a review of citizenship education, Whitely (Whiteley 2013) reports that the subject had a positive impact on three key components of civic engagement: efficacy, political participation, and political knowledge. Furthermore, the national curriculum for schools provides not only for appropriate knowledge acquisition but also developing reasoning and evaluation capabilities. For Key Stage 3 (i.e., children aged 11–14 years), for example, the national curriculum for citizenship states that:

Teaching should develop pupils’ understanding of democracy, government and the rights and responsibilities of citizens. Pupils should use and apply their knowledge and understanding whilst developing skills to research and interrogate evidence, debate and evaluate viewpoints, present reasoned arguments and take informed action. (Dept of Education)

There is little here, I suggest, with which any republican would wish to quarrel. Given that there is much to be positive about the current provision of citizenship education (at least, in schools), from a civic republican standpoint what else is needed? What appears to be lacking from the curriculum, from a republican standpoint, is a narrative that presents liberty as a central element of the political identity of citizens.

What kind of features might such a narrative contain? Certainly there should be some knowledge of the history of struggles of liberty and how what counts as *subjects* of liberty was progressively expanded. For example, attention needs to be paid to the suffragettes and the role of the antislavery movement in the United States and elsewhere. This would include a narrative of specific figures such as Frederick Douglass and W. Du Bois. But also, attention could be paid to those episodes of history sometimes neglected in schools. As far as Britain is concerned, this would include the English Civil War and the loss of the US colonies a century later. Possibly a historical narrative that has a focus on the rise of citizenship would also spend slightly less time on the Tudors, eminent Victorians and the causes of World War 1. But it *would* include some account of the important stand taken by Churchill in May 1940. Such a narrative – a narrative of liberty – is not easy to present in the

UK because it inevitably involves taking a critical stance regarding the role of Empire, not to mention that of England's first colony – Ireland. British history is complex precisely because the same country can be described *both* in terms that emphasize the growth of empire and subjection *and* the promulgation of ideas of liberty both at home and abroad. This inheritance is still very much alive today: “British values” are a contested domain. Nevertheless, the role of liberty could be emphasized less as a triumph of British supremacy and more as a struggle for self-rule and against domination. Republicans, therefore, would be keen to present (as part of a curriculum) a narrative of liberty which weaves a trajectory through Renaissance Florence and Northern Italy, through to the Putney Debates of 1647 and the struggle for American independence in 1776, up to the present time (there is some limited recognition of this alternative tradition in the mainstream media – see David Marquand, *The Guardian* Dec 2017). One of the features of such a narrative is that it presents an *inclusive* picture of citizens united in struggles against domination. The attitude of American colonists regarding slavery and Cromwell's treatment of Ireland need not be ducked; a critical attitude to a narrative of liberty is no bad thing. Perhaps, through such a narrative, persons will be induced to cultivate a *love* for liberty – a love that is an indelible part of one's identity such that without one's freedom, life is cheapened and sullied.

Such a narrative needs also to cultivate a democratic sensibility. For example, it can sometimes be difficult to understand that a democratic process does not exist simply so that one side can win the argument and vanquish the losers. For a commitment to a *democratic* process is essentially a nonperfectionist commitment: that is, the outcome is almost bound to be less than perfect. If one craves political certainty then engaging in a democratic process is most emphatically *not* the way to achieve it. The commitment to nonperfectionism enshrined in democratic process is fundamental. For the process in question asks participants not to demand certainty; indeed, it asks of them to embrace uncertainty in so far as any outcome achieved is not only not perfect but is also very often provisional. This is because the outcome itself is subject to scrutiny and revision, which applies not only, of course, to policies which are adopted but also to government itself, through regular elections.

The notion that “uncertainty” may play a role in democratic politics can be a difficult lesson to learn for some; but that for which they crave – certainty – democracy can never deliver for them. And those who favor “actions over mere words” as a way of delivering certainty merely exhibit a sensibility which is profoundly undemocratic because, as Hannah Arendt suggests, in democratic governance, words count for everything. Thus, the cultivation of what might be termed “democratic uncertainty” is best placed to undermine the self-certainty and self-entitlement that often accompany prejudice. It introduces the possibility that one's deeply held beliefs are not as obvious as one might assume, that listening to the narratives and personal testimony of others may sow the seeds of doubt, and that there is a virtue in being open to persuasion. Perhaps we need an education which proclaims that, as far as civic affairs are concerned, a degree of uncertainty may be no bad thing. Civic republicans have a strong regard for maintaining and nurturing public institutions that make liberty possible. They understand that the craving for

political certainty may undermine those institutions and leave a large part of the population (the losers in a political debate) permanently disaffected. A skepticism regarding the role of political certainty marks the limits of a contestatory political culture, and this skepticism needs to be reflected in the deliverances of civic education.

Thus a civic education needs to encourage a democratic sensibility that cultivates a degree of uncertainty in its citizens; an awareness that there are rarely easy answers and that one's own principles – and even dearly held prejudices – are subject to revision and examination. In addition, such a sensibility involves acceptance that the implementation of policies will be gradual and experimental so that there is time and space to reflect on the effects and consequences of fresh policy. And above all, it would be a civic education that introduces the notion that an acknowledgement of imperfections and uncertainties is not a sign of weakness but rather signifies the flourishing of a healthy democratic culture.

Conclusion

One of the main strengths of civic republicanism is its strong sense of history. Civic republicans – whatever their differences – see republicanism as a living tradition that stretches back over the centuries. This refusal to disconnect the present from the past gives republicans a critical perspective that is largely lacking in many contemporary liberal democracies. Republicans know how fragile and precious those hard-won liberties are. There are two implications here. The first is that any program of civic education needs to contain a historical narrative in order to sustain the living tradition mentioned earlier. For republicans, history is never just a past, remote series of disjointed events that have only a contingent connection with the present. Thus the recovery of the republican tradition by historians such as Quentin Skinner needs to have a resonance in the political culture more generally. Whereas, in England it is fair to say that the struggles and issues of the seventeenth century civil war (for example) are nowadays little known and discussed in public debate. It has become the preserve of a few specialists and enthusiasts for re-enacting historical battles. The wider implications of seventeenth century republicanism are seldom discussed and certainly do not figure very strongly in the current national curriculum.

The second implication of developing republicanism as a living tradition is that we may be able to see political debate in a different light. That is, we may learn to see debate as educative in itself, as a way of developing political education. The thought here is not that adversarial politics should be discouraged but that through listening to political opponents one might actually learn something. This, after all, is the point of dialogue: not simply to score points but to avail oneself of different points of view and benefit accordingly. To this extent, civic education does not merely take the form of a subject in the curriculum but is rather part of a wider culture in which political education is shared by all. This was certainly the belief of Madison and Hamilton back in the 1780s – we can still learn much from those gentlemen.

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Arendt, Citizenship, and Education

5

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Abstract

This chapter focuses on Arendt's notion of a republic of citizens united by a plural collective public arena. First, we clarify that, for Arendt, authentic self-determination means cooperatively bringing the human aptitude for action to refer to whatever is inaccurate in the joint arrangements. Political realms where individuals represent themselves materialize whenever citizens constitute them. The collaborative, disorganized architecture of the council system (an inverted political structure centered on local legislative bodies that are accessible to all individuals and so enable them to be involved in the government) functions as a series of interlinked arenas for democratic purposes and as a catalyst for emphasizing the meaning of the citizens' community. What concerns power is the protest of individuals – their vigorous demonstrations in public spaces to

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convince other people of their ideas. Second, we observe that, for Arendt, educational action supplies individuals with a withdrawal from the deep-rooted, shaping, multiple self. The substance of politics is action as laws and institutions provide the fabric for action that can demand underlying relevance, self-containedness, and thus freedom. Individuals are plural beings who aim to perform and to reveal themselves, requiring a political arena of actualization to do so. As individuals are social, political action is a question of cooperation between peers. Individuals are outstanding when they exhibit their distinct individualities in the public arena. Citizens acting cooperatively identify among themselves an efficiency somewhat inconsistent with their individual resources. Third, we hold that, for Arendt, the public educational sphere cannot be established in official and actual terms but becomes a reality when individuals participate in action in relation to human meaning. Human status, i.e., the right to citizenship, represents a transcendent standard. In the public sphere, the social self must be permanently assertive.

Keywords

Educational citizenship · Individual · Political realm · Action · Democracy

Introduction

Arendt's goal of authentic citizenship education is rigorous and ambitious: individuals can cohabit as a principled and human collective mainly when unbounded morality and material interests do not influence the purpose and the character of politics. Politics deprived of the appeals of the body and conscience may eventually satisfy the real moral and material concerns of individuals in satisfactory ways for them. Suitably grasped and implemented, politics provides a framework for personality, integrates reality into ordinary existence (Mihăilă et al. 2016), supplies the infrastructure of community, and furthers the accomplishment of human excellence. The reality of political life (Lăzăroiu 2017a,b) represents a phenomenon which can be comprehended chiefly in the discourse individuals employ in the public space. For Arendt, the concept of self-government as public action in the form of communication and performance between citizens provides the starting place of politics (Nica 2017). The objective of politics is to supply a public realm in which individuals can perform remarkably (Buckler 2011) and can display themselves as citizens in their action. Imagination, essential to the mechanisms of action and judgment, by facilitating political participants and onlookers to conceptualize a new realm that is in contradistinction to the social interactions that exist (Tyner 2017), can be instrumental here as it is the mental capacity specifically appropriate to the investigation of politics and history that rely for their actuality and significance (Lăzăroiu 2013) on the human mind's ability to think logically beyond common judgment (Arendt 1961). Politics constitutes the routine of civic life mitigated by a fashionable responsiveness to the demands of imagination and meaning, politics and human

meaning are feasible primarily with the accomplishment of freedom, and in its legitimate and imaginative aspects, politics develops on the foundation of self-government (Dossa 1989).

The main contribution this chapter has to mainstream educational thinking on Arendt is by clarifying her notion of a republic of citizens united by a plural collective public arena, together with the implications of her thinking for citizenship education. We show how her relationship between political engagement and public pedagogy articulates a convincing approach to the values of democratic pedagogy and how her concept of phenomenology of action in the public sphere shapes the morality of politically shared citizenship education.

Educational Citizenship Behavior: Arendt's Notion of a Republic of Citizens United by a Plural Collective Public Arena

As Arendt clarifies, authentic self-determination means cooperatively bringing the human aptitude for action to refer to whatever is inaccurate in the collective arrangements. Becoming a self-governing citizen necessitates realism, the dissatisfied identification both of a person's genuine, exemplary self and of his/her socially assigned categories. Educational society, training citizens for actively responsible roles, is a dynamic, self-ruling agent purposeful in managing individuals, assimilating them, and rendering them vulnerable. The social endangers and eventually consumes privacy and public life. The social is a totality of individuals who regulate themselves in such a manner (Curtis 2001) that they cannot dictate the large-scale outcome of their activities. The social (as self-seeking assimilationism) may be improved and become ubiquitous largely with the disintegration of society (as a class system of reputation and rating). The social is a double menace, threatening both distinctive personality and unplanned action (Arendt 1963a). Institutional structures are not physical procedures, comprising the patterned behavior and the connections between their actors (Mihăilă et al. 2016), but they have a definite determination or inertia, intimidating non-compliant participants. Institutional structures significantly impede the matters of instrumentality, culpability, necessity, and independence and consequently the prospects for invalidating the social (Pitkin 1998).

It is clear from the foregoing that the tremendous threat of modernity is that individuals are unceasingly releasing further cataclysm, activating pseudo-natural energies that may destroy civilization. Irrationally, individuals can subvert humanism, employing their power to degrade themselves and any other people to something unhuman. The destiny of stateless individuals proves that the universal human rights that should belong to human beings can basically be demanded by citizens. Arendt writes that the economic growth has brought about the contrived compulsion of modern society (Nica 2017), in which individuals are excessively captivated by consumption to be implicated in citizenship education. Individuals can thoroughly carry out their identity as human beings (Lăzăroiu 2017a,b) first and foremost in the public arena. Arendt (1963a) posits that human beings are not mechanical devices: they are not confined to ordinary expected behavior (Nica 2018), and their endeavors

cannot be comprised by the idea of pursuing means in relation to an objective. Personal morality cannot offer adequate protection against political evil. Action as speech is legitimate politics, consonance and compliance establish republics, and cooperation creates power (Canovan 1992).

Arendt asserts that citizens find again their interconnection and their own assessment through being seen and heard by other individuals. Political realms where individuals represent themselves materialize whenever citizens constitute them. The collaborative, disorganized architecture of the council system functions as a series of interlinked arenas for democratic purposes (Mihăilă et al. 2016) and as a catalyst for emphasizing the meaning of the citizens' community. Individuals are born not as separate persons (Nixon 2015), but into communities. There cannot be an educational democracy without perpetually jointed diversity. Current technologies necessitate accurate appraisal for their capacity to subdue plurality. The social issue of pauperism restores the state to the governance of citizens as if they were inanimate (Lane 2001).

The ideas discussed here imply that polls, like pointless requests for donation, indicate either having been defeated or been deceived of one's point of view. The absolute control of totalitarian governments (their eradication of human self-government) was the advent of pervasive malevolence in the world. While humans are collective, the privilege to be autonomous (Topolski 2008) is the completion of political revolution. The educational abilities to perform and to communicate are the essential requirements of political freedom. Arendt thinks that a gulf swiftly broke open between former times and time ahead when the extension of established norms traversing the passage of time (Lăzăroiu 2013) was silenced by the previously unanticipated political atrocities of totalitarianism (Arendt 1951). This gulf is deficient in all spatial elements, including depth, as it is immeasurable. In the crevasse of complete extermination, no settlement is feasible. If Christian belief had been widespread across the twentieth century, its apprehensiveness of purgatory would have hampered the dreadfulness of totalitarian oppression (Kohn 2018).

Arendt points out that totalitarianism denotes a kind of government that, no longer endorsing the confined goals of classical tyranny, requires ceaseless involvement of its subjects and does not allow society to stabilize into a long-lasting, stratified order (Arendt 1951). Totalitarian dictatorship governs through absolute intimidation; pursues, by use of the secret police forces, neutral opponents who are generally not subjective contestants of, or authentic menaces to, the regime; provides a wide-ranging ideological fabric that condenses the intricacy of life in a definite, indubitable, reality-resistant prerequisite that tolerates no cognitive disharmony; and is established on a practice of mass plethora accompanying the increasing freedom of movement (Nica 2017), vulnerability, and "worldlessness" of present-day individuals. Totalitarian governments, instead of stabilizing the moment they acquire complete authority over the state, are set in motion perpetually toward world oppression (Arendt 1951). Their domestic citizenries are constantly catalyzed (Mihăilă et al. 2016) through armed conflicts, offensives, combats, or suppressions. The decision of the chief and that of the citizens must steadily be carried out to bring about the intolerable, oppose regression, and quicken the trajectory of the world in the direction of its disastrous, if never achieved, completion (Baehr 2010).

The line of reasoning throughout the above discussion is consistent with the notion that to be political is equivalent with the claim to high standard and human status. Between individuals who share a collective realm (Lăzăroiu 2017a,b), excellence can be obtained in politics. In the human circumstances in which citizens find themselves, such high standard stressed openly is the best individuals can and should aim, that is, the human good – a mundane one to be differentiated from intrinsically unworldly moral and natural goods. Such a worldly good is simultaneously a transcendent one. Politics needs criteria of action: outstanding acts which traverse the design of structured behavior (Arendt 1969). Political theory is a distinct manner of conceptualizing the world, exactly as politics constitutes a particular mode of collective existence. Arendt (1951) points out that educational politics is the construction of the predominant or underlying reality wherever individuals cohabit in a regulated way; counterbalances the norms inherent in the notion of character, in either its ethical or appetitive sense; and sets up the constructive grounds of symbolic and factual order: it defines the nature and the boundaries of human connections in the shared realm. According to Arendt, in and through politics, individuals are indebted to an unambiguous inventory of rights (Lăzăroiu 2013; Popescu 2018), moral obligations, and social accountabilities. Reality and fundamental cohesion are two facets of a well-defined configuration of shared life (politics). In its authentic sense, self-government represents a political phenomenon. For Arendt, the concept of reality is inherently associated with that of autonomy: at this level politics represents the confirmation and the developing of freedom into an unbiased reality. Surprisingly, self-government is as much the influential impetus of politics as it constitutes a possible menace to its reality. As politics is inconceivable without the truthfulness of human self-government, then autonomy is impossible outside the configuration of ultimate accountability which politics determines (Dossa 1989).

The Plurality of Individuals and the Political Realm Between Them

As Arendt puts it, the rights of individual cannot be detached from those of the citizen. Without inclusion in a collective of citizens, the rights of individual do not have an objective reality. The rights of individual are to the greatest extent for people who hold the rights of the citizen, that is, persons who are members of a prearranged group, which is the requirement for the right of free speaking and action. Centered on the quality of public instruction, educational politics is based on a power that cannot be shared (Nica 2017) and should not be regulated. Political freedom is deferred for a few individuals, despite the fact that politics has implications for all citizens. The political elite encompasses persons in public positions who were neither selected from above nor backed from below. It can be argued their prerogatives to these roles depend exclusively on their drive for public contentment and self-determination and on their aptitudes to serve such goals. Arendt (1969) holds that autonomous governments should not accomplish administrative duties (Mihăilă et al. 2016), and the revolutionary councils should not have felt compelled to do so. A power might emerge from the concerted action of citizens who can produce and express beliefs

particular to each individual, to challenge such points of view and to proceed with each other regardless of their dissimilarities. The defiance of discrepancies is indispensable to the survival of public realm as an arena of manifestation of individual freedom (Colliot-Thélène 2018).

These considerations suggest that righteous political undertaking should be distinguished from personal morality that does not cover the public sphere (Nica 2018) but links between private individuals or the connection of a human being with himself/herself. Educational politics has a specific morality, emerging from the circumstances of action among plural individuals. Arendt (1969) contends the citizen migrates from private to public sphere without leaving distinctiveness behind. The citizens populate the same public realm, share its joint interests, recognize its standards, and are immersed in its maintenance (Mihăilă 2017) and in attaining a functioning concession when they are dissimilar. Individuals are plural beings, distinct persons capable of ceaseless disillusion. Arendt states that totalitarian terror deprives individuals of their plurality and freedom for the purpose of degrading them to an animal species (Arendt 1951). Individuals are implausibly to be thoroughly human (Lăzăroiu 2017a,b) without populating a man-made realm in addition to inhabiting the natural earth. The arena in which reality emerges is the public and political realm which plural individuals can constitute among themselves. Arendt (1969) remarks that plurality enables reality to be assimilated. Self-determination is the practical knowledge of the reality in the arena cleared by the diverse perspectives of plural individuals who expose among them a realm in which reality may emerge and be perceived from all sides (Canovan 1992).

Arendt remarks that educational political power is not brought about by individuals discussing with their companions about themselves, their kinsfolk, or their occupations. What concerns power is the protest of individuals, their demonstration with vigor in public to convince other people of their ideas. An event is non-discriminatory, it clashes numerous citizens (Mihăilă et al. 2016), and its aftereffects influence a mass of various individuals. The effectualness comprised within an event is the capacity of people who identify their endowment to render it manageable. The prerequisite of that manageability is political commonalty (accomplished public sphere), from which the characteristic or image of human injustice is canceled out. The council structure of governance is the positive antithesis to totalitarianism (Kohn 2018). Embracing an existential idea of Judaism, Arendt brings to light a concealed established practice within the awareness of the pariah and analyzes the issue of the Jewish people's political system. The destiny of Judaism should be defined politically and culturally by all Jews. Arendt condemns the position of the Jewish Councils throughout the Holocaust and has reservations about the human readiness for autonomy of action (Markell 2006) under totalitarian circumstances (Arendt 1951). Jewry should abandon the notorious historical patterns, both the fashionable ones to the extent that they entail integration, in addition to established religious models insofar as they mean following religious laws or focusing on folklore. Arendt's opinion that the ecclesiastical and cultural works of art from Germany and Eastern Europe should arrive finally primarily in Israel is an issue of traditional government in conjunction with political realism (Knott 2017).

The discussion above has shown that totalitarianism encompasses a bizarre mix of fearfulness and ideology, while its targets, once authentic enemies are exterminated, constitute notably social categories. Terror is absolute insofar as no individual is informed who will be the next casualty, notwithstanding how obedient they are (Arendt 1951). Totalitarianism was especially a movement and a range of institutions, and not a system of notions. Totalitarian governments are the exact opposite of bureaucracy (Nica 2017), as they allow no space for positive law, cohesion, or expectedness. Such regimes set free relentless, tumultuous movements. Totalitarian societies are classless. On Arendt's reading, concentration camp prisoners are entirely vulnerable and, without agency, excepting their general human features of extemporaneity, plurality, and untrustworthiness that the regime vigorously endeavors to eradicate. Arendt focuses on the educational public sphere as an arena in which political participants can convey their legitimacy (Lăzăroiu 2013), lending relevance and implication to an, in different circumstances, ephemeral, private existence. Indignation is fundamentally a non-political approach. Insofar as indignant individuals repudiate the world and its shortcomings, they are enthralled by the elaborate assertions of totalitarian movements (Baehr 2010).

Arendt notes that totalitarianism is not demarcated by its broad ill-treatment of freedom (as regarding tyranny), but by its revelation that self-government can be employed to eradicate its own requirements of permanence: plurality and individuality. Totalitarianism represents a practice in the invalidation of autonomy and self-control and the discretionary mastery of citizens. Freedom is the archetypal element of the public-political sphere (Popescu 2018) and fundamentally is equivalent with action in which freedom is reified as a mundane event, as differentiated from a conceptual claim to educational self-government (Arendt 1951). Human existence demands that a universal component triggers the uniqueness of historical expression. Unconstrained relativism and the nonexistence of a pecking order in knowledge and awareness impede both human significance and moral boundaries. The new foundation of judgment and assistance should be identified in the sphere of human affairs. As the former times of citizens' present is a testimony of predictability and violence, the articulation and the criteria of the original starting point are instrumental in the exploration of the new politics. Arendt (1951) insists that the educational public sphere, a contrived array of activities (Mihăilă et al. 2016), sets up its specific realm against the imperative and incessant claims of nature. The latter is constantly imminent in invading the public sphere physically and spiritually, as it is the personification of the organic energy which is the origin of corporeal life, but detrimental to authentic human life. Arendt (1951) points out that the link between nature and politics is stringently opposed. Distinguishing the persistent properties of individuals in relation to their previous times or projected future (Nica 2018) does not preclude unanticipated actions by people. A general human character, or one corresponding to the attributes of objects things, does not typify citizens. The evil that individuals do is attributable to the inconsistent character of their collective public life. Arendt (1969) explains that the nature of individuals is intrinsically and enduringly volatile and questionable. Individuals are shaped up by the behavior of other persons, by natural facts, and by deeds. People and things constitute the

circumstances of life, without determining it. Human existence is an assimilated practice collectively: no citizen can live uncooperatively or function as a sovereign person. To know human character means to know individuals in the human condition that however does not personify the entirety of the nature of man (Dossa 1989).

Arendt's Phenomenology of Action, the Morality of Politically Shared Citizenship Education, and the Public Sphere

Arendt observes that educational action supplies individuals with a withdrawal from the deep-rooted, shaping, multiple self. The substance of politics is action. Laws and institutions provide the fabric for action that can demand underlying relevance, self-containedness, and thus freedom. Political action goes beyond the moral standards that regulate traditional human behavior. The political undertaking and speech of individuals are archetypal, self-contained activities. Political action is citizens' most illusory (Popescu 2017) and revealing activity. The phenomenality of the public sphere is the chief constitutive requirement of its meaningfulness. The public space is a domain unto itself (Lăzăroiu 2013), disconnected by a broad gap from the concerns and aspirations that constitute civil society. Arendt remarks that with the advent of the underprivileged on the political arena, the public sphere and the self-determination characteristic to it are overpowered by the stream of unsatisfied human demands (Mihăilă et al. 2016) released from their space of concealment. Provided that biological necessity constitutes an intricate feature of the human condition (Arendt 1958), autonomy is achievable by and large via the rigorous demarcation of endeavors involving the life process and activities covering politics. The political community is a mechanism toward the completion of self-government. The performative nature of action offers the circumstances of action's inherent meaning or value and its self-determination and materiality (Villa 1996).

The above arguments suggest that the activity of the mind is a collectively dialogic practice that takes place outside, or beyond the bounds of, the practical realm of the ordinary life citizens share with others. The requirement to abandon the community is as much an indispensable component of the human condition (Nica 2017) as the obligation to be present in the community (Arendt 1958). Thinking is a private, apolitical undertaking that occurs in addition to ordinary practical affairs. Through *praxis* individuals create their realm (Schutz 2002), an arena that in concert gathers citizens together as one person and disconnects each of them as people (Duarte 2001).

When Arendt displays distinctive individuality as the critical value to which undertaking is a channel, practical repercussions appear quite insignificant. Fellow individuals constitute a public before whom the separate participant performs, aiming to do something remarkable and attain perpetuity through them. When Arendt displays educational action as the authentic objective, which presumes distinctive individuality as a channel, fellow individuals perform as co-participants rather than constituting a public (Mihăilă et al. 2016), and politics deals chiefly with establishing and supporting the collective realm, and not with oneself. The single

most important aspect to grasp about individuals is the capacity for performance (Mihăilă 2017), which is invariably and unquestionably distinct. Thinking, as a self-governing individual, encompasses constituting and pursuing one's own judgment and nevertheless paying attention to and showing consideration for the ideas of one's fellow individuals (Pitkin 1998).

According to this discussion, individuals are plural beings who aim to perform and to reveal themselves, requiring a political arena of actualization so as to do it. As individuals are plural, political action is a question of cooperation between peers. Arendt observes that individuals are outstanding when they exhibit their distinct individualities (Gordon 2001) in the public arena. Citizens acting cooperatively identify among themselves an efficiency somewhat inconsistent with their individual resources. Educational action is the stage of human self-determination. Arendt insists that autonomy is a condition in which individuals unceasingly reunite in vibrant association. The assent on which an autonomous government depends is a type of collective accountability holding together plural human beings who share obligation for their joint affairs. The power a government puts into effect is lent to it by the undertakings of its citizens (Popescu 2017), especially by their consent to accomplish orders. Common agreement is the most important component of political power. Republican equality is a characteristic of the political realm between individuals who populate the same governmental space (Canovan 1992).

Arendt assiduously disputes any concept of world government, as possibly the utmost imaginable reign of terror. In council structures of government, the lack of restrictions to migrate, to ponder, and to enforce would be in process at each level, even though power would be brought about to a large extent in the main levels' accountability for the accomplishment of the obligations of the supervisory levels. Council governments would make possible a collective realm, one really brimming over with concerns and being positioned between the world's mass of citizens (Popescu 2018), relating them as dynamic people while preserving enough space between them so that each can address other persons from his or her distinct perspective. This intermediate space would be present in any council structure and in a multiplicity of similar systems of governance (Arendt 1969). Council systems enable citizens to relate as peers in the arena of ideas and of goods of consumption and functionality. The intense cognizance of political fairness would impede discrimination by law (Lăzăroiu 2013) and legitimize and substantiate its absence thoroughly. The council structure of governance would crush the established idea of state sovereignty. Arendt claims that the process of rationalization is the requirement of comprehending events that make increasingly less sense in their display on the exteriority of the world. The meaning of what has taken place is instrumental in making sense of what is occurring. A sensed moment, contrasted with simply impermanent occasions, supplies the cohesion from which individuals can cooperate into the indefinite future (Kohn 2018).

This strongly suggests that educational ideology is a kind of cognition that is inferable and advances by deriving everything from that premise. The individual dominated by an ideology ponders in relation to stereotypes and to logical consistency. Instead of logic being a backing to rational reasoning, it is a surrogate of it

(Mihăilă 2017), as anything that seems to defy totalitarian logic is marginalized (Arendt 1951). Ideology represents a manacle of the consciousness, a cerebral constraint that obstructs the natural thinking mechanism, coercing the participants who claim to advocate it. Monopolistic party and plural party procedures are, in numerous decisive aspects, antithetical, but in the indifference they pursue in their individuals (Roberts-Miller 2002), and in the manipulative function they conferred to leaders, they are quite similar. On Arendt's reasoning, educational politics covers action under circumstances of plurality, whereas aggression is the diametric counterpart of politics. Citizens who disdain voting, or who vote infrequently, are not dissatisfied with the system intrinsically by its very nature (Mihăilă et al. 2016): they may unreservedly feel that political procedures function satisfactorily adequate without them and that modern times are pretty acceptable. Likewise, it is an inaccuracy to infer that such persons are not honorable citizens. In the political realm, individuals meet as officially unprejudiced persons who populate a world conjointly, regardless of disagreeing in myriad other ways (Baehr 2010).

Arendt holds that the educational public sphere cannot be established in official and actual terms and turns into a reality when individuals participate in action due to human meaning. Human status represents a transcendent standard. To be rightly human, individuals should attempt to accomplish what is exemplary in them (Euben 2001), and if the undertaking of high standards involves insensitiveness and aggressiveness against other individuals, then that is unreasonable and deplorable but eventually justifiable (Arendt 1968). The aim of politics necessitates no rationale beyond itself as the routine of politics permits citizens to be autonomous (Popescu 2017), demand human status, and attain distinct personal identities. Such virtues possibly intrinsic in politics are feasible enough to cherish politics more than anything else in the shared life of citizens. Arendt emphasizes that, although the aim of politics is intrinsic (Nica 2017), the virtues which exonerate politics are external as individuals regard them highly in their connections. The public nature of these virtues makes them political ones. Individuals are naturally and persistently unequal excepting in the sphere of politics. The fairness that people experience in community is a responsibility of their citizenship education (Popescu 2018), of their acceptance into the public-political space. Equality keeps going provided that individuals remain citizens and political actors. Reality constitutes the democratic judgment of the citizens regarding the legitimacy and pertinence of whatever takes place in the public arena, whereas politics represents the human assessment of reality. The public facet of human existence rehabilitates life's natural meaninglessness and enriches the historical accomplishments of individuals with meaning (Dossa 1989).

Conclusions

Arendt highlights that citizens are typically social participants, public people in the fearless mould, that is, persons possessed of the suffering spirit, exasperated by typical criteria of excellence and morality in quest of success. Public citizenship

education is the starting place of the human sense of veracity and personal uniqueness (Mihăilă 2017), justifying human freedom and liberating individuals from the unexciting and relentless ineffectiveness (Popescu 2017) of ordinary life. Citizenship education demands that the participants be constantly aggressive in the private realm of his life. To discontinue aggression is to risk oppression by other people, loss of self-government, and thus the likelihood of action and politics (Arendt 1963b). In the public sphere, the social self must be permanently assertive. In politics the citizen participates as ruler or as subject. Citizenship education does not thoroughly necessitate or involve the employment of the moral faculty (Mihăilă et al. 2016), despite the fact that the high probability that the individual is also a moral being. Arendt (1963b) concludes that the citizen carries out his moral judgment as a private person, not as a citizen (Nica 2018), on the grounds that moral judgment is a private issue between an individual and his conscience (Dossa 1989). Political education does not deteriorate as moral-emotional discourse, because empathy has a valuable role in the maturing of political agency (Zembylas 2018).

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Rousseau on Citizenship and Education

6

Bjorn Gomes

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Abstract

This chapter examines the ideas of Jean-Jacques Rousseau on the relationship between citizenship and education. The section “Citizenship in Rousseau’s Thought” offers a sketch of Rousseau’s political ideas and his understanding of the nature, requirements, and duties of citizenship. Section “Amour-propre and the Challenges to Citizenship” explains why education is required to form citizens. The chief reason for this turns on Rousseau’s view of the passion of amour-propre, which, once inflamed, impedes the development of civic virtue and the performance of citizen duty. In Rousseau’s thought, education has among its principal aims the prevention of amour-propre’s development into its inflamed variant. Section “Rousseau’s Educational Project(s): Domestic and Civic” outlines Rousseau’s educational project and scholarly disagreements about how we are to understand it. One influential interpretation holds that Rousseau offers us two distinct models of education – domestic and civic – which are opposed to one another. A second, more recent interpretation holds that the two models can be read as parts of a single scheme. The section examines arguments for both

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interpretations before proceeding to discuss the details of Rousseau's educational project under the second interpretation.

Keywords

Rousseau · Citizenship · Education · Amour propre

Introduction

In the middle of the *Discourse on Political Economy*, an *Encyclopédie* entry published in 1755, Jean-Jacques Rousseau tells the reader that “[t]he fatherland cannot subsist without freedom, nor freedom without virtue, nor virtue without citizens. You will have all these if you form citizens; without doing so, you will have only wicked slaves, beginning with the leaders of the state” (*PE* 154). In this statement, Rousseau not only reminds his readers of the great importance of virtuous citizens to a flourishing republic, he also puts forth an idea that would be central to his political philosophy, that citizens are not born but raised. The nature of, and relationship between, citizenship and education form the central concerns of this chapter. In what follows, we shall examine Rousseau's views on citizenship and education more closely and highlight, whenever possible, some of the more contentious debates surrounding them in the vast and growing literature on the Genevan's thought.

Citizenship in Rousseau's Thought

Establishing Rousseau's views on citizenship and education must begin with a sketch of his political ideas, which come most clearly to light in the *Social Contract*. The work contains Rousseau's proposed solution to the problem of finding “a form of association that defends and protects the person and goods of each associate with all the common force, and by means of which each one, uniting with all, nevertheless obeys only himself and remains as free as before” (*SC* I:vi, 138). The solution, at the most general level, involves a republican form of association constituted by a separation of the legislative and executive powers of the state. The executive branch of the republic – the government – is responsible only for interpreting and executing the laws defined by a general will (*volonté générale*) expressed through the legislative efforts of the sovereign body. The Sovereign, by contrast, is composed of the people actively exercising their law-making powers in concert; it is a moral being “to whom the social pact gave existence, and all of whose wills bear the name of laws” (*SW*, 73). It is not difficult to appreciate the radical nature of Rousseau's project, for he wants to claim that since laws are the expressions of a Sovereign body constituted by members of the body politic on the one hand, and since no individual's will can be represented on the other, *all citizens* are required to engage in the legislative functions of the state. Unlike representative democracies where

citizens typically vote in parliamentary or congressional representatives to make laws on their behalf, citizens in Rousseau's ideal republic must bear that responsibility themselves and must do so directly in their own persons.

Two central questions follow from the discussion above. Why does Rousseau require citizens to perform the arguably difficult task of lawmaking and what exactly does he mean by the general will? Let us take these questions in turn. Now, we have already seen that the social compact is, in part, Rousseau's proposed solution to the issue of how "each one, uniting with all, [can] nevertheless obey[] only himself and remain[] as free as before." Although Rousseau gives us varying accounts of what freedom consists in, the most relevant definition for our present purposes is that freedom involves *not being subject to the will of another*. As he describes it, "liberty consists less in doing one's will than in not being subject to someone else's; it also consists in not subjecting someone else's will to ours" (*LM*, 260–261). In a true republic governed by laws, citizens are not subject to the will of others but only to democratically agreed upon laws. Yet if laws are made only by a subset of the citizenry and applied to the rest, those not involved in the legislative project could be rendered subject to the former's will, leaving them without the very freedoms the social compact is supposed to actualize and defend. To avoid being subject to laws made by others and having those laws be externally imposed upon them (thus subjecting them to the wills of others), citizens must all participate in making the laws that are to govern the republic. Obeying a law I have made for myself, in short, leaves me free.

It is very important that in voting on the laws, citizens are not to vote in accordance with the particular or private interests they have as individuals; this would amount to a mere sum of individual preferences, the will of all. Moreover, because laws are general rules and apply to all members of the political association, voting on the lines of one's *private* interests can be seen as an attempt to subject associates to those interests. Rousseau's republican vision, devised as it is to circumvent these problems, requires individuals to vote as members of the sovereign body, purely in terms of their citizen identity. "Indeed," Rousseau tells us, "each individual can, as a man, have a private will contrary to or differing from the general will he has as a Citizen. His private interest can speak to him quite differently from the common interest" (*SC* I:vii, 140–141). The general will, in contrast to the will of all, looks to the *common good*. Because it tends to the common good – the good of every member of the republic (of which each is a part) – there is a vital sense in which voting in accordance with the *volonté générale* still aims at one's own good even when it runs counter to one's private interests. "In authentic acts of legislation," then, "a citizen does not vote for all by voting for himself but 'votes for himself by voting for all'" (Gomes 2018, p. 203; Putterman 2010, p. 11). While this is so, placing the common good above one's own personal good is no simple undertaking, given especially the frailties of the human condition (to be detailed in the next section). It requires no small measure of effort and no small degree of virtue. If individuals in a republic are to place the common good above their own, they must possess virtue, that is, they must be *citizens*. And since civic virtue is not a natural endowment, citizens must be *made*. In making these associations, we are returned to

the statement posed at the beginning of this chapter and have accounted for why “[t]he fatherland cannot subsist without freedom, nor freedom without virtue, nor virtue without citizens.”

This said, we are still without an account of what the general will – the will of a republic expressed through the lawmaking activities of its citizens – consists in. David Lay Williams, in his inspired study of the *Social Contract*, remarks that “[a]mong the many potential frustrations confronting readers of the *Social Contract* is the simple fact that Rousseau never commits to spelling out the meaning of his most important concept, the general will, in anything approaching a straightforward or analytic fashion” (Williams 2014, p. 245). In their efforts to make sense of this vital concept, interpreters disagree strongly on “whether or not the general will is largely a formal or procedural concept on the one hand, or a substantive one on the other” (Williams 2014, p. 250). On the procedural reading, the content of the general will is determined by a set of procedures concerning how laws ought to be made (Sreenivasan 2000). The will, by itself, has no particular content and aims at no particular value or set of values. Certainly, Rousseau places a number of procedural constraints on lawmaking. He insists, for example, that the general will “should come from all to apply to all” (the double generality rule) where this means that all citizens must vote on rules that apply to every member of the republic. The general will “loses its natural rectitude when it is directed toward any individual, determinate object” (*SC* II:iv, 149). He requires, moreover, that deliberation occur in the absence of communication – citizens do not actually discuss their views on legislative proposals but reflect (deliberate) on them individually so as to avoid having their views be swayed by factions or private interests – and that they be asked “not precisely whether they approve or reject the proposal, but whether it does or does not conform to the general will that is theirs” (*SC* IV:ii, 201). The content of the general will is simply the result of lawmaking subject to these procedural constraints.

Conversely, other interpreters have argued that “while the formal criteria of the general will are necessary conditions for generating a general will, Rousseau also associates that will with specific substantive ideas” (Williams 2014, p. 254). According to Williams (2014, pp. 257–262), Rousseau’s account of the general will encompasses three “tightly related” substantive values: “justice, goodness and equality.” Justice consists in universal principles of morality prescribing standards of conduct governing right and wrong, good and bad. Rousseau is not, of course, blind to the cultural differences of the world, but he insists that in spite of these differences, the principles of right underwriting these culturally diverse societies are nevertheless similar. Justice, moreover, “is inseparable from goodness” and can be understood as “the love of order which preserves order” (whereas goodness involves “the love of order that produces order”) (*E* 444). A true republic built on fraternal bonds where citizens are deeply attached to one another and to the republic constitutes one such order, and it follows from this that justice “involves the love of one’s fellow citizens” (Williams 2014, p. 260). Finally, equality stands as a central element of justice. Justice as equality involves, on the one hand, recognizing the political and legal equality of citizens, and having “a commitment to economic equality” on the other. Economic equality is significant because vast disparities in wealth can not only lead

to the moral corruption of citizens, they also reveal, or make possible and likely, an environment of exploitation where the poor become subject to the tyranny of the wealthy (Williams 2014, p. 262). Now, given Rousseau's ideas concerning the great virtues of citizenship, the general will and a healthy republic, and their importance to freedom and justice, we might ask ourselves why Rousseau views the making of citizens and the establishing of republics as rare and difficult enterprises. His reason for this is that:

It is too late to change our natural inclinations when they have become entrenched, and habit has been combined with amour-propre. It is too late to draw us out of ourselves once the *human self* concentrated in our hearts has acquired that contemptible activity that absorbs all virtue and constitutes the life of petty souls. How could love of fatherland develop in the midst of so many other passions stifling it? And what is left for fellow-citizens of a heart already divided among greed, a mistress, and vanity? (*PE* 155).

The problem, as Rousseau sees it, lies in the passions of the human subject. More precisely, it lies in particular with the passion of amour-propre. In the next section, we shall examine the passion in greater detail. Doing so will allow us to understand why citizens need to be formed through a process of education.

Amour-propre and the Challenges to Citizenship

To understand what amour-propre is, we need to first begin with Rousseau's clearest statement on the passion, which he contrasts with the innate passion of self-love (amour de soi-même):

Amour-propre and love of oneself (amour de soi-même), two passions very different in their Nature and their effects, must not be confused. Love of oneself is a natural sentiment which inclines every animal to watch over its own preservation, and which, directed in man by reason and modified by pity, produces humanity and virtue. Amour-propre is only a relative sentiment, artificial and born in Society, which inclines each individual to have a greater esteem for himself than for anyone else, inspires in men all the harm they do to one another, and is the true source of honor (*SD* 91).

There are, certainly, rather complex debates about the meaning and nature of amour-propre in Rousseau's works (Dent 1988; Cooper 1999; O'Hagan 1999; Neuhaus 2008; Kolodny 2010; McLendon 2014). Laurence Cooper suggests, for example, that the "great difference between it [amour-propre] and amour de soi is simply that in amour-propre, the desire for one's own good necessarily includes the desire to esteem oneself." It is "self-valuation, or the need for self-esteem" which "lies at the heart of amour-propre" (Cooper 1999, pp. 137–138). This reading, it should be said at the outset, does not have the deep textual support required to recommend it, if only for the reason that Rousseau never quite puts the distinction in those terms. At issue here is the rendering of amour-propre as a desire or need for *self-esteem*. In his immensely important and influential study of amour-propre in

Rousseau's thought, Frederick Neuhouser calls attention to the perceived error of Cooper's description, remarking that the passion is not mainly a matter of needing or desiring self-esteem. Rather, it is more suitable to understand the passion as the desire for the esteem or recognition *of others*, of those surrounding us in our inescapably social world. The great distinction between the two passions lies, then, not only in amour-propre's social sources in contrast to amour de soi's innate roots, but in the *relative* nature of the former passion, which, on the one hand, emerges in a "desire to have a certain standing in relation to the standing of some group of relevant others," where its satisfaction "requires – indeed, consists in – the opinions of one's fellow beings," on the other (Neuhouser 2008, pp. 32–33).

Rousseau never exempts the passion of amour-propre from the principal role it plays in our social and political pathologies. It is impressed upon his readers again in the *Dialogues* when he tells us that "amour-propre, the principle of all wickedness, is revived and thrives in society, which caused it to be born and where one is forced to compare oneself at each instant" (*D* II, 100). However, it is important to note that the passion of amour-propre is neither an inescapably nor a necessarily dreadful affect, that is to say, it is not unequivocally a bad passion. At one level, we have already indicated very generally why this must be so: if amour-propre is the passion that drives us to seek recognition, it surely cannot be the case that the desire that underwrites every attempt to win some form of social recognition is ill turned or ill conceived. The desire for equal recognition, whether socially or politically, or the desire to love and be loved, whether by our parents or by our partners, by our friends or by our acquaintances, are not, for example, in themselves unavoidably morally suspect or lacking in virtue. Neither do they, in themselves, lead always to undesirable outcomes. At another level, Rousseau himself does on occasion speak of the passion in positive terms. Not only can it be turned into a "sublime virtue," it is also responsible for some of the sweetest sentiments known to humanity (*E* IV, 389). In the light of this, scholars working on Rousseau, following the lead of Nicholas Dent's seminal observations and remarks on the subject, now commonly draw a distinction between amour-propre in its more general form and *inflamed* amour-propre, where the latter signifies a passion "turned to excess," of "having the character of a *strident* demand for superior position and title as the terms and conditions" of one's "being for others" (Dent 1988, p. 58). Although Rousseau does not make this distinction clear, it is nevertheless an important one to keep in mind. In other words, whenever Rousseau speaks of amour-propre in distinctly negative terms, which is not infrequently the case, or whenever he holds amour-propre responsible for the evils that plague the world, he is really talking about amour-propre in its *inflamed* form rather than the passion as it essentially is.

The principal aim of Rousseau's educational project is the prevention of amour-propre's development into its inflamed variant. But what, more precisely, does inflamed amour-propre consist in and how might it be clearly distinguished from its non-inflamed form? In his study, Neuhouser (2008, pp. 90–92) offers a detailed description of the varying ways in which the passion in its inflamed variant may be distinguished. A person's amour-propre is noticeably inflamed when it produces violent conduct and cruel behavior in her pursuit of recognition, when it overwhelms

the pursuit of her other “vital interests,” and when it becomes “restlessly imperialistic,” such that “nearly all of life’s activities” are transformed “into a quest for prestige.” It is inflamed, too, when freedom is willingly sacrificed for public approval, in the sense that conduct is determined less by an actor’s own judgments, values, and principles than by those fashionable in (what is, arguably, an already ethically corrupt) society. The drive for favorable opinion can further inspire “duplicity, pretense, and hypocrisy,” since the appearance of excellence, rather than the actual possession of it, is often enough to secure the high regard prized by each and sought after by all. In addition, amour-propre is inflamed “when a person has an exaggerated sense of the value of his own qualities and achievements and demands that the recognition he receives from others reflect his own inflated self-assessment, thereby ensuring not only his own dissatisfaction but also that of others (since he is then disposed to be as stingy in his recognition of others as he perceives them to be with respect to him)” (Neuhouser 2008, pp. 90–92). From servility to over-assertiveness and domination, from dependence to self-indulgence and hypocrisy, the source of our social and personal ills can, Rousseau believes, be traced back to an inflamed amour-propre, and it is securing this passion from turning into its inflamed variant that the work of education principally involves.

It is worth mentioning at this point that the problem of an inflamed amour-propre will not simply go away under a careful and rigorous upbringing. For the line separating a healthy and self-determined respect for public opinion and an over-reliance on it is easily crossed. We, as social beings, are all of us dependent on the court of opinion not only for the construction of ourselves and our identities but also for our internal sense of who we are and the value of our worth. The ceaseless effort to be worthy of consideration in the eyes of those who surround us, to possess considerable weight in their estimation, turns very quickly into a slavishness of spirit or an impulse to hurt in the absence of an educational project that continues past the careless exuberances of youth. In short, Rousseau thinks that insofar as our “sentiment of existence” is dependent on the views others have of us, we are always in danger of having our amour-propre inflamed. Any educational project that looks to prevent this occurrence must not therefore end as the learner reaches adulthood, but must go on, as it were, well into the later years of her life. It follows that the practice of citizenship can itself be understood as serving an educational function, where citizens learn and re-learn the ethics of civic virtue by engaging in the political practices constitutive of republican membership, for instance, by performing the duties required of citizens as specified by the participatory demands of a true republican association.

Rousseau’s Educational Project(s): Domestic and Civic

Having pointed out the interpersonal, social, and political problems arising from an inflamed amour-propre, our task now is to establish the main outlines of Rousseau’s educational project, a project that has as its principal aim the prevention of amour-propre’s development into its inflamed variant. But we are immediately

faced with the question of how we are to understand the general structure of this project. In dealing with this question, we find ourselves confronted with one of the most controversial issues in Rousseauian scholarship. The reason for this is that not only does Rousseau seem to present us with two philosophical visions in two distinct educational schemes, he also appears to present us with visions that are fundamentally opposed to one another. These seemingly competing visions can be found (perhaps most obviously) in the two works Rousseau published successively in 1762 – *The Social Contract* and the *Emile* – the latter of which is described explicitly as a treatise “on education.” Can these alternatives be read together? Or does Rousseau really offer us two opposing systems of education that admit of no prospect for reconciliation? We shall now discuss two influential interpretations of Rousseau’s educational project, beginning with the view that he offers us two distinct and opposed models. Following that, we shall discuss recent challenges to this view. On this second interpretation, Rousseau’s seemingly opposed forms of education can be read as complementary rather than rival enterprises.

The first interpretation, which emphasizes the tension between the two models, has most famously been articulated by Judith Shklar in her study of the Genevan’s social theory, arguably one of the best works written on Rousseau. In her view of things, “[w]hat is strikingly novel is his [Rousseau’s] insistence that one must choose between the two models, between man and the citizen . . . All our self-created miseries stem from our mixed condition, our half natural, half social state. A healthy man, the model for any system of education, would have to adhere consistently to a single mode of life.” “Education,” she goes on to say, “as a conscious choice is a social experience. The alternatives are therefore not nature or society, but domestic or civic education” (domestic education is the model found in *Emile*; civic education is the model described in the *Social Contract*). More expressly, if human beings are to “escape from” their “present disorientation and inner disorder,” they must either be “educated against society, in isolation from and rejection of all prevailing customs and opinions,” or they must be educated in a manner where their selves are entirely immersed in society, where they “lose [themselves] in a collectivity” (Shklar 1969, p. 5). Put simply, Rousseau provides us with two educational schemes. The first looks to raise an individual with the greatest degree of independence from the customs and opinions of society. The second looks to raise an individual wholly integrated into the mores, routines and conventions of a republic. Any attempt to raise an individual under the direction of both these educational schemes is incoherent and can result only in an unfortunate breach of “the psychic needs of men for inner unity and social simplicity” (Shklar 1969, p. 5). In her final assessment, however, Shklar suggests that the choice between the two educational schemes is a false one. As she describes it, “[w]hen he [Rousseau] called upon his readers to choose between man and the citizen he was forcing them to face the moral realities of social life. They were asked, in fact, not to choose, but to recognize that the choice was impossible, that they were not and would never become either men or citizens” (Shklar 1969, p. 214).

Setting aside the rather despairing note in Shklar’s final assessment, her view of the distinction between man and citizen (and thus the two modes of education) has

been deeply influential in the ways in which readers have come to understand Rousseau's philosophy. Mira Morgenstern (1996, p. 154) repeats the idea that the two schemes are to be understood as opposing alternatives when she writes that for Rousseau, we "can be either individual men or citizens, but not both." Similarly, Margaret Canovan (1983, p. 288), in her delightful essay on Arendt and Rousseau, describes the Genevan not only as one "who claimed that upon each man's conscience were inscribed basic rules for individual moral conduct," but also as one who "did not think that these sharp rules sufficed for the citizen. On the contrary, he made a sharp distinction between 'man' and 'citizen'." And even more recently, Karen Pagani (2015, p. 3), in her study on the significance of anger and forgiveness in Rousseau's thought, speaks of the "impetus behind" her work as proceeding from "the observation that Rousseau's thoughts on both anger and forgiveness were deeply influenced by the very important distinction between man and citizen that underpins his political philosophy and the radically different ethical imperatives regarding how one could and should respond to conflict that resulted on account of it."

In spite of this rather broad consensus, some scholars have in recent times suggested that the rigid and sharp distinction drawn between the two schemes is mistaken. This second interpretation holds that Rousseau does not oppose these models to one another but is rather opposed to the simultaneity of their implementation. Neuhouser, who offers the most sustained defense of this interpretation, argues that the aim of the educational project of *Emile* "is to produce a 'man-citizen', an individual who possesses the capacities required to embrace the general will of his polity as his own – the virtue essential to citizenship – while at the same time embodying a *certain version* of the ideal of self-sufficiency that defines men: the freedom to 'see with one's own eyes', to 'feel with one's own heart', to be governed only by 'one's own reason' rather than being compelled always to conduct oneself, or to judge, as others see fit" (Neuhouser 2008, pp. 20–21). In defending this view, he urges us to pay careful attention to Rousseau's own statement on the matter, in which he announces that "forced to combat nature or the social institutions, one must choose between *making* a man or a citizen, *for one cannot make both at the same time*" (*E* I, 163, emphasis added). Rousseau's concern, as Neuhouser sees it, is neither to offer us a choice between two competing alternatives nor to dismiss the project of bridging the divide between raising men and citizens as a futile or hopeless endeavor. Rather his concern lies with the attempt to engage in both projects *simultaneously*, which if embarked upon, will surely fail. The educational project as detailed by Rousseau in *Emile* aims, then, at the "overcoming of that opposition," and it does so by creating "a successive system of education that proceeds first with the ideal of man and later with the ideal of the citizen" (Neuhouser 2008, p. 20, 172; Gomes 2018, p. 195).

Endorsement for this second interpretation has recently grown. Agreeing with Neuhouser that Rousseau's account of the man and citizen divide indeed centers on an objection to the simultaneity of implementing the two modes of education, Gomes points out in further support of this view that Rousseau not only speaks of "the possibility of fashioning men and citizens despite his initial repudiation of this

possibility” in *Emile*, he also describes the *Social Contract* and *Emile* as forming a “same” or “complete” whole (Gomes 2018, p. 196, 197). That Rousseau himself thought of these works as parts of a complete whole should give pause to anyone looking to defend the former interpretation which reads them as rival enterprises. However, although Neuhouser is “indeed correct to argue for a successive system of education,” Gomes suggests (in contrast to Neuhouser) that “the making of a citizen is not completed in *Emile* but extends into the *Social Contract*.” The problem with Neuhouser’s view, according to Gomes, is that he does not consider “the crucial role the Lawgiver (*Législateur*) plays in the fashioning of citizens capable of discerning the general will.” Since citizens in Rousseau’s ideal republic are still required to see themselves in the first instance *as citizens*, that is, as selves whose identities are intimately bound up with the greater entity that is the republic, and since “an important aspect of the Lawgiver’s work” – which *Emile*’s tutor does not perform – “lies in ‘changing human nature; of transforming each individual, who by himself is a perfect and solitary whole, into a part of a larger whole from which this individual receives, in a sense, his life and his being’,” it is doubtful that the project of raising a man-citizen can be achieved by relying solely on the domestic mode of instruction found in *Emile* (*SC* II:vii, 155; Gomes 2018, pp. 196–197).

Given Rousseau’s own commitment to reading *The Social Contract* and the *Emile* as a single whole, and given that a central objective of education is to raise individuals capable of performing the duties of citizenship, let us now turn to see how domestic or private education can be understood as a first step towards the goal of raising a citizen. As we have already seen, one of the express purposes of *Emile*’s education is to prevent the inflammation of his amour-propre. Since this requires virtue, and since we are natural beings who first experience the world through sensory perception, part of his educational scheme must involve showing “how our capacity for sensation might be cultivated to develop the judgment and wisdom that distinguish the developed virtuous agent” (Hanley 2012, pp. 239–240). In Ryan Hanley’s brilliant reconstruction of Rousseau’s “virtue epistemology” (upon which the rest of this section on private education is based), the educational system found in *Emile* is best understood as a developmental one, which “requires progress through three discrete stages – first, sensation; second, judgment or reasoning; and third, conscience and willing – necessarily in this order,” where “each stage [serves as] a necessary preparative for the next” (Hanley 2012, p. 241) (This section is based on Hanley’s work. Errors and departures are mine. See also (Gomes 2018, 200–201).).

Rousseau thinks that any system of education must begin with sensory training. He makes clear that a child’s “sensations are the first materials of his knowledge” since “memory and education are still inactive” at birth (*E* I: 193). Human beings come into this world neither stocked with innate ideas nor endowed with already developed cognitive abilities of reasoning, memory, and judgment. Because of this “our senses are the instruments of all our knowledge” and “it is from them that all our ideas come, or at least all are occasioned by them.” To say that our senses are “instruments of all our knowledge” and that “it is from them that all our ideas come” or are occasioned is not to say, however, that sensory perception can by itself

provide us with certainty and knowledge of truths about the world. For “[o]ur senses are given to us to preserve us, not to instruct us, to warn us about what is useful or the opposite to us and not about what is true or false” (*ML*: 184). Nevertheless, since sensory perceptions constitute the first materials of a child’s knowledge, it is important to “present them to him in an appropriate order” since this would “prepare his memory to provide them one day to his understanding in the same order.” Or as Hanley describes it, “the indispensability of sensory education consists partly in the fact that the child’s sense impressions ultimately form a ‘storehouse of knowledge’ that can later be employed and synthesized once the faculty for judgment and comparison is cultivated” (*E*: 193; Hanley 2012, p. 243; pp. 242–244).

The second stage of private education focuses on the “cultivation of judgment” which, “‘in Rousseau’s definition, is a developed capacity for accurate and legitimate comparison,” a capacity that “requires engagement in the process of synthesizing discrete perceptions into systems of relations” (Hanley 2012, p. 246). Through her sensory faculties, a child receives only images rather than ideas, where the “difference between the two is that images are only absolute depictions of sensible objects, while ideas are notions of objects determined by relations” (*E* II: 243). In other words, our senses do not provide us with ideas. Rather, they give us images of things. Ideas are formed by making comparisons of the images obtained through the senses, by synthesizing and ordering them (and it is through comparison, synthesis, and ordering that relations are thus established). In this way, ideas are the result of and involve the activity of the mind. To be sure, ideas arising from the comparison, synthesis, and ordering of sensory images can themselves be put into a system of relations through the similar activities of reflection and judgment, the result of which is a more sophisticated and complex set of ideas. Now, it is certainly not the case that *any* relation of ideas or images will do; ideas and the relations between them or contained in them are not arbitrary and cannot simply be decided by the whims and fancies of any individual mind. Rather, they can be *properly ordered*. Improper reflection and judgment produce false relations and thus false ideas. The cultivation of a pupil’s judgment must therefore involve training his “ability to compare and order the relations between sensations and ideas *correctly*, to see true relations as they are. This is an important stage in the development of the moral agent, since amour-propre is itself a comparative sentiment, and whether it becomes inflamed or not is contingent on our capacity to judge, and judge human relations accurately.” (Gomes 2018, p. 200, emphasis added).

In the third stage, the pupil’s “cultivated capacity for the judgment of physical relations” is transferred “to the judgment of moral relations; indeed Rousseau is explicit in insisting that the study of ‘real material relations’ is the necessary preparative for ‘bringing him ever closer to the great relations he must know one day in order to judge well of the good and bad order of civil society’” (Hanley 2012, p. 255). The pupil must learn at this stage what the true relations of human beings consist in. “Men are not naturally Kings, or Lords, or Courtiers, or rich men. All are born naked and poor; all are subject to the miseries of life, to sorrows, ills, needs, and pains of every kind. Finally, all are condemned to death.” This, in Rousseau’s

opinion, “is what truly belongs to man,” “what is most inseparable” from human nature, and “what no mortal is exempt from” (*E IV*: 373). The actual relations of human beings are not constituted by characteristics that distinguish and raise certain individuals above others or the struggle to attain a position of ascendancy and privilege. They are to be understood in terms of the equality of human weakness and the likeness of their needs. To aid the student in gaining a clear picture of this, Rousseau relies on the lessons of history (Gomes 2018, p. 200). For “if the object were only to show young people man by means of his mask, there would be no need of showing them this; it is what they would always be seeing in any event.” Instead, education must attempt to reveal men as they are “since the mask is not the man and his varnish must not seduce them” (*E IV*: 390). History allows the pupil to see intricacies of human deception and the evils human beings do to one another without being himself harmed by those acts: “It is by means of history that, without the lessons of philosophy, he will read the hearts of men” and see them as “a simple spectator, disinterested and without passion, as their judge and not as their accomplice or as their accuser” (*E IV*: 391–392). The results of this are worth stating in full:

Casting his eyes for the first time on the stage of the world; or rather, set backstage, seeing the actors take up and put on their costumes, counting the cords and pulleys whose crude magic deceives the spectators’ eyes. His initial surprise will soon be succeeded by emotions of shame and disdain for his species. He will be indignant at thus seeing the whole of humankind its own dupe, debasing itself in these children’s games. He will be afflicted at seeing his brothers tear one another apart for the sake of dreams and turn into ferocious animals because they do not know how to be satisfied with being men . . . If he judges them well, he will not want to be in the place of any of them (*E IV*: 397; 400).

By coming to this understanding of the moral relations of humanity, by seeing that human beings are fundamentally equal, the pupil also develops her “innate principle of justice and virtue according to which, in spite of our own maxims, we judge our actions and those of others as good or bad,” that is, her conscience (*E IV*: 452). As Rousseau explains elsewhere, “conscience develops and acts only with man’s understanding. It is only through this understanding that he attains a knowledge of order, and it is only when he knows order that his conscience brings him to love it” (*LB*: 28). Once the student learns that the true order of humanity is one marked by relations of equality rather than privilege, her conscience will bring her to love it and work towards its preservation (Williams 2007; cf. Marks 2006).

It is worth stating at this point what domestic education does and does not do for the formation of citizens. On the one hand, it provides the student with an understanding of the truth of human relations – that we are fundamentally equal as moral beings – and aids in the development of his conscience through which he is impelled to preserve the fundamental order of human equality. Moreover, conscience is the sentiment by which the justice or injustice of human conduct is judged. In this way, domestic education helps prepare the student to discern the general will of his republic, since equality and justice form two of the substantive values embodied in that will. Moreover, private education prevents the inflammation of amour-propre, which makes it possible to “draw us out of ourselves.” One of the consequences of

an inflamed amour-propre is the concentration of the human self in individual hearts. It is in Rousseau's view almost impossible to reform corrupted hearts that can look only at satisfying the narrow interests of the self. Because the citizen is one who is able to see his self as part of a larger whole, the prevention of the inflammation of amour-propre leaves the possibility of citizenship open to a student not yet enslaved by vanity and pride.

What a private education does not do, arguably, is make a citizen. For the student is at the end of his education a man in the first place; he does not see his life and his being as part of a larger whole. He has not yet developed the bonds of fraternity required of citizenship, and is as a result incapable of willing the general will. Moreover, the general will is not a universal will. Each republic has a general will unique to itself. In the absence of fraternal bonds and a love of country, and without coming to an understanding of the unique nature of the general will of the republic to which he will eventually belong, it is difficult to speak of him as an already formed citizen. Indeed, as Rousseau makes clear, the project of transforming an individual into a part of a larger whole is in great measure the work of the Lawgiver, a foreigner of eminent wisdom and virtue who is able to see the corporate will of a people he is tasked to form before they are even aware of it themselves. The Lawgiver's work does not happen in a private education and the student of this education is not yet a true citizen.

"One who dares to undertake the founding of a people should feel that he is capable of changing human nature, so to speak, of transforming each individual, who by himself is a perfect and solitary whole, into a part of a larger whole from which this individual receives, in a sense, his life and his being" (*SC II:vii*, 155). This is the foremost duty of the Lawgiver; his task lies in transforming individuals into citizens by making them cognizant of their corporate will. He is needed, moreover, because "in order for an emerging people to appreciate the healthy maxims of politics, and follow the fundamental rules of Statecraft" in the absence of guidance and instruction, "the effect would have to become the cause; the social spirit, which should be the result of the institution, would have to preside over the founding of the institution itself; and men would have to be prior to laws what they ought to become by means of laws" (*SC II:vii*, 156). He must therefore look to foster corporate unity "and the edification of a people's *moeurs* through the initiation of laws that attend to all the particular features of a nascent people," which include "all that is required by the location, climate, soil, morals, surroundings, and all the particular relationships of the people he was to institute" (Gomes 2018, p. 207; *PE* 147). He must do so because the general will is not universal but specific to each collectivity.

The lawgiver goes about his task by "initiating laws that mirror the general will, with ratification remaining the prerogative of the sovereign solely." Individuals develop civic virtue and an increasing knowledge of their corporate identity by voting on the laws, since it is precisely through the act of voting that each must in silent deliberation consider the common good and ask themselves if a proposed legislation conforms to the general will (Gomes 2018, 207). Given their lack of political experience and their as yet underdeveloped cognizance of their own

corporate will, the lawgiver cannot hope to convince citizens of his wise counsel by the use of reason alone. Nor can he simply use force to compel compliance. He must instead “appeal to the gods,” “to win over by divine authority those who cannot be moved by human prudence” (Williams 2014, p. 91; *SC II*:vii, 156–157). Yet he cannot employ crude tricks – engraving tablets, buying oracles – to make an impression; these are acts any individual can perform. If the people are to believe that his wisdom and presence are indeed backed by divine sanction, then something more than questionable miracles is needed. In the end, the “Legislator’s great soul is the true miracle that should prove his mission” (*SC II*: vii, 157). It is by the miracles of his own genius, wisdom, and virtue that he shall persuade the people of the divine force behind his undertaking, and thus persuade them to adopt his counsel (Kelly 1987, 325). If he is successful, a republic will be formed and citizens will be made.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we examined the question of citizenship and education, and the relations between them, in Rousseau’s political thought. We also examined some of the major debates surrounding these issues in the growing literature on his ideas. We began by identifying and clarifying some of his central political ideas before proceeding to discuss the problem of inflamed amour-propre and the two educational schemes he offers to counter it. In closing, it would perhaps be fitting to end with some of Rousseau’s own remarks, which summarizes the views and arguments expressed above: “Although men cannot be taught to love nothing, it is not impossible to teach them to love one object rather than another, and what is truly beautiful rather than what is deformed. If, for example, they are trained early enough never to consider their persons except as related to the body of the State, and not to perceive their own existence, so to speak, except as part of the state’s, they will eventually come to identify themselves in some way with this larger whole; to feel themselves to be members of the fatherland; to love it with that delicate feeling that any isolated man feels only for himself, to elevate their soul perpetually toward this great object; and thereby transform into a sublime virtue this dangerous disposition from which all of our vices arise” (*PE* 155).

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Paulo Freire: Citizenship and Education

7

Kevin Kester and Hogai Aryoubi

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Abstract

This chapter focuses on the life and contributions of Brazilian educator Paulo Freire (1921–1997). The emphasis is on his scholarly contributions to educational theory and practice in educational fields that promote social change, including critical pedagogy, literacy education, citizenship education, social justice education, democratic education, and peace education. After outlining Freire’s key concepts, the chapter synthesizes the use of the concepts in these diverse fields, with a particular emphasis on formal, nonformal, and informal education. Although Freire’s primary interest was adult nonformal education, the scholarship indicates also the employment of Freirean ideas within formal and informal educational settings. Critiques of Freirean ideas and corresponding implications are highlighted throughout the chapter. The conclusion recapitulates Freire’s main contributions to education for citizenship and social change and offers some possible directions forward that emanate from within the literature.

Keywords

Paulo Freire · Conscientization · Dialogue · Praxis · Critical pedagogy

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to review the literature drawing on key contributions of the twentieth-century educator Paulo Freire. The chapter focuses on primary and secondary literature to provide an overview of Freire’s thinking and its influence on other scholars and scholarly practices. The literature broadly indicates that Freire’s contemporaries recognized him as a leading educational scholar-practitioner whose thinking shaped, and continues to shape, contemporary academic thought and practice in the areas of critical pedagogy, literacy education, citizenship education, democratic education, peacebuilding education, social justice education, and adult education, among other areas (Mayo 2009; Schugurensky 2011; Torres 2017a). Roberts (2007) asserts that Freire, “left a legacy of practical and theoretical work equaled by few other educationists in its scope and influence” (p. 505). As evidenced by the establishment of numerous Freire Institutes in universities and adult education centers around the world, Freire’s work has inspired countless scholars and educational practitioners globally toward humanistic and dialogic education for fostering intercultural understanding, democracy, and social justice.

The chapter begins with a brief review of Freire’s biography followed by an overview of his key social and educational concepts. The chapter then examines the employment of these ideas by other scholars in various political and educational fields and across nonformal, formal, and informal educational sites. In doing so, the chapter highlights and reviews three signature strands from within the expansive literature on Freire, citizenship, and education. These include (1) books and papers that explore Freire’s life and the personal experiences that influenced his educational

philosophy; (2) subsequent explications of Freire's contributions to the theoretical and pedagogical practice of other scholars; and (3) critical accounts of Freire's influence on adult, higher, and community-based formal, nonformal, and informal education. The reviewed literature in this chapter relates to these three key areas beginning first with his biography and key contributions.

The Life and Work of Freire

Paulo Freire was born in 1921 in Recife, Brazil (Schugurensky 2011). He grew up with poverty and inequality in both the region and his family life. As a child, Freire was four grades behind in school, as his poverty and hunger had negatively affected his education (Bhattacharya 2011). Freire stated, "I didn't understand anything because of my hunger. I wasn't dumb. It wasn't lack of interest. My social condition didn't allow me to have an education. Experience showed me once again the relationship between social class and knowledge" (quoted in Gadotti 1994, p. 5). His early experiences with poverty would later influence his work in education. When his brothers started working and the family's economic situation improved, Freire started making rapid intellectual progress which eventually led to university matriculation (Schugurensky 2011).

In 1943, Paulo Freire was admitted into the University of Recife's Law School but only defended one client before becoming a full-time high school teacher. Then, from 1947, Freire's formative years were when he became the director of the Department of Education and Culture of Pernambuco's Social Service Ministry for 10 years (Aryoubi 2018). In *Letters to Cristina*, he mentions this decade to be "the most important political-pedagogical practice of my life" (Freire 1996). In 1959, at the University of Recife (now known as the Federal University of Pernambuco), Freire defended his doctoral dissertation and was given a professorship at the university (Schugurensky 2011).

In 1961, Freire became the director of the Division of Culture and Recreation, and in 1963, he was the first director of the Cultural Extension Service at the University of Recife (Schugurensky 2011). In his time at the Cultural Extension Service, he brought literacy programs to peasants in northeast Brazil, which evolved to the entire nation from 1963 to 1964. His team was successful in teaching illiterate adults to read in very short periods of time, instances such as an impressive 45 days (Bhattacharya 2011).

The 1964 Brazilian coup d'état led to the halt of Freire's literacy programs and imprisonment as a traitor. Freire then spent 15 years in exile. Holst (2006) suggests these years in exile were crucial to the ultimate development of Freire's Marxist humanist ideology, claiming that prior to exile to Chile, Freire was "liberal developmentalist" in orientation rather than Marxist humanist. Holst thus claims the Chile exile intellectually molded Freire's critical thought. In the 1970s, Freire then worked with the World Council of Churches in Geneva, Switzerland, returning to his religious roots (Aryoubi 2018; Roberts 2010). Freire returned to Brazil in 1980 at the age of 57 after the cultural political environment changed (Bhattacharya

2011). At that time, Freire became the adult literacy project supervisor for the Worker's Party from 1980 to 1986; and when the party won the 1989 Sao Paulo municipal elections, he was appointed as the Secretary of Education (Gadotti 1994). Shortly afterward, in 1991, he resigned to continue writing and lecturing for the final decade of his life. Throughout the 1990s, Freire experienced tremendous professional success and completed significant academic activity until his passing in 1997 (Roberts 2010).

Freire's main recorded contribution to educational scholarship and civic practice is in the form of monographs. He wrote more than 20 books over his career and numerous journal articles. Among these, his most cited work is *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, a book published during the period of Freire's exile to Chile, which was interrupted when he spent a year as Visiting Scholar at Harvard University (Roberts 2010). *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* has been cited more than 75,000 times in the 50 years since its publication, as indicated on Google Scholar as of June 2019. This book has received nearly a quarter of Freire's more than 300,000 citations, more than any of his other single works.

Freire's Key Contributions to Education

Looking to Paulo Freire's *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, where he outlines many of his enduring ideas, Freire presents his key concepts of conscientization, dialogue, praxis, banking education, and problem-posing education. These concepts have influenced numerous other scholars and educational practices around the world toward promoting education for social change, which will be further examined later in the chapter. The chapter now turns to discuss each one of these ideas briefly in order to survey his key contributions to educational theory and practice in the twentieth century.

The Concept of Conscientization

Paulo Freire's goal was to make it possible for people who were illiterate to quickly learn to read and write, while simultaneously learning the reasons why society works the way it does (Horton and Freire 1990). In *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, Freire (1970/2005) writes, "A deepened consciousness of their situation leads people to apprehend that situation as an historical reality susceptible of transformation" (p. 85). He termed the word conscientization, which according to Smidt (2014) is almost synonymous with consciousness-raising and/or critical consciousness. Conscientization is the process of teachers and learners becoming conscious, especially on what is problematic within contemporary society and to consequently have the power to drive social change (Smidt 2014). Dale and Hyslop-Margison (2010) state that conscientization occurs when people reflect critically on social reality and historical experiences. The aim of conscientization is to enable illiterate adults to read and make sense of the world in order to help them become critically aware of

the reasons that they are in the situations in which they exist, whether it is poverty, joblessness, or such, and to examine what is keeping them there (Smidt 2014). In turn, personal and social transformation may be possible. Dialogue supports the process of conscientization.

Dialogue as Indispensable to Conscientization

Paulo Freire stated, “If it is in speaking their word that people, by naming the world, transform it, dialogue imposes itself as the way by which they achieve significance as human beings. Dialogue is thus an existential necessity” (Freire 1970/2005, p. 88). Dialogue as an exchange or conversation between two people or more should be on the premise of equality, which Freire contrasted with anti-dialogue that was handing down information in an exchange that was unequal (Smidt 2014). Further, dialogue positions the teacher and student *horizontally* to be both knowing and learning, rather than *vertically* with only the teacher holding the individualistic stance of knowing (Darder 2015). Dale and Hyslop-Margison (2010) mention that an important aspect of dialogue includes its ability to build emotionally and socially caring relationships between people. Freire (1983) believed that dialogue was indispensable to the process of conscientization, as it was the act of transforming and knowing the world. Students can enter into the problematization process through critical dialogue, which could lead them to experience breakthroughs of knowledge that appear from their rethinking of both historical and contemporary conditions (Darder 2015). Other scholars, however, have critiqued Freire’s faith in dialogue and consciousness-raising to transform the world, arguing instead that such methods are patronizing as the “enlightened few” seek to “emancipate the masses” (Berger 1974). Such methods, the critics claim, often serve to reinforce social inequalities rather than rectify them. These scholars argue this is primarily because such modes of dialogue usually favor those within positions of power and dominance (Ellsworth 1989; Tuck and Yang 2012).

Praxis = Reflection + Action

For Freire, praxis means both reflection and action occurring together and “directed at the structures to be transformed” (Freire 1970/2005, p. 126). The term describes action and thought comprising the political and ethical life of humankind. Paulo Freire believed that “humans were beings of praxis (a term he borrowed from Marxist philosophy)” and possess a consciousness that distinguishes humans from other living things (Smidt 2014, p. 22). He contrasted humans here with animals, which are beings of pure activity that do not consider the world but are rather immersed in it. In detail, Freire (1972) stated, “In contrast humans emerge from the world, objectify it and in so doing understand and transform it with their labour... (Human) activity consists of action and reflection. It is praxis; it is transformation of the world. And as praxis it requires theory to illuminate

it. (Human) activity is theory and practice” (p. 96). Freire (1970/2005) also stressed that in revolutionary efforts to transform oppressive structures, the leaders of a movement cannot be designated as the “thinkers,” while the oppressed become the “doers” (p. 126). Mackinlay and Barney (2014) similarly cite Freire’s praxis as informing their practices in Australia to contribute to decolonizing Indigenous Australian studies. They write that their critical education “privileges the Freirean concept of praxis, that is, the ongoing interaction of reflection, dialogue, and action in order to illuminate human activity” and builds a better world (Mackinlay and Barney 2014, p. 65). Hence, praxis is dialogue in action through reflection and informed interventions in the world that challenge traditional forms of passive education.

Banking Education

Freire disapproved of the style of teaching where teachers taught information to passive students and compared it to what occurs in banks: money goes into an empty account only to later be withdrawn. He called this banking education. This teaching method depends on passivity in the students (Freire 1972), where they wait for the teacher in a monological manner to give an answer, message, or meaning behind a text. This information is deposited, memorized, and assessed. Smidt (2014) describes this process when he explains, “Information is banked in the empty head of the learner” (p. 123), and thus the student is “filled” with knowledge. This method is in direct opposition with relational methods such as dialogue. Freire (1970/2005) describes that in banking education, knowledge is “the property of the teacher rather than a medium evoking the critical reflection of both teacher and students” (p. 80). Darder (2015), for example, argues that banking education “predominantly anchors ideas of teaching and learning to values of individualism, independence, and competition” (p. 18). Freire argued that the banking model not only impacts the classroom, which is reflective of broader oppressive dynamics, but the method also has long-term implications for human agency and eventually for social transformation (Schugurensky 2011). As students passively accept and store the information given to them, they accept and adapt to the state of the world, their passive role within it, and acquire a view of reality that is fragmented (Schugurensky 2011). Critical thinking is arrested, and the learners are less likely to attain confidence, attitudes, skills, and behaviors for social change. Freire (1970/2005) sums up banking education to preserve the following practices and attitudes:

- (a) The teacher teaches and the students are taught;
- (b) The teacher knows everything and the students know nothing;
- (c) The teacher thinks and the students are thought about;
- (d) The teacher talks and the students listen – meekly;
- (e) The teacher disciplines and the students are disciplined;

- (f) The teacher chooses and enforces his/her choice, and the students comply;
- (g) The teacher acts and the students have the illusion of acting through the action of the teacher;
- (h) The teacher chooses the program content, and the students (who were not consulted) adapt to it;
- (i) The teacher confuses the authority of knowledge with his or her own professional authority, which she and he sets in opposition to the freedom of the students;
- (j) The teacher is the Subject of the learning process, while the pupils are mere objects (p. 59).

Problem-Posing Education

As a response to what Freire identifies as the core problematic of traditional banking education, he offers the counter-practice of problem-posing education. Also called emancipatory or liberatory education, this method emphasizes dialogue, inquiry, discussion, and group projects for learners and regards education to be the practice of freedom. The aim of problem-posing education is to constantly reveal unequal social and institutional power structures via processes of conscientization and critical thinking in order to transform the world (Schugurensky 2011). Darder (2015) explains that for the learner, an “active engagement with an author’s ideas is encouraged from the very setting up of a ‘problem’ to be (dialogically) investigated in the first place” (p. 87).

Schugurensky (2011) compares the banking education model with the problem-posing education model through eight points:

- Banking education emphasizes information transfer; problem-posing encourages acts of cognition, liberating both the teacher and the students.
- Banking education attempts to mythologize reality by concealing certain facts about social relations; problem-posing education aims at demythologizing and unveiling the different layers of reality.
- Banking education resists dialogue; problem-posing education treats dialogue as indispensable to the act of cognition.
- Banking education treats students as objects of assistance; problem-posing education regards them as critical thinkers.
- Banking education fails to recognize men and women as historical beings; problem-posing education starts with people’s own history and experience.
- Banking education has a predesigned, fixed, and static curriculum; in problem-posing education, the content emerges from the reality and dreams of the learners.
- Banking education’s goal is the perpetuation of social inequalities; the purpose of problem-posing education is to nurture the development of consciousness and active intervention in the social world.
- Banking education is about reinforcing fatalism and domination; problem-posing education is about nurturing autonomy and transformation. (p. 73)

These concepts of conscientization, dialogue, praxis, banking education, and problem-posing education are further expounded in Freire's other core works: *Cultural Action for Freedom* (1972), *A Pedagogy for Liberation* (with Ira Shor 1987), *We Make the Road by Walking* (with Myles Horton 1990), *Pedagogy of Hope* (1994), *Letters to Cristina* (1996), and *Pedagogy of Freedom* (1998), among others. This chapter now turns attention to Freire's influence on various educational fields. In focusing on these influences, the hope is to highlight Freire's significance specifically to critical pedagogy, literacy education, citizenship education, social justice education, democratic education, and peace education in the late twentieth century and some implications for education for social change in the early twenty-first.

Freire's Influence on Educational Fields

Freire's work is cited frequently in numerous fields of education, notably critical pedagogy (Apple 1982; Giroux 1983, 1997; McLaren 2000, 2006; Kincheloe 2008), literacy education (Muro 2012), citizenship education (Johnson and Morris 2010; McCowan 2006; Schugurensky and Madjidi 2008; Torres 2017), social justice education (Gibson 2012; Zembylas 2014), democratic education (Bolin 2017; Carr 2008; Portelli and McMahan 2004), and peace education (Bajaj and Hantzopoulos 2016; Harris and Morrison 2003; Kester and Booth 2010; Reardon and Snauwaert 2015). This section reviews Freire's influence on these educational fields with an eye toward Freire's efforts to cultivate social change, peace, intercultural understanding, and democracy through education.

Critical Pedagogy

Freire's impact is clearly evident in the field of critical pedagogy (Tuck and Yang 2012). The progenitors of the field cite his work as the impetus for their critical pedagogy practice (Giroux 1988, 2010; Shor 1992; McLaren 2006), although Freire rarely used the term instead referring to his work as "libertarian education" (Freire 1970/2005, p. 72), "problem-posing education" (ibid., p. 81), or "education as the practice of freedom" (ibid., p. 81).

In defining critical pedagogy, Freire's close collaborator Ira Shor (1992) writes that critical pedagogy is:

Habits of thought, reading, writing, and speaking which go beneath surface meaning, first impressions, dominant myths, official pronouncements, traditional clichés, received wisdom, and mere opinions, to understand the deep meaning, root causes, social context, ideology, and personal consequences of any action, event, object, process, organization, experience, text, subject matter, policy, mass media, or discourse. (p. 129)

Henry Giroux (2010) further claims "Paulo Freire is one of the most important critical educators of the twentieth century. . . His book *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* is

considered one of the classic texts of critical pedagogy and has sold over a million copies” (p. 715). Giroux (ibid.) argues, “Since the 1980s there has been no intellectual on the North American educational scene who has matched either [Freire’s] theoretical rigor or his moral courage” (p. 715). Critical pedagogy, as a praxis of reflection and social action, in turn provides the ethical and pedagogical core of many other educational fields for social change.

Freire and Literacy Education

Numerous literacy programs draw from Freirean inspiration. Andres Muro (2012) details the practical literacy work of the Community Education Program of El Paso Community College in El Paso, Texas, which draws on Freire’s critical pedagogical work to promote Spanish literacy and general education in Spanish to Mexican immigrants. The program offers creative writing classes to immigrants so they can “document their experiences through poetry and prose while acquiring the ability necessary to earn a GED certificate (high school equivalency certificate in the US)” (p. 2). The program aims to promote a measure of social change although it acknowledges that its contribution in this regard is limited. Bartlett (2005) studies the practice of Freirean ideals in popular adult education nongovernmental organizations in Brazil. In doing so, she showcases the tremendous influence of Freire on progressive educational practice in Latin America. She also highlights the limitations that continue to trouble critical educators using Freirean methods, most notably efforts to ensure the equitable practice of dialogue in educational encounters, disrupting the teacher-student hierarchy, and the challenge of utilizing local knowledges in and through educational interactions. More recently, Alison Phipps (2019) employs Freirean thought to re-imagine ways to do literacy education and social justice work multilingually in order to support decolonial forms of education, citizenship, and justice.

Citizenship Education, Politics, and Critique

Another educational subfield notably influenced by Freire’s work is citizenship education. McCowan (2006), acknowledging Freire, writes that the introduction of citizenship education into the English school curriculum in 2002 allowed for the first time such political issues of peace, development, and human rights to have an “official presence” in schools (p. 57). McCowan (2006) explains:

Curricula in many countries have included political, citizenship or civics education as a separate discipline, and the current National Curriculum provision recommends that it can be either a separate subject or a cross-curricular theme. In Freire’s conception, however, all education is politically oriented and has political consequences. The very existence of ‘citizenship education’ implies that the rest of the curriculum is not education for citizenship, and may cause learners to view citizenship as a specific part of their lives, rather than something that imbues their whole experience. (p. 67)

Other contemporary citizenship educators push Freire's thinking and the limits of critical pedagogy forward to reconceptualize citizenship education through a lens of responsibility, peace, diversity, and justice (Torres 2017a). For these scholars, still drawing substantially on Freire, earlier critical pedagogy and citizenship education tended to be overly preoccupied with issues of class at the expense of gender, race, and intersectional analyses (Heggart et al. 2018; Beckett 2013). For example, Jackson (2007) argues that Freire did not offer "sufficient attention to difference, to the conflicting needs of oppressed groups, or to the specificity of people's lives and experiences"; and to this day, she remains critical of his "apparent universalization," "lack of gender analysis," and conception of the teacher as "emancipator" (p. 210). Beckett (2013) too offers criticism of the "rationalism," "universalism," and "vanguardism" in *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. Although these scholars remain committed to Freirean principles, they detail the implications of their critiques, that is, to further engage with issues of race, gender, and intersectional analyses in addition to class analysis.

Diversity and Social Justice Education

Kari Grain and Darren Lund (2016) draw on Freire's "critical social justice pedagogy" to "advocate for a continued diversification of voices in the field, and adopt a firm anti-oppressive stance" (p. 46). They draw on Freire's profound hope, claiming that the notion of critical hope in education "is inspired by the praxis and frameworks of critical theory, particularly those emerging from the Frankfurt School, neo-Marxist critiques, and the work of Freire" (p. 51). Other social justice educators contend that Freire's praxis offers personal empowerment and diverse potential to transform conflict in and through education (Hahn Tapper 2013; Zembylas 2014). Hahn Tapper (2013) writes, "Freire contends that education provides venues for students to achieve freedom, both intellectual and physical. . . Freire asserts that education either domesticates or liberates students and teachers" (p. 413). Hahn Tapper continues, "Freire explains the role that identity plays in the shaping and implementation of education. One of his most important arguments is that students' identities need to be taken into account in all educational settings. They should not be approached as if everyone in the classroom, including the teacher, is starting from the same place in terms of social status and identity" (p. 414). Achieving social justice is a core objective of Freirean pedagogy.

Democratic Education

Bolin (2017) contends that Paulo Freire's teaching strategies also support radically changing education toward democratic forms and structures as a means toward socially just political and educational governance. Portelli and McMahon (2004) concur arguing that Freire's methods inform critical democratic engagement in education; as does Paul Carr (2008) who suggests that Freire's critical pedagogy

helps underscore “thick” democracy. Glassman and Patton (2014) explain that Freire’s educational praxis supports the development of democratic values for a just, well-functioning society. To this end, Reardon and Cabezudo (2002) too claim that a pedagogy of democratic engagement, influenced through Freirean thought, is the best method toward achieving democratic citizenship for building cultures of peace in and beyond schools. Freire’s methods thus inform myriad approaches to constructing and supporting democracy and peace through education.

Peace Education and Social Transformation

Hilary Cremin and Terence Bevington (2017) write from peace education that, “Perhaps the most notable educator for justice of the twentieth century was Paulo Freire. Freire’s influence on peace education (as well as critical literacy, and non-formal education) has been immense” (p. 43). Additionally, noted peace educator Betty Reardon cites Freire as core to influencing her practice (Reardon and Snauwaert 2015), which in turn has influenced numerous peace educators around the world for over six decades (Snauwaert 2019). Reardon writes, “Critical pedagogy is the methodology most consistent with the transformative goals of peace education. . . I have argued that the theories and practices that we have learned from Paulo Freire are the conceptual and methodological heart of the most effective peace learning” (as quoted in Reardon and Snauwaert 2015, p. xv). Bajaj and Hantzopoulos (2016) too argue that Freire’s work is core to the field in his engagement with both the oppressive and liberatory capacities of education. Bajaj (2015) builds upon Freire’s work in elucidating a critical peace education praxis. She questions, “What content, pedagogy, structures, and practices are needed in educational spaces that seek to cultivate critical consciousness among learners (Freire 1970)? How might such educative practices orient towards social action in ways that can effectively challenge unequal socioeconomic and political conditions?” (p. 164).

Drawing critical pedagogy, literacy education, citizenship education, democratic education, social justice, and peace education together, Carlos Torres (2017b) recapitulates the influence of Freirean praxis on each of these fields:

The first answer of why we need global citizenship education is that global citizenship education contributes to global peace. . . Paulo Freire, recognizing that relations of domination are central to public and private life, argued that domination, aggression, and violence are an intrinsic part of human and social life. (n.p.)

Any educational endeavor seeking to cultivate critical citizenship, peace, and democratic participation in public life must ensure the interrogation of structures of oppression and domination in society and, in consequence, propose alternative social and political possibilities. Furthermore, as Freire ardently argued, such educational efforts must also be recognized as inherently political and achieved through diverse educational means. The next section will examine Freire’s contributions to non-formal, formal, and informal spheres of educational activity.

Freire's Contributions Across Educational Contexts

Freire primarily worked in nonformal adult education contexts, and his writings have contributed to theorizing in this educational domain (Mayo 1999, 2009). Yet, others have given consideration to the implementation of Freire's ideas within formal schooling (Johnson and Morris 2010; McCowan 2006) and informal education (Hall et al. 2012).

Freire's Focus on Adult Education

The bulk of Freire's work has been in nonformal adult education contexts. Freire developed "culture circles," as one of the early methods of teaching (Schugurensky 2011). The circles were composed of a coordinator, instead of a teacher, and adult learners, who were mostly illiterate. The teaching method was dialogue, instead of the traditional banking education method, and the discussions were on subjects that interested the group of students. Smidt (2014) gives examples of the subjects being on, "the rising cost of staple foods; the effects of flooding on daily life; the failure to get children to school" (p. 42). The lessons also had images, narrative, pictures, and some linguistic analysis. Eventually the culture circle would become an adult literacy class site. Initially this method was used in Recife in Brazil. The first attempt was with five illiterate adults, of which two dropped out in the early stage. The group came from rural areas and felt accepting of their illiteracy and socially alienated from formal education. Freire and his fellow workers decided to develop a literacy program that addressed these issues from the adults' life experiences, as Smidt (2014) outlines, in these ways:

- The students in each session would be active dialogical, critical and involved;
- The content of the program was flexible and open to change;
- The techniques used would include what Freire called the breakdown of themes and codification (p. 42).

Freire's success in promoting literacy through these means underscored his achievement in promoting literacy across Brazil and, in turn, nurtured his global reputation. With time, the methods were adopted internationally in adult education, and from this success others began to ask whether such methods could succeed within formal schooling.

Relevance to Formal Schooling

Though the focus of Freire's work was in nonformal adult education contexts, his work was also later implemented within formal education and curricula as well (Johnson and Morris 2010; McCowan 2006). In US secondary schools, for example, Behizadeh (2014) argued, "Scripted curricula and other standardized teaching

materials that do not start with the knowledge and questions students bring to school are not effective tools for learning” (p. 103). The solution that Behizadeh presented was to implement Freire’s problem-posing education for student-centered learning experiences, which allowed students to learn critical-thinking skills and to co-construct knowledge (Behizadeh 2014). There are multiple other examples of Freire’s methods being used in formal education and curricula, which include Hodder’s (1980) work in art education; Shor’s (1980) work with a college English curriculum; Crawford-Lange’s (1981) work with foreign language instruction in schools; Frankenstein’s (1983) work with a mathematics curriculum; Holzman’s (1988) work in advanced literacy; and Sarroub and Quadros’ (2015) work on critical pedagogy in classroom discourse, among others. Narita and Green (2015) too discuss the use of nonformal and informal music educational practices to enhance learning in formal music classrooms. Freire believed that literacy in itself would not empower learners, who were living in oppressive conditions, but needed to be connected to a critical awareness of social action and context to change their conditions (Freire 1985). From this, Freire’s idea that teachers need to go beyond literacy, or whichever academic subject is being taught, to empower learners is seen across many age groups and various contexts, including within formal schooling.

Freire and Informal Education

Freire’s dialogical work has also been cited as influential for informal educational spaces. The *Encyclopedia of Informal Education* (Smith 2002), for instance, states the “emphasis on dialogue has struck a very strong chord with those concerned with popular and informal education. Given that informal education is a dialogical (or conversational) rather than a curricula form this is hardly surprising,” yet “Freire was able to take the discussion on several steps with his insistence that dialogue involves respect. It should not involve one person acting on another, but rather people working with each other” (n.p.). One such arena for building respect and dialogue among citizens is social movements and civic engagement. Thus, informal learning in social movements and political participation is another area where Freire’s approach has impacted on education in informal spaces, particularly where participants learn politics through engagement in voting, jury duty, protests, and other civic demonstrations (Butte 2010; Hall et al. 2012; Lerner and Schugurensky 2007). Hall et al. (2012), in their work, detail cases of learning for a better world through social activism in different global regions, including evidence from democratic and environmental activism in Latin America, India, the Middle East, the UK, and the USA. Lerner and Schugurensky (2007), for their part, similarly build upon Freire and informal learning to inquire into what knowledge and skills activists and members of participatory democracy programs acquire through their participation in democratic processes. This emerging field is part of renewed scholarly interests in the field of social pedagogy drawing from Freire’s popular education as well as other Indigenous and progressive education movements (Schugurensky 2016).

That Freire's work continues to be relevant to and influential in these diverse educational arenas indicates the salience and power of dialogical education to support social change. This is possible not only across sectors but at multiple social and political levels within sectors and via personal reflection and social action. Freire's ideas remain just as important today as when they were first conceptualized. The final section offers some implications for contemporary education.

Summary Conclusion and New Possibilities

Paulo Freire (1970/2005) famously wrote at the introduction to *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, "I hope that from these pages at least the following will endure: my trust in the people, and my faith in men and women, and in the creation of a world in which it will be easier to love" (p. 40). This chapter has highlighted Freire's social critique and hope offered throughout his many writings on pedagogy. In particular, the chapter reviewed primary and secondary literature concerning educational efforts to promote social change and critical citizenship drawing on Freire's educational concepts. This has included a review of writings related to critical pedagogy, literacy education, citizenship education, social justice education, democratic education, and peace education. Freire's impact on these educational fields has been addressed throughout the chapter providing evidence from within the literature.

Additionally, a review of Freire's influence on adult education, formal education, and informal learning has been discussed as emerging in the scholarly literature. Despite some critiques related to Freire's preoccupation with socioeconomic analysis, his gender and rational limitations, and what some scholars have identified as his naïve hope in the power of dialogue to nurture equality and social justice, nonetheless Freire's main contributions to education for citizenship and social change cannot be overstated. His influence on social justice, democracy, peace, and citizenship education for the twenty-first century still widely endures.

Finally, we argue there are three renewed possibilities for educators today drawing on Freire's work for education, citizenship, and social justice. First, Freire's work allows for scholars and practitioners to re-engage with critical reflection on the inherent political nature of education. This is particularly exigent in times of contentious politics, such as the post-2016 era of divisive post-truth rhetoric and the rise of alt-facts discourse. Working with politics rather than retreating from difficult conversations opens space for transformative possibilities in and through education. Second, related to the first point, the call to dialogue across social, economic, and political difference is work to heal communities, build lasting respect, and promote sustainable peace and social cooperation. Like Freire's oeuvre, it is a work in progress, unending, constantly shifting, and seeking growth. The implication here for social justice, multicultural, peace, and democratic education in the contemporary world is profound. Third, Freire calls for educators to use straightforward humanizing language that is inclusive and compassionate. This means avoiding paternalistic language and unnecessary jargon while offering critiques and incisive insights on present-day society. Dialogue and social action here

must be grounded in shared experience and the collective belief that it is possible to co-create a better world. From these three renewed possibilities re-emerges the hope and faith in humanity that Freire embraced throughout his life and work. There could hardly be a more important lesson for the educational community today.

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Dewey and Citizenship Education: Schooling as Democratic Practice

8

Piet A. van der Ploeg

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Abstract

This chapter provides a reconstruction of Dewey’s approach to citizenship education based on his books and articles written between 1885 and 1945. It is argued that Dewey’s views regarding citizenship education coincide with his views on democracy and on teaching and learning and are closely related to his general philosophy. In the chapter, extensive attention is given to the development of Dewey’s thinking on citizenship education: first through highlighting core elements of the book *Democracy and Education* and then through discussing relevant aspects of both his earlier work and later work. For Dewey, education and democracy are organically connected: Democracy is a condition for education and education is a condition for democracy. In schools, citizenship education cannot be distinguished as a separate subject or domain: All education contributes to democratic citizenship, provided it is inclusive and equally accessible to everyone. In addition, the chapter argues that, for Dewey, democratic education must fulfill two elementary functions: familiarizing students with their social roles and teaching them to think. Through the decades, Dewey’s focus

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increasingly shifts towards the importance of learning to think critically, including through investigating and understanding social structures and dynamics.

Keywords

Dewey · Citizenship · Democracy · Critical thinking · Citizenship education · History of education · Philosophy of education

Introduction

The American philosopher John Dewey (1859–1952) is arguably the most cited author in the literature on citizenship education worldwide. Dewey’s popularity is primarily due to three well-known features of his vision: firstly, his broad conception of democracy, secondly, the highly participative, active, and interactive nature of his views on both citizenship and learning, and thirdly, his emphasis on critical inquiry and thinking.

Dewey published an extensive oeuvre comprising of books and articles on philosophy, psychology, politics, and education, spanning the six decades between 1885 and 1945. Halfway through this period, in 1916, his book *Democracy and Education* was published, which he considered a good summary and application of his thinking. The present chapter reconstructs Dewey’s approach to citizenship education by first highlighting core elements of *Democracy and Education* and then discussing relevant aspects in both his earlier work and later work. Meanwhile, it identifies what, over the course of his work over more than half a century, remained consistent in Dewey’s approach to democracy and education and what changed. In doing so, the chapter traces Dewey’s work on democracy and education closely, in order to clarify his key ideas and make these accessible to readers of this chapter.

Democracy and Education

In the first four chapters of *Democracy and Education*, Dewey argues that social life and education are organically linked. Education is social to the core, and teaching and learning happen where people involve one another in activities. Education occurs in “co-operative doings,” “sharing experience,” “sharing concerns,” “communication,” and “conjoint activity.” At the same time, social life needs education to ensure its continuity. According to Dewey, education stands for the “transmission” of beliefs and language, “expectations” and “occupations,” “standards” and “aims,” and “habits of doing, thinking, and feeling.” Furthermore, education enables the adaptation of social life to changing circumstances: It stands for the “transformation” of beliefs, standards, habits, etc. Hence, for Dewey, social life and education are two sides of the same coin. That is, “Life is a self-renewing process. What nutrition and reproduction are to physiological life, education is to social life” (1916a, 12).

The transformative, renewing nature of education is of the utmost importance to Dewey. An activity is only truly educative when this activity refines and enriches a person's experience, making him more able to gain further and different experience. According to Dewey, "A technical definition of education: It is that reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning of experience, and which increases ability to direct the course of subsequent experience" (1916a, 82). In his later work, Dewey illustrates the transformative nature of education in the following way:

Any experience is mis-educative that has the effect of arresting or distorting the growth of further experience. An experience may be such as to engender callousness; it may produce lack of sensitivity and of responsiveness. Then the possibilities of having richer experience in the future are restricted. Again, a given experience may increase a person's automatic skill in a particular direction and yet tend to land him in a groove or rut; the effect again is to narrow the field of further experience. An experience may be immediately enjoyable and yet promote the formation of a slack and careless attitude; this attitude then operates to modify the quality of subsequent experiences so as to prevent a person from getting out of them what they have to give. (1938, 11, 12)

For Dewey, then education is at odds with practices such as training, disciplining, directing, molding, and shaping. Such practices offer too little scope for the development of personal initiative, open-mindedness, critical thinking, and creativity. Education is not mere transmission, but transformation. Education keeps experience open, and by doing so education opens the path to more experience, more education. In Dewey's words, "There is nothing to which education is subordinate save more education," and "The aim of education is to enable individuals to continue their education, . . . continued capacity for growth" (1916a, 56, 107).

Dewey explains this basic educational theory in the first four chapters of *Democracy and Education*. In Chaps. 5 and 6, he compares his educational theory to competing theories, for instance, theories that conceive education in terms of preparation ("getting ready" for "the responsibilities and privileges of adult life"), development ("unfolding of latent powers toward a definite goal"), the training of faculties or the formation of mind. In the remainder of the book, he gives a detailed discussion of the implications of his own approach for democratic citizenship education, including school education in a democratic context.

For Dewey, democratic citizenship is more than voting and having rights. Democracy is not a form of government, it is considerably broader. It is a form of social life: "a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience" (1916a, 93). Social life is *undemocratic*, insofar as it is divided, hierarchical, and conservative. Social life is divided and hierarchical, for instance, when certain categories of people lay down the law and behave as if they are not dependent on other groups, and as if the interests and contributions of other groups are unimportant. Social life is conservative, for instance, when a society is comprised of introverted and conservative groups, unwilling to learn from other groups and reducing mutual contact to a minimum. Social life is *democratic* insofar as it is the opposite of divided, hierarchical, and conservative, hence, insofar as it is communal

and renewing. For Dewey, social life is communal when it places “reliance upon the recognition of mutual interests as a factor in social control.” Social life is renewing via the “continuous readjustment through meeting the new situations produced by varied intercourse . . . between social groups” (1916a, 92).

Crucially for Dewey, as previously mentioned, democracy is conducive to education. The more communal social life is (so, the more democratic it is), the richer and more varied the communication is, and the more experience and interests are shared, the more educative social life is. Also, the more renewing social life is and the more scope for flexibility and openness there is, the more creativity and personal initiative are stimulated and rewarded, and in turn, the more educative it is. Conversely, democracy needs education for two core features: communality and renewal. Communality means that everyone is involved. Inclusive co-determination and co-responsibility presuppose “that intellectual opportunities are accessible to all on equable and easy terms” (1916a, 93). Renewal, the dynamics of continuous development, assumes that citizens “are educated to personal initiative and adaptability” (1916a, 94, also 105). For Dewey, offering intellectual opportunities and promoting initiative and renewal is what counts as education. In *Democracy and Education*, this is elaborated in the form of two functions of school education; according to Dewey, the two *elementary* functions are: learning to think and vocational preparation.

At school, learning to think is crucial. Dewey contends that “(a)ll which the school can or need to do for pupils, so far as their minds are concerned, is to develop their ability to think” (1916a, 159). On Dewey’s account, the ability to think is the reflective dimension of experience, and thinking coincides with inquiry: “Thinking is a process of inquiry, of looking into things, of investigating . . . (A)ll thinking is research” (1916a, 155). The inquiring nature of thinking becomes even more apparent where Dewey describes the role of thinking in “reflective experience” (1916a, 157). He distinguishes between the “reflective experience” and “trial and error”-like learning. Both kinds of experience follow three steps: A problem emerges during an activity; an image emerges as to how the problem might be solved; and the activity is adapted in accordance with this image. In “reflective experience,” however, the second step is more complex than in “trial and error”-learning. Reflection goes beyond a spontaneous or associative image and involves critical thinking, the application of knowledge, careful judgment regarding how best to (proceed to) act: “a careful survey (examination, inspection, exploration, analysis) of all attainable consideration which will define and clarify the problem at hand; a consequent elaboration of the tentative hypothesis to make it more precise and more consistent, because squaring with a wider range of facts” (1916a, 157). Democratic citizens need such thinking abilities. The school develops them.

Besides this, schools in a democracy have an additional elementary function: vocational preparation. On this subject, Dewey agrees with Plato. Adequate education brings out the best in everyone and addresses children’s natural aptitudes.

We cannot better Plato's conviction that an individual is happy and society well organized when each individual engages in those activities for which he has a natural equipment, nor

his conviction that it is the primary office of education to discover this equipment to its possessor and train him for its effective use (1916a, 96, see also 121, 125, 318, 319).

Dewey believes that education should not identify children's aptitudes with their social origins. Children's natural abilities, although it may sometimes seem otherwise, are not dependent on their parents' wealth or social status. It is the task of education to correct "unfair privilege and unfair deprivation" (1916a, 126), to break with the status quo, instead of perpetuating it. Democratic schooling remediates the effects of unjust and restrictive aspects of society on opportunities for self-development.

Furthermore, education should not predetermine students' future vocational activities by teaching- and training-specific vocational knowledge and vocation skills. Technology and industry are ever changing, so that "an attempt to train for too specific a mode of efficiency defeats its own purpose" (1916a, 126). Therefore, for Dewey, education should guard against restrictive development and promote personal initiative and adaptability, also in the realm of work. The changeable nature of work is not the only reason for doing so. Another reason is that persons should not be (made) subordinate to their work. Democracy means, among other things, that everyone manages their own work. Democratic education helps "to develop capacity to the point of competency to choose and make its own career" (1916a, 126).

In one of the last chapters of *Democracy and Education*, Dewey states that vocation or career should be interpreted broadly: "each individual has . . . a variety of callings, in each of which he should be intelligently effective" (1916a, 317). Important activities besides work can be understood in terms of a calling, for instance, fatherhood, friendship, membership of a church, or a political party. Ideally, education also ensures that everyone can choose such callings for himself and to make them his own by pursuing them in his own way and that everyone adopts an open attitude towards new possibilities. For this reason, Dewey believes that even the ability to spend one's leisure time in a useful manner should be an objective of citizenship education (1916a, 127). After all, leisure activities also have a potential to contribute to "continued capacity for growth" (1916a, 107).

To summarize: for Dewey democratic citizenship education ensures that everyone is intellectually equipped and skilled, is full of initiative and open to change, and is able to use these qualities to investigate and solve problems, and to do his work and live his life as he sees fit.

Early Work (Before 1900): The School as "Embryonic Society"

In Dewey's work prior to *Democracy and Education*, the described approach to the relationship between democracy, education, and the school is already clearly discernible, although vocabulary, emphasis, and justification were sometimes different from his later work. Dewey's core ideas on democracy change little from about 1890 onwards. From the outset, Dewey regards democracy as shared communication and interaction, from which no one is excluded (cf. for instance: "Ethics of Democracy,"

1888). In *Christianity and Democracy*, for example, Dewey presents democracy as standing for “community of ideas and interests through community of action,” involving all members of society (1892, 91). Through their conjoint activities and communication, people work at improving their activities and communication. Besides being socially inclusive, democracy is also socially innovative: Democracy is renewing social life.

Renewing occurs in conjunction with the “self-realization” or “development” of individuals. In the period before about 1900 (for instance in “Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics,” 1891), Dewey uses the term “self-realization,” tying in with Neo-Hegelianism; after 1900 (for instance in “Ethics,” 1908) he uses the term “development,” which is more befitting to functionalistic psychology and pragmatism. Although self-realization or development is considered a personal matter, it is social to the core, both as a process and as a goal. It comes about through participation in culture (sharing language, rules, habits, meanings, thinking, values, ideals, etc.), and hence, through communication and interaction, association, and social intercourse. Self-realization or development, therefore, depends on community and social life. Meanwhile, self-realization works towards developing one’s social roles and tasks, discovering these and being able and willing to fulfill them. Besides being deeply social, self-realization, or development is also open. Indeed, the direction of self-realization or development is not fixed: It is guided by experiences, and hence by circumstances, circumstances that are continuously changing. Self-realization or development is also open in another sense: not unreservedly reproducing or accepting roles and tasks, but adapting them, as required and possible, given the circumstances at hand, and based on experience. Furthermore, it is never complete: Self-realization and development remain fluid as long as experience is ongoing, provided that there is growth. The dynamics between democracy and self-realization or development reflect the organic relationship between democracy and education. Education is a democratic practice, as democracy is an educative practice.

This understanding of the integral connection between democracy and education is reflected in Dewey’s early writings on schools, education, and democratic citizenship in the 1890s, for instance, in his much-cited *Ethical Principles Underlying Education* (1897) and in *School and Society* (1899). As in *Democracy and Education*, these early works stress the democratic importance of intellectual education and of vocational preparation, broadly conceived. A minor difference from his later work is that Dewey discusses the didactically crucial function of “occupations” more explicitly than in *Democracy and Education*, particularly in *School and Society*. Work-like doing, practical effort, labor, is understood as the motor of learning. To illustrate the distinctive characteristics of Dewey’s early work, an impression of *Ethical Principles Underlying Education* (1897) and *School and Society* (1899) follows.

In *Ethical Principles Underlying Education* (1897), Dewey argues that education coincides with the development of democratic citizenship: Apart from this “the school has no end or aim” (1897, 60). School is not “training for citizenship” in the sense of preparation for political participation and adherence to the law, because citizenship requires more than this. The school provides for the development of the

student's knowledge, insights, skills, and habits, needed to fulfill his social tasks, *all* his social tasks: his tasks as a voter, a neighbor, a family member, a parent, a breadwinner, an employee, a customer, a village resident, etc. Teaching and learning are socializing, in this sense, but must be carried out in such a way as to not be at the expense of the development of autonomy: "He is to be (for instance) a worker, engaged in some occupation which will be of use to society, *and which will maintain his own independence and self-respect*" (1897, 58; my italicization). Teaching and learning, although aimed at socialization, must also be carried out in such a way that the student is open to change and growth, also in the future, and that he is willing and able to improve and reform the roles he will occupy, the organizations and communities in which he will be participating, and the society of which he will be a member. The school should give the student "such possession of himself that he may take charge of himself; may not only adapt himself to the changes which are going on, but to have the power to shape and direct those changes" (1897, 60). In order to work in this way towards the development of social participation, and citizenship in every respect, the school must offer broad education:

(It) means training in science, in art, in history; command of the fundamental methods of inquiry and the fundamental tools of intercourse and communication; it means a trained and sound body, skilful eye and hand; habits of industry, perseverance, and, above all, habits of serviceableness (1897, 59).

Developing the latter, serviceableness, is an integral part of education. Dewey does not think highly of "teaching about . . . particular virtues or . . . instilling certain sentiments with regard to them"; he disqualifies this as being "too goody-goody" (1897, 75).

When the school functions properly as a "vital social institution" (1897, 61), moral and social learning coincide with intellectual and academic learning. Outside the school, in social life, moral and social development does not occur separately, isolated from practice, but through first-hand experience with work, caring, and other endeavors. Dewey is quite clear about this, as for example when he contends that "The school cannot be a preparation for social life excepting as it reproduces, within itself, the typical conditions of social life" (1897, 61, 62). He explains in detail what this means for both the form of education ("methods," 1897, 63–66) and the content ("subject-matter," 1897, 66–75). For didactics, this means providing opportunities for cooperation, but, more specifically, it entails connecting to and using "the child's active powers, . . . his capacities in construction, production, and creation" (1897, 65). For the content, it entails selecting and organizing subject matter in such a way that "it brings the pupil to consciousness of his social environment and confers upon him the ability to interpret his own powers from the standpoint of their possibilities in social use" (1897, 67). In this way, education fosters "social intelligence" and "social power," enabling students to contribute to society, in accordance with their own critical insight, as they see fit (1897, 75). Elsewhere, Dewey develops this idea of education more fully, for instance, in *School and Society* (1899).

In *School and Society*, Dewey discusses the function of schools in the context of social progress arguing that schools should be social. In a democracy this means, first and foremost, that education should be available to all children, regardless of their social origins and class.

What the wisest parent wants for his own child, that must community want for all of its children. Any other ideal for our schools is narrow and unlovely; acted upon, it destroys democracy. All that society has accomplished for itself is put, through the agency of the school, at the disposal of its future members (1899, 5).

The premise that schools should be social implies, secondly, that education should not withdraw from developing society but participates in “the whole social evolution” (1899, 6). For this reason, Dewey welcomed the changes occurring in education towards the end of the nineteenth century as it became more practical. One of the key educational reforms, at that time, was the introduction of manual work and domestic skills, such as woodwork, gardening, needlework, housekeeping, and cookery. This is a good thing, Dewey explains, because, in this way, children become familiar with “forms of industrial occupation” (1899, 7). Dewey’s contention was that due to urbanization and industrialization, most work was no longer carried out in and around the home and that as a result, children no longer came into contact with such tasks naturally and no longer learned, over the course of time, to take part in these activities. For Dewey, this was a loss, given the educative value of growing up around labor and gradually participating in it:

The children as they gained in strength and capacity, were gradually initiated into the mysteries of the several processes We cannot overlook the factors of discipline and of character-building involved in this kind of life: training in habits of order and of industry, and in the idea of responsibility, of obligation, to do something, to produce something, in the world. There was always something really needed to be done, and a real necessity that each member of the household should do his own part faithfully and in co-operation with others (1899, 7, 8).

According to Dewey, the loss of these traditional socialization processes ought to be compensated by schools, and this is the social function of the school. For this reason, Dewey assigns a central role to labor in schools. Not only because practical and useful work motivates and activates children, which were the usual reasons for introducing labor and domestic skills into the curriculum. Dewey goes a step further. He proposes to make labor the organizational basis of education: “occupations which exact personal responsibilities and which train the child in relation to the physical realities of life” should become “the articulating centers of school life” (1899, 9, 10). In practice this means that everything learned at school is learned through, and in conjunction with useful activities, experienced as useful by the students themselves (cf. Van der Ploeg 2013, 76–88). Understanding practice in this way calls for fundamental didactical and curricular reform. Dewey developed such ideas for the Laboratory School in Chicago and tried them out there (Dewey 1895, 1896).

In summary, Dewey's idea of the school conceptualizes it as a mini-society: "The introduction into the school of various forms of active occupation" gives schools the opportunity "to be a miniature community, an embryonic society" (Dewey 1899, 15, also 27). Dewey wishes to base education on "occupations" (work-like activities) because he viewed doing so as the most appropriate way to develop social power and social intelligence in each and every child and, consequently, to help them to find their place and role in society. In his early work, learning by doing is seen as a didactical key to democratic citizenship education. In Dewey's later work, the emphasis shifts towards critical thinking.

Later Work (Post-1916): Intelligent Understanding and Scientific Spirit

In the three decades following the publication of *Democracy and Education*, Dewey wrote several articles specifically dealing with democracy and education (almost 20; Van der Ploeg 2016). The views Dewey expressed in his later work confirms the views in *Democracy and Education*. Nevertheless, there is a shift of focus that is important so far as education for citizenship is concerned. In *Democracy and Education*, the focus was on the cross-fertilization of intellectual learning and vocational preparation. In Dewey's earlier work, relatively speaking, a great deal of attention was given to labor as a didactical key to democratic citizenship education, conducive to both vocational preparation and intellectual learning. In Dewey's later work, the emphasis shifts towards critical thinking, investigation, and intelligent understanding. When comparing the late with the early work, there is a clear trend: Instead of "occupations" (work-like activities), "inquiries" become the key to citizenship education.

In the articles published after 1916, Dewey argues particularly, and at length, that education should teach students to investigate and to think. Education must ensure the democratization of "the scientific spirit" (1916b, 142, 143). Students should acquire an understanding of societal relations, processes, conflicts, and problems. Even specialized vocational education should encourage "understanding the scientific facts and principles or the social bearings of what is done" and "industrial intelligence – a knowledge of the conditions and processes of present manufacturing, transportation and commerce – so that the individual may be able to make his own choices and his own adjustments, and be master, so far as in him lies, of his own economic fate" (1917, 148, 149; see also 1916b, 139). For Dewey, society had become so complex and extensive that citizenship becomes inconceivable without specific schooling.

Only as the coming generation learns in the schools to understand the social forces that are at work, the directions and the cross-directions in which they are moving, the consequences that they are producing, the consequences that they might produce if they were understood and managed with intelligence – only as the schools provide this understanding, have we any assurance that they are meeting the challenge which is put to them by democracy (1937a,

183). What we need . . . is an intelligent understanding of actual conditions that will stimulate individual inquiry and enable the minds of students . . . to think in a straightforward and competent way and to reach their own conclusions (1934a, 176).

Schools should, therefore, “cultivate the habit of suspended judgment, of skepticism, of desire for evidence, of appeal to observation rather than sentiment, discussion rather than bias, inquiry rather than conventional idealizations,” regarding social themes. Only then will “intelligent management of social affairs” come within reach (1922a, 334). For Dewey, this is an essential condition of democracy. Education should therefore become more investigative, more critical, more realistic.

The emphasis on inquiry, intelligent understanding, and critical thinking fits in with Dewey’s other work in the 1920s and 1930s, firstly with his defense of democracy against skeptical social and political scientists, for instance, in *Human Nature and Conduct* (1922b) and *The Public and its Problems* (1927), and secondly with his reflections on learning to think, particularly in *How We Think* (1933).

In understanding the shift in Dewey’s work in these later publications, it is necessary to recognize that these were written at a time when the ideal of democracy had come under pressure due to research findings in social and political sciences. Experimental and empirical research had shown that thinking skills, reasonableness, intelligence, powers of critical judgment, and rationality of most people were easily overestimated and while ignorance, laziness, compliance, and credulity were readily underestimated. Many scholars concluded that it was unwise to let everyone have a say and take part in government. They thought social affairs and questions had become too difficult to allow inclusive collective decision making. Decision making could better be left in the hands of a select group of experts, those who are sufficiently competent, reasonable, intelligent, critical, and rational. Dewey was well aware of the problem of the tension between what democracy expects of citizens and what citizens are actually capable of. His solution to addressing this gap was radically different: not less democracy is called for, but more (Dewey 1922, 1927). For Dewey, all citizens should be involved in deliberation and decision making, then they will learn naturally and become motivated in the process, and learning by doing and through experience. Instead of exclusion and paternalism, Dewey’s solution to the question of whether citizens possess requisite democratic knowledge and skills is inclusion and participation. And the school is a good place to start, according to Dewey: learning and practicing democratic citizenship through gaining knowledge, investigation, critical thinking and judgment, regarding social questions and affairs.

In *How We Think* (1933; an elaboration of two chapters of *Democracy and Education*, 1916a, Chaps. 12 and 13), Dewey explains why critical thinking, as a core skill, is really nothing special, why it is an ordinary skill belonging to everyone, and how it can be practiced and developed through education. It was mainly written to offer teachers guidance in this regard. Dewey offers various extensive and concrete recommendations for teaching critical thinking, for instance, how the teacher can encourage and direct children’s curiosity, how he can organize students’ thinking, how important it is to ensure that his personality does not stand in the way

of the students' learning to think, how he should select learning-matter, how he should organize and support tasks and how to prepare and handle whole-class lessons. Learning to think does not just happen by itself. It requires constant alertness and thoughtfulness on the part of the teacher. In this context, Dewey points out the importance of knowledge of the subject matter:

This should be abundant to the point of overflow. It must be much wider than the ground laid out in textbook or in any fixed plan for teaching a lesson. It must cover collateral points, so that the teacher can take advantage of unexpected questions or unanticipated incidents (1933, 338).

Dewey also focuses on the importance of attitudes, *intellectual* attitudes that is: "open-mindedness," "responsibility," and "whole-heartedness" (1933, 136–138). Those who are not "open-minded," but "closed-minded," learn nothing because experience makes no difference. With "responsibility" Dewey does not mean responsibility for practical consequences, but for logical consistency: "Intellectual responsibility secures integrity; that is to say, consistency and harmony in belief. It is not uncommon to see persons continue to accept beliefs whose logical consequences they refuse to acknowledge" (1933, 138). Responsibility ensures consistency, and hence logical connectivity, particularly in long chains of insights, arguments, and conclusions. Responsibility also ensures what Dewey calls "thoroughness" (1933, 138): not settling for incomplete thinking or relying on sloppy assumptions or flawed assessment or verification. "Whole-heartedness," finally, is giving one's undivided attention, one's intense commitment and exclusive focus to the subject at hand, to what is relevant, concentration.

As is the case in his early work, in Dewey's later work his thinking on citizenship education is closely intertwined with his general philosophy. However, in this later period, critical inquiry and thinking became the crucial activity. Critical inquiry is obviously an "occupation" of some sort but is a different kind of "occupation" than the practical livelihood-oriented activities that Dewey emphasized around 1900. At that time, he moved away from idealism (Neo-Hegelianism) in favor of pragmatism, hence, the emphasis on learning by doing. In this later work, he defends democracy against the criticism and skepticism of the political and social sciences; hence, the emphasis on the general human ability of critical thinking and on the importance of practicing critical thinking at school as preparation for democratic citizenship.

Conclusion

The relationship between education and democracy has been a consistent focus of exploration throughout Dewey's scholarship. For him, they are two sides of the same coin and are organically connected. Democracy is a condition for education and education is a condition for democracy. Moreover, education is a democratic practice, as democracy is an educative practice. In schools, citizenship education cannot be distinguished as a separate subject or domain: All education contributes to

democratic citizenship, including all school education. Provided it is inclusive: equally accessible to everyone. And provided it is adequate education. Dewey held pronounced views on the nature of adequate education. Adequate education should fulfill two elementary functions: teaching students to think critically and familiarizing them with, and becoming competent in social roles (such as family member, parent, neighbor, employee, consumer, patient, voter, caregiver, and tourist). Without the former, the latter would degenerate into mere socialization, transmission. The combination guarantees that education will contribute to social transformation. During the six decades that Dewey explicitly focuses on democratic education, the emphasis increasingly shifted towards the importance of learning to think critically: investigating and understanding social structures and dynamics.

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Cosmopolitanism, Citizenship, and Education Through the Lens of John Dewey

9

Jason Beech

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Abstract

This chapter analyses the challenge of educating students in and for a cosmopolitan world. I argue that since students live in a cosmopolitan reality, educational institutions could address productively this challenge by using the everyday experiences of students as a starting point and an input for pedagogic action. I explore Dewey's notions of democracy and experience and reflect upon their implications for the development of pedagogies aimed at the education of young people for living together in a hyperconnected world.

Keywords

Cosmopolitanism – Global citizenship · Dewey · Experience · Democracy and education

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Introduction

This chapter uses some concepts developed by John Dewey to reflect upon the challenge of educating in and for a cosmopolitan world. Specifically, I explore the concepts of experience and democracy, which are central to Dewey's philosophy. I contend that Dewey's ideas could be used to expand pedagogic imaginations in addressing one of the most pressing issues in education today: the need to prepare young people for living together in a hyperconnected world.

The chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section, I analyze the challenges of citizenship education in a cosmopolitan reality, and I sketch the idea that these challenges could be addressed productively by using everyday experiences of students as a starting point for pedagogic action. In the second section, I examine the concepts of democracy and experience in Dewey's writings. In the third section, I revisit some of my initial ideas based on Dewey's work and its implications for the development of pedagogies aimed at education in and for a cosmopolitan reality.

The Challenges of Education in and for a Cosmopolitan World

Citizenship education has always been among the key objectives of educational systems, promoting the kind of knowledge, abilities, and sensibilities that people need to live together with others that are different. However, citizenship education is dynamic. Its aims, and the methodologies that are used to pursue those aims, are transformed as empirical conditions and social values change. Thus, one of the key issues in thinking about citizenship education in the current times is to understand the world in which our students live.

If education is defined as the process through which young people develop the means of orientation (Eliás 1994) that will help them interpret and act upon the world, then these means of orientation should be defined in context. In the case of education for living together with others that are different, a key element is to think about who are the others with whom our students interact and those with whom they will interact in the future. This empirical question is followed by an ethical one: How do we want them to connect with these others? What kind of attitudes do we want to promote in those encounters? The last issue is practical and refers to the kind of pedagogic strategies that can be used to promote those dispositions.

In their origins, most educational systems were based on the logic of educating citizens to develop a national identity and loyalty to the homeland. The spatial reference was the nation-state. To know whether the others deserved our respect, compassion, and loyalty, the question was simple and binary, are they our compatriots? This way of approaching citizenship education was rooted in the projects aimed at constructing nation-states and at legitimizing the power of new modes of social organization that included many groups that previously did not have much in common. Rousseau (1966), one of the founders of political nationalism, argued that patriotism was the most heroic of passions and the best way of educating good people. He also asserted that the "feeling of humanity" evaporated and became

feeble when trying to include all humans. He deduced from this reasoning that it was recommendable to limit our “humanity” to our fellow citizens.

Notwithstanding the opinion that one might have of Rousseau’s statement and the educational priorities that were deduced from it, what is clear is that the empirical conditions of connectivity have changed profoundly since the times of the French intellectual. If the idea of including all humanity sounded implausible at those times, the current global flows of images, ideas, people, and capital generate a situation in which connectivity among all humans seems to be much more feasible (Appadurai 1996, 2013; Urry 2007; Vertovec 2009), while the notion of having geopolitical territorial borders that coincide with symbolic identity borders is much more difficult to sustain (Rizvi and Beech 2017).

Nation-states with uniform languages, identities, and cultural experiences, if they ever existed, have become a fiction. The coexistence of different identities, life styles, and cultural preferences within the territories of nation-states and the recognition of these diversities have become a global norm (Rizvi and Beech 2017). Thus, even when senses of belonging to local and national spheres are still important, these are dynamic phenomena that are articulated in new ways in changing empirical conditions of extended connectivity and flows across national borders.

Citizenship education is aimed at promoting the type of knowledge, abilities, and sensibilities that students need to live together with others. Consequently, shifts in conditions of connectivity, mobility, and the growing presence of diversity imply a challenge for the ways in which citizenship education is conceptualized and enacted. How then can we think of citizenship education in a hyperconnected world? To address this issue, I suggest, the first step is to question the idea that globalization is a kind of abstract entity that is “out there,” dislocated from everyday social interactions. On the contrary, the phenomena we tend to associate with globalization are part of our everyday lives.

Beck (2006), for example, argues that we live in a “cosmopolitan reality,” since we are in continual contact with what we construe as “other cultures.” This cosmopolitan reality is not only a reality of the elites or middle classes that have access to leisure travel. Migrations have grown significantly at a global level, and most of those who migrate are escaping conflicts of adverse living conditions, searching for a better life. For many, mobility is not a choice, but it is rather a strategy of survival. Furthermore, cosmopolitan realities influence even those that are immobile and meet “the other” in their own local territories.

In order to conceptualize these realities, Skrbis and Woodward (2013) use the concept of “everyday cosmopolitanism,” arguing that most people participate in cosmopolitan encounters in their daily lives. In addition, the increasing global dimension of issues such as equity, justice, security, and sustainability, and the realization of the global scope and origin of the challenges of current times create “a global horizon of experience and expectation” (Beck 2006, p. 73).

People’s reactions to everyday cosmopolitanism are varied (Beck 2006; Rizvi and Beech 2017; Skrbis and Woodward 2013). On the one hand, there are positive reactions to the global mobility of people. Many people decide to travel abroad to work, study, or simply to discover new experiences, if they can afford it. Others, that

might not be able to travel, celebrate meeting with different others in their own locales. There are countries that promote global economic exchange, immigration, and some have programs to host refugees that flee from unfavorable conditions at home. However, on the other hand, the growing mobility of people images and objects has created fears and anxieties resulting in xenophobic political views (Appadurai 2006). Opposition to immigration has become widespread in some parts of Europe, the USA, and other places, in some cases related to projects that seek to reaffirm closed and reactionary national, cultural, and/or religious identities (Wodak 2015). The politics of fear towards the other is growing in many parts of the world, aiming at establishing barriers that define who is allowed to move and who is not. Thus, we live in a world with contradictory views on mobilities and its desirability (Rizvi and Beech 2017).

The challenge is even more complex when faced with a context of fragmentation of the public sphere. Borja and Castells (1997) argue that processes of urbanization have augmented ethnic pluralities in big cities through intranational and international migration. Contemporary migration processes have certain characteristics that pose huge challenges to social cohesion. The combination of migrations with digital media result in what Appadurai (1996) calls diasporic public spheres, since migrant groups can stay in permanent contact with their “culture” of origin, reducing the need to “adapt” to the locale in which they now live. This creates a new order of instabilities in the constitution of subjectivities and collective identities. In addition, ethnic minorities tend to concentrate in specific areas of global cities, where they sometime become the majority of the population. As noted by Borja and Castells (1997): “spatial segregation based on cultural and ethnic characteristics of the population is not the inheritance of a discriminatory past, but rather a fundamental trait of cities in contemporary societies: the global information age is also the age of local segregation” (p. 4 – my own translation).

Urban segregation and the dynamics of digital communications that tend to the fragmentation and isolation of ethnic and political identities contribute to the development of extreme and closed political positions. This creates a challenge for the construction of communities that are open to dialogue in difference, and for democratic coexistence. As Arendt (1958, p. 57) noted, many years ago “The end of the common world has come when it is seen only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one perspective.”

Global mobilities, everyday cosmopolitanism, and the political debates that these realities trigger have a significant impact on education. Educators have the challenge of helping students understand and interpret a complex world in which mobility of people, images, imaginaries, ideas, and capital are happening at a scale never before experimented and are considered to be desirable by some but are feared by others. How can schools help young people to develop a moral sensibility towards the type of cultural exchanges that have become a constitutive part of their daily lives? How to promote democratic living together in a world in which the encounter with the other is frequent and inevitable, but the public sphere has weakened and conversation with those that different perspectives and positions is the exception?

Although there is no univocal or definitive answer to these questions, Rizvi and Beech (2017) have suggested that a possible approach is to consider the daily experiences of students as a starting point for pedagogic practices that promote citizenship education in and for a cosmopolitan world. To explore this approach, in the next section I discuss some concepts in the work of John Dewey.

Experience and Democracy in the Philosophy of John Dewey

In the preface to his book *Democracy and Education*, Dewey (1916, p. 4) suggested that “the philosophy stated in this book connects the growth of democracy with the development of the experimental method in the sciences, evolutionary ideas in the biological sciences, and the industrial reorganization.” According to Dewey, these developments were key in promoting the transformations that were taking place in the US society at the beginning of the twentieth century. Thus, when relating education with democracy, Dewey was not developing a theory of democratic education or a version of citizenship education but rather a much broader philosophy for education in general (Quay 2016). The subtitle of the book – *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education* – is quite eloquent in this sense. As Quay (2016) argues, Dewey’s project aimed at a philosophical reflection on the kind of reforms that should be made in education to go along with the significant social changes of the time.

Thus, when thinking about the relation between education and democracy in Dewey’s work, it is important to understand that his writings encompassed much more than citizenship education, addressing the role of education in the development of individuals and society. As Biesta and Lawy (2006, p. 65) notes “democracy is not confined to the sphere of political decision-making but extends to participation in the ‘construction, maintenance and transformation’ of all forms of social and political life.”

One of the key issues in Dewey’s analysis of the relation between education and democracy is the dynamism of societies and its implications for education. He criticized what he called traditional education for being anchored in the past and being unable to apprehend the waves of social change that were taking place in his times. He had a very critical view of the contents of traditional education:

that which is taught is thought of as essentially static. It is taught as a finished product, with little regard either to the ways in which it was originally built up or to changes that will surely occur in the future. It is to a large extent the cultural product of societies that assumed the future would be much like the past, and yet it is used as educational food in a society where change is the rule, not the exception. (Dewey 1938/1997, p. 19)

Dewey’s focus on the relation between education and social change in moments of significant transformations makes his work very relevant to analyze the type of challenges that education is facing today in terms of educating young people in and for a cosmopolitan world.

Dewey noted how the technological changes of his times, such as access to automobiles, cinema, and radio, broadened the horizons of experience and aspirations of children and people in general. In this way, he noted that there was a direct relation between technological changes and transformations in the ways in which people related to their environment and other people, creating new challenges for social cohesion (Quay 2016). It was in this spirit that Dewey construed the challenges that democracy posed to education. In order to survive, democracy had to be dynamic, and education is a fundamental strategy to foster the kind of change that sustains democracy. Dewey (1937/1985) noted that “the greatest mistake that we can make about democracy is to conceive of it as something fixed, fixed in idea and fixed in its outward manifestation” (p. 138).

The fundamental unity of Dewey’s philosophy was found in understanding the relation between experience and education (Dewey 1938/1997). Experience is what permits a close connection between theory (reasoning) and practice (Quay 2016). Thus, the development of a theory of experience was central in his philosophical and pedagogical writings. Dewey promoted a progressive education that should be based on the daily experiences of students. Consequently, he argued that any “practical attempts to develop schools based upon the idea that education is found in life-experience are bound to exhibit inconsistencies and confusions unless they are guided by some conception of what experience is” (Dewey 1938/1997, p. 51). The solution to this problem resided in the development of a profound philosophy of the social factors that operate in the construction of individual experiences (Dewey 1938/1997). He identified two key factors that influence experiences.

The first of these factors is, according to Dewey, the principle of continuity. The continuity of experience implies that each experience that an individual has is built upon experiences that the person had in the past, and at the same time modifies in some way future experiences. This implies that the central aim of an education based on experience is to intervene on the effects that a given experience of the student will have on his or her future experiences. Dewey stressed that a fundamental role of educators is to define which kind of experiences contribute to the positive development of the student and which do not.

Growth, or growing as developing, not only physically but intellectually and morally, is one exemplification of the principle of continuity. The objection made is that growth might take many different directions: a man, for example, who starts out on a career of burglary may grow in that direction, and by practice may grow into a highly expert burglar. Hence it is argued that “growth” is not enough; we must also specify the direction in which growth takes place, the end towards which it tends. (Dewey 1938/1997, p. 36)

In that sense, for Dewey, the intervention of the educator is the key in influencing the direction that growth will take, since each experience is a “moving force,” and its value can only be judged in terms of the direction that that movement takes. Thus, it is “the business of the educator to see in what direction an experience is heading” (Dewey 1938/1997, p. 38).

The second factor that operates in the construction of experience according to Dewey's theory is the principle of interaction. This principle is based on the notion that experiences take place in a given context. Experiences imply an interaction between an individual and its environment. There is a subjective or individual aspect and another contextual or external one that interact to constitute an experience.

The word "interaction," which has just been used, expresses the second chief principle for interpreting an experience in its educational function and force. It assigns equal rights to both factors in experience—objective and internal conditions. Any normal experience is an interplay of these two sets of conditions. (Dewey 1938/1997, p. 42)

Thus, experiences are not constituted solely in the body and the mind of a person. They do not happen in a vacuum. They are partly constructed by the elements that are outside the individual. The environment of experience can manifest in diverse ways, and it is comprised of elements such as the people with whom the individual interacts, the themes in the conversations they have, materials such as books or toys, the location, etc. (Dewey 1938/1997).

The transactional characteristic of experience creates a challenge for teachers that must generate a "connection between the child and his [sic] environment as complete and intelligent as possible" (Dewey and Dewey 1915/1972, p. 390). Teachers must learn how to use the material and social context that is available to extract from it everything that could constitute a virtuous experience for students. Dewey stresses that given this challenge, what he calls progressive education is much more difficult to accomplish than traditional education (Dewey 1938/1997).

In this way, Dewey suggests that the principle of continuity and the principle of interaction are closely related and should not be seen as different aspects. They are the "longitudinal and lateral aspects" of experience. Given the principle of continuity, when a person passes from one experience to the next one, what (s)he has lived and learned in the first situation becomes an instrument to understand and act upon the following situation. Thus, there is not only change in the individual but also in the ways in which (s)he interprets the environment. In this way, continuity and interaction taken as a unified process define the relevance and educational value of an experience.

At the same time, Dewey's notion of progressive education implies a particular relation with temporality. One of his most well-known statements is the one that suggests that education is not preparation for life, that education is life itself.

The ideal of using the present simply to get ready for the future contradicts itself. It omits, and even shuts out, the very conditions by which a person can be prepared for his future. We always live at the time we live and not at some other time, and only by extracting at each present time the full meaning of each present experience are we prepared for doing the same thing in the future. (Dewey 1938/1997, p. 49)

Dewey argues that education must be centered on current experiences of students as fundamental material for its intellectual, physical, and moral growth. Teachers

must help students develop the ability to make sense of their experiences at a moral and cognitive level, so that they can also use it independently in future experiences.

Dewey did not elaborate in his work a detailed pedagogic method to obtain the kind of educational effects he expected from experiences (Quay 2016). However, he did provide some ideas linked with the relevance of reflexivity and with the role of teachers that are worth exploring in more detail since they can provide a source of inspiration for the development of pedagogies aimed at education in and for a cosmopolitan reality.

Dewey highlighted the importance of promoting reflection on experiences so that these could be educationally relevant. For an experience to have an educational value, it should tend towards a more profound knowledge of facts and to the development of new ideas (Dewey 1938/1997).

To reflect is to look back over what has been done so as to extract the net meanings which are the capital stock for intelligent dealing with further experiences. It is the heart of intellectual organization and of the disciplined mind. (Dewey 1938/1997, p. 86)

The relevance of promoting a reflexive attitude towards experiences stresses the importance of the role of teachers. For Dewey progressive education based on experience should not be seen as foreign to organization and planning. It does not imply that the teacher leaves its students to develop knowledge and abilities in an unstructured mode. On the contrary, the role of teachers is fundamental, even if the style of their work is different from what they do in traditional education. The teacher is no longer in the position of “external boss or dictator but takes on that of leader of group activities” (Dewey 1938/1997, p. 59).

Freedom should not be understood as an end in itself. The lack of all kinds of restrictions could be negative and destructive for cooperative activities and could result in a negative kind of freedom. He gave the example of a game or a sport in which children need certain rules that define restrictions to behavior to be able to play. Without those restrictions, a state of absolute freedom becomes detrimental for social relations and for cooperative activities. The freedom that matters is “a freedom which is power: power to frame purposes, to judge wisely, to evaluate desires by the consequences which will result from acting upon them; power to select and order means to carry chosen ends into operation” (Dewey 1938/1997, p. 63). The ideal of education is to develop the power for self-control, but if we simply remove all type of external control there is no guarantee that self-control will be developed.

Thus, Dewey reminds us that the guide of the teacher contributes to the development of the kind of freedom that matters. Sometimes, based on simplistic readings of progressive education, teachers might think that intervention and restricting the conduct of their students might be negative, risky, or even authoritarian. Dewey mentions cases in which, in the name of promoting freedom, teachers leave their students on their own surrounded by objects and materials without providing them with guidelines regarding how they can make good use of those materials or the kind of activities that they should perform. Reflecting on this kind of situations he sustains that it “is impossible to understand why a suggestion from one who has a larger

experience and a wider horizon should not be at least as valid as a suggestion arising from some more or less accidental source” (Dewey 1938/1997, p. 71). Of course those teachers can also abuse of their positions and force students towards channels that pursue their own objectives, rather than the well-being and the moral, physical, and cognitive development of students. But the way to avoid this kind of negative situation is not to renounce to the power and obligation that the adult has to plan educational activities and guide students. “The plan, in other words, is a co-operative enterprise, not a dictation. The teacher’s suggestion is not a mold for a cast-iron result but is a starting point to be developed into a plan through contributions from the experience of all engaged in the learning process.” (p. 72).

Therefore, from this brief review of some of the central concepts in Dewey’s pedagogical theories, we can extract some principles to think more profoundly about the challenge of educating in and for a cosmopolitan world. These are: a broad conception of the relation between education and democracy, the dynamism of democracy, the significance of using present experiences of students as an input for their education, the principles of continuity and interaction as factors that define experience, and the importance of promoting reflexivity and rethinking the role of teachers.

Revisiting the Challenges of Educating in and for a Cosmopolitan World Through the Lens of Dewey’s Philosophy

In this final part, I will reflect upon the relevance of Dewey’s philosophical concepts for the challenge of educating young people in and for a cosmopolitan reality. It might be worth clarifying that I will not present a series of detailed recipes for pedagogic action, since that would be in contradiction with the main principle that I want to put forward: that it is the actual everyday cosmopolitan experiences of students that should be the starting point for democratic education. Experiences are constructed through interaction between individuals and their environments, consequently pedagogic strategies aimed at using experiences as a fundamental element should be adapted to the specific experiences available to students (and teachers) in their context.

The first aspect I want to emphasize is the focus in education for democracy. As I mentioned when analyzing the link between education and democracy in Dewey, it is important to have a broad conception of education for democracy, to avoid what could be called a narrow perspective of its relevance. In other words, we should not think that education for democracy is the task of a few school subjects or curricular compartments that formally are in charge of the issue. Education for democracy is what makes the school meaningful; it is related to the ontological aims of education (Dewey 1916; Quay 2015), or what Jackson (2012) calls transformative educational traditions. Education for democracy is the most profound aim of education: the transformation of the self. The project of converting the other into something different. I suggest that an education for democracy is a way of conceptualizing this project, and consequently it cannot be reduced to a few school spaces and times.

In terms of the curriculum, it is also necessary to open the “curricular cage” of citizenship education, understanding that all school subjects contribute to this central role of schools. I am not only referring to the principle that all teachers should be aware of their role as educators that exceeds teaching history or physics but rather to the notion that the categories and concepts that students learn through the school disciplines to understand, interpret, and act upon the world are a fundamental input when people define their ethical positions. The disciplines are not exempt from values, and school contents are not neutral. Consequently, the development of an education for democracy in a cosmopolitan world requires a revision of disciplinary contents to assess the kind of political and ethical values that they promote.

In his great book, *Learning to divide the world*, Willinsky (1998) argues that attitudes of negative discrimination towards others are not the result of ignorance but rather of the education that we receive. He shows how many of the categories we use to classify the world and populations that are still taught in schools were created during the times of the great European empires and their colonial projects. In this way, he argues, educational systems keep reproducing ethnocentric views of the world and stereotypes that are the breeding ground for negative discrimination towards certain groups.

Thus, the concepts and ways of representing the world that are learned in the different school subjects have a great impact on the ways in which we conceptualize the world, construct our collective identities, and develop our views on others that are different. For example, school textbooks for primary schools in Argentina offer definitions of the notion of globalization such as this:

It can be said that globalization consists of a set of strategies that tend to consolidate the hegemony of the big industrial, financial, and media corporations, whose aim is to appropriate the natural and cultural resources of poor countries. . . (Kapelusz 2001, p. 293)

It is clear that the process of globalization can be associated with modes of economic, political, and cultural domination, and it is important that students learn about global inequalities and how they are based on historical configurations of international relations at a global level. Yet, this kind of ultra-simplified and biased definition not only omits a significant and valuable part of global exchanges but also seems to be quite negative in terms of promoting a morally productive attitude towards cosmopolitan encounters and global processes.

In any case, global inequalities rather than being presented exclusively from a defensive perspective that promotes closure should be the object of reflexive practices, promoting the analysis of international power relations, inequalities and injustices, and the evaluation of the political position of students, their representations, imaginaries, and desires related to these issues. Dewey’s notion of the importance of experience as a fundamental pedagogic input can be a valuable resource to contribute to the reflexivity of students and to the analysis of how global flows and their consequences impact on their own life and their communities. Global processes should be studied in their complexity, understanding their historical construction with the aim of generating the conditions for students to imagine a more just global order.

Another relevant aspect that Dewey contributes to this discussion is the dynamism of democracy as a concept, both as an ideal and in terms of its empirical manifestations. This is linked to what Beck (2006) identifies as the emergence of a cosmopolitan reality in current times. We live in an interconnected world in which the definition of collective identities, symbolic borders, and the idea of a common ground for living together are being questioned and are unstable and dynamic. It is a world of permanent change, complex, and chaotic. This is the reality in which students live. It is the world that they must understand to be able to act upon it. Thus, our pedagogic strategies should have the capacity to bring those complex and dynamic realities into the processes of teaching and learning.

In this sense, Dewey's perspectives imply a significant change in the traditional way in which schools have addressed issues related with the moral development of student. Pedagogic strategies often take abstract normative declarations as a starting point: the Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or others (Rizvi and Beech 2017; Todd 2009, 2013; Wahlstrom 2014). Of course that it is important that students learn about these regulations. The challenge is how to introduce them into the content of these norms in ways in which they can develop an interpretation of how the normative and ethical principles that are included in regulations relate to their everyday experiences and ethical decisions, so that they can use them productively in their future experiences.

However, when these declarations are presented to students in an abstract form, it is difficult for students to link them to their actual everyday experiences. We can easily fall into a style of teaching that promotes decontextualized learning of these norms if we simply present to students a list of principles that define the behavior of a good citizen. In this way, we generate idealized moral constructions that do not exist and cannot exist in reality, since no person can always abide by every rule that (s)he would agree with in an abstract form.

Moral conflicts and contradictions are inherent to human behavior. It is not so difficult to agree on a set of common ethical principles in abstract. The everyday practical challenge is that the borders between those principles are not always clear and the problem is not only to abide by an abstract moral order or not. We are many times faced with the dilemma of making decisions in which we must choose between violating one ethical norm or another, both of which we would agree with in abstract. For example, most people would agree that lying is wrong, and that hurting someone else's feelings is also bad. The practical problem is that many times we are faced with a situation in which one of these rules will be broken, and we need to decide in a second which one to break.

Our students are already citizens that participate in interactions with others and in cosmopolitan encounters, and consequently they are permanently faced with moral dilemmas and ethical decisions. Based on Dewey's notion of the educational potential of experience, the question then is how we can have pedagogic strategies that link the conversations on normative declarations with everyday moral experiences of students, opening the possibility for reflection and moral evaluation of their actions and decisions, and having an impact on future experiences and ethical behavior. In other words, what I am suggesting is that pedagogic strategies for

citizenship education take as a starting point the experiences of students, of teachers, or even other experiences that could be similar to those lived by students and are documented in cultural productions, such as movies or books (Rizvi and Beech 2017).

As argued by Rizvi and Beech (2017), once experiences of encounters with others are made visible, the next step is to promote reflexive and critical evaluation of these experiences. The ethical evaluation of our own conduct and decisions should avoid falling into a simplistic binary good-bad analysis (although of course in some cases, it might be quite clear that certain attitudes or behaviors can be classified as being good or bad). On the contrary, everyday experiences should be debated in their complexity, making students aware of how moral everyday decisions can bring certain values of rights of different groups into conflict.

I suggest that by identifying everyday experiences, and promoting a critical and complex reflexive attitude and moral evaluation of these experiences, it is possible for students to develop the capacities to relate to normative and ethical principles in a more productive and contextualized form. Instead of students learning about important normative declarations in an abstract form, they would be able to link these norms with their everyday life and decisions and, in this way, their interpretations of previous experiences could become a guide for action, generating the reflexive capacity to relate their daily actions with the construction of a more just global order.

As Dewey notes, enacting these types of pedagogic strategies is complex and more difficult than simply teaching students to memorize the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (to caricature what Dewey called traditional education). The role of teachers change but in no way are they less involved with the learning process. On the contrary, it is fundamental that teachers construct a scenario to make the experiences of students visible and to promote a profound and significant reflection so that the process can have an impact on future daily experiences of students. Teachers are challenged with the need to find a fine balance between being the guide that the learning process requires and allowing at the same time for students to contribute to the proposed activity. This implies revising the ways in which we relate with knowledge, certainty, authority, and agreement. It is not an easy challenge.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have defined citizenship education as the part of education aimed at developing the kind of knowledge, abilities, and sensibilities that students need to live with others. I also suggested that citizenship education is dynamic and should be adjusted as empirical conditions and social values change. Consequently, in order to define the kind of citizenship education that should be promoted, it is key to understand the world in which students live.

Recent changes in connectivity, mobility, and the ways in which diversity is valued imply significant shifts in terms of the kind of encounters with others that people have and will have in the future. Thus, citizenship education needs to be

rethought. The first step I proposed in that direction is the awareness that students are already living in a cosmopolitan reality in which encounters with different others are part of their daily life. Thus, rather than presenting students with abstract normative principles about global citizenship, I suggested that their everyday cosmopolitan experiences could be used as a starting point for the development of pedagogies aimed at education in and for a cosmopolitan reality.

To further explore this pedagogic principle, I argued that Dewey's notions of experience and democracy as potentially potent inputs to design pedagogies aimed at a type of citizenship education that can dynamically adapt to different empirical realities, using the experiences of students as a source for reflexive learning. In this way, students could develop the ability to relate to ethical principles in more productive and contextualized ways.

I have only reached the stage of proposing a series of pedagogical principles (set at a quit high level of abstraction) for the design of a kind of citizenship education that can address the challenge of preparing young people to live together with others in a cosmopolitan reality. Partly because it would be contradictory with this approach to give a detailed recipe for pedagogic action, when my main argument is that ethical learning should be contextualized. But also because educating for democracy in and for a cosmopolitan world is one of those challenges that some authors call "wicked problems" (Rittel and Webber 1973). It is one of those problems that, given its nature, it can never be fully solved. The challenge of educating good citizens does not have an end. We will never reach a moment in which we will be satisfied. Because it is a contested issue and we will not all agree exactly on what being a good citizen entails, and even if we agreed, there will always be room for improvement. Thus, education in and for a cosmopolitan world is a never-ending project that requires permanent attention and effort both at an individual and at a collective level.

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Neoliberalism, Citizenship, and Education: A Policy Discourse Analysis

10

Andrew Wilkins

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Abstract

In this chapter, I draw on various literatures and theories spanning different academic disciplines to explore some of the connections between neoliberalism, citizenship, and education. Not to be confused with studies of citizenship education, this chapter documents how users of education services, specifically parents, are invited, even compelled, to perform certain responsibilities and obligations as bearers of consumer rights and champions of their own self-interest. Building on literature which likens citizenship to a “governmentality” (Hindess, *Citizenship Stud* 6(2):127–143, 2002; Ong, *Neoliberalism as exception: mutations in citizenship and sovereignty*. Duke University Press, Durham, 2006), this chapter examines the ways in which parents are invited to manage themselves responsibly and rationally through the proliferation of ever-greater forms of choice making and calculated risk in their navigation of and access to education provision. To evidence the range and reach of these interventions, this chapter adopts elements of Foucauldian discourse analysis (Sharp and Richardson, *J Environ Policy Plan* 3(3):193–209, 2001) through a study of key education policy texts to show how

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parents are imagined and activated as consumers (or “citizen-consumers”) in the field of education.

Keywords

Neoliberalism · Citizenship · Discourse analysis · Consumer · Education · Governmentality

Introduction

In this chapter, I draw on relevant theories and perspectives sourced from different academic literatures to trace the relationship between neoliberalism, citizenship, and education. A key focus of the chapter concerns the different ways in which users of education services, specifically parents, are constructed and imagined through key education policy texts. Through applying elements of Foucauldian discourse analysis (Sharp and Richardson 2001), this chapter examines the rhetorical and ideological significance of education policy texts to the promotion of distinct models of citizenship, namely “active citizenship” (Kivelä 2018) or “neoliberal citizenship” (Hindess 2002). The analysis includes a focus on the different kinds of oppositions and distinctions that are articulated through policy rhetoric to effect certain constructions of the citizen as desirable (active) and undesirable (passive).

Neoliberal citizenship is a useful concept for making explicit the relationship between neoliberalism and citizenship in the field of education. At the heart of neoliberal citizenship is a narrow rational, utilitarian view of citizens as consumers, namely citizens who exercise choice that is commensurate with consistent or predictable outcomes (i.e., outcomes that conform with a standard rationality presupposed by utility theory or public choice theory, see Finlayson 2003); citizens who are adept at navigating new responsibilities and their attendant calculations and risks; and citizens who are adaptable and responsive to change and their moral hazards, or what Chandler and Reid (2016: 53) call “resilient subjects.” In this chapter I adopt the concept of neoliberal citizenship to capture the discursive terrain of “ethico-politics” (Kivelä 2018: 160) through which citizens are trained and enjoined by way of structured incentives and ethical injunctions to fulfill certain obligations and responsibilities vis-à-vis their relationship to the state and to the market more generally.

In practice, however, neoliberal citizenship is a muddy concept. Neoliberal citizenship tends to be aligned with and grafted onto different models of citizenship, be it socio-liberal citizenship, libertarian citizenship, or republican citizenship (Johansson and Hvinden 2005). Moreover, neoliberal citizenship is mediated and inflected by “processes of assembly” (Higgins and Lerner 2017: 4) shaped by the activities, rationalities, and priorities of national governments and their regional authorities. While remaining attentive to these slippery dynamics, this chapter utilizes the concept of neoliberal citizenship as a first approximation to specifying a form of education governance (and “psychological governance,” see

Jones et al. 2013) that is prevalent among mainly advanced liberal countries and their education systems.

Contested Concepts and Approaches

Owing to the competing meanings attributed to neoliberalism, citizenship, and education, this chapter draws on diverse theoretical perspectives to help situate and refine the analysis. Theory “as a sort of moving self-reflexivity” (Gregory 1994: 86) is used here to trace the political-intellectual history of ideas and the struggle over power (or “hegemony,” the dominance and ascendancy of particular ideas) linking politics and everyday life. Theory is the critical investigation of the contested nature of language and thought and therefore is about making the familiar strange, principally through challenging the kinds of everyday assumptions claimed to be universal and acceptable or “truthful” (identical and indivisible to a reality “out there”). On this account, theory is a suitable lens through which to examine neoliberalism, citizenship, and education because these terms are better understood as overt political constructions – contingent, situated, and unstable – rather than anything that resembles static, universal concepts. What is the role of education? What does it mean to be a citizen? There are no simple answers to these questions. In fact, these questions typically give rise to more nuanced questions. How should we define the role and value of education – in relation to civic training, to self-development, to employment? What types of identifications are actively promoted or undermined through various definitions and practices of citizenship?

These questions remind us that neoliberalism, citizenship, and education are not only dense concepts but overt political constructions underpinned by various sets of interests, motives, and normative commitments. Citizenship is shaped by historically conditioned patterns of exclusion and belonging for example, making it an “essentially contested concept” (Lister 2003: 14). Similarly, neoliberalism fails to resemble a coherent, uniform ideological project owing to its “contradictory tendencies” (Apple 2017: 1) and co-option and translation by different national governments (Peck and Theodore 2015; Plehwe 2009). On this understanding, neoliberalism, citizenship, and education are better understood as compounds or assemblages of various concepts, perspectives, and processes shaped by distinct political philosophies, cultural traditions, and geo-politics. The contested nature of these terms means that context is integral to any meaningful analysis of the ways neoliberalism and citizenship are overlaid and aligned with national education systems and their “specific semiotic, social, institutional and spatiotemporal fixes” (Jessop and Sum 2016: 108).

In what follows I unpack some of the various meanings attributed to concepts of neoliberalism and citizenship in order to draw out their conceptual diffuseness. Following this I move from the general to the particular through an analysis of key education policy texts produced by successive governments in England between 1990 and 2010 (DCSF 2006, 2008; DES 1988, 1991; DfEE 2001, 2004; DfES 2005; HMSO 1991; OPSR 2002; SCPA 2005). While these policy trends are specific to

England, they are expressive of a wider political and economic movement that has dominated education since the 1980s, namely neoliberalism (Wilkins 2016), and therefore the policy analysis presented here will resonate strongly with other countries around the globe with similar market imperatives governing their education systems. The analysis is supplemented and strengthened by elements of Foucauldian discourse analysis (Sharp and Richardson 2001) with its emphasis on the fluidity and discontinuity of “truth” (Foucault 1981). Here policy texts can be viewed as dynamic, productive spaces that attempt to constitute rather than simply reflect reality and which seek to “authorize what can and cannot be said” (Britzman 2000: 36). The analysis relies on a textually oriented approach to discourse analysis through a focus on education policy texts and therefore fails to capture discourse in practice, namely the ways in which policy discourse is interpreted, translated, and implemented. As Clarke (2004: 2–3) argues,

Achieving and maintaining subjection, subordination or system reproduction requires work/practice – because control is imperfect and incomplete in the face of contradictory systems, contested positions and contentious subjects.

A textually oriented approach to discourse analysis is key to understanding how relations of domination are sustained and reproduced through policy texts that “seek to purport ‘truths’ about who we are or what we should be” (McKee 2009: 468). At the same time, relations of domination are not “monolithic, with state practices fitting seamlessly with practices of self-creation” (Bevir 2010: 425). A textually oriented approach to discourse analysis fails to capture these practices of self-creation since it is a study of the intended effects of policy discourse rather than a study of their actual effects. Therefore, what is missing from this analysis is a study of the embodiment or lived experience of discourse, namely the ways in which socially circulating discourses are contested, negotiated, and revised. I conclude the chapter by adopting a “governmentality” approach (Dean 1999) to help situate and refine some of the key observations and arguments presented in the analysis.

Neoliberalism and Citizenship

Neoliberalism (or “neoliberalization,” see Castree 2006) has emerged within academic jargon and common parlance as one of the most cited concepts used to describe and understand the impact of global forces on the formation of national economies and their welfare states. Over the past 30 years, the concept of neoliberalism has been indispensable to understanding the contradictory nature of welfare reform, especially in many Western, social democratic countries where typically governments design welfare programs with an emphasis on traditional welfarist principles, be it distribution and to a lesser extent recognition, while simultaneously and aggressively pursuing market principles of competition and private enterprise (Hall 2005; Newman 2001). More generally, neoliberalism describes a movement or “thought collective” (Mirowski 2009: 428) driven by specific economic and political

goals. A key focus of these goals is the subordination of national economies to global patterns of deregulated, precarious labor, high levels of consumption and debt, repressive state fiscal practices (or austerity), and increased corporate monopoly of industry (Harvey 2005). More specifically, neoliberalism denotes a form of government (or “governance,” see Rhodes 2007) focused on disaggregating state power to complement new forms of self-organization or “heterarchy” (Olmedo et al. 2013) characterized by public-private partnerships, diminished collective bargaining, and increased private sector takeover of public sector management.

More recently terms such as “postneoliberalism” (Springer 2015) and “after neoliberalism” (Rose 2017) have been introduced to signal the displacement of neoliberalism in some countries and the so-called “crisis of neoliberalism” (Beder 2009) that followed the global financial crisis in 2008. In Latin America, for example, many countries have recentralized certain public utilities and entities in order to bring them under state control (Lewkowicz 2015). However, global competition means that many of these countries are making large concessions to the market and to the circulation of private capital in order to survive economically, and therefore neoliberalism, or some adapted form of neoliberalism, continues to shape their political economies (Houtart 2016).

Key to understanding neoliberalism in these contexts is the disaggregation (or “roll back,” see Peck and Tickell 2002) of state power and the commissioning of new “intermediary associations” (Ranson et al. 2005: 359) including charities, social enterprises, and private companies who manage the development of welfare programs on behalf of the state, from health and social care to education and housing. Sometimes referred to as privatization management of public sector organization or “exogenous privatization” (Ball and Youdell 2007: 14), the neoliberalization of political economies is less straightforward than the wholesale transfer of public assets to the private sector since those assets sometimes remain publicly funded and publicly accountable while under the management of private organizations and actors. Unlike classical liberalism which held a strong belief in spontaneous order and the moral primacy of the autonomous subject (Jonathan 1997), and, therefore, opposed all species and configurations of state intervention in civil society and civil institutions, it is argued neoliberalism gives legitimacy to the state as “a market-maker, as initiator of opportunities, as remodeller and moderniser” (Ball 2007: 82). As Peck et al. (2009: 51) show,

While neoliberalism aspires to create a utopia of free markets, liberated from all forms of state interference, it has in practice entailed a dramatic intensification of coercive, disciplinary forms of state intervention in order to impose versions of market rule.

Neoliberalism therefore captures something unique about the political restructuring of the state and the transmutation of the state form, namely the shift away from government as the locus of power and the shift toward new modes of governing (or “governmentality,” see Dean 1999) characterized by new institutional forms and practices in which elements of state power are decoupled from the center and tightly or loosely coupled to nongovernment authorities and actors (Wilkins 2016). At the

same time, the state is no less active in “setting rules and establishing an enforcement mechanism designed to control the operation of the system’s constituent institutions, instruments and markets” (Spotton 1999: 971; also see Levi-Faur 2005). Therefore, neoliberalism denotes a form of advanced liberalism in which state power is dispersed outwards and downwards through networks, partnerships, and policy communities (namely businesses, social enterprises, and charities) who “consensually” work with stakeholders to overcome the restrictions that characterize traditional models of governing with their rule-bound hierarchies and bureaucracies. At the same time, power is recentralized as the state continues the work of setting priorities, formulating rules, and managing expectations. In England, for example, the development of a system of devolved management in which school leaders and governors manage schools free of local government interference is expected to supplant the “formal authority of government” (Rhodes 2007: 1247). Yet despite their independence from certain local bureaucratic and political structures, school leaders and governors continue to build legitimacy with central government and other regulatory bodies through making themselves answerable as high-reliability organizations or businesses (Wilkins 2016). Neoliberalism therefore entails strengthening the capacity of the state to intervene in holding others to account, albeit at a distance, principally through standardized testing regimes, data-driven audit cultures, and comparative-competitive frameworks.

From a governmentality perspective (Dean 1999), neoliberalism entails the political restructuring of the state and a redefinition of the role of government more generally. No longer provider and regulator of public services, the role of government under neoliberalism is to impose structured incentives and ethical injunctions on behavior that might compel among welfare users and welfare providers specific kinds of dispositions, rationalities, or “worldviews,” especially those that accommodate “the explicitness and transparency of quantitative, economic indicators, of which the market price system is the model” (Davies 2014: 4). On this account, the concept of neoliberalism does not sit comfortably within parceled discourses or certain literatures, as if its meaning can be extrapolated from a single perspective or canon of theory. Neoliberalism is a broad descriptor that can be operationalized using a variety of conceptual toolboxes borrowed from Foucault (Brown 2006; Chandler and Reid 2016; Dean 1999; Wilkins 2016), Marx (Bruff 2014; Duménil and Lévy 2004; Plehwe et al. 2006) and Gramsci (Apple 2017; Hall and O’Shea 2013). Neoliberalism registers multiple discursive meanings and practices (Clarke 2008). It is therefore more accurate to describe neoliberalism as framed by struggles over meaning owing to its articulation and translation through different theoretical abstractions, ideal types, analytical strategies, and normative descriptions and commitments.

Like neoliberalism, the concept of citizenship also suffers from promiscuity owing to the various meanings and practices attributed to it. Traditional statist approaches to citizenship emphasize the rights and duties of citizens within bounded sovereign communities (Marshall 1950). Here citizenship can be understood to refer to the civil rights of citizens to liberty and equality before law as well as the political and social rights of citizens to participate in deliberative and judicial activities that affect

communities and government. These forms of citizen participation may include voting to appoint elected officials, participating in jury service, paying tax on earnings or purchases, serving as a governor on a school board, or responding to local government consultations on budget spending, urban planning, and community projects.

However, citizenship is contingent on geo-politics, for example. The rights and opportunities for citizen participation are more restricted in autocratic and oligarchic countries compared to democratic countries. Moreover, the term citizenship – meaning the position or status of being a “citizen” – is now typically preceded by and affixed to other words which give it new discursive meaning and political force. The meaning of citizenship now extends to the rights and obligations of citizens as consumers (or “consumer citizenship,” see Trentmann 2007); to the role of digital tools as meaning-making devices in the creation and support of civic culture (or “digital citizenship,” see Couldry et al. 2014); to the moral and ethical responsibility of citizens as planetary humanists (or “cosmopolitan citizenship,” see Linklater 1998); and to the rights of citizens to safe spaces and dignifying representation in which diverse lifestyles and identities are respected (or “cultural citizenship,” see Pakulski 1997).

In what follows I operationalize the concept of “neoliberal citizenship” (Hindess 2002) through a discourse analysis of key education policy texts in England as an illustrative case to show how meanings of neoliberalism and citizenship are combined to effect certain changes in the field of education, namely specific social arrangements, institutional orders, and dominant discourses. A focus of the analysis concerns how users of education services, specifically parents, are summoned and activated as “citizen-consumers,” that is, citizens who understand and manage themselves as consumers of public services.

Neoliberal Citizenship in Context: Education Policy Making in England

Since the 1980s education policy in England has been dominated by market principles of competition and choice. A significant turning point was the Black Papers of 1977 which called for parents to be granted freedom of school choice by application. Up until this time parents were granted a school place for their child by the local education authority (LEA, a government-run organization) who allocated school places to children on the basis of geography (children were permitted to attend schools within their “catchment” area or schools already attended by a sibling). It was not until the introduction of the 1980 and 1986 Education Acts and the 1988 Education Reform Act (ERA) (DES 1988) by the then Conservative government that school choice was underpinned by law. Yet the right to exercise choice was framed using the language of responsibility: “This is your charter. It will give new rights to you as an individual parent, and give you personally new responsibilities and choices” (DES 1991). School choice was contingent on parents inhabiting and performing a certain version of citizenship, namely “effective citizenship”:

Whilst some have suggested that becoming better informed about the range and quality of services available is a “research cost”, it is one that most people could consider a legitimate investment for effective citizenship (SCPA 2005).

Effective citizenship – or “active citizenship” (Kivelä 2018) – gained huge traction among right-wing neoconservatives during the late 1970s. Although not called effective citizenship at the time, the notion of shifting some of the responsibility for personal welfare, from health to education, on to citizens appealed to those on the right in favor of the liberty of individuals and a minimalist state. From this perspective, effective citizenship can be understood as a powerful vehicle for destabilizing elements of Keynesian-welfarist and social-collectivist institutions with their emphasis on the socialization of risk and security (namely the protection of individuals and groups against some of the unintended consequences of the capitalism) and the administration of “need” through rationalist social planning. During the 1980s, for example, LEAs were typically maligned by the then Conservative government as demoralizing, oppressive, and antithetical to the needs of consumers. The scaling back of LEA powers was considered necessary for a market-led education system, namely one dominated by choice, competition, school autonomy, and diversity of provision. The introduction of rate-capping on education provision, in which school budget levels were linked to student intake, was another significant policy intervention in this area. The result was that schools were forced to compete for students as well as adopt a business/managerial approach to school governance that included raising money from industry and charity to offset decreased government funding (Lowe 2005).

These reforms were complimented and strengthened by successive governments, from John Major’s Conservative government (1990–1997) to Tony Blair’s Labour government (1997–2007) and Brown’s Labour government (2007–2010), who continued the discursive-political work of summoning parents as consumers of education services, albeit using their own brand of rhetoric. In the 1990s, the Conservative government introduced *The Citizen’s Charter* (HMSO 1991) which explicitly addressed welfare users as consumers rather than citizens. Later in the 2000s, the Labour government introduced similar policy rhetoric that sought to strengthen a view of citizens as consumers and public services as providers. Central to New Labour policy discourse was a desire to “modernize” public services by changing their culture and bringing them in line with the expectations of a consumer society (Wilkins 2010). These changes to the culture of welfare can be traced back to the reforms introduced by Thatcher’s Conservative government (1979–1990). As Keat argues (1991: 1), “this programme has increasingly also come to be represented in ‘cultural’ terms, as concerned with the attitudes, values and forms of self-understanding embedded in both individual and institutional activities.” In education, these modernizing reforms were contingent on parents adopting the vocabulary of consumer choice and voice, for example. Moreover, it compelled schools to adopt similar vocabulary so that they might better understand and capture through their mission statements, visual iconography, and league table standing the “needs” of parents as consumers (Wilkins 2012).

At the heart of New Labour education policy was a rigid distinction between the “old” system of education and the “new” system of education which underpinned their proposals to modernize the education system. The old system of education was strongly linked to the “rationing culture which survived the war” and to a structure of education that, “in treating everyone the same, often overlooked individuals’ different needs and aspirations” (OPSR 2002: 8). New Labour went on to argue that “our education system was too often built on a ‘one-size-fits-all’ model” (DfEE 2001: 15). In stark contrast to this old education system with its “focus on a basic and standard product for all” (DfES 2004: Foreword), the new system of education was aligned to the needs and desires of a “consumer culture” with its “expectations of greater choice, responsiveness, accessibility and flexibility” (OPSR 2002: 8). The introduction of policy levers of competition and choice were therefore rationalized on the basis that they compel schools to organize themselves as flexible, responsive organizations, with the result “that the system fits to the individual rather than the individual having to fit to the system” (DfES 2004: Foreword). Moreover, the policy of school choice was typically celebrated within an account of social change:

The affluent can buy choice either by moving house or by going outside the state system. We want to ensure that choice is more widely available to all and is not restricted to those who can pay for it (DfES 2005: 3.2).

But these reforms were not simply about redressing social inequalities in access to public provision, namely removing contexts in which access is dominated by the middle classes with their “louder voices, better contacts and sharper elbows” (Le Grand 2007: 33). In fact, research suggests that, far from mitigating social inequalities in access to public provision, choice in public services exacerbates those inequalities since it privileges users already adept at positioning themselves in the role of consumers (see Adler et al. 1989; Gewirtz et al. 1995; Willms and Echols 1992). Moreover, as Yemini and Maxwell (► Chap. 33, “Discourses of Global Citizenship Education: The Influence of the Global Middle Classes”) indicate in this edited volume, the middle classes retain the special privilege of geographical mobility due to their financial and cultural capital and therefore can transcend the limitations of space and place to seek out educational opportunities wherever they exist. Crucially, these reforms were about accommodating a model of citizenship – “active citizenship” (Kivelä 2018) or “neoliberal citizenship” (Hindess 2002) – which enabled governments to call upon public service users to manage their own personal welfare as self-responsible, discriminating choosers: “Without any choice, they [welfare users] are far more like the passive recipient than the active citizen so often idealised by opponents of choice” (SCPA 2005).

Informed by neoclassical economics, rational choice theory, and public choice theory, school choice is predicated on the idea that people “always seek the biggest possible benefits and the least costs in their decisions” and “have sets of well-informed preferences which they can perceive, rank and compare easily” (Dunleavy 1991: 3). On this understanding, public service users are rational utility maximizers who are “basically egoistic, self-regarding and instrumental in their behaviour,

choosing how to act on the basis of the consequences for their personal welfare” (ibid). A condition of rational choice, however, is that people possess “perfect knowledge” (Goldthorpe 1998: 170) of the options available to them. The creation of “better informed consumers” (DCSF 2008: 6) therefore necessitates the marketization of education in lots of ways, including the managerialism of school organization and the use of comparative-competitive frameworks like league table data to distinguish between “poor,” “average,” and “good” or “excellent” education providers.

From a governmentality perspective (Dean 1999), these reforms can be described as techniques or strategies for producing ethical subjects who, in the absence of direct state intervention, take responsibility for their personal welfare as matter of moral obligation. At the same time, these reforms make it necessary for the state to intervene to ensure that citizens make a rational, informed choice and who possess the kind of information, advice, and guidance that enables them to become active citizens. In 2006, LEAs appointed “choice advisers” (DCSF 2006) to assist parents with the handling and preparation of their school choice application. These choice advisers were introduced to assist parents who “find the system difficult to understand and therefore difficult to operate in the best interests of the child,” or who are simply “unable or unwilling to engage with the process” (DCSF 2006: 2). From this perspective, neoliberal citizenship is “a political discourse about the nature of rule and a set of practices that facilitate the governing of individuals from a distance” (Larner 2000: 6).

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have sourced perspectives and theories from various literatures to examine the complicated relationship between neoliberalism and citizenship in the field of education and the contradictions that flow from that relationship in practice. A key focus of the chapter concerns the political and pedagogic function of the state in terms of its relationship to, and construction of, citizens as bearers of consumer rights and responsibilities. Through applying the concept of neoliberal citizenship to an analysis of key education policy texts in England, this chapter demonstrates the significance of neoliberalism as a political and economic project shaping the development of the relationship between parents and schools through the introduction of structural incentives and ethical injunctions that compel certain orientations and dispositions.

A Foucauldian discourse analysis of key education policy texts produced by successive governments in England between 1990 and 2010 reveals the complicated history of these developments and their neoliberal appropriation. Specifically, the analysis documents the rhetorical spaces through which governments have sought to reorganize the balance between rights and responsibilities through a narrow rational, utilitarian framing of parents as consumers of education services. These rhetorical spaces – what Clarke (2008: 139) calls “the discursive and political work of articulation” – are more than just policy statements. Viewed from a Foucauldian

discourse analytic perspective (Sharp and Richardson 2001), education policy reflects attempts by those in power to make certain positions intelligible (or unintelligible) according to prevailing ideology. As Foucault (1981: 52–53) argues, “discourse is not simply that which translates struggles or systems of domination, but is the thing for which and by which there is struggle.” Reflected in the language of education policy is a continuing, albeit revised, narrative designed to remake citizenship in the image of the market and its celebrated figure of “homo economicus,” namely the rational, calculating, self-maximizing actor.

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Peace Education and Citizenship Education: Shared Critiques **11**

Terence Bevington, Nomisha Kurian, and Hilary Cremin

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Abstract

Citizenship and peace are inarguably related – both have human fulfillment at the heart of their endeavors. Their relationship is bidirectional and their influence mutual; good citizenship begets good peace and good peace begets good citizens. The purpose of this chapter is to explore ways in which recent developments in the field of peace education can inform the evolution of the field of citizenship education. Following discussion of the connections between peace and citizenship education, the chapter provides an overview of the history and evolution of the field of peace education. The second section of the chapter is a detailed exposition of some of the criticisms leveled at peace education – specifically in terms of its relationship with the questions of gender, nature, and faith – with a view to examining how responses to these criticisms in the field of peace education might be of use for citizenship educators in considering the continuing evolution of their own field.

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Peace education · Citizenship education · Postmodernism · Gender · Nature · Faith

Introduction

This chapter presents evolutions in the field of peace education and invites citizenship educators to consider how the insights gained might be applicable to their own closely related field. The chapter begins with a presentation of the alignments between citizenship and peace education – conceptually, philosophically, and politically – and then moves on to provide an overview of the history and evolution of peace education. The subsequent section explores some of the criticisms leveled at peace education – specifically in terms of how it deals with questions of gender, nature, and faith – and reviews the ways in which peace education has responded to those criticisms. We end by considering parallels between these criticisms and responses and those that might also be applicable for citizenship education. We hope that this might be useful for both peace educators and citizenship educators.

Connecting Citizenship Education and Peace Education

Citizenship and peace are inarguably related – both have human fulfillment at the heart of their endeavors. Their relationship is bidirectional and their influence mutual; good citizenship begets good peace and good peace begets good citizens. Both are “essentially contested” with active and ongoing debate regarding their definitions (Bosniak 2001; Jutila et al. 2008; Lister 1997). Both bring into focus questions regarding what it means to be a person, a citizen, and a human and what it means to live a good life in good relation with others. There are thus many points of connection, here, we highlight three.

Firstly, peace and citizenship education share common aims. Both fields are concerned with positive futures for individuals and societies. Both fields have aims that are wide in reach, spanning the range of human activity from the intrapersonal, the interpersonal, the social, and the societal to the global. For citizenship education, Wiel Veugelers draws on a variety of authors to categorize three aims: “citizenship may be oriented towards adaptation, towards personal emancipation or towards more collective emancipation (Giroux 1989; Van Gunsteren 1992; Veugelers 2000; Isin and Turner 2002)” (2007, p. 106). For peace education, Bar-Tal attempts to summarize one overarching aim that also takes account of complexity and points toward human emancipation as well as planetary well-being (2002, p. 28):

The goal is to diminish, or even to eradicate, a variety of human ills ranging from war, violent conflict, inequality, prejudice, intolerance, violence, environmental destruction,

injustice, abuse of human rights and other evils in order to create a world of peace, equality, justice, tolerance, human rights, environmental quality and other positive features. (see Bjerstedt 1993b; Burns and Aspeslagh 1996; Harris 1988; Reardon 1988)

Neither field can be accused of a lack of ambition! This ambition is important, however, if human beings are to survive and thrive. The closeness and timeliness of the aims of peace and citizenship education is evidenced by the inclusion of both within the United Nations 17 Sustainable Development Goals for 2030 (United Nations 2016):

the knowledge and skills needed to promote sustainable development, including, among others, through education for sustainable development and sustainable lifestyles, human rights, gender equality, promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence, global citizenship and appreciation of cultural diversity and of culture's contribution to sustainable development.

Secondly, given their shared ambition, it is unsurprising that both fields engage in shared domains. For peace education, Cremin and Bevington have identified the “core themes of justice and equality, conflict resolution, global citizenship and human rights” (2017, p. 38). For citizenship education, young citizens have identified the following core domains: “laws and rules, the democratic process, the media, human rights, diversity, money and the economy, sustainable development and world as a global community; and concepts such as democracy, justice, equality, freedom, authority and the rule of law” (Young Citizens 2018). Therefore, the aspects of human life of interest to the two fields are related and at times coincide.

Thirdly, both peace and citizenship education share an interest in the issue of criticality. One distinction that is present within both fields is in education *about* peace/citizenship and education *for* peace/citizenship. The question underpinning this distinction is whether we teach about the topic of peace/citizenship or whether we teach learners to become more peaceful/better citizens. Teaching for peace/citizenship rather than *about* peace/citizenship relates to the question of criticality. Critical approaches to peace and to citizenship education “enable students to challenge power imbalances, negotiate identities and, ultimately, to achieve greater equality, justice, democracy and peace via individual and societal transformation” (Reilly and Niens 2013). With regard to citizenship education, Vanessa Andreotti draws a useful distinction between *soft* and *critical* citizenship education (2006, pp. 46–48). She argues that “a complex web of cultural and material local/global processes and contexts needs to be examined and unpacked,” if young people are to gain a deep understanding of global citizenship.

The question of criticality perhaps touches on the political nature of both fields. The implicit and explicit political nature of citizenship education is frequently discussed by commentators in the field (see Peters 2010; Staeheli and Hammett 2011). James Page remarks with regard to peace education: “it is difficult to avoid the perception that peace education involves some implicit criticism of the existing social order” (2008, p. 15). Given the overt and covert political aspects of both peace and citizenship education, and the shared aims and coinciding domains identified

above, our argument is that each discipline is well positioned to learn from the other. In order to make clearer the case of what peace education has to offer citizenship education, it will be useful to provide an overview of the history, theory, and practice of peace education.

Peace Education

As Ian Harris has pointed out, “throughout history, humans have taught each other ways to avoid the scourge of violence” (2002, p. 19); peace education can therefore be considered a perennial endeavor. Several prominent historical figures have been identified as the philosophical ancestors of peace education. One such figure, Jan Amos Comenius (1642), the Czech philosopher, teacher, and theologian, “developed peace education as a fundamental principle in all teaching, learning and information processes” (Golz 2015). Immanuel Kant’s 1795 essay *Perpetual Peace* presented the notion that peace could be achieved through the creation of more humanistic legal and judicial systems (Harris 2002, p. 19). Teaching about peace is embedded within the religious and spiritual traditions across the world (Harris and Morrison 2013). From an educational philosophy perspective, John Dewey in the 1910s, Maria Montessori in the 1940s, and Paulo Freire in the 1970s have all identified teaching about peace as an integral purpose of education (Kester 2011; Harris 2008). Thus, from its early inception, peace education has been about peacebuilding – preventing war and promoting justice and global citizenship.

As Kester remarks, peace education is “part of the larger field of peace and conflict studies” (2012, p. 62), and as such, its evolution has been strongly informed by developments in theory and research in that larger field. Johan Galtung is widely recognized as the father of peace studies (Lawler 1995; Boulding 1977). Galtung has played a key role in defining the field; he developed a lexicon for the study of peace that persists today (Lawler 1995). In his editorial of the inaugural issue of the *Journal of Peace Research*, Galtung presented one of his most influential theoretical contributions to the field of peace studies: “there are two aspects of peace. . . : negative peace which is the absence of violence, absence of war – and positive peace which is the integration of human society” (1964, p. 2). He later added that positive peace could be equated with social justice (1969, p. 190). This expansion in the conceptualization of peace also served to expand the conceptualization of peace education (Salomon and Nevo 2002).

Galtung made a further contribution to the theory of peace when he introduced the novel construct of peacebuilding in his 1976 essay, *Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding*. He characterized the three notions as, “peacekeeping: the dissociative approach” (p. 282), whereby parties in conflict are kept apart under threat of punishment; “peacemaking: the conflict resolution approach,” where the “source of tension, the underlying conflict,” is addressed and resolved (p. 290); and, “peacebuilding: the associative approach” (p. 297), which attends to the creation of structures “that remove causes of war and offer alternatives to war” (p. 298). In applying the concept of peacebuilding to education, Kathy

Bickmore has translated Galtung's original distinctions in the context of schools. One focus of Bickmore's work is to explore the "kinds of learning opportunities in schools [that] might best address conflict constructively, and resolve the causes of violence, in school and in society" (2011, p. 1). This focus on "learning opportunities" reflects the more holistic perspective on creating peace that is inherent within the concept of peacebuilding (Tschirgi 2011). Cremin and Bevington (2017) have built on Bickmore's work to identify those aspects of education and schooling that enable the three dimensions of peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding to be realized. In their book, *Positive Peace in Schools*, Cremin and Bevington include critical citizenship education as one of three core dimensions of peacebuilding in schools, alongside inclusion and well-being.

Following this overview of the history, theory, and practice of peace education, we now turn to examine some of the criticisms that have been leveled at peace education in recent years and the responses that have been made to those criticisms.

Transcending Modernity

As we explore how peace education can stretch the boundaries of citizenship education, it becomes clear that the field of peace education itself is in a state of flux. Since it sets itself a lofty ambition – to transform individuals and societies – peace education must constantly evolve through debate and dialogue. In this section we spotlight the field's adventures in overcoming the constraints of modernity, as these offer parallels for citizenship education. We begin by clarifying the meaning of twentieth-century modernity as a historical category and a normative Enlightenment-based ideal. Then, we use three dimensions of the human experience to highlight how twenty-first-century peace education transcends modernity: gender, nature, and religion. We argue that citizenship education can draw on these twists and turns because they stem from a growing openness to alternative cultural epistemologies and a nuanced understanding of the plurality of peace and therefore also of citizenship.

Modernity originated in the Enlightenment, an eighteenth-century European intellectual movement. Decrying religion as superstition, the Enlightenment considered reason the central source of authority. Grand narratives of humanity navigating a linear path to progress deemed reason essential. Kant and Locke celebrated individualism or the right of every individual to reason independently. Positivism and realism, ideas which prioritized quantifiable, tangible truths, gained traction. Science became a rational, deductive tool to systematically control and order the world through human intervention (Outram 1995). Another concept underpinning the Enlightenment was that of Cartesian duality or Descartes' idea that the mind is independent from the body (Fitzpatrick 2004). Yet another was liberal humanism, as espoused by Kant and Locke, a belief in an essential, shared, and unchanging human nature and universally valid and timeless values (Outram 1995). As an embodiment of all these ideals, the rational, white, heterosexual, Western European male became the normative icon of the Enlightenment because it reflected its canonical thinkers

(Rousseau, Voltaire, Hume, and so on). Thus, Enlightenment values – rationality, individualism, scientific deduction, the mind-body duality, normative whiteness, and universalism – underpin the historical epoch and analytical framework called “modernity.” These values are important to delineate because they transcended the eighteenth century and continue to permeate peace education and citizenship education today.

It is worth noting that peace education became prominent after World War II, in a century dominated by modernity and dissatisfaction: dissatisfaction with faith, tradition, and totalitarianism (Pippin 1991). Deaf to voices from other cultures, twentieth-century peace educators amplified Western narratives of peace (Gur Ze’ev 2001). These narratives were shaped through the lens of liberal humanism in their emphasis on rationality and universalism. Western notions of securitized peace shone as timeless, packaged for export to any local context. Gur Ze’ev (2001) brands this ethnocentrism as a form of hegemonic violence. His critique seems valid because if peace educators endorse a single cultural understanding of peace, they risk imposing monolithic values on populations with different cultures and traditions. The contemporary challenge for peace education is thus to avoid the ideological traps of modernity and to recognize that peace is no fixed entity but a contested social construct whose meaning is continually negotiated, depending on context. The same can perhaps be said for citizenship education.

We now delve into three developments in peace education that may be of interest to citizenship educators. First, rebuffing excessively patriarchal discourses of rationality, peace education honors feminized perspectives and the role of affect and relationships, particularly in its attention to care ethics. Second, rejecting technocratic modernist values, peace education highlights diverse concepts of peace that privilege nature and ecological well-being. Third, shifting away from the Enlightenment view of religion as superstition, peace education recognizes different faith-based philosophies and traditions globally. Sears and Hughes’ much-cited (2006) critique flags similar dangers faced by citizenship education: the possibility of veering toward jingoism, indoctrination, or demonization of the other. Our overarching argument is that peace education, with its emphasis on understanding a plurality of worldviews, is beginning to address these dangers and that peace educators and citizenship educators have much to gain from productive dialogue.

Foregrounding Gender

The first critique of peace education reviewed here is the way that it has historically overlooked the role of affect, care, and relationships in ways that ignore gendered perspectives. A key educational theorist in this area is Nel Noddings. She has written specifically about peace education (Noddings 2011), but her earlier work, *Caring: A feminine approach to ethics and moral education* (1986), is also relevant to citizenship education. This book makes an argument for education to be based on natural processes of caring. Noddings is not interested in how moral reasoning

develops in children, nor in teaching about morality through rational argument. She prefers instead to examine what it means to care and be cared for and how caring functions in educational contexts.

Due to the historic marginalization of women in public spaces, feminized perspectives on conflict and caring are often seen as “odd” or relegated to the private realm. Noddings wishes to challenge the dominance of standardized rules, debate, and rational-cognitive approaches in education such that it is the quality of the relationship – the commitment to care – that really counts. In her later book about peace education, Noddings (2011) brings the ethics of care into the field. Drawing on the work of thinkers such as Elise Boulding (2000), she argues that schools can moderate the psychosocial factors that promote violence. Noddings wants peace educators to help young people become more aware of the forces that seek to manipulate them, to imagine new ways of educating children for a more peaceful future, and to enable feminized perspectives on care, love, home, and community to flourish in their classrooms.

This re-envisioning of human relationships in school spaces has widespread appeal for peace educators. James Page sees care ethics as the essence of peace education because peace is “ultimately about relationships” (2008, p. 8). Peace educators have embraced care as a tool to transform. For example, Cann’s (2012) study illuminates how care can nudge young people to be vulnerable and open about how structural violence, such as racism and sexism, shapes their worldviews. Cann suggests that such dialogue epitomizes what Bajaj (2008) calls critical peace education. Critical peace education stimulates individuals to perceive the myriad forms of violence marring their daily lives and to respond at both a micro- and a macro-level. Care strengthens critical peace education because it creates safe dialogical spaces for students to risk vulnerability. It involves deep attentiveness and engagement. Among other purposes, care can nurture children displaced by conflict (Munter et al. 2012), honor the values of indigenous peoples (Ritchie et al. 2011), and decolonize praxes of peace education to counter colonial violence (Williams 2017).

This wide-ranging potential renders care ethics a rich foundation for citizenship education as well as peace education. Furthermore, citizenship education has been accused of undue masculinization by sociologists, political scientists, educators, and philosophers alike. Critics are keenly aware that citizenship is not gender neutral. That citizenship is framed by a gendered vision of who may participate in society was notably argued by the feminist political theorist Carole Pateman (1980, 1992). Prominent feminist and educational sociologist Madeleine Arnot delineates how gender binaries translate into spatial binaries, elevating men to the public sphere and relegating women to the private sphere (1997, 2008). She observes that citizenship education has traditionally shunned the familial and domestic elements intrinsic to many women’s social worlds including the realm of care.

Like peace education, however, contemporary citizenship education is beginning to shed this historical baggage of gender exclusion. Citizenship educators have identified care ethics as key to more humane praxis. Zembylas (2010) proposes an “inclusive citizenship education,” anchored in care ethics, that refuses to other

and dehumanized individuals perceived as a threat to homogeneity. Nussbaum's (1997) vision of citizenship education foregrounds compassionate imagining: understanding the pain and suffering of others to take action for social justice. Also, Sevenhuijsen's highly influential (1998) work on the morality of citizenship pivots around care. For Sevenhuijsen, citizens dwell not in lone huts but in lively webs. In light of the advent of feminism, which seeks to make human relations more ethical and egalitarian, she argues that it is crucial to embrace how interdependent and vulnerable individuals are. The great benefit of surrendering overly masculinized, rationalist views of citizenship is that, in its bid to honor relationships, care ethics liberates the ideal citizen to be empathetic and responsible for social change.

The Centrality of Nature

Peace education is forging new relationships with nature through stressing compassion for the physical world as well as compassion for human beings. For example, based on the Earth Charter, Wenden (2014) demonstrates how education for peace must draw on values such as ecological integrity (recognizing that the natural world has a right to be protected) and intergenerational equity (the present generation must ensure that future generations have access to sustainable resources). Similarly, Joseph and Mikel (2014) advocate a transformative moral education imbued with notions of ecojustice, and Brantmeier (2013) proposes a "critical peace education for sustainability," alert to the power dynamics and systemic violence that hamper our environmental stewardship. Dietrich's *Many Peaces* (2012) include "energetic peace," found in the Global East and South, and "transrational peace" which integrates a variety of peace traditions. Energetic and transrational peace ascribe mythical attributes to nature; they emphasize human beings' physical, psychic, intellectual, and spiritual capacities. In opposition to the modernist view of nature as an object to be controlled by science, energetic peace and transrational peace depict nature as an object of worship, to be revered and guarded.

This approach fits the postmodern turn in peace education, which prioritizes ecological sustainability. Harris (2013) has pointed out how school textbooks extol the Industrial Revolution and technical inventions, and how such praise typifies modernity, because the Enlightenment endorsed intervening in the natural world to accelerate scientific progress. Reardon (1988) sees planetary stewardship as key; Burns and Aspelagh's classic (1996) anthology charts the ecological movement; and Harris and Morrison poignantly call on students to "experience the sound of the earth crying" (1988, p. 37). Contemporary peace education contends that an addiction to technology has spawned nuclear weapons and exhausted natural resources, making ecological sustainability an imperative (Bajaj and Chiu 2009; Harris 2013; Harris and Morrison 2013). Lum (2013) notes a growing trend in peace education research to focus on the interconnectedness of all life. Thus, concepts like "energetic peace," which seek caretakers, not commanders, of the natural world, make the concept of peace more holistic and wide-ranging, hence proving a worthwhile departure from the modernist technocratic worldview.

In this, peace education aligns itself with many of the goals and ideas of citizenship education. Dobson's (2003) seminal analysis of ecological citizenship argued that liberal and civic republican conceptions of citizenship insist too firmly on personal autonomy to cultivate a sense of duty toward the environment. His call for a conception of citizenship inclusive of care and compassion for the environment aligns well with postmodern peace education. Similar themes emerge in UNESCO's seminal guidance document, *Global Citizenship Education*, which portrays empathetic care toward the environment as a key aim of citizenship education (UNESCO 2015). Similarly, the Gandhian concepts of nonviolence, so familiar to peace educators, are deployed by citizenship educator Dash (2014) to encourage deeper moral changes in ecological citizenship education. Hayward's (2012) model of ecological citizenship education, which foregrounds the social agency of students to work collaboratively for change, has much in common with Brantmeier's model of critical peace education for sustainability. The two fields – peace education and citizenship education – thus have much to gain from reinforcing each other's shared goals of environmental stewardship.

Faith Revisited

Another innovation in contemporary peace education of interest to citizenship educators is the increasing attention to diverse religions. Within the value system of modernity, scientific progress took precedence over faith. The insistence on rationality has permeated peace and citizenship education discourses globally. For instance, England's Crick Report, which famously broadcast the nation's vision of citizenship education, stressed the importance of rational decision-making (QCA 1998). However, peace education is beginning to go beyond a rationalist focus to explore the potential of international faith traditions. For example, Köylü (2004) suggests a model of Islamic peace education. Divorcing Islam from its stereotype as a violent religion, Köylü shows that the Quran renders God the source of peace (as-salam) and "He" invites humanity to dar as-salam (the abode of peace). Similarly, Gervais (2004) crafts a Baha'i curriculum for peace educators. The Baha'i faith embraces peace education because it considers education to be a critical tool of transformation, environmental sustainability, and virtues like patience and humility. Peace educators are also beginning to study the Buddhist emphasis on compassion for all living beings. Goulah and Urbain (2013) showcase how Nichiren Buddhism can be a foundation for peace education programs in their tribute to Daisaku Ikeda, the Buddhist philosopher, educator, and nuclear disarmament activist. Ikeda's vision of peace education extolled Nichiren Buddhist concepts such as honoring the dignity of all life and the use of proactive dialogue to empower people to actualize their innate Buddha nature (calm and compassion) and soka (value creation or education that provides meaning, purpose, and happiness). The Hindu influences on Gandhi as he preached satyagraha or nonviolence are also well documented by peace educators (Luo 2010; Upadhyaya 2010).

Drawing such insights from faith-based traditions of peace challenges the modernist worldview because the Enlightenment considered religion to be superstition. In addition, faith can involve collectivist rituals, which depart from the modernist emphasis on individualism and offer models of peace that prioritize community and group-based identity. Recent research suggests that religion, despite its potential to be polarizing or divisive, can be an effective basis for intergroup contact, unity, and reducing tensions (Brantmeier 2011; Yablon 2010; Baratte 2006). This cross-cultural research on diverse religions can perhaps be valuable for tailoring peace pedagogy to the local context and the value systems of faith-based communities. Thus, diverse global faiths already find a home in contemporary peace education, offering a context-sensitive replacement for the modernist framework.

The relevance of this shift for citizenship education lies in how it is also increasingly recognizing religious and spiritual concepts. Gearon (2009) delineates how citizenship education has traditionally been considered secular ever since European Enlightenment-based conceptions of the modern polity. He traces how the eighteenth-century formal separation of church and state accompanied the French and American revolutions and infused political life with liberal secularism. Now, however, policymakers increasingly argue that citizenship education must attend to issues of religion and spirituality to empower students to become critical thinkers accepting of diversity. In England, for example, Ajegbo's influential Diversity and Citizenship Curriculum Review (2007) argues that it is a moral imperative to sensitize students to the multiplicity of identities that individuals hold and to cultivate their empathy toward followers of different faiths. Such work suggests that peace educators and citizenship educators who have addressed the potential of diverse faiths for peace, and the crucial question of how to build interfaith understanding and tolerance, have much to contribute to each other.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we initially presented an overview of the alignments between peace and citizenship education, followed by an overview of the history of peace education. We then deconstructed the historical and conceptual roots of modernity before going on to spotlight three ideological innovations in the twenty-first-century peace education revolving around gender, nature, and religion. We have discussed links with citizenship education in order to illuminate and develop theory, policy, and practice in both. Our argument is that if both peace and citizenship are dynamic and multidimensional, the postmodernist turn holds promise for them both. Postmodern peace education does not replace one truth with another, but refuses to accept any grand narrative. From a postmodern perspective, peace and citizenship are protean and fluid, varying across place and time. They are not the static concepts of modernity but contextual, historicized, and interactional (Zembylas and Bekerman 2013). As Denzin and Lincoln (2000) put it, no single umbrella can house the dreams and experiences of people around the globe. This plethora of worldviews and practices finds a home in postmodern peace and citizenship education, which reject

fixed definitions. Untethered from grand narratives, postmodern peace and citizenship assume varied shapes across cultures and contexts. This dynamism seems the best contribution to the twenty-first-century peace education and citizenship education: the chance to offer future citizens ways of building peace that embrace pluralism, nuance, and diversity.

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Citizenship (and) Inequality: Ethnographic Research on Education and the Making and Remaking of Class Power and Privilege

12

Dennis Beach

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Abstract

This chapter is based on a meta-ethnographic investigation. Its main theme is that the processes of selection that operate in schools and education systems in Western countries, taking Sweden as an example, are claimed to be just and meritocratic but are instead fundamentally unjust and ineffective systems that reproduce rather than challenge existing structural inequalities. Socio-economic restrictions and the reproduction of upper-class cultural capital and ideology as official school knowledge play key roles, but it is also concluded that education and social equality, justice, and fair citizenship possibilities for all in capitalist societies have never stretched further than wringing out minor concessions from class society whilst leaving the reproduction and absolution of the class system and inequalities based on class and distinctions of race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, and physical and mental differences intact.

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Meta-ethnography · Bought privilege · Social reproduction · Cultural dissonance · Cultural capital · Symbolic capital

Introduction

Educational reforms evolve within national political systems as what is usually expressed as a means of fostering possibilities for the realization of individual propensities, for both the good of the individual and society. Principles of meritocracy are said to operate through economic resources being invested in people on the basis of talent, effort, and achievement, rather than wealth, gender, race, religion, region, or social class; to create more efficient and well run just and equitable societies with stronger future ties between citizens and the State (Heater 2004; Ireland 2006; Wilde 2005). But is this really what happens? Just and equitable education systems as ones that represent and prepare individuals for equal civil and political rights and citizenship. They should treat people equally as beings who are endowed with conscience and reason to undertake an education to prepare them to in the future enjoy full involvement in social decision making and equal access to social institutions and the fruits provided by them. But when we look closely we have to conclude that education systems are rarely just at all in these senses, and that no truly socially just and equitable education systems have hitherto existed (Arnot 1982; Brooks and Holford 2009; Kerr and Keating 2011; Wilde 2005). Even in a democracy like Sweden, the education system has prepared people not for citizenship equality but for citizenship inequality (Beach 2017, 2018; SOU 1990, p. 44). Bought privileges remain an important denominator. They include the right to buy places in prestigious educational institutions (Arnot 1982) and they lead later in life to different possibilities for shaping not only one's own future (Reay et al. 2005), but also the futures of others and even those of social institutions such as schools (Beach 2018; Jonsson and Beach 2015; SOU 1990, p. 44; Weis et al. 2013; Weis and Fine 2012).

Based mainly on readings and analyses of ethnographic research on education justice and the reproduction of inequality from the most recent four or five decades, the present chapter presents a synthesis of findings related to the above and other related features of education inequality such as social reproduction, cultural production, and cultural dissonance, related to race, social class, and gender. However, it does not focus particularly on recent education reforms that have introduced market politics and new actors and forms of governance into education systems. My intention is instead to discuss aspects of enduring education and social equality, justice, and citizenship in capitalist societies broadly but with a particular focus on Sweden, a country that is widely regarded as more educationally just and equitable than most, which I will argue have never stretched further than wringing out a few concessions from existing structures and institutions (Brooks and Holford 2009; Ireland 2006). Education reforms have broadly left the class system and racial,

ethnic, gender, sexuality, and able-ness inequalities intact (Beach 2018; Reay 2012; Vahtera et al. 2017; Wilde 2005) and the ontological realities of misogyny and racism untouched (Beach 2017; Gillborn 1990; Kerr and Keating 2011; Lundberg 2015; Wright 1992).

Works addressing neo-liberal reforms in education and their consequences, such as Stahl (2017) and Wilkins (2016), describe how governments internationally have recently introduced policies that have successively undermined the idea of direct national political responsibility for education supply (Beach 2018). These reforms have allowed philanthropy and businesses to take a place as significant actors within education policy processes and delivery, through initiatives like charter schools and school academies and various free trust schools that own their own assets and are able to establish subversive partnerships with foundations outside the State (Salokangas et al. 2016). Nations are moving towards an education supply chain that is much messier and more diverse than in recent decades and that now involves a variety of new providers with new forms of injustice and inequality that exist with and reinforce the significance of older ones (ibid.; Stahl 2017; Wilkins 2017; van Zanten 2009; Verger et al. 2016).

A Brief Note on Method: Comparative Synthesis and Meta-ethnography

The method used for the research behind the chapter is meta-ethnography, which is a way of reviewing and synthesizing individual ethnographic investigations that may stretch across several years or even decades and lifting their findings to a higher level of abstraction than in the primary studies. In line with descriptions of the method by Noblit and Hare (1988), it involves reading ethnographic studies connected to a particular theme and making a list of the key metaphors, phrases, ideas, concepts, and interpretive storylines in each and any possible relationships between them. Two types of interpretation are involved: reciprocal (exploring concepts and respective storylines in terms of how they may be commensurate and reinforce each other) and refutational (exploring them for contradictions and negations) as a way to develop a synthesis that can hopefully renew or extend existing knowledge in the field. Noblit and Hare (1988) use a seven-stage model to illustrate. Table 1 below provides an overview.

Bought Privilege and the Significance of Economic and Cultural Capital

Kenway et al. (2016) recently carried out a multisite ethnographic investigations in seven global highly selective schools to cast light on the issue of bought privilege and its value in relation to future citizenship. The schools were based on an updated British public school model with a modern curriculum that included globally recognized skill and competency needs (Kenway et al. 2016) and similar types of

Table 1 Describing meta-ethnography

Phase 1. Assigning a focus for the analysis
Phase 2. Selecting articles, books, reports or chapters addressing the focus
Phase 3. Reading the studies: identifying concepts from the studies
Phase 4. Using reciprocal and refutational translations to interpret concepts and determine how they are related
Phase 5. Translating the studies into each-other and integrating study findings
Phase 6. Synthesizing translations to develop a new interpretation
Phase 7. Tailoring the communication of the synthesis as a line of argument narrative that can be compared with research products from other studies

schools to these have been described in investigations in Nigeria, Sweden, the USA, UK, Ecuador, and India in research by Ayling (2019), Erlandson and Beach (2014), Posecznick (2013), Delamont (1989), Wakeford (1969), Walford (1986), Johnson (2009), Dewey (2006), and Gilbertson (2014). These scholars construct and convey myths about themselves by using exalted ornaments of value to attract clients through a notion that money can buy many things, but it means little culturally and politically without experiences and merits like those passed on through schools such as these. Mutually important symbolic capital was developed and employed to signal worthiness and reputation with a message that these schools can prepare their students for an influential future and that the students are worthy of this (Ayling 2019; Erlandson and Beach 2014; Kenway et al. 2016).

Simply buying a place in the schools was not an option. The schools were not objects on an open economic market that could be accessed by anyone at all, with money. Money was needed, but there were scholarships available. Rather than money the schools traded off and nurtured hierarchy-legitimizing myths and practices. They also targeted a clientele that was identified and treated as not primarily economically but rather principally culturally and even intellectually superior. And the recruited pupils were then treated in this way, as an elite, before the start of and throughout their education careers. Elaborate choreographies of privilege and capital were fostered and used to uphold this charade (Ayling 2019; Beach 2018; Delamont 1989; Kenway et al. 2016; van Zanten 2009; Wakeford 1969; Walford 1986, 1991, 2009):

1. Bought privileges guarantee a monopoly of dominant class patronage that concentrates and perpetuates the communication of upper-class cultural capital with a high educational and economic exchange value as a resource for upper-class pupils only.
2. Choreographies of symbolic capital have produced a mirage of added value to inherent intelligence to project and protect a sense of the mutual exclusivity of the schools and their clientele in their respective interests. The clientele are treated, projected outwardly as (and consider themselves to be) members of a special group who are the future bearers of civilization.

3. Like the ruling colonial elite in books such as Orwell's *Burmese Days*, learners in elite schools describe themselves and are treated and socialized, as civilized, aware and cultivated compared to others, who are in their turn derided as uncultivated and irrational beings who need moral surveillance and control in both their own best interests and the interests of the societies they are part of.
4. Maintaining the mirage of mutual superiority is the core work of elite schools.
5. Elite schools have also been made available to working-class families in new-deal capitalist (neo-capitalist) nations through the creation of State funded grammar schools and scholarships that enable elite-school placements.
6. National investment provides a guaranteed economic supplement to elite schools and together with privately sponsored scholarships also a means for their social legitimation and the cultural hegemony of the dominant class.
7. Elite schools cement privileges for the upper-class by adding further weight to a cultural and social imbalance in which individuals from outside this class are denied full access but then still identify positively with forms of privilege that undermine the attainment of full and equal citizenship rights and possibilities for all.
8. Expensive private schools are part of an ongoing story about how the upper class is able to gain domination through associations of its overt practices with high values.
9. Although elite private schools do not rob subordinate groups of their own cultural identity and its values, they do reshuffle these values on a specific ideological terrain. They have been exercised for centuries by this dominant class to make their class-cultural knowledge more worthy than other forms of knowledge in ways that continue to bear down heavily on attempts to modernize and democratize nations.
10. Elite schools are institutions that house, educate, and socialize the offspring of the contemporary upper-class for their roles as anticipated future business, cultural and political leaders. However, the power of the elite also becomes a learned phenomenon that is accentuated by attendance at schools such as these that instill a sense of privilege and entitlement.

The term, hegemony, is the mechanism behind the creation of elite-ness in education for and in the interest of the dominant class. As described by Gramsci, hegemony is the means by which power succeeds through the use of a discourse that legitimizes that power regardless of whether the discourse is logically or factually correct or not (Jonsson and Beach 2015). It means that the assumption that economically advanced countries rely on achievement criteria in education from effective and efficient schooling as the key to both individual success and economic growth is false (Beach 2018). But it also means that for those who run and use elite schools this does not matter, because the mutual interest lies only in turning a profit (be this economic and/or cultural or political) and protecting and reproducing class exclusivity and domination not creating justice, equity, and efficiency (Stahl 2017).

Citizenship, Social Class Reproduction, and Resistance

Working ethnographically from within a UK national secondary modern school, perhaps the antithesis to an elite school of the kind discussed above, Paul Willis (1977) focused on the ways in which the education system prepares young people for citizenship in capitalist societies, and how schools are complicit in social reproduction, by promoting the desirability of white-collar labor and undermining the possibilities for working-class youth to be educationally successful while at the same time still identifying positively with their class origins. His work was in a sense then about what happens when the sanctioned translation and institutional transmission of objective upper-class cultural capital confronts subjects with embodied forms of capital from outside the elite or aspiring elite (middle) classes and with very different dispositions and experiences from the dominant class. However, the book made the following important recognition concerning this issue that had not received much previous attention. It was not success in formal schooling that would carry the working class forward, but manual, secretarial, and domestic work, which young working class people experienced not as forms of damnation, but as things of real value (Griffin 1985; Skeggs 1997; Weis 1990; Willis 1977).

The social conditions for independence through manual work did not exist in exactly the same way for all young working class people. It did not exist to the same extent for young women as it did for young men for instance: and nor was the same possibilities of economic exchange through physical labor as easily accrued for individuals who fell outside white, male mainstream working class norms (Arnot 1982; Griffin 1985; Vahtera et al. 2017; Willis 1977). But Willis never denied this. Instead his point was that school propagated a perpetual class insult for working class young people by valorizing middle class intellectualism against the grain of working class physicality and the domestic care of women, with this thus undermining in other words; at least for the majority of them, both the physical work done by fathers, brothers, sisters, aunts, uncles, and cousins in industries and domestic labor in the home by mothers as care-givers and the chief economists for the weekly wage were devalued. Yet these things had helped to provide decent home-lives, love, security, an annual holiday, a car to ride round in, a good bed to sleep in, and furniture to sit on in rooms where parents and children alike could also entertain their friends (Skeggs 1997). There was a stiff contradiction between the messages given by school and the lived experiences of young working class subjects (Willis 1977).

Moreover, the jobs the working class did at the time were not usually excessively dirty or dangerous jobs. National (and even international) agreements between capital and labor had struggled for and won that served to regulate factories and other sites of production as relatively safe working environments where the levels of exploitation of both male and female labor power in the pursuit of profit had to be legally accounted for. Unions and the capitalist fear of socialist revolution had seen to this through collective agreements and had also helped politicians to force forward labor laws that drastically reduced the hours manual laborers needed to work in order to make a living. The volume of leisure time had increased subsequently, which

together with rising incomes made it possible for more and more people to buy cars, holidays, televisions, refrigerators and become a mobile class whose economic conditions rivaled those of much of the middle-class. In the eyes and social, emotional, and material experiences of young working class people in school, they were on top of the game (as Willis 1977 put it) and life actually seemed to be quite rosy, despite the lack of respect for their values and lifestyles in the content of the formal curriculum and from the dominant and middle-class fractions, including many teachers (Beach 2018; Skeggs 1997; Willis 1977).

Working class young people understood their social conditions very well in many respects, including the principle characteristic of their conditions of existence and position within the social whole (Skeggs 1997), as well as the major the contradictions at the heart of the working class school experience and this helped them to liberate themselves “from the burden of conformism and conventional achievement” (Willis 1977, p. 130). But this understanding still mirrored existing conditions of production, and for the young male informants in Willis’s research these were generally both blindingly white and emphatically homophobic, able-ist, and strongly chauvinistic (Willis 1977). Willis used the concept of limitation to describe this condition. It referred to internal and external cultural elements that worked effectively against a deeper penetration and wider grasp of social conditions (Willis 1977) and confused and impeded a more complete understanding of social class relations (also Marshall 1950) in ways that were compounded by the almost complete rejection of any value in intellectual work. The development of greater awareness was blocked both by the official curriculum and within the circuits of cultural production within the school context that left young working class pupils not only unable to intellectually transcend class borders, but also susceptible to reinforcing them through their own actions (Willis 1977). This was also identified to be a problem for the majority of working class students in higher education in Maisuria’s (2017) investigation.

Particularly missing from the cognitive map of the working class subculture was what higher levels of education could entail for those who were placed outside of their family members’ social class position and how these levels of education were used by the middle- and upper-middle classes not only in the interests of these classes themselves, but also in relation to the conditions of existence and future of the working class as well, both at school and at work (Maisuria 2017). But above all, no understanding was expressed about the depth of self-righteousness, derision, mistrust, fear, and sense of “just-desserts” the educated upper- and middle-class harbored. This was never given any consideration. And nor was how the middle- and dominant classes also used education as a tool of justification for their rights to a dominant position in society that enabled them to curtail citizenship possibilities within the framework of society for others by denying them material power and full cultural respectability (Beach 2018; Erlandson and Beach 2014; Jonsson and Beach 2015; Marshall 1950; Skeggs 1997; Torres 1998; Willis 1977).

History helps illustrate the significance of these developments. Since *Learning to Labour* was published, the globalization of capitalism has taken new proportions (Therborn 2018; Trondman and Lund 2019), with the emergence of new

confrontational economic policies, particularly following the dissolution of the Soviet Coalition of States in 1991, subsequent to which the global economy has been transformed in very significant ways by the economic and political elite. The labor market agreements that existed during the time of Willis' (1977) investigation have been reduced, side-stepped, and even decommissioned (ibid.; Beach and Sernhede 2011). Industrial labor has been moved to low income areas with low levels of organized labor, and there have been severe cuts in public spending (called austerity today) along with service outsourcing and upwards of 60% of households in European countries, including the UK, Italy, and Sweden, can no-longer maintain the living standards of the old working class in new times. Leaving school in Europe without qualifications today is a very different matter than it was in the 1970s (Beach and Sernhede 2011; Trondman and Lund 2019).

Internationally, paid manual work is now massively underpaid in relative terms today compared to the 1970s. Average incomes among the top 10% of earners has gone up to almost seven times those of the bottom 10% in the past 5 years (from four to one during much of the 1990s), and the richest five economic individuals now own and control of more resources than the poorest 50% of the combined population (Beach 2018; Therborn 2018). Running a home from unqualified work today means needing to take more than one job just to survive: driving cabs, cleaning hamburger chains at night, or doing domestic work in the homes of the well-to-do (Beach and Sernhede 2011). But what about people working in this new so-called "gig" economy comprising, for example, students, older workers, or parents looking after kids who need a bit of extra income to supplement other sources (Ravenelle 2019). It may mean ending up on the economic margins of society on a permanent or semi-permanent basis, begging on the streets, or doing the work others do not have to do in conditions of waged poverty just to try and get by (Beach and Sernhede 2011; Ravenelle 2019).

For most of these "self-employed contractors," the gig economy means low pay, insecure work, no employment rights, and earning less than the hourly Minimum Wage with no financial security (Ravenelle 2019). Moreover, the effects have spilt over into traditional mainstream employment, as companies and public services are now bidding down prices and adopting increasingly precarious contractual arrangements. Zero-hour contracts are now commonplace in the public as well as the private sector, in the health service, in schools, and even in some universities, where lecturers (but particularly auxiliary staff) operate as independent contractors that are outside the social safety net of basic workplace protections.

Cultural Dissonance Factors Including Race, Class, and Gender

In considering the relationship and tensions between education and citizenship, an investigation involving young Muslim men in England and their daily interactions as students at an elite university was conducted by Bhatti (2011). It showed some of the tensions and pressures these young men experienced when trying to get on in white middle-class education institutions. However, what cut

against the grain for these young working class men was not a masculine working class identity as much as a racial and above all Muslim one, where ethnic stereotyping and racism had made the young men feel that they were both outsiders and insiders in the country where they were born, brought up, and were they were being educated (Bhatti 2011). Similar types of cultural experience are also discussed for other ethnic groups in the work of Sewell (1997) and Mac an Ghaill (1988). They capture how education identities are potentially both fluid but yet also shaped in relation to epistemologies of race, class, and gender as well as material conditions of existence. Furthermore, this scholarship highlights how success and survival as a self-identifying black student in a white institution may involve therefore having to cope with racial insults, stereotypes, misrepresentations and misunderstandings, and structural repression and reproduction alongside the workings and content of Eurocentric, white, class dominated curricula. Thus, although social reproduction is not something that is straightforwardly fixed and hardwired to a single universal working-class identity that does not mean that social reproduction does not exist at all (Bourdieu and Passeron 1964; Marshall 1950; Reay 2001; Torres 1998).

Mac an Ghaill's (1988) research explored this matter in terms of the relationships to education that developed within three school subcultures that though being unique in certain ways also shared things in common due to their very different school experiences to those of white middle-class individuals: mainly through class stereotyping and racism (the Asian Warriors, the Rasta Heads and the Black Sisters). School academic success was uncommon, belonging mainly to the Black Sisters. These girls were from different nonwhite ethnic groups, but they used the term black to denote a common feeling of structural oppression (Mac an Ghaill 1988). They helped each other, and although in private they expressed at least as much resistance toward the dominant bourgeois white curriculum and institution as the members of the two other groups did, they found ways of hiding this and most of them went on to later study at university. But even so in study trajectories that were still predominantly angled away from elite institutions and study programs. Differentiation thus involved processes of institutional discrimination but also self-selection in the progression through the school system and into higher education and/or employment (Fordham and Ogbu 1986; Lundberg 2015; Torres 1998; Trondman et al. 2012).

Teachers can play a strong intermediary role here in these processes of differentiation. As Sewell (1997) suggested, in strongly socially classed imperialist societies, teachers will have admittedly been socialized into a racist, classist, and structurally also obviously misogynous society, and they will also most likely have been exposed to a form of teacher education that does not prepare them well for dealing with class, gender and race related injustices (Gobbo 2011) or for the responses these injustices can call forth. Wallace (2016) has considered this in his research concerning how young black men may attempt to counter racial subordination through masculine domination, particularly when engaging with white female teachers. Capitalist ideology hides exploitative social relationships from teachers and counter-school cultures alike, and they both react to this by instinct at

the same time as ideological effects limit, confuse, and impede the full development and expression of these impulses. Teachers reproduce stereotypes about black young men and the young men draw on three common strategies to offset these negative stereotypes: namely, distinctiveness, deference, and dominance (Wallace 2016).

David Gillborn (1990) analyzed similar features to this and also the responses of teachers to the actions of young black men in his investigation of how African-Caribbean boys were often perceived to be a threat by their teachers when no threat was intended, and how they often then became exposed to measures of control they did not feel they deserved, and that they felt were based on teacher evaluations that showed racist tendencies. Moreover, this happened, Gillborn pointed out, despite the fact that the teachers not only openly claimed to be appalled by racism, they also insisted that (despite the obviously different educational outcomes for black boys) they did not treat black children differently to white, or black boys differently to black girls. But as identified also by Cecile Wright (1992), they probably should have done, because society definitely does treat them differently (Gillborn 1990; Lundberg 2015; Wallace 2016). For as Gobbo (2011) wrote, when school experiences are affected by perceptions and expectations that are shaped by persisting stereotypes and harsh prejudices linked to material conditions in class biased racially oppressive and exploitative societies, there does not need to be any form of blatant class aggression or racism in educational contexts from teachers. The system processes pupils differently and schools will tend to end up legitimizing marginalization, exclusion, and segregation unless these are concretely identified and opposed (Gillborn 1990; Johnson 2009; Sewell 1997). Objectively, and despite constant assertions that schools and national education systems in Western countries operate on the basis of class/color/disability/gender and race neutrality, social class, gender, color/whiteness have remained significant in relation to education differentiation with influences then also on future citizenship (Wilde 2005).

Similar points to these points were made also by Fordham and Ogbu (1986) more than three decades ago when they described how institutions tend to submerge racial and cultural differences and tensions just at the same time as students are attempting to make sense of their racial identities in and out of school and cope with discrimination (Beach and Sernhede 2011, 2012; Trondman et al. 2012). As Johnson (2009) and also Wallace argue, in class and color hierarchic societies, notions of white or nonwhite become identified in opposition to one another and being nonwhite is usually seen to imply that pupils will be more difficult to manage and less likely to do as well as white pupils. Success can also then become an aspect of a style or performance, of acting white or not and as a cross-class or race experience this can chafe against both the personal experiences of young people and the professional habitus of teachers (Mac an Ghail 1988). When being successful in education, young men and women of nonwhite backgrounds may experience a risk of devaluing their cultural inheritance and background and their feeling of identity and belonging (Beach 2018). But as with the example of the

Black Sisters in Mac an Ghaill's research (1988), there are instances of high academic achievements.

Closing Remarks

This chapter has been composed from an analysis of mainly ethnographic research, which Gobbo (2011) writes means studying education at close quarters through interaction and by intensive participant observation, to allow for not only the identification and description of everyday rules and regulations in educational institutions, but also the documentation of the differently enacted agency of pupils, teachers, and families there. It has identified the significance of bought privilege and the hollowness of elite school experiences that reproduce class distinctions and class power and how schools in white capitalist societies, as also Reay (2012) points out, rarely constitute social justice and fair citizenship possibilities for all, but rather reproduce inequalities and forms of class, color, sexuality, able-ness, and gender bias alongside forms of economic selection to privilege the dominant class ideology and execute repression in the interests of this class (Beach 2018).

Some groups, such as Mac an Ghaill's group of Black Sisters, cope and appear to do well in education despite this, and these and other examples are sometimes held up to illustrate that schools do reward and recognize intellectual prowess, commitment, motivation and effort, not only race, physical able-ness, gender, and socio-cultural or socio-economic inheritance. Yet at the same time we know the efforts that these students have had to put in and the social chafing and tensions success in school can create when the social and ethnic backgrounds and gender of young people still determine their future educational pathways to a large extent (Bhatti 2011; Schwartz 2013; Trondman et al. 2012; Willis 1977). Sexualities and physical as well as mental challenges also carry tensions that seriously contradict all suggestions about integration and full and equal opportunities for everyone (Beach 2018)! But as pointed out by others such as Reay (2012), Weis and Fine (2012), and Weis et al. (2013), these injustices are not new phenomena. Economically and socially privileged parents have always had and have also used greater possibilities to reproduce their existing cultural, social, and economic advantages in the hierarchy of public and private schools and these institutions have served them well for decades as a way to work the system and reproduce class hierarchies through class choreographies employing various signifiers of cultural and symbolic capital in conjunction with economic power (Kenway et al. 2016). Education and social equality, justice and fair citizenship possibilities for all in capitalist societies have never stretched further than wringing out a few concessions from existing structures and institutions (Brooks and Holford 2009; Ireland 2006), with this then leaving the reproduction and absolutism of the class system and other inequalities (such as racial, ethnic, gender, sexuality, and able-ness) intact (Reay 2012; Vahtera et al. 2017; Wilde 2005) and the ontological realities of misogyny, race, and racism untouched (Gillborn 1990; Kerr and Keating 2011; Lundberg 2015; Wright 1992).

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Part II

Citizenship and Education in National and Localized Contexts



Curriculum Policy and Practice of Civic Education in Zambia: A Reflective Perspective

13

Gistered Muleya

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Abstract

In recent years Civic Education has evolved into an important school curriculum subject in Zambia. Similar to other parts of the world, Zambia has experienced changes mostly driven by educational policy innovations. The educational policy innovations have, in turn, been driven by the desire to democratize the teaching and learning environment in schools. As a result of this development, the call for more critical, active, and participatory approaches to the teaching of Civic Education has become imperative. In this chapter, the historical development of Civic Education in Zambia, including the curriculum policy provisions for Civic Education and current practical aspects of the subject, is discussed. Using the terms Civic Education and Citizenship Education interchangeably, the chapter articulates what it perceives to be the best practices and values derived from Civic Education. In so doing, the chapter concludes by highlighting the key arguments about the curriculum policy and practice of Civic Education in Zambia.

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Introduction

Civic Education, also known as Citizenship Education, has become an important focus in Zambia's educational policy, and this is in line with an international surge of interest and motivation in the wider field of Civic Education. One can speculate that the reason or reasons for such a position are based on the understanding that Civic Education is deemed as an important constituent of the development of citizenship in current and future generations. In a similar fashion, Sim and Chow (► [Chap. 48, "The Development of Civic Participation Among Youth in Singapore"](#)) note that the active participation of citizens is crucial to the sustenance of a healthy democratic society. The observation has been made on account of Civic Education being a subject that equips citizens with the relevant knowledge, skills, values, and dispositions which allow them to participate effectively in the community. Similarly, Print (2000) suggests that the purpose and content of Civic Education includes what is taught in schools about the system of government, the rights and responsibilities of citizens, the history of the government, parliament and constitution, the role of citizens in a liberal democracy, and a set of values based on democracy, social justice, and the civic virtues of an active, participating citizenry.

Despite Zambia's democratic space being relatively constrained owing to challenges arising from the current sociopolitical context, it can be argued that there has been a strong consensus among key stakeholders – academicians, educators, and policy makers – concerning the importance and content of Civic Education in schools, especially with regard to a revised curriculum of 2015. One of the key aspects in the revised curriculum is to produce among other things self-motivated, lifelong learners; confident and productive individuals; and holistic, independent learners with the values, skills, and knowledge to enable them to succeed in life (M.o.G.E 2015). This chapter discusses the historical development of Civic Education in Zambia, including the curriculum policy provisions for Civic Education and current practical aspects of the subject. As stated above, the subject has become compulsory in all secondary schools in Zambia from grades 10–12. The age range of the learners at this level (grades 10–12) is 15–19 years. At junior secondary level (grades 8–9, ages 12–14), the revised curriculum requires that Civic Education, History, and Geography are integrated within Social Studies. The chapter articulates what are perceived to be the best practices and values central to Civic Education in Zambia. Furthermore, the chapter highlights central arguments regarding the curriculum policy and practice of Civic Education in Zambia. The key argument of the chapter is that Civic Education has quickly become an important focus in Zambia's national educational provision owing to the fact that it teaches substantive knowledge, skills, attitudes, and values that have a positive impact upon student behavior,

all elements perceived by stakeholders to be vital for meaningful citizenship in Zambia.

Education Provision in Zambia: Historical Perspective

To put this chapter in its proper context, especially to readers who may not be familiar with Zambia, it is important that a brief background about Zambia is provided. Zambia gained her independence from the United Kingdom on the 24th of October 1964. In the period from independence to 1972, Zambia was governed by the socialist United National Independence Party, first within a multi-party system of governance, then, between 1973 and 1991, as a one-party state system. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, there was perceived discontent among Zambians regarding the one-party system resulting in calls for multi-partyism which was attained in 1991 under the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) (Muleya 2018a).

Of particular relevance to this move to a multi-party democracy was the worldwide renewal of interest in citizenship, sparked by a number of political events and trends across the globe, including, among others, perceptions of increasing voter apathy, the resurgence of nationalist movements, the impact of global forces on local social traditions, the stresses created by increasingly multicultural societies, and a decline of volunteerism (Prior 2006). The MMD ruled for 20 years before losing power in 2011 to the Patriotic Front, which formed government in 2011. There is some perception that the coming of the Patriotic Front into government has eroded the process of a functioning democratic arrangement. The perception has arisen from the manner in which the principles and values of democracy are being applied in the different governance institutions. Arising from the foregoing, it would appear that such perceptions have the potential to impact on the intended capacities that Civic Education develops in learners such as critical thinking, creative thinking, and analytical thinking among the many others. Abdi, Shizha, and Bwalya (2006) have described Zambia's postcolonial economic development as a failed category on account that what had been created could be described as socioeconomic underdevelopment.

Civic Education, in general terms, provides possibilities for engaging students in civil and political issues. However, in Zambia, as observed elsewhere by Kennedy (2003), students are often marginalized and silenced through the use of repressive state apparatus such as the police service or force. Since the return to a multi-party state, Zambia has experienced political, economic, and social challenges constrained by the narrow, economic base, which historically is dependent on copper mining, concentrated ownership of assets, limited foreign and domestic investment, the legacy of authoritarian, corruption, and high unemployment (USAID 2003). In addressing such challenges, Flanagan (2003) stated that Zambians needed to be socially and politically incorporated into "the body politic" and develop "habits" that promote and sustain social, political, and cultural rights. Additionally, they should be

given opportunities to exercise these rights and learn to fulfil responsibilities in the community and institutions. In turn, Civic Education is prefaced as laying the foundation for democratic citizenship by educating citizens about the types of behavior and attitudes they need to function effectively in a democratic society (Morris 2002).

Within this changing political and economic context, education has remained as a core part of Zambia's political and social infrastructure (Abdi et al. 2006; Muleya 2015). This is not to suggest, however, that education and schooling have remained static and unchanged. Indeed, the development of education and schooling in Zambia has passed through many phases, including those dating back to pre-colonial traditional systems operated through Christian missionary-managed education in colonial times to the postindependence era (M.o.E 1964). It is also important to note that despite various educational policies that have come with successive governments since independence, the Education Act of 1966 has continued to set the basic framework for the education system in Zambia (M.o.E 2000). Despite achievements made in the implementation of previous educational reforms, much more remains to be done to realize real change and transformation within Zambian society (Muleya 2015). This observation is also supported by Carmody (2004: 158) who asserts that the educational system in Zambia has not clearly addressed the important question of educating future generations for democracy. In other words, he noted that schools across the country were not encouraging learners to foster a "democratic ethos in their interactions as young people," whether in school or out of school, and this has had an impact on the preparation of these learners for democracy in the community. It is important here to highlight that Civic Education had been discontinued in the school system in 1978 by the United National Independence Party (UNIP) of Dr. Kenneth David Kaunda on the understanding that the learners exposed to Civic Education knowledge, skills, and values would more easily challenge Dr. Kaunda and his government. On this score, the Government at that time decided that Civics should instead be maintained at the junior level of education so that learners would only learn basic knowledge, skills, and values on governance issues.

Carmody also noted that the lack of actual democratic education was creating challenges despite clear policy statements which hailed the ideal of democracy. The national education policy on education published in 1996, *Educating Our Future*, emphasized the democratic ideal that:

Zambia was a liberal democratic society. Hence, it was the values of liberal democracy that were to guide the formulation of educational policies and their implementation. The core values of rational and moral autonomy, equality, fairness and liberty were to underpin the concept of a liberal democracy. In this system, the people were expected to participate fully and rationally in the affairs of the country.

Such a position at the time demonstrated a clear need for a more participatory version of Civic Education to be reintroduced in schools in order to address the gap

which the subject Civics had not clearly addressed. Civics as a school curriculum subject had a narrow focus and did not allow the learners to engage actively in their lessons. Civics was mainly promoting what would be described as procedural knowledge thus knowledge about state institutions as opposed to substantive knowledge or knowledge meant to challenge inequalities in the community and provide or suggest alternative solutions to the powers that be without being censored. Civics as a subject also promoted blind loyalty to those in authority, and this encouraged the generally citizenry to remain mute on many issues that were affecting them for fear of being reprimanded by the state apparatus. The other point to note here is that Civics was only taught at the junior level of secondary education thus from grades 8–9 and could not be taken up at senior level of education (grades 10–12), and this was seen as one of the many gaps that prompted the Ministry of Education and other key stakeholders to reintroduce Civic Education at senior level.

In summary, the reintroduction of Civic Education at the level of secondary education aimed at renewing an ethos of critical thinking and creative thinking among students which was seen to be greatly lacking in previous iterations of Civics in Zambia. In the next section, the chapter discusses in more detail the reasons that led to the revival of Civic Education in the school curriculum.

The Contemporary Revival of Civic Education in Zambia

Before examining the contemporary revival of Civic Education in Zambia, it is worth highlighting that this revival has run concurrently with changing conceptions of both citizenship and education for citizenship in academic scholarship. These changes have recognized and prioritized the development of a set of skills to learners which, in turn, will help them to become active and informed participants in their communities (Muleya 2018a). As noted by Wilkins (► [Chap. 10, “Neoliberalism, Citizenship, and Education: A Policy Discourse Analysis”](#)), meanings of citizenship are now typically preceded by and affixed to other words which give citizenship new discursive meaning and political force, and, as such, it is no longer meaning the position or status of being just a citizen. In this way citizenship is about being an effective citizen able to get involved in what is going on in one’s community or society. Wilkins (► [Chap. 10, “Neoliberalism, Citizenship, and Education: A Policy Discourse Analysis”](#)) further notes that citizenship should be understood to refer to the civil rights of citizens to liberty and equality before law as well as the political and social rights of citizens to participate in deliberative and judicial activities that affect communities and government. The reintroduction of Civic Education rose out of the need to produce learners who would be versed in the ideals and practices of a democratic community. Central to this new curriculum was teaching learners about how they can live as true citizens in the community, following the ideals of what may be referred to as transformative citizenship education. Banks (2008) states that transformative citizenship education aims to challenge mainstream conceptions of citizenship by engaging students in critical analysis of taken-for-granted

assumptions about membership, identity, and community. Mainstream citizenship education – what Banks (2008) refers to as more traditional forms of citizenship education – is rooted in factual information about systems of government and constitutions, often reinforcing and therefore perpetuating hegemonic values and institutional knowledge. Banks suggests that this kind of education is grounded in versions of citizenship which adopt the established values and morals of the majority and maintains the dominant power relations in society.

Interest in the reintroduction of Civic Education in Zambia's school system arose from a feasibility study which was commissioned by the Southern University/Democratic Governance Project under USAID in 1995. Muleya (2015) reports that the study was undertaken by group of experts and academicians from the University of Zambia after realizing that there was a gap in the education of learners for democratic ideals in society such as the inability of the learners to challenge taken-for-granted positions in the community; lack of critical thinking skills; and lack of democratic skills like participatory, active, civic engagement and civic involvement just to mention a few. The need to retrain teachers in line with the objectives of Civic Education was also a critical element in the revitalization of Civic Education in the Zambian school curriculum. Reflecting on key issues with the approach taken prior previously, Carmody (2004) has argued that there were important deficiencies in education for the promotion of democracy, social responsibility, and justice. For example, he noted that discussions of explicitly political matters were not encouraged and when they did happen were so somewhat covertly. As efforts were made to depoliticize schools, they were not able to prepare students for the practice of democracy in the community. The recognition of the argument by Carmody above was an important factor that created the revived aims of fostering democratic communities and making such communities to become the loci of citizenship.

Indeed, according to an Irish Aid Report of 2002, the rationale for the reintroduction of Civic Education in schools in Zambia arose from the following factors: that civics was taught at junior level of secondary education, which had created a gap between the upper secondary and tertiary level; that the content at junior level was too loaded and detailed to be grasped by learners at junior level; that the skills and values in the content were limited to enabling learners to understand and practice their civic rights and obligations in society; and that trained civics teachers had a low esteem of the subject and preferred teaching subjects other than civics. The reports' last point was that pupils themselves thought of the subject as less important and therefore did not give it the status it deserved.

At the same time, Civic Education across the globe had become a primary concern for many countries in their endeavor to nurture citizens who were going to possess the capacity to address local and global issues rationally (Gilbert 1996; Crick 1998; Criddle et al. 2004; Noddings 2013). The Zambian Government White Paper, the *National Capacity Building Programme for Good Governance in Zambia*, identified and stated that central to the development of good governance was a need to expand and intensify Civic Education (Muleya 2015). It is worth reflecting, too, that the reintroduction of Civic Education in Zambian schools had become a critical

issue due to the fact that what was being offered to the learners under Civics was in most cases not impacting on the national consciousness required of the general citizenry in addressing local and global issues rationally. The revised focus on Civic Education was also meant to support the new overall education policy direction which had been conceived on the lines of democratic principles and ideals (M.o.E 1996).

In strengthening the subject in schools, the revised curriculum of 2015 has made Civic Education a compulsory subject at senior level of the secondary education where in both career pathways (academic and vocational), it appears as one of the core subjects. This was not the case before the revision of the 2015 revised curriculum. It also goes without saying that the Civic Education curriculum as revised has a different approach to the way learning should be conducted as it places a lot of emphasis on civic engagement among the learners a point of departure from Civics which was carefully tailored to produce passive and obedient learners. As such the observation to be made here is that the Zambian School curriculum no longer has Civics as a subject but rather has now Civic Education. While Civic Education is now compulsory at senior secondary school level, it is integrated at the Junior Secondary level into what is referred to as Social Studies. The social studies subject combines Civic Education with Geography and History on account that there is interrelated content and similar competencies between these disciplines. (Religious Education does not fall into the social studies dimension in Zambia, and it is a stand-alone in the current curriculum framework.) The Junior Secondary School Curriculum is a 2-year course that covers grades 8 and 9 (12–14 years) of the Zambian Education system (M.o.G.E 2015). However, Civic Education is a living subject experiencing changes from time to time. As such, the curriculum intends to provide learners with the basis for the acquisition of relevant knowledge, skills, and values needed for learning in subsequent formal studies at Senior Secondary School. According to the M.o.G.E, (2015), the curriculum at this level also equips the learners with knowledge and skills to either continue with the academic education or pursue prevocational and life skills. It is also important to point out here that the two career pathways at senior secondary level are deemed as academic and vocational. In order to realize the aspirations of the revised curriculum of 2015, respective schools across the country are being encouraged to come up with continuous professional development activities (CPDs) in Civic Education so that teachers would be oriented and reoriented on the innovations taking place in their field of study. Equally to note is that training institutions are also encouraged to train the students in line with the changes made in the revised curriculum. Additionally, the training institutions are also encouraged to design programs that will cater for the integration of Civic Education, History, or Geography into social studies at grades 8 and 9.

In all this, the practice of Civic Education in Zambia remains alive to its mission of what one could call refocusing, reinvigorating, and repositioning as well as recreating in learners the tenets and rudiments of what it means to be citizens, whether nationally or globally. According to Print and Smith (2000), the key elements of Civic Education are the critical values required for participation in

democratic societies. Values in this case appear to play an important role in the formation of social capital, one of the foundation stones of civil societies and democracies (Putnam 1995; Montgomery 1998 as cited in Print and Smith 2000). Law (► Chap. 20, “The Role of the State and State Orthodoxy in Citizenship and Education in China”) observes that Civic Education enhances the dominant orthodoxy values and fosters an obedient citizenry for social and political stability rather than cultivating people to become more independent and autonomous. It is clear from such a position that the values found in Civic Education are variously applied in different contexts. Peterson et al. (► Chap. 57, “Education for Youth Civic and Political Action in Australia”) observed that the rationale for the Australian Curriculum Civics and Citizenship was aimed at helping the students to explore ways they could actively shape their lives, value their belonging in a diverse and dynamic society, and positively contribute locally, nationally, regionally, and globally. Similarly, Muleya (2016) noted that Civic Education as a subject involved the active participation of citizens in managing themselves in society and to make sure that everyone who needs help is supported. Furthermore Muleya (2018b) contends that Civic Education reflects on the assumptions, approaches, paradigms, worldviews, philosophies, systems, structures, and people of diverse backgrounds as the means to gain great understanding through hands-on knowledge on the ways of life in society. This again has bearing on the kind of values that one gets through the principles and ideals of Civic Education. A scrutiny of the 1996 *National Policy of Education, Educating our Future* points to the upholding of national peace, citizenship, patriotism, national pride, and respect for other people’s freedom and sovereignty as some of the values that should be promoted through Civic Education. These values are guiding ideals for the nation in terms of what Civic Education should contribute to the education of Zambian citizens. Thus, Civic Education is considered in the Zambian education curriculum as achieving the objectives that may not be attained by other subjects only.

It is thus clear that successive governments in the postindependence period in Zambia adopted different education policies especially in the 1990s which played a critical role in informing current educational provision and practices (Muleya 2018a). In addition to focusing on Civic Education as a curricular subject, as argued by Abdi, Shizha, and Ellis (2010), educational policies and reforms during this era also sought to democratize the education system. The current government’s educational vision aims at providing education which is responsive and relevant to the requirements of society. In doing so, through its *Vision 2030 policy document*, the Government of the Republic of Zambia notes that the Ministry of Education should provide for wider values and goals that are significant to the core of Civic Education, namely, providing learners with the required knowledge, skills, and values meant to uphold and respect their own freedoms and those of others in society.

Based on the *Civitas Framework* of 1991, Muleya (2018a) contends that Civic Education in Zambia has the capacity to bring forth to the learners’ attitudes and habits that would help them as citizens to contribute effectively to the

development of their communities. Civic Education is also said to help learners acquire relevant knowledge and skills required of them to participate accordingly in society and that Civic Education supports learners in becoming part of what is happening around them and this in the long run has the potential to help get involved in addressing the challenges of the day in their local communities. To be able to fulfil their rightful obligations, the learners will first of all have to understand their role as citizens of Zambia. Without this understanding of who they are as citizens, it is difficult to realize the goals of Civic Education, especially the values derived out of it. As to whether the current curriculum is addressing the problems which led to the revival of Civic Education at the senior level of secondary education, it can only be speculated that there is still a lot of work to be done in this area. While the revised curriculum is clear on the aims of Civic Education, there is a lack of studies which explicitly examine the practice and impact of Civic Education in Zambian schools.

Whether the intended practices are being realized or not is something that will have to be seen once the revised curriculum of 2015 has been fully implemented in schools. However, it can be argued that Civic Education in the Zambian school curriculum remains an important way and means of teaching citizens about their individual rights, duties and responsibilities. It is worth concluding this section by referencing Jekayinfa et al.'s (2010) contention, written in relation to Civic Education in Nigeria, that Civic Education brings benefits for schools, other educational organizations, and society at large. Schools and other educational organizations argue that Civic Education supports motivated and responsible learners, who relate positively to each other, to staff, and to the surrounding community, creating for society, an active and responsible citizenry, willing to participate in the life of the nation and the wider world and play its part in the democratic process. In this way, that Civic Education stands out as a subject in the Zambian school curriculum whose responsibility is to prepare the citizens for life and thus speaking to the depth and breadth of what needs to be learnt.

Conclusion

Civic Education in Zambia has now become one of the compulsory subjects in the school curriculum. The Ministry of General Education has been at the center of policy, curricula, resources, curriculum materials, teacher professional development, and research directed to Civic Education. It is clear to note that Civic Education in the Zambian school system looks promising for now, and one gets the sense that with this kind of support not only from the government but also from key stakeholders, such civil society organizations and the like will continue to support the application of the policy in schools. One interesting aspect about Civic Education in Zambia is that it has become one of the subjects being taken at all stages of education provision, and one can argue that just like in other parts of world, Civic Education in Zambia is indeed experiencing rapid renaissance.

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The Language of Citizenship: Indigenous Perspectives of Nationhood in Canada

14

Frank Deer and Jessica Trickey

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Abstract

The indigenous peoples in Canada are a demographic that has largely had difficulties situating itself into the body politic of the Canadian nation state. (The term *indigenous* will herein refer to the First Nations, Metis, and Inuit peoples who are the descendants of the original stewards of what is now Canada. These three groups that constitute the triumvirate of constitutionally recognized “Aboriginal” peoples (*Constitution Act, 1982*, being schedule B to the *Canada Act 1982* (U.K.), 1982, c. 11) each represent a vast number of nations, cultures, language groups, and treaty contexts.) If one accepts that the goal of contemporary Canadian citizenship is the sharing of values in a collective, democratic community (Deer F, *J Educ Thought* 42(1):69–82, 2008), then the role of indigenous peoples in a Canadian citizenry may merit exploration. Indigenous peoples, who frequently show that they have demonstrably different conceptualizations of their own group identity and nationhood that are different from those of non-indigenous peoples, may be caught in a struggle of competing

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values – these struggles may have serious implications for social harmony and contemporary reconciliation. This chapter explores the ways in which indigenous peoples in Canada may be understood by others in terms of their national contexts, the manners in which they view their own roles as members of a Canadian citizenry, and the implications for educational initiatives.

Keywords

Indigenous · Citizenship · Nationhood · Education · Social movements

Introduction

Canada is a nation state that occupies the traditional territories of numerous indigenous nations – nations that represent a broad diversity of cultural and language backgrounds (Kulchyski 2007). These indigenous nations have served as stewards of the territories of North America far longer than the European colonizers that would eventually establish the Dominion of Canada (Dickason and Newbigging 2010). The colonial activities of settlers in these territories have experienced acute hardships that include government-led initiatives designed to “get rid of the Indian problem” (Miller 2004). Government initiatives such as the establishment of enforced habitation in “reserves,” enfranchisement (i.e., forced acceptance of citizenship at the expense of rights and entitlements as indigenous people), and the now well-known and regretful Residential School System have contributed to ongoing poverty, lack of opportunity, and trauma (Milloy 1999). (Indian residential schools were government initiated and sponsored schools that were almost exclusively administered by religious authorities across Canada. Many of the students who attended these schools were forcibly removed from their families and communities to attend these schools in which much abuse, neglect, and trauma occurred. Generations of indigenous children attended these schools – these experiences are identified as one contributing cause of the poor state of well-being for many indigenous peoples in Canada.) Many of these colonial and postcolonial activities on the part of the federal government and their partners (e.g., churches of various denominations) may be understood as genocidal in nature (MacDonald 2019). (Although not a topic of focus in this chapter, the concept of genocide has begun to be applied to numerous indigenous contexts. The findings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada is one example of how the concept of genocide has (and continues to be) been considered when describing the intent of government authorities with regard to the residential school system.) Ongoing oppression has obscured indigenous perspectives and worldviews from discussion. Even with current efforts to recognize indigenous history, indigenous worldviews are still excluded from having a central focus. Though schools are incorporating more lessons about indigenous history and traditions, students may find difficulty in understanding the discrepancy between having rights and privileges as a function of Canadian citizenship and as a function of indigenous sovereignty. The paragraphs to follow detail indigenous perspectives of

nationhood and citizenship and how indigenous perspectives are now at the forefront in a new era of reconciliation.

Indigenous Nationhood in Canada

Colonization imposed a new set of regulations on existing indigenous communities to constitute one unified nation (e.g., Canada). Indigenous peoples had already established their own concepts of nation and nationhood, but these were displaced by White settlers.

Before colonialism, indigenous nations defined themselves with regard to kinship and connections. Cornell (2015) identifies five important aspects of indigenous nationhood: (1) connections to the land, (2) kinship and community, (3) narratives and history associated with the land and culture, (4) self-governance, and (5) collective well-being. For example, Anishinaabe peoples conceptualized nationhood as being built on stories and traditions and shaped by relationships and communities (Stark 2012). Further, Anishinaabe peoples were not one people or one nation, but consisted of multiple distinct nations. These different nations functioned in tandem with one another by forming allyships and sharing land.

Colonialism disrupted and reconfigured indigenous ideas of nationhood. Colonizers ignored all aspects of indigenous nationhood by exploiting land, dividing communities, reconstructing narratives, denying self-governance, and emphasizing individual well-being over the collective (Cornell 2015). Anishinaabe nations were conglomerated into one nation (Stark 2012). This not only altered indigenous nations but changed the overall definition of nationhood. In colonialist representations, nations are characterized by industrialization and working-class labor (Anderson 2015). This definition specifically excludes indigenous organizations, who are instead considered “pre-nations” (Anderson 2015). Because of this, some scholars argue that European definitions of nations cannot, therefore, apply to indigenous nations. As an example, while Western nations are hierarchical and secular, indigenous nations are more egalitarian and spiritual (Anderson 2015). It is differences such as these that represent challenges to the establishment and maintenance of a single Canadian citizenry that is inclusive of indigenous peoples.

Kalant (2004) argued that nations are built on myths and are, therefore, fictional. In relation to considering indigenous perspectives of nationhood in Canada, media and interpersonal relationships ignite these fictions to create an instilled idea of a unified nation, divided by geographic location, with certain principles and ideals. Canada, for instance, holds the ideal of multiculturalism and is separated from other nations by the US border and vast oceans. The Oka Crisis of 1990 doubted this concept of Canadian nationality (Kalant 2004). The Mohawk peoples and Québécois peoples came to be considered as separate identities and not under one nation. However, by forcing Mohawk peoples to affiliate with Canada’s ideologies through, among other things, mandatory and nefarious education, Canada became a nation built on assimilation and the othering of indigenous peoples (Kalant 2004). Nations are shaped by their relations with one another (Stark 2012). Just as indigenous

nations were shaped through negotiations and conflict with settler Canadians, Canada as a nation was shaped as well.

As a response to the transformation of indigenous nations, many indigenous communities sought self-determination and self-governance. Many indigenous communities have reorganized and reinterpreted their structures such as aligning with other indigenous groups to create a subnation or having a firm focus on restoring a collective identity (Cornell 2015). For example, in the Northwest Territories, four First Nations came together to form the Tlicho Government; this reassessed the boundaries and identities that the Canadian government had imposed (Cornell 2015). Further, many indigenous nations are now beginning to take control over the well-being of their peoples, their exports, and their laws. As an example, the Listuguj Mi'gmaq Nation passed a law on the management of their salmon fishery, a key export for their economy (Cornell 2015). The law was a response to a decline in salmon impacting Mi'gmaq well-being (The National Centre for First Nations Governance 2015). To control fish production, Quebec raided Mi'gmaq fisheries with arrests, confiscations, and even beatings. This prompted the Listuguj people to come together and fight for their rights. They passed the law with the provincial government in 1993, giving them full control of their fisheries. This example illustrates how unacceptable and destructive government practices can facilitate activism and response from indigenous nations.

Citizenship

With indigenous communities restoring its self-determination and self-governance, some Canadian government officials are concerned that Canada is losing its national unity (Blackburn 2009). What would it mean for Canada if indigenous peoples were considered citizens primarily of their nations rather than Canada? Blackburn (2009) examined this question in the context of a recent Treaty signed between the British Colombian government and the Nisga'a peoples. The Treaty allows the Nisga'a Nation, who resides in the Nass River Valley, to self-govern and define their own version of citizenship. A citizen of the Nisga'a Nation is one who is of Nisga'a ancestry (either themselves or through their mother) and who is tied to the land. Nisga'a peoples' use of "citizen" in the Treaty was strategic; it allowed them to reconfigure Canada's definition of a sovereign nation and create a new political space within Canada that is not just another piece of Canada's mosaic. While many indigenous peoples in Canada already identify as having a dual citizenship with Canada and their home Nation, Nisga'a peoples are officially a separate political entity within Canada.

The Nisga'a Nation's redefining of citizen is significant because Canada's definition of a citizen, one who has certain rights, privileges, and responsibilities to the state, has historically excluded indigenous peoples (Battiste and Semegani 2002). There is no agreed-upon conceptualization of citizenship by scholars; however, it is recognized as a legal category, distinguishing those who are citizens from those who are not (Cho 2011). The status grants certain privileges such as security and

belonging. It also gives clarification to people of their place in relation to others through inclusions and exclusions, creating an “us versus them” mentality. For example, in Canada, citizenship was originally represented by the White man and excluded women, indigenous peoples, and minorities (Fleischmann and Styvendale 2011). While the definition of citizenship has expanded, its foundation of exclusion makes it an improper definition to expand to indigenous nations. For First Nations communities, citizenship may be seen as a colonialist myth that is used as another method of assimilating newcomers. Before colonialism, First Nations communities were largely communal and collectivist (Battiste and Semegani 2002). They operated on principles of reciprocity and consent, tied not to the state but to relationships with others. Group values superseded individual hedonisms. By contrast, colonialism brought ideologies of individuality and oppression, as well as a philosophy of blind obedience to a state in order to have rights (Battiste and Semegani 2002). Indigenous peoples were put in a precarious position to be Canadian citizens, granted the right to vote and contribute to policy, or be relocated to reserves and lose any power in Canadian governance. The Haudenosaunee peoples in Ontario and their ongoing disputes with the government to reclaim their land are an example of the inconsistency between Canada’s conceptions of citizenship and First Nations’ conceptions of belonging to a nation. The Haudenosaunee peoples (Six Nations) are in disagreement with the government to cease government and company-led construction on their land so they can reclaim their land (Coleman 2011). While White protestors demanded that all people in Canada be under one law as citizens, Haudenosaunee peoples prefer for each group to share the land while not imposing on one another’s rights and livelihoods. This idea can be represented by the Two Row Wampum (Coleman 2011), important to Haudenosaunee peoples – a symbol that indigenous peoples and Europeans can both live on the land and practice their own customs without impinging on the customs of each other. The Two Row Wampum is a belt containing white shells divided by two parallel rows of purple shells. This symbol of mutual respect has challenged the notion of Canadian citizenship by giving Haudenosaunee peoples their own laws and rights, separate from those of Canada. For instance, some Haudenosaunee peoples will opt for a Haudenosaunee passport instead of a Canadian passport. Neal McLeod, a Cree scholar, stated that “a discourse of universal citizenship has the capacity to rationalize the process of colonization” (Coleman 2011, p. 191). Any argument for a unified, Canadian citizenship obscures the history of citizenship as one who is included in Canada’s body politic and, therefore, not indigenous.

Though indigenous peoples may not fit into the Canadian definition of citizenship, they define their own nationhood and, within this, their own citizenship. Battiste and Semangani (2002) describe Western citizenship as resulting from nationalism, an emotional connection and belonging to the state. With this form of citizenship, however, comes certain ideologies and power imbalances. In order for indigenous perspective to become more visible, current notions of citizenship and nationhood must be revised to be more inclusive.

Nationhood and citizenship are complex terms that do not apply readily to indigenous peoples. Western concepts of nations are not synonymous with

indigenous nations. Policy-makers and governments have an obligation to consider this in order to ensure indigenous nations are able to self-govern and exist both separately from and together with the Canadian state.

An Era of (Re)Conciliation

There has been some significant sociopolitical distance between conceptions of indigenous nationhood and how indigenous peoples may situate themselves within the body politic of Canada (Green 2009). This distance is not trivial or ineffectual as evidenced in the current and recent dialogue among and between indigenous and nonindigenous peoples (Mzinegiizhigo-kwe Bédard 2018) as well as in the notable conflicts that have occurred in recent times such as the 1990 Oka crisis and the current Wet'suwet'en predicament. (The Oka Crisis of 1990 involved the defense of a portion of Kanienke'haka territory in southern Quebec by members of an indigenous community involving the blockades of local roads. With the support of another indigenous community nearby and the blockade of a bridge, government authorities responded with force resulting two deaths. The Wet'suwet'en predicament involved Wet'suwet'en (a nation that rests in the Province of British Columbia) hereditary chiefs who opposed the construction of a pipeline across their territories – the threat of incursions into the traditional territories led to solidarity protests across Canada.) As is resident within many colonial states, many of the relationships between indigenous and nonindigenous peoples in Canada are either strained, fractured, or nonexistent. The need in Canada may be to (re)establish our relationships in a healthy, fecund, and mutually beneficial manner (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada 2015a).

Reconciliation has been cited by commissioners of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada as the act of establishing new relationships between indigenous and nonindigenous while retaining an understanding of a shared and perhaps unsavory history (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada 2015a). Reconciliation may be regarded as a rather Canadian concern as it is a response to the Indian residential school experience in Canada. Although reconciliation may focus upon how primary and secondary education was handled by Canadian government and church authorities for much of the last two centuries, the need to engage in activities of reconciliation following the work and final report of the TRC has extended beyond educational considerations and has extended into many forums of endeavor in Canada (Frideres 2011). In terms of citizenship, topics such as law, political participation, language and culture, and labor market participation are captured in the TRC Calls-to-Action and have expanded the discussion of how relationships between indigenous and nonindigenous peoples may be improved.

Although presented and discussed in length in the final report of the TRC, the concept of and response to reconciliation is still a developing issue in Canada. Most of the Calls-to-Action that emerged from the TRC were focused upon the potential responses of federal and provincial/territorial governments (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada 2015b). Other institutions such as churches/clergy,

higher education, and offices of civil service were cited, but the emphasis upon the two principal levels of government as being principally responsible for developing reconciliatory activities represents what the TRC judged to be most significant. These two levels of government are viewed as key:

- Federal areas of responsibility may be understood in the context of, among other things, past roles in the establishment and administration of residential schools as well as previous and current roles with regard to treaty and constitutional responsibilities.
- Provincial areas of responsibility may be understood in the context of, among other things, the responsibility for delivering and administering key social welfare services such as those of health and public education.

In the brief period of time since the release of the TRC final report, these two levels of government have been engaged in discussions on reconciliation (in varying degrees of sufficiency and success) in numerous events, initiatives, and other activities that are, ostensibly, in the public interest (Chandler-Olcott and Hinchman 2018).

In spite of the fact that most of the TRC Calls-to-Action cite initiatives of a reconciliatory nature directed toward government – for which some efforts been made to respond – many other public institutions and community groups have expressed interest in (and even commitment toward) the reconciliation. In some cases, such institutions and groups have begun to accept the Calls-to-Action that are directed to government. Public sector organizations such as universities and community groups such as churches have been discussing and even initiating conversations and activities that support the achievement of the general goals of reconciliation – activities intended to facilitate improved relations with indigenous peoples while coming to terms with difficult histories. The general conception of and approach toward reconciliation in Canada has extended beyond the interface indigenous peoples have had with government and has become inclusive of many for whom the Calls-to-Action were not nominally directed (Korteweg and Russell 2012).

Although reconciliation appears to be a topic of concern in many public quarters, the general discussion of reconciliation has, perhaps understandably, extended to those involved in different forms of formal education (Newbery 2012). Indigenous histories, experiences, and perspectives have become increasingly essential when engaging in the creation of educational programming in schools. Many who are affiliated with primary and secondary education have committed themselves to explore indigenous content, histories, and social issues. In many educational settings, the programming that is employed to provide opportunities for learning for children and youth has become inclusive of important dimensions of the Canadian indigenous experience that are relevant to First Nations, Metis and Inuit languages, literacies, mathematics, and other areas where focus is on the numerous and specific manifestations of indigenous knowledge, heritage, consciousness, and tradition. School administrators and teacher leaders who have a role in developing and

encouraging teachers to account for the emergent value associated with this relatively new area of indigenous education are becoming more responsive. This responsiveness is associated with the notion that indigenous content should be shared and celebrated and inform the development of a balanced perspective on the Canadian indigenous experience that is appreciative (Deer 2014).

The reconciliation movement in public education, as well as the more dated movement toward integration of indigenous perspectives, has not developed without critical reception (Montero and Denomme-Welch 2018). Numerous writers and public figures have contributed to negative and dismissive dialogue on this topic. In a country in which such pushback exists, many jurisdictional authorities have pressed forward with this new chapter in Canadian history. Thus, many education leaders in Canada have assumed responsibility to facilitate the development of appropriate learning opportunities that will support a sustainable and educationally useful journey toward reconciliation. Many school district boards and others who occupy similar positions of authority have ventured into this area in a manner that is inclusive of divergent indigenous perspectives. This progressive approach has allowed many indigenous elders and community members to provide leadership and knowledge that is essential to this process.

A Case of Relationships Conditioned by Rights

The issue of citizenship and how indigenous peoples in Canada may understand and employ the concept has been (and continues to be) conditioned by the indigenous rights movements of recent decades. The indigenous rights movement in Canada has been buoyed by a number of events that have brought to school consciousness issues of poverty and social marginalization experienced by many indigenous peoples. Of the more fundamental mechanisms that have and continue to codify the rights of indigenous peoples in Canada are the various Treaties with First Nations peoples, the Royal Proclamation of 1763, and Section 35 of the Constitution Act 1982; what has problematized the contemporary indigenous rights movement is how discussion on legislation and entitlements has situated many people's perspective on indigenous people. Any consideration of how citizenship is understood and employed by indigenous peoples in Canada would benefit from an overview of the contemporary indigenous rights movement in Canada and how that may inform a discussion on inherent rights and the broader international discourse on universal rights.

One of many events through which one might understand the contemporary indigenous rights movement in Canada is the relatively episodic yet publicly visible *Idle No More* (INM) movement. In the autumn of 2012, this movement began by four women in the Canadian Province of Saskatchewan – Jessica Gordon, Sheelah McLean, Sylvia McAdam, and Nina Wilson (The Kimo-nda-niimi Collective 2014) in response to the then Conservative Government's second omnibus budget bill, also known as Bill C-45, in October 2012. These women initiated the first event of the Idle No More movement, which was held in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, in early November as a protest of this bill (Sinclair 2014). Within the following months,

demonstrations were staged across Canada in an effort to protest the bill and to raise awareness of the government's treatment of indigenous issues. At the heart of the movement was the notion held by many that Bill C-45 will have undesired consequences for indigenous peoples with regard to their constitutional and Treaty rights.

Because of the pan-Canadian nature of the movement that was represented by numerous regional perspectives, it may be difficult to provide a singular narrative that reflects the INM movement. Similar to the *Occupy* movement in America at the time, different groups from different regions have different foci that reflect the diversity of colonial experiences. However, a number of individuals/groups have ventured to comment on the purpose for the movement (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2013):

- According to one prominent movement leader, the movement's purpose is to "stop the Harper government from passing more laws and legislation that will further erode treaty and indigenous rights and the rights of all Canadians."
- One statement reads, "*Idle No More* has a responsibility to resist current government policies in a Peaceful and Respectful way."
- According to one social media source, the purpose of the movement is "to support and encourage grassroots to create their own forums to learn more about Indigenous rights and our responsibilities to our Nationhood via teach-ins, rallies and social media."

There was no single prevailing purpose for all who affiliated with the INM movement. However, there was a principal concern that was frequently cited by the informal leaders of the movement and that was legislative changes that would potentially affect indigenous peoples in Canada.

Bill C-45: Concerns

The principal concerns for indigenous people across Canada during the time of INM were in regard to:

- Changes to the Indian Act (e.g., First Nations decision-making processes governed by changes that can effectively silence community members; AANDC can ignore resolutions developed by First Nations governments).
- Lakes and rivers (industry representatives involved in mining or other natural resource extraction no longer have to demonstrate that their activity will not damage/destroy/contaminate lakes or rivers).
- Environmental assessment issues; the previous assessment process which was designed to ensure rigorous assessment of environmental impacts by industry and other activities is replaced by a much faster process that is far less rigorous.

Perhaps, in terms of citizenship, an equally important concern for indigenous peoples is that Bill C-45, which acquired Royal assent in December 2012,

represents a larger movement by Government to forgo Constitutional and Treaty responsibilities in an effort to further marginalize Canada's indigenous population. Many of the indigenous people affiliated with the INM movement can recall their personal experiences within their respective communities during the infamous "White Paper" episode when the Trudeau government attempted to change Canada's relationship with First Nations peoples through outsourcing to provinces and to initiate federal institutional changes that would effectively end the formal governmental relationship between the Government of Canada and First Nations (Dickason and Newbigging 2010). The White Paper era is one instance of the Canadian Government's activities that may be interpreted as attempts to avoid acting on responsibilities toward indigenous peoples in Canada – Bill C-45 as a possible means of correcting the government's relationship with indigenous peoples that privileges the government's position is not a unique occurrence (Palmater 2012).

The INM movement has reminded the Canadian public and international onlookers that issues of poverty, unrecognized rights, unaddressed governmental obligations, and recognition among the broad public is still a pressing issue for indigenous people in Canada. Although much attention in the media has been made to the connections between Bill C-45 and INM, one might rightfully suggest that this Bill is one initiative in a long line of government attempts to avoid deliverance on their responsibilities within the contexts of indigenous rights (Diabo 2012). One of the foundational principles that are advanced in support of the indigenous rights movement has been the existence of un-extinguished rights and accords that are intended to codify the relationship between indigenous peoples and the governing authorities that have facilitated the settlement of what is now Canada by non-indigenous peoples.

Inherent Rights: From Time Immemorial

Entitlements and rights may be an essential part of citizenship and citizenship education – especially in Western contexts. In Canada, indigenous rights are sometimes broadly asserted, sometimes by indigenous peoples, as apropos of certain inherent rights (Kulchyski 2013). These "inherent" rights, those rights that are entitled to an individual by virtue of their existence as human beings alone (Orend 2002), are frequently argued to be existent due to the condition of indigeneity of indigenous peoples (Grammond 2009).

The notion that indigenous peoples were here first has led to increased discussions regarding indigenous sovereignty (Lindau and Cook 2000). The argument that asserts indigenous peoples as the original inhabitants of Turtle Island may make for interesting debate, but the more salient point regarding colonization and the original inhabitants is contained by simply asking *who was here first*. This question can then lead to perhaps the more crucial issue of who had/has sovereignty in the lands in question. Traditional European and contemporary Western perspectives on

settlement have pointed to this question in a way that may give undue privilege to the colonial power's perspective. Just as Christopher Columbus was said to have ceremoniously erected a flag claiming lands in the Caribbean as Spain, so did French explorers erect crosses and the British raised flags. The idea that these lands were *terra nullius*, lands that were uninhabited and where sovereignty had not been established by anyone, was essential to European settlement and the establishment of colonial rule. Although much of the mid-twentieth century history asserts that a number of European explorers "discovered" parts of what is now North America, Peter Kulchyski reminds us that:

[O]bviously, columbus and jaques cartier and samuel de champlain and samuel herne and alexander mackenzie and all the rest we hear so much about never actually 'discovered' anything at all. [A]ll the land they saw, the rivers and lakes and mountains they gave new names to were already well known, used, occupied, and named by native peoples. [T]o say they 'discovered' all this land is to act as if native people didn't exist and hadn't, for thousands of years, themselves explored and discovered what today we call the [A]mericas. (2007, p. 8)

The notion that the first peoples of North America had some measure of sovereignty associated with their respective lands became more prevalent in the late nineteenth century when Crown officials began entering into negotiations with First Nations in Western Canada for what would be referred to as the Numbered Treaties. These negotiations were necessary for the Dominion of Canada as the importance for acquiring land in Western Canada in order to establish sovereignty informed much governmental action during this era. Authorities wished to acquire these lands through negotiation.

Prior to, during, and following the establishment of Crown sovereignty in the west through the processes of treaty negotiation, the Government of Canada engaged in another process – the assimilation of the first peoples into peoples that can be regarded as more civilized when measured against the ethnocentric standard of their colonizers. The Indian residential school system, informed by the sentiments that led to the development of such legislative developments as the Gradual Civilization Act of 1857 and the Indian Act of 1876, was intended to facilitate assimilation by taking "the Indian out of the child." This assimilation was deemed necessary for the realization of Canada's goal of moving "Aboriginal communities from their 'savage' state to that of 'civilization' and thus to make in Canada but one community – a non-Aboriginal one" (Milloy 1999, p. 2). The impact of separating First Nations children from their families and the subsequent affect that such separation has had on numerous aspects of their identity caused ongoing harm to First Nations peoples and their cultures.

There are two manifestations of indigenous rights in Canada that are relevant to this discussion – constitutional rights in the Canadian context and inherent rights in the domestic and international contexts. Constitutional rights for indigenous peoples in Canada are perhaps best understood within the context of Section 35 of the *Constitutional Act, 1982*.

Discussion: Opportunities for Learning

Currently, discourse that explores the awareness and importance of national and international rights is a bona fide dimension of social studies education in Canada (White Face and Wobaga 2013). Usually discussed within the context of charter rights, universal human rights, and the larger discussion of citizenship (Hebert and Wilkinson 2002), Canadian secondary students acquire an understanding of entitlements and freedoms that emphasize social responsibilities toward others and to themselves as well as their relationship with the state (Deer 2010). In recent years, the discussions of rights and citizenship in secondary schools in Canada have begun to include the perspectives associated with the Canadian indigenous experience (Battiste and Semegani 2002). These perspectives are frequently explored through a supplementary discussion on the broader responsibilities and rights associated with citizenship (Warry 2007).

However, many resources that are used in primary and secondary schools in Canada do explore the allegedly inherent nature of indigenous rights. One of the fundamental notions associated with the inherent nature of indigenous rights is that they are entitlements of people based on the fact that they are individuals only without any other source (Dick 2011). The inference of this notion in regard to indigenous peoples – that there exists a set of entitlements that are (a) held by the individual by virtue of their existence and (b) are, in the *Cardinal-esque* tradition, unique in so far as they are additional entitlements to those normally associated with Canadian citizenship (Cardinal 1977) – can govern the developing student perspective on indigenous peoples issues.

The tension between these two discourses, one which explores the broad range of entitlements, freedoms, and responsibilities for all Canadians and the other more focused discussion exploring those that are specifically associated with the indigenous peoples of this land, may have an undesired effect on how students and adults perceive how indigenous people are situated in Canada. Concepts of citizenship and nationhood further complicate indigenous peoples' place in Canada as these are applied through a Western lens and typically exclude indigenous perspectives and influences in Canadian society. Further, with indigenous rights movements such as *Idle No More* cited above as well as some of the historic events associated with land stewardship and rights issues such as the 1990 Oka Crisis, the Grand River land dispute of 2006, and the Gustafsen Lake standoff of 1995, there is potential that those who study or otherwise consume through media sources narratives concerning the Canadian indigenous experience that are replete with these stories may develop a proxy for understanding the Canadian indigenous experience – that of jurisdiction.

It may be understandable that the Canadian indigenous experience is frequently regarded principally as a jurisdictional discourse by both indigenous and nonindigenous peoples; generations of First Nations, Metis and Inuit peoples subject to residential schools, the denial of rights normally enjoyed by others, and legislative developments intended to marginalize indigenous peoples may easily

govern the quality of discussions that explore our first peoples. The sorts of emotionally and/or politically charged rhetoric and posturing that is frequently associated with such discussions that occur in the public realm have the potential to create this proxy, that of jurisdiction, for understanding the Canadian indigenous experience. In some rather crucial ways, exploring indigenous peoples and experiences as a jurisdictional issue has obscured some of the ethno-cultural dimensions of indigenous identity in the broad public consciousness. It has been suggested that exploring the Canadian indigenous experience through jurisdictional, legislative, or political lenses may do little to achieve reconciliation in a postcolonial Canada.

Many in the field of indigenous education have chosen to focus on more than just jurisdictional issues for exploring indigenous peoples and issues. In many provincial and community contexts, the content and pedagogies used to provide learning opportunities for primary and secondary students have begun to employ aspects of the Canadian indigenous experience that has direct relevance to language, literacy, mathematics, and other curricular areas where emphasis is placed on a variety of the unique manifestations of indigenous knowledge, heritage, consciousness, and tradition. Treaty relationships, legislative issues, and constitutional rights are and should be a part of these educational discourses, but it is essential that they are not explored in such a way that lends to the development of a perspective that is governed by jurisdictional matters. School and district leaders are responsible for governing and empowering educators to account for the emergent educational imperatives associated with contemporary indigenous education. Thus, they should be responsive to the notion that indigenous content may be shared and celebrated and inform the development of a balanced perspective on the Canadian indigenous experience that is appreciative.

Conclusion/Summary

Indigenous peoples have had a longer history on Canadian land than has the existence of the current nation of Canada. Settlers created a concept of Canadian citizenship that does not take into account indigenous perspectives and knowledges. Because of this, indigenous peoples have found it difficult to situate themselves within the political climate of Canada. Through social movements and assertion of rights, indigenous nations have sought self-determination and the right to construct their own narrative of citizenship and nationhood that is distinguished from that of Canada. Educational practitioners and policymakers must consider indigenous perspectives when considering human rights and indigenous experience. While educational institutions are beginning to incorporate indigenous content and attempt effective transmission of indigenous perspectives, they must ensure that they do so with a larger and more inclusive narrative of citizenship that considers indigenous worldviews, thus creating a more comprehensive and balanced understanding of Canada as it relates to experience.

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The Making of Neoliberal Citizenship in the United States: Incultation, Responsibilization, and Personhood in a “No-Excuses” Charter School

15

Garth Stahl

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Abstract

Schools remain important sites where identities are inculcated in accordance with societal norms and values. With this in mind, this chapter reflects upon a particular form of schooling in the United States – “no-excuses” charter schools – where I seek to make connections between neoliberal governance, educational practices, and the formation of subjectivities. Influenced heavily by venture philanthropy, many charter schools – especially those in the upper echelons of the market – promote the belief that education *can* and *should* borrow heavily from corporate culture to ensure the best education for their students. First, the chapter recounts some of the wider history of how pro-charter school reform efforts have dramatically altered the provision and style of education for underprivileged populations living in complex urban spaces. Second, to further an understanding of how neoliberal forms of personhood are privileged in charter schools, I draw on previous ethnographic data to illustrate how institutional and pedagogic practices inculcate students and staff to present a subjectivity aligned with the “entrepreneur of the self.” Then, in bridging these two areas of scholarship, I ask what the implications are for the making and (re)making of citizenship – neoliberal and otherwise.

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Keywords

Neoliberal schooling · “No-excuses” charter schools · Citizenship · Personhood · Responsibilization

Introduction

In considering how subjectivities are formed and maintained, we should never underestimate the potency of schooling and its capacity to structure our understandings of self. Reay (2010) writes: “No other public institution is as crucial for the development of the identities children and young people will carry into adulthood” (277). In the United States, the bipartisan support and continued growth of charter schools – closely aligned with fierce debate concerning their practices and values – continue to both grab national headlines and further contentious debate on how to ensure the best education for students of color living in poverty. We are witness to wider neoliberal forms of governance in education internationally (Ball 2009; Wilkins 2016) as well as exogenous privatization where public schools are opened to private individuals and corporate companies. Giroux (2001) writes of capitalist corporate culture as reconstituting our notions of democracy, childhood, and schooling. This phenomenon compels us – as educational researchers – to question how policies determine who is in power, where the prerogatives may lie, and how risk is constructed. Governance here is the embedded strategies and tactics within and across institutions for *conducting conduct*. Schools are sites where techniques of governance, such as responsibilization, have been used to mold “responsible citizens.”

Neoliberalism, an amalgamation of economic and social policies which promote the primacy of the market, is fragmented where different styles and sequences of neoliberal power exist (Chester 2012; Phillips 2004; Ong 2006). However, while a fragmented picture, the potency of neoliberalism should not be underestimated. In the field of education, the effects of neoliberal governance have promoted the belief that education is infused with human capital and an integral part of the formation of the workforce (Connell 2013, p. 104). Within this approach, the humanistic, developmental, and personalized affective elements of teaching and learning are jettisoned (Giroux 2001). Not receiving an adequate education carries with it not only significant risks but also brings forth notions of shame. The prevalence of such a form of thinking has significant implications for how we conceive of ourselves and how we perform subjectivities in relation to such notions of risk and self-worth. Rose (1996) writes “. . . subjectivity is now fragmented, multiple, contradictory, and the human condition entails each of us trying to make a life for ourselves under the constant gaze of our own suspicious reflexivity, tormented by uncertainty and doubt” (p. 9).

In considering neoliberalism as a pervasive force, Wendy Brown writes of rampant deregulation where state provisions and protections become endangered and where there is the “increasing dominance of finance capital over productive capital in the dynamics of the economy and everyday life” (p. 28). Certainly, the

ideologies associated with neoliberalism have become “the ruling ideas of the time” (Harvey 2005, p. 36), and such ideologies do work to exacerbate both inequality and guide our understandings of those who may fail to “measure up” as citizens. I draw on the work of Elliott (2013) who defines neoliberal personhood as “possession of individual interests and [the] ability to rank and decide between them” (p. 84) which works under the assumption that, as citizens, we all have equal choices, thus ignoring the gross inequalities we all operate within. Thus, the neoliberal prerogative frames citizenship as “the duty of the individual to be sufficiently flexible to maximize the opportunities available to her/him, and any failure resides in the individual rather than in the socio-economic structures” (Francis 2006, p. 191). Therefore, in terms of citizenship, neoliberalism diminishes certain forms of relationships and ways of understanding relationships, aspirations, etc.

The notion of neoliberal citizenship (Hindess 2002), by its very nature, is focused on individual advancement and subverts the idea of democratic citizenship which primarily concerns itself with the common good. Woolford and Nelund (2013) contend that “individualized responsibility have become the currency” for vulnerable populations, integral to ensuring they are able to access services from the state (p. 307). Reflecting on what responsabilization may mean for notions of selfhood and subjectivities, it is worth acknowledging how neoliberal citizenship is easily conflated with active citizenship where Nóvoa (2010) writes: “Active citizenship, entrepreneurial culture and lifelong learning are part of a process of reconfiguring the self” (p. 267). This reconfiguration is where notions of “rights” and “responsibilities” become muddled and where paradoxes manifest especially for underprivileged populations. However, as Wilkins (► Chap. 10, “Neoliberalism, Citizenship, and Education: A Policy Discourse Analysis”) notes neoliberal citizenship is “a muddy concept” (p. 2) where the notion of “neoliberal,” “citizenship,” and “education” remains contested and problematic terms (p. 3).

Recent scholarship has explored the relationship between neoliberalism, schooling, race, and underprivileged populations (Lipman 2005; Buras 2011; Kretchmar et al. 2014). Drawing on Molnar, Stuart Wells et al. (2002) focus on how market-based reforms in education (e.g., for-profit school management companies, charter schools) are built on the “illusion that our society can be held together solely by the self-centered pursuit of our individual purposes as opposed to common, democratic purposes” (p. 340). While discussions remain divisive, charter schools now remain a permanent part of the education landscape in the United States, an illustrative example of neoliberal governance exerting tremendous power and influence over both the provision of education and educational practices. In her work on the enactment of educational reform, Kretchmar (2014) asserts, “the revolution will be privatized” (p. 632). In this reflective piece, I seek to both synthesize and problematize understandings of how “society-state relations and claims, and enactments of citizenship” (Robertson 2011, p. 282) manifest in one charter school existing at a moment in time. I am interested in the relationship between philanthropic investment and “corporatized schooling” (Saltman 2001) and what this may mean for the schooling practices for disadvantaged populations. Drawing upon an analytical framework which considers both my own personal experience and my wider interest

in how societal inequalities play out in schooling, I seek to make connections to how charter schools contribute to the formation of subjectivities and notions of citizenship, what Wendy Brown calls “habits of citizenship” (2015, p. 17). First, the chapter briefly recounts some of the ways in which the pro-charter school reform efforts (e.g., Democrats for Education Reform, Education Equity Project, Teach for America, etc.) have dramatically altered the provision and style of education for underprivileged populations living in complex urban spaces. Second, to further an understanding of how neoliberal forms of personhood are privileged in charter schools, I draw on previous ethnographic data (Stahl 2017; 2019a, b; 2020) to illustrate how institutional and pedagogic practices inculcate students and staff to present a subjectivity aligned with the “entrepreneur of the self.” Then, in bridging these two areas of scholarship, I address how schools are “crucial sites of identity work and identity making” (Reay 2010, p. 278) and what the implications are for the making of citizenship.

Charter Schools, Urban Spaces, and Underprivileged Populations

Motivated by teacher activism, charter schools in the 1990s were originally grassroots founded, anti-bureaucratic, and designed to be led by empowered teachers. From the outset, charters were beholden to the principle of providing “more opportunity for innovative practices that, advocates argued, were stifled by the bureaucracy of district-run public education and onerous public regulations” (Bulkley 2012, p. 60). However, this original intent was quickly subverted; progressive intentions quickly withered as “corporate elites and politicians from both major US parties have taken them up as an opportunity to merge public education with market-based assumptions” (Kretchmar et al. 2014, p. 744). As a result of heavy investment by venture philanthropy (Robin Hood Foundation, Eli and Edythe Broad Foundation, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation), discourses surrounding charter schools are often deeply tied to promoting the belief that education *can* and *should* borrow heavily from the “best practices” of corporate culture (Kretchmar 2014; Stahl 2017, 2019b) to ensure the best for students. Furthermore, through adopting this model of schooling, underprivileged populations would experience pedagogical practices which will allow them to become the “deserving poor” (Woolford and Nelund 2013), disciplined for what the market has to offer.

For the most part, charter schools in the United States operate under the policy remit that their continued existence is determined by student performance on high-stakes state testing. While it may vary state to state and district to district, failure to achieve the necessary test scores results in revoking the charter and thus immediate school closure. Given their staunch nonunion stance, standard practices in charter schools include a high level of attention to teacher effectiveness (Kretchmar et al. 2014; Malloy and Wohlstetter 2003), firing underperforming teachers (Stahl 2019b), intense accountability and surveillance (Golann 2015), and the adoption of pedagogical practices focused on corporeality (Stahl 2019a). This has led charter schools to be labeled as militaristic “skill and drill” environments where failure is not

tolerated and the expectation to perform consistently at a high level is paramount. In terms of neoliberal citizenship, which foregrounds individual responsibility, such practices influence the “reconfiguring the self” (Nóvoa 2010, p. 267). In defense of such unconventional practices, pro-charter school political action committees – such as Democrats for Education Reform and the Education Equity Project – contend their model, and approach to schooling ensures that students can achieve regardless of their circumstances. This, of course, dismisses both the robust resourcing many charter schools receive (in contrast to their public counterparts) as well as the variety of ways in which charter schools find ways to weed out students who may not be fit for the model. Furthermore, the focus is on getting students into elite colleges where many appear to flounder (KIPP Foundation 2011).

Educational research has documented the deep and sustained inequities that have characterized the historic struggle for quality education in poor communities of color (Anyon 2014; Noguera 2003; Buras 2014; Fabricant and Fine 2012). Scholars have called attention to how investment is withdrawn from low-income communities – through neoliberal governance – and how this disinvestment has led to so-called crises in public education, which have, in turn, fueled a movement toward privatization (Lipman 2008; Ravitch 2013). This is what Saltman (2007) calls “backdoor” or “smash-and-grab” privatization (p. 134), where notions of “[c]risis and emergency benefit privatization advocates who can seize upon a situation with pre-formulated plans to commodify this public service” (p. 142). In considering how ideologies work to exacerbate inequality, Swalwell and Apple (2011, p. 373) note “the web woven between charter schools, venture capitalists, and neoconservative think tanks forms an increasingly powerful, interconnected force intent on influencing votes on policies supporting the expansion of charter schools and even running candidates for office.” As public education endures despite these forces at play, there exist important questions regarding the structural disinvestment in low-income communities, resourcing, and policy prerogatives which foster private interests.

Before considering my own experience at a charter school, I first set the context by calling attention to two brief examples of education reform from Michigan and New Orleans. In the 1990s Michigan’s state board of education pushed market-oriented proposals which made the state conducive to the development of a wide range of charter schools. This was all done under the remit that charter schools would foster innovation, specifically in reference to increased competition and parental choice. Drawing on empirical research from Michigan, Lubienski (2001) illustrates how “the public” – as conceived among neoliberal reformers and advocates of charter schools – no longer refers to the broader community of taxpayers. Rather, given the legislative practices in Michigan, Lubienski (2001) contends the public is represented as only those immediately owning or consuming a good or service where “private ownership for the ‘consumer’ and ‘producer’ is the key to implementing this vision of a redefined public education” (p. 642). This shift in consumer thinking and what is meant by “public” has led to critiques not only in terms of how public education has been coopted by private interests – specifically in reference to a growing for-profit sector (Hill and Welsch 2009) – but also how the student

composition of charter schools tends to intensify the disadvantaged students in urban schools (Ni 2012). In thinking of this in terms of neoliberal governmentality and neoliberal personhood, as citizens are cast as consumers aligned with a system of “incentives and disincentives,” they are required to be “players in its game” selecting “between options with perceptibly different and meaningful consequences” – all under the guise of free choice (Elliott 2013, p. 87). In short, as citizens we are expected to choose well when many of us may have limited choices to make.

In the time immediately following Hurricane Katrina, schools in New Orleans, specifically schools in the Lower Ninth Ward, were dramatically restructured by pro-charter advocates who were backed by venture philanthropists. Buras (2010, 2014) documents how the city was transformed into a charter school market of competing networks where teachers and local community members had very little say as they were witness to how these “reforms” exacerbated racial and economic injustice. Strategies were put in place to disempower unions, and veteran teachers were all fired in what could be described as a corporate takeover. Essential to Buras’ argument is how “policy actors at the federal, state, and local levels have contributed to a process of privatization and an inequitable racial-spatial redistribution of resources while acting under the banner of ‘conscious capitalism’” which has little to do with improving academic attainment for children of color (Buras 2011, p. 296). Similar to Michigan, this was all done under the neoliberal belief that scaling back regulation and dismantling influential teacher unions would foster “innovation” and expand opportunities. Highlighting the relationship between what is effectively the privatizing of public goods, Buras’ research contrasts the “culture of the education market” with the “culture of the community” where citizens are disempowered through neoliberal, corporate interests. Furthermore, integral to the dramatic changes in New Orleans was how charter schools were funded by and heavily staffed by Teach for America (TFA) alumni and their affiliates (Kretchmar et al. 2014). As Lefebvre and Thomas (2017) astutely note, TFA has a mission around education and social justice, but such a vision exists within a neoliberal framing which heavily echoes the interests of pro-charter school reform efforts. Such a framing has significant implications not only for our understandings of social justice but also for how we personhood is realized.

Inculcation Through Institutional Cultures and Pedagogic Practices

According to Stuart Wells, Slayton, and Scott (2002, p. 346), like all forms of schooling, charter schools cannot be conceived of as “isolated institutions removed from the political, economic, and social forces that surround them” but rather need to be explored within the constraints of their local communities. With this in mind, I seek to further an understanding of how neoliberal forms of personhood are privileged within one “no-excuses” charter school drawing on previous ethnographic data (Stahl 2017; 2019a, b; 2020). While the study of charter schools at the macro-level remains robust, there is little study of daily life and common practices within

these institutions. I explore how institutional and pedagogic practices require the students and staff to present a subjectivity aligned with the “entrepreneur of the self.” Within the world of charter schools – where venture philanthropy and hedge-fund investors donate billions of dollars annually in promoting deregulatory educational reforms – many charter schools become products of a corporate work environment. Or, as Scott (2009) notes, many individuals working within charter schools “often believe that educational reform could greatly benefit from the strategies and principles that contributed their financial successes in the private sector” (p. 107). Within the institution, tremendous emphasis is placed on high-stakes competition, audits, accountability, and weeding out those who transgress the mission. The charter school I worked in was nearly entirely staffed by either TFA affiliates and alumni or those who previously worked in the corporate sector. Kretchmar (2014, p. 632) calls attention to TFA’s idea of “relentless pursuit” around the mission of what they believe to be an equity of opportunity around education. This section considers the “pursuit” as lived reality while considering the implications for neoliberal forms of personhood and, in turn, neoliberal citizenship.

Acknowledging that charter schools range widely in terms of philosophy, composition, and quality, I draw on my experience at one school site within a wider “high-performing” charter school management organization (CMO) renowned for its consistency in regard to students of color living in extreme poverty consistently reached the top 1% on state exams. Closely aligned with venture philanthropy, the board that oversaw the CMO was composed of prominent hedge-fund brokers. The student body was 90% African American and 10% Latino. The days are long and grueling with the doors opening at 7:15 am, and students were dismissed at 5:25 pm. The curriculum is intensive (“skill and drill”) and ignores the sociohistorical context and cultural backgrounds of the students. The pedagogy is authoritarian and transmissive considering theories of developmental intelligence such as Vygotsky or Piaget as examples of the bigotry or low expectations. Existing within a complex urban space, the school was located in a part of the city where there was generational unemployment, extensive crime, and inadequate forms of schooling. In schooling, the self is increasingly sublimated through neo-liberal agendas (Davies and Bansel 2007; Connell 2013), and I have previously discussed the ethical tensions of an educator enacting this specific model of schooling (Stahl 2019a, b; 2020). As a leader in a CMO, my primary role was to study the practices of the institution in order to improve the organizational culture, the customs, habits, and rituals/traditions. On a daily basis, working as both agent and observer, I had full remit to transverse the school site to foster and maintain a model of schooling while guarding against any infringements.

In terms of my ethnographic account of working in a charter school, I make comparisons to American corporate profit-driven environments. The logic underpinning the daily schooling practices was aligned with the notion that student academic attainment is viewed as profit, and any potential threat to the accrual of capital must be removed in order to ensure growth and dominance. Failure to accrue profit (e.g., test scores) could entail an immediate shutdown, and, as a result, nothing in a “no-excuses” charter school is left to chance. Such practices become a powerful

mediating force in the identity construction of both staff and students with implications for how they come to see themselves as citizens within the wider polity. Here, I draw on Brown's (2015) provocation regarding how citizenship is "remade" in response to the neoliberal free market – where "neoliberal rationality remakes the human being as human capital" (p. 34). As the humanistic and affective elements are squeezed out, education becomes centered around self-advancement contributing to how we conceive of ourselves and how we perform subjectivities in relation to such notions of risk and self-worth. Through focusing on school cultures and pedagogic practices and what this means for the technologies of citizenship (Cruckshank 1993; Dean 1999), I consider how "Techniques of relating to oneself as a subject of unique capacities worth of respect run up against practices of relating to oneself as a target of discipline, duty, and docility (Rose 1996, p. 35). In exploring these notions of the disciplined "subject" and "subjectivity," I draw on Bourdieu's conception of habitus which allows for a more in-depth analysis concerning the technologies of responsabilization (as extending the reach of governance) and the making of neoliberal personhood.

Habitus, as a mix of the conscious, subconscious, and the corporeal, is a socialized body "which has incorporated the immanent structures of a world or of a particular sector of that world – a field – which structures the perception of that world as well as action in that world" (Bourdieu 1998, p. 81). For Bourdieu (1997/2000) the precise function of habitus is to restore to the agent "a generating, unifying, constructing, classifying power, while recalling that this capacity to construct social reality, itself socially constructed, is not that of a transcendental subject but of a socialized body, investing in its practice socially constructed organizing principles that are acquired in the course of a situated and dated experience" (p. 136–137). Drawing on two examples to illustrate how standard practices contribute to the structuring of the habitus and thus neoliberal personhood, I seek to foreground schooling as a form of inculcation where students and staff were required to present subjectivities aligned with the "entrepreneur of the self." What we knew as the relational and affective elements of education become recast according to the neoliberal demands of selfhood, while mere anecdotes, for example, work to illustrate how policies, as a mode of subjectification, can "trickle down" – structuring "school cultures," subjectivities, relations, and corporeality (Ball et al. 2011, p. 620). They highlight both modes of subjectivation (principles and logics drawn upon) and technologies of self (how people work on themselves, what methods they adopt) (Spohrer et al. 2018, p. 332). Charter schools often spend considerable time and resources on developing their model of schooling designed to have students buy into a "pull 'em up by their bootstraps' meritocratic discourse where personal responsibility is aligned with notions of 'owning one's failure.'"

First, I consider how middle-class aspirations – and the privileging of a certain conception of self – are worked upon within the institution. Most schools are casual about the ways in which they foster student aspirations wherein "no-excuses" charter schools structuring of aspiration is both central to the mission and infused with the pedagogy. Many challenge no-excuses practices as a form of institutional racism that undermines the well-being and psychosocial health of children (Renzulli and Evans

2005). As evidence of standard practice, within the institution I worked in, there was a significant emphasis on décor where learning is cast according to the idea of “empowerment through education” and “education as a ticket to success.” All educators were required to display pennants and their degrees from their mainly elite alma maters (e.g., Yale University, Princeton University, etc.). The physical manifestation of a culture of aspiration contributes to what Grodsky and Riegle-Crumb (2010, p. 14) term a “college-going habitus” (p. 40). As fiercely goal-driven environments, where the notion of TFA’s “relentless pursuit” pervades (Kretchmar 2014, p. 632), staff encourage students from a very early age to “choose” their college and make it their goal and “let nothing stand in their way.” There is little emphasis on the intellectual foundations of knowledge as well as the fulfilling nature of learning. This goal is then reinforced through various routines where students are presented with the opportunity to verbalize their intended goal. These practices stress the importance of getting students to think about college early and often where students come to “own their future” or aspirational trajectory (Stahl 2017). In terms of social mobility, the aspiration to educational success promises a remedy to poverty, simplifying complexity (Spohrer et al. 2018). A certain form of personhood is privileged through this process where students came to embody an identity that is both “entrepreneurial” and market ready. After all, the notion of neoliberal citizenship (Hindess 2002) is one focused on individual advancement. Furthermore, the shaping of aspiration is reinforced through visits from college representatives, and thus students, who spend a significant part of their waking moments within the institution, come to see this as the only acceptable form of personhood as their habitus is inculcated toward a middle-class notions of success.

Second, I consider the corporeality of the body drawing on Watkins and Noble’s (2013) work on “scholarly habitus” in which academic success “depends on particular embodied capacities which are evidenced of dispositions towards learning which, in turn, affect cognitive ability” (p. 7). Scholarly habitus is an amalgamation of scholarly labor, composed of and influenced by parental engagement, aspirations, stereotypes, homework habits, spatial and corporeal congruence, schemas of perception, and student attitudes to teaching and learning. Watkins and Noble (2013) write of the scholarly habitus as “embodied dispositions and sociocultural background because it allows us to address issues of self-regulation and the possession of educational capital” (p. 8). As the high-stakes policy remit of a charter school requires a high level of success on exams, there is a substantial amount of attention to cultivating the body to endure spells of prolonged concentration (Stahl 2019a). There are echoes here to Giroux’s (2001) work on capitalism and childhood where he asserts bodies, desires, and identities are all subject to the capitalist logic. At the charter school where I worked, attention to the corporeal involved a continuous attention to detail including how students walked (pace, tilt of the head) in the hallway to how they held their pens and pencils (Stahl 2019a). Staff were required to ensure that all students answered questions using a confident voice under the assumption it would build confidence and ownership necessary to be successful in a competitive market. Failure to achieve a certain level of corporeality resulted in reprimand and punishment (Stahl 2017) – reinforcing issues of risk, value,

self-worth, and shame. My experience highlights how it was the mission of the charter school to actively form durable thoughts and actions where – in thinking of terms of citizenship – developing the capacities around being adept test-takers was paramount, thus reflecting the embedding of neoliberal ideology (“education-for-self-advancement”), an integral part of competing in the workforce (Connell 2013, p. 104).

Reflections on Making Neoliberal Citizenship and the Responsibilized Subject

Brown (2015) contends “As neoliberalism wages war on public goods and the very idea of a public, including citizenship beyond membership, it dramatically thins public life without killing politics. Struggles remain over power, hegemonic values, resources and future trajectories” (39). This highlights an important dimension of neoliberal personhood – its power to narrow certain conceptions of what is valued – and thus valuable. Strategies of responsabilization, as a technology of neoliberal governmentality, seek to transform and reconstruct what is possible. Bridging two areas of scholarship – reflecting on the history of how pro-charter school reform alongside my own ethnographic experience – I now consider two dimensions of neoliberal citizenship in reference to education, specifically: the devaluing of students diverse cultural background; the performance of a subjectivity aligned with the “entrepreneurial self”; and its implications for the responsabilization of the poor. These areas further our understanding of the implications for the making and (re) making of citizenship but also highlight some of the uneasy tensions involved when considering the neoliberal agenda and social justice.

Within the neoliberal readings of selfhood, intersectional identity categories (e.g., race, gender) are often ignored as all individuals are expected to be self-sufficient and enterprising. Within the charter school, there were notable and purposeful silences around the cultural background of their students as well as the socioeconomic context the students existed in. In conversations with the leadership team, it was clear that part of the model of the charter school was to make certain that notions of being “poor” and “black” or “brown” had no role in the school environment. Such notions were seen as an infringement on the “relentless pursuit” (Kretchmar 2014, p. 632) where everyone *can* and *should* succeed. Furthermore, the implication here is that without validation from the school, the richness of certain cultures are marginalized. For minority youth who may live on the margins, drawing upon a framework of culturally and linguistically relevant citizenship education is an essential aspect of democratic citizenship, social cohesion, and communal collectivity (Jaffee 2016). Placing the cultural and civic assets as central to pedagogic enactment frames notions of “community” and “selfhood” in affective ways.

In studying the performance of a subjectivity and responsabilization aligned with the “entrepreneurial self,” the article uses habitus. For Bourdieu, habitus, as the “social embodied” is “‘at home’ in the field it inhabits, it perceives it immediately as endowed with meaning and interest” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 128). The

students were often at school for long periods of time where they came to reflect the meritocratic ideologies of neoliberalism structuring the school culture. Therefore, the dispositions in their habitus became centered around becoming competitive in terms of gaining academic qualifications in order to perform self-responsibility and enhance their future employability, a tenet of neoliberal citizenship (Hindess 2002). In her research on charter schools, Kerstetter (2016, p. 513) notes:

... studies have demonstrated that when students are able to learn skills that more closely align with the evaluative standards of middle-class institutions, such as an ease in communicating with authority figures, they tend to receive more help from teachers (Calarco 2011), more attention during doctor's visits (Lareau 2003), and have an easier time transitioning to elite postsecondary institutions. (Jack 2016; Torres 2009)

However, this is subject to critique as, for the most part, it would appear that while the practices in charter schools may contribute to preparing citizens for competition in the modern market, these practices cannot consistently compensate for the limiting effects of poverty (KIPP Foundation 2011; Kerstetter 2016). Or, as Golann (2015) puts it, "Behavioral norms might help students get through high school, but the types of skills needed for success in higher levels of learning and work become evident when students enter college" (p. 106).

Extending the possible frailty in performing neoliberal personhood, I draw attention to how subjectivity is a performance as recent research has also shown how working-class poor, who are vulnerable, can "mobilize characteristics of neoliberal or responsible citizenship" to perform/embody what is referred to as "the deserving poor" (Woolford and Nelund 2013, p. 294). Performances, by their very nature, hone our attention to questions of authenticity. Within the charter school, students performed an identity aligned with a privileged conception of neoliberal personhood which held currency within the school walls. However, the capacity to operationalize this outside the highly structured norms and routines of the institution may have been problematic. Therefore, there may be limits to the level of inculcation within the habitus. Or, as Woolford and Nelund (2013) note, we require a "fuller account of performances of self and citizenship among the marginalized requires first that we examine the broader constraints that structure these performances, which give them their shape and purpose and which are, in turn, shaped and reshaped by these very performances" (p. 296).

Conclusion

Within the onset of neoliberal governance, contemporary forms of schooling are borrowing heavily from corporate logics which ignore the vast inequalities structuring our everyday lives. In exploring neoliberal citizenship through a reflection on pro-charter school reform and previous ethnographic data, I have sought to illustrate some of the ways in which techniques of governance influence policies and personhood to inculcate individuals into presenting subjectivities aligned with the

“entrepreneur of the self.” Schools are sites of responsabilization where notions of responsible citizenship are molded in the interests of those in power. Reay (2010) writes “School norms, practices and expectations provide key symbolic materials that students draw on to make sense of their experiences and define themselves” (277). Keeping in mind the political climate, the formation of subjectivities, and development of neoliberal personhood, I conclude by making some conjectures regarding neoliberal citizenship focusing specifically on the motivations of educators in the “no-excuses” charter school.

Proponents of the NE model argue that the no-excuses approach is not only defensible but is the *best* way to counteract the “soft racism” of low expectations and solve racial and class inequities in schools (Thernstrom and Thernstrom 2003). Many people I worked with at the charter school recognized how the practices were controversial but felt they would be beneficial in the long term. Integral to the model of schooling was an inbuilt rationale where the standard practices were rationalized according to the “hero narrative” of saving urban children from the bigotry of low expectations, mismanaged schools, etc. What pervaded many conversations between leadership and staff is how not receiving a good education carries significant risks (e.g., children only “get one shot at a good education”). For those educators who have chosen to work in a “no-excuses” charter school, they are often acting on their own perception of the “common good.” One reading of this is as an example of “going with the flow” which could signify the erasure of contestation and thus demonstrate the pervasiveness of neoliberal personhood. However, upon reflection, I believe their motivations highlight another dimension of neoliberal citizenship that has received less attention. In considering the culture of neoliberal performativity in the “no-excuses” charter school, the actions of the staff I worked with was a reflection of how they perceive risk and rewards, which structured not only their “habits of citizenship” (Brown 2015, p. 17) but also how they see the habits of others. Neoliberal citizenship, in this instance, is more about fostering “individualized responsibility” for vulnerable populations (Woolford and Nelund 2013, p. 307), rather than simply individual advancement. This muddies the water even more when we consider how the education reform movement’s mission reframes social justice in a neoliberal paradigm (Lefebvre and Thomas 2017). Therefore, the actions we associate with inculcating – or disciplining – vulnerable populations so they can perform effectively in a marketized and competitive world is a significant aspect of how the self is reconfigured and how neoliberal citizenship is made.

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Citizenship, Education, and Political Crisis in Spain and Catalonia: Limits and Possibilities for the Exercise of Critical Citizenship at School

16

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Abstract

The process of the independence of Catalonia has generated great interest on the part of international analysts as well as among a part of the citizenry while also producing disputes and controversy that have grown with the passage of time. This controversy lies, at first glance, in the opposition of interests defended by independentist sectors (who want the independence of Catalonia) and unionists (defenders of the unity of Spain). However, deeper analysis reveals another element of discord: the latent concept of citizenship.

This chapter deals with six aspects: first, it briefly addresses the concept of citizenship used in the chapter; second, it situates Catalonia within the framework of Spain; third, it analyzes the process of political recentralization and its consequences (citizen mobilization, referendum, and use of police violence by the

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State); and fourth, it addresses the issue of education and language as a weapon of political combat. This is followed by a section explaining the process of participation in favor of the right to decide and a presentation of the arguments used to counter the independence movement. The chapter concludes with a section devoted to analyzing the relationship between education, citizenship, and politics and a proposal to encourage political and citizen debate that can be framed beyond the Catalan-Spanish context.

Keywords

Citizenship · Politics · Education · Spain · Catalonia · Democracy

Introduction

The ongoing independence process in Catalonia has generated a great deal of interest among various international analysts. The linguistic and educational reality in Catalonia, which is not without controversy and polemic, has been the subject of particularly noteworthy debate, as the Spanish government and unionist political parties (defenders of the unity of Spain) supported by the media have repeatedly accused Catalan schools and families of the political indoctrination of children. The main arguments employed include claims that the Spanish language is prohibited in Catalan schools; that families have taken their children to demonstrations to demand the referendum [on Catalan independence] held on October 1 2017; that inappropriate textbooks are used in schools and politics is being discussed in a biased and tendentious way; and that once the referendum was held, there were teachers who openly talked about what had happened with their students. In short, it has been said that both families and Catalan schools indoctrinate, though those making this charge do not ever specify the precise meaning of this term.

This chapter situates the process of independence of Catalonia, addressing the political and institutional crisis that has occurred from 2000 onward and which is related to the concept of citizenship generated in this context. By extension, the chapter examines debates concerning the teaching and learning of democracy, participation, and politics in Catalan schools. The chapter concludes with a reflection on how citizenship can be worked on both in the family and in school.

The Concept of Citizenship

“Citizenship” is one of the most used concepts in political science and political philosophy. It is routine to hear the concept in common parlance, whether by political representatives, the media, or in the wider population. However, as with many other concepts in the social sciences, there is a risk of using the concept in contradictory ways, as a “conceptual stretching” (Sartori 1970), due to citizenship’s historical essence and polysemic nature. Thus, today, we find multiple

interpretations of citizenship: global, cosmopolitan, urban, sexual, cultural, etc. (Hampshire 2013).

For the purposes of this chapter, our concept of citizenship focuses primarily on identity aspects and, to a lesser extent, on legal aspects. Following Connor (1989) and Krauss (1996), in plurinational democratic states, it is just and appropriate for different nationalities to be recognized as such and for them to cooperate or remain united by choice and not by imposition. Plurinational states face the challenge of articulating, harmoniously and through free consent, flexible political-administrative structures that allow diversity of identity to be expressed satisfactorily. This approach, from our point of view, leads us to consider it pertinent that different nationalities, as sovereign political polities, have the right to exercise self-determination, that is, the ability to freely decide their future through referendums or other forms of democratic participation.

The translation of this concept of citizenship in the school encompasses three basic questions: to visualize and positivize diversity in a broad way (social class, sexual orientation, religion, cultural practice, geographical origin, cultural belonging, etc.) (Levinson 2012); to be able to talk about everything, without exception, with the only condition being not to disrespect anyone, especially minorities (Fox and Messiou 2004); and to promote the institutionalized and spontaneous participation of the entire educational community, especially referring to students (Susinos and Ceballos 2011).

Catalonia Within the Framework of the Spanish State

Catalonia is, for now, an autonomous community that, together with 18 other autonomous communities, is part of the Kingdom of Spain. This system was established by the Spanish Constitution of 1978, which is the first and only constitution that the Spanish State has had following the death of the dictator Francisco Franco who ruled Spain from 1939–1975. Throughout his dictatorship, Franco implemented an annihilative policy regarding any manifestation of democratic expression and civil liberties, including the attempted liquidation of the cultural and linguistic diversity inherent in the country, especially in the territories with more marked idiosyncrasies: Catalonia, Basque Country, and Galicia. With the so-called Spanish political transition (1975–1978) and the advent of democracy, Catalonia, as a historical community with its own language, history, laws, and institutions dating from medieval times, recovered its political institutions: the Parliament and the *Generalitat de Catalunya* [Government of Catalonia].

In contemporary times, Catalonia has consistently been, with more or less intensity, a controversial subject of political debate to determine, essentially, its degree of autonomy in the framework of the Spanish State (Fontana 2014). The Constitution of 1978 establishes four types of competences: exclusive competences of the State, exclusive competences of the autonomous communities (including Catalonia), concurrent jurisdiction between State and autonomous community, and shared competences. This question is “resolved” in a way that, now that we have a

certain historical perspective, has led to substantial confusion and dissatisfaction on all sides, namely, through a distribution of powers between the Spanish State and the Catalan government (hereinafter *Generalitat*) that in some respects can be considered confusing, unclear, and, above all, ineffective.

The ambiguity of the distribution of competences and the progressive emergence of new aspects (such as tax increases on sugary drinks or banks) that could either be attributed to the State, the Generalitat, or to both institutions, has entailed legal issues that have had to be resolved by the Constitutional Court (a court accused by many actors, including *Jueces y Jueces para la Democracia* [Judges for Democracy], of being highly politicized as magistrates are proposed by the different political parties according to their parliamentary quota in the Spanish Congress of Deputies). This situation generates a high number of appeals of unconstitutionality and conflicts of jurisdiction presented by both sides; 26 lodged by the Generalitat in the period from 2010 to 2013 and 8 by the Spanish government against the Catalan administration in the same period. However, it is worth mentioning that on certain occasions – albeit very few – a broad and flexible interpretation has been adopted, thus enabling higher levels of self-government to be achieved and, consequently, greater autonomy.

Education is a confusing sphere of competence because there is no legal text that clearly determines whether it is subject to concurrent or shared competence. Even so, examination of Catalan autonomic law affirms that the Generalitat can develop its own, although quite limited, educational policy (Prats 2015). This legislation gives the Generalitat full (but not exclusive) powers that are specified in the “regulation and administration of education in all its extension, levels and degrees, modalities and specialties,” reserving to the central government the regulation of academic and professional qualifications, the promulgation of the basic norms that guarantee fulfilment of the obligations of public authorities toward education, and supervision and control (the so-called High Inspectorate) of the entire education system.

The Process of Political Recentralization in Catalonia and Its Consequences

Since 2000, and with greater visibility from 2010 to the present – a period in which Spain has been governed by the *Partido Popular* (PP), a neoconservative political formation advocating a traditional Spanish nationalism – Catalonia has suffered a far-reaching process of recentralization, with the subsequent reduction of a range of rights and powers that had already been integrated into the ordinary functioning of the country (Puigpelat 2016).

A major turning point in the recognition of rights and the concept of self-government of Catalonia took place in 2006 when the Government of the Generalitat and the political parties of the Parliament of Catalonia modified the Statute (equivalent to the constitution of Catalonia). In this year, Parliament passed a new regulatory framework (the previous one was from 1979) by an overwhelming majority (120 votes in favor and 15 against), which was substantially modified (more than 50% of its articles) when it was sent to the Spanish Parliament. After

tense negotiations, and reluctant acceptance of the suppression of concepts referring to the Catalan nation, among other aspects, the Statute was approved in the Spanish Parliament by a large majority. Subsequently, and as mandated by the Spanish Constitution, the new Statute was submitted to a referendum among the Catalan population, obtaining 74% of the votes in favor, 21% against, and 5% abstentions. Even so, the PP collected signatures throughout Spain to bring the Statute to the Constitutional Court, which, in 2010, invalidated certain key articles regarding identity, reducing still further the legal and symbolic value of Catalan difference. Throughout the duration of the process of the new Statute, there was a continued weakening of the recognition of a plurinational State and the diversity of the communities that coexist within it, as well as of the acceptance of the embodiment of historical nationalities and plural forms of citizenship, at the same time that political tension became increasingly evident (Castells 2017).

The progressive construction in Spain of a restrictive model of citizenship, when not directly exclusive and discriminatory, has had unexpected effects to the point that it has reached a kind of dead end that, from a strictly political point of view, brings into question the logic and viability of the policy. The fact that little by little – but in a persistent way – the concept of Spanish citizen has been built around a less plural and more homogeneous national identity has also contributed to the fact that a significant part of the Catalan population feels increasingly detached from Spain. For example, data from the *Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió* in February 2018 shows that 40.8% of the population supports the independence of Catalonia.

On July 10, 2010, shortly after the Constitutional Court cut back the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia, a demonstration attended by one and a half million people took place in Barcelona (the capital and largest city in Catalonia) under the slogan “We are a nation, we decide.” This demonstration was supported by all the political parties comprising the Parliament of Catalonia, except for Spanish nationalist parties contrary to the aspirations for greater self-government in Catalonia (Partido Popular of Catalonia and *Ciudadanos*). As of this moment, the institutional declarations appealed to “the moral exclusion of the Spanish Constitution” and every September 11 (national day of Catalonia), there have been massive demonstrations, always festive and peaceful, requesting the right to decide on, or directly calling for, independence. On September 11, 2017, approximately one million people from all over Catalonia filled the streets of Barcelona in one of the massive demonstrations that have been held on the national day of Catalonia every year since 2011.

The articulation in Catalonia of an increasingly large independence movement has been led by both civic and cultural associations of all kinds, most of which are characterized by being politically plural (within the broad pro-independence ideological spectrum), intergenerational, and peaceful. On the other hand, the movement has also been supported by those Catalan political parties that have always been pro-independence, as well as others that until this time had only been autonomists and that in some cases had even supported unionist parties to facilitate the formation of the government in Madrid.

The discontent of an important part of the population of Catalonia during these years (2000–2018) has not only come about because of the symbolic (although not

minor) issue, of the refusal of the Spanish government to grant legal recognition of a singular national identity. Discontent also stems from an economic issue: from 2000 onward there has been a constant breach of investment commitments by the State. It is not that the State has not invested sufficiently in Catalonia (although that too, in the opinion of many citizens) but that part of the investments planned and approved in the general State budgets in Parliament have not been implemented, thus hampering the development of certain infrastructures and services, many of which have affected and continue to affect the poorest classes. Furthermore, and as a demonstration of a clear exercise of lack of transparency, the State has repeatedly refused to publish the fiscal balances that account for the real economic contributions of Catalonia to the whole of the Spanish State.

The fact is that, since 2010 and amid this tense climate, a political confrontation has grown exponentially in which the national element and the latent concept of citizenship have played a central role. For some, the Spanish nation is singular and indivisible, and they call for a recentralization process to be launched in which the autonomous communities would have competences taken away, thus disempowering them while strengthening the role of the State. In fact, in recent years, the percentage of people in Spain who are in favor of a more centralized state has increased from 25% to 36% (from 2015 to 2017) (Barómetro del Real Instituto Elcano (BRIE), 39 Oleada, January 2018. Available at: <http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org>). This opinion is reflected in declarations by people in executive positions in the Partido Popular such as those of the Minister of Justice Rafael Catalá, who emphasized in November 2017 that, more than expanding competences, it is necessary that the *central government again assume control over essential public policies* (https://www.eldiario.es/politica/Gobierno-promover-regresion-autonomica-constitucional_0_706580002.html). On the other hand, in Catalonia, the support for independence among the population has increased from 19% in January 2010 to 40% in October 2017 (Baròmetre d'opinió política del Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió de la Generalitat de Catalunya. 3^a onada 2017. Available at: <http://ceo.gencat.cat/>).

Education and Language as a Pretext

In this context of political-national tension, the Spanish government of the Partido Popular, as well as a substantial part of the major statewide political parties and diverse mass media, has used education and language to try to influence public opinion. In the case of Catalonia, the complex linguistic reality of the country has been used as a battlefield by the PP and, above all, by Ciudadanos, a party that came into being in Catalonia and later extended throughout the rest of Spain with the aim of governing the whole nation.

It is important to note that the linguistic issue in Catalonia, although it has always been a sensitive subject and of concern, has not always been as controversial as it is now. So much is this so that in 1983 all the political parties with representation in the Catalan Parliament voted in favor of the law of linguistic normalization, a law that, if

we take into account policy development as well as the tacit political agreement between the Catalan and Spanish governments during certain periods, has allowed language immersion in Catalan schools to this day. In practical terms, this means that children are mainly taught in Catalan, with Spanish being progressively introduced so that at the end of the primary education cycle all students are competent in both official languages of Catalonia (Catalan and Spanish). This model differs from other autonomous communities such as the Basque Country, for example, where until relatively recently there were as many as four models of schooling based on how and when the Basque and Spanish languages were introduced (Turell 2007). While the Basque Country has tended to move away from using an immersion model, considering that it favored segregated school communities, Catalonia has maintained its immersion policy, especially after verifying that, even though the country has received an important contingent of foreign migrants, 12-year-old children are competent in both Catalan and Spanish. Moreover, objective testing of students in Catalonia has repeatedly shown that they are as (or more) competent in the Spanish language than students from other monolingual communities, according to data from the Ministry of Education on the results of university entrance exams in Spain in 2017 (<https://www.mecd.gob.es/servicios-al-ciudadano-mecd/estadisticas/educacion/universitaria/estadisticas/estadistica-de-las-pruebas-de-acceso-a-la-universidad0/Ano-2017.html>).

Nonetheless, the political struggle over the Catalan language in school and by extension in the whole of society has become evident. In 2010, as we have already commented, the Constitutional Court issued a sentence against the Statute of Autonomy and, in particular, against the fact that Catalan is the vehicular language in Catalan schools. The Court ruled that in those cases in which Catalan is considered normalized, schools must move toward having a similar percentage of classes in the two official languages.

The Minister of Education of Spain, by virtue of the implementation of the Organic Law for the Improvement of Educational Quality (LOMCE 2013), established that families residing in Catalonia that requested to receive primary education in Spanish would have to enroll in private schools and forced the Government of Catalonia to pay the costs of this schooling. This decision brought concern because Catalan teachers, academics, families, and unions considered that there was a partisan, instrumental, and political use of the language in the sense that it slowed the normalization of Catalan (a pending normalization, among other reasons, owing to the banning of this language during the periods in which Spain has been subject to dictatorial regimes) and laid the foundation for a sociolinguistic confrontation, nonexistent until then. Despite the fact that this decision was revoked by the Constitutional Court in 2018, both the current Minister of Education and the President of the Spanish State have publicly stated that in the 2018–2019 school year, Catalan families, when preregistering their children for school, must choose if they want to be schooled in Catalan or Spanish.

This dispute reveals, as we have said, different conceptions of citizenship within the framework of an unequivocally plural Spanish State in which there are territories with two official languages and with multiple and diverse identities. Everything

suggests that, while it may bring electoral benefits in Spanish national elections, the aspiration to diminish, if not completely silence, projects that seek recognition of individuality in territories such as Catalonia has little future. Moreover, seeking political, linguistic, and social confrontation between two sectors of the same territory is dangerous because of the increased tensions and social conflicts that are generated (Suselbeck 2008).

The Future of Catalonia: Civic and Participatory Processes

The process of recentralization we referred to above, the curbing of linguistic normalization that we have just described, the cuts in the Statute of Autonomy of 2006, the failure of the Spanish government to invest in Catalonia, the configuration of an imaginary in a plurinational state that fails to recognize plurality, the impossibility of establishing an egalitarian dialogue between Catalonia and Spain to see how the two realities can fit together, the systematic and repeated invalidation of laws of a social nature approved by the Generalitat, and other factors have increased independence sentiment among part of the Catalan population. This sentiment, both politically and socially, crystallized with the demand expressed in an outcry: “the right to decide” the future of Catalonia.

The “right to decide” was a social movement that was generated in 2013 and was specified in the National Pact for the Referendum at the end of 2016 on the grounds that 80% of the Catalanian public was in agreement with holding a referendum on the independence of Catalonia. This movement brings together diverse groups of people, associations, platforms, and political parties: ranging from independentist options to federalists and including unionists with strong democratic convictions. Despite repeated requests from the Government of the Generalitat of Catalonia, the Parliament, and Catalan civic entities, the Spanish government would not agree on the development of an official referendum, in contrast to Britain and the granting of a referendum on Scottish independence. Two consultation processes were carried out in Catalonia: the 9-N Consultation (November 9, 2014) was responded to by 2,305,290 voters, of whom 1,861,753 opted for an independent Catalonia and 104,760 for Catalonia to remain within Spain. In the Referendum of 1-O (October 1, 2017) 43.3% of the census participated, with 2,044,038 (90.18%) voting in favor of independence and 177,547 (7.83%) against it.

The two participatory processes were actively fought by the Spanish government and ended up being judicialized, to the extent that a considerable number of people are currently under investigation and many political leaders are either in prison or in exile. Moreover, the repression by the police and State on 1-O has been denounced by several international organizations, including Human Rights Watch, as a disproportionate violation of human rights. From the moment the polling stations opened, the Spanish police tried to prevent people from voting, and, failing to do so, a government order unleashed indiscriminate and brutal police violence against voters.

Hundreds were left injured, some seriously. Catalonia's Health Department estimated on October 2 that 893 people had reported injuries to the authorities. Spain's Ministry of the Interior said on October 1 that 19 National Police and 14 Civil Guards had required urgent medical assistance, and that an "innumerable number of others" were injured. Following the referendum, Human Rights Watch documented excessive use of force against peaceful demonstrators by Civil Guards or National Police at a primary school in Girona being used as a polling station, and in the hillside villages of Aiguaviva (Girona province) and Fonollosa (Barcelona province). Human Rights Watch received other allegations and purported evidence of police ill treatment, which it has not been able to verify or examine in detail, along with instances of assaults on police officers by some demonstrators. (<https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/10/12/spain-police-used-excessive-force-catalonia>)

In the days following the referendum, there were many schools that spoke about the events of 1-O with their pupils. In some schools, the incidents were addressed because when the children entered the school they saw the damage and destruction (doors broken down, shattered glass, closets with their contents ripped apart, school material on the floor, etc.). In other cases it was talked about because the children asked to do so, if only to be able to express their anxiety or fear about what they had witnessed in person or saw replayed in the media or Internet on the day of the referendum. There were also schools that spoke about what had happened by decision of the teachers, simply because they are teachers who tend to talk about what happens in society, in their town, etc. or because, like so many other citizens, they felt outraged, harassed, humiliated, or beaten. For whatever reason, educators in many schools deemed it an appropriate time to talk about rights versus responsibilities, of violence versus peace, of democracy versus tyranny, and of citizenship and rule of law.

Arguments Accusing Families and Catalan Schools of Indoctrination

As noted in the introduction to this article, that several schools discussed what had happened on October 1 led the Spanish government to react by constructing a meta-narrative based on the "indoctrination" of children by families and the school. The main arguments of this narrative revolved around four ideas that, in summary, amounted to the following: *parents bring their underage children to pro-independence demonstrations and events, and this is unacceptable; many parents took their children to vote in a referendum declared illegal by the Spanish State, thus contributing to the ideologization of defenseless minors; separatism is advocated in Catalan schools, thus propagating a clearly indoctrinating and anti-Spanish ideology; and to hammer the point home, in Catalan schools it is prohibited to speak Spanish.*

The seriousness of the case is that these arguments, including those that are false, were constructed by commentators, mass media, and members of the government itself with the idea of creating a seamless monolithic public opinion that would legitimize the Spanish government. Next, we proceed to a detailed analysis of the

arguments that we have just described with a double objective: to explain whether they are true or false and, independent of that, the latent concept of citizenship they lead us to.

1. *Parents bring their underage children to pro-independence demonstrations and events, and this is unacceptable.* It is true that all the demonstrations related to the independence process have been attended by families with children of all ages. In fact, they have been demonstrations made up of a marked plurality of people, from both the political-ideological point of view (as already mentioned earlier) and the generational: children, adolescents, young people, adults, and large numbers of seniors have participated. It is important to emphasize that all these demonstrations have been overwhelmingly peaceful. In this regard, the authors of this article consider that an act like the one explained here is closely related to the concept of educating in politics and in and for democracy.
2. *Parents took their children to vote in a referendum declared illegal by the Spanish State, thus contributing to the ideologization of minors.* It is true that on the day of the referendum there were families who came to vote with their children, and it is likely that this fact would give rise to speak about why a referendum was being held, what its meaning was, the voting orientation of their parents and, who knows if also, other family members, etc. This act was criticized by some. The political culture of citizenship, especially that of children, is acquired in various spaces and areas of socialization, among which the family is of great importance. However, here we can see how some political parties strove to emphasize the conflict and tensions surrounding the socialization of children by questioning whether the family or the State is the “right” agent of socialization. Under our approach, these tensions should not be present in the public sphere if the conceptualization of citizenship were to be addressed from the republican model mentioned in the beginning of this chapter.
3. *Separatism is advocated in Catalan schools, thus propagating a clearly indoctrinating and anti-Spanish ideology.* There exists little evidence to suggest that this claim is actually true. Considering how primary schools and secondary schools teach history, political institutions, democracy, and citizenship, it is not possible for the Catalan school to indoctrinate. Neither the school curriculum, nor the educational competencies, nor the textbooks allow it. The Catalan school, if it infuses a national sentiment, does nothing more than schools in the rest of Spain or in democratic Europe. Here we would add an observation, one which is by no means unimportant: while schools in Catalonia teach about the history of both Spain and Catalonia and Spanish and Catalan political institutions, and children end up speaking and writing both languages equally, the same does not occur elsewhere in Spain.
4. *In Catalan schools it is prohibited to speak Spanish.* While this claim has been constantly repeated and disseminated by some politicians, it is not the case that speaking Spanish is prohibited; Spanish has never been banned in schools in Catalonia because, among other things, politicians, intellectuals, academics, and ordinary citizens who lived through the Franco dictatorship know all too well the

consequences of prohibition of a language. The Spanish Constitution, the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia, the Law of Linguistic Normalization, and common sense have established that Catalan and Spanish, both, are official languages of Catalonia, and, as such, every citizen has the right and the duty to know them.

As previously mentioned, the regulatory framework and the political consensus around it (when it has existed, of course) has meant that in Catalan schools children are taught in Catalan with Spanish being progressively introduced, so that at the end of primary school students are equally familiar with both languages. Even so, there are primary and secondary schools, especially in the periphery of Barcelona (areas of significant Spanish immigration during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s of the last century) where there has not been any linguistic immersion in Catalan and schooling has been conducted exclusively in Spanish. Yet, despite this, nothing has happened, except the fact that these students have not learned Catalan. This situation, which could be considered anomalous and contrary to the spirit of normalization of the Catalan language, has not been denounced by the Catalan educational authorities nor by educational inspectors, labor unions, or pro-independence political parties. We might also add that beyond the schools and secondary schools where linguistic normalization has not been implemented, there are many educational centers where Spanish is spoken primarily or solely on the playground, being a reflection of the sociolinguistic situation of the neighborhoods where these centers are located. Moreover, as it cannot be otherwise, it is a question that has been respected always and everywhere. Consequently, Spanish has neither been prosecuted nor persecuted in Catalonia.

The Current Debate: The Relationship Between Education, Citizenship, and Politics

In line with our analysis so far in this chapter, and in the fundamental spirit of this publication, the purpose of this section is to frame the relationship between education, citizenship, democracy, and politics, focusing on both the role of the family and the school.

In a mature democracy, it is desirable for the family to be involved in the civic and citizenship education of their children (Prieto-Flores et al. 2018). To completely delegate political education to other socializing agents is not, from a holistic and integrative educational perspective, highly recommendable. How can a family educate their children to be citizens in the twenty-first century? Obviously, there is no single answer, especially when this education will depend largely on the political and ideological perspective of the family and the communities in which they live. Even so, if we look for fundamental and cross context guidelines that are compatible with the ideological diversity described above, perhaps we can consider the following recommendations appropriate: educate children to have a thorough respect for the opinions expressed within and outside the family unit; educate in the knowledge and practice of the rights and duties that, in accordance with children's age, can be

understood and practiced; educate in the experiential knowledge of the town, neighborhood, or city in which they live; educate in respect for human diversity present in the place where they live, as well as in other areas; etc.

Apart from what has just been mentioned, the fact that families encourage their children to actively participate in activities carried out in the territory facilitates and fosters citizenship education. In this way, children become, to the extent that it is possible, part of the associative, cultural, and recreational fabric of society, prioritizing, if possible, community-based activity (Biesta and Lawy 2006). As a derivative of this proposal, the authors of this chapter believe that it is important to accustom children to conscientiously participate in public life, attending political and social demonstrations that, apart from the experience itself, serve as a pretext to discuss issues that have to do with the shared community reality. A “good” education for citizenship within the scope that we are addressing also involves doing everything possible to prepare and form “good people,” “useful people,” that is, people interested and involved in community issues that in this way transcend the strictly personal or family space.

Regarding schooling, education for responsible citizenship, according to Edelstein (2011) and considering the contributions of the Demoskole Research Group, can be worked on (i) from the testimony of adults; (ii) from an appropriate modulation of the relationships and interactions among members of the educational community; (iii) from an appropriate teaching-learning methodology; and (iv) through the curriculum.

- (i) The testimony of teaching professionals and other adults present in the school is essential to guide students toward a model of responsible citizenship. The adult who addresses students with respect, care, and attention; who sets reasoned boundaries, both reasonable and with love; who knows how to listen and is able to create a favorable climate to talk about whatever is necessary; who trusts their students and does not hesitate to allow them to speak and express themselves freely and respectfully; and who strives for their students to be able to speak with a voice of their own, etc., embodies a citizen model that encourages active and informed engagement. As stated by Max Van Manen (1998), the example of the educator, and their gestures, is crucial for students to incorporate certain values that, as if they were attitude-generating matrices, shape certain behaviors and patterns of interaction.
- (ii) Appropriate modulation of the relationships and interactions among members of the educational community. The construction of respectful and flexible social relationships, accustomed to the diversity of ways of doing and feeling and radically opposed to any form of discrimination or violence, is conducive to the construction of an open, tolerant, and just citizen model (Hayward 2012). A democratic school concerned with forming responsible citizens should promote such relationships and should do everything possible to quickly detect any situation that goes in the opposite direction. In this regard, we believe that we must be very attentive to the standards of naturalized violence (taken as a matter of course and as inevitable) that occur in so many primary and secondary

- schools – violence that, in many cases, is mistakenly seen as admissible because it is considered to be contingent on the tension that occurs in society. Needless to say, the acceptance of this violence does nothing other than impoverish the prototype citizen that is slowly being constructed while also lowering the fraternal aspirations of the human species.
- (iii) The teaching-learning methodology also has to do with, although perhaps more indirectly, democracy and the model of citizenship propagated in the center. Although on many occasions the methodology employed in the classroom is considered a strictly technical issue, authors that have reflected on this from a critical point of view do not believe this to be so (Gimeno Sacristan and Pérez Gómez 1992; Contreras 2010). The way in which knowledge is transmitted and created in the classroom to the extent that a conception of learner and educator intervenes is objectified, in part, in a complex of interactions of power and domination (Bourdieu and Passeron 1970) projects different models of citizen, citizenship, and society. Even the most novice observer can discern the differences that may exist between a school based on traditional pedagogy and one that is based on active learning. The latter has to do with the postulates of the active school (De Zubiría Samper 2008) and, in a more transparent way, with the principles of free and respectful education (Wild 2002) and also with the broad spectrum of student-centered learning and green pedagogy that, as explained by Heike Freire (2011, p. 12), “stimulate a sense of deep connection with life, with oneself and others, and that fosters the capacity for empathy and responsibility.”
- (iv) A curriculum that is committed to citizenship must integrate, without reservations, aspects having to do with democracy, politics, and ideologies, among others (Giroux 2003; Guichot 2014). Democracy is something that is practiced every day and everywhere; it is something that is part of the school’s DNA and is manifested, more than with grand discourses or classes, through the gestures and attitudes of teachers and educators. Politics and ideologies are worked on in all their extent and complexity, and, unlike what frequently occurs in the family environment, ideology is not guided, to begin with. In the event of doing so, the school or the teacher would be restricting the ideological freedom of the child, which would hinder the possibility of choosing. It is also true that we do not only subscribe to a simple description of different ideologies, like someone who presents different neutral “products” that can be consumed according to the tastes and impulses of consumers. Along with the presentation of different equal ideologies, we believe it is necessary to consider two fundamental questions: to enumerate the values that support them as well as the consequences involved in their implementation and, in addition, to also encourage students to raise fundamental questions precisely so that they can evaluate any and all ideologies, especially those the teacher most identifies with and that because of caution and especially ethics they would never explain.

Apart from what we have just said, citizenship and politics can also be worked on – and it is good that this is done – through a more structured curriculum that takes

into account diverse and complementary aspects. We consider the following points to be important: First, to deal with the rights and duties of the citizens, placing special emphasis on the different generations of human rights. Second, to make known the political institutions comprising the local, national, state, and international spheres, explaining their role or objectives, the functioning, and the decision-making process. Third, it is also necessary to speak of the different actors involved in politics, with, in our opinion, a special focus on noninstitutional actors that work for collective rights and causes. Fourth, it is appropriate to present the different systems of government, highlighting the role of the citizen in each of them as well as the rights that are recognized or denied. Fifth, it is desirable for students – when they are in a sufficiently advanced stage of maturity – to know political, social, and economic history, paying much attention to the problems and conquests in the aforementioned areas. And sixth, it is necessary to speak about linguistic, ethnic, or identity problems and how these are contained in constitutions and international norms that promote respect and tolerance for diversity. In line with what we have been explaining, it is clear that education for citizenship is a broad and transversal area full of possibilities.

Conclusion

We cannot finish this chapter without outlining how we can work effectively on a topic as far-reaching and complex as the one we have been exploring. Aiming only to introduce the subject, and taking as a starting point the guidelines of Barbosa (2000) and the Demoskole Research Group, it is desirable to treat aspects related to the area of citizenship from proximity, in other words, based on everyday issues that have to do with the reality experienced by students. By not doing so, we can easily fall into the mistake of imparting an excessively abstract curriculum and moving away from the interests and experiences of students.

Starting from the consideration we have just made, citizenship can be addressed through very different ways or systems. These include:

- Through a master class, the viewing of a film or documentary, focused and comparative analysis of the press, and by interviewing political actors and members of social movements that come to school
- From student visits to the headquarters of different actors
- Through service learning activities inside and outside the school
- From carrying out actions linked to the needs of the neighborhood, town, or city (worked on before school)
- Through participation in protest demonstrations, with prior work and consensus with families
- Through incorporating new democratic structures of participation that go beyond what is habitual – especially if they have democratic stumbling blocks that limit free expression

- Through the distribution of positions whose exercise has individual and collective repercussions
- By involving students and families in the ordinary life of the center
- By organizing shared directions between teachers and families
- By creating meaningful communities and therefore going beyond the rhetoric to which we are so accustomed, making use of active, nondirective, and free pedagogies
- Through embodying a consciously chosen ethos that is applied in a transversal way throughout the center

In summary, as explained by Feu and others (2016, 2017), we need to take into account governance, habitance, otherness, ethos, and pedagogical practice to make possible the development of free, responsible, critical, creative, and solidary human beings at the service of a more egalitarian and just society.

The fact that the Catalan school has addressed the central theme of the controversy – the process of independence of Catalonia, or aspects related to it including the referendum on October 1, the police violence, the previous and subsequent demonstrations, etc. – does not necessarily have to be a negative issue. In line with what we have said, talking about politics in school based on issues that are part of current political and social debate “vivifies” them and makes them easier to understand. Dodging them, pretending they do not exist, and leaving them outside the walls of the school does nothing but increase the existing divorce between society-politics and school while renouncing critical and informed citizen education.

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Citizenship and Citizenship Education in Zimbabwe: A Theoretical and Historical Analysis

17

Aaron T. Sigauke

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Abstract

Civics, citizenship, and citizenship education are currently issues of attention for a number of state education systems over the world. Yet, because civics and citizenship education are contested and controversial concepts, it is sometimes not clear as to what the intentions of state authorities are in introducing civics and citizenship education in the curriculum. This chapter discusses the position of civics and citizenship education in Zimbabwe. Firstly, it looks at the different theoretical conceptions associated with civics and citizenship. It then traces the historical position of this subject in the country's education system focusing mostly on why the subject has taken different forms at various political stages. The chapter then focuses on the current position of civics and citizenship

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education in Zimbabwe as of 2018 and tries to respond to the question as to why it is the way it is. It concludes with a summary regarding the subject in the country.

Keywords

Civics and citizenship · Zimbabwe · Controversies · Presidential Commission · National and strategic studies · *Ubuntu/hunhu* · Values · National identity · National Pledge

Introduction

Civics and citizenship education is generally regarded as important in teaching citizens of a country to be politically, socially, and economically active members of society (Olssen 2004; Lawson 2001; Tibbitts and Torney-Purta 1999; Crick Report 1998). However, in many cases, negative macro-socio-political factors can negatively impact on attitudes of these same citizens (young and adults) and the extent to which they can participate in the socio-political activities of the country. In Zimbabwe, citizens have become distrustful of the political environment. They are disillusioned with the political system and are unhappy with the economic developments in the country (Sigauke 2011b). Introducing a citizenship education program in such a politico-socio-economic atmosphere of mistrust may neither change the attitudes of learners, nor alter their participation levels now and in future. In support of this view, Matereke (2012) notes that the official perception of civics and citizenship education in Zimbabwe has

“rendered both the school system and teachers as mere functionaries of the status quo, thus constricting the public sphere and eroding civil liberties, these being the very elements which enable citizens to fully participate in the political process and to hold public officials and institutions accountable. It is these developments that bring the dual crisis of citizenship and education into purview” (p. 97).

Over the years, since independence in 1980, a number of attempts have been made to introduce civics and citizenship education in the curriculum in Zimbabwe but without success. This failure to a successful implementation of the subject is a result of conflicting interpretations between government (ruling party) on one hand and teachers and the general public on the other concerning the nature and role of civics and citizenship education in the Zimbabwean society.

This chapter discusses the position of civics and citizenship education in Zimbabwe’s education system. Firstly, it looks at several relevant theoretical conceptions and controversies associated with civics, citizenship, and citizenship education in general. It then traces the historical background of the subject in Zimbabwe’s education system focusing mostly on how and why it has taken different positions at various political stages. The chapter then looks at the subject in Zimbabwe as of 2018 and tries to respond to the question as to why it is the way it is. The concluding section summarizes views raised in the chapter.

Civics and Citizenship Education: A Brief Theoretical Background and Some Pertinent Controversies

There is as much controversy about what constitutes citizenship education as there is about citizenship itself. Arthur and Wright (2001: 8) identify three different views often presented in discussions concerning citizenship education, that is, “education about citizenship; education for citizenship and education through citizenship,” what Kerr (2003: 14) calls the “tripartite division of *about-for-through*” citizenship. A distinction is also often made between a citizenship education that empowers the learner and that which is tantamount to indoctrination, that is, involving teaching someone to accept that something is true in spite of evidence to the contrary (Sears and Hughes 2006). Indoctrination is used as a useful means to an end for people in positions of political power. Citizenship education thus can be used to control young people so that they do not question the status quo and to mold, manage, and reform young people for the benefit of people in positions of power. In such cases, citizenship education does not develop active citizens who are capable of thinking critically, questioning and making decisions about issues that concern them. At the political level, this narrow sense of citizenship education neither raises nor offers political empowerment to young people, keeping them passive and ignorant of political, economic, and other social issues that benefit the powerful ones. Davies (2001) observes that in many cases the nature of citizenship education a country adopts is greatly influenced by the political context and ideology of the state. Osler and Starkey (2005) and Magudu (2012) add that if citizenship is as controversial and as contested a concept as noted above then being a “good citizen” is therefore similarly controversial and contestable. In this sense, and as defined by any government, a good citizen could mean someone who unquestioningly accepts and conforms to values, norms, and beliefs as defined by authority.

In contrast, authentic citizenship education enables learners to engage in critical discussions of issues, using evidence, exploring alternatives and developing dispositions and skills that allow them to act on other possibilities. Authentic citizenship education goes beyond the development of passive citizenship and seeks instead citizens who are justice-oriented and who critically analyze and address social injustices. Authentic citizenship education involves teaching and learning about social and moral responsibility, involvement in the community, and about political literacy (Olssen 2004; Westheimer and Kahne 2004). It is a citizenship education that sharpens critical thinking capacities important in the analysis of political, social, and other issues, a preparation of young people for their roles and responsibilities and for the challenges and uncertainties of life through provision of relevant education (Kerr 1999). The main goals of this deeper, thicker sense of citizenship education are thus to provide political socialization and to equip young people with the knowledge, skills, and values to participate effectively in a democratic society (Kisby and Sloam 2009 cited in Magudu 2012).

Authentic citizenship education, especially at the classroom level, may require a methodological and pedagogical shift, especially regarding the medium of

instruction, given that it involves an emancipatory and transformative model of instruction that promotes questioning of knowledge as well as awareness of social injustices that are inherent in society. In addition, authentic citizenship education includes making students aware of power and political differences (Panganayi et al. 2017). Authentic citizenship education or education for democracy aims at predisposing and developing students' skills, attitudes, beliefs, and values that will empower them to participate and remain engaged and involved in their society's culture, politics, governance, and general democracy (Runhare and Muvirimi 2017). In the case of civics and citizenship education in Zimbabwe, which is the focus of this chapter, it is important to have some understanding of the background to this subject.

Civics and Citizenship Education in Zimbabwe: A Historical Background

Political, Social, and Economic Context Prior to the Introduction of Civics and Citizenship Education

Over the last four decades, that is, since independence from United Kingdom in 1980, Zimbabwe has been going through a downturn in political, social, and economic conditions. This downturn can be attributed to the introduction of harsh legislation against democratic dissent by the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party. This legislation has targeted and restricted civic organizations, labor movements, opposition political movements, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), churches, and student demonstrations which demanded a recognition of their rights as citizens and citizen organizations (Hammett 2010; Zeilig 2008). As a result, the country has been characterized by hyperinflation, social hemorrhage, and political conflict. Specifically, the year 1998 was characterized by radical political opposition to the ruling party evidenced by the formation of the main political opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), an alliance of civic society, and groupings of labor movements (Raftopoulos 2002). Prior to and beyond 1998, student political discontent and activism had also been on the rise especially at the tertiary education level. Zeilig (2008) notes that student voice reconstructs historical events and should therefore be interrogated in order for the public to understand the meaning of student activism. For most of the 1990s and beyond, Zimbabwe has been characterized by a gradual economic decline characterized by rising unemployment, underdevelopment, and disillusionment with elite corruption. Thus, the political upheavals of the 2000s resulted in the dwindling of the democratic space and an upsurge of populist rhetoric from the ruling politically powerful aimed at justifying their positions (Hammer et al. 2003). That is, to silence the general public from openly voicing against these socio-economic hardships and elite corruptions, the ruling party became more and more autocratic.

These political events in Zimbabwe since 1998 may be summarized as follows: the referendum of February 2000 which rejected the government's proposal for a new constitution; the popularity of the opposition party as confirmed in the June elections of that same year when the MDC got a number of seats in parliament followed by what has been generally regarded as "controversial" presidential elections in 2002, parliamentary elections in 2005, and the 2008 elections (Raftopoulos 2002; Chimhowu 2009). As suggested above, Zimbabwe's continual political crisis up to the present day (2018) has further exacerbated the country's economic decline, political instability, and social divisions resulting in a lack of trust in the political system from some sections of the population locally and internationally. In addition, the political crisis has resulted in a rise in conflict between citizens as illustrated by some public violence between members of the ruling and opposition parties.

Over the years, and in the context of these worsening conditions, the ZANU-PF government's popularity has continued to decline drastically as evidenced by rising support for the opposition party (i.e., the rise in the numbers of citizens who voted for opposition party members in parliament). The response of authorities to these events has, in some cases, been further political suppressions including the closing of the space for democratic debates through various legislation and measures. The 2002 Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), for example, allowed state media to broadcast ideological messages on behalf of the state. The Land Designation Act, also known as the "Fast Track Land Acquisition Reform Programme," led to violent occupation of farmland and the displacement of farm owners and workers (McGregor 2002). In 2001 the judicial system was restructured. Significant too have been the appointment of military personnel to lead some state institutions, what has been described as "the militarization of state institutions" (Chimhowu 2009: 19), and the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) which extended the powers of the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) (Raftopoulos 2007a; Raftopoulos 2007b; Raftopoulos 2002; Bond and Manyanya 2002). Added to the above was "Operation Murambatsvina/Restore Order" or "Clean-up Operation" (Tibaijuka 2005) of 2005, euphemistically described as the "tsunami." While this was meant to "restore order" by destroying unplanned and illegal accommodation and business structures, it was violent and indiscriminate. In addition to making society submissive to the state, it also ended up making people, mostly those living in the low income residential areas, homeless (Fontein 2009).

These events, regarded as an "evolution of a repressive political governance culture characterized by violence, insecurity and political paralysis" (Chimhowu 2009: 19), worsened relations between the state and civil society. It is within this socio-political context that citizenship education was to be introduced in schools in 2007, raising significant questions for and from Zimbabweans about what it means to be a citizen, who is a citizen, and whether citizenship is about practicing democratic values such as tolerance, participation, and empowerment (Tshabangu 2006). To engage with, and to seek to answer such questions, it is necessary to examine how the events in Zimbabwe help in understanding the operationalization of citizenship, including the form it takes within curricular programs.

The Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Education and Training (1999)

It was within the above context that in 1998 the Government of Zimbabwe established a commission whose task was “to inquire into and report on education and training in Zimbabwe” (Presidential Commission 1999: i). Prior to 1998, no such comprehensive review had been carried out on the education system. According to the commission, during public debates, young people were blamed for antisocial behavior, and such behavior was attributable to a lack of citizenship values, relevant ethics, morals, and individual and collective responsibility towards property. Furthermore, young people were blamed for lacking knowledge about the meaning and qualities associated with good citizenship. The commission also noted that during its hearings “people expressed concern about the absence of citizenship education in the school and tertiary education curricula” (Presidential Commission 1999: 350). The commission thus recommended a compulsory and statutory citizenship education in the entire school curriculum.

As noted earlier, citizenship and citizenship education are controversial and sometimes subjectively defined concepts (Osler and Starkey 2005). In such a deteriorating political context and given this controversy, the claims made by the Presidential Commission about young people were politically motivated and sought to silence young people on the ruling party’s political abuses. One such example of the indoctrination or silencing of young people is the infamous National Youth Service introduced in Zimbabwe at the peak of the socio-political instability in the country (Nyakudya 2007; Mashingaidze 2009; Ranger 2004). Furthermore, claims about young people’s lack of citizenship values and the need for citizenship education were based on information collected from the public and not directly from or through research on young people themselves. By excluding the voices of young people, the Commission’s review presented a narrow conception of citizenship.

A critical discourse analysis of the citizenship education chapter of the Commission’s report (Sigauke 2011a) shows bias in the agenda for the appointment of the commission and that this was influenced by the socio-economic and political events in the country. In addition, various statements from the report demonstrate the Commission’s concern about the socio-economic and other problems in the country at the time of its operation. It concluded that these problems could be addressed through education because:

Education is a fundamental strategy to prepare Zimbabweans for socio-economic well-being in the new millennium and to be competitive in the global era dominated by information technology. (Presidential Commission 1999: i)

Citizenship education curriculum would enable children to grow into good citizens who *conform to certain accepted practice* (*italics: author’s emphasis*); train them to hold beliefs; to ensure the reception and acceptance of our values, ethics and civic processes by all our youth; and to enlighten our children of their civic rights, obligations and responsibilities (Presidential Commission 1999: 353).

The suggested curriculum would also focus on such aspects as “Our Heritage, Legal Education (learners learning about human rights, responsibilities and obligations); National Identity: a study of our culture. . . a close study of our democracy” (Presidential Commission 1999: 252).

The report was, however, not specific about the disorder in the country, and it was deliberately general and nonpartisan in its arguments. However, the report implicitly advocated for public commitment to the ruling party’s ideals. While the Commission says it consulted widely before arriving at its conclusions and making recommendations for citizenship education in the curriculum, in addition to not finding out student positions on the subject, the report did not consult the teachers who were to implement the citizenship education program. Large-scale surveys elsewhere have shown that where teachers are not consulted and if they hold negative views about the subject, this may lead to significant issues, and even failure in its implementation (Losito and Mintrop 2001; Wilkins 2003).

Content/Focus of the 2007 Civics and Citizenship Syllabus

In between 1999 when the Presidential Commission Report was released and 2007 when the civics education syllabus was implemented, there is no official policy document directing the Ministry of Education and Culture to develop the civics syllabus (*Source: Interview with official at Curriculum Development Unit (CDU); May 30, 2006*). Subsequently, 8 years later (in 2007) a “Civics Education” syllabus was designed by the Curriculum Development Unit (CDU) of the Ministry of Education and Culture initially to be taught at the secondary education level. Consistent with the Commission’s suggestions, the first aim focused on the need to develop in young people the quality of *unhu/ubuntu* which the Commission describes as

the human being in the fullest and noblest sense; a good human being; a well behaved and morally upright person (Presidential Commission 1999: 61–62, 349).

The assumption is that through the civic education syllabuses, these qualities can be “cultivated” and “sustained” Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) (2007: 4). The inclusion of these qualities in civics and citizenship education is in response to the Commission’s observation that “*unhu/ubuntu* is currently lacking in society and in the formal education system” (Presidential Commission 1999: 353). However, the Civics syllabus was only “allocated one period per week” (GoZ 2007: 6). A number of different teaching/learning approaches were listed in the syllabus including community participatory methods, again in response to the statement that “the subject encourages the use of a variety of methods with particular emphasis on participatory methods. . .” (GoZ 2007: 4). These observations, combined with government’s apparent sudden interest in citizenship education in schools at a time when the same government was experiencing political, economic, and other social difficulties, raise questions about whether or not there were other motives for the introduction of citizenship education in schools at that time.

Civics and Citizenship Education in Zimbabwe: Current Position (2018)

Debates on Ideological Implications of the Current Program in Zimbabwe

The current position on civics and citizenship education in Zimbabwe, which is offered as a cross-curriculum theme rather than a stand-alone subject (as of 2018), is outlined in a number of documents of the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education and Ministry of Higher Education (see Ndhlovu 2016; Mushava 2014; Magudu 2012; Matereke 2012; Mapetere et al. 2011; Makanda n.d.; Chabikwa n.d.). A stand-alone or statutory citizenship education subject in the school curriculum, as recommended by the Presidential Commission (1999) and introduced in schools 2007, was not successful as it was unpopular with teachers who were worried about teaching sensitive political issues in a politically sensitive environment (Sigauke 2011b). The section on “[The Nature of Civics and Citizenship Education Programme in Zimbabwe](#)” which comes next provides details on the suggested content and teaching approaches on the subject. However, before discussing the content and teaching approaches, it is important to be aware of ideological implications of the current program in Zimbabwe.

Writing of the Zimbabwean context Matereke (2012), citing Gutmann (1999), believes that political education, that is, the cultivation of the virtues, knowledge, and skills necessary for political participation has moral primacy over other purposes of public education in a democratic society. According to this position, the role of citizenship education or political democracy (Gutmann 1999) should be the development of a “deliberative/democratic” character. The current curriculum in Zimbabwe does not match these ideals and is too narrow and focused on political knowledge rather than active participation. The question then is: to what extent has citizenship education in Zimbabwe bequeathed individuals with what Milner (2002: 1) terms “civic literacy” or the knowledge, ability, and capacity of citizens to make sense of their political world? Writing about education for citizenship in Zimbabwe Matereke (2012) further points out that education in general should cultivate students for critical citizenship emanating from the undeniable fact of pluralism: we live in a world that is characterized by multiple identities (ethnic, racial, sexual, religious, etc.), different and often competing (thus incommensurable) conceptions of the good. This “fact of pluralism” makes it unreasonable to expect that national borders should coincide with a single homogenous community. Thus, as Matereke (2012) argues, education should prepare all citizens, especially the young, by imparting critical skills to engage with plurality. The fact of pluralism requires Zimbabweans to question how they can achieve political stability in the polity. Rather than promoting critical dispositions that allow citizens to hold public officials accountable, through various processes, including those specifically connected to citizenship education examined in the next section, education in Zimbabwe at the moment has fostered intolerance and heightened the risk of political instability through a curriculum which prioritizes conformity and commitment to

existing political structures. Therefore, it can be argued that the political polarization, economic decline, and social strife that characterize the Zimbabwean crisis are a manifestation of an instability that stems from an education system that demands an acquiescent citizenry (Matereke 2012). As Giroux (1998a: 173) points out, there is need for educators to define “schools as public spheres where the dynamics of popular engagement and democratic politics can be cultivated as part of the struggle for a radical democratic state.”

At present in Zimbabwe, as in other parts of the world, educational reforms have tended to assign teachers and schools the roles of reproducing the political society and creating a predetermined political consensus by imparting specific kinds of knowledge in order to buttress the ruling party’s hold on power. The ideology that underpins the postcolonial education reform in Zimbabwe does not question the “relationship between knowledge and power” (Giroux 1998b: 6). Zimbabwe needs a citizenship education that raises citizens’ critical consciousness (Freire 1987), one that transforms teachers and students into intellectuals who conceive teaching and learning as “an emancipatory practice” and who “work relentlessly, dedicated to furthering democracy and enhancing the quality of human life.” They should not behave as functionaries “whose labor is to benefit those in political power” (McLaren 1988: xviii). Through various processes, ruling elites have stifled the role of teachers and lecturers as transformative intellectuals.

The Nature of Civics and Citizenship Education Program in Zimbabwe

More recently new programs that incorporate some aspects of civics and citizenship education have been introduced at various levels of the education system. These include, for example, the “National Pledge” in primary and secondary schools, the “National and Strategic Studies (NASS)” in teachers’ and polytechnic colleges and a compulsory course on “Peace Leadership and Conflict Transformation” in universities (Ndhlovu 2016). At the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education level, Magudu (2012) notes that the History curriculum remains central in the delivery of aspects of citizenship education. In addition, attempts have been made to introduce Human Rights education as a stand-alone subject, but this failed due to the same reason that teachers are hesitant to teach issues they regard as politically sensitive that would get them in trouble with the ruling party (see Sigauke 2011b). In the primary school, the HIV/AIDS and Life Skills Education Primary School Syllabus was introduced in 2003. Although the content of the syllabus focuses heavily on HIV/AIDS education, it includes aspects of citizenship education such as values and beliefs, participation in community programs, and conflict resolution. It should also be noted that citizenship education initiatives in Zimbabwe primary schools have not generated much debate, perhaps because they do not focus on obviously controversial issues.

In his work, Makanda (n.d.), a Principal Director of the Curriculum Development and Technical Services unit of the Ministry of Education and Culture in Zimbabwe,

identifies three key content areas for the new civics and citizenship education curriculum which at the moment is being treated as a cross-curriculum subject: concepts of *hunhu/Ubuntu*, values and national identity, all three also mentioned in the Presidential Commission Report discussed above.

Hunhu/Ubuntu denotes a good human being, a well-behaved, and morally upright person characterized by qualities such as responsibility, honesty, justice, trustworthiness, a commitment to hardwork, integrity, a cooperative spirit, solidarity, hospitality, devotion to family, and the welfare of the community (Sigauke 2016). *Ubuntu/hunhu* also means a well-rounded and respectable human being, one with particular characteristics of care, good mannered and with regard for others, self-disciplined and courageous, diligent and tolerant. These are characteristics treasured by other cultures and are upheld and promoted as virtues of good citizenship.

On values Makanda (n.d.) further adds that values denote what humanity is; they give weight to humanity and must therefore be shared, especially when they are acceptable to society. Values are what people cherish as guiding principles and act as a main reference for their choices and behaviors. Any system without values lacks order and has a very limited shelf-life. The new curriculum, it is believed, will inculcate positive ethics and values in every learner. So, learners in the school system are expected to exhibit acceptable values such as discipline, integrity, honest, and *Ubuntu/hunhu*. If learners enter society without these values, they become a threat to the social fabric and socio-economic development. Incidences of corruption, infidelity, theft, lying, murder, and natural environment and property destruction become rampant. This preparation of learners, it is believed, will enable them to rise to the challenges they inevitably face as they grow into adulthood. Principally, some of the key life values relate to peaceful resolution of conflicts, employment of sound judgment and principles at critical moments and integrity, conviction and commitment to do what is right (Makanda n.d.).

On national identity, learners are expected to exhibit a Zimbabwean identity in every respect of their life, a manifestation of patriotism, a recognition of and respect for national symbols, and voluntarily engagement in participatory citizenship. However, while these are genuine qualities expected of any citizen in any nation, currently in Zimbabwe participatory engagement in political activities that are critical of the ruling party (ZANU-PF) is generally punishable. This discourages citizens from engaging in these same activities that are suggested here. It appears that only activities that are supportive of the ruling party are acceptable. The process of building consciousness and patriotism through citizenship education is also viewed as only being possible through drawing on *hunhu/Ubuntu* (see expected qualities of *hunhu/Ubuntu* as described above). Furthermore, learners should be grounded in their culture, show respect for life, diversity, environment, property, laws, and the dignity of labor, and have a clear identity, confidence, assertiveness, and be enterprising with reference to opportunities offered by new knowledge, technologies, and circumstance. Again, the weakness of the current curriculum is that some of the above ideas are missing. These views are perhaps best summarized in the document *Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education: The New Curriculum Framework* (Chabikwa n.d.) which outlines the curriculum aims as being to promote and cherish

the Zimbabwean identity, prepare learners for life, and work in a largely agro-based economy and an increasingly globalized and competitive environment, foster life-long learning in line with the opportunities and challenges of the knowledge society, prepare learners for participatory citizenship, peace, and sustainable development, and to prepare and orient learners for participation, leadership, and voluntary service. However, while the aims set out in the document are appropriate, wide ranging, and democratic for civics and citizenship education, the actual lived political environment in the country makes it unlikely that these would be achieved since they may only be enacted in a much narrower way. The narrow enactment of these aims is because the ruling party often enforces conformity to its political wishes which are different from the stated aims.

The introduction of the National Pledge in primary and secondary schools in 2016 was, again, one of the responses to the Presidential Commission Report. The pledge was designed to encourage a patriotic work ethic among students and is intended to uphold honesty and hard work, while affirming freedom, justice, and equality as national values. These are regarded as fundamental features of citizenship education meant to equip students with basic rights, values, duties, and responsibilities. Students are expected to sing the pledge like a national anthem at school assemblies pledging their respects and acknowledgments of various national symbols (the flag, fallen national heroes, natural resources, traditional cultures, etc.) and qualities associated with good citizenship (Ndhlovu 2016).

The content of the pledge is, however, currently the subject of religious and civic controversy. Opponents to the pledge (parents, church leaders and others), as it is presently constituted, say that debate must have preceded the pledge. There was no public debate about what should make up the pledge. By citing the phrase “*Almighty God*” at its introductory stage, the pledge is viewed like a prayer which elevates secular symbols such as the national flag and deceased liberation war heroes, scenarios which opponents to the pledge equate to idolatry and ancestral worship rather than to God. Using the phrase “*Almighty God*” is tantamount to giving respect to idols (Ndhlovu 2016). Implementing the pledge requires an oath from minors (school children) which is tantamount to forcing someone to act against their will (indoctrination). Furthermore, presenting the pledge as a compulsory requirement is a violation of the liberty of conscience, a value provided for by Zimbabwe’s Constitution. Given that its content was not consulted upon and is missing a plural dimension, the current pledge is viewed as falling short of its “national” adjective (Ndhlovu 2016). Government, on the other hand, argues that the pledge was reached upon consultatively since the principle and much of its content are drawn from a nationally ratified constitution, technically developed and endorsed by elected representatives at cabinet level.

At tertiary institutions in the country (i.e., the Ministry of Higher Education’s teacher education colleges, universities and other tertiary levels) a new compulsory subject, the National and Strategic Studies (NASS) program was introduced in 2004, also as a response to the 1999 Presidential Commission Report. This was meant to accomplish the goal of *producing socially relevant individuals with desirable values and attitudes* (*italics: author’s emphasis*) and who would be effective role models for

future generations (Moyo et al. 2011; Zvobgo 1986). In addition, another program, Peace, Leadership and Conflict Transformation also covers issues of civics and citizenship education. However, as Mapetere et al. (2011) point out, the introduction of NASS has also been surrounded by controversy. Some have viewed NASS as unnecessary and an attempt to indoctrinate the youth (student teachers) along the same lines as the infamous National Youth Service introduced in Zimbabwe at the peak of the socio-political instability in the country (Nyakudya 2007; Mashingaidze 2009; Ranger 2004). Other observers have viewed NASS as another attempt to advance the political agendas of people in power. On the other hand, those who support the program see its aim as “to produce skilled personnel with a sense of patriotism . . .” (The Herald 11 May 2016). Yet other commentators argue that there is no education that is apolitical; all education is designed to achieve certain political and economic ends and so are these programs in Zimbabwe (Maravanyika and Ndawi 2011; Apple 1990 and Jansen 1991). Such a lack of consensus on the relevance of the subject is likely to manifest itself among the implementers (teachers) and the consumers (students) of the NASS curriculum as well as other stakeholders outside the education system.

Concluding Summary

This chapter has discussed the theoretical, historical, and current position of civics and citizenship education in Zimbabwe’s primary, secondary, and higher education levels. The general impression from the reviewed literature on the current position of civics and citizenship education in the country provides a diversity of opinions on this subject. The discussion demonstrates a lack of consensus on the relevance of the subject to the country. This is a result of perceived political interferences in what exactly should be involved in civics and citizenship education. For instance, in a study on Zimbabwean teachers’ and students’ views on the subject, Sigauke (2011b) found out that teachers consistently expressed fears that teaching about some issues could lead to victimization especially if these issues were seen as being politically sensitive and controversial. For students in that study, it seems that taking part in political activities does not constitute a measure of democracy or good citizenship. Students do not regard discussions of political issues and following political discussions in the media as indicators of good citizenship. Students have a low trust in political institutions of the country, perhaps a result of their experiences of political conflicts in the country (Sigauke 2012). Unless current political tensions change, this may have negative implications for future levels of political action by young people in the country indicating the beginning of future political apathy. As Print (2007) points out, political apathy arises where citizens are distrustful of politicians, where they are skeptical of government institutions, and where they are disillusioned about how democratic processes work. Introducing a citizenship education program in such an environment seriously undermines its possibilities.

In the case of the NASS program noted in this chapter, research points to a significant level of antipathy towards the program in teacher training colleges where

the top to bottom approach makes it difficult for some NASS lecturers and students to identify with the program. Researchers have suggested a number of improvements that can be made to and for the success of the program (see Mapetere et al. 2011). At the secondary school level, Magudu (2012) notes that civics and citizenship education in Zimbabwe is generally characterized by dichotomies and what Sears and Hughes (2006) describe as a tension between education and indoctrination in both discourse and practice. The need to educate the youth to be informed and responsible is recognized but a narrow conception of citizenship is enacted. The prevailing socio-political environment in the country does not allow for the proper implementation of the citizenship education curriculum. What passes for citizenship education in the country today is inconsistent with the principles of experiential and service learning. Indeed, some of the features of indoctrination are manifest, for example, a narrow or “jingoistic view” of nation building (Magudu 2012: 187), demonization of opponents and gross over-simplification of both problems and solutions (Sears and Hughes 2006). Consequently, the legitimacy of the discourse in the school curriculum has been compromised. Clearly, there is a need for a de-politicized approach where citizenship education is not seen as a political ploy but where stakeholders can begin to freely appreciate its relevance. In view of all of the above observations, it is recommended that, if the goal of citizenship education in Zimbabwe is to be realized, there is need for fundamental changes in the way the subject is conceptualized, perceived, and taught. Also, there is need for the involvement all stakeholders – the curriculum planners, teachers, and the community to be engaged in developing a model for citizenship education that all conceive to be the best for the country, Zimbabwe.

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Religious Citizenship in Schools in England and Wales: Responses to Growing Diversity **18**

Peter J. Hemming and Elena Hailwood

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Abstract

This chapter explores the concept of “religious citizenship,” in the context of state-funded schooling in England and Wales, and against a backdrop of growing religious pluralism. The chapter considers the role of various educational actors in determining the extent to which schools recognize and accommodate diversity of religion and belief. With reference to the existing research literature, religious citizenship is explored through various dimensions of education, including faith schools and pupil admissions, religious education and festivals, collective worship and prayer, and pupil values and interfaith relations. In so doing, the chapter highlights an important dimension of the informal citizenship education that state-funded schools in England and Wales provide to pupils on the basis of their religion and belief.

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Introduction

In recent years, diversity of religion and belief has been increasingly recognized within social and public policy debates as distinct from “race” and ethnicity and as worthy of attention in its own right. England and Wales have become progressively more diverse in religious terms since the turn of the twenty-first century. The two nations share a decennial Census, meaning that religious demographic trends in England and Wales are typically considered together. Data from the Office for National Statistics (2015) show that while the number of people identifying as Christian fell significantly in the period between the 2001 and 2011 Census, there were marked increases in respondents with no religion and smaller but nevertheless notable increases in those from Muslim, Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, and other minority faith backgrounds (see Table 1).

Bouma and Ling (2009: 509) argue that: “the theme of the early twenty-first century appears to be religious diversity and its consequences for social order and public life.” Religious pluralism may present a number of issues and challenges for societies to grapple with, such as how the state can adequately accommodate for diverse religious needs within public service provision. Machacek (2003) argues that the biggest challenges are likely to arise in fields such as education, where participation is relatively compulsory for religious and nonreligious groups (except in cases where parents are legally permitted to educate their children through home schooling). Many schools in England and Wales now find they are catering for a greater diversity of religion and belief amongst their pupils than was previously the case. As such, questions about how these groups should be provided for in schools have become more common (e.g., see Pring 2018; Wilson 2015). Many of the judgments

Table 1 Census figures, Office for National Statistics

	2001 (%)	2011 (%)
Christian	71.8	59.3
No religion	14.8	25.1
Muslim	3.0	4.8
Hindu	1.1	1.5
Sikh	0.6	0.8
Jewish	0.5	0.5
Buddhist	0.3	0.4
Other religions^a	0.3	0.4
Not stated	7.7	7.2

^aIn the 2011 Census, the most numerous affiliations in the “Other Religion” category included Pagan, Spiritualist, Mixed Religion, Jain, and Ravidassia

made in these cases have the issue of competing rights and interests at their core and cannot be fully understood without reference to citizenship.

Contemporary conceptions of citizenship have moved beyond notions of fixed rights and responsibilities bestowed upon citizens by law (e.g., Marshall (1950 [1973])). Instead, scholars have pointed to the fluid and contested nature of citizenship, and the on-going power struggles for rights and inclusions that it entails (Ho 2006). Similarly, citizenship is increasingly understood as encompassing issues of identity, belonging and inequalities, and thus possessing a social/cultural dimension, as well as a political one (Painter and Philo 1995). In this light, citizenship is viewed as a complex process rather than a fixed given, encompassing both politics and culture, and constituted through everyday practices and discourses (Staeheli et al. 2012).

The concept of citizenship has traditionally been associated with “race” and ethnicity (e.g., Kymlicka 2007), but researchers have also identified a number of other strands of difference through which processes of citizenship play out, including, for example, gender and sexuality (e.g., Bell 1995; Chouinard 2004). In the case of religion, Hemming (2015) has drawn on the work of Joppke (2007) and his three dimensions of citizenship – status, rights, and identity – to interrogate the relationship between religion and the everyday practices and discourses of citizenship. Hemming (2015: 27) defines “religious citizenship” as: “the role of religion in devising criteria for access to state or community membership, the political rights and responsibilities attributed to particular religious groups within that membership, and the religious aspects of collective social/cultural identity that influence belonging.”

In the context of education, religious citizenship is therefore concerned with religious influences on *access* to schooling, the ways in which particular religious and nonreligious groups are *recognized* and *accommodated* within schools, and the implications for pupil/parent identity and *belonging*. Fundamentally at stake here is social justice and the extent to which educational arrangements privilege certain groups over others. Evaluating these arrangements requires consideration of what Kymlicka (2007) refers to as “the politics of identity” and “the politics of interest.” Are there inequities in the extent to which different religious and nonreligious identities are recognized through the types of schooling offered and the contents of the curriculum? How far are the interests of different groups accommodated in education through provision for diverse religious and nonreligious needs? What are the effects of such arrangements on feelings of identity and belonging to school, community, and society for members of different groups?

In order to investigate these issues, the chapter focuses on state-funded education in England and Wales. Education is a devolved matter in the UK, with separate systems operating in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. However, the role of religion in schooling in England and Wales has always been quite similar, reflecting the close links between the two education systems prior to Welsh devolution in 1999. Both systems include nondenominational schools and schools with a religious character, which make up 34% of all state-maintained schools in England and 16% in Wales (Long and Bolton 2017; Welsh Government 2018). The chapter

considers aspects of education such as faith schools and pupil admissions, religious education (RE) and festivals, collective worship and prayer, and pupil values and interfaith relations with reference to the different roles played by various educational actors. Collectively these aspects constitute an important dimension of the informal citizenship education that state-funded schools in England and Wales provide to pupils on the basis of their religion and belief.

Access: Faith Schools and Pupil Admissions

The importance of religion for access to education in England and Wales is apparent in the case of schools with a religious character. Faith schools, as they are otherwise known, are significant for religious citizenship because they attempt to recognize and accommodate religious groups within the schooling system and thus potentially encourage a wider sense of cultural belonging (Power and Taylor 2013). The existence of faith schools in Britain is rooted in the historical involvement of the Christian churches in the development of universal education and the “dual system” of state-led and church-led schooling in the late nineteenth century (Baumfield 2003). After 1944, schools previously funded by religious bodies entered into a formal partnership with the state, ensuring state-funded Anglican, Roman Catholic, and a smaller number of Methodist and Jewish schools (Jackson 2001).

There are now a number of different types of state-maintained faith schools in England and Wales, including voluntary controlled, voluntary aided, and foundation schools. Voluntary controlled and foundation faith schools are fully funded by the state, but maintain a distinctive religious ethos, with the latter enjoying greater autonomy in relation to school governance. Voluntary aided faith schools are state-funded but are expected to raise 10% of their own capital funding costs. They maintain a distinctive religious ethos and enjoy greater autonomy in relation to school governance, pupil admissions, and RE than voluntary controlled faith schools. After 1999, applications to establish voluntary aided faith schools from minority religious groups began to be accepted, and there are now a small number of state-maintained Islamic, Sikh, Hindu, Greek Orthodox, and Seventh Day Adventist schools (among others) in England (Long and Bolton 2017). The rolling out of academies and free schools in England over the last decade or so has created the potential for more schools with a religious character. Academies are independent, state-funded schools, which are run by charitable trusts and sometimes sponsored by other groups (including faith groups). Free schools are independent, state-funded schools, which have been set up by parents, teachers, or other organizations (including faith groups) to meet local demand. Both types of school receive their funding directly from central government, rather than a local education authority. Faith-based academies and free schools maintain a distinctive religious ethos and enjoy similar privileges to voluntary aided faith schools regarding pupil admissions and RE.

The above arrangements have implications for the level of access that different groups are granted to faith-based education. Firstly, the religious profile of schools does not match that of the population, as represented in Table 1. In England, 99% of

all state-maintained schools with a religious character are Christian-based and in Wales this figure is 100% (Long and Bolton 2017; Welsh Government 2018). However, the Census figures for 2011 highlight that only 87% of those with a religion describe themselves as Christian with 13% identifying with a non-Christian faith (Office for National Statistics 2015). As such, schools with a minority religious character are significantly under-represented. Furthermore, 25% of the population have no religion, but there is no dedicated category of schools to cater for this group. Nondenominational schools are not technically secular (see section on “[Accommodation: Collective Worship and Prayer](#)”) and typically cater for pupils from a range of backgrounds.

Secondly, levels of access to faith-based schools are particularly dependent on geography. As previously stated, 34% of all state-maintained schools in England possess a religious character, but this figure is only 16% in Wales (Long and Bolton 2017; Welsh Government 2018). Church schools are distributed in certain ways due to historical factors, such as the large numbers of Anglican schools in rural villages, reflecting the church’s traditional mission to provide education for the whole parish (Louden 2012) or the concentration of Roman Catholic schools in North West England, due to the influx of Irish migrants to the region in past times (Flint 2007). The small numbers of state-maintained schools with a minority religious character, such as Islam, are located in urban, metropolitan areas and hence only accessible to families living nearby. Such arrangements reflect an unequal landscape of schooling, where certain groups have more access to faith-based education than others.

Pupil admissions procedures can also play a role in access to faith-based education. Nondenominational schools cannot select pupils on the basis of faith, but some schools with a religious character are permitted to do so. According to Allen and West (2009, 2011), on aggregate, faith schools contribute to higher levels of ethnic and religious segregation in the education system and disproportionately cater for more affluent families. However, the picture is more complex than these patterns suggest. The majority of local authorities prevent their voluntary controlled faith schools from including religion on their admissions criteria, and some faith-based academies are obliged to take a quota of pupils from other religious backgrounds (Fair Admissions Campaign 2013). In the case of other types of faith school, under-subscription may mean that admissions criteria do not come into operation, or schools may choose not to select by faith in order to cater for a wider cross-section of the community (e.g., Hemming 2018a). School admissions policies can, therefore, reinforce the existing inequities that different groups experience in access to education, but there are also instances where they can mitigate such inequities.

It is important to note that parents are not passive recipients of these processes. Research has shown that some middle-class Christian parents are adept at utilizing strategies to gain admission to high performing church schools, through what has been referred to as the “cashing in” of their faith-based resources (Butler and Hamnett 2012). This may involve reaffirming a latent religious affiliation or recommencing church attendance at convenient moments, in order to obtain school admissions references from church leaders. However, there is also evidence of other

groups negotiating the school system to their benefit, despite starting from a less privileged position in terms of access to faith-specific schooling provision. Muslim parents often favor church schools over nondenominational schools, where places are available, for the value they attach to religion (Scourfield et al. 2013). Similarly, there is a range of reasons why nonreligious families might choose to send their children to a school with a religious character where the option exists, including to take advantage of local or high quality provision (Hemming and Roberts 2018).

The examples above further emphasize the contested nature of religious citizenship in the context of access to schooling. Although the education systems in England and Wales tend to privilege Christian groups, through access to disproportionately high numbers of church schools with a wider geographical distribution than other faith schools, the situation is continuously negotiated and contested by a range of actors. Faith schools themselves may reinforce or mitigate these inequities in access through exclusive or inclusive use of their religious-based admissions criteria. Parents from different religious and nonreligious groups may also negotiate admissions requirements for their own ends, in order to try and gain access to more desirable schools. Religious citizenship in education can therefore be understood as a fluid and dynamic process involving a range of actors, rather than a fixed and static contract between citizen and state.

Recognition: Religious Education and Festivals

RE is an important vehicle through which schools can recognize diversity of religion and belief. In its current form, RE has been part of the curriculum in England and Wales since 1988, although syllabus content is set at the local, rather than national level. The subject has gradually evolved since 1944 from an approach based on evangelistic Christian instruction to education about world religions (Conroy et al. 2013; Copley 1997). RE in nondenominational schools is expected to reflect the predominantly Christian nature of the religious traditions in Britain but also include the beliefs and practices of other principal religions represented nationally (National Association of Teachers of Religious Education 2017). Faith schools may teach RE in line with the beliefs of their religious denomination. However, voluntary controlled and foundation schools with a religious character usually follow the locally agreed syllabus. All parents have the right to withdraw their children from RE lessons, although this is rarely enacted in practice (Richardson et al. 2013).

The above arrangements have implications for the kind of RE experience received by pupils from different backgrounds. RE is widely viewed as important for citizenship, with the potential to develop interfaith understanding, promote common values, and tackle religious discrimination (Baumann 1996; Madge et al. 2014). Several research studies suggest that pupils value RE as an opportunity to hear about different religions and worldviews from an objective viewpoint and may feel more inspired to learn about their own faith or beliefs as a result (Francis and Robbins 2011; Jackson 2012; McKenna et al. 2009). However, pupils often ask for a

more diverse range of traditions to be taught in RE lessons, in schools both with and without a religious character (Jackson 2004; Revell 2007).

The opportunity to study a broad range of religious traditions is usually reflected in locally agreed RE syllabuses in England and Wales, but some researchers have expressed concern about the tokenistic coverage of non-Christian faiths (Nesbitt 2004). Many teachers lack confidence in delivering RE, often feeling they do not have adequate knowledge of different faiths (Revell 2007). Moreover, pupils from minority groups sometimes report that teachers do not accurately represent their religion in the classroom (Ipgrave 1999; Moulin 2011). The inclusion of nonreligious worldviews in RE has become increasingly common but is not yet as widespread as other religious traditions (Watson 2010). Pupils from different religious and nonreligious groups therefore experience differing levels of coverage of their particular religious tradition or worldview in RE lessons. This has implications for citizenship, in terms of whether or not particular groups feel recognized and accepted within the school and wider community, as well as the extent to which pupils are adequately prepared for life in a diverse, multifaith society.

Despite the above issues, parents and pupils can nevertheless become involved in contesting RE arrangements. The interests of nonreligious groups were recently given a boost by a legal judgment concerning the content of a new GCSE exam syllabus for 14- to 16-year-olds. The ruling from the High Court stated that RE provision should include teaching about nonreligious worldviews, such as humanism (*R (Fox) v Secretary of State for Education* [2015]). Similarly, pupils from minority faith groups can also demonstrate resistance to RE teaching. Wilson (2015) conducted research in a Church of England primary school with a diverse pupil intake. He found that although learning about Christianity in RE was generally acceptable to Muslim pupils, in some circumstances, pupils adopted forms of resistant behavior when they were worried about contravening their own faith, including fidgeting, not listening, and saying “*stafallah*” (meaning “Allah forgive me”).

The celebration of religious festivals could also be understood as a type of RE. Christmas, Easter, and Harvest Festival are generally marked with activities and celebrations in schools in England and Wales (Nesbitt 2004). The ability of minority pupils to participate in these Christian celebrations often depends on whether they are perceived as religious or cultural, such as if they are held in a church or school hall (Wilson 2015). Many schools also choose to mark minority religious festivals such as Eid, Diwali, Hanukkah, and Vaisakhi (Keddie 2014; Nesbitt 2004). It is widely viewed as appropriate to recognize non-Christian festivals in an educational sense, during assemblies or classroom discussions (e.g., Catholic Education Service 2008). Some schools go further and hold school-wide celebrations by emphasizing the cultural aspects of festivals, such as telling stories and sharing food, which can be popular with minority religious families. However, this approach can also result in a backlash from some Christian parents, particularly in church schools, who may view it as inappropriate (Hemming 2015).

In both the teaching of RE and the marking of religious festivals in schools, Christianity enjoys a certain amount of privilege, even if this is sometimes

understood in a cultural rather than a religious sense. Schools often find themselves mediating between the desires of minority groups for more recognition of non-Christian beliefs and festivals and the concerns of other parents that Christianity should maintain its primacy in the curriculum and for school celebrations. This typically involves attempting to strike an appropriate balance between the various sets of interests represented among school stakeholders. At the root of these issues is the struggle for proper recognition of different religious and nonreligious groups, a key component of religious citizenship. The active role that schools, parents, and pupils play in this process further underlines the fluid and contested nature of religious citizenship in the context of education.

Accommodation: Collective Worship and Prayer

All schools in England and Wales are required to “promote the spiritual, moral, social, and cultural development of pupils” (Estyn 2017; Ofsted 2017). However, accommodating for the spiritual and cultural needs of minority groups sometimes requires changes to existing provision in schools. One example of this is the daily act of collective worship, which all schools are expected to provide. This should be of a “wholly or mainly Christian character,” unless the school has applied for a special exemption (Copley 2000). More commonly known as “assemblies,” such events involve whole-school gatherings of pupils and teaching staff and can be important for developing a shared identity within a school community (Hemming 2015). Research indicates that both pupils and teachers largely support and enjoy the collective, celebratory, and moral aspects of assemblies, such as the presentation of awards for good work or the sharing of stories that promote desired behaviors (Gill 2000a). However, teachers in schools with multifaith pupil intakes often view the religious components of assemblies as more contentious (Gill 2000b).

The expectation that assemblies will include Christian worship presents a number of difficulties for the accommodation of non-Christian pupils, especially as parents rarely enact the right to withdraw their children (Richardson et al. 2013). Consequently, many nondenominational schools no longer comply with the law, although Christian-based collective worship is still commonly practiced in church schools (Smith and Smith 2013). The inclusion of stories and other material from different religious and nonreligious traditions are popular ways of approaching assemblies in diverse contexts (Baumann 1996; Gill 2000b). Nondenominational schools tend to emphasize common values and virtues rather than explicitly Christian messages (Mogra 2017; Smith and Smith 2013). It is possible, therefore, for schools to balance the requirements for collective worship set by the state, which predominantly favor Christianity, with the spiritual and cultural needs of pupils from other religious and nonreligious groups.

In contexts where Christian worship does feature in assembly proceedings, for example, in church schools, problems can arise (Smith 2005). Parents from non-Christian backgrounds sometimes express concerns about perceived indoctrination (Weller et al. 2015), and pupils may find Christian worship alienating or

difficult to engage with (Kay and Francis 2001; Scourfield et al. 2013). Such instances may lead pupils to adopt creative responses, such as changing the words of Christian prayers in their head to ensure they are consistent with their own faith (Hemming 2015). While schools sometimes make provisions for minority religious pupils, such as allowing them to sit quietly during Christian prayers, nonreligious pupils do not always receive the same recognition, which can be uncomfortable if they find prayer meaningless or insincere (Fancourt 2017; Hemming 2018b). Prayers that express common values, avoid reference to a specific God, and/or provide opportunities for nonreligious reflection are likely to be more accessible for pupils from diverse backgrounds (Wilson 2015). However, schools will need to balance the interests of different groups, as such approaches may lead to concerns from Christian parents about the perceived dilution of Christian worship (Hemming 2015; Nesbitt 2004).

There are a number of other spiritual and cultural needs that schools typically try to accommodate, including prayer, dietary, and dress needs. Taking prayer as a case study, research indicates that while many schools aim to provide for these needs where possible, some could be more proactive in offering space and/or facilities such as prayer mats and washing areas (Conroy et al. 2013). For example, Hemming (2015) found that Muslim pupils in one multifaith primary school did not always feel comfortable to pray during Ramadan because they did not have appropriate ways of storing their prayer mats to ensure they remained clean. Berkley and Vij (2008) also note the importance of accommodating the spiritual needs of nonreligious pupils, who may benefit from the provision of spaces dedicated to reflection or meditation.

Despite its importance, providing for diverse prayer needs is not always easy. In some circumstances, schools with a large proportion of pupils from a minority faith may not have enough space to provide facilities for all to pray. Moreover, some schools with a religious character do not feel it is in keeping with their ethos to designate prayer facilities for other faiths (Wilson 2015). In such circumstances, pupils sometimes adapt their prayer routines to fit around school hours. For example, Muslim pupils may not strictly adhere to all five of their daily prayers or may “catch up” when they return home (Wilson 2015). Hemming (2015) found that pupils may even resort to praying in toilet cubicles due to the lack of provision made for prayer space in schools. Such examples highlight the creative ways that pupils attempt to negotiate school arrangements to provide for their spiritual and cultural needs.

This section has highlighted the contradictory nature of educational policy in relation to religion and belief and some of the implications of these tensions for religious citizenship. While one strand of policy requires schools to provide for pupils’ spiritual, moral, social, and cultural development, regardless of background, another demands daily assemblies that privilege Christian worship. These tensions are further exacerbated by spatial and temporal constraints that impede the ability of schools to adequately provide for issues such as minority religious prayer needs. As a result, schools are not always able to fully accommodate the religious and nonreligious needs of pupils to the satisfaction of all concerned, leading to unequal experiences for different groups. In these circumstances, pupils may be compelled to employ their own creative responses to the problematic situations they are presented

with, further highlighting the role of multiple actors in the contestation and negotiation of religious citizenship.

Belonging: Pupil Values and Interfaith Relations

Another aspect of religious citizenship in education is the extent to which schools create an environment where pupils from different religious and nonreligious backgrounds feel a sense of belonging as valued members of the school community and interact harmoniously as a result. The legal and curriculum frameworks in England and Wales are generally supportive of this aim, with the school inspectorates assessing schools on issues such as valuing diversity, promoting respect and tolerance, and preventing bullying and discrimination (Estyn 2017; Ofsted 2017). In England, schools are expected to promote “Fundamental British Values” including “mutual respect for and tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs and those without faith” (Ofsted 2017: 40). The nonstatutory subject of Personal, Social, Health and Economics Education (PSHE) or Personal and Social Education (PSE) as it is known in Wales also plays a key role, covering topics such as the celebration of difference (e.g., Welsh Assembly Government 2008).

Despite the above policy frameworks, research indicates that children from both religious and nonreligious backgrounds often fear being negatively stereotyped or experience bullying in school on the basis of their beliefs (e.g., Moulin 2015). A survey conducted by Weller et al. (2015) found that a majority of survey respondents from almost all religious groups experienced some unfair treatment from other pupils at school because of their religion or worldview. Examples included name-calling, social exclusion, and ridiculing beliefs. Some studies have found that pupils from nonreligious backgrounds can be less tolerant of religious perspectives (McKenna et al. 2009), but others have shown that nonreligious pupils can also be subjected to prejudice from both teachers and peers (Madge et al. 2014). Such experiences may contribute to informal religious segregation, given that friendship groups in diverse schools are often relatively homogenous (Smith 2005).

One of the ways that schools can combat such experiences is through the values they foster among pupils. There are variations in the extent to which schools in England and Wales explicitly recognize diversity of religion and belief, but most appear to encourage a climate of tolerance and respect for difference (e.g., Hemming 2015; Keddle 2014). There is also plenty of evidence in the research literature to suggest that schools with a religious character actively educate pupils to respect religious difference (Ipgrave 2016; Wilson 2015). However, there can be limits to the effectiveness of schools in their promotion of these citizenship values. Despite its “ethos of tolerance,” the school in Welply’s (2017) research inadvertently reinforced division between pupils of different religious backgrounds due to a lack of opportunities for pupils to discuss, explore, and understand their differences and commonalities.

The above example points to the need for schools to do more than simply promote respectful attitudes and tolerance among pupils, instead creating the conditions for

positive interfaith encounters and the prevention of bullying. Research shows that many young people view schools as playing an important role in facilitating healthy interfaith relations (Madge et al. 2014), but a significant proportion believe their schools could do more to help different groups get along well together (Conroy et al. 2013). The literature documents a number of approaches to building good interfaith relations in schools, including creating a climate where religious-based bullying is not accepted and encouraging open discussion about different perspectives and common values in RE and PSE/PSHE (Hemming 2015; Jackson 2004).

Schools with a less diverse pupil intake may have a more difficult task in facilitating interfaith encounters. This is true of many schools, but particularly those faith schools with religiously homogenous pupil intakes (Berkley and Vij 2008). Initiatives that build links between schools with different religious demographics, such as school “pairing” and joint activities, events, and visits, represent one approach to this dilemma (e.g., Breen 2009). Technology can also be harnessed for this purpose, by setting up email, instant messaging, and video conferencing exchanges with other schools (e.g., Iprgrave 2009). If well managed, programs like these have the potential to facilitate an increased understanding of others’ perspectives. They may also help to develop a more inclusive type of religious citizenship where pupils from all religious and nonreligious backgrounds feel a sense of belonging to the school and the wider community. Such developments would align well with wider social and public policy agendas in the UK that emphasize the need for stronger interfaith relations and understanding among citizens and that view schools as playing an important role in achieving this (e.g., Casey 2016).

Conclusion

This chapter has explored the issue of religious citizenship in schools in England and Wales through a focus on faith schools and pupil admissions, RE and festivals, collective worship and prayer, and pupil values and interfaith relations. Collectively these aspects constitute an important dimension of the informal citizenship education that schools provide to pupils on the basis of their religion and belief. By exploring the existing literature on these topics, a number of crosscutting themes have emerged that shed further light on religious citizenship in the context of education. They underline the involvement of multiple actors in the fluid and contested nature of religious citizenship, as well as its constitution through a range of everyday practices and discourses.

The influence of the state on religious citizenship, through educational policies and frameworks, is a central theme. There is a clear tension evident between respecting Britain’s religious heritage through the privileging of Christianity and ensuring fair treatment for minority religious and nonreligious groups through a more neutral approach. This is reflected in the over-representation of Christian faith schools and the prioritizing of Christianity in RE and collective worship on the one hand, but the requirement to provide for the spiritual and cultural development of all pupils and the role of PSE/PSHE and the inspectorates in valuing diversity of

religion and belief on the other. Schools are then left to find an appropriate path through these competing policy requirements.

The role of the school is therefore highly significant for the structuring of religious citizenship. The decisions that faith schools make regarding pupil admissions can reinforce or mitigate inequities in *access* to education. The religious festivals that a school chooses to mark, and the way it chooses to mark them, can have an impact on which groups feel *recognized*. The arrangements that schools make for pupils' prayer and reflection, and for collective worship, can determine how well Christian, nonreligious, and pupils from minority faith backgrounds are included and *accommodated*. The approach that schools take to promoting cohesive values and facilitating meaningful encounters between different groups can influence the extent to which pupils feel they *belong* to the school and wider community. School policies and practices therefore have real implications for the educational opportunities and experiences of different religious and nonreligious groups.

Schools and the state are not, however, the only agents involved in influencing religious citizenship. Parents from minority groups are active in challenging inequities by making use of church schools for their own ends, lobbying for more diverse representation of religious festivals and nonreligious traditions in RE, or pushing for accommodations in collective worship and provision for pupils' cultural and spiritual needs. However, other groups of parents use their resources to try and maintain Christian privilege, by ensuring access to high performing church schools or questioning the celebration of non-Christian festivals and the "dilution" of Christian worship in assemblies. Pupils also negotiate school arrangements through subtle resistance in RE and collective worship, or creative responses to issues arising with prayer. Pupils can also undermine school attempts to promote respect and tolerance by participating in religious-based bullying. The challenge for schools is to find a way to balance the needs and interests of parents and pupils from these different groups, thus contributing to more inclusive forms of religious citizenship.

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Filipino Teachers' Identity: Framed by Community Engagements, Challenges for Citizenship Education

19

Stephen Redillas

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Abstract

This chapter explores how contemporary Filipino teachers' mandated and voluntary community engagements contribute to the construction of their social identity while positioning their role towards a culturally sensitive citizenship education. The chapter first interrogates the state of citizenship education in the

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Philippine context with particular attention to the tensions between global and national citizenship education. It then articulates how Filipino teachers' numerous and continuous civil participation may contribute to the construction of their social identity. The discussion then focuses on how identity, particularly the manner by which this identity is constructed, influences how they deliver citizenship education both in school and in their respective communities. This analysis of teachers' community engagements draws from data collected in my earlier study entitled "*Exploring Filipino teachers' identity and community engagements*" (Redillas, *Exploring Filipino teachers' identity and community engagements*. Unpublished dissertation, University of South Australia, Adelaide, 2017). Through cursory historical analysis of how teachers' community engagements are implicated in a colonization agenda, this chapter establishes how engrained teachers' community engagements are in the Philippine culture. The chapter proceeds to examine how teachers' continuing community engagements can position them as critical agents for citizenship education in Philippine society and provide possible links between global and national citizenship education. The chapter concludes by retracing the main arguments of how Filipino teachers' community engagements facilitate the construction of their social identity and how the experiences drawn from these civic participations contribute to organizing a culturally sensitive citizenship education.

Keywords

Teachers' community engagements · Identity · Citizenship education · Schools and communities

Introduction

While the majority of existing studies point to how curriculum and policy statements are structured as the centerpiece of ongoing debates surrounding citizenship education, the roles that Filipino teachers play in this discourse remains underexplored. Specifically, the possible influence of the more than 800,000 cadre of Filipino private and public-school teachers, strategically dispersed in almost every community of the Philippine archipelago, cannot be underestimated. While the connection between teachers and their communities is interrogated further in the sections below, it is worth highlighting from the outset. One of the participants in the authors' empirical research, Crisanto (public school teacher from National Capital Region), offered the following reflection on the ramification of a life lived in the very community where they teach

If you live in the very same community where you teach, all the children from [the] school see what you do most of the time, they can observe what you do even at home—for example, it is unacceptable for teachers to be seen drinking in [a] public place or loitering around inebriated.

Supported by Localization Act, a landmark legislation prioritizing the assignment of teachers to schools where they are *bona fide* residents (*Republic Act No. 8190*), teachers in the Philippines are prioritized to teach in the very community they spend their day-to-day life. The repercussions of this law to how teachers' identity is constructed potentially extends to how they formally (in the classroom) and informally (in their respective communities) deliver citizenship education. Hence, the prevalence and persistence of Filipino teachers' community engagements that help "cultivate the reality of citizenship as an immersion [or] ways of being in the world" (DesRoches 2015, p. 548) can also help foster teachers' capacity to creatively create and re-create meaning in the world in the development of a critically informed and actively engaged citizenry.

The aim of this chapter is to make and examine the link between community engagements and teachers' social identity in order (1) to understand how Filipino teachers may positively contribute in the ongoing discourse on citizenship education and (2) how they can possibly contribute in the organization and delivery of a more critical, culturally sensitive yet global, citizenship education. The central argument of this chapter is that *the peculiar manner by which Filipino teachers engage their respective communities – enforced by various legislations, strengthened through cultural expectations and conditioned by historically exigencies – locates Filipino teachers in the vortex of a critical praxis of citizenship education.*

Pursuing the aim of this chapter involves two levels of analysis: historical and current analysis. In the contemporary analysis section, I utilize a case study of current Filipino teachers' identities to examine and illustrate the arguments advanced in this chapter. Specifically, the chapter is divided into six sections. In the first section, I investigate the Philippine context of citizenship education. In the second, teachers' agency in linking national citizenship education and global citizenship education is established. This second section is further elaborated by two subsections which, respectively, explore the contribution of School-Community linkage to Filipino teachers' identity formation and analyze how Spanish and American colonizers' mandates for teachers to engage the community contribute to a distinct notion of citizenship education. In the third section, I present the modalities of contemporary Filipino teachers' civic participations. This section provides the materials for the analysis in the subsequent two sections. In the fourth section, I examine how mandatory engagements are linked first to identity construction and second to citizenship education. In the fifth section, the same links are explored through teachers' voluntary engagements in religious/cultural activities and political exercises. The final section summarizes the key arguments and relates them to the main goal of this chapter.

The Philippine Context of Citizenship Education

In recent years, citizenship education in the Philippines has been generally and officially dominated by the desire to create global citizens. However, notwithstanding the perception that the future of an individual state lies in strengthened

collaboration, shared resources, and deeper intercultural understanding to form a more global society, in the Philippines, education-based efforts around this project have not gained the expected traction (UNESCO GEM Report 2016). Nonetheless, efforts are not wanting in the pursuit of transforming Philippine society into a global community via education. This observation is evident in the aggressiveness through which the Philippine government pursued and ensured the passage of the widely debated “Enhanced Basic Education Act of 2013,” popularly known as K-12 basic education program. This law underscored the urgent and sustained aspiration for membership in a globalized community as a global citizen through education. Expectedly, education programs emanating from this law generally aim to nurture a global orientation among students (De Los Reyes 2013) by organizing curriculum and designing pedagogical strategies that help acquire requisite literacies for meaningful participation in an interconnected world. In other words, the intent of the said law is to educate Filipino students to be an “informed, engaged, and emphatic citizen” (UNESCO 2014, p. 11) by obtaining literacy towards meaningful collaboration and also acquiring skills for global competitiveness (Adarlo and Jackson 2017).

In the Philippine context, obtaining literacy for global citizenship through a pedagogical route (Global Citizenship Education or GCE) inevitably reveals untapped resources and exposes deficit conditions of Philippine education, particularly in areas of policy enactment, curriculum, infrastructure, teacher training, and professional development. Compounding these assessments are observations – relevant to Philippine social condition – that most GCE programs only offer a diluted concern for social justice (Davies 2017), thereby failing to “facilitate dialogue and deal with social justice issues essential to ameliorate social inequalities” (Adarlo and Jackson 2017, p. 207). Furthermore, GCE has also been critiqued for an inauthentic and uncritical understanding of how national identity and consciousness may be forged alongside the global (Maca and Morris 2015), and for this reason GCE has been assailed for offering ineffective strategies to significantly address the present travails of Philippine citizenry (De Los Reyes 2013). For example, as a country whose economy is impacted by remittances of overseas foreign workers (OFW), the present form of GCE in the country appears inadequate to sustainably address the causes of economic insecurity attendant to migration (Durant et al. 2013). Finally, the above assessments of how the present form of GCE in the Philippines is being deployed indicate a crucial lack in critical understanding of Filipino social and cultural values, particularly in its capacity to resist continuing colonial impositions (see Enriquez 1992).

These fundamental deficiencies in GCE programs in the Philippines raise the demand for a more critical understanding and culturally sustainable notion of GCE. One possible way to acquire such an understanding is to re-examine the significance of citizenship education at the national level (Goren and Yemini 2017) and to specifically illuminate the capacity of national citizenship to provide cultural, social, and historical context to any GCE projects. Translating this argument to the Philippine context means highlighting the need to include discourse on the following: education towards national identity (Maca and Morris 2015; Constantino 1970) and social rights for migrants and transnational identities (Faist 2009; San Juan

2001); preparation of skills for disaster resiliency (Alcantara 2013); strengthening regional (ASEAN) collaboration (Albia 2015); and critical appreciation of indigenous culture (Cornelio and de Castro 2016). I further argue that citizenship education in the Philippines also needs to provide a space for discourse on current social issues like extra judicial killings and human rights, labor contractualization and security of tenure, peace and conflicts, environmental concerns, economic sustainability, political dynasties, and conversion to federal form of government.

Notwithstanding the issues briefly set out here in regard to GCE, a culturally sensitive global citizenship education remains as the most viable and sustainable tool towards the creation of a global society. So, how can these tensions and debates be addressed sufficiently to render viable forms of citizenship education in the Philippines today? Exploring alternative routes (i.e., beside curriculum and policy enactment) to arrive at culturally sensitive GCE involves a two-step process: first to reposition the focus of discourse on citizenship education from the global to national stage, and second, to explore what I have termed the “teacher factor,” or the relations among Filipino teachers’ civic involvement, social identity, and citizenship education.

Filipino Teachers’ Immersive Community Engagements: Re-imagining the Significance of National Citizenship Education (NCE) as a Crucial Factor for Meaningful Global Citizenship Education

The definition of national citizenship education (NCE) utilized in this chapter is one aimed at developing students’ capacity for active “participation in civil society, community and/or political life, characterized by mutual respect and non-violence and in accordance with human rights and democracy” (Hoskins and Van Nijlen 2006, p. 6). This notion of citizenship education contains the veiled suggestion that the success of global citizenship education (GCE) hinges on a critical notion of NCE, where local values are first nurtured, identities are constructed and respected, and what constitutes a citizen of a nation is deeply interrogated and established. More importantly, foregrounding these important elements of NCE counters the perception that “national citizenship is now weakened [thereby] necessitating new forms of education” (Davies et al. 2005). By taking a step back or by repositioning discourse on citizenship education from the global to the national level, a space is created wherein Filipino teachers’ role in citizenship education may be examined critically. This argument anchors on the possible affordances of the manner by which Filipino teachers are expected to engage their respective communities as part of their professional identity. For instance, the project of becoming a global citizen might need to be deferred or, temporarily backgrounded. This strategy provides a space to interrogate Filipino national identity by examining how the colonial periods impacted our present identity construct. It is in this space, that Filipino teachers occupy a strategic position in their respective communities to facilitate this discourse both in school and in the community. In other words, Filipino teachers’ multiple and

chronic participation in civil society does not only contribute to the construction of their social identity but also has the potential to form their notion of citizenship, which in turn influences their pedagogical practices of citizenship education.

Filipino teachers are mandated to engage in and their respective communities as part of their professional and citizenship identity (Losada 2010; Redillas 2017). A provision in the Code of Ethics for Professional Teachers in the Philippines (PRC 2013) defines Filipino teachers' civic participation. The most significant part of the provision states that:

Every teacher is an intellectual leader in the community, especially in the *barangay* (village), and shall welcome the opportunity to provide such leadership when needed, to extend counselling services, as appropriate, and to actively be involved in matters affecting the welfare of the people.

This encompassing policy designating teachers as “intellectual leaders” in their respective communities indicates their social position therein, identifying possible engagements and suggesting roles they ought to play. Adding to the weight of this provision are various supporting legislations that are further strengthened by cultural expectations. In a research entitled “*Exploring Filipino teachers' identity and community engagements*” (Redillas 2017), I obtained modalities of teachers' year-round civic participation. One of the findings in that study indicates that regularity of exposure to community activities and the inevitability of these engagements contribute to Filipino teachers' dispositions to habitually engage in their respective communities. Furthermore, these legal cornerstones and the weight of cultural and social expectations vest Filipino teachers with power to dispense multiple roles in various fields – whether in cultural, political, religious, educational, and social domains. These legal and cultural foundations legitimize their community engagements and function as resources that can be converted into various forms of capital required in navigating the social world (Bourdieu 1986). However, the value of these resources fluctuates depending on the demographics of the field and agents upon which these capitals were utilized. For instance, the recognition of teachers as intellectual leaders increases or diminishes depending on the degree of diversity of the population in community (i.e., presence or absence of other professionals and the level of involvement in community affairs). Furthermore, the volatility of the political climate and the hierarchical structure of their religious affiliations determine their vulnerability to forms of violence, physical or symbolic (Redillas 2017). The above discussion illustrates the problematic nature of designating and identifying Filipino teachers as intellectual leaders in the community, not only in constructing a collective identity but also in constituting and delivering citizenship education.

On another level, the importance of examining Filipino teachers' identity formation and how they deliver citizenship education relates to the inquiry of whether, in the Philippine setting, teachers have practices that facilitate the reproduction of hegemonic structures or whether they function as transformative intellectuals

(Muff and Bekerman 2017). The relevance of reflecting on this inquiry necessarily draws attention not only to the potentiality of how Filipino teachers' community engagements facilitate the construction of their social identity but also on how their community participation set the condition for how they deliver formal citizenship lessons both in the classroom (see Abulon 2014; De Leon-Carillo 2007) and in their respective communities (Waterson and Moffa 2016; Redillas 2017). Since the literature just cited indicates that Filipino teachers' professional practice includes both school and community fields, these two fields, particularly the activities therein, are spaces wherein teachers' identity may be constructed. For this reason, it is imperative to explore how the community, the school, and teachers are interlinked.

The Contribution of School-Community Linkage to Filipino Teachers' Identity Formation

While the formal delivery of citizenship education transpires in school settings, particularly in classrooms, the sphere in which learning is applied is the community. For this reason, meaningful involvement in community activities requires that teachers are equipped with the skills and literacies necessary to critically navigate this social sphere. However, the potentiality of Filipino teachers' roles in citizenship education remains an unexplored area, as evidenced by the dearth of present literature and the lack of professional development programs for teachers on how to critically engage their respective communities. Notwithstanding this deficit, the conception that Filipino teachers naturally engage their respective communities has acquired a legitimacy as a taken for granted reality.

In the Philippine context, teachers' civic participation is not exclusive to the social and political activities of the community. On the contrary, they are involved in different (i.e., cultural, religious, economic) aspects of community life. As a consequence, Filipino teachers' ubiquitous presence and active participation in civic activities indicate that "schools are not simply part of the community [...] they actively constitute it" (Lindsay 2014, p. 117). This appreciation of the relations between school and community also furthers the long-standing claim that community is a reservoir of resources [for teachers, students, and general citizenry] vital for transformation in developing countries (Waterson and Moffa 2016). In other words, the cultural knowledge teachers acquire in their civic participation can provide them with insights on how to "guide classroom discussion for democratic citizenship education" (Schuitema et al. 2018) and on how to address the observed widespread civic disengagements among the youth (Print 2012).

This said, it is also important to note that Filipino teachers' community engagements are shaped by a colonial legacy. Hence, a deeper interrogation of the colonial beginnings of contemporary forms of Filipino teachers' community engagements is shown in the succeeding section. This analysis exposes another layer of difficulty in comprehending the complex but promising link between teachers' identity, community engagement, and citizenship education.

How the Colonizers' Mandate for Teachers to Engage the Community Contributes to a Distinct Notion of Citizenship Education

While the main focus of this chapter centers on contemporary forms of civic participation, it is important to recognize that teachers' education-mediated community engagements were formally and institutionally configured during the Spanish and American colonial periods. Deciphering the genesis of social phenomenon underscores the importance of historicity in making sense of contemporary social realities (Steinmetz 2011).

During these two influential colonial periods in Philippine history, teachers' identity was distinguished between the colonizer as teachers and the local (Filipino indigenous educator). However, regardless of their nationality, teachers in general were required to engage in their respective communities whereby the objectives of such participation conformed to that of the colonizers. Hence, Spanish colonizers (i.e., both civil officials and the missionaries/clergy) organized teachers' community participation mostly along religious objectives. As a consequence, since "Spanish education was generally designed to convert the population to Catholicism and to maintain (converts) in the faith" (Schwartz 1971, p. 203), teachers' engagements with the community were largely invested in the attainment of such an objective. The attainment of this singular religious objective was further ensured through the use of the *visititas* (chapels) both as a place of worship and as a classroom. Utilizing a religious space for education shaped how religious instruction and basic education (i.e., reading, writing, and arithmetic), as well as the identity of the missionary and the teacher, were conflated to optimize the success of the colonial aim (i.e., conversion into the Catholic faith). In contemporary times, while there are designated spaces for each activity, Filipino teachers, particularly from private schools, continue to facilitate the transmission of religious values. This is done specifically by expecting or requiring Filipino teachers from these schools to disseminate the vision-mission of the institutions they are affiliated with. It is in this sense that, in a predominantly Catholic country, national citizenship education includes religious content in the curriculum and requires teachers to practice a pedagogy aimed at instilling religious values.

Teachers' civic participations during the American colonial period were more ubiquitous and inserted not only in the religious domain but in all aspects of Filipino life. In his book "*The Philippine Islands*" (Atkinson 1905, pp. 261–262), a Thomasite (US school teachers sent to establish public schools in the Philippines) by the name of Fred Atkinson summarized American teachers' community roles wherein they acted as:

conciliators of religious leaders, advisers to civil servants, advertisers of education, playwright, organizers, advocates, builders and a litany more [in order] to secure the loyalty of the inhabitants to the sovereignty of the United States by implanting the ideals of western civilization.

The main objective of their engagements was without doubt; "*para capturar la simpatiya del pueblo*" (to capture the sympathy of the public) (Aldana 1949, p. 11). It can be argued that the introduction of citizenship education, as we identify it now, entered

through the agency of American teachers and later, with and through their Filipino counterparts. This project was accomplished by mandating public, free, and compulsory education, which prioritized – within schools and communities – a democratic, liberal, English language-mediated and capitalistic ideals, facilitated, in no small parts, by teachers. Hence, it is tenable to trace the beginnings of citizenship education aimed at developing a proactive democratic life [not only] in rural [but also in other] communities (Waterson and Moffa 2016) to a period where teachers were utilized as instruments of colonization in what is aptly termed as a “pedagogic invasion” (Roma-Sianturi 2009).

Since meaningful citizenship is formed through its links to history (Peterson et al. 2015), it is important to interrogate how these multiple community engagements provide impetus to how Filipino teachers translate, read, and even resist the colonial imprints. Doing so illuminates both how teachers comply to the impositions of these regimes and suggests how they could have modified and even subverted the colonizers' practices. The importance of foregrounding how Filipino teachers construct and assert their agency cannot be undervalued when set against a colonial society that gives premium to unqualified obedience to the Catholic teaching (Spanish period) and compliance with democratic ideals (American period). It is also important to interrogate whether the notions of citizenship education central to the colonial periods can be regarded as a blessing or a curse. In other words, the ideals and values which form the ethical aims of personhood and nationhood in the Philippines are deeply ensconced as conversations with colonial experiences. Failure to see through the veneer of colonization will only sustain the suspicion that teachers are agents or simple ideological “dupes” of national governments (Bon Yee Sim 2011). Additionally, indifference to the historical genesis of Filipino teachers' identity and community engagements will only lend credence to the impression that citizenship education does not only perpetuate colonial forms of democracy but also utilizes civic participation to introduce neoliberal ideas as contemporary forms of Western imperialism. Lastly, the significance of recognizing colonial historical genesis of these practices rest on its capacity to provide contemporary Filipino teachers with insights on how to untether our citizenship education from colonial mentality by opening new standpoints – decolonial pedagogical experience – for citizenship education (Nieto 2018).

This section has, briefly, established the genesis and practice of Filipino teachers' community engagements during the two colonial periods, including how these periods have helped to form the notion of citizenship. In the next section, the contemporary modalities of teachers' civic participation are explored. The analysis focused on how this participation works to construct Filipino teachers' contemporary social identities and, in turn, how they practice citizenship education.

Forms of Contemporary Community Engagements, Social Identity, and Citizenship Education

The provision in the Code of Ethics for Professional Teachers in the Philippines (PRC 2013) mandating Filipino teachers, from both private and public educational institutions, to participate in civic activities generated diverse forms of culturally differentiated

community engagements. Drawn from focus group discussions among public and private school teachers from four rural areas and four urban centers, the table below summarizes the events, occasions, social phenomena, and programs where Filipino teachers are involved vis-à-vis their respective roles therein (Redillas 2017). Understanding the forms and frequency of teachers' participation deepens our comprehension of how specific engagements define their identity as Filipino teachers. Moreover, examining the nature of their contemporary civic participation reveals not only their substance but also their contributions in organizing culturally sensitive citizenship education programs.

The general goal of any citizenship education is the increased "participation in civil society, community and/or political life, characterized by mutual respect and non-violence and in accordance with human rights and democracy" (Hoskins and Van Nijlen 2006, p. 6). In the Philippine context, Filipino teachers can help obtain these goals through their participation in cultural, social, political, and religious activities of their respective communities. Consequently, these engagements become spheres where contemporary issues (e.g., national identity and sovereignty; environmental integrity and resiliency during calamities; political, economic, and social reforms; migration and poverty issues; and various social justices) are discussed. The following two sections illustrate how the practice of Filipino teachers' contemporary mandated and voluntary community engagements facilitate the construction of their identity and the organization of culturally sensitive citizenship education program.

Mandated to Engage the Community: An Identity Required to Deliver Citizenship Education

Filipino teachers' civic participation as election officers, facilitators of *Brigada Eskwela* program, and census enumerators derives authority from various laws and institutional memoranda. (See Electoral Reform Act of 1987. [The Board of Inspectors shall be composed of a chairman and two (2) members, one of whom shall be designated as poll clerk, all of whom shall be public school teachers. In case there are not enough public-school teachers, teachers in private schools [...] may be appointed for election duty.] See Department of Education Order 24, s. 2008. [This is a nationwide maintenance program that engages all education stakeholders to contribute their time, efforts, and resources in ensuring that public schools are all set in time for class opening. It is a week-long event where local communities, parents, alumni, civic groups, local businesses, NGOs, private individuals, and even teachers and students volunteer their time and skills to do minor to medium repairs and maintenance work in the schools (*DepED Order 24*, s. 2008).] See *Batas Pambansa* No. 72. ["Public school teachers shall be employed for enumeration work and for such service shall be paid an honorarium as may be determined by the National Census Coordinating Board v[...]."]). Even if these engagements are prescribed by law, the weight of their obligatory nature varies. To illustrate, election duty and involvement in *Brigada Eskwela* are indispensable duties for public-school teachers. Census enumeration, on the other hand, started as mandatory for teachers but gradually evolved into voluntary participation in some municipalities. It is

necessary to take note of these variances since the heterogeneity of how Filipino teachers perform these mandates provides a basis in differentiating teachers' identity in their respective communities while serving as a principle of diversity in how teachers construct notion and practice citizenship education. Furthermore, these legal foundations tend to function as currencies valuable in navigating the social and religious world and as a legitimating resource therein (Bourdieu 1991).

Filipino teachers' identity and function as intellectual leaders in their respective communities is evident through their civic engagements, which also serve to reinforce their identification as representatives of the state. In turn, such engagement lends credence to perceptions in communities that public school teachers are "agents empowered to act in the name of the state [where they] routinely perform and reinforce the authority of the state as citizens do by following state orders' [thereby] inevitably leading to the embodiment of civic engagement" (Chopra 2016, p. 1). The ramifications of the obligation to perform these civic roles, regardless of the political climate and conditions of the community, are twofold. On one the hand, these engagements expose teachers to violence, symbolic, or physical (e.g., reports of Filipino teachers harrowing election-related experiences). On the other hand, these engagements legitimize their identity as intellectual leaders in their respective communities (e.g., through their leadership roles in cultural activities of their community). This particular tension does not only mirror how teachers' social identity are constructed in these fields of encounter but also indicates how these experiences become an embodied disposition (see Bourdieu 1986; Grenfell 2014). In the form of embodied disposition, this practical knowledge becomes both a mold and a tool in constructing notions of citizenship as a practice of democratic participation in political exercises and in nurturing communal collaboration. Furthermore, reminiscent of how religious spaces (i.e., *visitas* or chapels) were used both as places of worship and education, and the use of classrooms as venues for electoral processes and evacuation centers, further strengthens the link between teachers' identity, community, and citizenship education.

To obtain an understanding of the extent and the degree by which Filipino teachers engage their respective communities as part of their everyday existence, Table 1 also includes other mandatory forms of community engagements (i.e., programs and activities such as educational mapping, community extension services, education and training, and community consultancy that create spaces for teachers' engagement with members of their respective communities). While I establish how these engagements contribute to the construction of Filipino teachers' social identity, in this chapter I argue that teachers' experiences in these engagements can be converted to funds of knowledge (González et al. 2006), the value of which cannot be underestimated particularly in educating for democracy and democratic processes, right of suffrage, governance, and collaboration. In other words, the same engagements that construct Filipino teachers' identity to their respective communities are the same activities that provide the content of citizenship education.

From various focus group sessions conducted by the author, teacher participants explained that interactions with members of the community during these activities help them nurture relationships among their neighbors, while at the same time, configuring them to their fluctuating ascendant and subordinated positions in various fields of

Table 1 Modalities of Filipino teachers' contemporary community engagements

Events, occasions, phenomena, programs	Frequency	Roles and functions
<i>Mandated engagements</i>		
Local and national elections	Every 3 or 6 years	Mandated election duty as poll officer (chair or member of Board of Inspectors or Board of Tellers) Election-related social-cultural roles (information dissemination, education of voters, election observers)
Census	Every 10 years	Census enumerator (conduct house visits, interview, and data collectors)
<i>Brigada Eskwela</i>	Annual	Prepare the school/classroom for the coming school year (solicit materials and assistance from the community, coordinate with other agencies for volunteer work, etc.)
Educational mapping	Annual	Conduct house-to-house campaign to promote enrolment
Community extension services	regular activity	Join in private institutions' community extension program, e.g., medical missions, relief operations, and teaching in the villages
Education and training	Regular activity	Conduct literacy programs, skills development to out-of-school youths and senior citizens
Community consultant or adviser	Regular activity	Adviser to youth groups, community sport programs, beautification and development of the locality
<i>Voluntary engagements</i>		
"Fiesta" (local celebrations)	Annual	In charge or part of program planning, decorate, train participants, emcee, judge pageants and contests, among others
Local politics	Occasional	Member of <i>Lupon ng Barangay</i> (village council)
Officers and members of local church organizations and committees	Regular activity	Officers of Parish Pastoral Council (PPC) and other organizations of different religious affiliations
Social movement	Regular activity	As members of party list organizations, work for teachers' welfare and improvement of educational system through political actions
Communication and liaison	Occasional	Coordinate with local agencies and organizations during election, <i>Brigada Eskwela</i> , fiestas, and other celebrations
Weddings and baptisms	Occasional	Stand as sponsor to former students and people in the community during socio-religious rites like weddings and baptisms
Financial resource	Occasional	Source of financial aid, no matter how meager, and human resource in the community
<i>Perceptions</i>		<i>Expectations</i>
Role model		Teachers are expected to uphold socio-cultural and ethical values and to transmit and instill

(continued)

Table 1 (continued)

Events, occasions, phenomena, programs	Frequency	Roles and functions
		<p>the same to their students in the classroom and in the community</p> <p>As role models, teachers are often invited to be a sponsor during social and religious rites like baptisms and weddings</p> <p>They are also expected to extend help, no matter how meager it could be</p>
Local intellectual		<p>There is an expectation for teachers to be relatively knowledgeable about matters in the community. As critical agents (for members of unions and Alliance of Concerned Teachers), an enlightened teacher is expected to possess the skills to analyze and act on the socio-political situation of and challenges in the country</p>
<i>Use of school</i>		
Evacuation center		<p>Teachers perform various voluntary functions to assist evacuees or refugees, using the classrooms as temporary shelters</p>
Voting precincts		<p>Local and national elections are typically held in the school classrooms</p>

community engagements. Therefore, the same community engagements that provide avenues to confirm their ascendant position in the community also open them to possible marginalization and other forms of violence. Hence, these dynamic, multiple, and protracted modes of civic participation characterize citizenship as “relational, emotional, embedded in power, and uncomfortable” (DesRoches 2015). On account of this complex and fluid relations, teachers’ identity is configured differently in regard to the degree of their experiences. By extension, the manner by which Filipino teachers interpret and deliver the content of citizenship education programs is also differentiated.

In addition to mandatory community engagements, Filipino teachers also participate voluntarily in various social, cultural, and religious undertakings. Consequently, the voluntary character of their engagements sets the stage for different modes of identity construction that, in turn, provide spaces and opportunities to enrich the notion and delivery of citizenship education.

Voluntary Engagements, Social Identity, and Citizenship Education

As just stated, Filipino teachers also voluntarily engage in their respective communities and actively participate in various activities therein. These unscripted civic participations are derived mainly from cultural and social expectations and religious

affiliations and driven by economic exigencies. These engagements in turn create culturally organized spaces for the construction of both teachers' identity and citizenship education. The following two subsections explore how this construction is possible through Filipino teachers' participation in the political arena as well as in religious and cultural domains.

Collective Militant, Progressive and Nationalistic Identity, Political Activism, and Dissent as Articulation of Democratic Citizenship Education

Filipino teachers have found an avenue for augmented participation in politics through membership in Party List or sectoral (political) parties formed to promote proportional representation in the House of Representatives (*Party-List System Act* 1995). While there are several registered teachers' "party list" groups with representation in the lower house, in my research (Redillas 2017) I opted to examine teachers' participation in the party list Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT), as they are regarded as a very progressive and militant group and also represent the majority of public school teachers. My interview with Juaquin (public school teacher and local officer of ACT) describes how participation in political and democratic processes shapes their identity as progressive educators:

While we use the halls of the House of Representatives as a space for struggle, we are also convinced that this avenue for critical negotiation with the government is ineffective without the pressures exerted through street parliamentary actions. For instance, while ACT representatives propose bills for salary increase, the urgency of these bills are not simply argued in the halls of congress but in the streets where we hold rallies and demonstrations. If we do not hold mass actions, the government is usually indifferent to our situations—they could not care less. The street then is an important space for our struggle. It is there that media broadcast our demands and other marginalized sectors sympathize with our fight.

How this form of progressive community engagement translates into citizenship education as a form of dissent can be gleaned from Juaquin's further elucidation of their practices. For him, a distinguishing characteristic of ACT is how it is structured to immediately respond to its members' predicaments, particularly in providing them legal support. He also emphasized that ACT members often include the education of their students and parents on various current social issues and on the necessity of their participation in this democratic process as part of their professional practice. For example, Juaquin observes that parents and students wonder why teachers need to participate in demonstrations and rallies. Responding to this query, he found it necessary to explain to his students that authentic democracy provides a space where citizens are free to articulate their views on social and political issues. He discusses with the students in his class that social learning includes the formation of critical dispositions as well as the development of students' capacity to apply knowledge learned in schools to social issues. For Juaquin, these dispositions can be facilitated by participation in social processes (e.g., rallies and demonstrations). Expressing

dissent to government policies deemed detrimental to the general welfare contributes to the development of what he termed as “mulat na magaaral” (eyes opened/with critical consciousness/educated).

The notion of teacher as activist and militant was the most contentious discussion point during the focus group sessions I conducted (Redillas 2017). The divisiveness that activism causes suggests that militancy among the ranks of teachers is not yet fully accepted. More senior teachers from rural provinces remain critical of teachers' participation in this progressive movement. This contrary position was shared across different focus groups. Reggie (a public-school teacher from northern province) echoed this common sentiment:

The law requires that we (teachers) should be non-partisan. So how could we abide with this provision when ACT is highly politicized? This dilemma is unsettling, and for this reason—at least in this province—teachers are not that enthusiastic to become members of ACT.

More positive appreciation among early career teachers, particularly those from urban centers, on teachers' active participation in ACT underscores the link between citizenship education and political activism (Stitzlein 2015). This link positions teachers towards culture-permeated democratic citizenship education built on an environment of discussion and dissent in addressing social issues (Abowitz and Harnish 2006). In various focus group sessions conducted by the author, discussions provided an insight as to how this is achieved. First, in the school setting, teachers who were reprimanded for their participation in various election-related protests are provided with legal support where they are shielded from arbitrary penalties. Participants in the focus groups also observed that enlightened ACT members are more aware of their rights. Hence, instead of capitulating immediately when confronted by any accusation delivered through memoranda, they are now literate of various legal remedies available to them. Second, in a larger social context, ACT as an organization often advocates through different platforms in lobbying for teachers' just compensation, for the improvement of teaching conditions, for increases in education budgets, etc. Third, ACT often joins forces with other Party Lists and marginalized groups to amplify their protest and dissent thereby magnifying the importance of their cause.

Regardless of the benefits that teachers obtained through their active involvement in party list organizations, educators' participation in the political field remains a divisive form of civic engagement. The one side of this divide is represented by conservative teachers whose understanding of their identity and professional practice is circumscribed within classroom spaces and consistent with Department of Education's policies. The other side is constituted by teachers who believe that membership in militant, progressive, and nationalistic political movements is a necessary strategy to advance the causes of teachers. Regardless of their position in this debate, teachers are inevitably caught in various power relations through their community involvements. For this reason, teachers also assume contradictory roles, necessarily locating them in the “conflicting demands of citizenship education, i.e., on the one hand, alliance, obedience, and loyalty to the state, and on the other hand, the demand

for critical thinking, pluralism, and transformation (Muff and Bekerman 2017). Nonetheless, this contradictory appraisal of political activism among teachers does not only provide a space for discourse on teachers' identity but more importantly potentially enriches the substance and provides context in organizing critical pedagogy in delivering citizenship education.

While Filipino teachers' involvement in the political sphere is contentious, their participation in cultural and religious activities remains to be the traditional and, it would appear, more acceptable mode of civic involvement. In the next subsection, the cultural and religious nature of teachers' civic participation is scrutinized, and it is argued that this mode of civic engagement reproduces the identity of Filipino teachers as disengaged from political and social activities, on the one hand, and wherein they are culturally expected to act more as vessels of traditional values, on the other hand.

Religious Affiliation and Cultural Leadership; Identity and Citizenship Education as Social and Cultural Reproduction?

Perhaps the most common form of Filipino teachers' voluntary community engagements relates to their roles in various traditional cultural, social, and religious activities, such as the ubiquitous annual fiestas (from village to municipality level) where teachers typically organize and facilitate different forms of celebrations (e.g., town parades, pageants, community games). Their work in these cultural activities is typical. In almost all of the focus group discussions in the author's own research (Redillas 2017), participants echoed common tasks, where they:

act as 'consultant', plan the cultural activities, function as program emcee, serve as judge in pageants and various contests, coordinate the decoration of venues, chair the sports activities, prepare the students in their participation (street dancing, parade, presentations), and officiate in various sports competitions.

The focus group discussions revealed that Filipino teachers' roles in cultural celebrations correlate with the heterogeneity of the community and are influenced by the distance from urban centers. That is, the further the community is from urban centers, the more prominent the roles that teachers assume in these communities become. In addition, teachers are more likely to be the most numerous professionals residing in more remote areas. This is evident in Lagring and Carmen's (both public school teachers from a rural municipality in the province of Isabela) description of teachers' indispensable role in the 2015 town fiesta parade and pageant:

99% percent of the activity this morning required the involvement of teachers. It is a town fiesta that without the participations of the teachers, it will not push through (in the manner that happened this morning) and perhaps... there will be no parade and show to watch.

Through voluntary and regular participation in these traditional activities, teachers find space to develop what may be referred to as "practical skills and self-

efficacy [necessary] to interact with their immediate and wider communities” (Hampden-Thomson et al. 2015). These literacies not only accrue to their identity in the community but also enrich citizenship education, particularly in education for national identity both in the classroom and in the community. To be more precise, this self-efficacy takes the form of social and cultural capital and is a valuable social currency in increasing civic participation among students and other community members.

How does voluntary civic engagement contribute to the teachers' understandings and delivery of citizenship education? In these fields of engagements, where social and cultural traditions are valued as sacred, teachers appear to act more as agents in reproducing values that constitute their social and cultural identity. Teachers' participation in these activities allows them to comprehend relations of power and locate their position in this structure. Additionally, teachers act as repository of these traditions and educate their students and their community on the importance of sustaining these practices. Unlike teachers' participation in progressive political organizations (i.e., ACT) where dissent, critical thinking, and participation in democratic processes are necessary components, active participation in cultural activities reflects a more conservative form of citizenship education where compliance to traditional practices and obedience to norms and values are both modeled and highly regarded. As reproducers of cultural values, this role appears to run counter to what global citizenship education requires of teachers. For instance, while GCE values cosmopolitanism, multiculturalism and diversity, teachers' engagements in cultural and religious activities – through which they act as role models to students and families – typically require them to promote practices that will sustain traditional cultural and social values as a constitutive element of the citizenry's collective identity and, together act therefore, as a particular form of national citizenship education program.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined how Filipino teachers' social identity is formed through performance of their mandatory and voluntary civic roles in their respective communities. Through these engagements, they are able to obtain authentic knowledge and understanding of the community. The chapter has demonstrated the conceptual links between Filipino teachers' community engagements, the construction of their social identity, and citizenship education.

In brief, the two “conceptual cradles” ensconced in this chapter are, first, that the *colonial experience* has influenced teachers' manner of educating for citizenship through their own active engagement within their communities and, second, that the relationship between the *nation and citizenship* evolved into modern project underscored by contemporary modalities of their civic participation that has, for some teachers, manifested in voluntary forms of critical citizenship. The chapter also argued that in the same manner that the heterogeneity of Filipino teachers' community engagements constructs their identity in multiple and sometimes contrary

modalities (e.g., as reproducers of cultural norms, agents of the state on the one hand, and as militant and progressive professionals on the other), the manner through which Filipino teachers constitute and model citizenship also varies.

The chapter sustained the notion that to be a Filipino teacher is not only to teach in the convenience of the classrooms but also to engage in the complex world of their respective communities. In addition, the plurality of the modes (i.e., community engagements), by which Filipino teachers' identity is constructed, also differentiates their appraisal of their participations therein. By extension, the same diverse nature of civic participation does not only illuminate the tensions between the traditional teachers' identity (i.e., classroom centered, typically compliant with education policies and reproducer of the way things are) and emerging activist identity (i.e., progressive, militant and nationalist), but they also magnify the tension between national citizenship and global citizenship.

The above discussions also reveal the manner by and through which Filipino teachers' collective identity is not only reproduced but also critically evaluated and aligned with the aspirations of national citizenship education in educating for national identity. In Philippine society, authentic forms of citizenship education require a space that generates and respects cultural and social values. However, the same space also needs to accommodate the development of Filipino citizens as progressive, militant, and nationalistic. It can also be concluded that appraising Filipino teachers' community engagements increases the potential for accommodating discourse on both traditional and progressive values and issues, as well as for exploring how citizenship education may be organized to include both national (e.g., national identity) and global (e.g., cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism) components.

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The Role of the State and State Orthodoxy in Citizenship and Education in China

20

Wing-Wah Law

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Abstract

This chapter draws on existing theoretical and empirical literature to examine citizenship and education in China. The chapter broadly traces the intertwined relationships between the state, its governing orthodoxy, citizenship, and education for citizenship in China. The chapter argues that Chinese citizenship and education for citizenship are situated and state-centric and can vary – and has varied – with changes in political regimes and domestic and global contexts. The state defines Chinese citizenship and education and selects the official orthodoxy for state governance to legitimize its leadership and rationalize the precedence of collective over individual interests. Education is more an instrument of citizen-making than person-making and is used to promote the ruler's orthodoxy and values and foster an obedient citizenry for social and political stability, rather than cultivating people to become more independent and autonomous.

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State · State orthodoxy · Chinese citizenship · Chinese education · China

This chapter draws on existing theoretical and empirical literature to examine citizenship and education in China. Citizenship can be broadly seen as one's membership in a political community, involving "relationships between rights, duties, participation, and identity" (Delanty 2000, p. 9). The state is responsible for protecting its citizens and their rights, and in return citizens have certain obligations – e.g., respect the law and pay taxes (Oltay 2017). Broadly speaking, education has three main functions: preparing students as human capital for economic development; socializing students into political, social, and cultural orders and norms (citizen-making); and making students more independent and autonomous (person-making) (Biesta 2009).

China's citizenship and education history spans three periods: ancient and imperial China (pre-1911), the Republic of China (ROC) (1912–1949), and the People's Republic of China (PRC) (post-1949). This chapter examines mainly the latter. It argues that despite changing political structures and leadership, Chinese citizenship has remained situated and state-centric. The Chinese state defines state-society relations, prescribes individuals' membership, responsibilities, rights, and participation, and stresses collective over individual interests. However, Chinese citizenship can vary – and has varied – as a result of changing domestic and global contexts as well as state leaders' perceptions over time. In different periods, the Chinese state adopted different orthodoxies to define state-society relations, legitimize its leadership, and maintain social order, using education to promote these orthodoxies. Thus, the overall aim of the chapter is to examine existing literature to explore the ways in which Chinese education is intertwined with the state and its ideology and how education policy in China stresses citizen-making above person-making.

Traditional Chinese Citizenship and Education Prior to the Socialist Chinese Republic

In ancient/imperial China, society was paternalistic, hierarchical, and non-egalitarian, its people owned and ruled by the emperor. Citizenship was mainly Confucian-oriented. Since 134 BCE, Confucianism – which advocated a clear social hierarchy subordinating son to father, wife to husband, and all to the emperor (Mencius 2003) – was the official orthodoxy. The state utilized education to promote Confucian values and foster obedient collective selves. Traditional Chinese education emphasized Confucian classics and related texts to inculcate loyalty, filial piety, and collectivism (Law 2016), as well as to promote a harmonious, hierarchical society, and to cultivate moral citizens

(Chen 1986). Thus, education stressed citizen-making, rather than person-making. This is, education focused on cultivating obedient citizens rather than human beings with independent, critical thinking. Despite dynastical changes, the relationship between the state, Confucianism, and education maintained social stability for over two millennia (Law 2011) and shaped Chinese citizenship and education by deifying the emperor and demanding the people's submission (Fu 1993).

Following China's military defeats in the 1800s, Confucian-oriented education was criticized for keeping China economically and technologically backward (Wang 1977), and its usefulness for developing a modern Chinese citizenry questioned (Gray 1990). The late Qing dynasty was overthrown in the 1911 Revolution; replacing the royal family with political parties did not, however, end the state-ideology-education symbiosis.

In 1912, under Sun Yat-sen's leadership, the Kuomintang (KMT) established the ROC, adopting Sun's (1981 [1906]) Three People's Principles (Nationalism, Democracy and the People's Livelihood) as its governing orthodoxy and citizenship framework. To restore and modernize China, Sun attempted to blend Confucian values with Western ideals to create a constitutional republic wherein power rested with the people. His proposed political framework synthesized the Western tripartite model (executive, legislative, and judiciary powers) and traditional Chinese powers (examination and control) (Meissner 2006), and advocated democracy through local self-government. However, the KMT neither institutionalized constitutional democracy nor tolerated pluralism. After Sun's death, Chiang Kai-Shek deified him to legitimize his succession and used Sun's three principles to monopolize political power and combat his main rival, the Communist Party of China (CPC).

The KMT-led state used education to consolidate its leadership, develop China, and shape Chinese citizenry. To foster modern citizens, the state followed the American three-tiered public education model, emphasizing learning Chinese, English, and science subjects. In 1923, it introduced China's first Civics subject, to help junior secondary students understand key constitutional and political principles (Government of ROC 2001), allowing Civics textbook authors some flexibility in their content selection and emphases.

However, after Chiang assumed power, education became overwhelmingly KMT-oriented (Law 2011) and focused on eliminating communist influences on campus and reinforcing students' affiliation/identification with the KMT. Specifically, it required educators to incorporate Sun's principles within all courses, to replace Civics with the KMT's Political Doctrines, and to educate students to obey the KMT. Schools organized student activities commemorating Sun and praising the KMT. Confucian values that informed Sun's principles – propriety, rightness, integrity, and a sense of shame – were promoted as core moral standards. However, the symbiosis between the KMT-led state, Sun's Principles, and education could not sustain the KMT's rule, and the CPC supplanted it in 1949.

Socialist Chinese Citizenship and Education in the People's Republic of China

Early Chinese communists rejected Confucius in favor of Engels, Marx, and Lenin. Under Mao Zedong, the PRC upheld socialism as its state orthodoxy for constructing a new socialist China. Per its Constitution, China is a “socialist state under the people’s democratic dictatorship” (National People’s Congress (NPC) 2018). However, different CPC leaders have interpreted socialism differently at different stages of nation-(re)building, to reinforce the CPC’s political domination. The CPC controls education to foster socialist Chinese citizenry under its leadership. Understanding the development of citizenship and education in socialist China requires understanding the conceptual distinction between *gongmin* and *renmin*.

Conceptual Distinction Between Gongmin and Renmin

In post-1949 China, *gongmin* (citizens) and *renmin* (people) were different, yet related concepts of state-society relations and individual’s membership, rights, and responsibilities. In the 1900s, *gongmin* popularly referred to “legally recognized members of nation-states” (Goldman and Perry 2002, p. 4); in the 1950s, *gongmin* was incorporated into China’s Constitution to represent “citizens” (NPC 1954). While *gongmin* included all legally recognized citizens, *renmin* referred to groups who were politically acceptable to the CPC – e.g., patriots, workers, peasants, and petty/national bourgeoisies (Yu 2002). *Gongmin* was mainly a legal concept, whereas *renmin* was an ideo-political concept.

Gongmin is associated with rights and duties, but not power. In China’s Constitution, citizens are individuals holding a PRC nationality and are equal before the law (NPC 2018, Article 33). Citizens have the right to vote in and stand for election, enjoy freedom of speech, press, assembly, association, process, demonstration, religion, scientific research, and literary, artistic and cultural pursuits (Articles 34–36, 46). Their freedom, personal dignity, and right of abode are “inviolable” (Articles 37–39). In 2004, the state enshrined in the Constitution that “the state respects and preserves human rights” (Article 33). Privacy and freedom of correspondence are protected (Article 40), and citizens may “criticize and make suggestions regarding any state organ or functionary” and expose, complain, or charge “any state organs or functionary for violation of the law or dereliction of duty” (Article 41). In exchange, Chinese citizens must receive an education, practice family planning, rear their children, observe the Constitution and law, work and pay taxes, perform military services, and safeguard national security, national unification, and ethnic solidarity (Articles 42–56).

Renmin is more directly associated with China’s ideological and political foundations and structure under the CPC, than with rights and duties. In China’s Constitution, *renmin* (people) appears in the country’s name and the names of state organs (e.g., People’s Congresses) indicating these organs’ power derives from the people and is used vis-à-vis the CPC (“people’s democratic dictatorship”) or China’s internal and

overseas adversaries (NPC 2018). *Renmin* have constitutional power to ensure the state serves and answers to the “people.” *Renmin*’s dominance over and ideo-political distinction from *gongmin* can be found in leaders’ speeches and reports. For example, President Xi Jinping’s (2017) speech to the 19th National People’s Congress (NPC) mentioned *gongmin* once (regarding the development of citizens’ civic and moral qualities), but *renmin* over 200 times (usually vis-à-vis the CPC).

The Fundamental Supremacy of the CPC

CPC supremacy is the dominant feature of citizenship in China. Since 1949, the CPC has maintained a one-party state (Kennedy 2014), partly by institutionalizing Confucian paternalism to legitimize its rule (Fairbrother 2014). This section contends the CPC has used six main strategies to minimize political challenges to its leadership and to consolidate and sustain its political power.

Firstly, the CPC ideologically rationalizes concentrating popularly derived power in the hands of a few leaders. Before 1949, CPC leaders like Liu Shaoqi (1940) and Mao Zedong (1945) opposed the KMT’s “one-party dictatorship” and sought a coalition government that would return power to the people, before finally overthrowing the KMT. After 1949, the CPC adopted the principles of “people’s democratic dictatorship” and “democratic centralism” (NPC 2018, Articles 1 and 3), arguing that while all power belongs to the people, the NPC and local people’s congresses are democratically selected to exercise it on their behalf (Article 2) and to establish popularly responsible state organs (Article 3) “under the unified leadership of the central authorities.” However, the unified leadership is centralized in the hands of a very few top CPC leaders, such as the CPC’s secretary-general.

Constitutionally, China’s highest state organs are the NPC (legislative), State Council (executive), and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (advisory). However, China’s most powerful supra-state organ is the CPC Politburo Standing Committee, which leads and controls all state institutions. It is chaired by the CPC Secretary-General and (currently) has six other senior party members. As Secretary-General Xi Jinping (2017) asserted, building a great China and reviving the Chinese nation requires strong CPC leadership, and for all people to unify under the CPC’s central leadership.

Secondly, like the KMT’s Sun, CPC leaders appeal to popular support by regularly reinterpreting socialism at different stages of China’s development and modernization. Moreover, they enshrined these interpretations – from Mao Zedong Thought (pre-1976) to Xi Jinping’s China Dream (NPC 2018) – in the Constitution as blueprints for constructing a socialist China. Xi’s China Dream, for example, includes principles for nation-(re)building (prosperity, democracy, civility, and harmony), social construction (freedom, equality, justice, and rule of law), and individual behaviors (patriotism, dedication, integrity, and friendship). One may question whether these values are socialist; however, they indicate Chinese leaders’ intentions.

Thirdly, the CPC has suppressed interparty power struggles by recognizing only the eight political parties that existed before 1949 (and prohibiting the formation of

new ones) and only allowing them to “participate in and deliberate on state affairs” on the condition they accept CPC leadership (State Council 2007), and that the CPC is China’s only legitimate leading and ruling party.

Fourthly, although Chinese citizens have rights to vote and stand for election (NPC 2018, Article 34), most are excluded from senior posts (e.g., President, NPC Chairperson, Premier, Central Military Commission Chairperson), as these are reserved for top CPC leaders, elected by the CPC National Congress (CPCNC). In 2017, the 19th CPCNC’s 2280 carefully selected party delegates elected 204 CPC Central Committee members, who elected 25 CPC Politburo members, who then elected seven Politburo Standing Committee members and the CPC Secretary-General (Zhao et al. 2017). Although the NPC technically elects and appoints state leaders (NPC 2018, Article 62), in March 2018, the CPC Central Committee nominated all candidates for the 2018–2023 term (Xinhua News Agency 2018), ensuring China’s key state positions were overwhelmingly held by CPC members. The CPC’s Secretary-General is also China’s President and Central Military Commission Chairperson. All ten current State Council members are CPC members, as are the heads of all 26 ministries or ministry-equivalent units. The Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee Council is a CPC Politburo Standing Committee member; moreover, eight of 14 Council members are CPC members, and six chairpersons of recognized non-CPC political parties under CPC leadership (<http://www.npc.gov.cn>).

Fifthly, the CPC has integrated Party and state by embedding two lines of authority (political and administrative) at all governance levels. The political line monitors and ensures implementation of CPC ideology and policies and controls the recruitment and appointment of personnel at the same or next-lower level, whereas the administrative line oversees affairs within their jurisdiction (Xu 2016). The two lines are not mutually exclusive, but are overwhelmingly intertwined, with the same personnel often occupying institutions’ top political and administrative positions; of China’s 26 state ministers, 19 are also party secretaries, and four are deputy party secretaries (per ministry websites).

Sixthly, the CPC uses the law to consolidate its status as China’s ruling party. After the turn of the century, China was one of very few countries still claiming to have a socialist ruling party, and the CPC feared a crisis of leadership legitimacy, due to its ideological mandate (Law 2011). The NPC (2004) thus amended the Constitution to state that CPC-led multiparty cooperation “will exist and develop in China,” without specifying for how long. In 2018, it further amended Constitution’s Article 1, establishing CPC leadership as the “most essential feature” of Chinese socialism (NPC 2018), thus reifying the CPC’s sole-ruling-party status in perpetuity, and outlawing any attempt to overthrow or transfer power with the CPC.

Development and Changes of Socialist Chinese Citizenship Framework

Despite the CPC’s dominance and insistence, China is a “socialist” state, the meaning of socialism varies at different stages of China’s development, as do such

citizenship elements as Chinese people's relation to the world, markets, law, Chinese culture, and civil society.

Mao's socialist citizenship framework, which redefined Chinese people's relationship to the world, the state, the market, and society, had three major features (Law 2006). First, it was based on the CPC-led state's dualist ideological worldview, perceiving socialist countries as friends and capitalist countries as enemies, thus limiting China's diplomatic ties and its people's international relationships and exchanges.

Second, it was expected to help China transition from a semi-feudal, bourgeois society into a socialist, utopian, classless society. To that end, the state eliminated market forces, took ownership of all property and the means of production, implemented a state-planned economy, diminished the role of law, adopted the party line of class struggle, suppressed civil society, and downplayed Confucianism and Chinese culture – thus depriving the Chinese people of rights and protections in these domains.

Third, it was characterized by radical political mobilization campaigns. Chinese people participate in mandatory nationwide movements to further the CPC's political agenda, including campaigns against counter-revolutionaries (1950–1953), the Anti-rightist Movement (1957–1959), the Great Leap Forward (1958–1960), and the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976).

After Mao's death, in 1976, the socialist Chinese citizenship framework became less restrictive. In 1978, the CPC-led state under Deng Xiaoping redefined its party line to emphasize economic modernization and introduced the policy of economic reform and opening to the world. Post-Mao China's socialist Chinese citizenship framework reintroduced five elements eschewed by Mao: expanded international relations, reliance on market forces, the rule of law, traditional Chinese culture and values, and civil society (Law 2011). These elements redefined Chinese people's interplay with foreign and domestic actors and gave rise to new issues and problems.

Firstly, China's international relations expanded beyond the former socialist bloc to include capitalist countries once deemed enemy states (e.g., Britain and the USA). It allowed Chinese people to travel the world for business, education, cultural exchanges, or tourism. China also dramatically increased its international political and economic engagement (e.g., participating in Korean denuclearization and financially aiding African countries), although some viewed this as a threat (Al-Rodhan 2007).

Secondly, the market became a significant element in redefining socialist citizenship and in diversifying and redistributing power and resources, with the CPC-led state increasingly relying on market principles and capitalist practices to reform China's economy. After serious ideological debate within the CPC, Deng Xiaoping (1992) introduced a drastic ideological change, stating a market economy and central planning could coexist in China, as China was at a primitive stage of socialism. China now recognizes the importance of private ownership, and allows Chinese people to invest and own property; some scholars (e.g., Xing and Shaw 2013) deem this state-directed capitalism. However, market reforms have intensified competition for resources, increased interpersonal and ethnic conflicts, and spawned numerous moral and social problems (CPC Central Committee 2011). Moreover, China's

growing upper and middle classes increasingly demand individual rights and have increased expectations of the Chinese government (Pei 2016).

Thirdly, paralleling this was the reinstatement of the rule of law as a macrolevel mechanism governing market forces and the relationships and practices arising therefrom. Because the disastrous Cultural Revolution eviscerated China's legal system and judiciary, the CPC-led state had to rebuild its legislative and judiciary systems (State Council 2011). In 1982, the NPC (1982) revised the Constitution to enshrine the rule of law. Since then, old laws and regulations have been revised, and new ones enacted. Law is now an external force regulating the behaviors of the Chinese government and its people and balancing the legal rights and responsibilities of different parties (Law 2011).

However, individuals' rights remain inadequately enforced and protected, and Chinese people's constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of speech and assembly are routinely suppressed (Feng 2017). For example, 2010 Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo, who called for political reform in his writings, was imprisoned for subverting state power and the socialist system (Beijing No. 1 Intermediate People's Court 2009). Despite Liu's 2017 death while in custody, his wife, Liu Xia, remains under house arrest; this has infringed on her "inviolable" right to freedom (NPC 2018, Article 37). Lawyers defending political and social activists have also been suppressed. For example, on 9 July, 2015, over 200 human rights lawyers and activists were interrogated or arrested (Agence France-Presse 2018b), with some being convicted of crimes and sentenced. As of April 2018, Wang Quanzhang, charged with subversion of state power in the crackdown, has "disappeared" without trial for over 1000 days. The authorities reportedly still block Wang's wife and family-appointed lawyer from reaching him (Agence France-Presse 2018b). These events have led some countries to question China's commitment to its constitutionally guaranteed human rights (e.g., U.S. Embassy and Consulates in China 2017).

Fourthly, Chinese culture and values, once downplayed, are now seen as key to socialist Chinese citizenship and national identity (CPC Central Committee 2011). Post-Mao CPC leaders have made use of traditional Chinese values and virtues as an internal, impelling force supplementing the function of law by reshaping people's thinking and behaviors, reinforcing ethnic solidarity, and addressing moral and social issues and problems socialism cannot.

More important, as the commitment to socialism has declined in China and overseas, the CPC has repositioned itself within Chinese culture and civilization to legitimize its continued leadership. Under Jiang Zemin (2001), the CPC claimed to represent China's advanced cultures. The CPC Central Committee (2011) even claimed that the CPC had, since its founding, been the inheritor and promoter of Chinese culture and developer of China's advanced culture. The CPC also realizes the soft power of Chinese culture in promoting China's image and influence globally – e.g., through Confucius Institutes in overseas universities. During the 2008 Beijing Olympics and 2010 Shanghai World Exposition, China showcased Chinese culture and civilization, not socialism. Likewise, in his speech to the 2018 Boao Forum for Asia, Xi Jinping (2018) referenced five Chinese classical texts (including Laozi and Xunzi), rather than Marx and Lenin, to explain China's developments and

achievements since 1978. This raises the question of how relevant socialism is to China, its development, and its leaders in the twenty-first century.

Fifthly, while still tightly controlled, civil society – as a realm of social relations, public discourse, and participation – is an increasingly important element of China’s new socialist citizenship (Law 2011). The Internet, mobile phones, and social media have become important tools for daily communication, sharing diverse views on public policy and affairs, expressing dissatisfaction, and calling for social action – they have, in short, facilitated “societal pluralism” (Xing and Shaw 2013, p. 107). Recognizing this, the state increasingly uses social media to explain its policies and solicit popular support, instead of large-scale political mobilization campaigns.

However, the CPC-led state under Xi Jinping began to use state security and national solidarity to justify greater control over civil society. In 2016, it began requiring overseas NGOs operated in China to register with, secure approval from, and be overseen by the Ministry of Public Security and local police departments (NPC Standing Committee 2016b). Although the law welcomes “friendly” international NGOs, it could suppress “hostile” ones (Feng 2017).

Cyberspace is no exception to the CPC-led state’s increased control. The Cyber Security Law requires netizens to use their real name and information during real-time communications and Internet service providers to provide the state with users’ personal information and stop or restrict services during ad hoc social security events (NPC Standing Committee 2016a). In 2017, the CPC-led state cracked down on virtual private networks (VPNs) used by Chinese netizens (and China-based foreign companies) to access global websites (e.g., Facebook, Google) blocked by China’s Great Firewall. China’s domestic social networking websites (e.g., Weibo) were asked to remove vulgar and unhealthy contents, and some popular news apps (e.g., Jinren Toutao and Tencent) were removed from app stores for 3 weeks, as a penalty for previously allowing users to post contents in conflict with CPC-prescribed socialist values (Agence France-Press 2018a). Jinren Toutao’s chief executive publicly apologized for ignoring “socialist core values” and promised increase content censorship (Lau 2018). Chinese authorities also asked global publishers to deny Chinese portals access to articles deemed politically sensitive (Bland 2017; Cambridge University Press 2017). Similarly, religion is subject to increased political control, with thousands of crosses being removed from churches (Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2017), religious bodies having to apply to local authorities 30 days in advance for permission to hold large-scale religious activities, and prohibitions on overseas travel for religious training, conferences, and activities (State Council 2017).

Socialist Education for Citizenship

Since 1949, education in the PRC has embodied the ruling elite’s political will and has been used as an agent of socialization to promote the CPC-led state’s orthodoxy and socialist citizenship, and maintain its leadership, through four main strategies.

Firstly, the CPC-led state has legislated the embedding of its political will in education and has prescribed sociopolitical values to be fostered to develop a socialist citizenry. Education is explicitly entrusted with two nation-(re)building tasks: equipping students for national development and modernization (economic task) and training students to be “builders and successors of socialism” (political task) (NPC 2015). According to its Education Law, China’s education is to be guided by Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong’s Thought, and theories of Chinese socialism (NPC 2015). Public and private schools and tertiary institutions have the constitutional responsibility of fostering state-prescribed sociopolitical values: “five loves” (loving the nation, the people, labor, science, and socialism) for China’s development and modernization, and “five-isms” (patriotism, collectivism, internationalism, communism, and dialectical and historical materialism) to fight “capitalist, feudal and other decadent ideas” (NPC 2018, Article 24). The 2018 Constitution deems these “socialist core values,” and the 2015 Education Law tasks education with reinforcing students’ consciousness of them (NPC 2015). This reflects that using education to foster modern citizens is important to the development of socialist politics and a harmonious society and cultivating human capital for modernization (Chuanbao Tan 2014).

Secondly, like other state institutions, universities and schools feature a dual leadership system (political and administrative) under the president/principal responsibility system. For example, in Peking University (China’s oldest and most important university), the university party secretary oversees political work, whereas the university president (also deputy university party secretary) oversees administrative affairs. Peking University’s charter vests most governing power in the Peking University Party Committee, which is responsible for implementing the CPC’s party line, policies, and decisions (Peking University 2014). The charter decides university structure, reform, and development and chooses key personnel. In comparison, Peking University’s president’s power is largely limited to daily university operation, recruiting/dismissing staff, managing students, and drafting university development plans. Similar dual leadership is institutionalized in schools (Xu 2016).

Thirdly, since the 1950s, the PRC has adopted a cross-curriculum approach to teaching socialist orthodoxy and political positions, through such subjects as Chinese Language, Chinese History, Geography, Music, and compulsory political education. In September 2017, the latter subject was renamed Ethics and Law (*daode yu fazhi*). University students must also pass political courses (e.g., Principles of Marxism, Mao Zedong Thought) for graduation, as must school students if they wish to continue to the next level of education.

Interestingly, during Mao’s period (1949–1976), school curricula emphasized collectivistic selves rather than individuality, to cultivate “new socialist persons” who were both “red” (allowing socialist ideology to command their lives) and “expert” (having academic knowledge and technical skills for China’s socialist modernization) (Law 2011). Curricula promoted the superiority of socialism over capitalism and the CPC’s dualist worldview of socialist countries as friends and capitalist countries as enemies. Chinese culture was downplayed and criticized.

During the Cultural Revolution, education was severely disrupted, and Mao's thoughts upheld as the highest knowledge.

Under Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao (1980s – early 2010s), school curricula were less ideologically restrictive, both to help students adapt to “primitive socialism” and to reflect leaders' varied interpretations of Chinese socialism. In the 1990s, China began to help students transition to a socialist market economy. Per Lee and Ho (2008), China's citizenship education emphasized students' personal growth and psychological capacity; ethics in family, occupation, and society; and global outlook and awareness. In the early 2000s, the state began to gradually extend the learning of English from junior secondary one to primary three, and even primary one in such developed cities as Shanghai. Lee and Ho (2008) saw these changes as depoliticizing education.

However, the CPC-led state has not abandoned education's citizen-making function in fostering modern socialist citizenry. The 2002 revised citizenship curriculum continues to promote CPC political views and positions (Ministry of Education 2002). As part of the CPC's repositioning of Chinese culture, students were encouraged to study past Chinese civilization and culture and their global contributions. Students were reminded of China's national humiliation by foreign powers, and how the CPC had helped save China from foreign encroachments. Although the CPC-led state no longer mentioned socialism's superiority over capitalism, it encouraged students' pride in China's achievements under the CPC leadership and fostered their enthusiasm and love for the CPC. Moreover, as in Mao's period, students were required to learn and to be tested on CPC leaders' theories, important statements, policies, and socialist values. Although students learned more about foreign countries and cultures, such learning still highlighted China's role in and engagement with the world (Law 2011).

Compared to his immediate predecessors, Xi Jinping has more tightly controlled education's ideo-political function of sustaining the CPC's leadership in the twenty-first century. As one deputy minister of education explained, education is an important means to help students strengthen their fundamental understanding of China (*dahao zhongguo dise*) and to transplant “red DNA” (*hongse jiyin*) into them so they can resist ideological infiltration by adversarial forces in increasingly complicated domestic and global contexts (Chang Tan and Yang 2017). Education has been given two specific political tasks – to strengthen the CPC leadership, fully implement its education policies, and ensure schools are strong bases of CPC support; and to cultivate students' love of the CPC, the nation, and its people, and their understanding of, identification with, and support for the state's political system (Ministry of Education 2017).

To that end, in 2016, the CPC Central Committee and State Council issued a document (*Opinions on the Strengthening and Improvement of Textbooks for Universities, Secondary Schools and Primary Schools*) demanding school and university textbooks be revised to ensure their correct political orientation (Fan 2016). By early 2017, the Ministry of Education completed its revision of textbooks for three primary and junior secondary school subjects deemed most related to the CPC's ideology and ethnic identification – Chinese Language, Chinese History, and

Ethics and Law. The major textbook amendments included increased learning contents about Chinese cultural traditions, China's revolutionary traditions (particularly CPC heroes and red classics), state sovereignty, education in law, ethnic solidarity, and understanding the world. These textbooks began to be used in schools in September 2017.

Fourthly, the CPC-led state uses extracurricular activities and national civic rituals to enhance students' national identity and reinforce their affiliation with the CPC. The National Flag Law requires primary and secondary schools to conduct a weekly flag-raising ceremony in which the national anthem is played or sung (NPC 1990). China's current national flag is CPC-specific; its red color symbolizes the spirit of socialist revolution, with five stars representing the CPC (the largest star), the working class, peasants, urban petty bourgeoisie, and national bourgeoisie, arranged to symbolize the unity of the people under CPC leadership. In 2017, the NPC Standing Committee (2017) passed the National Anthem Law, requiring primary and secondary school students to learn the national anthem's background and spirit and sing it in a solemn ritual as part of their patriotic education.

Moreover, since its assumption of power in 1949, the CPC has established and developed two important political leagues on campus to help foster students' affiliation and identification with the CPC. The Young Pioneers is for students (aged 6–14) in primary schools and junior secondary schools to learn socialism and become a preparatory team for constructing socialist undertakings (China Young Pioneers National Congress 2005). The league's anthem is: We are Communist Successors. Although not CPC members, Young Pioneers must swear they will "enthusiastically love the Communist Party of China, the nation, and people... and prepare to contribute to the communist undertaking" (Article 12). When asked on important occasions about whether they are preparing to strive for socialist undertakings, young pioneers are required to respond, "Always preparing" (Article 9).

The second on-campus political league, China Communist Youth League (CCYL), targets students (aged 15–27) in senior secondary schools, colleges, and universities. CCYL is seen as a cradle for future state officials; President Hu Jintao (2003–2012) and Premier Li Keqiang (2003 – present) are former CCYL leaders. In the CPC's structure, the CCYL's political status is very high, as its central committee is under the direct leadership of the CPC Central Committee. The number of CCYL members increased to 87.5 million in 2015, from 78.6 million (of which 51.3% were students) in 2008 (CCYL 2009; Xinhua News Agency 2016). The CPC has high political expectation of CCYL members, regarding it as the CPC's "assistant and reserved army" and a place for young people to learn and practice Chinese socialism and communism (CYCL National Congress 2008). CCYL members are required to "resolutely support" the CPC's manifesto, unswervingly hew CPC's party line, and strive for the final realization of communism.

All this suggests that Chinese education and citizenship education have become the embodiment of the CPC's political will and an important ideo-political instrument with which to consolidate and sustain its leadership. The CPC-dominated state and Chinese socialism, as the state orthodoxy, have played important roles in

defining and shaping modern Chinese citizenry for the last seven decades. As such, the future of the CPC and Chinese socialism, as examined in the next section, could be critical to the future of Chinese citizenship and education for citizenship in the twenty-first century.

Contentious Issues Confronting Chinese Citizenship and Education in China

China has made significant changes in Chinese citizenship and education for citizenship for nation-(re)building. However, the more China opens to and engages with the world, the more the CPC leadership relies on China-specific elements to define China's national identity and the tighter its political and ideological control of Chinese society and education. China faces three contentious issues in making modern Chinese citizenry in the twenty-first century: power monopolization and participatory citizenship; the relevance of socialism to a rising China; and education for citizen-making or person-making.

The first concerns who governs and who is governed and how the latter can participate in governance and be protected from the former's misuse or abuse of power. Aside from Taiwan's democratization since 2000 (Law 2004), no Chinese society has peacefully transferred power between political parties, which Huntington (1991) called a minimal indicator of a fairly well-established democracy. The 1911 revolution heralded the beginning of party-based governance, and, like the power transfer from the KMT to the CPC, was achieved through bloodshed and death. Despite having urged the KMT to abandon one-party dictatorship and share power, the CPC has, since 1949, maintained a similar model of party-dominated governance, jealously guarding its power against other political parties.

Does China need an inter-party power transfer in its leadership and governance, particularly when China is growing stronger and rising as a world power? The CPC's answer is clearly no; thus, it has institutionalized inequality in state structures to monopolize power and minimize political competition. In 2018, the CPC Central Committee (2018) reformed state institutions to allow the CPC to lead all aspects of Chinese life, including government, the military, education, and society. The CPC has actively suppressed groups and activities it deems challenging to its leadership, and current CPC leaders argue for strong CPC leadership in China's national development, national security, and rejuvenation in the world.

Since the 1978 policy of economic reform and opening to the world, some elements of socialist Chinese citizenship have changed significantly, including individuals' relationships with the market, law, and Chinese culture. Chinese society, through technology and social media, has become increasingly pluralistic and diversified – except in its political landscape. Chinese people's needs have grown, as have their expectations of and demands on the Chinese government, and their desire for participatory citizenship (Woodman and Guo 2017). As shown by the example of Liu Xiaobo, suppression, this author believes, may silence people's voices, but cannot end their thoughts of freedom and liberty. The CPC-led state

should embrace its constitutional responsibility to protect its people's rights and freedoms and remember and reestablish the CPC's original mission (*buwang chuxin*) of sharing power with and governing through the people (rather than dictating in their name).

The second issue concerns the relevance of socialism to China's development and the needs of its people. Chinese rulers have not abandoned the country's millennia-old tradition of adopting a specific school of thought or ideology – Confucianism in imperial China, Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles in the ROC, and socialism in the PRC – to guide and shape the state's structure and governance and legitimize their leadership. However, since the 1990s, the CPC has faced a dilemma between its political orthodoxy that only socialism could save China, and the practical reality that only China could save socialism. Thus, CPC leaders have constantly adapted socialism to suit changing conditions and needs at different stages of China's nation-(re)building. The CPC has used China's primitive stage of socialism and socialism with Chinese characteristics to rationalize its drastic ideological shift in using market forces to allocate resources, reinforce the role of law, and tolerate the emergence of social classes.

To preserve its ideological mandate, CPC-governed China tried to make Marxism more relevant by establishing Marxist institutes in universities and republishing writings on Marxism. Simultaneously, the CPC created a cultural mandate for its leadership by reinstating traditional Chinese culture and encouraging people to learn and appreciate Chinese culture and civilization. It has made more efforts at promoting Chinese culture and civilization than at promoting Marxism and socialism, suggesting its efforts are more about China saving socialism, than about socialism saving China, and that the CPC needs socialism more than the Chinese people do.

The third controversial issue is the tension between citizen-making and person-making (Law 2017). Chinese education has been severely criticized for being an instrument of social and political forces, failing to help students become autonomous persons, and not developing students' creativity and ability to innovate and think independently and critically (Zhao and Deng 2016). In recent curriculum reforms, China's Ministry of Education (2012) admitted this hindered students from handling the challenges of globalization and assigned education two contrasting tasks: to help students learn CPC-prescribed values and be patriotic, and to enable them to inquire, think independently, and examine issues from multiple perspectives.

It remains to be seen how these two contrasting tasks will be balanced. To foster autonomous persons, some propose a return to Confucian pedagogy and self-cultivation to help students become autonomous persons (Wu 2014), and nurture their capacity for independent critical thought (Zhao 2016). However, the CPC instead uses Confucianism as a cultural mandate for its continued leadership and domination. Despite calls for individualism and self-making (Woodman and Guo 2017), the PRC under Xi Jinping has tightened, rather than loosened, its ideological grip on state institutions, education, society, and cyberspace, emphasizing the CPC's leadership.

Conclusion

This chapter has broadly traced the intertwined relations between the state, its governing orthodoxy, and education in imperial China, the ROC, and the PRC. It has demonstrated Chinese citizenship is situated and can vary with changes in political regimes and domestic/global contexts. Despite changes of dynasty or ruling party, Chinese citizenship is state-centric, rather than people- or citizen-oriented. The state defines Chinese citizenship and education and selects the official orthodoxy for state governance to legitimize its leadership and rationalize the precedence of collective over individual interests. Education is more an instrument of citizen-making than person-making and is used to promote the ruler's orthodoxy and values and foster an obedient citizenry for social and political stability. This symbiosis of state, state orthodoxy, and education is a cultural tradition, and unlikely to change soon. The future of Chinese citizenship and education for citizenship depends on the CPC's future, who its leaders will be, and their responses to changing domestic and global contexts in the twenty-first century.

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Citizenship Education in the Republic of Ireland: Plus ça Change?

21

Audrey Bryan

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Abstract

This chapter presents a critical overview of the literature concerning the reception and content of citizenship education which has been taught as a compulsory subject to lower-secondary level students in Irish second-level schools since the late 1990s in the form of Civic, Social and Political Education (CSPE). It seeks to illuminate the “placebo” function that citizenship education serves (Gillborn, *Educ Citizenship Soc Justice* 1:83–104, 2006). While ostensibly concerned with enabling young people to come to a deeper understanding of social and global injustice and empowering them to take action against these injustices, it presents evidence to suggest that CSPE works to constrain young people’s imagination about what is possible and how they might engage in struggle for a more egalitarian world (Kennelly, *Citizen youth: culture, activism and agency in a neoliberal era*. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2011). The chapter also interrogates the recent reframing of citizenship within a newly foregrounded well-being discourse in contemporary educational policy, paying particular attention to the ideological work performed by the civic dimensions of a newly implemented well-being program in Irish schools. Specifically, it is argued that

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the citizenship-as-well-being discourse serves to amplify earlier individualized versions of citizenship promoted in CSPE and to encourage citizen-subjects who are self-reliant, self-responsible, self-managing, and resilient. In so doing, it seeks to demonstrate the ways in which the contemporary focus on well-being detracts from the *actual* social and material determinants of well-being and considers what forms of citizenship are foreclosed by a citizenship-as-well-being discourse.

Keywords

Citizenship education · Well-being · Welfare · Resilience · Neoliberalism · Education policy · Reform · Curriculum · Responsibilization

Introduction: Citizenship Education in Context

In the Republic of Ireland, the task of educating young people for citizenship has gained significant momentum in recent years, as evidenced by the introduction of a new, elective, upper-secondary subject known as *Politics and Society*, in 2018. At lower-secondary level, there has been a revisioning of citizenship education within the context of a broader reform of the “junior cycle” curriculum, resulting in a realignment of citizenship as part of a larger well-being program for 12–15-year olds. In view of the fact that *Politics and Society* has only recently been introduced as a subject at senior cycle or upper-secondary level, resulting in a lack of published research on this new subject, the chapter focuses primarily on developments in citizenship education at junior cycle or lower-secondary level. Its primary focus, therefore, is on Civic, Social and Political Education (CSPE), which was introduced as a universal, examination subject as part of the junior cycle curriculum in the late 1990s.

The chapter begins with a necessarily selective engagement with some of the main sociocultural influences which have informed the focus and direction that citizenship education has taken in Ireland. The next section presents an overview of the literature concerning the reception and substantive content of CSPE, before considering some of the implications of recent curricular developments in the area of well-being which are shaping the particular “brand” of youth citizenship that is currently being promoted in Irish schools (Mills and Waite 2017). Specifically, it interrogates the reframing of citizenship within a newly foregrounded well-being discourse in contemporary Irish educational policy, paying particular attention to the ideological work that the civic dimensions of the well-being program perform. It is argued that the citizenship-as-well-being discourse serves to amplify earlier efforts to encourage individualized understandings of citizenship and to promote citizen-subjects who are self-reliant, self-responsible, self-managing, and resilient. In so doing, it seeks to demonstrate the ways in which the contemporary focus on well-being detracts from the *actual* social and material determinants of well-being and considers what forms of citizenship are foreclosed by a citizenship-as-well-being discourse.

A Brief History of Citizenship Education in the Republic of Ireland

Historically speaking, citizenship education's place in the Irish curriculum has been highly contentious; as in other jurisdictions, curriculum developments in the Republic of Ireland are a reflection of power struggles among different interest groups, most notably, in this instance, among representatives of the Catholic Church on the one hand, who were opposed to the introduction of citizenship education, and educationalists and government officials on the other, who advocated for the introduction of citizenship education as a stand-alone subject as far back as the 1920s. The evolution of citizenship education in Ireland cannot be understood, therefore, without reference to the centrality of the Catholic Church in Irish educational, social, cultural, and political life; nor can the form that citizenship education has taken be understood without reference to the consensualist and anti-intellectual cultures which dominated Irish intellectual thought for much of the twentieth century, the ramifications of which are arguably still evident today (Lynch 1987).

Citizenship education was absent from the formal curriculum at both primary and secondary levels until the 1960s. Whereas the post-independence Free State government had plans to include civics as a curriculum subject at primary level as early as 1922, it only appeared on the primary school syllabus for the first time in 1971, largely as a result of Church-led opposition to the proposal. Educational policy-making during the first four decades of the Irish State's postindependence existence was dominated by a "theocentric paradigm" (O'Sullivan 2005, p. 106). The Roman Catholic Church presided over a privately owned but state-financed system, insisting on "monopolistic control of the education of young people" (Garvin 2004, p. 201). Church control over the education system met with a passive, deferential response from successive education ministers who were content to act merely in a caretaking capacity, leaving to the Catholic Church the task of training children in the fear and love of God through the prioritization of religious and moral training and character formation and reviving the Irish language (O'Connor 1986; O'Donohue 1999).

The Catholic Church's opposition to civics stemmed in part at least from the belief that civic issues should be addressed within the context of religious education (Kerr et al. 2002). When citizenship education was eventually introduced at primary level in the early 1970s, civics and religious formation were viewed as inextricably linked (Williams 1999). Both subjects were seen to "share much common ground in the knowledge they seek to impart and the attitudes and virtues they aim to develop," and as a result "...[t]here is obviously a very close affinity between religious education and civics" (Department of Education 1971, p. 116; cited in Williams 1999, p. 326). Similarly, when civics was introduced as a separate subject at second level for the first time in 1967, official documentation about the new academic subject articulated the primacy of religious education and expressed the belief that moral and civic education were derived from religious principles (Williams 2005). Instructional materials stressed the importance of "co-ordinating civics with religious instruction" (Williams 1999, p. 325), with the result that in practice, civics and religious education were often taught by the same teacher and treated as a single subject (Gleeson 2010).

The civics curriculum also had a strong patriotic dimension. The introduction to the syllabus stated that one of the key functions of education was to ensure that future citizens “. . . will acquire the civic virtues of integrity, fortitude, independence of mind, loyalty to this country and diligence” (Government of Ireland 1968–1969, p. 111). One of the stated goals of civics was to “inculcate. . . an understanding of true patriotism and its demands” and to teach young people “to be ready to defend the national territory should the need arise” (cited in Keating 2009, p. 168). The resulting syllabus was “bland” (Hyland 1993; Jeffers 2008), and students and teachers alike experienced it as “dull, boring and conformist” (Jeffers 2008, p. 12).

It was within this context that civics – even through it was a curriculum requirement – came to occupy a very marginal status in schools and was often quietly ignored in favor of examinable subject areas and other topics (Hammond and Looney 2004; Hyland 1993; Kerr et al. 2002). As early as the 1970s, it had become clear that civics was “a dying subject” (NCCA 1997, p. 1), having failed to establish itself in the curriculum in any meaningful way (Clarke 2002). It wasn’t until the 1990s that sufficient political commitment to a reimagining of citizenship education resulted in the implementation of a pilot project which led to the introduction of a new curriculum program in CSPE at lower-secondary level in 1997. Heralded as a “landmark event” (Jeffers 2008, p. 11), CSPE was introduced against a wider backdrop of significant economic, political, and social change in Irish society, including a growing secularization of Irish society, an increasing desire at European Union (EU) level to promote a sense of European identity among member states, the birth of the so-called Celtic Tiger economic boom, and growing national as well as international concerns about the broader trend of disaffection of young people from political and social institutions (Hammond and Looney 2004). Organized around seven key concepts (democracy, rights and responsibilities, human dignity, interdependence, development, law, and stewardship) and taught through four units of study (the individual and citizenship, the community, the state, Ireland and the world), CSPE sought to develop active citizens who have a sense of belonging to the local, national, European, and global communities.

Since 2017, CSPE has featured as one of the four main pillars of a new well-being program for junior cycle students (alongside physical education (PE); social, personal, and health education (SPHE); and guidance education), the goal of which is to teach and encourage young people to be *active, responsible, connected, resilient, respected, and aware* (DES 2018, p. 10). CSPE, along with SPHE and PE, *must* be included in the well-being program devised by each school, and schools have to meet a minimum requirement of 70-h in each of these across 3 years of the junior cycle program. Since 2017, schools have had three options in relation to CSPE. They can either use the original 1996 CSPE syllabus or continue to teach citizenship education over 70-h (one 40-min class per week) over the 3 years but adapting the syllabus to reflect newly established “well-being indicators” (discussed in more detail below). Alternatively, schools can introduce the somewhat lengthier NCCA CSPE “short course” (comprising 100-h to run over 2 or 3 years) which is built around three strands: rights and responsibilities, global citizenship, and exploring democracy. Finally, schools have the option to design a shorter, 70-h CSPE program,

based on the new short course specification for CSPE. Irrespective of which option schools choose, the goal of CSPE is “. . .to inform, inspire, empower and enable young people to participate as active citizens in contemporary society at local, national and global levels, based on an understanding of human rights and social responsibilities” (NCCA 2016, p. 5).

The next section presents a brief overview of the research exploring the reception and implementation of citizenship education since its introduction as a stand-alone subject in the late 1990s. This analysis provides the foundation for a consideration of some of the key implications of the recent alignment of citizenship within a well-being framework, with a particular emphasis on the ideological work that is performed by this new focus of learning in Irish schools.

Citizenship Education as a “Cinderella Subject”

Since its inception in the late 1990s, there have been a number of studies examining the reception and implementation of citizenship education as a discrete curricular subject in Irish schools (e.g., Bryan and Bracken 2011; Gleeson 2009; Gleeson and Munnelly 2003; Niens and McIllrth 2010; Nugent 2006). Gleeson and Munnelly (2003) highlight the role of school cultural and organizational actors in influencing perceptions of, and attitudes toward, CSPE. They attribute the poorer reception of CPSE in privately owned schools (which are denominationally managed) to the historical opposition by the Catholic Church to citizenship as a discrete subject in the curriculum highlighted above. While state-owned schools may have proven *relatively* more enthusiastic about the introduction of CSPE as a discrete academic subject than their privately owned counterparts, there is a body of evidence to suggest that CSPE has been regarded as a “Cinderella subject” in many schools, regardless of their ethos or managerial structure (Gleeson 2009; Murphy 2009; Niens and McIllrth 2010; Sugrue et al. 2007). The perception that CSPE is underappreciated (albeit potentially with much to offer) exists for a variety of reasons, not least because of the failure to afford it parity of esteem with other academic subjects and its consignment to one 40-min session per week. As in other jurisdictions, CSPE often acts as a timetable filler to cover shortages in teachers’ timetables (Clarke 2002), which means that in practice, many, if not most of those tasked with teaching CSPE, are effectively “conscripted” into this role rather than qualified and motivated to teach CSPE (Davies 2010; Murphy 2009; Niens and McIllrth 2010).

The exam-driven focus of the curriculum at second level has also been identified as a major obstacle to the meaningful inclusion of citizenship issues in the formal curriculum more generally, particularly in relation to in-depth exploration of social and global justice themes and issues. Research suggests that teachers often feel restricted by the need to produce “safe” and acceptable answers in the context of a competitive national examinational system which militates against more critical engagement with the complexities of social and global problems and injustices (Bryan and Bracken 2011). Despite many teachers’ sophisticated understanding of the complex nature of social and global injustices, simplistic “softer”

prescriptions offer a more manageable, “knowable world” and therefore constitute a more seductive and reassuring alternative within a system that privileges and rewards people on the basis of tangible, measurable outputs and definitive results. These restrictions are a function of a highly centralized, point-driven system which leaves very little “freedom. . . for teachers or schools to experiment with different approaches or for pupils to try a risky subject or indulge a particular interest or passion” (Dunne 2002, p. 83). The broader suite of junior cycle reforms alluded earlier is intended to provide schools with “greater flexibility to design programs that are suited to the needs of their junior cycle students and to the particular context of the school” and places much greater emphasis on classroom-based and formative assessments than on terminal examinations (Department of Education and Skills [DES] 2015, p. 7). However, the allocation of 70–100 contact hours over three years (depending on the particular program which individual schools opt for) arguably does not provide sufficient opportunities for deep, meaningful, or complex engagement with citizenship themes and issues.

In addition to these perceptual and structural constraints, the actual content of CSPE textbooks and curriculum resources has been found to be wanting. Faas and Ross (2012), for example, identified “discrepancies between the progressive rhetoric of policy documents and the content of textbooks and other curriculum material” (p. 574). These authors maintain that “while the rhetoric of the CSPE syllabus presents education for citizenship in terms of active participation, the empowerment of young people and reflective citizenship, the prevailing impression is of a largely liberal conception of citizenship” (p.583). Other analyses suggest that citizenship education texts reflect and promote *neoliberal* understandings, as evidenced by their promotion of individual action as the primary “solution” to large-scale social problems (Bryan 2014). Biesta and Lawy (2006) maintain that since the 1980s, conceptions of citizenship have become increasingly depoliticized and individualistic and that education has come to play an instrumental role in this individualized notion of citizenship through the attempt to instill a specific set of knowledge, skills, values, and dispositions with the aim of producing committed, active, self-regulating, and responsible citizens. Similarly, Westheimer and Kahne (2004) point to the existence of citizenship education initiatives premised upon the *personally responsible* vision of citizenship, which encourages citizens to act responsibly by, for example, making charitable donations, being an ethical consumer, picking up litter, giving blood, recycling, and obeying laws. In addition to framing activism as an individualistic endeavor, educational initiatives premised upon a personally responsible citizenship framework are often further informed by a “solidarity with benefits” ideology that stress the individual reward, personal empowerment, and self-enhancement that accompany one’s actions (Bryan 2014; Chouliaraki 2013; Kearns 1992; Kennelly 2011). As Westheimer and Kahne (2004) observe, the personally responsible citizen – namely, someone who engages in voluntaristic, charitable acts, and whose activism simultaneously functions as a resource for the self – is not arbitrary but rather reflects a specific set of political choices with both ideological and material effects. Looking at the specific actions that young people are encouraged to take in CSPE textbooks and related materials

suggests that they are encouraged to perform solidarity through individualized, voluntaristic, and typically “low-cost” actions that tend to involve no more than minimal effort. Both learning resources and school-based efforts to promote so-called active citizens are reflective of a “three Fs” approach to citizenship education – comprising *fundraising, fasting, and having fun in aid of specific causes* (Bryan and Bracken 2011). As Kennelly (2011) observes, the conflation of “good” or “responsible” citizenship with narrowly conceived versions of activism and legitimized through citizenship education curricula has a range of problematic effects, including the regulation and curtailment of activism and the undermining of an alternative set of activist practices, particularly those which pose a challenge to state legitimacy.

The content of CSPE is further compromised of a failure to provide young people with access to knowledge about the structural dimensions of social injustices such as poverty and a tendency to promote apolitical, sanitized understandings of global problems, which do little, if anything, to inform them of their underlying complexities and causes. In addition to concealing the root causes of the very injustices it seeks to raise awareness about, citizenship education fails to critically or meaningfully engage students with their own complicity in these unequal global relations of power (Andretti 2006; Bryan and Bracken 2011). From this perspective, citizenship education can be seen to function as a sort of “public policy placebo” or “pretend treatment” for social and global injustices as intractable as the global climate crisis, poverty, and the unjust policies and practices of international institutions and transnational corporations (Gillborn 2006, p. 83). In other words, while ostensibly concerned with enabling young people to come to a deeper understanding of social and global injustice and to “make a difference” by “taking action” against these injustices, citizenship education in effect works to constrain young people’s imagination about what is possible and how they might engage in struggle for a more egalitarian world (Kennelly 2011). The next section considers these criticisms of citizenship education’s so-called placebo effect within the context of the repositioning of CSPE as a key pillar of the well-being program in Irish schools. Through a consideration of a number of concepts which “appear. . .benign at first glance” (Howell and Veronka 2012, p. 4), it seeks to illuminate the role that the citizenship-as-well-being discourse plays in displacing responsibility for solving social problems from the state and institutional level to the individual.

Citizenship-as-Responsibilization

As outlined above, in 2017 CSPE became part of a new curricular and educational policy emphasis on the promotion of well-being in schools. The foregrounding of well-being in Irish educational policy is reflective of a new “zeitgeist” on the perceived importance of social-emotional learning (SEL) (Humphrey 2013, p. 2) as well as an increasingly therapeutic approach to schooling which is concerned with individual development and emotional and psychological well-being (Ecclestone and Hayes 2009; Wright 2015). As McLeod (2015) notes “. . .the reach of well-being

as an educational discourse is extensive” (p. 179). There exists a small but growing body of critical literature on the prevalence of well-being as a discourse in an Irish context (e.g., Cronin 2015; McAleavey 2013; Mulhall 2016; O’Brien 2018; O’Brien and O’Shea 2018). This work considers the extent to which the increasing emphasis on nonmaterial determinants of well-being in public policy and mainstream media – such as contributing to one’s community, feeling connected to others, being able to cope with life’s challenges, etc. – elides the importance of attending to the material and economic conditions that also affect people’s quality of life and physical and mental health.

Drawing on the deployment of well-being discourses in Ireland in multiple domains such as mainstream media as well as health, mental health, and educational policies, Mulhall (2016) provides compelling evidence of how the discourse of well-being and its “proxy concepts” such as “happiness,” “resilience,” etc. (Marklund 2013, p. 210) function “...as a symbiotic neoliberal technology of self-responsibilization that works in tandem with a shrinking of publicly-funded resources and the targeting of ‘problem’ populations for a kind of extinction at a distance” (pp. 30–31). As Mulhall persuasively argues, it is no coincidence that the enthusiasm for well-being discourses intensified in the context of economic recession and structural adjustment which had a profound impact on Irish society in the wake of the global financial crisis that began in the late 2000s. Mulhall’s compelling interrogation of national policy documents and international initiatives to measure subjective well-being and happiness demonstrates that while national governments and international agencies may acknowledge the detrimental impact that poverty and the unequal distribution of resources can have for people’s lived realities, they tend to privilege personal and local determinants of well-being to the neglect of state-level or economic factors. The emphasis on local and personal-level sources of well-being is, Mulhall argues, an ideological decision. She puts it like this:

If happiness primarily derives from the social (rather than economic) capital available to the individual, the family, the neighbourhood and the community, then the responsibility of the ruling class for the immiseration attendant on the dismantling of the welfare state in the name of the free market can be effaced to a considerable extent. (p. 33)

O’Brien (2018) addresses the tension that exists between individualized psychological conceptions of well-being on the one hand, and collective, welfarist, or sociological approaches to well-being, on the other, with a specific focus on how these discourses are being applied in schools. Given the contraction of the welfare state, she questions whether well-being can be meaningfully addressed with those students whose basic needs for housing, a safe environment and nutrition are not being properly met. Approaching the question about the role of schooling in the promotion of well-being from a sociological perspective, O’Brien draws our attention to the inherent tension that exists between the increasing responsibility that schools have to promote well-being and the socially reproductive function that schooling serves, replicating and reinforcing inequalities that exist in the wider society, and thereby functioning as a hindrance – rather than an enabler – of well-being.

The remainder of this chapter looks specifically at the realignment of CSPE within this broader well-being agenda that constitutes a new area of learning for students at second level. Despite its appearance as a progressive feature of the curriculum, it is argued that the positioning of CSPE within a wider well-being program reflects a deepening of the responsabilization of citizenship; tasking citizens with increased personal responsibility for their own individual educational, health, and welfare needs; and promoting a significantly greater role for communities – rather than the state – in ameliorating social and global injustices (Hartung 2018; Kisby 2017; Lister 2011).

The Citizenship-as-Well-being Discourse

“Managing myself” and “staying well” are two of the eight “key skills” that students are expected to learn as part of the junior cycle program, implying that young people have a duty to manage themselves and to remain healthy. Well-being is further operationalized in terms of six so-called well-being indicators (DES 2018, p. 10). Young people are taught and encouraged to be active, responsible, connected, resilient, respected, and aware through their involvement in a “well-being program,” which seeks to produce citizens who are “confident and skilled participant[s] in physical activity”; who make “healthy eating choices”; who know when their “safety is at risk” and who “make right choices”; who possess the right “coping skills to deal with life’s challenges”; who believe in themselves; who feel listened to and valued; who have positive relationships with, and show care and respect for, others; and who are aware of their values and have an understanding of what helps them learn and how they can improve. The picture that emerges is that of an autonomous, self-managing, self-regulating, self-reliant citizen who is individually responsible for their well-being through making “the right” choices, such as actively choosing healthy behaviors and lifestyles and avoiding risky situations – in short the ideal subject of the neoliberal order (Brunila and Siivonen 2016). According to Fisher (2011, p. 52), “terms such as “well-being,” “empowerment,” and “ability” constitute a form of cultural politics that involve “an introduction to, preparation for, and legitimization of certain ways of seeing and behaving in the world (Morgan 2000, p. 274).” The citizenship-as-well-being discourse sets the norms of what it means to be an acceptable individual by advocating normative versions of what it means to be a responsible citizen (Juhila et al. 2017). Casting well-being as the effect of certain abilities and life choices (e.g., being physically active and eating “healthily” or being able to cope with adversity) renders certain forms of personhood more desirable and more valuable than others (Ahmed 2010). This version of citizenship education has implications in terms of young people’s preparedness to show solidarity with others and their sense who is/who is not deserving of care, rights, or responsibilities – ideas which are central to their practicing of citizenship (Devine and Cockburn 2018). Furthermore, casting well-being as the effect of what individuals *do*, rather than in terms of a basic set of conditions that the

state has a responsibility to ensure, surely encourages people to prioritize their purely private interests in a context where different groups are forced to compete for a shrinking share of state resources (Devine and Cockburn 2018) and are premised on what Howell and Veronka (2012, p. 4) describe as “a technology of looking inward.”

The positioning of citizenship education as one of the four well-being pillars in the curriculum serves to preempt criticism that might be levelled against an individual focus on well-being in other areas of the curriculum.

Without CSPE, there is the risk that discussion of well-being can feed into individualism and miss the opportunity to make links between individual well-being and collective well-being, between the personal and the political, and ultimately between our well-being and that of the planet. Students become aware of themselves as local and global citizens with rights and responsibilities and develop a sense of care for the well-being of others as they learn how their well-being is connected to the well-being of others and of our planet. (NCCA 2017, p. 46)

Taken in conjunction with questions such as “Do I take action to protect and promote my well-being and that of others?” (responsibility well-being indicator) and “Do I appreciate that my actions and interactions impact on my own well-being and that of others, in local and global contexts?” (connected well-being indicator), these statements give a clear sense of the extent to which the individual is perceived to be responsible not just for their *own* well-being but also for the well-being of others (and the entire planet). These ideas are further reinforced in instructional materials and textbooks that instruct students to “[take] responsibility for [their] well-being and the well-being of others” on the basis that “happy and healthy citizens can create a World of Well-being” (Murphy and Ryan 2018, p. v). Echoing what Ahmed (2010, p. 7) refers to as “the happiness duty,” the citizenship-as-well-being discourse instructs young people that they have a responsibility to be well and to “stay well” both for others and themselves, creating a relationship of dependence between one person’s well-being and the well-being of others and obfuscating an awareness of the role that negative emotions such as anger and unhappiness play in effecting positive social change. Ahmed’s problematization of happiness is further instructive as a means of illuminating the power of states of unhappiness to effect change. As she explains, “[r]evolutionary forms of political consciousness involve heightening our awareness of *just how much* there is to be unhappy about” (pp. 222–223; emphasis in original).

The injunction to manage and be responsible for one’s own health and well-being, as well as the health and well-being of others, is a weighty one, especially for children as young as 12. While not denying the role that individuals can play in supporting others and addressing social injustices, placing the burden of responsibility for the well-being of others (and the planet) on children is arguably highly irresponsible. Moreover, it constitutes a shifting or displacement of responsibility for ameliorating social and global problems from the state, international agencies, and other entities such as corporations to the individual.

Concluding Comments

The theocentric paradigm which long dominated the Irish educational landscape was eventually challenged by a mercantile one, resulting in the formulation of educational policies and curricula designed, first and foremost, to fulfil the needs of a capitalist economy (O’Sullivan 2005). The emergence and intensification of a neoliberal-inflected mercantile paradigm in Irish education has had profound implications for how citizenship education is conceived and practiced in that context. In other words, the particular “brand” of youth citizenship that is promoted in Irish schools is not arbitrary but rather reflects a specific set of political choices with both ideological and material effects (Mills and Waite 2017; Westheimer and Kahne 2004). Moreover, the emergence of well-being as a “touchstone idea” in Irish education policy-making and curricula (McLeod 2015, p. 180), and the positioning of citizenship education within this broader well-being agenda, has an amplifying effect where the responsabilization of citizenship is concerned. The highly individualized and responsabilized version of citizenship which is evident in the citizenship-as-well-being discourse has the effect of forestalling political dialogue and social questioning – encounters which should be at the very heart of citizenship education – and of producing instead individualized, atomized ways of thinking about the self, based on a “technology of looking inward” (Howell and Veronka 2012, p. 4) that detract from the *actual* social and material determinants of well-being and repudiate collective solutions (McAleavey 2013; Mulhall 2016). As Mulhall (2016, p. 30) puts it: “with the individual interpellated as fully responsible for their own condition, the forces of capital and their institutional and political collaborators are exonerated of any responsibility for the suffering of the majority population.” Thus, the responsabilization of citizenship has implications for how citizen-subjects practice solidarity with others and who is perceived to be deserving or undeserving of care in contexts which are profoundly shaped by neoliberal policies and ideologies. Rather than constantly looking to education as the panacea to social or mental health problems in the wider society (Vavrus 2003), there needs to be much deeper engagement with the role that schooling plays in replicating and reinforcing inequalities that exist in the wider society and recognizing its role in hindering – rather than an enabling – well-being.

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Moments of Possibility in Politics, Policy, and Practice in New Zealand Citizenship Education

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Abstract

The history of citizenship education in New Zealand has entailed several key moments that have been subject to contested historical, social, political, and economic forces. While there has never been a stand-alone citizenship education curriculum in New Zealand, the social studies curricula remain the primary vehicle for citizenship education delivery since its origins in 1944. This chapter examines the development of citizenship education, through New Zealand’s social studies curricula, as an “education ensemble” in which five historical moments of “politics, policy, and practice” (Dale, *The contradictions of education systems: Where are they now? Address to the School of Critical Studies in Education, The University of Auckland, New Zealand, 2017*) emerged. Examining these moments against a critical theoretical lens, this chapter considers the possibility such moments held for the development of more critical and active

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citizens. The authors analyze the more recent emphasis on social inquiry and social action as two further moments of possibility for enhancing critical and active citizenship. This analysis attests to the potential for critical change through curriculum reform, but also, in contrast, the potential for an enduring minimal, content-heavy, and neoliberal approach to learning citizenship in the absence of seizing a curriculum moment. In doing so, the chapter contributes to wider debates about how citizenship curricula are positioned within an ensemble of competing political agendas, practitioner influences, and policy frameworks.

Keywords

Citizenship education · Politics · Policy · Practice · Ensemble · New Zealand

Citizenship Education as an Education Ensemble

The concept of an *educational ensemble* (Robertson and Dale 2015) challenges the idea that singular, immutable structures or powerful discourses are necessarily the best explanations for the way in which education is shaped in any given context. Instead, the idea of an ensemble highlights the fluid and dynamic impact of multiple and contesting forces, both visible and invisible, that coalesce to create the current situation and, in turn, influence future directions. To investigate the past, present, and future of citizenship education in New Zealand, we draw on Robertson and Dale (2015) and Dale (2017), especially where Dale (2017) highlights the interrelatedness of moments of politics, policy, and practice in influencing educational outcomes. In this chapter, this is applied to debates about the best way to prepare children and young people through citizenship education for their future as citizens of New Zealand (Fig. 1).

Moments of possibility can be bifurcations, that is, forks in the road where particular notions of the ideal citizen are emphasized, marginalized, or not yet




Fig. 1 Moments of possibility in politics, policy, and practice in citizenship education in New Zealand. (Adapted from Dale 2017)

imagined. There is not the space here to analyze extensively gains and losses in the twists and turns in New Zealand's history of social studies and citizenship education. Instead, this chapter uses "moments of possibility" to describe, with the benefit of hindsight and without suggesting a seamless narrative, the extent to which approaches to citizenship education in New Zealand could be considered "critical" and "active." These terms loosely define a more "maximal" approach to citizenship education, which McLaughlin (1992) described as promoting discussion, debate, active participation, and critical thinking. In contrast, minimal approaches focus on learning about civics and citizenship but not engaging in it (McLaughlin 1992). The authors suggest that a framework for "critical" and "active" citizenship education includes the following dimensions:

1. Flexible, open, and inclusive understandings of how citizenship is constituted
2. Considerable knowledge of the complexity of society and the contested nature of social issues
3. Critical links to real world social issues
4. Support for active responses (Wood and Milligan 2016. p. 69–70)

These components are founded broadly upon critical theory. Critical theory holds as its goals a commitment to expose how power relations and inequality are manifest within cultural, political, and social institutions, to reveal the practices that serve to create inequalities and injustices in society, and to transform society especially for those who hold the least power (Apple et al. 2009). When applied to citizenship education, this approach evokes goals of *critical* societal understandings, in which young people learn to critique social issues and systemic historic and contemporary injustices and also develop the skills and ability to participate with *active* responses.

The following section presents a critique of five "moments" in the historical development of citizenship education, culminating in the 2007 *New Zealand Curriculum*, which, despite various updates, has not yet been replaced with a more recent version (Ministry of Education 2007). The section focuses on social studies – as the primary vehicle of citizenship education in New Zealand (Archer and Openshaw 1992) – and how a competing ensemble of political agendas, policy debates, and practical realities led to different outcomes that, to a greater or lesser degree, enabled the emergence of a critical and active citizen.

Moments of Possibility in the History of Citizenship Education in New Zealand

The first moment of possibility to provide children and young people with preparation for citizenship came with the Education Act of 1877. Politically, the Act was in response to the need to keep children and young people usefully occupied in the newly established British colony. Policy-wise, the Act was forward-looking, establishing a schooling system that was free, compulsory, and secular.

New Zealand's first formal curriculum for primary-aged children provided a wide-ranging liberal education, including geography, nature study, music, and drawing (Bailey 1977). The practice, however, did not live up to the promise. While the curriculum was described as, "more ambitious in aim than any in the British Empire" (McLaren 1980, p. 22), there were few teachers available to teach the curriculum in the manner in which it was intended, large class sizes, and inappropriate buildings (May 2011). Māori were excluded from this curriculum and instead were educated under the 1967 Native Schools Act, which "aimed to bring an uninitiated but intelligent and high spirited people into line with our civilisation" (Bailey 1977, p. 5) and to prepare them for roles in laboring or domestic service (Simon 1994). The arrival of the First World War further amplified the imperialist aims of the curriculum. The curriculum became harnessed to the war effort, constantly reminding children of their duty to the Empire and promoting the values of heroism and self-sacrifice (Perreau and Kingsbury 2017). Following the catastrophic losses of the First World War, there was a distinct change towards loyalty to the nation rather than the Empire (Perreau and Kingsbury 2017). This change was reflected in curriculum policy, but the 1928 curriculum did not go as far as it might have. It was a missed opportunity to forge an education system that prepared children and young people as citizens for the more egalitarian society that was forming in New Zealand, without the yoke of a rigid class system (Simon 1994).

In the 1930s, a second moment of possibility presented itself. Ideas from the New Education Fellowship, a progressive education movement with its genesis in Europe, became noticed in New Zealand (Abbiss 1998). This coincided with the election of the first Labor government, with its promise of a fairer society following the hardship of the Great Depression (Alcorn 1999). Education was to be the vehicle to achieve this aim. New schools were built, more teachers were trained, and education had a sense of momentum that had not been seen before. In classrooms, progressive education methods fostered the arts alongside more holistic and experiential learning (Mutch 2013). By 1944, the influential Thomas Report (Department of Education 1944) set the scene for the establishment of social studies as "an integrated course of history and civics, geography and some descriptive economics" (Shuker 1992, p. 36) and part of a core curriculum for the first two years of secondary schooling. The curriculum was to prepare young people to value democracy and to take an "active place in New Zealand as a worker, neighbour, homemaker and citizen" (Department of Education 1944, p. 5). The expectation that young people would begin to identify and solve social problems, that is, exercise judgment, is somewhat distinguishable from the civics focus in the former 1877 and 1928 syllabi. This showed a small nod towards critical and active citizenship, but not a significant one.

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, a third moment of possibility occurred. Politically, in New Zealand, the period of social and economic stability of the 1960s was about to be challenged by economic downturn and social change movements, such as feminism, antiwar protests, and minority rights (Dunstall 1981). Responses to a changing society were echoed in policy. Social studies became aligned with a more responsive and active citizenship approach. The 1961 curriculum and a subsequent series of handbooks stated that social studies aimed to get students, "to think clearly

about social problems, act responsibly and intelligently to social situations ...” (Department of Education 1961, p. 1). Looking back, it is also notable that little was said about how students were to address social problems other than the expectation that students would act intelligently and responsibly.

In the 1970s, in line with the “new social studies” movement, social studies in New Zealand became more multidisciplinary, including, for example, teaching sociological and anthropological concepts alongside those from history, geography, and economics (Mutch 2008). Social studies aimed to get students to “respect human dignity, to show concern for others, to respect and accept the idea of difference and to uphold social justice” (Department of Education 1977, p. 4). A new Forms 1–4 (middle) school curriculum was approached via four themes: cultural difference, interaction, social control, and social change. An important development over this time was the notion that it was not enough to be taught social knowledge and abilities, but that values awareness and analysis, together with taking social *action* to address injustices, were important. These two curricula paved the way for ideas-led (as opposed to facts-driven) learning through processes of self-critical, reflective inquiry, and the importance of developing active citizen responses to social issues which continue underpin the structure of the social studies curriculum today.

With social studies now entrenched as the vehicle for citizenship education, the subject’s fortunes became entwined in a highly contested fourth moment of possibility in the 1980s and 1990s. At this time, the politics that underpin the competing discourses surrounding the “good citizen” (Archer and Openshaw 1992) emerged in a more blatant way than before. This political moment emerged against a backdrop of a worldwide economic downturn that was felt keenly in New Zealand. A new Labor Government, in 1984, inherited a funding shortfall from the previous government and, in line with the market-led neoliberal ideology of the time, set about radically restructuring health, education, and social welfare to ensure the country remained financially viable and globally competitive. The social sciences (the umbrella term for social studies, history, economics, and geography) still had a place, but their purpose was hotly contested (Mutch 2008) as demonstrated by the “curriculum wars” which ensued in the 1990s (Openshaw 2000). The stand-alone social studies curriculum was re-written three times before it was finally mandated. The first version was not acceptable to conservative business interests or the Ministry of Education. Another writing team was formed. This second, more traditional, curriculum was not accepted by teachers. Finally, a compromise was reached (Mutch 2004). In the third version, the subject’s stated aims were to “enable students to participate in a changing society as informed, confident and responsible citizens” (Ministry of Education 1997, p. 8).

Continuing social studies’ focus on social problems, the 1997 document placed considerable emphasis on societal issues. In addition, it affirmed and considerably amplified the valuing, decision-making, and social participation elements of social studies. The separate social studies skills were crystallized as three inter-related processes – inquiry, values exploration, and social decision-making – that were leading features of social studies curriculum design. A much stronger sense of criticality was also evident throughout the curriculum, within the social studies processes, and through the expectation that students would explore different

worldviews (perspectives). For example, students were now to be “challenged to think about the nature of social justice” (Ministry of Education 1997, p. 17), rather than accept concern for social justice as a commonly held value. Nevertheless, in order to reach a compromise between politics, policy and practice, a stronger civics thread appeared in the social organization content strand. Social action, however, was watered down to a less controversial “social decision making” process strand. Further, as has always been the case, opportunities for critical reflection were tempered by encouraging particular commitments, most notably expressed in the *Attitudes and Values* section of 1997 document.

The final moment of possibility in this historical overview leads us through to the 2000s. In 2003, social studies became an examinable subject in the National Certificate of Educational Achievement [NCEA] (the national qualifications that assess student achievement in the final three years of secondary schooling). Prior to that, students had to select a senior social science subject such as history or geography. This change provided greater status for social studies in the senior years and offered a qualifications pathway for students with an interest in the critical and active dimensions of citizenship. In addition, a curriculum review (Ministry of Education 2002) led to previously separate learning area statements becoming two national curricula: *The New Zealand Curriculum* (Ministry of Education 2007) and a version in *te reo Māori*. Rather a direct translation, this version, *Te Marautanga o Aotearoa* (Ministry of Education 2008a) draws on a Māori worldview to frame the content, understandings, and approaches for teaching the curriculum in *Kura Kaupapa Māori* (Māori immersion schools) or schools with bi-lingual classes. However, despite the curriculum review also recommending a stronger focus on citizenship education as a cross-curricular theme (along with social cohesion and education for a sustainable future), no specific citizenship education statement exists within New Zealand’s English-medium curriculum. Citizenship education instead appears in an aspirational manner within the curriculum’s vision, values, and principles and in a practical manner through the key competencies and recommended pedagogical approaches such as future-focused themes (Mutch 2010). The main vehicle for citizenship education remains the social sciences, specifically social studies. However, the goals of citizenship education are characterized by a pastiche of competing claims (Kliebard 1986), including the idea of the twenty-first century learner which is positioned as a more “active” type of learner to meet the needs of a rapidly changing global marketplace. Notably, the Māori-medium version of the social studies curriculum adopts a more critical theoretical position that aims to address historical injustice more openly than the English-medium version (H. Dale 2016).

Moments of Possibility in Present Debates Around Citizenship Education

The historical summary of key moments of possibility in politics, policy, and practice in citizenship education highlights the politically contested and socially constructed (Cornbleth 1990) nature of the curriculum in New Zealand. This section discusses dilemmas and possibilities that have arisen since the 2007 curriculum.

Like many other nations, the challenges of equity and meeting the demands of a complex, changing society are significant policy concerns. In 2009, New Zealand participated in the *International Civics and Citizenship Education Study* [ICCS] (Schulz et al. 2010). The ICCS highlighted both strengths and weaknesses in the New Zealand approach to citizenship education. New Zealand students performed well above the international average (517 points compared to 500) with 35% achieving scores at the highest proficiency level (Level 3). The ICCS assessment, however, confirmed the ethnic disparity in achievement that was apparent in other national and international assessments; that is, that students identifying with Pākehā or Asian ethnic groups did better than Māori or Pasifika students (Bolstad 2012). The policy response to challenges such as these has largely occurred through system-wide and pedagogical levers and has not involved curriculum review. However, in the decade since the publication of *The New Zealand Curriculum* (Ministry of Education 2007), a range of subtle mechanisms have elaborated and re-worked the curriculum's rather concisely drawn expectations. For example, within a series of "curriculum updates," a 2011 statement re-emphasized the need for citizenship education as a key cross-curricular and future-focused theme along with sustainability, enterprise, and globalization (Ministry of Education 2011). Two further mechanisms are particularly notable because they specifically signal a shift in practice and offer the possibility for more critical and active approaches to citizenship education for the future: namely, the elaboration of *social inquiry* within curriculum support documents and an increasing focus on *social action* within the context of NCEA assessment. These are discussed in turn.

Social Inquiry

Using a social inquiry approach, the 2007 social studies curriculum strongly recommended that students:

- Ask questions, gather information and background ideas, and examine relevant current issues
- Explore and analyze people's values and perspectives
- Consider the ways in which people make decisions and participate in social action
- Reflect on and evaluate the understandings they have developed and the responses that may be required (p. 30)

At the time of publication, this methodology was likely familiar to many New Zealand social studies educators, particularly given a persistent focus on inquiry operations since the 1970s and the tradition of reflective inquiry that has informed social studies, social sciences, and citizenship curricula internationally. However, while the processes of inquiry, values exploration, and social decision-making within this methodology were clearly identifiable in the 1997 statement and in a series of exemplars that demonstrated how the processes enhance learning in relation to social studies achievement objectives (Ministry of Education 2004), the

term “social inquiry” was still new in the 2007 curriculum and established “an appropriate and distinctive approach for studying human society” (Ministry of Education 2008b, p. 4).

The 2007 curriculum statement sketched the details of social inquiry rather lightly, a small section within a one-page description of the social sciences learning area as compared to greater detail and achievement indicators provided in the 1997 document. One of the immediate effects of this was a widespread confusion between social inquiry and “teaching as inquiry,” the latter being a model of reflective professional practice that was newly promoted in the curriculum to improve teacher decision making. However, a key opportunity to elaborate social inquiry, now the name given to the overarching methodology, rather than an aspect of it, came through the *Building conceptual understandings in the social sciences* [BCUSS] (Ministry of Education 2008b, 2008c, 2009, 2012). This series of booklets provided second-tier support material for the implementation of the 2007 curriculum, one of which specifically focused on approaches to social inquiry (Ministry of Education 2008b). While the 1997 document envisaged the social studies processes as inter-related, these booklets did much to emphasize, through text and imagery, the re-iterative nature of seven interconnected aspects: framing a conceptual focus for learning, finding out information, exploring values and perspectives, considering decisions and responses, so what, now what, and reflection and evaluation. In many ways, this catch-all social inquiry approach attempted to outline an approach that held the possibility of meeting the citizenship aims of more informed, reflective, active, and critical citizens through the study of society.

The explanation of social inquiry in the BCUSS documents preserved a procedural orientation to inquiry that was evident in previous curricular iterations and, at the same time, sustained the critical and active dimensions. Students were, for example, now encouraged to explore the contested nature of concepts, missing perspectives, and to consider the decisions or actions that they might make/take in relation to their social inquiry (Ministry of Education 2008c). This encouragement notwithstanding, the critical and active dimensions of citizenship were somewhat underdrawn in the BCUSS series. Social action is, for example, a suggestive aspect of social inquiry and largely positioned as an outcome rather than a site of critical reflection. As a result, the extent to which social studies teachers read citizenship outcomes as involving the critique of social issues and injustices, and the skills and ability to take active responses, is an open question. This “moment lost” has not been helped by a tendency – at least in the authors’ experience – for social inquiry to be collapsed into more generic models in primary school settings and for the “hard bits” (Keown 1998), such as the contested nature of knowledge and values, to be dropped out. Furthermore, few other citizenship education resources produced by government, nongovernmental organizations, or commercial publishers have deeply engaged with the opportunities for a critical and active approach to citizenship education (Tallon and Milligan 2018).

In the absence of strong curricular direction, there appears a vital need for encouraging more “maximal” readings of social inquiry. A step towards this lies in a more recent elaboration of this model, “social inquiry for social action” (Mutch

et al. 2016). This is perhaps the most explicit expression of the transformation potential for social inquiry published to date. The authors demonstrate how social inquiry can be read in a more critical light, with social justice as a visible aim of both inquiry and action. They propose, for example, a series of “acceptability criteria” for selecting social inquiry resources based on their social justice content, such as the visibility of social justice movements and an acknowledgment of the central importance of social action within democracy. Arguably, similar criteria could be extended to the entirety of the social justice model. Indeed, what appear lacking in this current moment in time is shared, national agreement about what constitutes robust social inquiry and/or tools that enable teachers to evaluate the strength of their approach. In the absence of this, it is quite possible for educators and policy makers to social inquiry as containing a less ambitious intent.

Social Action

Notions of more “active” citizens were prevalent across the 2007 *New Zealand Curriculum* and, as discussed above, prominent in social studies. This heightened focus on social action in the New Zealand social studies curriculum mirrors trends in many citizenship education curricula seen elsewhere (Davies et al. 2014; Ross 2008). The impetus for a more active curriculum is difficult to pin down to one or two single factors and instead is more likely to have emerged from an ensemble of multiple and complex relationships (Robertson and Dale 2015). In keeping with the timing of the launch of the 2007 *New Zealand Curriculum*, Nelson and Kerr’s (2006) analysis of active citizenship across 14 countries found that changing societal patterns and challenges – such as migration, economic flows, globalization, and environmental issues – and the need for an active citizenry to address such concerns were key to the growth of more active approaches. Further, the global promotion of themes associated with the “knowledge age” (OECD 1996) and key competencies (OECD 2005) required a greater commitment to creativity, innovation, and problem-solving in order to keep up with the skills required for the twenty-first century and the demands of a global educational marketplace, which in turn encouraged more “active” ideas about learning (Gilbert 2005; Nelson and Kerr 2006; Wood and Sheehan 2012). A final, less well-known impetus was from social studies teachers involved in curriculum and NCEA assessment development who, in the words of one curriculum writer, decided that “we were sick of our students just studying *about* the social action of others and wanted to have a chance for them to take social action themselves on issues, so we just thought we’d give it a go and write social action into the curriculum” (pers. comm. Greenland, August 2017). This combination of critical, cultural, political, and economic factors contributed to the structures and relations which underpinned the development of the 2007 NZC and the stated outcome of social studies, that students will “participate and take action as critical, informed, and responsible citizens (Ministry of Education 2007, p. 17). The curriculum created a moment of possibility, with arguably a more critical and active notions of social action (Abbiss 2011; Wood et al. 2013).

Despite this curriculum endorsement, research about the application of social action in by New Zealand social studies teachers has shown that social action is viewed as one of the “hard bits” of social studies (Keown 1998). For example, Taylor’s (2008) postal survey of 45 social studies teachers found that while a few embraced the active citizenship potential of the curriculum, many expressed caution, noting concerns about controversy in the social issues studied and fears of indoctrination. Similarly, Wood’s study of four diverse social studies departments identified that teachers were anxious about the expectations that social action could place on students, as well as concerned about health and safety compliance and management when students engaged with the local community (see Wood et al. 2013, pp., for a fuller description of these two studies). A 2015 survey of 145 social studies teachers identified similar patterns (Wood et al. 2017), with the lack of implementation of social action by some teachers attributed to the time-consuming nature of taking social action and the anxiety of the “riskiness” of the standards. These studies confirm earlier research findings that show that social action still represents a challenging aspect of social studies teaching – even with a heightened support in both curriculum and assessment policies.

However, while there has not been a wholesale adoption of social action since the 2007 curriculum, there is evidence of an increasingly active response to social studies, at least at the senior end of schooling. In particular, the specific focus for the senior social studies curriculum for Year 11–13 (ages 15–18) where students can gain NCEA achievement credits if they take “personal social action” has served to cement this focus further. Drawing on data collected as part of a *Teaching and Learning Research Initiative* project, Wood et al. (2017) showed that there has been a steady uptake of both senior social studies and the use of the social action standards, to the extent that by 2015, 61% of New Zealand secondary schools were offering at least one Social Studies achievement standard. These data show that the integration of social action into the national assessment framework may have created a moment of possibility for a more “active” approach to citizenship education in New Zealand than many earlier curriculum reforms. In many ways, this 2011 assessment policy shift – which placed active citizenship participation (social action) into the suite of assessment credits available through NCEA – has driven greater participatory practice into social studies teaching and learning. While this was underpinned largely by neoliberal, twenty-first century ideals for a certain type of active learner, the greater practice of social action has come about as a result of the possibility the 2007 curriculum offered.

However, while the growth and acceptance of social action in social studies has been steady, research shows that the types of social action students take still tends center on personal and community-related actions. Wood et al. (2017) found that students’ actions held more “maximal” potential if they: (i) focused on personally and socially significant issues (these held greater meaning and authenticity for students), (ii) were underpinned by in-depth knowledge and critique of how and why the issues emerged (evidence-based and informed by a wide range of perspectives), and (iii) developed an action strategy that matched the social issue and reached a range of interest groups, including those who held positions of power to

inform change. The study also promisingly found that when students were well supported, undertaking social action was viewed by students (and their teachers) as highly valuable forms of citizenship learning about society, social issues, and skills for civic and community engagement (Wood et al. 2017).

Seizing Moments of Possibility for Citizenship Education in the Future

This chapter contributes to wider debates about how citizenship curricula are positioned within an ensemble of competing political agendas, practitioner influences, and policy frameworks. Citizenship education in New Zealand has historically encountered several moments of possibility. The authors in this chapter have analyzed five such moments which heralded either a growing or declining emphasis on the development of critical and active citizens. As Robertson and Dale (2015) remind us, such moments cannot be isolated and pinned down to one singular narrative or explanation – instead an ensemble of critical, cultural, political, and economic factors shapes an event such as a curriculum development. The authors also remind us that at the moment of outcomes (Fig. 1), it is important to not only take into account the unity of multiple determinations of such an outcome, but also the hierarchy of such contributing factors. The analysis of five such events in New Zealand citizenship education curriculum history points to a contested and erratic pattern – in which some held a greater and lesser potential for a critical citizenry to emerge.

The historical analysis places the current situation in New Zealand in a different position as regards citizenship education in both policy and practice from those settings in which the curriculum is tightly prescribed. In New Zealand, there is no specific citizenship education curriculum, although social studies takes responsibility for much of the content and related skills teaching. There are no mandated textbooks and the concepts are outlined in only the most general terms in the social studies achievement objectives and teacher support materials. Teachers have a high degree of autonomy in selecting both *what* and *how* they will teach. Yet, many New Zealand students appear to gain the appropriate knowledge, skills, and dispositions that prepare them to be active and engaged citizens in their communities, their nation, and on the global stage (Schulz et al. 2010).

This high level of teacher autonomy offers a new moment of possibility. While the two particular themes identified in this chapter of social inquiry and social action build upon a legacy of these traditions in the New Zealand curriculum and hold considerable opportunities for critical and active citizenship, the authors in prior work have all noted that social inquiry and social action is less commonly “political” or transformative in practice (Mutch et al. 2016; Wood and Milligan 2016; Wood et al. 2017). Nevertheless, at least since the 1970s, we have witnessed an expanding landscape of possibility, to the extent that there is now little that expressly precludes teachers from advancing a transformative approach to citizenship education through the social studies learning area. We believe that teachers have the capability to seize

the possibility offered by the fertile ground of the accepted traditions of social inquiry and social action and drive a citizenship education for social transformation. What appears most needed is not so much another iteration of the social studies curriculum – although a clearer explication of its citizenship intent is certainly warranted – but much stronger support for social studies teachers to take up its existing possibilities for critical and active citizenship. This chapter’s historical and current analysis of citizenship education attests to the potential for transformative change through curriculum but also the potential for a minimal, content-heavy, and neoliberal approaches to learning citizenship in the absence of seizing the next moment of possibility.

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The Politics of Citizenship Education in Chile

23

Rodrigo Mardones

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Abstract

This chapter reviews citizenship education in Chile as a national public policy vis-à-vis the international academic and political debates in the field. Chile's citizenship education policy appears highly conditioned by successive paradigmatic experiments – progressive education (1930–1950), Christian democratic reformism (1964–70), socialist revolution (1970–73), and authoritarian and neoliberal (1973–90). Since 1990 civic education policy in Chile has tried to update to the international paradigm on citizenship education, conditioned in this attempt by a long transition to democracy and the recent appearance of a student social movement agitating for a shift away from neoliberal educational policies. As a result, Chile has partially adopted international standards in its citizenship education curricular guidelines, with some notable omissions such as the ideas of global citizenship and multiculturalism. Actors' interests and preferences, as well as normative ideas and debates, are ubiquitous; therefore, no adversarial or

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deliberative approach by its own could explain citizenship education as a public policy. Instead, the analysis provided in this chapter applies an institutional perspective that integrates the adversarial and deliberative approaches into a long-term process that defines institutional development, historical legacies, and social and political context.

Keywords

Citizenship education · Public policy · Politics · Chile

Introduction: An Institutional Perspective for Citizenship Education Policy

Looking at diverse national contexts and varying political constraints, there exists a broad consensus that the primary normative objective of citizenship education is to improve the knowledge, skills, attitudes, and experience of children and youth to allow them to effectively exercise democratic citizenship (Campbell 2012). However, the important role that citizenship education plays in the quality of democracy is potentially diluted by the emergence and operation of various competing objectives, views, and agendas. To understand citizenship education policy in a given jurisdiction, that is, we need to examine and comprehend which competing objectives, views, and agendas are at play and how these are mediated through political processes.

The adversarial model has been prominent in theories of politics; so it is by extension in the politics of education. Under this model, institutions – such as the school system – reflect the ideas and preferences of self-interested dominant groups. As Moe (2000, 130) puts it: “In a diverse society, democracy produces winners and losers. It is the winners who will control the schools, and the winners’ preferences that will set educational policy and structure.” Yet educational policy is also about defining the democratic purposes of education, a highly normative goal better suited to a deliberative model of politics, an alternative model that reflects norms and rules that extend beyond self-interest and which prioritizes consensus politics developed through the give-and-take of political discussion (McDonnell and Weatherford 2000, 130).

To overcome the limitations of both the adversarial and the deliberative models of policy decision-making, this chapter uses the institutional perspective of March and Olsen (2000, 150) to explore the politics of citizenship education in Chile. This institutional perspective integrates the adversarial and deliberative models and tries to explain how the exogenous factors contemplated in the adversarial model – interests, resource redistribution, interpretations, and rules – are formed, modified, and sustained through a political process that includes distributional exchanges as well as public deliberation on ideas and values (March and Olsen 2000, 152).

The first five sections of this chapter reviews and analyses the politics of citizenship education in Chile from the nineteenth century through to the present day. The sixth presents two citizenship education topics (global citizenship

education and national identity vis-à-vis multiculturalism) that while widely present in the international debate have been mostly missing in Chile. This chapter argues throughout in favor of this institutional perspective, which as an integrative approach effectively explains the politics of a particular public policy, in a specific case, unfolding over a long period.

Civic Democratic Education: The Progressive Education Movement in Chile

In the nineteenth century, public interest in civic education was framed by the political objective of building the nation-state. In Italy, for example, the school system responded to two political objectives: strengthening the country's recent unification and contributing to state secularization (Ribolzi 2004). In France, as Osler and Starkey (2001) argue, the government of the time concerned itself with civic education to consolidate the citizenry's support for the Third Republic, an effort that took its first form in the 1882 introduction of *instruction morale et civique* (Mardones 2018, 746). In Chile, a development model known as the "teaching state" (*Estado Docente*) emerged soon after independence to reinforce the state's role in education. This purpose manifested in the 1860 primary instruction law (*Ley de Instrucción Primaria*), which formally permitted the coexistence of public and private education. The state's main objectives were to expand free public primary education and promote literacy (Serrano et al. 2012a). The 1860 law mandated reading, writing, and arithmetic, along with Catholic catechism, Chilean history, and constitutional studies, as the principal subjects of instruction. In 1898, "civic instruction" was incorporated as a subject at the primary level (Serrano et al. 2012b).

Using the adversarial model, one can identify three political issues at the beginning of the twentieth century that could be instrumentally served by the political socialization of public school students: *patriotic nationalism*, to strengthen the identity of a new nation-state still fighting and negotiating border conflicts, the *state-church scission*, and the *emergence of a social policy agenda*. From Lira's study (2013, 28–31) of three history and civic education textbooks with different political orientations used at that time (roughly liberal, social democrat, and socialist), it is possible to conclude that while political actors broadly concurred on patriotic nationalism, social policy caused controversy, as the social democratic and socialist textbooks strongly emphasized the need to develop a critical awareness in students of social issues. With respect to the state and church cleavage, the 1925 constitution – which replaced the previous 1833 constitution – was followed by a presidential decree that eliminated the teaching of Catholic catechism at public schools. However, in an attempt to avoid further conflict, this measure was later partially reversed by Decree 1.708, April 29, 1927, which provided that religion classes would be available to students whose parents require it and at no cost to the state as teachers (Catholic priests) could not charge public schools for their lessons (Salinas 2016).

Primary education became compulsory in Chile in 1920 with Law 3.654, which prescribed that school programs should include civic instruction (Gobierno de Chile 1920). Its updated version mandated a similar “social and civic education” subject (Decree 5.291, May 19, 1930) (Gobierno de Chile 1930). Chile and other Latin-American countries, influenced by the progressive education movement, underwent a paradigm shift that decade. These ideas, associated with Latin America’s “new school” (*Escuela Nueva*), included a child-centered education principle and the progressive movement’s democratic education goal. Following John Dewey’s model, the Chilean government founded in 1932 its first experimental school (*Liceo Experimental Manuel de Salas*) for the purpose of piloting and testing organizational and pedagogical innovations in secondary education (Zemelman 2010, 52).

One of the innovations that emerged from experimental schools was a type of homeroom or advisory, known as “class council” (*Consejo de Curso*). By 1953 class councils spread across the Chilean school system, operating as a time during which students elect representatives and discuss issues such as class and school conviviality, the organization of social and cultural events, and, notably, national and political affairs. Class councils consolidated the progressive movement in Chile, as they were officially conceived as a space for fostering democratic life by developing attitudes like tolerance, responsibility, honesty, and cooperation in students (Gobierno de Chile 1957, 15–18).

According to Serrano (2018), between 1930 and 1960, the public secondary schools, “lyceums,” peddled in the political culture of the middle class. In Serrano’s (2018, 46) view, lyceums taught Western history and civic education as the continuous advance of liberty, democracy, and social justice, a hegemonic vision shared by teachers and government authorities. The conservative historical and political perspective limited its influence to the private school system, which in 1957 accounted for 38% of total secondary school enrollment (Campos 1960, 92). At this time, the main public university in the country (*Universidad de Chile*) designed the national university admission test (*Bachillerato*), which incorporated a history and civics component tilted toward a social democratic perspective (Serrano 2018, 58).

Civic education at the Chilean lyceums extended beyond the schoolyard, as it promoted student organizations and their involvement in national politics, sometimes driving students to riot in the streets instead of using formal, institutional channels. Cautionary calls were made by government officials regarding the alleged use of students for partisan purposes, as well as by conservative groups that blamed the progressive education movement as responsible for “excessive” participation and social unrest (Serrano 2018, 106).

The legacy of the “teaching state” was a very strong educational system. By the beginning of the twentieth century, there was a solid national educational system fed by well-established, capable body of teachers. Teachers took and promoted the proposals of the progressive movement in Chile from the 1920s onward into the 1960s (Reyes 2010). This was a bottom-up demand for change; the proposals of the progressive movement in Chile were mostly normative and non-distributional in nature. From the institutional perspective, it was the long-term development of

education and teachers' organizations that channeled the adoption of the progressive movement. Furthermore, the progressive movement led to the development and practice, at least in public schools, of a social democratic approach to citizenship education within which student activism and political engagement were central.

The Centrist and Leftist Comprehensive Reforms During the 1960s and 1970s

Comprehensive educational reforms to the existing system in Chile began in 1964. Both the centrist Christian Democratic government (1964–1970) and the Marxist Popular Unity coalition (1970–1973) had foundational political, economic, and social objectives which shaped both education policy more widely and citizenship education itself (Mardones 2018, 747).

The Christian Democratic government changed the overall approach to education, focusing less on hierarchy and course content while placing more emphasis on the integral education of students through innovative pedagogical practices (Cox 1984). For this purpose, in 1967 the government created a research, experimentation, and teacher training center (CPEIP) within the Ministry of Education. It also grappled with one of the lyceum's main problems, its emphasis on grooming students for university, which served few students well. To that end, the Christian Democratic government promoted increased high school enrollment, shortened its duration from 6 to 4 years, and emphasized vocational education. In this process the government subsumed civic education within the subject of "social sciences and history" (Gobierno de Chile 1967).

This reformist project was nurtured by the critical pedagogy of Paulo Freire, who collaborated with the Christian Democratic government, especially in the areas of adult and rural education. The Popular Unity government that followed also employed Freire's critical pedagogy when developing its National Unified School (ENU) project. The ENU was a comprehensive educational reform project envisioned as the government's flagship and was soon seen by the opposition as an attempt at Marxist indoctrination. The ENU's launch in 1971 generated intense opposition, its approval postponed and finally aborted by the 1973 military coup. The enormous political and social implications of the ENU project exceeded the technical and curricular issues of education (Mardones 2018, 748).

Distinct, defined political identities clashed over opposed social projects between 1964 and 1973 in a political system that had previously enjoyed high levels of stability relative to other Latin-American countries. However, following the military coup of 1973, civic education was conceived of as a political socialization project aimed not at fostering politically active citizens but rather at legitimizing the newly established right-wing dictatorship. In the next section, it is argued that this failed even coupled with comprehensive neoliberal economic and social reform and huge transformations in the education system.

Civic Education under Dictatorship

Following the 1973 coup, the military dictatorship created a commission to revise all elements of the school curricula that might contain ideological biases left by previous governments (Gauri 1998). In 1980–1981, a comprehensive curricular reform was enacted (Gobierno de Chile 1980a, 1981). For primary schools, civic education continued to be part of history and the social sciences, while for high schools, “civic education and economics” were reintroduced as school subjects (Gobierno de Chile 1980b, 1981).

The government decrees that regulated the curricula conformed to a traditional approach to civics, but detailed analysis reveals a nationalistic, authoritarian focus. For example, while the previous curricula of 1965 offered a more balanced account of the disputes between liberals and conservatives during the nineteenth century in Chile (Gobierno de Chile 1968), the 1980–1981 curricula unambiguously credited the virtuous role of conservative authoritarianism for Chile’s political stability during that period (Gobierno de Chile 1980b). With respect to economics, while the 1965 curricula prescribed the teaching of the political economics of development, including, for example, commodity mono-production, and dependency, the 1980 curricula emphasized the market economy and free trade (Gobierno de Chile 1968, 1980b).

For the secondary education curricular reform of 1981, Bascope et al. (2015) note that the Ministry of Education’s Centro de Perfeccionamiento, Experimentación e Investigaciones Pedagógicas (CPEIP) consulted educators and scholars of education. As in the case of the primary education reform, consultations were primarily with private school teachers, who were close to the ministerial authorities. Espínola and De Moura Castro (1999) pointed out that the new curricula and programs of study proposed by the Ministry of Education generated permanent conflicts, even within the small circle of actors that supported the dictatorship. From then on, at a micro level, expert consultation and commissions appointed by the government – as will be shown in the next section – defined the main outcomes of citizenship education while operating as restricted deliberation spaces that fed bureaucratic designs and decisions.

The dictatorship was defeated in a national plebiscite in 1988 and in the open presidential elections of 1989. On March 10, 1990, the day before handing over the presidency to a center-left coalition government, the dictatorship proclaimed several laws to protect its legacies, the authoritarian regime defined by the 1980 Constitution and a neoliberal economic model. One of these bills was a general education law (LOCE), which among other things terminated the ministerial monopoly on school curricula and educational plans, a power the state had held since the nineteenth century (Cox 2006b). Through this process, school autonomy increased, so that within the curricular framework of *Fundamental Objectives and Minimum Mandatory Contents* defined by the Ministry, schools could develop their own plans and programs, including those related to citizenship education.

Educational freedom as the capacity to create a mission-driven, nonprofit school, along the lines of a religious or lay educational project, had a long history in Chile but

under strong state regulatory power. The dictatorship's educational reforms of 1980 changed this institutional legacy, allowing for-profit schools and universities. Following its unexpected defeat in 1988 and 1989, the outgoing government relaxed state regulatory power over the school system with its 11th-hour 1990 law. This deregulation was consistent with the dictatorships' neoliberal social policy framework but mostly aimed at limiting the powers of the incoming democratic government.

Citizenship Education under Democracy

Since the 1990s, citizenship education policies in many nations have undergone important changes. In the UK, France, and Australia, for example, concerns over low rates of youth participation in politics and political alienation shaped civic education reforms that variously introduced new classes and a greater focus on understanding the functioning of government and democracy (Haigh et al. 2014). In line with this worldwide trend, the Chilean government's national commission on twenty-first-century educational challenges proposed a framework for modifying the citizenship education curricula for primary and secondary education (Gobierno de Chile 1995).

Those recommendations came during a period of educational reform after the restoration of democracy. However, the reform failed to substantially change the deregulated neoliberal system implemented by the dictatorship, which had created school vouchers, transferred public school oversight from the Ministry to municipalities, increased curricular flexibility, permitted for-profit education, and loosened teacher contracts (Gauri 1998). Reversing these changes was either not possible due to authoritarian institutional legacies or undesirable in an era in which structural adjustment policies and neoliberal reforms were being implemented across the world. Chilean education reforms in the 1990s had different priorities: introducing information technologies, targeting socially deprived segments of society, injecting additional funds into the system, extending the length of the school day, improving labor conditions for teachers, and, finally, reforming curricular content (Espínola and De Moura Castro 1999).

The Ministry of Education proposed a curriculum that included a series of emerging themes – each potentially connected to citizenship education – such as gender, environment, and human rights. The opposition objected to the proposal, comparing it with the ENU project of the Popular Unity government (Cox 2006a; Picazo 2007). Points of technical dispute included the distribution of hours between the different subjects as well as the fate of elective subjects, but attempts to introduce the emerging themes to citizenship education provoked much of the opposition's resistance (Cox 2006a). Fearing ideological confrontation and unable to end the political gridlock over the educational reform initiative, the first post-authoritarian democratic government (1990–1994) decided to withdraw the proposal.

Conditioned by authoritarian legacies and threatened with the use of force by the military, the second center-left democratically elected government (1994–2000) appointed a national commission to solve the education reform impasse (Mardones 2018, 751). The commission had 32 members from different areas of national life

and included a technical committee. It produced a report stating that the curriculum should include a civic education component that would familiarize students with the mechanisms and day-to-day processes of society's functioning, which at the same time would allow them "... to fulfill their duties and demand their rights as a member of the community" (Gobierno de Chile 1995). According to Cox (2006a), the national commission approach adopted by the government opened both an expert and a citizen forum that ultimately articulated a political decision using a framework of consensus and cooperation. To Picazo (2007), this consensus was achieved within the technical committee by purposefully ignoring the normative dimension of education, which intermingles with the normative dimension of democracy itself. The commission's politically neutral declaration on civic education avoided entering into the still ongoing democracy-dictatorship cleavage. Within the framework of adversarial politics, pragmatism emerged with a mask of consensus and deliberation, to make feasible comprehensive reform.

Defining what should be incorporated into the curriculum has been a field of intense dispute in many countries. In the USA, the controversies over the content of the subject of social studies have been characterized as a true ideological war (Evans 2004), a hopeless confrontation between radical and conservative excesses regarding democracy and citizenship (Barber 1992). In one corner there is a vision that aims to maintain a specific social order according to values and the country's traditional institutions (social reproduction) and in the other, a vision that disputes this order (social reconstruction) via critical examination of traditions, institutions, and existing social practices (Ross 2004). Chile's specific historical evolution produced the same confrontation.

To facilitate its approval, the government decoupled the curricular reform from the more comprehensive educational reform. While some components of the education reform require congressional processing, the curricular reform requires only executive decrees, which are mostly molded by internal government politics. The details of the executive decrees on curricular reform were shaped at the bureaucratic level of the Ministry of Education's Curriculum and Evaluation Unit (UCE). The UCE conducted several rounds of consultations with education scholars, teachers, and policymakers, ultimately generating the curricular frameworks for primary and secondary education, approved in 1996 and 1998, respectively (Espínola and De Moura Castro 1999).

In these curricular frameworks, four fundamental changes were introduced, following international practices (Mardones 2018, 752). First, the model of *civic education*, centered on the description of the organization and functioning of the political system, was replaced by the model of *citizenship education*, which includes three dimensions: knowledge, skills, and attitudes. Second, the frameworks eliminated the specific subject of "civic education and economics," replacing it with objectives and contents that ran through different subjects across every grade. Third, that content would be preferentially taught within the subject of "history and social sciences" but complemented in language and communication, class council (created in 1953), and philosophy. Fourth, citizenship education would be present in other areas of the school experience, such as student organizations, community service,

debate or litigation tournaments, civic ceremonial events, and other extracurricular activities (Gobierno de Chile 2005). These four changes generally aligned with citizenship education practices at the time in a number of other nations. In addition, and notably, the emerging themes (gender, environment, and human rights) that had obstructed the first round of consultations in 1991 were included in the 1996 and 1998 curricular reforms. This suggests that it was the political dynamics of the transition to democracy that explain the blockade in 1991, which evaporated when the transition consolidated.

The following years saw growing concern and controversy over inequality of education opportunities. One legacy of the neoliberal educational reforms in Chile is broad access to schools accompanied by high, persistent socioeconomic stratification (SES) school segregation, resulting from market dynamics (Valenzuela et al. 2013). That is, the quality of education a student receives is highly correlated with the amount of money families can pay. This educational inequality, alongside low youth voter turnout, was the main concern expressed by a 2005 government commission on citizenship education comprised of experts, scholars, politicians, and social actors (Gobierno de Chile 2005; Mardones 2015).

The socioeconomic stratification problem became part of a broader struggle when taken up by a number of social mobilizations over education which have been especially active since 2006 (Somma 2012). As for boosting youth electoral participation, the 2005 commission's report inspired the 2009 and 2013 curricular adjustments which without fundamentally altering the content defined in the 1990s aligned with international citizenship education standards (Cox and García 2017). Nevertheless, and again mirroring trends in other nations, young people in Chile remain alienated from formal political institutions, such as elections and political parties, and are more likely to engage instead in informal, protest-based forms of action (Somma and Bargsted 2015).

Since 2006, an incredibly strong student social movement emerged and consolidated in Chile and remains extremely active. This student social movement encompasses mostly secondary and higher education students and the social organizations that support their demands. With a variety of objectives and loose coordination, the student social movement has lasted and been effective at protesting for the improvement of education quality, the reduction of socioeconomic stratification in education, and ending for-profit primary, secondary, and higher education. Additionally, the student social movement agitated for free-of-charge higher education. Today, perhaps the movement's most noteworthy achievement is the fact that free higher education is available to 60 percent of students from the lowest-income families, with a commitment by the government to eventually reach universal coverage. Those private universities receiving funding from the state have chafed not so much at the general purpose of this policy but because of its ill-designed mechanisms, which have compromised their financial sustainability. In any case, since 2006 the student social movement has successfully framed vigorous national debate over education (Somma 2012; Von Bülow and Bidegain 2015). However, the Chilean education social movement has demanded little or nothing with respect to citizenship education, which has developed as a normative and technical issue

mostly discussed by experts within the confines of government commissions rather than by the wider public.

The latest development in the public policy of citizenship education in Chile was the reintroduction in 2018 of citizenship education for the last two grades of secondary education. Law 20,911 requires all Chilean schools, public and private, to include a citizenship education plan from preschool through secondary and was enacted in April 2016 by Congress, marking the first time that legislators, rather than bureaucrats and technical consultants on government commissions, formally discussed and sanctioned citizenship education (Gobierno de Chile 2016). The legislation provides legal impetus to the guidelines while giving teachers a greater sense of the purpose of a fragmented, confused curricular framework. The law mandates that schools must integrate the bulk of national curricular guidelines, most notably on democracy, human rights, and diversity, although the law has left out two emerging issues of importance in international academic and political debates: national identity in face of massive migratory influxes and global citizenship. So far these elsewhere salient issues have been absent from the Chilean discourses on citizenship education.

Global Citizenship and National Identity: The Missing Issues in Contemporary Chilean Debate

Strengthening national identities has been a major goal in the developed world, pursued at times via citizenship education. Denmark, for example, undertook a curricular reform in the 1990s with the objective of protecting democracy, social cohesion, and national identity, all challenged by globalization (Jensen and Mouritsen 2015). The right-wing government that took office in 2001 held that some youth in Denmark lacked a sufficiently democratic mentality and, without a sense of national belonging, would be prone to disaffection or radicalization. In response, the curriculum was centralized and Danish history, language, and literature, and citizenship education content increased (Jensen and Mouritsen 2015).

The aforementioned 1990s citizenship education reforms in France and England intended to strengthen democracy, just like in Denmark, with a focus on tolerance of racial and ethnic diversity (Osler and Starkey 2001). Their response was to include a focus on traditional national identity. Citizenship education in France, for example, has maintained the objective of reinforcing the state's republican character, which has in some cases created conflict with private, ethnic, or religious groups that might weaken the national identity and that, therefore, should be submitted to the republican ethos (Osler and Starkey 2001). The same occurs in the USA, where the diverse cultural origins of its population are recognized, yet there is a widespread idea that there exists a set of easily identifiable common beliefs that should be promoted (Westheimer and Kahne 2004).

From the international experience, it is not clear whether the formula of embracing multiculturalism while reinforcing national identity centered on traditional patriotic values is effectively more inclusive than past forms. The challenge lies in

updating an ever-shifting national identity to retain a commonality alongside plurality.

In the 2017 national census, 12.4% of Chile's population identified themselves as belonging to an indigenous people. Since the 1990s, the multiculturalism debate in Chile has contemplated indigenous peoples and their demands for land restitution, poverty and inequality reduction, cultural recognition, self-governance, and legislative quotas. Layering over this issue is the emerging immigration debate. According to census data, immigrants grew from 0.81% of the population in 1992 to 4.35% in 2017 (Gobierno de Chile 2018).

Immigrants in Chile are mainly from other Latin-American and Caribbean countries. Even though this 4.35% figure is relatively low, it is a growing trend that is altering Chile's social landscape. In any case, it is high enough to constitute an important issue for Chile's government. The legal status of immigrants, discrimination, and access to social services, including education, are common discussion topics nowadays. If the abovementioned countries are any guide, recognition and efforts toward social cohesion might be addressed by citizenship education.

As for global citizenship, nationalism has been viewed as impeding the forging of an international community (Banks 2004), while in democratic theory, the concept of global citizenship has been incorporated as a critical component of citizenship education (Mardones 2012; Nussbaum 1996). Motivations for promoting the global citizenship education model vary, but two noteworthy extremes are developing labor skills that a globalized economy needs, the "global competence approach," and developing cultural sensitivity and empathy toward non-countrymen, the "global consciousness approach" (Goren and Yemini 2017). The latter is a key feature of the concept of "cosmopolitanism," which Amy Gutmann (1999) defines as "an affect towards all human beings, independent of particular identities."

From a policy perspective, UNESCO has been a leading advocate of global citizenship, with a focus on sustainable development, justice, social equity, and global solidarity (2015). But despite UNESCO's efforts, a study of six Latin-American countries – including Chile (Cox 2010) – shows that global citizenship does not even appear as a thematic category in their curricula (Mardones et al. 2014).

Conclusions

In Chile, deliberative politics around citizenship education falls short of its purposes, despite the topic's highly normative character. Excepting the progressive education movement, deliberative politics seems to have had marginal impact on the way policy has evolved. Meanwhile, the adversarial approach's straightforward explanation of citizenship education as the outcome of the preferences of self-interested actors also fails to provide a full explanation. The institutional approach produces a more useful perspective that considers historical development, context, and institutional legacies, as well as interests, values, preferences, and ideas. Citizenship education curricula, for example, are the result of several layers of ideas, policy tools, and institutions. No winning government coalition can completely erase these

legacies; not even the dictatorship, with its formidable power, could ensure that the curricula could be implemented in its authoritarian and neoliberal character at the grassroots level.

For much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Chile, civic education was present but submerged in wider political processes and broader policy domains, as shown by the comprehensive neoliberal reform of the school system during the dictatorship. This reform had two notable political implications. The first was the attempt to promote the protected democracy model under the aegis of allegedly politically neutral civic education and to depoliticize institutions and society – a failed attempt, considering the dictatorship's later electoral defeat. The second implication was the promulgation of the general education law in 1990 at the end of the dictatorship, which among other things enabled school-level curricular flexibility within the general guidelines prescribed by the government. This was valuable in ensuring educational freedom. However, the dictatorship never intended to boost educational freedom but to limit the political discretion of the incoming center-left democratic government.

Thus, this policy is not a mere direct by-product of winners advancing their narrow interests but also the unintended consequences of other political purposes. For example, neither the idea of global citizenship nor the challenges of national identity vis-à-vis multiculturalism have seemed preeminent up to now in Chile. Instead, Chile's troubled recent record of and efforts to promote human rights have been prominent. Entering the twenty-first century, curricular adjustments in Chile, as in other countries, responded specifically to the perception of the low quality of democracy, considering indicators of alienation from formal political institutions such as voter turnout and political party disengagement, in addition to rampant social inequality and the socioeconomic stratification of the school system.

Massive social protests and student mobilizations along with an even broader social debate on the need for a new constitution have recently pushed education policy in Chile away from a neoliberal legacy. However, changes in citizenship education occurred specifically through expert consultation, combined with bureaucratic, not legislative, decision-making, excepting the 2016 citizenship education law. The prospects for a deliberative turn in citizenship education policy seem good thanks to the newly designed local agencies for public education, where students and parents should have a formal voice in political control of their schools. The empowerment of parents and students will counterbalance or complement the adversarial exchange with the expert commission consultation, politicians, bureaucrats, school authorities, and teachers. Moreover, as the institutional perspective suggests, this empowerment would add key stakeholders in a highly complex process that also involves history, context, institutional legacies, public ideas, and normative goals.

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Global Citizenship Education in South Korea: The Roles of NGOs in Cultivating Global Citizens

24

Jae-Eun Noh

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Abstract

Global citizenship education (GCE) has recently emerged as a prominent issue in South Korea, a nation faced with an inflow of immigrants and international demands for GCE as emphasized, for example, in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This chapter examines existing literature in the field to explore how GCE has been understood and implemented in South Korea. Despite the increasing GCE imperative in South Korea, GCE has not been well integrated with the national curriculum. In addition, pedagogic strategy development has been limited. Building on studies which suggest inherent limitations of state-led

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GCE, this chapter explores the potential of NGOs as GCE provider in the Korean context. On the basis of a review of Korean NGOs' GCE programs, the chapter identifies a number of notable strengths compared to state-led GCE as well as some remaining issues for further development.

Keywords

Global citizenship · Citizenship education · Global education, Nonformal education, NGO

Introduction

Debates on global citizenship education (GCE) have arisen out of concerns with how to prepare all citizens to live in multicultural societies and in an interconnected world where diversity and equality are appreciated. Mirroring other national contexts where “others” have been encountered for a relatively long time (Bebbington et al. 2008, p. 302) and where global citizenship education (GCE) has received significant policy, academic, and practical attention, discussions about GCE have increased in recent years in South Korea. A systematic review of 255 GCE studies published in South Korea between 1995 and 2016 reveals that the amount of research has rapidly increased since 2010 (Park and Cho 2016). Early studies on GCE programs in the context of South Korea sought to establish the rationale for GCE based on survey results showing Korean students' prejudice against foreigners and the examination of global trends in education (Im 2003; No 2003). More recent studies have identified demographic change and the rising demands from the international community as underpinning reasons for the increased attention on GCE (Moon 2010; Pak 2013).

This chapter provides an overview of how GCE has been embraced in South Korea and examines the role of NGOs' in promoting GCE in this context. The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section explores the reasons why the past decades have seen a rapidly growing interest in GCE in South Korea. The second section outlines the key concepts and typologies of GCE. The next section discusses GCE-related policies and programs of the Korean government, before the last section investigates the nature of NGO-led GCE in order to identify the strengths and remaining challenges to be addressed of NGO involvement as an alternative to state-led GCE.

The Quest for Global Citizenship as a Pressing Issue in South Korea**Changing Population**

A key driver informing and shaping GCE in South Korea has been the changing nature of its population. Traditionally, Korea has regarded itself as a monoethnic society. A monoethnic society has been associated with positive images in South

Korea, similar to Japan (Banks 2004). Korean people have lived within a “nationalist” ideology, rather than one of “cosmopolitanism,” as denoted in a long-kept slogan, “one blood, one culture, and one nation” (Moon 2010, p. 6). However, the growing number of immigrants to South Korea means that Korea is not a single-ethnic and homogeneous country anymore.

One element of the changing demographics is Korea’s rapidly increasing number of non-Korean citizens. According to the Korea National Statistical Office, the registered number of foreigners jumped to 2,049,441 (3.9% of the total population) in 2017, a drastic change in comparison to 206,895 (0.4%) in 1999. The increased heterogeneity is mainly explained by a significant growth in migrant workers and marriage migrants who married Korean nationals. South Korea is now one of the major destinations for migrant laborers, who are filling a labor shortage caused by an aging population and a low birth rate (Korea National Statistical Office 2015). Marriage migrants increased sixfold from 25,182 in 2001 to 152,374 in 2015, and 72% of marriage migrants are women largely from Vietnam and China (Korea National Statistical Office 2017). Children of international marriages are correspondingly challenging the traditional concept of “one nationality.”

In response to such demographic change, the Korean government revised its nationality law in 1997 and announced the “Grand Plan” which included a principle of raising awareness about cultural diversity (Lee 2008, p. 116). The Ministry of Justice introduced the Korea Immigration and Integration Program (KIIP) in 2009, which was designed to support new migrants’ initial adjustment with a focus on knowledge of Korean culture and language (Korea Immigration Service 2016). The Korean government is trying to make KIIP mandatory for all permanent and temporary immigrants. This program aims to make immigrants fit in Korean society, described as “a transformation of immigrants into normal citizens of South Korea” (Kim 2016, p. 11).

Korea’s short history of living with others and prevalent nationalism can result in discrimination against foreign residents. Identified issues include discrimination against marriage immigrant women and their children (Chung and Lim 2016), limited access to the labor market for immigrant women (Yang 2017), and mandatory foreigner-only HIV/AIDS test (Wagner and Van Volkenburg 2011). Recent media coverage on children with no registration (Park 2017) and hardship facing refugees and immigrants (Seong et al. 2017) has provoked discussions about the necessity for awareness raising and policy reforms.

International Agenda for Global Citizenship Education

The international recognition of global citizenship education (GCE) can be traced back to the 44th UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) Conference in 1995. GCE is defined as education for ensuring peace, human rights, democracy, and sustainable and equitable economic and social development (UNESCO 1995). GCE has been high on UNESCO’s agenda, with changing emphases on reflective and transformative learning (UNESCO 2013), lifelong learning, and contextualization (UNESCO 2014).

Korea's promotion of GCE was accelerated by the facts that South Korea became the 24th member nation in the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 2009 and that it hosted key international conferences on GCE in 2015 and 2016. Firstly, Korea's membership of the DAC meant increased financial contribution from South Korea to developing countries for development and poverty reduction through official development assistance (ODA). According to research conducted by the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy in 2005, only 37.1% of Koreans were aware of ODA, and 48.8% responded that Korea should maintain or decrease the amount of ODA (Kwon et al. 2006). This posed an urgent need to raise people's awareness of international aid, with GCE positioned as an effective way to shape public awareness on global development issues and build public support for foreign aid (Lappalainen 2015).

Secondly, the World Education Forum was held in South Korea in May in 2015. Chung and Park (2016) suggest that the Korean government strongly emphasized GCE while preparing for the Forum, possibly influenced by the Global Education First Initiative (GEFI) which was promoted by the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, a South Korean, in 2012. The 2015 Forum puts GCE high on the global education agenda. The global education agenda has been dominated by catchphrases such as "education for all" and "quality learning for all." Within this agenda, the newly emerged focus on GCE confirms the necessity that education should contribute toward peace building and social cohesion (Kim 2017). In September in 2015, all 193 member states of the United Nations agreed upon the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The SDGs suggest the most pressing issues to be addressed by 2030, including GCE in Target 4.7 as follows:

"By 2030, ensure that all learners acquire the knowledge and skills needed to promote sustainable development, including, among others, through education for sustainable development and sustainable lifestyles, human rights, gender equality, promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence, global citizenship and appreciation of cultural diversity and of culture's contribution to sustainable development." (UNESCO n.d.)

The importance of GCE for sustainable development was emphasized in two international conferences held in Korea in 2016: the International Conference on GCE hosted by the Korean Ministry of Education in partnership with UNESCO and the 66th UN DPI (Department of Public Information)/NGO conference entitled "Education for Global Citizenship: Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals Together." Hosting these conferences enabled the Korean government and Korea-based NGOs to mobilize national efforts for GCE.

Underpinning Concepts and Typologies of Global Citizenship Education

With increasing interests in GCE, there has been much discussion about curriculum, pedagogy, and assessment related to GCE, but its underpinning ideas were not much examined in Korea (Park and Cho 2016). This section hereby outlines key concepts

which comprise GCE and typologies of GCE emerging from the literature. Understanding these concepts and typologies provides a valuable basis for the examination of the differences between state-led GCE and NGO-led GCE in the South Korean context which follows in the remaining sections.

Key Concepts of Global Citizenship Education

Global citizenship education (GCE) has evolved through the integration of diverse agendas and through promotion in varied education settings. As a result, GCE remains loosely defined and ambiguous (Rapoport 2010). GCE is not an independent educational agenda. Rather, GCE embraces universal values such as human rights, peace, social justice, nondiscrimination, diversity, and sustainable development (Kim 2017).

It is possible to discern varied names for education which has a global dimension. The names usually specify their focus, as seen in “development education” (recently replaced by “education for sustainable development”), “human rights education,” “peace education,” and “multicultural education.” In this sense, global citizenship education (GCE) is perhaps best understood as an umbrella term. Scholars have tried to draw a distinction between GCE and other types of global education. For example, Banks (2004) suggests that GCE is the highest level of multiculturalism (Banks 2004), and Arshad-Ayaz (2011) argues that GCE should be differentiated from multicultural education which has a narrow focus on only the cultural dimension, with no consideration for social justice and tensions. With regard to differences, education for sustainable development tends to be centered around environmental issues and has been considered as less critical than GCE (Chung and Park 2016).

Even when GCE incorporates diverse concepts, a central question is around who a global citizen is. An earlier attempt to define “global citizen” was made by Korten (1990) as follows:

“The distinctive quality of the responsible global citizen is found in a commitment to integrative values and to the active application of a critical consciousness: the ability to think independently, critically and constructively, to view problems within their long-term context, and to make judgments based on a commitment to longer-term societal interests.” (Korten 1990, p. 107)

Heater (1996) suggests four characteristics of a global citizen: (a) belief in community of mankind, (b) environmental entitlements and obligations, (c) acceptance of moral laws, and (d) contribution toward world government. More recently, Pike (2008) suggests six features from a critical viewpoint: (a) multiple identities and loyalties; (b) critical understanding of both nationalism and globalism; (c) development of global thinking; (d) understanding citizenship as doing, not just being or knowing; (e) acceptance of the moral responsibilities; and (f) understanding citizens’ roles for the health of the planet.

In order to cultivate such global citizens, key components of GCE curriculum are commonly suggested as follows: knowledge and understanding (e.g., international issues, interconnectedness, reflection, and awareness), values and attitudes (e.g., sense of solidarity, shared responsibility, and respect for differences), skills (e.g., political literacy and critical analysis), and actions (e.g., active interests in international affairs, commitment to justice, and practice for solving problems) (Davies 2006; Merrifield 2002; Osler and Vincent 2002; Parekh 2003).

It is argued that transformative learning processes are essential for global citizenship. Critical thinking, dialogue, and reflection are suggested as the key dimensions of a pedagogical framework for GCE (Grossman et al. 2008). An empirical study conducted in Mexico recommends shifting the priority of GCE “from the formal curriculum to the transformation of school practice” to promote students’ participation and political ability (Pérez-Expósito 2015, p. 251). Ensuring the learning process is reflective and open to diversity can be both the means and the ends of GCE.

As discussed, key concepts and components of GCE have been well documented. However, what really matters is how these concepts and components are understood and practiced. In Korea, these concepts and components remain too vague, too ideal, and normative without much discussion (Kim 2017).

Typologies of Global Citizenship Education

Existing studies identify many different ways in which GCE can be grouped in terms of major focus and orientation. GCE can have differentiated foci, as Davies (2006), for example, offers the following typology:

- Global citizenship + education: GCE is a framework to nurture global citizenship.
- Global + citizenship education: GCE is basically a citizenship program but redesigned to respond to globalized world.
- Global education + citizenship: GCE is seen as global education which promotes awareness on global governance, rights, and responsibility, with an emphasis on citizen participation and roles.

Veugelers (2011) suggests three categories of global citizenship: open, moral, and sociopolitical. Each category emphasizes openness, humanity and global responsibility, and equal relations, respectively. Dill (2013) upholds that GCE can take an approach with a focus on either global competencies or global consciousness. Another recent study (Oxley and Morris 2013) categorizes GCE into two main strands: cosmopolitan-based and advocacy-based. The former involves political, moral, economic, and cultural aspects of global citizenship, and the latter incorporates social, critical, environmental, and spiritual dimensions.

The aforementioned typologies highlight the diversity of framing and implementing GCE. These typologies are helpful for understanding differences between state-led GCE and NGO-led GCE. According to Davies’ framework,

GCE implemented by the state is suggested as an extension of existing “citizenship education” (Davies et al. 2005; Davies 2006), while NGOs’ GCE has focused typically on “global education.” Of course, how “global education” is conceptualized and implemented by a given NGO determines the focus and content of their GCE programs. The typologies set out in this section are helpful in informing an examination of GCE in the Korean context in the following sections.

State-Led Global Citizenship Education in Korea

GCE-Related Policies and Programs in Korea

A number of policy interventions have strengthened the focus on GCE in South Korea over the last 20 years. Education Reform in 1995 acknowledged the importance of young Koreans being prepared for globalization (Kim 2017). Following the direction of the Reform, the “Adapting Education to the Information Age” policy was introduced in 1998 (Grossman et al. 2008). In 2007, textbooks were revised to remove descriptions which invoked nationalistic and ethnocentric sentiment (Cha et al. 2016). The Revised Curriculum in 2009 aimed to nurture concerning and caring global citizens who can contribute toward development of global community. To meet this aim, the 2009 Revised Curriculum confirmed the necessity for strengthening GCE components in teacher education and training (Kim 2017). However, GCE suggested by the 2009 Revised Curriculum was limited to an educational strategy for enhancing national competitiveness and for raising awareness of multiculturalism (Lee 2015). While preparing for the 2015 World Education Forum, the Ministry of Education announced the 2015 Revised National Curriculum with a long-term vision to embrace key components of GCE (Korean Ministry of Education n.d.).

Translating the GCE-related policies into teaching practices is not yet well established in South Korea. Korea has no formal curriculum for multicultural awareness and global citizenship. Instead, subjects such as “Morals” and “Social Life” include a focus on interconnectedness and moral responsibility but with far greater emphasis on national citizenship than on GCE (Lee et al. 2015; Moon and Koo 2011). Kim’s (2017) analysis also reveals that Korean moral education encompasses key concepts of GCE to some degree, but commitment to and participation in action is rarely discussed.

Limitations of State-Led GCE in Korea

The governmental drive to foster global citizenship education (GCE) implies that the state enacts the cultivation of global citizens. However, one of the problems involved in state-run GCE is the possibility of indoctrination (Biesta 2011). In addition, Gaventa (2002) argues that state-driven GCE has a limited concept of citizenship since it is generated by a liberal approach which prioritizes citizenship as a set of rights and responsibilities defined only by the relationship with the state. Such a

concept of citizenship developed out of city-states, secular culture, and modernization, which were peculiar to the West in the eighteenth century (Turner 1993). The critique on the Western centrism of human rights (Nyamu-Musembi and Musyoki 2004) also invites an examination of conceptual foundations of GCE. Although the values of human rights and democratic citizenship are universal, the concepts of citizenship and human rights can be interpreted differently in non-Western contexts (Thompson and Tapscott 2010). As a result, key ideas of GCE such as citizenship and human rights can be regarded as rooted in Western discourse, and citizenship-focused GCE appears unfamiliar to non-Western people (Kim 2017).

Another issue is that GCE in formal education tends to lack a social justice framework and action-oriented perspective, both of which are necessary to improve political literacy (Davies et al. 2005; Bourke et al. 2012). Political literacy refers to an ability to “think critically about what socio-cultural, economic and international politics that generate multicultural society mean for a citizen in a global world” (Moon 2010, p.10). With no emphasis on political aspects of global citizenship, GCE could build cosmopolitan solidarity but fail to challenge transnational inequality (Nash 2008). A systematic review of 90 empirical studies published between 2005 and 2015 in 5 continents shows that teachers are reluctant to talk about sensitive and political issues (Goren and Yemini 2017). Given that citizen action is one of the key components of GCE (McCloskey 2016), some criticize state-led GCE as decontextualized and depoliticized (Kim 2017; McCloskey 2016; Pérez-Expósito 2015).

The extant literature suggests that GCE should embody universal values and at the same time contextualize the values to be relevant to the Korean context. Current Korean laws and policies concerning immigrants have been criticized as “one-sided assimilation” (Corks 2017). Likewise, governmental orientation toward GCE has been based on the notion of assimilation (Yoon 2008). This liberal assimilation is strengthened by Confucian values such as social unity and harmony (Moon 2010). Confucian beliefs can create tension as well, given that case studies of other Asian countries note tensions between state-oriented education and individual-oriented education (Grossman et al. 2008). However, it should be noted that some studies suggest that Confucian values fit well with GCE because of their humanitarian focus, as observed, for example, in China (Reed 2004; Xiong and Li 2017).

Existing reviews of actually implemented GCE programs in South Korea evidence a number of challenges, including ambiguity, low awareness, unequal accessibility, and a lack of action. Global education at primary schools is criticized as too simple and abstract (Park et al. 2007). Park et al. (2007) emphasize that GCE should be linked to communities out of schools to have practical implications. One empirical study shows that less than 30% of primary schools offer GCE and more than 60% of teachers indicate low levels of knowledge with regard to GCE (Lee et al. 2015). Another critical finding is that GCE is more widely performed in schools from affluent areas than in schools from less affluent areas (Lee et al. 2015). This implies a gap in access and exposure to GCE based on socioeconomic status. Lack of action-oriented learning is commonplace in state-led GCE as discussed earlier. In South Korea, for example, GCE tends to be framed with humanity without a focus on political contexts and conflicts of interests (Kim 2017).

NGO-Led Global Citizenship Education in Korea

Non-governmental organizations involved in international development and humanitarian aid (development NGOs hereinafter) have played an active role in GCE in partnership with schools. For example, schools in the UK have worked with development NGOs including Oxfam, which have provided schools with support in terms of resources and curriculum (Marshall 2009). Likewise, in Europe, Development Education and Awareness Raising (DEAR) programs have been implemented by CONCORD (the European Confederation for Relief and Development NGOs) (Lappalainen 2015).

In South Korea, development NGOs have taken a key role in delivering GCE. NGOs' involvement in GCE has been suggested by some Korean scholars as a way of refining the state model (Yoon 2008; Moon 2010). Target 4.7 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) also confirms that GCE is a common goal between the state and NGOs.

NGOs as GCE Provider

In non-Korean contexts, development NGOs have been regarded as appropriate providers of GCE. Osler and Vincent (2002) maintain that NGOs can play an effective role for GCE, because NGOs themselves are a part of globalization by linking supporters in developed countries to those in developing countries (Desforges 2004). NGOs have provided development education, in turn shaping public awareness on global developmental issues and building public support for foreign aid (Lappalainen 2015). In addition, development NGOs' strengths to implement GCE can be found in their value-orientation and vitality. Habermas (2001), for example, presents NGOs as an important actor to institutionalize innovative values. Many NGOs have worked for realizing values such as sustainable development, human dignity, and good governance, which resonate with key elements of GCE. In terms of implementation, NGOs are presumed to be cost-effective, innovative, and flexible (Dichter 1999). These traits have legitimated NGOs' involvement in GCE.

Korean development NGOs are also suggested as effective organizations for GCE because of their relevantly abundant experience in developing countries and the possibility they offer for creative and flexible GCE, as compared to state-run GCE (Park 2008). It is reported that 21.3% of registered Korean NGOs (122 as of 2015) provide GCE programs (UNESCO Korea 2015). A key influence on Korean NGOs' recent interests in GCE was the decision by KOICA (Korea International Cooperation Agency) to sponsor NGOs' GCE program (KOICA 2009).

Korean development NGOs' GCE is diversified in terms of the focus (global competency/global consciousness, cosmopolitanism/advocacy), operation (within/out of the school system), target group (school children, university student, adults), learning style (lecture, visual tools, volunteering, outdoor activity), and duration (1-day session, several week-long course, long-term project). An initial form of GCE

delivered by NGOs was teenagers' camps for global understanding, as seen in examples of the Korean National Commission for UNESCO, World Vision Korea, and Korea NGO Council for Overseas Cooperation (KCOC) (UNESCO Korea 2010; World Vision Korea 2010; KCOC 2010). These camps were dominated by a competency approach (Dill 2013), which is based on the neoliberal perspective that education should nurture competitive workers for cosmopolitan capitalism (Goren and Yemini 2017; Lynch et al. 2007). Most participants in these voluntary events were students from foreign language schools or from a privileged background (Heo 2017). With less emphasis on moral responsibility and critical awareness, camp participants conceived of a global citizen as a fluent English speaker. Highly valued capabilities to serve the global workforce in turn reinforced neoliberalism as the defining reality in which people learn and work (Shin 2016).

Another type of GCE program widely implemented by Korean NGOs is an introductory program designed for volunteers overseas, mostly university students and adults. Korean development NGOs put a volunteer program under the category of civic education (Good Neighbors International 2010; Global Civic Sharing 2010), as they regard it as an effective way to cultivate global citizens. The induction program for volunteers aims to broaden their understanding of global issues and to gain a global perspective. This induction training is followed by short-term and long-term participation in international development projects in developing countries. The focus is given to cosmopolitanism, humanity, and global responsibility, which embody moral aspects of global citizenship. Participants in this practice-based GCE are expected to play an active role as a project worker, not as a passive learner (Kim 2017).

Recently, some larger NGOs with adequate financial and personal resources have started to develop more refined and standardized educational programs for school children to promote global citizenship nationwide. These NGOs offer training to volunteers, who deliver global citizenship education at schools. Global Civic Sharing is the first Korean NGO which launched a development education program titled "Global Civic School" in 2002. Volunteers trained by this program, mostly university students, have taken part in GCE programs in primary or secondary school as guest teachers (Global Civic Sharing 2010).

When it comes to GCE programs designed for children and youth, Global Citizenship School is the most renowned program run by World Vision Korea since 2007. Close to two million participants have completed the program since 2012 when Global Citizenship School was accredited by the Ministry of Education (World Vision Korea n.d.). UNESCO Korea and Good Neighbors International are also implementing GCE in primary and secondary schools (UNESCO Korea 2010; Good Neighbors International 2010). Working with schools is possible because of the reputation and nationwide networks of these organizations. For example, one program of Good Neighbors International, "Writing a hope letter" to poor children living in southern-tier countries, involved 1,764,221 students from 2414 schools in 2011 (Good Neighbors International 2011). However, smaller NGOs with no nationwide network have difficulty in gaining access to schools (Yoo 2015).

Besides, Good Neighbors International and Korea Food for the Hungry International have online contents to expand their reach to more children, especially those who live in remote areas (Good Neighbors International 2010; Korea Food for the Hungry International 2010). These NGOs are expanding the targets to include everyone in Korean society as well as school students (Good Neighbors International 2011; World Vision Korea n.d.).

Key Issues

Acknowledging that NGO-led GCE is under-researched, this section outlines the strengths and remaining issues of NGO-led GCE in South Korea. Identified strengths include transformative learning by doing, orientation toward cosmopolitanism, and diversity in program types and participants.

The first notable strength of NGO-led GCE in Korea is that volunteering activities in the name of GCE provide participants with opportunities to develop awareness of multiculturalism and global community in practice. Participants in international development projects or in GCE delivery in a classroom can experience transformation from passive learners to active practitioners or to trainers, respectively (Kim 2017). In addition, Korean NGOs' GCE programs are more accessible than those of international or national governmental organizations such as UN bodies and KOICA, in which participation is limited due to competitive selection processes, longer participation periods, and the high cost involved (Kim 2017).

A further strength of NGO-led GCE is that it can overcome one of the typical problems of state-led GCE, namely, assimilation and depoliticization. Korean NGOs state their GCE aims as "to seek justice in helping youths become mature global citizens" (World Vision Korea n.d.) and "become future leaders of social change" (Good Neighbors International 2011, p. 222). Although there can be a gap between these aims and their enactment, NGOs' language of GCE suggests that these NGOs pursue values aligned with key concepts of GCE.

In addition, in South Korea, NGOs' GCE programs take various forms, targeting various groups, whereas state-run GCE is designed mainly for school-aged children. NGOs can reach out further to include learners at different stages of life, including university students, adults, or the elderly. Providing GCE with diverse age groups accords with one of the principles that GCE should be connected with lifelong learning (UNESCO 2014). NGOs' use of field offices in developing countries or web-based software diversifies GCE programs to suit varied needs of all target groups.

However, there are challenges to be addressed to be an alternative to state-led GCE. Remaining issues are a lack of expertise in GCE, a lack of effectiveness, and limited options for actions other than donation – each of which are discussed now in turn.

Korean development NGOs' GCE programs tend to focus on the interconnectedness of global world, world poverty, and cultural diversity based on their specialty in aid and development. Other issues such as human rights, peace, and democracy are

covered in a rather superficial way. However, many Korean development NGOs do not seek collaboration with other NGOs specialized in those issues. In addition, it is critical that NGOs examine the particular ways of teaching and learning which are apt for GCE, including connecting with students' experiences of such learning (Breunig 2016). Here, partnership with educational professionals can be of help.

Another issue is that the GCE teaching materials used by South Korean development NGOs were mostly developed by copying work from other international NGOs. As such, these programs hardly reflect the social, cultural, and political context of South Korea. As Merrifield (2002) holds, it is important to consider the context in which people learn and apply their learning. GCE delivered by Korean NGOs does not encourage students to identify problems in their own society and to find strategies to solve the problems.

An effectiveness-related issue is that NGOs' GCE are mostly delivered on a one-off basis (UNESCO Korea 2016). Critical thinking and comprehensive understanding are not likely to be acquired from such a short-term single session. Merrifield (2002) argues that providing information is not enough to deepen understanding. Taking key characteristics of GCE into account, Korean NGOs' GCE sessions seem too short to provide opportunities to link knowledge, attitude, skills, and practice. For example, one evaluation report illustrates changes to students' perception and attitudes but does not capture any sign of their commitment to action (World Vision Korea 2015).

Delivery by voluntary instructors might also result in ineffectiveness. Although volunteerism should be encouraged in recognition of its importance as described in Korten (1990) as a "key to transformational change," the use of volunteers in GCE can risk the quality of education. High-quality instructors are needed for successful delivery of GCE. Instructors are required to be equipped with knowledge and some skills for facilitating activity-oriented programs. Existing studies show that school teachers in the UK and the USA have difficulty in teaching GCE due to lack of resources, training, and confidence (Davies 2006; Rapoport 2010). These limitations deeply affect the contents and the focus of GCE: teachers tend to cover only comfortable issues other than complex ones; teachers prefer depoliticized languages such as "caring," "unselfishness," and "cooperation" to rights talk; cultural differences and conflicts are confined to private life; GCE is presented in a didactic way with simple facts (Davies 2006, pp. 14–17). These concerns raised in other contexts are relevant to South Korea. Korean NGOs face difficulty in recruiting and retaining qualified instructors. Therefore, volunteers, mostly university students, fill the demand for instructors. While not degrading volunteer instructors per se, it is questionable whether Korean NGOs' cascade training can guarantee the quality of GCE conducted by volunteers.

Last but not least, Korean NGOs provide GCE participants with limited options for acting as global citizens. As donations are often encouraged by GCE providers, GCE appears to serve a fundraising purpose. In other words South Korean NGOs suggest that making a donation is a way to be a responsible global citizen. For example, Good Neighbors International ran a 10-year campaign named "Miracle of 100 Korean won" (equivalent amount to 5 UK pence). This campaign changed its

name into a GCE program in 2008. The slight change is the provision of educational service before collecting money from school children. The amount of money raised from GCE is the most important criteria for an internal evaluation of this campaign (Good Neighbors International 2009). This suggests that NGO's GCE may be, even partly, driven by a fundraising purpose. When NGOs use GCE as a fundraising strategy, their GCE is likely to be limited in terms of providing diverse options for action.

Conclusion

Global citizenship education has been embraced in formal education in many countries. In South Korea, contemporary changes such as an influx of immigrants are increasing the necessity for GCE. While GCE is not yet included in mainstream education, some Korean NGOs working globally for international development have responded to this social request more rapidly than other actors. Even though current understandings of GCE programs run by development NGOs are limited, with little empirical research, existing studies have explored various aspects of GCE, drawing on several comparison points with state-driven GCE. The argument made in this chapter suggests that NGOs' involvement can compensate for some defects of state-led initiatives. Examples of some GCE programs delivered by Korean development NGOs demonstrate both the strengths and limitations of providing an alternative to state-driven GCE. A review of South Korean GCE programs identifies a number of remaining issues which warrant further examination. Future research which offers GCE participant perspectives would undoubtedly be valuable.

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Citizenship Education in England: Policy and Curriculum

25

Liz Moore

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Abstract

This chapter outlines the context and key developments that led to the introduction of citizenship education in schools in England and examines some of the recent education policy changes that have had an impact on the subject. Despite many previous initiatives connected to Education for Citizenship, it was not until 1999 that citizenship was introduced formally as a national curriculum subject for secondary schools in England. As Bernard Crick (Parliamentary Aff 55:488–504, 2002), who had chaired the influential *Advisory Group on Education for Citizenship and the Teaching of Democracy in Schools*, put it, the lack of formal citizenship education prior to the new curriculum subject was

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primarily “because, of course, we thought we didn’t need it.” Tracing key policy developments, provides an account of the key people, context, and events that led to the introduction and continuation of citizenship as a subject in the school curriculum in England and explains how policy has changed over time. The processes used to construct the content for the national curriculum and successive curricula reviews, as well as influential shifts in the ideological context in which policy development has occurred, are also explored. The chapter closes with a discussion of how these processes and ideological influences have impacted in particular on the inclusion of active citizenship in the curriculum for citizenship and highlights how debates about the purpose, status, and content for citizenship in England are set to continue.

Keywords

Citizenship · National curriculum · Citizenship education · National curriculum review · Active citizenship · Crick · Education · Policy

Introduction

At the time of writing, citizenship is on its third iteration as a national curriculum subject in England. For the purposes of this chapter, “citizenship” is the title of the national curriculum subject in England, and as such the term is used when specifically discussing the subject. “Citizenship education” is used when discussing the concept more broadly; the GCSE qualification is titled “Citizenship Studies” and is referred to as such. Over the last 20 years, a number of factors have influenced and shaped citizenship education policy and curriculum. Such factors include moments of policy opportunity and political will that led to the subject being introduced in the late 1990s to recent shifts in the way citizenship and in particular “active citizenship” are included in the curriculum. Two key factors stand out: first, differences in the processes used to consult on and construct the national curriculum, and, second, shifts in the education priorities and the ideological influences that have shaped the curriculum. Twenty years on from its introduction into the curriculum in England, debates about purpose and policy for citizenship education endure, and these will continue to influence the curriculum subject and its status in schools.

This chapter begins by tracing the early context for citizenship education well before the national curriculum was created in the 1980s and then discusses how the subject was introduced and has evolved over a series of periodic reviews of the national curriculum initiated by successive governments – first under labour administrations in the late 1990s/2000s and then in the early 2010s by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government. An account of the key influences, politics, and policy moments is provided, followed by an exploration of how the aims, purpose, and content of citizenship as a subject have developed and changed. The chapter closes with an examination of active citizenship, an essential component of the subject which should be understood as both a key concept and

process within the content of what is taught, as well as a pedagogy for teaching pupils how to participate in democratic decision-making. In this final section, it is argued that the way active citizenship is positioned reflects sensitivities around the term and the different views held by respective governments as to the kinds of citizens young people are to become.

The History of Citizenship Education in England: A Brief Overview

The development of citizenship education is often linked to important periods of social and political change. Historically, reasons for introducing citizenship education have included state formation and a desire to establish or renew a sense of identity and belonging among citizens (Johnson and Morris 2010). In England, explanations for policy attention on citizenship education are more complex and appear to shift over time. Over the last 70 or so years, these explanations include moments of policy opportunity or “policy windows,” the political will that has led to the subject being introduced and then retained in the school curriculum, shifts in education priorities often influenced by political ideology, and the effects of processes used to construct, consult on, and reform the national curriculum.

Perhaps the easiest place to begin to trace the development of citizenship education in England is between the two world wars. This is also a good place to illustrate how the concept and practice of citizenship has changed through recent history (Heater 2001). In the inter-war period, real concerns existed about the growth of fascism in Europe, leading to a desire to use schools as a means to strengthen liberal democracy and, subsequently, the establishment of the Association for Education in Citizenship (AEC) in 1934 (Heater 2001). Oliver Stanley MP, the President of the Board of Education (now the Department for Education), captured the context in his foreword to the Association’s publication, “Citizenship in Secondary Schools” (1935):

The decay of democracy abroad has led many people to the conclusion that, if those democratic institutions which we in this country agree are essential for the full development of the individual are to be preserved, some systematic training in the duties of citizenship is necessary.

The founding members of the AEC, Sir Ernest Simon and Eva Hubback, set out the aims of education in citizenship as being a sense of responsibility, a love of truth and freedom, the power of clear thinking in everyday affairs, and a knowledge of the broad and economic facts. They advocated a direct method of Education for Citizenship through the new subjects of Politics, Public Affairs, and Current History, rather than relying on teaching through traditional subjects in the curriculum and the school ethos (Clarke 2007).

Interest in political education gathered momentum in the 1970s, fuelled by a decline in membership of political parties among young people and the lowering of the voting age to 18 in 1970 (Clarke 2007). Around this time the Nuffield

Foundation provided funding to the Hansard Society, with cooperation from the Politics Association, to launch the “Programme for Political Education” (PPE). This initiative involved curriculum work with schools aimed at developing young peoples’ political literacy through the specific teaching of political education. The program was based on work by Crick and Porter (1978) with the aim “to develop a critical awareness of political phenomena, rather than an uncritical acceptance of the status quo.” However, political events (including the election of the New Right Conservative government in 1979) and economic recession caused a shift away from broader education to a focus on basic skills and employability (cf. Clarke 2007). Kisby (2006) also suggests that the Conservative government under Margaret Thatcher was suspicious of the PPE and the possibility of indoctrination of pupils by teachers.

During the 1980s, a number of high-profile people and organizations began to call for educational change, including a focus on Education for Citizenship. Notably, a *Commission on Citizenship* was set up in 1988 by the Speaker of the House of Commons, the Rt Hon Bernard Weatherill, in order to consider how to “encourage, develop, and recognize active citizenship within a wide range of groups in the community, both local and national, including school students.” The Commission’s report was published as *Encouraging Citizenship* (HMSO 1990), and the opening sentence of the report continues to resonate today. “Citizenship. . . has to be learned, like everything else.”

By the late 1980s, an increasing number of prominent organizations and people were calling for citizenship education to be more formally taught in schools. The Speaker’s Commission report had noted that the introduction of Education for Citizenship to the national curriculum, as one of several cross-curricular themes, had not had the desired impact in schools. The Citizenship Foundation (now also known as Young Citizens), set in up 1989 by Andrew (Lord) Philips OBE, called for education to address a lack of public legal understanding. Similarly, Community Service Volunteers, an organization led by Dame Elisabeth Hoodless, called for schools to take a greater role in promoting voluntary activity and community service. Both organizations, together with the Hansard Society, subsequently acted as key contributors to the development and implementation of citizenship education in schools in England (Democratic Life 2011b). However, while there was a broad consensus that citizenship education was needed in some form, debates about its status as a subject and purpose in the curriculum continued.

Toward a Curriculum for Citizenship Education in England

For most of the twentieth century, then, citizenship education had been identified, and sometimes supported, as a meaningful focus for schools in England. However, by the late 1980s, no real curriculum for citizenship education existed. Indeed, the majority of guidance published concerning citizenship education followed the pattern identified by Kerr (1999, p. 204) of “. . . noble intentions, which are then turned into general pronouncements, which, in turn, become minimal guidance for

schools.” At the time, there also seemed to be a lack of political conviction and will on the part of the Conservative government to give prominence and status to the teaching of citizenship education in schools as a subject. In this section, the shift from this context to the introduction of citizenship education in 1999 is traced. It is argued that two factors, each now considered in turn, were crucial in this shift: policy opportunity and political will. Key moments in the development of citizenship education between 1988 and 2018 are also summarized in Table 1.

Policy Opportunity

In the late 1980s, a policy opportunity emerged, as education policy began to shift toward a greater specification at national level of what should be taught in schools in England. A subject-based, national curriculum for England was introduced by Kenneth Baker (then Education Secretary) for the first time, in 1988. The rationale for this decision was described as having four intentions: establishing an entitlement to a broad and balanced curriculum, improving school accountability, improving curriculum coherence, and aiding “public understanding” of schools (House of Commons Library 2018).

In part the move to a national curriculum reflected a desire for education that better prepared young people for adulthood, including to contribute to the economic prosperity of the country. The 1988 Education Reform Act, which established the national curriculum, did not provide a place for statutory citizenship education. However, the Act did place a responsibility on schools to provide a broad and balanced curriculum, promoting the spiritual, moral, cultural, mental, and physical development of pupils and to prepare pupils for the opportunities and experiences of adult life. In 1990, “Education for Citizenship” was included nationally as a cross-curricular theme along with other themes on health education, economic and industrial understanding, careers education and guidance, and environmental understanding (Tilbury 1997, p. 93). These themes did not have statutory force but were intended to help schools deal with important matters that crossed over individual subjects.

At this time, schools were expected to take responsibility for introducing these themes into their curriculum, and teachers would address them through their subject teaching. Research suggests, however, that the cross-curricular themes did not work in practice. Many teachers were too busy teaching their subject according to the requirements of the national curriculum to have time to think about them and implement them properly (Tilbury 1997, p. 93). In addition, the theme “Education for Citizenship” was criticized for leading to fragmented and incoherent learning, dry civics teaching and for being marginalized from the rest of the curriculum (Oliver and Heater 1994, pp. 163–4). Crick himself wrote about this issue in his *Essays on Citizenship* (2000) describing “the aspiration of many individuals and interest groups frustrated by the marginalisation of citizenship as a cross curricular theme in the 1990s and by its general absence from the curriculum in the decades before.”

Table 1 Key moments in the development of citizenship education 1988–2019

1988	National curriculum for England was introduced in primary and secondary schools
1990	Cross-curricular theme “Education for Citizenship” introduced in Curriculum Guidance 8, for schools
1997	Schools White Paper “Excellence in Schools” announced Advisory Group on Education for Citizenship and the Teaching of Democracy in Schools
1998	Crick Advisory Group report “Education for Citizenship and the teaching of democracy in schools” published, recommending citizenship becomes a national curriculum subject Recommendations accepted in full by government
1999	Revised national curriculum published including statutory programme of study for citizenship at key stages 3 and 4 (secondary) making citizenship a national curriculum subject A non-statutory framework for personal, social, and health education and citizenship is published for use in primary schools
2001	National Foundation for Educational Research commissioned by government to undertake a longitudinal study into the impact of citizenship Qualifications and Curriculum Authority launch national guidance and teaching exemplification for citizenship in the form of schemes of work for citizenship Post 16 citizenship support program launched with government funding
2002	First teaching of national curriculum for citizenship in schools GCSE Citizenship Studies qualification becomes available as a “short” course (50% of full GCSE)
2005	Government announces a review of the national curriculum in schools
2005–2006	House of Commons Select Committee Inquiry into the impact of citizenship education
2006	Ofsted publish report on inspection subject monitoring findings “Towards Consensus? Citizenship in secondary schools”
2007	Sir Keith Ajegbo reports on “Review of Diversity and Citizenship in the curriculum” for government
2007	Revised national curriculum published, including revised teaching requirements for citizenship and attainment targets for pupils described as an 8 level scale
2008	Reformed A level Citizenship Studies available for first teaching
2009	GCSE Citizenship Studies qualification (full course) available for first teaching with 60% weighting on active citizenship
2010	Ofsted report on school subject inspection findings “Citizenship established?” National Foundation for Educational Research Longitudinal Study for citizenship, final report on impact published
2011	Coalition government launches a review of the national curriculum for primary and secondary schools
2013	Ofsted publish subject monitoring report, “Citizenship Consolidated?”
2014	Reformed national curriculum is published including revised program of study for citizenship with new teaching requirement on political institutions and aspects of personal finance education
2016	Reformed GCSE Citizenship Studies qualifications available with greater emphasis on knowledge of constitution and institutions and reduction of active citizenship to 15%
2018	House of Lord Select Committee Citizenship and Civic Engagement Committee – recommends statutory citizenship in every school primary and secondary
2019	Citizenship is included explicitly in the new School Inspection Framework: as a national curriculum subject under Quality of Education measure and as a leading subject under the personal development measure

A shift in policy commitment started when, in 1993, Ofsted – the agency responsible for school inspection – developed a “Framework for the Inspection of Schools” that recognized the role and importance of citizenship education. The framework stated:

Judgements should be based on the extent to which the school encourages pupils to: relate positively to others, take responsibility, participate fully in the community, and develop an understanding of citizenship; and teaches pupils to understand their own cultural traditions and the richness and diversity of other cultures.

The policy opportunity to pay more explicit attention to citizenship education in the school curriculum was also informed by the fact that in the mid-1990s, public concern had developed about the morality and values of young people. These concerns were highlighted by a number of high-profile murders: of Jamie Bulger 2-year-old-child killed by two other children; of Stephen Lawrence, a black teenager killed by white youths at a bus stop in East London; and of Head Teacher Philip Lawrence who was stabbed while trying to protect a pupil at his London school who had been assaulted.

However, a revised national curriculum in 1995 (School Curriculum and Assessment Authority 1994) offered little reassurance for advocates of citizenship education. Notably, the reduced subject requirements did not include the cross-curricular themes from 1990, and many felt that the materials discarded by the slimmer curriculum were those very parts that helped subjects to promote more explicitly the wider purpose of the curriculum. Taken together these were “to promote pupils’ spiritual, moral, social and cultural development” and “prepare them for the opportunities, responsibilities and experiences of adult life” (1988 Education Reform Act; see also Moorse 2015).

Political Will

The turning point for citizenship education came in 1997. With the Labour government elected to power, and David Blunkett appointed as Secretary of State for Education and Employment, the commitment to citizenship education began to shape policy (Jerome and Moorse 2016). The significance of David Blunkett in the development of citizenship education is clear; he was “an absolutely key figure in the initiative” (Kisby 2006). However citizenship education was not a “flagship policy” of the Blair government; it did not, for example, feature in the Labour Party manifesto or in the Queen’s speech. Indeed, Mycock and Tonge (2012) suggest the inclusion of citizenship education in the White Paper “Excellence in Schools” (1997) was a surprise to many in the party. However, the policy did fit with broader objectives to create political change and democratization through political reform, devolution, and increased transparency through Freedom of Information, all aiming to enhance social capital (Kisby 2006).

The commitment to citizenship education in “Excellence in Schools” was clear. The White Paper set out the new Labour government’s education policy priorities and stated that schools should:

help to ensure that young people feel they have a stake in society and the community in which they live by teaching them the nature of democracy and the duties, responsibilities and rights of citizens. (para 6.42, p. 63)

An Advisory Group was announced with a remit to examine citizenship education and the teaching of democracy in schools. Professor Bernard Crick, Blunkett's former teacher and mentor, accepted the role as chair of the group (Kisby 2006). The group was managed by the body with responsibility for the national curriculum, the School Curriculum and Assessment Authority (SCAA later the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority or QCA), and reported directly to the Secretary of State. Attempts were made from the start to ensure the work had cross-party political support, if not formal endorsement. The Advisory Group's terms of reference were:

to provide advice on effective education for citizenship in schools – to include the nature and practices of participation in democracy; the duties, responsibilities and rights of individual citizens; and the value to individuals and society of community activity. (QCA 1998, p. 4)

The Advisory Group worked together for a year and during that time had dialogue with hundreds of organizations and individuals (all are listed at the end of the report). A series of national consultation conferences were organized across the country for school governing bodies, parents, teachers and teacher associations, local authorities, youth, community and voluntary bodies, and employer and employee associations (QCA 1998, p. 72). The group also looked to learn from existing national curriculum subjects and drew lessons from best practice in other countries following an international seminar in London (Crick 2002, p. 495).

The Advisory Group reported in 1998 and set out their view of *Education for Citizenship and the Teaching of Democracy in Schools* (QCA 1998). Commonly known as the Crick report, the document made the case for statutory citizenship and set out what constitutes effective citizenship education (Jerome and Moorse 2016). The group was ambitious about what it wanted to achieve through citizenship education:

We aim at no less than a change in the political culture of this country both nationally and locally: for people to think of themselves as active citizens, willing, able and equipped to have an influence in public life and with the critical capacities to weigh evidence before speaking and acting. (QCA 1998, p. 7)

In addition, the report recommended:

that citizenship and the teaching of democracy . . . is so important both for schools and the life of the nation that there must be a statutory requirement on schools to ensure that it is part of the entitlement for all pupils. It can no longer sensibly be left as uncoordinated local initiatives which vary greatly in number, content and method. This is an inadequate basis for animating the idea of a common citizenship with democratic values. (QCA 1998, p. 7)

Three essential strands of citizenship education were put forward:

- *Social and moral responsibility*, knowing from the very beginning of education about fairness, rules, and the difference between right and wrong and social responsibility
- *Community involvement*, becoming helpfully involved in the life and concerns of communities and learning through community involvement
- *Political literacy*, the knowledge, skills, and values needed to be informed, active, and responsible citizens and be effective in public life (Crick 2002)

The report was accepted in full by the government, and the three strands of effective citizenship along with a framework of key concepts, skills, attitudes, and values were the basis from which the first national curriculum programme of study was developed in 1999. The next section will examine the features and shifts in the national curriculum for citizenship since 1999.

The National Curriculum for Citizenship Since 1999

The First National Curriculum for Citizenship

In 1999, an order was placed before parliament to introduce citizenship as a national curriculum foundation subject. The national curriculum provided a “strong bare bones” (Crick 2002, p. 498) rather than detailed or prescriptive teaching requirements and set out the aim of the subject as being to develop “knowledge and skills necessary for effective and democratic participation” (DCSF/QCA 2007). First teaching would begin in 2002, giving schools 2 years to prepare for the new subject. Programmes of study – a description of teaching requirements comprising knowledge, understanding, and skills – set out what must be addressed by schools in their teaching at key stage 3 (11–14 year olds) and key stage 4 (14–16 year olds). A non-statutory framework for personal, social, and health education and citizenship had been introduced for primary schools in 2000 and provided for progression from what should be taught to 5–11 year olds to the subject in secondary education. National qualifications at GCSE and A level were developed to publicly recognize pupil achievement in citizenship.

An emphasis on using knowledge and understanding to take action was deliberate to ensure citizenship did not become civics and was active where pupils learned through participation with others.

National Curriculum Programmes of Study for Citizenship 2002

Key stage 3 programme of study

Citizenship

During key stage 3 pupils study, reflect upon and discuss topical political, spiritual, moral, social and cultural issues, problems and events. They learn to identify the role of the legal, political, religious, social and economic institutions and systems that influence their lives and communities. They continue to be actively involved in the life of their school, neighbourhood and wider communities and learn to become more effective in public life. They learn about fairness, social justice, respect for democracy and diversity at school, local, national and global level, and through taking part responsibly in community activities.

1a → links to other subjects
This requirement builds on Hi/10, 13.

1b → links to other subjects
This requirement builds on Hi/2b and Gg/6f and A&D/5d and Mu/5e.

1c–1e → links to other subjects
These requirements build on Hi/9, 10.

1h, 1i → ICT opportunity
Pupils could explore the growing importance of the internet, email and e-commerce.

1i → links to other subjects
This requirement builds on Sc2/5a and Hi/13 and Gg/3b, 3e, 5a, 5b, 6f, 6h–6k and MFL/4c.

2a → links to other subjects
This requirement builds on En2/4a–4c.

2b → links to other subjects
This requirement builds on En1/1a–1e and En3/1i–1o.

2b → ICT opportunity
Pupils could use email to exchange views.

2c → links to other subjects
This requirement builds on En1/3.

Knowledge, skills and understanding

Teaching should ensure that knowledge and understanding about becoming informed citizens are acquired and applied when developing skills of enquiry and communication, and participation and responsible action.

Knowledge and understanding about becoming informed citizens

- 1 Pupils should be taught about:
 - a the legal and human rights and responsibilities underpinning society, basic aspects of the criminal justice system, and how both relate to young people
 - b the diversity of national, regional, religious and ethnic identities in the United Kingdom and the need for mutual respect and understanding
 - c central and local government, the public services they offer and how they are financed, and the opportunities to contribute
 - d the key characteristics of parliamentary and other forms of government
 - e the electoral system and the importance of voting
 - f the work of community-based, national and international voluntary groups
 - g the importance of resolving conflict fairly
 - h the significance of the media in society
 - i the world as a global community, and the political, economic, environmental and social implications of this, and the role of the European Union, the Commonwealth and the United Nations.

Developing skills of enquiry and communication

- 2 Pupils should be taught to:
 - a think about topical political, spiritual, moral, social and cultural issues, problems and events by analysing information and its sources, including ICT-based sources
 - b justify orally and in writing a personal opinion about such issues, problems or events
 - c contribute to group and exploratory class discussions, and take part in debates.

Developing skills of participation and responsible action

- 3 Pupils should be taught to:
 - a use their imagination to consider other people's experiences and be able to think about, express and explain views that are not their own
 - b negotiate, decide and take part responsibly in both school and community-based activities
 - c reflect on the process of participating.

Key stage 4 programme of study

Citizenship

During key stage 4 students continue to study, think about and discuss topical political, spiritual, moral, social and cultural issues, problems and events. They study the legal, political, religious, social, constitutional and economic systems that influence their lives and communities, looking more closely at how they work and their effects. They continue to be actively involved in the life of their school, neighbourhood and wider communities, taking greater responsibility. They develop a range of skills to help them do this, with a growing emphasis on critical awareness and evaluation. They develop knowledge, skills and understanding in these areas through, for example, learning more about fairness, social justice, respect for democracy and diversity at school, local, national and global level, and through taking part in community activities.

1i → links to other subjects

This requirement builds on MFL/Si.

Note for 1j

Local Agenda 21 gives local authorities responsibility to improve sustainable development.

1j → links to other subjects

This requirement builds on Sc2/4b, 4c (single) and Sc2/5b, 5c (double).

2a → links to other subjects

This requirement builds on En2/4a–4c and Ma4/5k (foundation and higher).

2b → links to other subjects

This requirement builds on En1/1a–1e and En3/1i–1o.

2c → links to other subjects

This requirement builds on En1/3.

Knowledge, skills and understanding

Teaching should ensure that knowledge and understanding about becoming informed citizens are acquired and applied when developing skills of enquiry and communication, and participation and responsible action.

Knowledge and understanding about becoming informed citizens

- 1 Students should be taught about:
 - a the legal and human rights and responsibilities underpinning society and how they relate to citizens, including the role and operation of the criminal and civil justice systems
 - b the origins and implications of the diverse national, regional, religious and ethnic identities in the United Kingdom and the need for mutual respect and understanding
 - c the work of parliament, the government and the courts in making and shaping the law
 - d the importance of playing an active part in democratic and electoral processes
 - e how the economy functions, including the role of business and financial services
 - f the opportunities for individuals and voluntary groups to bring about social change locally, nationally, in Europe and internationally
 - g the importance of a free press, and the media's role in society, including the internet, in providing information and affecting opinion
 - h the rights and responsibilities of consumers, employers and employees
 - i the United Kingdom's relations in Europe, including the European Union, and relations with the Commonwealth and the United Nations
 - j the wider issues and challenges of global interdependence and responsibility, including sustainable development and Local Agenda 21.

Developing skills of enquiry and communication

- 2 Students should be taught to:
 - a research a topical political, spiritual, moral, social or cultural issue, problem or event by analysing information from different sources, including ICT-based sources, showing an awareness of the use and abuse of statistics
 - b express, justify and defend orally and in writing a personal opinion about such issues, problems or events
 - c contribute to group and exploratory class discussions, and take part in formal debates.

Developing skills of participation and responsible action

- 3 Students should be taught to:
 - a use their imagination to consider other people's experiences and be able to think about, express, explain and critically evaluate views that are not their own
 - b negotiate, decide and take part responsibly in school and community-based activities
 - c reflect on the process of participating.

The Department for Education and Skills (DfES) agreed that the QCA, the body with responsibility for the school curriculum, should develop necessary support for the new subject by producing some initial guidance to help schools understand what the new requirements meant and how to approach planning and teaching citizenship. Key questions the DfES and the QCA were interested in examining, about how well the subject was implemented included: How prescriptive or light touch was the new programme of study for citizenship? How much discrete provision or teaching time would be required? What links could be made with other subjects, and how would this affect teaching?

It was difficult to determine how well schools and teachers could answer these questions, and indeed they remain pertinent to the teaching of citizenship education in schools in England today. In particular a debate began about what light touch meant and whether the flexibility schools were given and encouraged to take was creating sufficient and rigorous teaching for pupils to make progress in their citizenship learning. The tension was highlighted in the House of Commons Select Committee Inquiry into citizenship education conducted in 2006–2007. The following extract makes clear the focus of the light touch approach:

From the outset, the DfES has deliberately adopted a “light touch” approach to citizenship education, allowing schools a very high degree of freedom in terms of delivery, avoiding prescriptive models. For example, when the curriculum was launched, guidance stressed that citizenship could be delivered as discrete units, during special “citizenship days” where the regular timetable was suspended, in an embedded form through other subjects such as history, geography or even maths, or any combination of these methods. Additionally, provision could take the form of organised activities which encouraged active participation; for example, working with local community organisations to achieve an identified goal, such as the improvement of local play facilities or other community services. (House of Commons, Select Committee Enquiry 2006–2007)

However, Ofsted expressed concern about this in evidence given to the House of Commons Inquiry, questioning whether “light touch” had been interpreted by some schools as “soft touch.”

Early evidence from Ofsted subject monitoring of the quality and impact of citizenship as a national curriculum subject was published in *Toward Consensus?* (2006). The Qualifications and Curriculum Authority whose brief “to keep the curriculum under review” (QCA 2004) highlighted some of the issues in establishing and implementing the subject. Perhaps the most critical were how the subject was being included in a school’s curriculum provision and the quality of teaching. QCA’s annual monitoring of the curriculum found two thirds of schools surveyed had given no additional teaching time to accommodate the new curriculum requirements for citizenship and a significant number of teachers (17%) reported they were not confident in teaching key aspects of the new subject (QCA 2004). Ofsted reported that schools had responded in very different ways, “a minority have embraced it with enthusiasm and worked hard to establish it as a significant part of their curriculum. Others, also a minority have done very little.” In others, “school mistakenly believe they are doing it already.” They also concluded most teachers of citizenship are non-specialists and “far from their normal

comfort zone” (Ofsted 2006). The issues of specialist teaching and curriculum space and time remain key to the quality of provision in schools today. The Department for Education and Skills commissioned a longitudinal study of citizenship by the National Foundation for Educational Research that highlighted the key indicators needed for successful citizenship including: the importance of a school’s senior leadership team supporting the subject; a nominated subject leader to coordinate subject teaching; specialist trained citizenship teachers; and sufficient and regular teaching time on the school curriculum (NFER 2010).

The Department for Education and Skills (DFES) had made some efforts to address these early concerns, by commissioning the QCA to develop detailed guidance and schemes of work for citizenship showing how it could be organized and taught in primary and secondary schools and by introducing citizenship teacher training courses in the form of PGCE citizenship. The main aspects of the guidance are still available on the Standards website. See QCA (2002a) <https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20080804145057/http://www.standards.dfes.gov.uk/schemes3/>.

The Second National Curriculum for Citizenship

In 2005 the government asked the QCA to review the national curriculum in order to “increase flexibility” and “improve coherence to ensure effective progression from primary to secondary education” (QCA 2007, p. 3). The review led to a revised national curriculum being published in 2007 and shortly after the House of Commons Select Committee Inquiry reported into the impact of citizenship education. A second version of the national curriculum program of study for citizenship was developed and published. The subject remained true to the principles of the Crick report but also took account of the work of Sir Keith Ajegbo, a head teacher of some 21 years at a London school, who was asked by ministers in 2006 to review how the school curriculum addressed diversity and citizenship (DfES 2007).

The context within which the Ajegbo review had taken place was very different to 1998, and two developments were particularly significant. The first was the Victoria Climbié Inquiry in Hackney, London, which evidenced the failure of various services (including medical and social services) to prevent her torture and murder and which in turn influenced the “Every Child Matters” education policy. (Every Child Matters was a flagship government policy which sought greater interdisciplinary working and commitment to protect and support children’s health, well-being, safety, and participation.) The second were the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and 7/7. In England, the latter had resulted in a series of policy responses, including those affecting schools, with proposed changes to the citizenship curriculum to pay greater attention to cultural diversity and a new duty on schools to promote community cohesion (Moore 2015). Additionally, in 2008 the government introduced a delivery strategy for the prevention of violent extremism. Although the strategy did not make any particular reference to the role of national citizenship education in schools, it did focus on the idea of extending citizenship education to young Muslims, particularly those attending madrassas and being educated by Imans (Maer 2008).

The revised national curriculum 2008 encouraged schools to take an “aims-led” approach to building their curriculum and to consider the needs of the whole child alongside the needs of communities and preparing children for the opportunities and challenges of adult life. The 2008 curriculum aims stated that all learners should develop as: *responsible citizens* who make a positive contribution to society

The requirements of the 1999 Citizenship Programme of Study were replaced with a format common to all national curriculum subjects that set out teaching requirements as key concepts and processes, range and content, and curriculum opportunities. An importance statement set out the essence of the subject, including how citizenship contributed to the overarching aims of the curriculum. The concepts of citizenship education took a cue from the those laid out in the Crick report in 1998, but also the direct influence of the Ajegbo report (2007) that introduced a new focus on identities and diversity in the curriculum. Criticality and taking action remained central within the skills and processes that pupils need to learn, as did the focus on using contemporary issues, problems, and events to learn about the key concepts, institutions, and processes and to bring the subject to life.

National Curriculum Key Stage 3 Programme of Study for Citizenship 2008

Citizenship equips pupils with the knowledge and skills needed for effective and democratic participation. It helps pupils to become informed, critical, active citizens who have the confidence and conviction to work collaboratively, take action and try to make a difference in their communities and the wider world.

1 Key concepts

There are a number of key concepts that underpin the study of citizenship. Pupils need to understand these concepts in order to deepen and broaden their knowledge, skills and understanding.

1.1 Democracy and justice

- a Participating actively in different kinds of decision-making and voting in order to influence public life.
- b Weighing up what is fair and unfair in different situations, understanding that justice is fundamental to a democratic society and exploring the role of law in maintaining order and resolving conflict.
- c Considering how democracy, justice, diversity, toleration, respect and freedom are valued by people with different beliefs, backgrounds and traditions within a changing democratic society.
- d Understanding and exploring the roles of citizens and parliament in holding government and those in power to account.

EXPLANATORY NOTES

Democracy and justice: This focuses on the role that citizens can take within the political and justice systems in the UK. It includes: freedom as part of democracy; fairness and the rule of law as part of justice; power and authority; and accountability. Pupils should understand that accountability happens at many levels, ranging from a responsible opposition in parliament challenging, testing and scrutinising what government is doing, to citizens in local communities challenging decisions that affect them.

Pupils should learn about the need to balance competing and conflicting demands, and understand that in a democracy not everyone gets what they want. Linking teaching about democracy, elections and voting with the student council provides a way for pupils to apply their learning to real decision-making situations. Active participation provides opportunities to learn about the important role of negotiation and persuasion within a democracy.

1.2 Rights and responsibilities

- Exploring different kinds of rights and obligations and how these affect both individuals and communities.
- Understanding that individuals, organisations and governments have responsibilities to ensure that rights are balanced, supported and protected.
- Investigating ways in which rights can compete and conflict, and understanding that hard decisions have to be made to try to balance these.

1.3 Identities and diversity: living together in the UK

- Appreciating that identities are complex, can change over time and are informed by different understandings of what it means to be a citizen in the UK.
- Exploring the diverse national, regional, ethnic and religious cultures, groups and communities in the UK and the connections between them.
- Considering the interconnections between the UK and the rest of Europe and the wider world.
- Exploring **community cohesion** and the different forces that bring about change in communities over time.

EXPLANATORY NOTES

Rights and responsibilities: There are different kinds of rights, obligations and responsibilities – political, legal, human, social, civic and moral. Pupils should explore contested areas surrounding rights and responsibilities, for example the checks and balances needed in relation to freedom of speech in the context of threats from extremism and terrorism.

Identities and diversity: living together in the UK: This includes the multiple identities that may be held by groups and communities in a diverse society, and the ways in which these identities are affected by changes in society. For example, pupils could learn about: how migration has shaped communities; common or shared identity and what unifies groups and communities; and how living together in the UK has been shaped by, and continues to be shaped by, political, social, economic and cultural changes. The historical context for such changes should be considered where appropriate.

All pupils, regardless of their legal or residential status, should explore and develop their understanding of what it means to be a citizen in the UK today.

Community cohesion: Citizenship offers opportunities for schools to address their statutory duty to promote community cohesion.

2 Key processes

These are the essential skills and processes in citizenship that pupils need to learn to make progress.

2.1 Critical thinking and enquiry

Pupils should be able to:

- engage with and reflect on different ideas, opinions, beliefs and values when exploring **topical and controversial issues and problems**
- research, plan and undertake enquiries into issues and problems using a range of information and sources
- analyse and evaluate sources used, questioning different values, ideas and viewpoints and recognising bias.

2.2 Advocacy and representation

Pupils should be able to:

- express and explain their own opinions to others through discussions, formal debates and **voting**
- communicate an argument, taking account of different viewpoints and drawing on what they have learnt through research, action and debate
- justify their argument, giving reasons to try to persuade others to think again, change or support them
- represent the views of others, with which they may or may not agree.

EXPLANATORY NOTES

Critical thinking and enquiry: Using real case studies to explore issues and problems can help to develop skills of critical thinking, enquiry, debate and advocacy. Pupils should learn how to make judgements on the basis of evidence, exploring ideas, opinions and values that are different from their own.

Topical and controversial issues and problems: Political, social and ethical issues and problems can be controversial and sensitive, and can lead to disagreement. They should not be avoided, but need to be handled so that pupils develop skills in discussing and debating citizenship issues and considering points of view that are not necessarily their own. Setting ground rules and using distancing techniques can help to manage the discussion of such issues.

Analyse and evaluate: This includes pupils evaluating and assessing different opinions and challenging what they see, hear and read through research and investigation, considering scenarios and case studies.

Advocacy and representation: Developing skills of advocacy and representation provides opportunities for pupils to build on the skills of speaking and listening, reading and writing from the English programme of study. In the context of citizenship, they learn to take account of different points of view and the various ways in which people express themselves. They practise communicating with different audiences, including those in positions of power, to try to influence and persuade them about ways of making a difference to political and social issues.

Voting: This includes knowing about and participating in different kinds of voting, for example a show of hands, a secret ballot and simulating division. Voting can be part of activities, for example to decide on a motion within a debate or to agree a new policy for the student council.

2.3 Taking informed and responsible action

Pupils should be able to:

- a explore creative approaches to taking action on problems and issues to achieve intended purposes
- b work individually and with others to negotiate, plan and take action on citizenship issues to try to influence others, bring about change or resist unwanted change, using time and resources appropriately
- c analyse the impact of their actions on communities and the wider world, now and in the future
- d reflect on the progress they have made, evaluating what they have learnt, what went well, the difficulties encountered and what they would do differently.

It helps pupils to become informed, critical, active citizens

3 Range and content

This section outlines the breadth of the subject on which teachers should draw when teaching the key concepts and key processes. Citizenship focuses on the political and social dimensions of living together in the UK and recognises the influence of the historical context. Citizenship also helps pupils make sense of the world today and equips them for the challenges and changes facing communities in the future.

The study of citizenship should include:

- a political, legal and human rights, and responsibilities of citizens
- b the roles of the law and the justice system and how they relate to young people
- c key features of parliamentary democracy and government in the constituent parts of the UK and at local level, including voting and elections
- d freedom of speech and diversity of views, and the role of the media in informing and influencing public opinion and holding those in power to account
- e actions that individuals, groups and organisations can take to influence decisions affecting communities and the environment
- f strategies for handling local and national disagreements and conflicts
- g the needs of the local community and how these are met through public services and the voluntary sector
- h how economic decisions are made, including where public money comes from and who decides how it is spent

EXPLANATORY NOTES

Take action: Action should be informed by research and investigation into a political, social or ethical issue or problem. This includes developing and using skills, while applying citizenship knowledge and understanding. Actions could include: presenting a case to others about a concern; conducting a consultation, vote or election; organising a meeting, event or forum to raise awareness and debate issues; representing the views of others at a meeting or event; creating, reviewing or revisiting an organisational policy; contributing to local community policies; lobbying and communicating views publicly via a website, campaign or display; setting up an action group or network; training others in democratic skills such as advocacy or campaigning.

EXPLANATORY NOTES

Political rights: This includes the development of universal suffrage and equal opportunities, which can be linked with the study of the development of democracy in history.

Human rights: Human rights and the rights of the child can be revisited in many different contexts. Linking teaching to topical issues provides a way of engaging pupils in learning about the values and principles underpinning human rights, including exploring decisions that need to be made to balance conflicting rights and the extent to which conventions and declarations have been enshrined in national law.

Law and the justice system: This includes the criminal justice system. Some topical areas of law, such as antisocial behaviour legislation, can provide a focus for exploring the difference between criminal and civil justice.

Key features of parliamentary democracy and government: This includes an understanding of the role of political parties, the 'first past the post' system of elections, the role of government and opposition, and cabinet decision-making.

The constituent parts of the UK: This includes how democracy has changed in recent times with the devolution of power to the Scottish Parliament and the assemblies in Northern Ireland and Wales. This can be linked with the study of the origins of the UK in history.

Environment: This provides opportunities to evaluate individual and collective actions that contribute to sustainable practices. Pupils could consider the different ethical implications of actions, policies and behaviour. This work can be linked with work in science and geography.

- i the changing nature of UK society, including the diversity of ideas, beliefs, cultures, identities, traditions, perspectives and values that are shared
- j migration to, from and within the UK and the reasons for this
- k the UK's relations with the European Union and the rest of Europe, the Commonwealth, the United Nations and the world as a global community.



EXPLANATORY NOTES

Changing nature of UK society: Change is a constant feature of UK society and pupils should understand some reasons why change occurs (eg migration, economic factors, globalisation) and how communities change as a consequence (eg shops, food, schools, languages).

Diversity: Diversity includes our different and shared needs, abilities and membership of groups and communities such as gender, sexual orientation, race, ethnicity, physical and sensory ability, belief, religion and class. Learning about diversity involves recognising that culture, including the language, ideas, customs and traditions practised by people within a group, also forms part of identity. Pupils should explore the diversity of groups and communities and examine the changes that occur. They should also explore things that unify us, including the shared values that UK society is committed to, and what groups and communities have in common as we live together in society.

Europe: A European dimension can be incorporated when exploring many topical issues, including human rights, the environment, immigration, trade and economic issues, diversity and identities.

The Commonwealth: This includes the development, membership and purpose of the Commonwealth. It can be linked with the study of the British Empire in history.

The United Nations: This includes exploring the role of the United Nations in the context of topical events such as conflict situations affecting the international and/or global community.

4 Curriculum opportunities

During the key stage pupils should be offered the following opportunities that are integral to their learning and enhance their engagement with the concepts, processes and content of the subject.

The curriculum should provide opportunities for pupils to:

- a debate, in groups and whole-class discussions, topical and controversial issues, including those of concern to young people
- b develop citizenship knowledge and understanding while using and applying citizenship skills
- c work individually and in groups, taking on different roles and responsibilities
- d participate in both school-based and community-based citizenship activities
- e participate in different forms of individual and collective action, including decision-making and campaigning
- f work with a range of community partners, where possible
- g take into account legal, moral, economic, environmental, historical and social dimensions of different political problems and issues
- h take into account a range of contexts, such as school, local, regional, national, European, international and global, as relevant to different topics
- i use and interpret different media and ICT, both as sources of information and as a means of communicating ideas
- j make links between citizenship and work in other subjects and areas of the curriculum.

EXPLANATORY NOTES

Community-based citizenship activities: These encourage pupils to work with people beyond the school community to address real issues and decisions. They can involve inviting people into schools to work with pupils on issues and/or pupils working with others beyond the school site.

Campaigning: This can help pupils learn how to influence those in power, take part in decision-making and participate positively in public life in ways that are safe, responsible and within the law.

Community partners: These could include voluntary organizations and public and private bodies. For example, the police, magistrates and the courts could support work relating to the law and justice system. Local councillors, MPs and MEPs could support work relating to parliament, democracy and government.

Historical: This includes considering relevant historical contexts in order to inform citizenship issues and problems. For example, pupils could consider the movement and settlement of peoples within the British Isles over time and the impact of migration on diversity in communities living together in the UK today.

Media and ICT: This includes: using different media and ICT to communicate ideas, raise awareness, lobby or campaign on issues; using and interpreting a wide range of sources of information during the course of enquiries and research; and learning how different media inform and shape opinion. Pupils need to evaluate the extent to which a balanced or partial view of events and issues is presented.

Make links: This includes: making links with work on the media in English and ICT; work on diversity and inclusion in history and RE; and work on the environment and sustainability in geography and science.

There is some evidence to suggest that, at this time, the status of citizenship was developing in schools. The Ofsted subject monitoring report “Citizenship established?” (2010) highlighted a number of improvements including that the quality of provision had been good or outstanding in more than half of schools inspected and the number deemed inadequate had reduced from 25% to 10%. This period also saw significant growth in the uptake of the GCSE Citizenship Studies – peaking at 94,000 candidates who achieved the qualification in 2009 – and citizenship teachers were beginning to share their practice and ideas for teaching the subject through regional groups established to support the revised curriculum. One such teacher, teaching at Sir Keith Ajegbo’s own school in London, developed an approach to describing citizenship in the *curriculum*, *culture*, and *community* of the school – also known as the three Cs of citizenship (Moorse 2015). The approach drew on thinking developed in QCA schemes of work (2001, 2002b) and was designed to encourage teachers and schools to see citizenship as a subject but also as more than a subject. The three Cs are still used as a way of framing a model of effective citizenship provision by the official subject association in England – the Association for Citizenship Teaching – and are included in the latest strategic plan (Association for Citizenship Teaching 2018).

The Third National Curriculum for Citizenship

A further review of the national curriculum was announced in 2010 following the election of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government, when Michael Gove took up the role of Secretary of State for Education. Early indicators suggested that the review would slim down the national curriculum further and might even remove certain subjects from the national curriculum, including citizenship. The Government White Paper for Schools 2010 “The Importance of Teaching” described the aims of the curriculum review as:

reducing prescription and allowing schools to decide how to teach while refocusing on the core subject knowledge that every child and young person should attain at each stage of their education. (DFE 2010)

In the absence of a non-governmental body to conduct the review (the Qualifications and Curriculum Development Agency and its predecessor body QCA had previously handled such work but was being disbanded and closed in 2011 as part of a policy to reduce the number of agencies and centralize policymaking), the government established an Expert Panel to advise on the review. The possibility of citizenship being removed from the national curriculum became a real one, when the Panel, Chaired by Tim Oates, published a report with recommendations that included:

Citizenship is of enormous importance in a contemporary and future-oriented education. However, we are not persuaded that study of the issues and topics included in citizenship

education constitutes a distinct 'subject' as such. We therefore recommend that it be reclassified as part of the Basic Curriculum. (Department for Education 2011)

However, the reformed national curriculum was put out to public consultation with proposals for citizenship as a subject in the secondary education at key stages 3 and 4. Following a coordinated campaign known as *Democratic Life*, by the citizenship subject community supported by many politicians, academics, parents, and young people as well as teachers and 40 organizations, citizenship was retained in the revised national curriculum published in 2013 (Democratic Life 2011a; Moorse 2014).

The revised national curriculum for citizenship began first teaching in schools from September 2014. However, contrary to the previous versions of the curriculum outlined above, this time there was no national support program to help teachers and schools adjust to the changed curriculum.

This said, some aspects of previous versions of citizenship were still in place including democracy, parliament and the political system, and law and the justice system and at key stage 4 human rights and international law, local, regional, and international governance and the UK's relations with the rest of Europe, the Commonwealth, and the wider world, alongside content on the ways citizens contribute to community and influence decision including through voting. However, some new elements had been introduced. For example, for the first time, there was an explicit requirement to teach about the UK's constitution and the role of political parties in the political system of the UK. Personal aspects of finance education were also included more explicitly than before. In addition, some key content that had appeared in previous versions of the national curriculum for citizenship were not explicit, for example, teaching about the economy, consumer, employer and employee rights and responsibilities, sustainable development, public debate, policy formation, pressure and interest groups, and diversity and change in society. References to pupils taking action or active citizenship, although implied, were made in relation to "participation in volunteering" and "other forms for responsible activity." Although in citizenship there remains a requirement to teach critical thinking, research and enquiry, debate, evaluation of evidence, reasoned argument, and taking informed action, there was a significant shift away from specifying subject skills to be developed. This was not just in citizenship but across the national curriculum as a whole (ACT 2014; Moorse 2014).

Overall, the 2014 version of the national curriculum for citizenship – still in effect at the time of writing – is shorter with less detail and arguably contains less clarity. Teachers have to work hard to interpret the requirements and translate them into meaningful schemes of work and lessons. This coupled with a limited communication strategy by the DFE about the curriculum reforms and what changed for each subject has left many schools in the dark about what was expected and some who still do not realize citizenship is still part of the national curriculum in secondary education. Furthermore, while there were no changes to the non-statutory framework for citizenship in primary education, many schools and teachers thought it had gone and simply stopped teaching the subject (Association for Citizenship Teaching 2017).

National Curriculum Programmes of Study for Citizenship 2014

Citizenship – key stages 3 and 4

Subject content

Key stage 3

Teaching should develop pupils' understanding of democracy, government and the rights and responsibilities of citizens. Pupils should use and apply their knowledge and understanding whilst developing skills to research and interrogate evidence, debate and evaluate viewpoints, present reasoned arguments and take informed action.

Pupils should be taught about:

- the development of the political system of democratic government in the United Kingdom, including the roles of citizens, Parliament and the monarch
- the operation of Parliament, including voting and elections, and the role of political parties
- the precious liberties enjoyed by the citizens of the United Kingdom
- the nature of rules and laws and the justice system, including the role of the police and the operation of courts and tribunals
- the roles played by public institutions and voluntary groups in society, and the ways in which citizens work together to improve their communities, including opportunities to participate in school-based activities
- the functions and uses of money, the importance and practice of budgeting, and managing risk.

Key stage 4

Teaching should build on the key stage 3 programme of study to deepen pupils' understanding of democracy, government and the rights and responsibilities of citizens. Pupils should develop their skills to be able to use a range of research strategies, weigh up evidence, make persuasive arguments and substantiate their conclusions. They should experience and evaluate different ways that citizens can act together to solve problems and contribute to society.

Pupils should be taught about:

- parliamentary democracy and the key elements of the constitution of the United Kingdom, including the power of government, the role of citizens and Parliament in holding those in power to account, and the different roles of the executive, legislature and judiciary and a free press
- the different electoral systems used in and beyond the United Kingdom and actions citizens can take in democratic and electoral processes to influence decisions locally, nationally and beyond
- other systems and forms of government, both democratic and non-democratic, beyond the United Kingdom

Citizenship – key stages 3 and 4

- local, regional and international governance and the United Kingdom's relations with the rest of Europe, the Commonwealth, the United Nations and the wider world
- human rights and international law
- the legal system in the UK, different sources of law and how the law helps society deal with complex problems
- diverse national, regional, religious and ethnic identities in the United Kingdom and the need for mutual respect and understanding
- the different ways in which a citizen can contribute to the improvement of his or her community, to include the opportunity to participate actively in community volunteering, as well as other forms of responsible activity
- income and expenditure, credit and debt, insurance, savings and pensions, financial products and services, and how public money is raised and spent.

Recent Policy Initiatives and the Impact on Citizenship and “Active Citizenship” in the Curriculum

A central purpose of citizenship education is to develop the knowledge, understanding, and skills that pupils need to become politically literate, active citizens. Over the three iterations of the national curriculum for citizenship, the ways in which teaching requirements have interpreted this aim have changed. Jerome and Moorse (2016) identify two key reasons for this: first, differences in the approach and methods used to construct and develop the content of the national curriculum teaching requirements and second a shift in the ideologies influencing education priorities and the subject.

The Process of Designing National Curriculum Policy

Since the policy push for the “academization” of schools, the national curriculum carries less weight and status than when it was established in the late 1980s and was statutory in every state school. Academies are state schools which receive their funding directly from central government and, as such, are independent of local authority control. Some academies have been compelled to enter such status on the basis of a schools “underperformance,” while others have converted to academy status by choice and on the basis of their “outstanding” or “good” performance. Free schools are legally academies but are schools which are new to the schooling system (rather than having replaced or been converted from an existing school). Both academies and free schools are granted particular flexibilities to

increase their autonomy, including what they teach within the national curriculum, employment practices, and the structuring of the school calendar. Yet often the national curriculum is one of the first things that a new Education Secretary seeks to reform. The processes used to review and reconstruct the curriculum and how much participation citizens have is therefore an important consideration in its final shape.

In summary the three iterations of the citizenship national curriculum involved three different processes:

- The 2002 version involved a short and closely controlled process managed inside the then Department For Education and Employment and a public statutory consultation managed by the QCA (a non-governmental body whose remit included keeping the curriculum under review).
- The 2008 version involved a longer and more developmental approach organized by the QCA that was more open and involved many planned face-to-face interactions with stakeholders both in education and from the wider public involving committees, conferences, and seminars across the country, followed by formal consultation involving both online and face-to-face stakeholder activities (QCA 2007, p. 5).
- The 2014 revisions were made after the abolition of QCDA. This time the DFE managed the consultation process and the development of new programmes of study for each national curriculum subject internally. There was much more minimal contact with stakeholders and short public, online consultation.

It is noticeable that the more extended and inclusive development process in 2008 coincided with a more confident and well-established citizenship subject community and a fuller curriculum specification of what should be taught in the subject. At this point the subject was also being embedded within schools. There was a network of more than 20 universities training citizenship specialist teachers as well as a wider range of NGOs involved in supporting aspects of the subject or the subject as a whole with resources, conferences, and training for existing teachers (Hayward and Jerome 2010). The subject association – Association for Citizenship Teaching – also reached its peak membership at this point, and shortly afterwards the uptake of GCSE Citizenship Studies also peaked (Joint Council of Qualifications 2009).

During 2013 it was to the surprise of many that government rejected their own Expert Panels' view and Michael Gove confirmed citizenship would remain a national curriculum subject in secondary education. This was in no small part the result of extensive lobbying of many in the subject community who organized a campaigning group, "Democratic Life," supported by leading politicians including the former Education Secretary who established citizenship as a subject, Lord Blunkett. However, while the lobbying was successful in ensuring citizenship continued as a national curriculum subject, there has been a narrowing of subject content and a focus on the softer "voluntary" action rather than political and democratic action and change making of earlier iterations.

Ideology and Citizenship

As noted earlier, discussions about citizenship education have been influenced by governments' ideologies about what the good society looks like and what roles citizens might take in such a society – as law-abiding and compliant citizens who do their duty and vote and/or as critical and active citizens who take a more prominent part in democratic and political decision-making and policy shaping. While there remains a broad consensus that citizenship education is needed if democracy is to survive and thrive, the form, content, and teaching approaches required remain subject to much debate.

One of the main areas where important shifts in meaning are evident in curriculum policy is in relation to active citizenship (see Table 2).

In 1998, the Advisory Group for citizenship stated that “Active citizenship is our aim throughout” although they then chose the term “community involvement” to describe this – perhaps fearing a negative association with the more politically loaded term, “activism.” The drive for active citizenship was based on concerns about the democratic deficit, political apathy, concerns about the moral health of the young, and the goal of building greater involvement of young people in their neighborhoods and communities. The first national curriculum published in 1999 required pupils to be taught skills of “participation and responsible action” alongside “knowledge and understanding about becoming an informed citizen.” By 2008, the purpose of the subject included “to become informed, critical, active citizens who have the confidence and conviction to work collaboratively, take action, and try to make a difference in their communities and the wider world.” Citizenship knowledge and understanding were accompanied by skills of “advocacy and representation” and “taking informed and responsible action” The list of guidance notes for teachers referred to actions including presenting a case to others about a concern; conducting a consultation, vote, or election; organizing a meeting, event, or forum to raise awareness and debate issues; contributing to local community policies; setting up an action group; and training others in democratic skills such as lobbying and campaigning. Both the 2002 and the 2008 programmes of study included active citizenship built on the premise that students should develop the ability to work together with others within the school and wider community to achieve real change and contribute to public life.

In the 2014 Citizenship National Curriculum, there are some noticeable absences of key subject terms and concepts and in particular in relation to “active citizenship.” The curriculum now talks of “volunteering and responsible activity” although teaching requirements do make references to learning about the actions citizens can take in democracy. The shift in language can most obviously be attributed to the interests and motivations of the minister responsible for decision-making about the national curriculum at the time the reforms took place – Michael Gove. This resulted in a content-led “traditional knowledge-rich” curriculum and a return to more “direct instruction.” In a speech given in 2013 by Michael Gove cited a number of academics and writers who supported this view. Notably Daniel Willingham who

Table 2 Changing descriptions of “active citizenship”

Source	Description
1998 Crick report Community involvement	“learning about and becoming helpfully involved in the life and concerns of their communities, including learning through community involvement and service to the community”
2002 National Curriculum for Citizenship Participation and responsible action	Key stage 3 teaching requirements “use their imagination to consider other people’s experiences and be able to think about, express and explain views that are not their own” “negotiate, decide and take part responsibly in both school and community- based activity” “reflect on the process of participating”
2008 National Curriculum for Citizenship Taking informed and responsible action	Key stage 3 teaching requirements “Pupils should be able to: explore creative approaches to taking action on problems and issues to achieve intended purposes work individually and with others to negotiate, plan and take action on citizenship issues to try to influence others, bring about change or resist unwanted change, using time and resources appropriately analyse the impact of their actions on communities and the wider world, now and in the future reflect on the progress they have made, evaluating what they have learnt, what went well, the difficulties encountered and what they would do differently”
2014 National Curriculum for Citizenship Volunteering and responsible activity	From subject aims – “develop an interest in, and commitment to, participation in volunteering as well as other forms of responsible activity, that they will take with them into adulthood” Key stage 3 teaching requirements “the ways in which citizens work together to improve their communities, including opportunities to participate in school-based activities” Key stage 4 from preamble to teaching requirements “They should experience and evaluate different ways that citizens can act together to solve problems and contribute to society” Key stage 4 teaching requirements “actions citizens can take in democratic and electoral processes to influence decisions locally, nationally and beyond” “the different ways in which a citizen can contribute to the improvement of his or her community, to include the opportunity to participate actively in community volunteering, as well as other forms of responsible activity”
2015 DFE GCSE Citizenship Studies Subject Content Taking citizenship action	“Citizenship action may be defined as a planned course of informed action to address a citizenship issue or question of concern and aimed at delivering a benefit or change for a particular community or wider society. Taking citizenship action in a real out-of-classroom context allows students to apply citizenship knowledge, understanding and skills, and

(continued)

Table 2 (continued)

Source	Description
	to gain different citizenship insights and appreciate different perspectives on how we live together and make decisions in society. It requires them to practise a range of citizenship skills including: research and enquiry, interpretation of evidence, including primary and secondary sources, planning, collaboration, problem solving, advocacy, campaigning and evaluation”

says “the more knowledge students acquire, the smarter they become” and ED Hirsch, who Gove claimed “proved this phenomenon beyond any doubt. . .”.

In a context in which the Secretary of State for Education makes such comments, it is not surprising that the concept, process, and pedagogy of “active citizenship” based on the idea that children need to learn citizenship through doing politics, participating in democracy and democratic decision-making and experiencing the process of taking informed action with others including campaigning, are not made explicit in the revised national curriculum citizenship programs of study.

Some years on from the 2014 curriculum, the phrase “active citizenship” has reappeared in national education policy alongside “social action” but this time in a new context. The DFE’s statutory guidance on Relationships and Sex and Health Education published in 2019 advises that schools link taking action with the well-being of citizens, service to others, and the development of personal attributes:

As in primary, secondary relationships education can be underpinned by a wider, deliberate cultivation and practice of resilience and character in the individual. These should include character traits such as belief in achieving goals and persevering with tasks, as well as personal attributes such as honesty, integrity, courage, humility, kindness, generosity, trustworthiness, and a sense of justice, underpinned by an understanding of the importance of self-respect and self-worth. There are many ways in which secondary schools should support the development of these attributes, for example, by providing planned opportunities for young people to undertake social action, active citizenship, and voluntary service to others locally or more widely (Paragraph 74).

The new rationale seems to be that students should be an active and good citizen because of the benefits for the individual, rather than for democratic society and collective democratic well-being.

This narrow and individualized approach has been recognized elsewhere. In 2018, the House of Lords Select Committee report, “The Ties that Bind: Citizenship and Civic Engagement in the 21st Century,” highlighted the “Citizenship challenge” as how to create an environment in which everyone feels they belong and have a stake in society. The report also discussed active citizenship:

What became increasingly clear through the course of this inquiry is that the United Kingdom’s approach to citizenship has in many policy areas become synonymous with an arguably over-narrow and individualised emphasis. Active citizenship is too often defined purely in terms of volunteering, social action or learning facts, and too rarely in terms of

learning about and practising democracy in the sense of political engagement and democratic participation. (Para 13, House of Lords 2018)

The report called for the citizenship curriculum to be reformed and “re-prioritized, creating a statutory entitlement to citizenship education from primary to the end of secondary education and set a target which will allow every secondary schools to have at least one trained citizenship teacher.”

The government response rejected this suggestion on the basis that they had committed not to reform the national curriculum during the current parliament, stating that “We want all pupils to understand democracy, government and how laws are made and to understand the different ways that citizens can work together to improve their communities and society. We want children and young people to use this understanding to become constructive, active citizens” (HM Government 2018).

Conclusion

In examining citizenship education policy and curriculum in England, this chapter has argued that a number of key factors have shaped and influenced the content of the national curriculum subject of citizenship. Notably key moments that both led to the subject being introduced and included in the school curriculum in England and its subsequent development have directly reflected the views and values of those in power, political will, and policy windows of opportunity as well as the process used in the formation and construction of subject content and the levels of engagement with politicians, stakeholders, and the wider public. The most recent curriculum reforms in 2014 led to a narrowing of the subject and even greater need for teachers to interpret and plan their teaching to meet the requirements and provide a meaningful citizenship curriculum for students.

At the time of writing, it is notable that there is a renewed interest in the curriculum and what is taught in schools in England, including citizenship. This has emerged from the School Inspectorate Ofsted, and the curriculum subject has been included explicitly in new inspection framework which was introduced in the autumn of 2019 (Ofsted 2019). The subject of citizenship will be inspected as national curriculum subject under the new Quality of Education measure. Ofsted are clear all schools must provide a broad and balanced curriculum based on the national curriculum or a curriculum of equivalent rigor and breadth. Citizenship is also one of two subjects identified as contributing to personal development, another new measure which schools will be evaluated against. It remains to be seen what impact this might have on the quality of citizenship education, the status of curriculum provision for the subject, and the place of active citizenship in schools. In today’s somewhat temporary and ever-changing political context, where ministers and policymakers and shapers come and go, the debate about the role, purpose, content, and teaching of the citizenship curriculum in England looks set to continue.

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Further Reading

Association for Citizenship Teaching website has copies of the National Curriculum programmes of study 2002 and 2008 available at <https://www.teachingcitizenship.org.uk/resource/national-curriculum-programmes-study-citizenship>



Justice-Oriented, “Thick” Approaches to Civics and Citizenship Education in Australia: Examples of Practice

26

Keith Heggart and Rick Flowers

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Abstract

There has been extensive research into formal approaches to civics and citizenship education which has identified different typologies (e.g., justice-oriented and participatory) and underlying philosophies (“thick” vs. “thin”). However, research remains limited in regards to the pedagogical possibilities that enable such approaches. This chapter explores a range of different examples of justice-oriented and thick approaches to citizenship education. It begins by identifying both formal and informal examples from schooling before broadening the debate

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to discuss examples from civil society, such as refugee advocacy groups and cycling social movements. In doing so, this chapter explicates a typology that frames different forms of citizenship education from passive to active and participatory and then to justice-oriented.

Keywords

Thick citizenship · Justice-oriented citizenship · Participatory citizenship · Active citizenship · Community cultural development · Examples · Grassroots · Organizing

Introduction

It is one thing to critique the state of citizenship education as being too constrained and narrowly focused only on information-giving and raising awareness but is another to then argue that there should be bolder approaches to citizenship education which not only raise awareness but also foster active citizenship. An important and necessary starting point in detailing these bolder approaches is to focus on defining and theorizing about their main features. In this chapter, we examine approaches to citizenship education which foster active citizenship by drawing on existing literature to theorize two key concepts. The first concept is the notion of “thick” citizenship, and we begin by illustrating what constitutes a “thick” approach by describing various examples from the formal education sector. The second concept is “justice-oriented,” and in the second half of the chapter, we describe various examples from informal education projects to illustrate our angle on what constitutes “justice-oriented” citizenship education. To make clear what thick and justice-oriented approaches look like in practice, we illustrate our analysis with examples drawn from the context in which we work, namely, Australia.

Thick and justice-oriented approaches to citizenship education have had to be resourceful and resilient in the face of politically conservative forces that have enjoyed an ascendancy in Australia for over 20 years. This conservatism is exemplified in criticism of the Australian Civics and Citizenship Curriculum by the then federal Education Minister, Christopher Pyne, as being biased and leftist (Crowe 2014). The conservative policy environment is illustrated further by recent legislative proposals to make Australian government funding for community organizations and charities conditional on them agreeing not to make critical comment on major policies of the government of the day. Peak bodies have labeled such legislation as seeking to gag NGOs in their political advocacy (Wade 2007; Hassan 2018). Despite recent, overly narrow policy agendas, there is, nonetheless, good reason to remain optimistic about efforts to build and sustain radical approaches to citizenship education. When appraising these efforts – and as we seek to do in this chapter – attention should, however, be paid not only to official and institutionalized curriculum spaces but also to informal and grassroots spaces.

“Thick” and “Thin” Approaches to Citizenship Education

There is extensive scholarship about the prevailing models of minimalist or thin citizenship education that are dominant in most schools and educational systems in Australia (Cogan and Morris 2001; Kennedy 2007; Macintyre and Simpson 2009; Peterson and Tudball 2017). Typically, commentaries and critiques of these minimalist or thin approaches to citizenship education seek to advocate for a wider, more expansive approach. In this section, we examine and theorize “thick” approaches to citizenship education and describe the ways in which these provide a valuable conceptual base for citizenship education in Australia.

The term “thick” itself has a lengthy etymology in relation to notions of citizenship and citizenship education (Isin and Turner 2002) and has been used by a number of scholars – including Terence McLaughlin (1992), Joel Westheimer and Joseph Kahne (2004), and David Zyngier (2011a) – to describe citizenship education that emphasizes student-led, activist, and participatory approaches. One of the key differences between thick and thin (or maximal and minimal) approaches to citizenship and citizenship education is the level of civic involvement – which could be advocacy, activism or/and voluntary community service – expected and required of individuals within society. McLaughlin describes the difference in this way:

On minimal views, there is a degree of suspicion of widespread involvement, and the citizen is seen primarily as a private individual with the task of voting wisely for representatives. In contrast, maximal views favour a more fully participatory approach to democracy. (1992, p. 237)

This more fully participatory approach is based on the assumption that a strong democracy relies on a robust public sphere and civil society, which in turn rely on the experiential, (nodding to John Dewey), conscientized (nodding to Paulo Freire), and emancipatory (nodding to Frankfurt School Critical Theory) knowledge of grass-roots citizens. Thin approaches to citizenship, by contrast, emphasize didactic and teacher-led approaches underpinned by an assumption that strong democracy relies on citizens having instrumental knowledge about how political structures work. The tension between both thick and thin approaches to civics and citizenship education has informed much of the development of civics and citizenship education materials.

In Australia, across the political spectrum, a succession of state and federal government education agencies has placed priority on teaching about the processes and mechanisms of government and have been criticized for this exclusionary and narrow approach (O’Loughlin 1997; Heggart et al. 2018). *Discovering Democracy*, a citizenship education syllabus that was developed in the 1990s and ran until the mid-2000s, was one such example. While *Discovering Democracy* originally sought to embrace a more activist notion of citizenship education, it was ultimately too content-heavy and was often delivered in a way that was teacher-centered and didactic (Heggart et al. 2018). The more recent *Australian Civics and Citizenship Curriculum* made some improvements, especially in the way that citizenship was defined for young people, but it is still limited and does not sufficiently recognize the diversity of citizenship and citizens within Australia and nor does it foreground the

ways young people might be active within their communities. Instead, like other curricula before it, it perpetrates the notion of young people as “citizens-in-waiting” (Arvanitakis and Marren 2009; Heggart et al. 2018).

In seeking alternative examples to thin approaches, we recommend looking beyond government developed and mandated approaches to citizenship education to local school, community, and civil society initiated approaches. In these contexts, it is possible to find citizenship education examples that are more activist in focus, more local in context, and more student-centered in practice. We have chosen to characterize these models in two ways – *bottom-up approaches*, which are led by students and are often focused on a single issue that usually develops organically from a specific context and *established curriculum frameworks* that are often deployed in schools, usually with local applications but draw on a predetermined network of resources and structures.

Thick and Formal Approaches to Citizenship Education: Pop-Up and Student-Led Examples

If one’s benchmark for a healthy democracy is framed through the lens of old social movements – where social action campaigns are run by organizations with a head office – then one would look for capacity to sustain advocacy over a long period of time. Through such a lens transitory and, especially, one-off, actions would be regarded less positively. Framed through the lens of new social movements – where campaigns are run through decentralized networks – locally initiated actions, even when one-off, are regarded as potentially powerful (Offe 1985). Indeed, like pop-up restaurants and stores, there are citizenship education initiatives that are one-off or transitory. A central argument of this chapter is to view citizenship education through new social movements lens. Here, therefore, we critically discuss some examples of citizenship education that are not only student-led but have popped up organically around specific issues.

A key contention within existing literature is that young Australians relate to, and participate in, pop-up approaches which serve to challenge the traditional notion that young people are apathetic or ignorant (or both) about politics and civil society. Anita Harris, Johanna Wyn, and Salem Younes (2010) corroborate this. Their empirical research suggests that young people are often neither apathetic or activists but are largely disaffected from a political system that they feel is not responsive to their needs. Phillipa Collin and Lucas Walsh put a finer point on new ways in which Australian young people are expressing their interest in politics:

Young people are often more interested in direct, everyday, individualised and networked forms of participation. Their everyday participatory practices (such as boycotts and sharing political content via social media), interest-based activities (such as contributing to youth mental health service design or starting their own online petition or campaign), and creative and media practices (joining a flashmob, producing a mash-up or a Tumblr account) are often framed as “taking action” on issues they care about. Surveys or electoral rolls rarely

pick up these forms of participation. But what they tell us is that taking part in elections is only one form of participation young people value. (2016, p. 1)

One such example of a direct, networked, and individualized response to an issue is the *Asylum Seeker Resource Centre* (ASRC n.d.). We use the term “individualized” here to describe examples that are developed by individuals or small groups of people but more often than not are undertaken in a collective and participatory manner. This project began in 2001 when Kon Karapanagiotidis, a teacher moved by the plight of homeless asylum seekers in Melbourne, decided to start a resource center with his students at a technical and further education college. The ASRC began as a student project. Seventeen years later it boasts that it is

supported by a network of more than 1,000 volunteers and 100 staff in assisting around 4,600 people seeking asylum each year. . . [As an] independent, community-led organisation the ASRC is in a unique position to advocate for the human rights of people seeking asylum, exempt from the pressures of government or the private sector. For this reason, the ASRC has been able to take a leading position in the opposition of Australia’s asylum seeker policy, while offering alternatives to issues faced by people seeking asylum and refugees. (Asylum Seeker Resource Centre n.d.)

This approach exemplifies the organic or noninstitutionalized nature of many social justice movements and activist citizenship education approaches (Gosden 2006). While it began as a local collective, the ASRC now has a national – even international – reach and continues to work to both support asylum seekers and educate Australians about these matters. This increased profile has inspired other, more localized activism – for example, the students at Bethlehem College in Sydney who protested the Federal Government’s asylum seeker policies with a silent sit-in (McNeilage 2014).

Here we also want to draw attention to the epistemological politics of these two examples. Although quite different, both ASRC and the work of students at Bethlehem College are arguably examples of thick citizenship education in that they are projects that were activist in orientation and were developed and led by students and participants. Furthermore, rather than seeking to develop government-mandated curriculum knowledge, they instead begin from the concerns and understandings of the young people in question. The knowledge that is privileged is that of the young people themselves. In the second half of this chapter, we go onto explain how this is a central feature of justice-oriented approaches to citizenship education.

Another example of a thick approach to citizenship education is the *Aussie Democracy* project, which began just before the Australian federal election in 2010. It took place as part of a Civics class in a Victorian school and made heavy use of social media as a means to build engagement among students and involve them in the real-world election as active participants rather than disinterested bystanders. This project was the idea of Mike Stuchbery, a teacher who was conscious that despite the looming 2010 federal election, students were, for the most part, apathetic about the election and the issues related to parliament and government. Instead of teaching them in a standard way (a minimalist approach)

by using textbooks and the *Discovering Democracy* syllabus and resources, Stuchbery attempted to teach the students about Federal Parliament by actually involving them in the election campaign – as political commentators, reporters, and journalists. He describes the change that this caused in the classroom:

As I move around the room, showing them the Twitter account I've set up for them, the blog and a few other gadgets I've picked up, they get it. They sit down in groups, working on questions that they want to direct at politicians. They're good questions too. There are ones on trade alliances, school funding and the pressures of public scrutiny. Truth be told, I'm kind of gobsmacked. One kid asks me whether he and his mate can call a TV station, that they reckon they might be able to get Julia or Tony if someone reported on what we're doing. I nod, smile, and send them off to write a script for the phone call they'll make. There's electricity in the air. It doesn't feel like school. It feels like something else. The kids are alert, focused, loving what they're doing. (Stuchbery 2010)

By making the lessons about citizenship education much “thicker” (i.e., more student-led and activist), Stuchbery tapped into the interests of young people. This presents an example of David Gauntlett's techno-optimistic perspective that Web 2.0 platforms can strengthen democracy because they offer new opportunities for participatory action and learning (2015). *Aussie Democracy* served as a powerful example of thicker and justice-focused citizenship education as it taught young people that it is essential for members of a democracy to challenge their leaders, to ask difficult questions and to demand transparency. These are the kinds of attitudes that are often overlooked in thinner, more minimalist approaches to citizenship education, but they were firmly foregrounded in *Aussie Democracy*.

Thick and Formal Approaches to Citizenship Education: Examples that Established a Place in School Curricula

While thin approaches to citizenship education continue to be dominant, there are, nonetheless, examples of innovative and thick citizenship education initiatives that have gained places in school syllabi. The first example we present is from the *Australian Youth Climate Coalition* (AYCC) which draws together a range of youth climate action groups and seeks to place young people in positions of leadership in the climate change debate. It does this by campaigning, educating, and agitating for changes to governmental policy. They see the education of young people, by young people, as central.

We are ambitious and innovative, and we're not afraid to make mistakes and learn from them. By giving young people the opportunity to be courageous, we give them the space to learn. (AYCC 2018)

The AYCC have developed “peer-to-peer education, empowerment and training programs for high school students” (Partridge 2008, p. 22).

The second example is *RUMAD?* (Are You Making A Difference?) developed by David Zyngier. This program is "values-focused, student-led and at its core starts from student-identified values and visions" (2007, p. 54). Unlike thin citizenship education programs which focus only on the learning of political knowledge, *RUMAD?* actively seeks to engage and support young people to build and enact their knowledge in the community through action research projects. It seeks to break down the walls that exist between schools and communities, and instead, through school and community participation, equip young people with self-esteem, confidence, and skills to solve real world problems (Zyngier 2011b, p. 140).

One example of a project using the *RUMAD?* framework is Jessie's Creek. At a small primary school in Victoria, students worked with a selection of government and nongovernment agencies to clean up the local creek. They conducted a biodiversity study of the local area, during which they had to engage with the public, undertake problem-solving activities, and work collaboratively to achieve desired outcomes. Zyngier (2007) writes:

From the outset they have been at the centre of the campaign to save Jessie's Creek, mustering community support by producing brochures, conducting surveys and sending letters to government bodies linked with management of the creek. (p. 53)

Another example of an established curriculum framework being applied in a local context is the *Global Connects* program. This program, developed by Lynette Schultz et al. (2009), arose out of a recognition of the impact that globalization is having on young people. While it might be true that young people are having difficulty processing the rapidly changing nature of the world and their place in it due to the influence of globalization (Schultz et al. 2009), it is also true that many young people want to contribute to their society and solve problems of injustice and inequality, but they are hesitant to do so because they feel they lack the ability to do so (Eckersley et al. 2007).

The *Global Connects* program, developed by *PLAN International*, is an example of active citizenship-centered, youth-led, global learning. One example involved middle school children in Melbourne who engaged in conversations over the course of 6 months with youth groups in Indonesia (Schultz et al. 2009). The two groups exchanged communication pieces about issues that they felt were of significance to their lives. These texts included letters and posters, as well as short films. Crucially, the global elements of technology made this project more feasible than would have been previously possible and much more relevant and engaging to the young people involved.

Having begun communicating with each other, the next step of the *Global Connects* program was for the two groups to identify common issues and then establish action plans to address these issues in their local communities. The project was intended to develop active citizenship skills: "As a result, *PLAN* expects that children will undergo more of a personal transformative experience than they would if they were passive recipients of information" (Schultz et al. 2009, p. 1025). This appears to have occurred:

[Students] demonstrated a number of skills and personal changes that have allowed them to engage as active citizens, within their own communities and in wider national and global communities, now and in the future. (p. 1027)

While the *Global Connects* program had a global focus, other examples of established curriculum frameworks are available which demonstrate a greater focus on the local. One example of such a local approach is *Justice Citizens* (Heggart 2015a, b). Based at a school in Australia, this program was established by the authors and worked within the local community in which the school was based, and sought to empower students to identify and then challenge sources of injustice in this community through collaborative film-making. In the next section, we focus on the structure of *Justice Citizens* project and argue that it constitutes an example of what thick citizenship education in a formal setting might look like.

Justice Citizens was a project designed by the authors to explore the concepts behind justice-oriented citizenship (as defined by Joel Westheimer and Joseph Kahne 2004) as well as to examine how such notions correlated with young people's own understandings and practices of active citizenship, both in person and online. We have, since then, developed the notion of justice-oriented citizenship further (as is discussed in the second half of the chapter). *Justice Citizens* was implemented at a Western Sydney Catholic high school in 2012. The aim of the course was for students to develop the skills, values, and attitudes required of active citizens. In particular, it sought to develop critical thinking, digital literacy, research skills, and collaborative learning practices.

The course was broken into three main sections. In the first section, students were challenged to consider their own agency. This was done by presenting students with a range of situations in the form of true/false statements (e.g., "Young people are capable of organizing nationwide protests"). Students were then presented with real-world examples where young people had done organized nationwide protests. This led to discussion about why young people were capable of doing such things, and whether the participants in *Justice Citizens* could conceive of themselves undertaking similar actions. In addition, students identified the kinds of skills and knowledge that were required in order to take this form of action, as well as whether they possessed these.

In the second part of the course, students worked with journalists from local newspapers to develop an understanding of research and interview techniques. Students also had the opportunity to speak to a range of community members about different topics that the community member felt was important. During this phase in the intervention and study, a number of issues constantly recurred: these included racism, the treatment of asylum seekers, the dangers of drug and alcohol abuse, and bullying and harassment.

The final part of the course involved students researching, planning, shooting, and editing their films. Students worked in small groups (chosen by themselves), and the groups ranged from pairs to one group of seven. Students were responsible for "pitching" an idea for their film to their teacher, then researching it. They then had to devise a script collaboratively, as well as a storyboard, before shooting their film. For

many students, this was undertaken during school time (either during the lessons themselves or during other free time), but some groups used their own personal time to meet up with participants or people they wanted to film. More than 30 films were produced.

These films were then shown to the whole cohort, who voted on which ones they thought were the best; these films were placed on the school’s YouTube channel and also presented at a local Film Festival. The online space and the actual physical film festival were important for different reasons. The physical festival allowed students to invite prominent members of the community to see their films and also engage in discussion about the topics, while the online space provided a chance for students to share their films with a much broader audience.

A Threefold Typology of Informal Citizenship Education with Adults: Examples from Australian Refugee Advocacy Groups

In this section, we illustrate further the features of “thick” citizenship education, through focusing on justice-oriented approaches to citizenship education drawn mostly from informal “educational” initiatives with adults. Following Griff Foley’s (1999) and Tony Jeffs’ and Mark Smith’s (1999) typologies, we define informal education to refer to education which is neither credentialed (formal) or classroom-based (nonformal). Informal education is also to be distinguished from incidental learning because informal education is planned with clear intent to facilitate learning. Unlike schooling, the informal education space is not regulated, and this means that there is little consistency of terminology used to describe it.

In order to draw out the distinction between active and justice-oriented learning, we describe and discuss a threefold typology drawing on Westheimer and Kahne’s (2004) concepts of passive, active, and justice-oriented learning. Three refugee advocacy organizations that each work in distinct ways are used to illustrate the typology (see Table 1). The context is a long and rich history of campaigns led by a myriad of local, national, and international NGOs seeking to mobilize public support to bring about change to Australian government policies in relation to refugees who arrive by boat. One example is “A Fair Go for Families: campaign for family reunion” led by the *Refugee Council for Australia*. In order to support the campaign, people are asked to inform themselves about refugees and relevant laws, sign a petition, donate money, and host a picnic as an awareness-raising activity. This can be seen as enabling informal citizenship education where members of the community learn about political context and structures. The “learning” takes place not with the guidance of a “teacher” or “facilitator” but through study of web- and print-based information prepared by “experts” and provided by the *Refugee Council for Australia*. Drawing on Westheimer and Kahne’s (2004) typology, we would describe this type of education as serving to promote the personally responsible citizen, given that it involves mainly didactic “instruction” and passive learning and thus corresponds to the first tier of the typology below.

Table 1 Threefold typology of citizenship education for and with refugees

	<i>Passive learning</i>	<i>Active and participatory learning</i>	<i>Justice-oriented learning and grassroots knowledge</i>
<i>Refugee Council for Australia</i>	Citizens (who are not refugees) studying web- and print-based material given to them to inform solidarity-actions		
<i>Chillout</i>		Citizens (who are not refugees) locating materials for themselves; devising and writing own materials to inform participatory activism	
<i>RISE</i>			Refugee-citizens research, plan and lead actions for themselves

We would argue that an example of active learning is provided by *Chillout*, an NGO that campaigns to promote the rights of children seeking asylum. In addition to petitions and publication of research reports, *Chillout* has instigated a number of actions which require supporters to not only read, donate, and sign but also to undertake their own research to inform their own initiatives. These include writing letters to asylum seeker children in detention centers and supporting refugees to present in school classrooms. Again drawing on Westheimer and Kahne's (2004) typology, we would describe this type of informal education as serving to promote the participatory citizen. This is the second tier of our typology. Here, citizens do not only learn information in a passive manner (because it is made available to them in the form of *Chillout* research reports that is why the column in Table 1 connects to more than one category) they also learn in an active manner because they are supported to undertake research for themselves when preparing letters and presentations. The key "curriculum" feature, however, that we want to draw attention to is not just how participatory the learning is, but to what extent the advocacy and social action builds on the grassroots knowledge of the frontline citizen-activists.

We now want to present the third type that does not exclude the first two approaches but extends them, namely, justice-oriented citizenship education. *RISE* is, in its own words, the "first refugee and asylum seeker organisation in Australia to be run and governed by refugees, asylum seekers and ex-detainees" (RISE n.d.). *RISE* undertakes petitions, research, and presentations, much like the *Refugee Council of Australia* and *Chillout*, mentioned above. The important difference is that *RISE* campaigns are underpinned by the grassroots knowledge of refugees themselves.

This difference is important because it points to epistemological distinctions. Westheimer and Kahne call for an approach that places emphasis on learners'

challenging inequalities to promote the justice-oriented citizen. Here they draw attention not only to acts of advocacy but also to a structuralist analysis which seeks to identify root causes and address them. But the argument we are developing is that it also matters who gets to undertake the analysis, informal education, and social action. It is one thing when a justice-oriented, structuralist analysis is researched and presented by “experts” and another when it is undertaken by frontline citizen-activists themselves.

This is why we focus not only on Westheimer and Kahne’s justice-oriented process of structurally analyzing and challenging inequalities but also on the epistemological politics of John Dewey (1938), Paulo Freire (1970), as well as Lew Zipin and Alan Reid (2008). Dewey saw democracy and justice being enacted through curriculum that walked the talk; in other words built on the experiential and subjective knowledge of learners. Freire, likewise, has been influential in his case for championing a notion of justice where curriculum is developed from the perspective of those who are most poor and least powerful and are oppressed in both material and epistemological terms. Zipin and Reid argue that approaches to citizenship education focusing on personally responsible and participatory citizenship are inherently individualistic and instrumentalist because they do not challenge dominant classed, racialized, and gendered epistemological views of political structures. They see justice being enacted through educators privileging what they call the lifeworld knowledge of less powerful socio-cultural groups.

When considering frontline citizens and their grassroots knowledge, there is a difference to be drawn between citizens who are not refugees acting in solidarity for and with refugees and refugees advocating for themselves. The informal education that both types of citizen undertake is important, but there are specificities. At the risk of over-simplifying, we tentatively offer another binary opposition to thin and thick approaches. We suggest there are “soft” and “hard” approaches to citizenship education. It is soft and easy to rely on experts devising and delivering citizenship education. It is hard and challenging to support frontline activists or ordinary citizens to undertake their own research and plan their own learning. It is even harder when those citizens are in precarious circumstances, for example, have restricted work and study rights.

Drawing on Practices of Community Cultural Development for Justice-Oriented Citizenship Education

To pursue this type of “hard” epistemological politics to do advocacy and informal education for refugees requires more than an organization like *RISE* simply having refugees and asylum seekers as members. It involves deploying strategies that require sophisticated skill-sets to enable grassroots members to undertake their own research that will inform ideas and initiatives for informal citizenship education. Enabling grassroots people, especially those with histories of exclusion, to research, plan, and implement informal education is easier said than done. For anyone, but more so for people who are not used to having their voice and knowledge regarded as

important, to research and present educational “stories” is a process that requires not just highly developed technical skills but also an epistemological disposition. Paulo Freire (1974) described this as a process of moving learners through stages from magic, then naïve to critical consciousness.

It is no coincidence that a good deal of justice-oriented campaigns and citizenship education initiatives rely on the involvement of arts workers. This is because they have expertise in researching, producing/making, and presenting “stories” in ways that are creative. This is a field of practice known as community cultural development (Adams and Goldbard 2005). An illustrative example is an Aboriginal reconciliation campaign known as *The Torch*. *The Torch* was a partnership between the *Brotherhood of St Laurence* and a Melbourne-based theater company and a justice-oriented and informal education program that sought to facilitate learning with grassroots “citizens” in rural towns about the history of local interactions between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal residents. This was done through a story-making process. Writers and actors with the theater company prepared a skeleton script. The plot involved the local country town preparing for a visit by the Queen and torch bearers shortly before the 1956 Olympics that were staged in Melbourne. A major part of the preparations included moving Aboriginal people living in shanty make-shift accommodation away from the main streets. They were regarded as an eyesore. The theater workers would spend several weeks in the respective town prodding and provoking both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people to undertake research to flesh out the skeleton script. Local stories were unearthed. There were, as Zipin refers to them, accounts of “dark” knowledge dimensions (2009). For example, a farmer undertook research about his grandparent’s accounts of Aboriginal people being shot by police, and an Aboriginal woman investigated the circumstances surrounding the taking of children by welfare authorities. But there were also accounts of “lighter” knowledge dimensions, for example, a local football club welcoming Aboriginal players and a local pub hosting Aboriginal musicians for more than 30 years. Such local stories were woven into the script. But the justice-orientation of this approach to citizenship education for reconciliation went beyond local people including their research in the script/curriculum. It also included local people being recruited and supported to assist with stage and costume design and perform on stage, whether it be singing, acting, or dancing. This process of collaborative storymaking enacts what can be called a justice-oriented approach to citizenship education. *The Torch*, of course, is not an isolated example of this type of practice. Indeed the field of community cultural development or applied community arts includes various Australian arts organizations; for example, *Chorus of Women*, *BigHart*, *Urban Theatre Projects*, *Somebody Daughter’s Theatre Company*, and the *Artful Dodger’s Studio*.

Citizenship Education for and with Cyclists

We now turn our attention to efforts to promote more bicycle friendly cities. This is an arena for informal citizenship education which relies heavily on the campaigning efforts of grassroots cyclists’ groups. In order to illustrate a justice-oriented approach, we will compare three different epistemological perspectives. The first

is an instrumentalist perspective which prioritizes informing current and potential cyclists about the political structures which make decisions about and fund bicycle infrastructure. While we acknowledge that in this perspective citizens are learning passively, this type of informal education practice is, nonetheless, important and foundational. A second epistemological perspective is interpretive and prioritizes supporting bicyclists to enact active citizenship. There is, of course, a continuum from passive to active, then to justice-oriented citizenship. But the act of cycling itself can be seen as a participatory action and these groups not only encourage more people to cycle, but also to write petitions and post stories on social media. Through such advocacy, these citizen-cyclists are educating themselves and others about creating cities that are less dependent on motorized transport and more reliant on human-powered vehicle movement.

To continue moving along the continuum, *Critical Mass* and *CycleHack* present examples of even more participatory and justice-oriented citizenship. *Critical Mass* began in 1992 in San Francisco and is now active in hundreds of cities across the world, including Australia. There is no formal organization, no office holders, just monthly political-protest rides. Typically cyclists ride en-masse through major road intersections. There are variations. Some groups obey the road rules but make a point of taking up all road space. Other groups make a point of clogging up intersections for a short period of time and handing out pamphlets and chanting slogans to car drivers. And some do actions such as die-ins where cyclists lie on the road with their bicycles to draw attention to bicyclists being killed by cars, or lifting bikes above their heads as a celebratory gesture.

The reason we are focusing on epistemology is to draw attention to whose knowledge and what sort of knowledge is at play. In the *Critical Mass* actions, it is the embodied knowledge of diverse grassroots cyclists, as opposed to the authoritative knowledge of “senior”/expert organizational bike-citizens in information-based advocacy, which counts. This is participatory, verging on justice-oriented, citizenship. It is participatory because there is active involvement in collective decision-making and action. For some participants, it may only be a spectacle where is neither passive or active learning. But for other participants, it may spur or require them to research for themselves local issues facing bicycle advocates. And for some this may embolden them to deepen their learning and sustain their advocacy efforts. In this vein, *Critical Mass* can be seen as sitting on a continuum between participatory and justice-oriented citizenship as depicted in Table 2.

If one was to design a movement that was further along the continuum towards justice-oriented citizenship, one might develop something like *CycleHack*. *CycleHack* sits in column 4 of Table 2 indicating how its approach is an example of justice-oriented citizenship. This movement started in 2014 in Glasgow as a one-off event to bring together cycle activists, developers, designers, planners, and engineers to brainstorm the barriers that stifle more bike-riding and collaborate on new ideas. *CycleHack* has quickly grown into a movement and there are in 2018 collectives in over 40 cities across the world. We see this as an example of justice-oriented citizenship because it directly harnesses the knowledge of bicycle-citizens to develop substantial “curriculum.”

Table 2 Threefold typology of citizenship education for and with cyclists: instrumental, interpretive, and critical epistemological perspectives

	<i>Passive learning and instrumental knowledge</i>	<i>Active, participatory learning and interpretive knowledge</i>	<i>Justice-oriented learning and grassroots, critical knowledge</i>
<i>Australian Cycle Alliance</i>	Provide information via meetings, brochures, films and newsletters	But also encourage grassroots cyclists to write petitions and post stories on social media	
<i>Critical Mass</i>		Cyclists meet once a month and “occupy” a major road intersection as a protest spectacle	Some are emboldened to research and plan further actions
<i>CycleHack</i>			Grassroots and expert cyclists connect to research for themselves ways to improve experiences and infrastructure

As citizens, we are all experts in our own right. We all have countless hours of experience travelling through our local streets, interacting with other road users & using the products/services that surround us. . . . Our approach to solving the barriers to cycling connects citizens and allows them to be part of a positive change where they live. . . . We want to reduce the number of barriers that surround everything from; how you learn to ride a bike; where you lock your bike up; how you interact with others; to how cycling can fit into your daily routines. (CycleHack 2018)

These bike-citizens see themselves addressing the injustice of apathy and hostility towards measures to make cities less reliant on motorized transport and to feature more human-powered vehicles. It is not just about their agency and subjectivity, it is that they have developed a structured process – some call human-centered design – where they drive the “curriculum.”

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have defined and analyzed justice-oriented and thick approaches to citizenship education. In doing so, we have sought to extend Westheimer and Kahne’s definitions of passive, participatory, and justice-oriented citizenship on various levels. First we have highlighted differences and similarities between thick and justice-oriented approaches. Second, we have drawn attention to the centrality of epistemological politics. Third, we have highlighted the value of applying a broad lens to capturing the scope and multifaceted nature of radical approaches to citizenship education. Through this lens, one can see formal and informal education initiatives, pop-up and institutionalized curricula strategies. The main implication of our argument is that a justice-oriented approach to citizenship education requires

more attention be paid to the question: Does it matter whose knowledge we harness? The challenge is not only to design and implement “curriculum” – be that in formal or informal education contexts – that enables learners to pursue a structuralist analysis and action, but to do this with diverse groups of learners. It is important to support learners who are already confident of their capacity to be active and justice-oriented citizens, but also important to support those who are not.

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“Fundamental British Values”: The Teaching of Nation, Identity, and Belonging in the United Kingdom

27

Sadia Habib

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Abstract

The chapter seeks to problematize the policy requirement to promote “Fundamental British Values” in English schools. Historically, research shows Britishness to be fluid, evolving, and often difficult to define for White British and ethnic minority young people, as well as for pre-service student teachers, classroom teachers, and teacher educators. Recent research conducted with pre-service student teachers is outlined in this chapter to evidence intersections between nation, identity, and belonging that schools could explore. I analyze the teaching and learning of Britishness and “Fundamental British Values” as complex processes. I recommend for students and teachers to engage in reflective and collaborative classroom activities about identities and belongings. Critical pedagogy and arts-based pedagogies are recommended as possible useful

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teaching and learning approaches for young people and teachers who explore identity issues in the classroom.

Keywords

Britishness · British values · Citizenship · Nation · Belonging · Teaching · Learning · Multiculturalism · Identity

Introduction

The active promotion of “Fundamental British Values” (FBVs) is a policy requirement placed on educational institutions in England. The FBVs directive has been labelled as a “duty” in government documents, obliging educational institutions – including schools which are the focus in this chapter – to comply (Habib 2017; Revell and Bryan 2018) (The 2014 press release – “Guidance on promoting British values in schools published” – stipulates “All have a duty to ‘actively promote’ the fundamental British values of democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, and mutual respect and tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs. These values were first set out by the government in the ‘Prevent’ strategy in 2011.” See <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/guidance-on-promoting-british-values-in-schools-published>.) Research, however, indicates that the concept of Britishness is fluid, evolving, and often difficult to define for White British and British ethnic minority young people, as well as for educators. National identity – contrary to political rhetoric that attempts to fix, essentialize, and reify it through educational policies – is a concept that is contested and difficult to define (Jacobson 1997; Scourfield et al. 2006; Maylor 2010; Anderson 2006, 2012; Burkett 2013).

As teachers – some who may not identify as British themselves – may be wary of presenting to their students uncritical content regarding nationalism and patriotism (Osler and Starkey 2005), important questions emerge about how educators might respond to policy calls to teach Britishness and FBVs, particularly given that national identity is an ambivalent term. Evidence suggests that, in the past, English schools have encountered difficulties in exploring and teaching about a shared British identity (Ajegbo et al. 2007; Maylor et al. 2007). Maylor (2010), for example, highlights the multiple ways students define Britishness: being born in Britain, holding a passport, citizenship, Whiteness, British parentage or family, and historical heritage dating back to Anglo-Saxon times, while Hussain and Bagguley (2005) found Bradford’s ethnic minority youth keen on asserting their Britishness by referring to their rights to belong as citizens. Most recently, the head of OfSTED (the schools’ inspectorate in England) has complained that the teaching of British values in schools remains “piecemeal” (TES 2018).

This chapter draws on existing literature and the author’s own empirical research to problematize the duty placed on schools to actively promote FBVs (Habib 2017). Throughout this chapter, I draw on distinct critiques of the requirement for schools to promote FBVs. It is worth remembering that these critiques will have different points

of origin, and the critics will have various motivations, intentions, and reasons for highlighting the issues of concern with FBVs. Problematizing the teaching of FBVs is particularly important in light of concerns that the ways teachers are appraised by school leaders and OfSTED inspectors in relation to the FBVs duty are complicated by the relationship between FBVs and Counter Terrorism and Security (Revell and Bryan 2016). Perceived by politicians as a remedy to cure “vulnerable” youth “disloyal” to nation, the agendas of Britishness and FBVs that have come to pervade British society place an unnecessary pressure on schools to mold homogenous and loyal British citizens. Furthermore, it has been documented that from early years to higher education, it is Muslim young people (Kyriacou et al. 2017) who are the most impacted by the way that the FBVs and Prevent policies have become both inseparable and an imposition.

Political discourses about the “radicalization” of young Muslim males (Bryant 2009; Zuberi 2010; Jerome and Clemitshaw 2012), the failure of young people to adopt “British” values (Brown 2010; Berkeley 2011; Sales 2012), as well as the education of White working-class males (Jerome and Clemitshaw 2012; Stahl 2015) have resulted in Britishness being elevated as a category of inclusion and as a cure to what is perceived as fragmented British society. The political desire to teach about Britishness in contemporary England therefore was presented to school teachers as a means to end young people’s political disenfranchisement. In the backdrop of the promotion of Britishness and FBVs lies the Prevent duty.

In 2003, the Prevent policy (explained in more detail below) was introduced to counter terrorism initially by challenging “violent extremism” and then later in 2009 to tackle “non-violent extremism” too: “The revised definition of Prevent views non-violent forms of extremism through the prism of British Values” (Miah 2017, p. 4). By providing an overview of current literature on teaching Britishness and FBVs, this chapter examines reasons why the promotion of FBVs within schools in the United Kingdom is problematic for teachers and students who are negotiating numerous political agendas. In order to resolve some of the problems associated with teaching FBVs, the final section of the chapter suggests arts-based critical pedagogy as one possibility for ensuring reflective and collaborative work takes place when exploring (national) identities.

English Education Policy: From Teaching Britishness to Fundamental British Values

Britishness: Multicultural Belongings

Contemporary debates about national identity in the United Kingdom are frequently shaped by political and media discourses that condemn ethnic minority communities for not sufficiently “integrating” into British society. In these discourses, minority communities are often criticized for not sharing a sense of collective belonging with wider society, and ethnic minority young people are often blamed for social disharmony (Vasta 2013). Such discourses of blame, which bring into question the extent

to which all citizens have a sense of belonging, also recreate old tensions and new ambiguities regarding multicultural Britain. On the one hand, some politicians applaud diversity and integration, while simultaneously political policies are critiqued for recycling assimilationist rhetoric (Back et al. 2002).

Recognizing that national identity and nationhood are difficult concepts to define and analyze for both White Britons and minority ethnic communities (Vadher and Barrett 2009), over the last two decades, formulations of British national identity have become intimately connected with a range of concerns. Perhaps the most significant of these concerns is the inclusion/exclusion of ethnic minorities. For example, the “new McCarthyism” that other British Muslims have created a moral panic about Muslims disloyal to British values (Fekete 2009), consequently resulting in the rise of anti-Muslim racism and Islamophobia (Scourfield et al. 2005; Osler 2015). British Muslims, portrayed as the “enemy within” (Abbas 2004, p. 30), are alienated by news headlines like “Be more British Cameron tells UK Muslims” (Walters 2014). Such media representation constructs British Muslims as not British enough and as less than citizens (Gilmartin 2008). Therefore, bearing this in mind, complexities surrounding the teaching of Britishness and FBVs raise theoretical, methodological, and pedagogical concerns about how students and teachers might best respond to political initiatives reminiscent of assimilatory and racist rhetoric of the past.

Furthermore the complexities and uncertainties surrounding notions of immigration, identity, multiculturalism, and the United Kingdom’s future were also seen as potentially resolvable by promoting Britishness in schools and in society (Andrews and Mycock 2008). The terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 (9/11) and in London in July 2005 (7/7) amplified debates about Britishness (Kiwan 2012), and as a consequence, the UK government “began to stress the importance of education in uniting the nation” (Osler 2008, p. 11). Following the election of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government in 2010, debates about immigration, place, and national identities continued to intensify and influence the ways in which schools, teachers, and students were expected to understand Britishness and British values. The then Communities Secretary, Eric Pickles, advocated an end to “state-sponsored multiculturalism,” instead seeking to popularize “British values” through the promotion of Christianity and the English language as core to British identity (Walford 2012; Communities and Local Government 2012; Grayson 2012).

FBVs: Expectations on Schools and Teachers

In 2011 a revised set of “Teachers’ Standards” (to be met by all qualified teachers) were introduced. These standards explicitly required teachers not to *undermine* fundamental British values, both in their professional lives and personal lives (DfE 2011). It is important to note that in referencing FBVs, the Teachers’ Standards explicitly referenced a key strand of the government’s CONTEST counter-terrorism strategy – Prevent. The connection between the Teachers’ Standards and the Prevent policy is significant given suggestions that the latter serves to construct Muslim

communities as “undermining the secular-neoliberal consensus” and that, thus, Muslims become perceived as “an ontological threat to the West” (Miah 2017, p. 75).

In 2014, the coalition government announced that schools in England were expected to actively *promote* Fundamental British Values (FBVs), defined as “democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs” (DfE 2014). In addition, the Counter Terrorism and Security Act of 2015 and the 2016 White Paper *Educational Excellence Everywhere* both place emphasis on teachers’ duties in preventing radicalization (Revell and Bryan 2016). The White Paper (DfE 2016, p. 94) declares “a 21st century education should prepare children for adult life by instilling the character traits and fundamental British values that will help them succeed.”

The school inspectorate (the Office for Standards in Education (OfSTED)), “Common Inspection Framework,” also stipulates the promotion of FBVs as a key feature of their inspection of schools: “inspectors will make a judgement on the effectiveness of leadership and management by evaluating the extent to which leaders, managers and governors. . . actively promote British values” (2015, pp. 12–13). Once again, British values are directly associated with preventing radicalization and counter-terrorism, as the OfSTED document on inspections for schools states “for a definition of these values, see the Prevent Strategy” (2015, p. 13). Thus, the FBVs guidance (HM Government 2015) controversially originates from Home Office documents on “extremism” and counter-terrorism. In Prevent, extremism is defined by the government as “vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values. . .” (HM Government 2015, p. 2). Richardson (2015, p. 1) highlights how the principal problems with “FBVs” are that they originate from counter-terrorism strategies “of dubious validity both conceptually and operationally” and the “trigger” for calling on schools to teach FBVs was “the so-called Trojan Horse letter in Birmingham. . . a malicious forgery” (Richardson 2015, p. 1).

FBVs: The Political Policy Context

While it is accepted that discourses on Britishness in the last two decades have had various drivers, by 2011, though, “unintegrated” ethnic minorities – particularly Muslims – were the core target of the FBVs directives (Maylor 2016). In this policy context, rather than preparing teachers to work with ethnically, racially, and culturally diverse student demographics, teachers and teacher educators find themselves negotiating a securitization- and surveillance-driven agenda attached to “upholding” Fundamental British Values (Lander 2016). Arguably, today in the United Kingdom, the Teachers’ Standards now act as a political tool to promote government approved ideology of Britishness (Maylor 2016). Furthermore, the UK government has placed schools and teachers at the forefront of the championing of British values. According to then Prime Minister, David Cameron (2014), “We are saying it isn’t enough simply to respect these values in schools – we’re saying that teachers should actively promote them. They’re not optional; they’re the core of what it is to live in Britain.” After Cameron’s speech, the media reported that schools would be made to confront

young people, parents, and teaching staff who were deemed to be expressing extremist or intolerant views, that schools would need to refer students deemed vulnerable to being radicalized to the counter-terrorist program, Channel, and that schools might be penalized for not promoting FBVs (The Yorkshire Post 2014).

Some politicians have, however, begun to openly criticize the consequences of the Prevent strategy. Conservative MP Lucy Allan (2017), for example, commented how schools and teachers were fearing the consequences of not making enough referrals under Prevent and pointed to the detrimental relationships of mistrust and suspicion forming between teachers and young people. A 2018 report from a House of Commons Select Committee recommended that the government should stop using the term Fundamental British Values, should instead use the term Shared Values of British Citizenship, and should very clearly separate the promotion of shared British values from counter extremism policy (House Of Lords 2018). At the time of writing, the government's response has been to state its continued commitment to the term Fundamental British Values and to suggest that promoting shared values and tackling counter extremism can usefully draw on the same resources (Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government 2018). Questions, therefore, continue to be raised by teachers, by researchers, and of course by Britons, about who defines "British values" and whether religiously and culturally diverse Britons are permitted to contribute to the conversation on Britishness (Bragg 2006; Berkeley 2011; Miah 2015), particularly if Prevent is operating to undermine the safe spaces that teachers and young people require to explore multicultural Britishness and belonging.

In summary, within wider discourses and critiques of recent commitments to the promotion of Britishness and British values, educationalists have argued that the explicit teaching of British (or now Fundamental British Values) needs to be problematized, debated, and discussed. In a growing body of research literature, FBVs policy has come to be seen by scholars of education as contradictory, burdensome, counterproductive, divisive, and undermining the professional and personal identities of teachers (Tomlinson 2015; Habib 2017; Elton-Chalcraft et al. 2017). There has been even less discussion on the pedagogic approaches to how it is taught. Furthermore, it has also been suggested that in the school context often FBVs policy "is unchallenged and its insidious racialising implications are unrecognised by most teachers" (Elton-Chalcraft et al. 2017, p. 29). In order to explore the complexities of teaching and learning about Britishness and FBVs, the chapter now examines existing literature which presents educator and student teacher perspectives on British values.

Teaching Fundamental British Values

Given the complex and contested policy environment, the teaching of British identity, British values, and FBVs raises significant challenges for educators. In this section, empirical research undertaken in this area over the last few years is summarized to identify some of these challenges. In addition, I draw on my own research on the use of critical pedagogy and arts-based pedagogies to suggest that these pedagogical approaches offer positive possibilities for educators to explore

identity issues in classrooms with their students. For example, in my research, one pre-service Art teacher concluded that exploring British identities through Art could be “most exciting” if students were given structured and creative opportunities to “unravel, criticise, re-imagine” Britishness and FBVs (Habib 2017, p. 68).

Arts-Based Education and Critical Pedagogy

It is important to note that the pedagogies offered here as ways to explore identities in the classroom are not a response to all the aforementioned criticisms of FBVs. Instead I intend to propose arts-based education and critical pedagogy as one way of tackling some of the problems with the assimilatory and neoliberal nature of the promotion of FBVs. Arts-based practice and critical pedagogy can be combined to challenge neoliberal ways of doing education. The combination between arts-based practice and critical pedagogy “holds the potential for not only creating critically engaged students, intellectuals, and artists but can strengthen and expand the capacity of the imagination to think otherwise in order to act otherwise, hold power accountable, and imagine the unimaginable” (Giroux 2018, n.p.).

In response to the inclusion of FBVs within the Teachers’ Standards, a number of researchers have asserted that pre-service student teachers may be disconcerted about having to negotiate politicized FBVs, particularly since pre-service teachers are often thrust in compromising and uncomfortable positions in the classroom (Habib 2017; Revell and Bryan 2016) and given the politicization of the teaching profession, with teachers expected to monitor and report students (Elton-Chalcraft et al. 2017). My own research shows Art pre-service teachers are wary about promoting patriotic agendas about Britishness and FBVs; they challenge conceptions of FBVs by arguing that some of the values defined as British are universal fundamental values (Habib 2017). Values such as tolerance and the rule of law were viewed as far-reaching and global values.

The literature presents pre-service teachers as critical of governmental initiatives to teach Britishness, contending that student teachers are willing “to teach about complex issues, while generally refusing to promote simple or simplistic messages on behalf of politicians” (Jerome and Clemitshaw 2012, p. 39). Throughout this chapter, the underlying theme is that to empower students to provide their counter-stories on FBVs and what it means to be British, teachers can use key Freirean principles. By employing a language of hope and possibility, critical pedagogy supports students to actively participate in critical reflection, to ask questions and find solutions, and to explore how they can act for social justice and change (Freire 2000; Brett 2007).

FBVs, Racism, and Islamophobia

The pre-service student teachers in my own research similarly saw themselves as facilitators of debate and discussion about identity in an open, safe, and respectful classroom environment, rather than teachers of FBVs. They understood the

importance of teaching about identities in schools and about exploring a cohesive collective identity, but struggled with using terms like “Britishness” or “FBVs.” They were demonstrating awareness about the complexities of notions of national identity that they felt connote privilege and cause exclusion (Habib 2017). Nevertheless, there remain concerns for teacher educators. Even if pre-service student teachers know that “being a professional means not emulating the seemingly relentless, sometimes crude and polarising, racist nativist discourse offered by both the media and politicians,” often it is the case that they are not “educated to resist it” (Smith 2016, p. 311).

Research also suggests that teacher educators in England have strong reservations and frustrations about the promotion of FBVs to pre-service student teachers from diverse cultural backgrounds (Maylor 2016; Elton-Chalcraft et al. 2017). It is also important to note that, at the same time, teacher educators are having to grapple with their own personal perspectives and experiences of British values. For Muslim educationalists, there is a danger that FBVs are what Miah (2017, p. 5) describes as “structured in opposition to Muslims.” FBVs place Muslims as “racial outsiders” which is evident to them through “the meta-discourse of Prevent” which emphasizes British values as British because they are not Islamic (Miah 2017, p. 5). In part for this reason, some have questioned whether the duty regarding FBVs in the Teacher’s Standards can be implemented in a way that gives pre-service student teachers the confidence to challenge stereotypes, racism, and narrow conceptions of Britishness and the courage to promote a critical consciousness (see, e.g., Maylor 2016). Others still have highlighted the racist and Islamophobic nature of the relationship between FBVs and Prevent.

Learning and Teaching about Identities

Given these concerns regarding the framing and teaching of FBVs in recent education policy, it is important to highlight possible approaches to exploring Britishness and FBVs through which an inclusive sense of multicultural Britishness might be promoted. In my own research, I have examined the potential of arts-based critical pedagogy as a meaningful approach in this regard. There is much scope for teaching and learning about identities and belongings to nation by encouraging teachers and students to experiment with arts-based critical pedagogies (Habib 2017). Celebrating the creative and experimental potential of using Art to explore cultures and belongings through innovative and imaginative ways is often a core principle for Art teachers’ professional identities (Habib 2017). By examining the pedagogies employed by two Art classes in a southeast London school, my own research with Art teachers and their students, in 2008, aimed to address the implications of Britishness exploration on young people’s relationships with and within multicultural Britain (Habib 2016). My ethnographic arts-based educational research study examined (i) the complexities of teaching and learning Britishness and (ii) young people’s discourses of Britishness and belonging. The research investigated the reflections of teachers and students regarding the pedagogical processes involved

in the exploration of Britishness in the classroom, as well as how British identities might be explored with ethnically, religiously, and culturally diverse students in multicultural Britain.

My analysis draws on the data of emotive artwork created by students, interviews with teachers and paired students, and extensive questionnaires, and moving and personal insights into the significances of everyday racialized and classed belongings were investigated. The key findings showed young people's experiences of local and global identities informed their notions of national identity. Students' senses of Britishness were deeply connected to intersectional and multiple experiences of social class, race, and local attachments. Local identities and transnational postcolonial identities seemed more prominent than a sense of national identity in the young peoples' descriptions of belonging to Britain.

My findings support the idea that Britishness remains an ever-contested concept (Saeed et al. 1999; Croft 2012; Thurston and Alderman 2014; Mason 2016). However, amidst this contestation about Britishness, I found also that Britishness continues to be depicted as synonymous with Whiteness (Swann 1985; Maylor et al. 2007), with some White Britons advocating racialized Britishness over civic Britishness (Garner 2012). Thus, Britishness discourses sometimes seek to normalize and privilege Whiteness, pitting White Britons against others (Wemyss 2009), while simultaneously there is "over-racialization of visible minorities at the expense of a deracialization of ethnic majorities" resulting in White identity crises (Nayak 2003, p. 139).

Classed and Racialized Belongings

Furthermore, following Freirean philosophies, my research demonstrates the value of critical pedagogies in order to guide students to "question answers rather than merely answer questions" (Brett 2007, p. 4). The students and teachers involved were able to expose and disrupt "monovocals, master narratives, standard stories, or majoritarian stories" (that privilege the White male political elite) by contributing counter-narratives (Solórzano and Yosso 2002, p. 28) about Britishness and belonging. My research with young Art students in a London school revealed young people engaging with critical pedagogies to assert their personal experiences about Britishness and belonging while simultaneously engaging with differences and diversities regarding Britishness. One of the Art teachers, Mr. Martin, explained students wanted him to tell them, for instance, to "draw a portrait of themselves with a Union Jack in the background. . . a nice cup of tea. . . and a nice red phone box." He had to adapt the lesson to challenge students, reminding them, sometimes to their frustration, this was not about his knowledge but about *their* knowledge of belonging to Britain. Critical pedagogy (Freire 2000, 2001; Giroux 2013) approaches encourage students to become responsible and active participants or citizens, unafraid to seek social transformation and social justice. Exploring British identities critically through artwork permitted my research participants to produce new knowledge relevant to their readings of nation and ways of doing pedagogies. One student, Ellie, commented upon classmates moving away from superficial and stereotypical

notions of Britishness: “I think British colours are just colours on a flag. And that’s not what anyone really did their work about. Everyone did it about something that was kinda personal to them.”

The apprehension both of the teachers felt prior to teaching soon dissipated as most students energetically embraced critical pedagogical approaches to Britishness exploration. Instead of passively accepting a hegemonic narrative of Britishness, students utilized the space to debate the current discourses on British identities and revealed personal definitions and experiences from diverse racial, ethnic, and class positionings. If a democratic goal of education is to inspire morally and socially responsible citizenry, critical pedagogy helps students to become “critical, self-reflective and knowledgeable” active members of society (Giroux 2013, p. 3). Careful deliberation on identity resulted in, for example, student Ellie creating a stunning portrait about the vicious social stereotypes encountered by White working-class youth. Ellie, a White female student, depicted struggles encountered by the stigmatized working classes because of the imposition of the undesirable and demeaning label *chav*. Around a decade or so ago, the term *chav* – synonymous with the “White trash” of the United States (Tyler 2008) – became a familiar media “buzz word” to describe the White working classes (Nayak 2009). Ellie’s sense of Britishness was tied up with *stereotypes and judgments* (as she powerfully named her artwork) about social class, belonging, and Bermondsey. Ellie explained that she struggled to escape the class imprisonment of “stereotypes and judgments,” frequently feeling as though society reminded her of her status and her place as a White working-class female. Ellie’s poignant artwork reflected deep displeasure and frustrated resentment at being labelled unfairly and prematurely. In the artwork, a bar restrained her eyes, restricting her to a specific identity, enclosing her, confining her, and repressing her self-identity, like prison bars:

Ellie: “. . . so it’s like you’re caged in and you can’t express yourself how you want to be perceived because other people do it for you.”

Ellie saw society denigrating her through the *chav* label, for example, because she wears a Tiffany chain (a brand label associated with the caricature of the *chav* in the popular consciousness). Ellie’s vivid description of the positioning of the Tiffany chain in her artwork evoked Freirean perspectives, for it reflected her oppressed and marginalized experiences and her sense of lacking a voice to defend herself: “. . . it’s like tight around my neck and my mouth. . . so I can’t talk to myself . . . I can’t breathe. . . I’m like tied up.” Ellie’s artwork on Britishness and belonging, with its Tiffany chains and Burberry branded bullets, as well as the terrifyingly opened jaws of the Lacoste crocodile, pointed toward confinement in an unfairly imposed sense of identity, as she battled social class prejudices.

Ellie’s peer, Chris, a mixed heritage young male, described his identity as “half Jamaican half English,” “because that’s who I am and how I feel. . . but I feel I belong more to the Jamaican culture because I only know my Jamaican side of the family and I grew up with only them”. Chris’ artwork, entitled *Jamaican London*, exemplified his view that British identity is composed of cultural diversity.

Emphasizing his mixed heritage and dual identity through drawing two parts to his face, Chris juxtaposed London landmarks with Jamaican national colors of green, black, and gold. Chris, like his peers, expressed ambivalent feelings about Britishness: while he was "proud" of belonging to Britain, he also reflected, "I don't feel part of it." Chris argued media rhetoric, particularly negative representation of Black youth, influences his peers into making racial judgments. The "media obsession" with London Black youth and gangs (Shildrick et al. 2010) impacted upon Chris' sense of belonging to Britain. Chris referred to his observations of Black youth as demonized through negative media representation, portrayed as likely to "rob" or "stab" other Londoners.

Instead of reproducing tired tropes and simplistic stereotypes about belonging to Britain, the arts-based critical pedagogies encouraged some young people to probe and interrogate contemporary multicultural Britishness. As a result, the majority of the Art students became confident in deconstructing their everyday experiences of Britishness as racialized and classed. The emphasis on student voice, respectful and caring dialogue, and collaborative communication led to meaningful and engaged individual and collective critical reflections on students' own stories of Britishness.

Conclusion: Counter-Stories of Britishness

When it comes to exploring FBVs in the classroom, teachers and pre-service teachers find themselves in difficult circumstances where their personal and professional roles and identities are compromised by the demands of school managers, OfSTED, and government policies. This is as a result of schools in England becoming "an ideological battleground for competing versions of 'Britishness'" causing teaching staff to feel as though they have been "positioned on the frontline of the 'war on terror' at home, with an emphasis on the surveillance and control of BME students rather than their education" (Alexander et al. 2015, p. 4).

While policy makers may desire to reproduce "a systematic process of assimilation. . . preparing each successive generation of children for the nation's version of adult citizenship" through educational systems and political policies to fulfil these aims (Rosaldo 1996, p. 239), the political construction and hegemonic perpetuation of everyday nationalism in multicultural societies is fragmented and needs critical interrogation, particularly if inclusiveness and diversity are a priority for the nation's citizens (Mavroudi 2010). In terms of citizenship, patriotic discourses have historically been problematically gendered, classed, and racialized. If promoting overly narrow forms of patriotism is "morally dangerous" and harmful to "the goal of national unity in devotion to worthy moral ideals of justice and equality" (Nussbaum 1996, p. 4), cosmopolitanism becomes a more preferable goal for the people of a multicultural nation.

Research has shown that pre-service student teachers who actively choose to reject what they see as indoctrinating or undemocratic pedagogies prefer instead that students become independent learners (Jerome and Clemitshaw 2012). Young people as independent learners providing their counter-stories on Britishness is

preferable to an imposition of FBVs. One way of encouraging students to confidently adopt strategies of autonomy and collaboration in their learning is through introducing them to the principles of critical pedagogy (Habib 2017).

If neoliberal ideas about multicultural citizenship and national identity marginalize experiences of oppressed groups (Sleeter 2014) by “stifling critical thought, reducing citizenship to the act of consuming, defining certain marginal populations as contaminated and disposable, and removing the discourse of democracy from any vestige of pedagogy” (Giroux 2013, p. 8), then it is crucial that teachers and young people engage in reflection and dialogue to rethink what it means to belong to nation and to reassert their right to belong. Further research on the relationship between Britishness, nation, citizenship, youth, and belonging is required. Currently research seems to focus on the “elite master-narratives of nationhood that have fascinated historians, political scientists and quantitative sociologists” (Garner 2012, p. 455), but we need to describe the ways in which young people are actively constructing their own counter-stories of Britishness.

When exploring the pedagogy concerning Britishness and FBVs, the pre-service student teachers, teachers, and students in my research were sensitive to identities as unfixed and as difficult to capture concretely or definitively. If educators believe that “identities are never completed, never finished; that they are always as subjectivity itself is, in process” (Hall 1997, p. 47), this has profound implications for how teacher educators and pre-service student teachers might teach FBVs or explore British identities with young people. Teacher educators might find pre-service student teachers would benefit from engaging in deeply reflexive opportunities to better know their personal positionality on Britishness and FBVs. More work urgently needs to be done in England to educate pre-service student teachers regarding appropriate strategies to actively resist exclusionary and racist discourses.

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Civics and Citizenship Education in Australia: The Importance of a Social Justice Agenda

28

Babak Dadvand

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Abstract

This chapter examines how civics and citizenship has been constructed in education policy in Australia since the publication of “Education for Active Citizenship in Australian Schools and Youth Organisations” (SSCEET 1989). The chapter identifies possible tensions and contradictions in citizenship education policy and highlights how policy discourse often ignores wider issues of inclusion and social justice with the assumption being that *all* young people can achieve full citizenship if they acquire formal citizenship knowledge and skills. The discussions presented in this chapter are informed by recent developments in Citizenship Studies and Sociology of Youth which have pointed to the need to broaden the definition of citizenship from “formal rights and duties” to “a lived experience” grounded in everyday spaces and enacted through social relationships (Lister 2007). Attention to the lived aspect of citizenship requires us to recognize social exclusion as a barrier to active participation in spaces such as

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schools and classrooms. This is particularly important for young people who face multiple and often interlocking forms of disadvantage. The chapter concludes by calling for a social justice agenda for civics and citizenship education.

Keywords

Civics and citizenship · Citizenship education · Education policy · Participation · Social exclusion · Social justice

Introduction

This chapter examines civics and citizenship education policy in Australia. The aim is to identify possible tensions and contradictions in the way young people's citizenship is constructed in education policy discourse. The chapter also draws on the scholarship in the fields of Citizenship Studies and Sociology of Youth to highlight the importance of addressing social exclusion in relation to youth participation. Using the definition of "citizenship as a lived experience" grounded in everyday spaces and enacted through social relationships (Lister 2007), it is argued that education policy needs to acknowledge the importance of everyday practices and relationships to the construction of young people's civics identities and political subjectivities. This, in turn, requires paying attention to how social divisions rooted in factors such as socio-economic status, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, disability, and locale – to name a few – can mediate young people's participatory experiences in schools.

The discussions in this chapter are organized into five sections. The first section looks at what has come to be recognized as "the problem" of youth participation in many Western democracies. The second section examines recent policy for civics and citizenship education in Australia and discusses the ways in which young people's citizenship has been constructed in policy since the publication of "Education for Active Citizenship in Australian Schools and Youth Organisations" (SSCEET 1989). The third section highlights the tensions in policy discourse, in particular a tendency to treat citizenship as a "universal" status that *all* young people can achieve. Section "[Youth Citizenship: Beyond the Rhetoric](#)" reviews developments in Citizenship Studies and Sociology of Youth to argue that citizenship needs to be concerned with what participation means to young people, especially those who face multiple and interlocking forms of marginalization. The final section provides a synthesis of the discussions by calling for broadening the parameters of citizenship education to address issues of inclusion and social justice.

Youth and "the Problem" of Participation

It is hard to find a debate about citizenship that does not make a reference to young people. In many Western liberal democracies like Australia, public and media commentaries about citizenship participation are abound with references to youth

and their state of political participation. More often than not, these references evoke a sense of alarm about “a problem” that needs immediate intervention, namely that of low participation and disengagement. This alleged problem is discussed in the backdrop of the findings that point to low levels of electoral turn-out and mistrust of political institutions among young people (Manning and Edwards 2014). This is believed to have put at jeopardy the (future) health of Western democracies, from the USA, the UK, and Europe to Australia and beyond. The public perceptions of youth disengagement have also entered political discussions prompting governments to embark on youth engagement initiatives through policy.

Australian policy debates about youth participation have long been driven a “deficit” thesis in which young people are portrayed as a concern for democracy. In 1988, the Senate requested its Standing Committee on Employment, Education and Training (SSCEET) to conduct an inquiry into the status of citizenship participation among young Australians. The report from the inquiry concluded that youth participation “amounts to a crisis which Australians cannot afford to ignore” (SSCEET 1989, p. 6). The report also pointed to an endemic of “ignorance” and “apathy” among young people, especially in terms of their political knowledge and engagement with the institutions of government. SSCEET (1989, p. 15) concluded, rather alarmingly, that the absence of political knowledge translates into:

. . . the young person who cannot make sense of large parts of the daily paper; the citizen who has no idea what section of the bureaucracy to approach to attend to some pressing matter; the local council which is making decisions affecting young people in their area without the benefit of young people’s views; the disadvantaged neighbourhood which suffers from a lack of amenities because those living there have no idea of how to organise themselves, who to approach about their problem, and how to press their case; the person who is baffled by the apparent complexities of State and Federal politics and who resorts to simplistic solutions such as ‘all politicians are corrupt’ or ‘what has it got to do with me anyway?’; and the large numbers of people who are vaguely conscious that the fate of their country is somehow inseparable from what happens in the rest of world but who dismiss the whole question because ‘there is nothing we can do about it’.

A subsequent report by the SSCEET (1991, p. 36) also pointed to “a curious gap” between the proclaimed interest of many young people in politics and their actual knowledge of political structures and processes. A later inquiry by the Civics Expert Group (1994) confirmed this conclusion, drawing attention to “overwhelming evidence” that many young Australians lack the knowledge that they need to fulfil their civic duties. This deficit, according to the Civics Expert Group (1994, p. 21), was the main cause for young people’s “feelings of cynicism, estrangement and resentment about our system of government.” A similar conclusion was later reached by the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters (2007) highlighting a prevailing “sense of disillusionment” about formal politics among young Australians.

A more recent series of poll research conducted by the Lowy Institute since 2012 have also pointed to “ambivalence” among young Australians about the value of democracy. According to the most recent Lowy Institute survey, support for democracy is “alarmingly” lower among young people with 52% of younger Australians

aged 18–29 years agreeing that democracy is the preferable form of government (Roggeveen 2017). Conclusions of this sort support a disengagement thesis of youth participation. The disengagement thesis points to the generational gap in young people's participation and interprets this as evidence of their disconnect from politics (Bennet 2008). Despite questions about validity of the evidence behind the disengagement thesis (Percy-Smith 2010), perceptions of youth disconnect have acted as a catalyst for policy interventions from successive Australian governments.

Youth Citizenship: Australian Policy Response

A key “policy solution” designed to address “the problem” of youth civics deficit has been the provision of formal citizenship education. While education for citizenship has a long history in Australia, it is only within the past couple of decades that it has emerged as a key area of education policy. The SSCEET (1989) report titled “Education for Active Citizenship in Australian Schools and Youth Organisations” is one of the earliest government commissioned initiatives which called for a national program of citizenship education. After highlighting widespread “civics deficits” and “political apathy” among young people, the SSCEET (1989) report made a series of recommendations to the Commonwealth including: initiating a national program for active citizenship, designating education for active citizenship as a priority in primary and secondary education, emphasizing education for active citizenship in teacher education programs, and developing teaching resources for citizenship education.

The importance of citizenship education was emphasized in a subsequent report by the SSCEET (1991). This report made further recommendations to the Australian Education Council, schools, government departments, and higher education institutions. Among these recommendations were: the need for a national curriculum framework for the Social Studies and the Environment, regular national surveys of the political knowledge, attitudes and orientations of young people, and evaluation of the effectiveness of the proposed national social education curriculum. Later, the Civics Expert Group (1994) reiterated the conclusions of the two earlier SSCEET reports calling for more rigorous citizenship education to address young people's “ignorance” and “misconceptions” about democracy. For the Civics Expert Group (1994, p. 45), the cause for concern was that many students lacked “sufficient knowledge and understanding of Australia's political and social heritage, its democratic processes and government, its judicial system and its system of public administration.”

Responding to concerns of similar nature, the Discovering Democracy program emerged as a major government initiative in education for citizenship. Launched in June 1997 by the Ministerial Council for Education, Employment, Training and Youth Affairs (MCEETYA) under the conservative, Liberal-National coalition government of John Howard, the program encouraged “the development of skills, values, and attitudes that enable effective, informed and reflective participation in political processes and civic life” (MCEETYA 2015). Fostering “active” and “informed” citizenship has also been a recurring theme in other education proposals including the Hobart Declaration (MCEETYA 1989), the Adelaide Declaration

(MCEETYA 1999), and the Melbourne Declaration (MCEETYA 2008) which act as national “roadmaps” for education across various Australian states and territories.

Two further core federal education policy initiatives connected to civics and citizenship education under the Howard government were the National Framework for Values Education in Australian Schools (Curriculum Corporation 2005) and the Statements of Learning for Civics and Citizenship (Curriculum Corporation 2006). Both of these initiatives outline a set of core civics values, knowledge, and skills that all young Australians should have the opportunity to learn and develop as a result of their education in schools. These two policy documents, which were established by the Federal government when educational curriculum was almost exclusively determined by individual states and territories, preceded the development and implementation of Australia’s first national, Australian Curriculum.

Situated within the broader Humanities and Social Sciences Learning Area, the Australian Curriculum includes Civics and Citizenship. The Australian Curriculum: Civics and Citizenship aims to achieve the educational goals identified in the Melbourne Declaration by “developing knowledge and understanding, and skills – underpinned by values, attitudes and dispositions to participate in civic life, locally, nationally and globally” (ACARA 2012, p. 6). Similar to the previous initiatives outlined above, the Australian Curriculum emphasizes the importance of citizenship knowledge and skills, particularly in relation to how people “choose their governments; how the system safeguards democracy by vesting people with civic rights and responsibilities; how laws and the legal system protect people’s rights; and how individuals and groups can influence civic life” (The Australian Curriculum 2018).

As this short review shows, what much of the Australian citizenship education policies since the publication of the first SSEET (1989) report have in common is a focus on fostering “active” and “informed” citizenship among young people. Active and informed citizenship is often framed in terms of the knowledge, skills, and values that young people need to acquire from their formal civics and citizenship education. The Australian Curriculum: Civics and Citizenship sets the bar even higher by linking citizenship with the ideals of equity and social justice (The Australian Curriculum 2018). Regardless of the multiple and varied meanings that such terms can take on, one needs to look beyond the rhetoric to identify tensions and possible contradictions in the way young people’s citizenship is constructed in policy discourse. This is the topic that I turn to in the next section of the chapter.

Youth Citizenship: Beyond the Rhetoric

As Black (2011) argues, the discourse of “active” and “informed” citizenship in Australian education policy conceals a more complex reality. While policy discourse heralds active and informed youth participation, an assumption of “deficit” threads through much of the education policy response to young people’s citizenship. This is perhaps the reflection of wider concerns about the state of youth participation which, as suggested in the first section, have for some time been at the forefront of public debates in many liberal democracies. Citizenship education policy in Australia seems to be responding, at least in part, to some of these concerns by framing “the

problem” of youth citizenship as one of civics deficit and political apathy (e.g., Edwards 2007; Print 2007). Such a problem formulation, according to Print (2000, p. 24), has been a powerful motivating factor in accounting for “the civics renaissance” in the Australian education policy since the late 1980s.

In his review of the major contemporary citizenship education policies, Fyfe (2007) contends that underlying much of the Australian civics and citizenship education related policies is a perceived social problem that requires immediate attention and intervention. This perceived problem, which is situated within the wider typologies of young people “as at risk” or “as risk,” reflects a more general public perception and concern that young Australians lack knowledge about the processes and institutions of representative democracy. These concerns surfaced in the recent media commentary and public reactions to the results of the National Assessment Program for Civics and Citizenship (NAP-CC). The findings of the NAP-CC which was delivered to 10,480 Year 6 and Year 10 students in 2016 show stagnation and decline in students’ performance in civics and citizenship (Fraillon et al. 2017).

A further assumption that underpins the Australian citizenship education policy response relates to its *developmental* and *future-oriented* tendencies. Such tendencies often disregard young people’s citizenship “here and now.” As McLeod (2012) points out, citizenship education policy in Australia focuses on the person formation aspect of education; it emphasizes the role of schools “in shaping young people to become citizens for and in the future” (p. 14). This futurity discourse values young people for their later civics contributions. Ailwood et al. (2011) also critique the age- and stage-based understandings of children in the Australian educational policy and curriculum for citizenship. Ailwood et al. (2011, p. 641) note that citizenship education in Australia is a narrative of young people “that is future oriented – about the adults, workers, citizens they will become in the future – rather than in enacting and engaging with citizenship in their current context and community.”

Finally, Australian education policy for civics and citizenship is driven by “one-size-fits-all” assumptions. Citizenship is often framed as a status that *all* young people achieve uniformly as they transition to adulthood. Such a one-size-fits-all approach, as Dahlgren (2006, p. 269) explains, reflects an assumption in the liberal theories of citizenship that individuals emerge as fully-fledged citizens “devoid of social bonds, out of some sociocultural black box, ready to play his or her role in democracy.” Viewed as such, participation gains a level of normativity by creating an expectation that all students will participate as citizens as part of their curriculum requirements. What is ignored, however, is that these requirements “are frequently divorced from emotions, places of meaning and pre-established social relationships” (Wood 2013, p. 50) that mediate participatory opportunities through axes of class, gender, ethnicity, age, and disability to name a few.

Citizenship Education: A Spatial-Relational Turn

One of the critiques of the Australian education policy for civics and citizenship is its emphasis on the acquisition of formal political knowledge and skills as one of the main, if not the main, aim of citizenship education. While political knowledge can be

a good indicator of young people's awareness about politics, framing the purpose of citizenship education merely as one of knowledge acquisition can be reductionist. Such an approach attributes youth disengagement, whether real or imagined, to their lack of knowledge and understanding about formal political processes. In so doing, it perpetuates what Somers (2008) calls a "conversion narrative" whereby young people become accountable for wider problems and their "disengagement" becomes divorced from context.

It is also difficult to imagine how educational programs that are driven by a deficit thinking can engage young people in constructive ways (Osler and Starkey 2003). Such programs often amount to compensatory interventions that aim to "fix" young people and produce citizens from "a template." To create authentic participatory opportunities, policy and curriculum for citizenship education need to acknowledge that young people are already implicated in the politics of everyday life where they actively contribute to their own citizenship learning. Far from being citizens-in-waiting as some political theorists have suggested (for example see Marshall 1950), young people experience their political agencies and develop their civics identities through the day-to-day social encounters in the context of their families, schools, communities, and the wider society.

Lawy and Biesta (2006) criticize the conception of citizenship as a status towards which young people should be steered and instead call for a re-orientation from "citizenship-as-achievement" towards "citizenship-as-practice." Citizenship-as-practice offers a relational approach that does not presume "young people move through a pre-specified trajectory *into* their citizenship statuses or that the role of the education system is to find appropriate strategies and approaches that prepare young people for their transitions into 'good' and contributing citizens" (Lawy and Biesta 2006, p. 43; emphasis in original). This understanding of citizenship counters the discourses of "deficit" and "preparation" which mark education policy in some liberal democracies. Citizenship-as-practice highlights the lived experiences of young people in the process of practicing democracy and, in so doing, foregrounds young people's everyday experiences as a critical component of their citizenship.

In a study of political participation in the UK, Marsh, O'Toole, and Jones (2007) pursue a similar line of argument. The authors criticize the strands of youth participation research and policy that are driven by a narrow understanding of "politics" and political engagement. Conceptualizing politics as "a structured lived experience," Marsh et al. (2007) emphasize the need for a broader definition of "the political" in research and policy on youth participation. Such a conception recognizes the multiple ways young people, embedded in a matrix of structural possibilities and constraints, understand and enact participation. In addition, an alternative approach to politics situates young people's participation in the context of their everyday experiences which are conditioned by a range of social divisions and differences rooted in factors such as age, socio-economic status, gender, sexuality, and ethnicity.

These and other critiques that point to temporality, spatiality, and relationality in youth citizenship participation (for example see Wood 2017) help highlight the need for a context-sensitive approach to civics and citizenship education, an approach that is not oblivious to the important role that daily practices and relationships play in

young people's political socialization. Such an approach, on the one, acknowledges the political significance of everyday contexts which were previously considered as apolitical arenas. Schools and classrooms are examples of such spaces where young people actively engage in the politics of everyday life. On the other hand, alternative accounts of youth citizenship along the lines delineated above draw our attention to how the practices and relationships that characterize the social geography of space can *position* young people and how such positioning can contribute to their participatory experiences.

Fundamental to an alternative account of citizenship is the recognition that citizenship is not a level playing field in which everyone participates in the same manner. According to Levinson (2012), both at a conceptual and practical level, it is reductionist to view civic identity as a homogenous construct. Even though we might all be citizens theoretically, our "other" identities intersect with our civic identity in such profound ways that are hard to disentangle (Yuval-Davis 2011). This is where identity and subjectivity converge with politics. Dahlgren, Miegel, and Olsson (2007, p. 9) highlight the importance of the subjective dimensions of citizenship arguing that "in order to be able to act as a citizen, to participate in achieved citizenship, it is necessary that one can see oneself as a citizen, as subjectively encompassing the attributes of agency that this social category may involve."

Therefore, far from signifying a shared experience, citizenship needs to be viewed as a process involving people who are situated *differentially* within the grids of power. Intersecting social divisions rooted in factors such as gender, class, ethnicity, sexuality, ability, and stage in the life cycle can mediate how members of collectivities experience their citizenship through participation in everyday life (Yuval-Davis 2007). Reviewing the work of Feminist and anti-racist scholars in the field of Citizenship Studies, Yuval-Davis (2007, p. 261) contends that in contemporary political contexts, we need to *dehomogenize* the notion of citizenship by situating it in "the wider context of contemporary politics of belonging which encompass citizenships, identities and the emotions attached to them."

With the question of citizenship being increasingly re-framed through a sociological lens, real life experiences have emerged as key arenas in which the formal rights and duties of citizens are understood, expressed, and enacted. There is now a recognition that citizenship is a "multidimensional" construct in which formal status and entitlements are tightly entangled with lived experiences and identities (Joppke 2007). As such, any attempt to conceptualize citizenship should not only take into consideration the formal rights and obligations associated with membership of particular groups, but also acknowledge the sense of belonging, inclusion, and recognition that follow from such memberships.

A more nuanced approach, thus, goes beyond the legal and political discourses of "rights and responsibilities" which have for long provided the framework for discussions about civics and citizenship education in Australia. This is not to suggest that the normative aspects of citizenship are no longer relevant or significant. Rather than discrediting the legal and political basis of citizenship, we need to understand citizenship as multitiered encompassing both the *formal* and the *informal* (Lister 2007). Such an understanding requires us to abandon one-size-fits-all and deficit

mentalities and instead draw on “a surplus model” that recognizes the unique knowledge, contributions, and experiences of young people in learning and practicing citizenship (Heggart et al. 2018).

A Social Justice Agenda for Citizenship Education

If we accept the thesis that youth citizenship is contingent upon complex relationships between factors in their backgrounds and the place-bound social relationships, the question that needs to be asked then is: how can we foster a more active citizenship participation in spaces such as schools and classrooms? This is an important question whose answer can lead us towards a more inclusive and democratic education agenda, especially for those young people who face multiple and often interlocking forms of marginalization. In this section, I build on my earlier review and discussion to address this question. The argument that drives my discussion is that to create a truly democratic education that is inclusive of *all* students regardless of their needs, differences, and social backgrounds, we should bring social justice center-stage in debates about civics and citizenship education.

The importance of addressing social justice in relation to citizenship lies in the ideological association between “equality” as a principle of social justice and “democracy” as a political ideal (Black 2012). Due to the tightly entwined nature of equity and participation, social justice is often discussed in terms of “parity of participation.” Fraser (2010, p. 16), for instance, explains that overcoming injustice “means dismantling institutionalized obstacles that prevent some people from participating on a par with others, as full partners in social interaction.” Similarly, in her review essay that covers a decade of scholarship on the political geographies of children and youth, Skelton (2013) highlights the centrality of social justice in exposing the processes of exclusion and marginalization.

A social justice project which exposes the barriers that stand in the way of a more active participation is central to an education that pursues inclusion and equity for young people. As Lister, Middleton and Smith (as cited in Lister 2008) contend, an inclusionary approach to citizenship education should recognize social exclusion and disadvantage as real obstacles to active and participatory citizenship. Such an approach, on the one hand, must provide for the needs and priorities of young people whose more complex backgrounds and circumstances, coupled with their negative experiences in the institution, have turned schooling into a disempowering experience for them. On the other hand, an inclusionary approach to citizenship education should help young people to contest these obstacles and in so doing contribute to their political agency.

A social justice project can have three broad, and inter-related, implications for citizenship education. First, such a project helps us interrogate the adequacy of formal structures such as Student Representative Councils (SRCs) as the main medium for student voice and participation. Schools’ commitment to student voice reflects their broader commitment to issues of inclusion and social justice (Baroutsis et al. 2016). Nonetheless, reliance on formal structures and processes that replicate

adults' modes of political participation can limit the possibilities for equitable participation. This is because while structures such as SRCs are useful in accommodating for certain voices, they can often be tokenistic, only catering for the views and voices of a small subset of students, namely those who embody the norms and values of the institution.

Second, a social justice agenda draws attention to the lived dimension of citizenship. As Percy-Smith (2010, p. 111) argues, there is more to participation than having one's views represented in decision-making; participation "is also about having equal opportunities 'to take part' and 'be involved in' the life of the community, organization, or project and feel valued for that contribution." The question, therefore, changes from "who takes part?" to "who has the opportunity to take part?" and "what are the impediments to participation?" Traditionally, questions of this sort have been ignored in much of the youth participation policy in Australia. Civics and citizenship education has not been an exception to this trend where "the problem" of disengagement has often been divorced from context and exclusionary practices and instead been located within individuals.

Finally, applying a social justice lens to civics and citizenship education foregrounds the role of "relationships" in youth participation. In the current education policy climate in which discussions about schools are increasingly framed around performance and measurable outcomes, one needs to reflect critically on the impact that performativity-driven agendas can have on the prospect of a relational education project, one that fosters deep and caring connections between teachers and students, and among students themselves. Research points to a shift towards reconstitution of caring relationships along performance and outcomes under recent neoliberal policy mandates (Dadvand and Cuervo 2018). An implication of this is growing "disengagement" of those students for whom outcome-driven practices and relationships have little resonance with their more complex needs and circumstances.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I examined policy and research on civics and citizenship education. I highlighted a tension between how citizenship is constructed in education policy discourse and how young people practice their citizenship as a lived and embodied experience. Despite growing emphasis on "active" and "informed" citizenship, policy for civics and citizenship education in Australia remains oblivious, for the most part, to the factors that can mediate participatory opportunities of young people. In education policy discourse, citizenship is treated primarily as a set of knowledge, skills, and attitudes that need to be inculcated in young people through formal civics and citizenship education. What is often overlooked is the ways in which multiple and interlocking social divisions and differences can act as sources of social exclusion affecting the participatory opportunities of some students.

I argued that marrying discussions of citizenship with those of social justice can have theoretical and practical contributions for policies and practices in the area of civics and citizenship education. Such a marriage provides a more robust conceptual

basis for understanding the deep inter-connections between issues of access, equity, and participation. Bridging the conceptual boundaries of citizenship and social justice also brings attention to what citizenship actually means to young people; it shows the dynamic interplay of knowledge, skills, and attitudes with everyday practices and lived experiences in the formation of political subjectivities. Broadening the parameters of citizenship education beyond its legal and political accounts offers an opportunity to bring relationships, mutuality, and positioning center-stage in discussions about youth citizenship.

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Citizenship Education in the Conflict-Affected Societies of Northern Ireland and Syria: Learning Lessons from the Past to Inform the Future

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Abstract

The role of education in peacekeeping has been well documented in the academic literature. While it has been argued that education provided through formalized structures of school-settings has the potential to create stable environments for children and young people to learn and to heal, this can be difficult to achieve when children are displaced during conflict and little formalized structures exist, as communities navigate loss, trauma, and uncertainty and as they rebuild their lives. Further, existing literature demonstrates that in light of the existence of contested or conflicting identities in relation to citizenship, the content and approaches taken in relation to citizenship education may represent part of the problem and also part of the solution, for conflict-affected societies. It is against this backdrop that this chapter explores the nexus between the challenges and problems that exist for conflict-affected societies, alongside the potential for solutions and the potential for a long-lasting positive impact of citizenship

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education on the children of the post-conflict, transitioning generation. To explore these larger questions, the chapter utilizes the two case studies of the protracted conflict in Northern Ireland and the ongoing conflict in Syria. In doing so, it will consider issues such as contested identities and notions of citizenship, dominant ideologies, division, and school structures, as well as exploring whether there are lessons that can be learned from the past to inform the future.

Keywords

Post-conflict · Conflict · Transition · Citizenship · Education · Approaches · Challenges

Introduction

“[E]ducation can both reproduce the conditions which underlie civil conflict, hence exacerbating and perpetuating violence, *and* help transform society by challenging the deep-rooted prejudices and inequalities at the heart of the conflict.” (Leach and Dunne 2007: 11)

The role of education in peacekeeping has been well documented in the literature (see Niens et al. 2006; Smith 2010; Loader and Hughes 2017). As the opening quotation reinforces, there appears to be a wide consensus that education can play a vital role in rebuilding communities that have experienced violent conflict and are crisis-affected (Leach and Dunne 2007). It has been argued that education provided through the school-setting has the potential to create stable environments for children and young people to learn and to heal (ibid). Smith and Vaux (2003) outline several core reasons why the relationship between education and conflict is significant. They assert that “education is a fundamental right that should be maintained at all times, even in the most difficult circumstances . . . education . . . may provide an important mechanism for the protection of children” (ibid). They also argue that the loss of education “due to conflict . . . is not just a loss to the individual, but a loss of social capital and the capacity of a society to recover from the conflict” (ibid). However, Smith and Vaux (2003) also propose that “education can be part of the problem as well as part of the solution.”

This chapter explores the nexus between the challenges and problems, alongside the potential for approaches to citizenship education, which may have long-lasting positive impacts for children of the post-conflict, transitioning generation. In doing so, this chapter utilizes contextually, the two case studies of the protracted conflict in Northern Ireland and the ongoing conflict in Syria. The case studies have been selected to demonstrate how history can inform the present and can inform the future. The year 2018 marked 20 years since the signing of the Good Friday peace agreement in Northern Ireland and therefore it offered an opportune time to reflect on the current arrangements for citizenship education. Further to this, the ongoing Syrian conflict, the displacement of children, and the estimation that 1.75 million children are currently out of school make it a key contemporary case study to explore how citizenship education could be developed in a constructive and positive way.

The chapter will review the current developments in the literature on citizenship education in post-conflict settings. It will also explore the United Nations' commitments to education, as well as the role of nongovernmental organizations and their freedom or lack of freedom to provide alternative discourses. The chapter contextualizes both of the case studies on Northern Ireland and Syria, by outlining the history to each conflict, including discussions of historical legacies of the militarized nature of aspects of education in Syria or the involvement of institutions such as the Church, in shaping aspects of the education curriculum in Northern Ireland. In addition, it explores the current citizenship education arrangements in Northern Ireland, the lack of citizenship education for children from Syria, and considers alternatives to citizenship education when the latter could be counterproductive, if dominated by one narrative. Another significant issue explored relates to the contested nature of "citizenship" and the issue of conflicting "identities" in post-conflict settings, as well as the inclusion and subsequent exclusion of certain sections of society. The chapter concludes by proposing that realistic expectations and approaches are needed, when critically considering what citizenship education may be able to achieve in post-conflict and crisis-affected societies.

Citizenship Education in Post-Conflict Contexts

In recent years, citizenship education has become a key area of inquiry in the existing international literature (see Goren and Yemini 2017; Rapoport and Yemini 2019). However, as Quaynor (2011: 33) notes, very few previous "reviews of civic education scholarship include research from post-conflict societies." Conflict-affected and post-conflict societies face a particular set of complex challenges, and this makes them unique and interesting contexts in which to explore the role of education as potentially promoting democracy, social cohesion, rights, equality, social justice, and as instilling a genuine sense of belonging moving into the future (see Hoskins and Janmaat 2019). Citizenship education has been referred to as central to the "reconstruction" of societies following periods of conflict (see Davies 2004, cited in Quaynor 2011: 34). There are particular challenges for the education systems and educators working in countries that have experienced conflict, as ideas and notions of "nationhood," identity, violence, and dominant narratives, often feature in the curriculum and can be particularly contested and conflicted when societies remain divided. Yet it should also be acknowledged that there are often structural and context-specific restraints on educators in societies that have overcome or are still experiencing conflict and violence (Reilly and Niens 2014).

According to the international body UNESCO (2014: 9), a global citizenship for the twenty-first century includes fostering in learners "an attitude supported by an understanding of multiple levels of identity, and the potential for a 'collective identity' which transcends individual cultural, religious, ethnic or other differences." To achieve that goal, it promotes a holistic approach, which demands "formal and informal approaches, curricular and extra-curricular interventions and conventional and unconventional pathways to participation" (UNESCO 2014: 11). However,

recently UNESCO (2019) observes that the implementation of such goals is facing various challenges in conflict affected societies. In light of this, it strongly recommended a “renewed understanding of Global Citizenship Education that is centred on its concept of learning to live together and builds more on the local and country context” (UNESCO 2019: 10). Using case studies from South Sudan, Kenya, and Nepal, Barakat et al. (2013) drew the conclusion that education in war-wrecked societies contributes to the promotion of tolerance, respect, and critical thinking as well as the stability and the reconstruction process (Penson and Tomlinson 2009). Lochner (2004) emphasizes the role of education as a human capital investment that increases future legitimate work opportunities.

Context, Conflict, and Education: Northern Ireland and Syria

While Northern Ireland and Syria initially appear to have very little in common, they both represent post–World War II contexts which have experienced and endured (and still are) the impact of armed conflict, trauma, violence, displacement, and the loss of life. Northern Ireland and Syria have been selected for this chapter as case studies, as each of the authors was born there and each has conducted extensive primary, empirical research with children and young people in these countries, exploring the impact of conflict on their everyday lives, on their sense of belonging, and on their future prospects. It is evident that the shared issues of dealing with the past, contested identities, inequalities, belonging, and citizenship are concerns for children, young people, and their families in both societies. Further to this, as major structural reforms and changes have taken place in Northern Ireland in particular in the spheres of education and criminal justice, this chapter proposes that there is potentially a lot to learn from such societies who have implemented such reforms.

Therefore, in this chapter we argue that countries currently experiencing or in transition from conflict and violence can potentially learn from the experiences of societies that have already navigated challenges in relation to issues such as divisions, conflicting identities, conflicting narratives, belonging, and interpretations of citizenship. In the Syrian scenario, the ethnic and religious diversity of the country and the sectarian nature of the conflict have resulted in identity crisis and questions. Sectors that have been impacted in this war (e.g., education, justice system, civil societies) are exploring the experience of countries that emerged from conflict while observing local context and customs.

Northern Ireland

Northern Ireland is a society emerging from over 30 years of protracted conflict (1968–1998). There is an established body of literature, which documents the origins and impact of the Conflict (see Gillespie 2009). Ruane and Todd (1996: 1) argue that during the Conflict, violence “damaged the whole fabric of the liberal democratic state and civic culture.” They note that: “normal” judicial processes were

“suspended”; there were “repeated breaches of human rights”; “collusion between members of the security forces and paramilitaries”; paramilitaries took over the functions of the police in many areas; and there existed “the demonisation of the ‘enemy’” (Ruane and Todd 1996: 1). Space was divided with “the erection of social and physical barriers” in Northern Ireland, resulting in “open communities” being “turned into closed ones” (Ruane and Todd 1996: 1). Jarman (1997: 2) observes that “it is impossible to ignore the prominent role that historical events . . . continue to play in the political and social life of Northern Ireland.”

The Belfast/Good Friday Agreement of 1998 remains known as one of the most significant political developments in the contemporary Northern Ireland Peace Process. The 1998 Agreement consisted of a multiparty agreement that was signed by the majority of the political parties in Northern Ireland (the DUP opposed the Agreement) and also an international agreement between the British and Irish Governments. Significantly referendums were held in Northern Ireland and also in the Republic of Ireland on May 22, 1998, with the majority of voters supporting the Agreement.¹ The Agreement identifies and outlines a number of areas in relation to Northern Ireland’s future, in particular the system of government, the work of North-South bodies, the relationship between the British and Irish Governments, the decommissioning of arms and weapons by paramilitary groups, the release of prisoners, human rights considerations, and the “normalization” of policing in Northern Ireland. Following the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement a plan to reform policing was established and in light of the recommendations of the Patten Commission (Northern Ireland Office (NIO) 1999), on November 4, 2001, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) became the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI).²

The Hillsborough Agreement (NIO 2010) outlined ways in which Northern Ireland could progress in relation to issues such as parading, the power-sharing arrangements in Northern Ireland and other issues that related to the St Andrew’s Agreement 2006. Following the Hillsborough Agreement 2010, criminal justice decision-making powers were devolved from the UK government to the Northern Ireland Assembly in April 2010. In political and media discourse it was represented as, “the final piece in the devolution puzzle,”³ with Northern Ireland’s First Minister asserting: “Throughout history there are times of challenge and defining moments. This is such a time. This is such a moment” (quoted by BBC News, March 9, 2010).⁴ International figures such as Hillary Clinton, United States (US) Secretary of State, commended Northern Ireland’s political leadership and described devolution as “an important step in ensuring a peaceful and prosperous future . . . for generations to come” (quoted by *Guardian*, March 9, 2010).⁵

¹See: <http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/fref98.htm>

²See: http://www.nio.gov.uk/a_new_beginning_in_policing_in_northern_ireland.pdf

³See: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/8457650.stm; <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8459824.stm>

⁴See: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/8558466.stm

⁵See: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/mar/09/stormont-northern-ireland-policing-vote>

On January 9, 2017, the Northern Ireland Executive (the government) collapsed, with the resignation of Martin McGuinness, who was the then Deputy First Minister. This was due to ongoing disagreements between the two largest political parties, the DUP and Sinn Féin. This collapse in the power-sharing arrangements led to a long period of instability for Northern Ireland, and with no functioning government, it was effectively run by civil servants on diminishing financial and other limited resources. As reports demonstrate, the lack of an active locally based and locally elected government had direct impacts upon health, education, and many other aspects of civic life (see Sargeant and Rutter 2019). The power-sharing was restored in Northern Ireland in January 2020; however, at the time of writing, the challenge of Brexit in the United Kingdom has raised a new set of concerns and questions in relation to identity, cultural diversity, and inclusion.⁶

The impacts of the protracted conflict and various points of political instability in Northern Ireland have long affected children, young people, and their families. Northern Ireland has the youngest population of any jurisdiction in the UK (Save the Children and ARK 2008) and was recorded as being one of the poorest regions in the context of the European Union (EU), with more than one-third of children and young people living in poverty (Save the Children and ARK 2008). Children, young people, and their parents continue to suffer from conflict-related trauma/intergenerational trauma, with a high proportion of working-class communities experiencing economic marginalization and social exclusion (see McAlister et al. 2009). As Scraton (2007: 148) argues, “several generations have endured pervasive sectarianism, hard-line policing, military operations and paramilitary punishments.” For many children “the notions of post-conflict or transition are distant possibilities as sectarianism entrenches hatred for the ‘other’” (Kilkelly et al. 2004: 245).

As Barber (2009: 126) observes, “children and young people in Northern Ireland have obviously paid a price for the political violence that has tainted the region.” Paramilitaries’ violence against children and young people has been endemic within communities and as a result children and young people have been “refugees, exiles for anti-social behaviour,” the “victims of punishment beatings” (Hillyard et al. 2005: 190; Gordon 2018), and there have been well-remembered incidents such as the Holy Cross Primary School dispute. Commencing in September 2001, there was a 12-week protest by loyalists, which resulted in Catholic schoolgirls from the nationalist Ardoyne area of North Belfast being subjected to abuse as they walked to Holy Cross Primary School (Cadwallader 2005). Imagery outside of the school, the children and their families were the subject of international media coverage. It is clear that in the context of education, as one community worker summarized, the “emotional effects of the conflict” have had a major impact on “children’s education, their mental health and their ability to participate in society” (quoted in Scraton, 2007: 149). Similar concerns were raised by Smyth et al. (2004: 43), who noted that

⁶See: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/deal-to-see-restored-government-in-northern-ireland-tomorrow?utm_source=bf51b5ed-7630-4f6e-b745-ec9dc4f43cf7&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=govuk-notifications&utm_content=immediate

those children deeply affected by the conflict had “difficulties in concentration and the aggressive behaviour that followed their traumatisation was misinterpreted by others, being seen as deliberately disruptive behaviour.”

The education system in Northern Ireland was divided between Protestants and Catholics, with churches maintaining their own schools. The government in the United Kingdom enacted a number of measures to establish “state run schools,” which would receive state funding in return for state (see Hayes et al. 2007). Protestant schools did agree to this change, whereas the Catholic Church insisted on retaining ownership of Catholic schools and this created a system whereby schools were divided into controlled (Protestant) and maintained (Catholic) schools in Northern Ireland. While controlled and maintained schools in Northern Ireland receive funding from the government, the key difference is that the Catholic Church manages maintained schools, while controlled schools are managed directly by the government. When the UK government implemented new legislation, the Education Reform (Northern Ireland) Order 1989, there was an emphasis on the development of a curriculum that accommodated difference (Schiaparelli et al. 2015).

With the period of relative stability and transition brought forth by the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, calls were made for the revision of the curriculum in Northern Ireland to embed and promote “cross-community relations” between Catholics and Protestants. In particular the learning areas of history and citizenship have been identified by researchers as subjects that were likely to be “most susceptible to different treatment in the separate school systems” and along with further revisions to the NI Curriculum in 2007, there existed more opportunities for educators to select what topics they would teach (Schiaparelli et al. 2015). In their important study, Niens and McIlrath (2010) found that interviewees expressed considerable belief that educators should assist learners to engage and think critically about contested and controversial issues, in order for learners to avoid the negative impacts of potential indoctrination.

In Northern Ireland integrated education was established since the first integrated school, Lagan College, was established in Belfast in 1981 by the campaigning parent group “All Children Together.” As McGlynn (2007) notes, a further 56 primary and post primary schools were also set up, and there is also a small number of children who attend Irish medium schools and independent schools. That said, the education system in Northern Ireland remains largely segregated. This division in the way in which education was administered resulted in a lack of consensus and learner experience, with schools responsible for designing and implementing their own versions of civic education and history (see Schiaparelli et al. 2015).

Segregated education poses considerable challenges for societies in relation to social cohesion and collective notions of identity and belonging. The division of learners physically and incompatible perspectives can enhance and prolong entrenched sectarian divisions in societies such as Northern Ireland. The literature on the integrated education sector in Northern Ireland has referred to the “anti-bias philosophy” and “cultures of tolerance” that are enshrined in the principles of integrated schools (Abbott 2010). However, it is acknowledged that there remains a lot of work still to be done to continue to promote inclusion, especially in relation to “newcomers” to Northern Ireland.

Syria

While schools in Northern Ireland have been historically categorized as controlled and maintained, it suffices to say that all schools in Syria, whether public or private, are controlled by the regime and influenced by one ideology, namely that of Al-Baath. To appreciate the influence of Al-Baath Party on education in Syria, we may need to revisit the party's history and how it retained and cemented its monopoly of political and social power. In 1963, a military coup in Syria delivered a group of Baathist officers to power. This coup resulted in decades of Al-Baath (which means "resurrection") party ruling the country until now. Immediately after the coup, the party tightened its grip on power in Syria, which has shaped the modern history in Syria to date, leaving its impact on every sector in Syria, including in the sector of education. Assuming the role of the leader of both the state and the society, it is therefore important to touch briefly on the principles and doctrine of the Al-Baath Party.

Al Baath Arabic Socialist Party was founded in 1947 and according to its articles of association, the Party is a nationalist, populist, socialist, and revolutionary Party, which aims at the unity and the freedom of the Arab nations. Its objectives are to achieve unity, freedom, and socialism.⁷ In many ways, the influence of fascism and Nazism on Al-Baath founders remains a debatable matter today (Lee 2018; Hasanov 2008; Saghieh 2007). The Party aims to unite Arabs in one state by capitalizing on Arab nationalism and downplayed religion. In the heart of Al-Baath ideology is that Arabs are a noble race, ancient and everlasting and their progression requires their unconditional faith in the Arab nations across the colonial made up borders and sacrificial love (Seale 1995). The Party also presents the Arab race as the origins of civilization. Having said that, the Party did not argue for ethnic purity of Arabs, which probably distinguishes the party from its contemporary fascist movements. Establishing "One Arab Nation with an Immortal Message" remains its core objective and struggle.

In 1970, the late Syrian president Hafez Al Assad, an early Baathist, led a coup which eliminated the comrades of yesterday. Some were detained until their death, while some were exiled and others were subsequently killed (Seale 1995). During the following three decades, and under Assad's leadership, Al-Baath Party cemented its power and transformed the education institutions to an apparatus that teaches, promotes, and disseminates its ideology (Van Dam 1996; Pierret 2013). To appreciate how this has been achieved, it might be useful to approach the argument here on both structural and curriculum level. On a structural level, every school in Syria, from primary school to secondary schools and higher education institutions, has Al-Baath Party Office presented by a secretary, who oversees the school activities and ensures that the latter as well as the staff and teachers are in line with the ideology of Al-Baath Party. Every morning, pupils start the school day by repeating slogans which consists of Al-Baath

⁷See the Party's constitution: http://www.baath-party.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=307&Itemid=327&lang=en

objectives which were highlighted above. In this sense, school governance emerged as a form of militarization, premised on fear and insecurity (Mouhiddin 2019). These strategies, if anything, underlines the tension between the Syrian ruling party of the education sector and its institutions as the State sector whose legitimacy stems from enforced measures and human rights violations, and the principles of education as a public mission. This will become even clearer when we consider the impact of the Baath ideology on learning curriculum.

Moreover, ideologizing Syrian students in line with the principles of Al-Baath Party is vested in two bodies emanating from the party itself. The first is the “Baath Vanguard,”⁸ which recruits children in the primary level, and the second is the “Revolutionary Youth,”⁹ which recruits teens at the secondary level. Both bodies are present in public schools and the private ones, although to a lesser degree in the latter (Mouhiddin 2019). On curriculum level, students are not only taught what does it mean to be “Syrian” from the view of Al-Baath Party, but also being a citizen of the Arab nation which the Party aspires to achieve, this inevitably excludes Syrian students from ethnical minorities such as Kurds, Assyrians, Armenians, and other ethnical minorities.

Arabic is the official language of Syria. The national curriculum is designed and delivered in Arabic and education in the country is compulsory from the age of 7 years to 15 years and it is free of charge in public schools for all stages. The state’s tight control over curriculum content extends to other subjects such as history, geography, and national education, all of which are written from the point of view of Al-Baath ideology. Over decades, this has resulted in education being a tool for political indoctrination and subjects discussing citizenship as well as civil and human rights are entirely absent from the national curriculum (Al-Hinawy and Zeno 2018). Hence the majority of Syrian students do not have an adequate grasp of the meaning of being a citizen in a state that grants equal rights to all its citizens (Mouhiddin 2019).

Overall, the national curriculum is designed and delivered based on political decisions and stances. For instance, Russian and Persian languages have been offered as optional languages in schools in response to the robust support received by the Syrian government from both Russian and Iran throughout the civil war. At the secondary level, military class was a compulsory subject and taught to all students (both boys and girls) until 2003 when the class was abolished from the national curriculum. Classes provided military lessons and political education in line with the ideological doctrine of the Al-Baath Party. Furthermore, all pupils at that level were required to wear military uniform while in school. Recent voices within the Syrian government have been calling to restore these classes and some even found a link between abolishing them and the civil war (Jabbour 2017).

⁸For an introduction to the role of Al-Baath Vanguard in education, see the website of Al-Baath Vanguard Organisation: <http://www.syrianpioneers.org.sy/node/24>.

⁹For an overview of the role of the “Revolutionary Youth” in education, see the website of the Revolutionary Youth Union: <http://ryu-sy.org/من-حن-حن/>.

These concentrated efforts by Al-Baath Party did not preclude a group of students in Dara'a, a Syrian southern city, to write "It is your turn, doctor"¹⁰ on their school's wall (HRW, 6op' 2012) on March 18, 2011, in response to the echoes of the Arab Spring which by then had toppled two Arab presidents, the Tunisian and the Egyptian (Dabashi 2012; Kaboub 2014; Bayat 2017), and the role of the youth in shaping the Arab Spring was significant (Rausch 2017). Unfortunately, what started as peaceful demonstrations in Syria gradually became armed clashes in September 2011 and escalated to an armed conflict and civil war in July 2012. Beside the basic infrastructure which has been severely damaged (UNDP 2017), the impact of the war, which is ongoing at the time of writing this chapter, will affect the Syrian community for generations to come. Millions of children and young Syrians have been deprived of education, displaced from their domiciles and neighborhoods, and/or recruited as soldiers in the course of the conflict (HRW 2012).

At the time of writing this chapter, the country remains divided between various belligerent parties and regional power. If anything, the war in Syria has furthered the militarization of the society, including schools. Approaching the topic in light of the ongoing conflict may prove difficult. Every armed and political force (Opposition, Regime, Kurdish Forces, Al Qaeda, etc.) on the ground across the country has established its own curriculum, and this control could easily change tomorrow or by the time this chapter is being prepared for printing. The common factor among all these curriculums though is that they lack citizenship education and where citizenship is mentioned summarily, it remains subject to the interpretation of the controlling force and its ideology, may it be religious or secular. This may partly mirror controlled and maintained schools in Northern Ireland approach to school's curriculum, and, as seen in Northern Ireland, this is resulting in conflicting identities and students learning different values in Syria.

Citizenship Education: Learning Lessons from the Past to Inform the Future

This section will explore the contested nature of citizenship and the issue of conflicting identities in post-conflict settings, as well as the inclusion and subsequent exclusion of certain sections of society. It will draw on the example of Northern Ireland to explore what can be learned from the past and further to this, it will look to the future and explore what citizenship education may be able to achieve in post-conflict and crisis-affected societies, such as Syria. It will call for the inclusion of the youth voice in all aspects of reform and educational development.

In moving from violence to political stability, societies such as Northern Ireland, which is a society in transition, face significant challenges (Aughey 2005). In Northern Ireland, these include challenges for children and young people as a social group, as they are framed on the one hand as both a threat to the stability of the

¹⁰Referring to President Bashar Al Assad.

“peace process” and, on the other, as the society’s greatest hope for the future (Gordon 2020). These pressures are coupled with the existing inequalities in relation to educational attainment levels. A series of reports have documented the inequalities existing in Northern Ireland’s education system. One such extended study that has produced several reports was initiated by the Equality Commission in Northern Ireland into “Education Inequalities in Northern Ireland.” This study identified that young Protestant boys from working-class communities are “underachieving” academically compared to other groups of children (Burns et al. 2015).

There are clearly conflicted notions of the past, of history, and of citizenship in Northern Ireland. One such example of this is Niens and McIlrath’s (2010: 73) interviews with nongovernmental organizations, political parties, trade unions, and the police in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland which found the existence of clear “differences” in opinion in relation to “national identity and political conflict,” which they argue “may raise questions for history and citizenship education.” Further challenges include the lost trust in politics by those tasked with designing and implementing citizenship education, the challenges that individuals may be confronted with in relation to dominant ideological perspectives. In addition, educators may feel unable to engage with issues or topics areas deemed as “controversial” and structurally and practically may be navigating working within the confines of a system that has limited resources (see Quaynor 2011).

Teachers working in integrated schools in Northern Ireland interviewed as part of Donnelly’s study (2004, cited in Quaynor 2011: 41) stated that they made personal choices to avoid controversial topics, were said to be compromising the learning of differences and the development of critical thinking skills. Further it was noted that when students engaged in “interfaith dialogues,” King (2005) reported that they tended to avoid discussions of controversial issues and did not seek to engage with a range of different perspectives. Despite this avoidance, those interviewed felt that the Northern Ireland curriculum needed to include controversial issues and that educators and learners needed guidance on how best explore these issues. This was deemed as essential in order for learners to be equipped to engage politically.

While a local context approach has been adopted in Northern Ireland coupled with a democratically elected local assembly and Department for Education with a Minister for Education, a local context approach may not be promising in the Syrian experience. In 2017, the Syrian president Bashar Al Assad admitted that the war in Syria has resulted in Syria losing its “youth and infrastructure” (SANA 2017). However, he added that the country has won a “healthier and more generous society” which eliminated the “sectarian dimension” and affirmed the “national unity of all the people of one nation” (ibid). This is not the kind of unity promoted by citizenship education which advocates for “identity, belonging and social cohesion” on national level (Osler 2013: 39).

At the time of writing this chapter, the end of the war in Syria has started to take shape. It could be assumed that Assad and his regime will remain in power for the foreseeable future. It could also be argued that the Syrian society has become a homogeneous society, as per Assad’s claims. Equally, the Syrian regime has inherited a broken country and a society whose fabric has been torn on ethnic,

social, and sectarian levels. The civil war, which started as a peaceful demonstration, has developed into a sectarian conflict which involved major regional powers that act as a protector of certain sectarian groups and forces on ground. Although what the Syrian president meant by homogeneous society is not the scope of this chapter, it is worth mentioning here that “citizenship education will vary according to how the ideal citizen is framed” (Cremin and Bevington 2017: 107). The literature and principles of Al-Baath Party indicates that citizenship is about belonging to one and united homeland. This element of belonging should neither be confused nor contradict the belonging on macro level to the Arab Nation. This is a disputable notion in a very diverse country that remains as such even during the war (Atasi 2015). The official name of Syria as the “Syrian Arab Republic” excludes prominent ethnical communities of the Syria society such as the Kurds, Armenians, the Assyrians, the Circassians, and many others.

Furthermore, Al-Baath Party argues that citizenship establishes the notion of national sovereignty and opposes anything that may threaten that sovereignty. It then concludes that citizenship (distinguishing the latter from nationality) in contemporary Syria is synonym to “uprooting terrorism” (Al-Baath Bureau for Planning and Culture 2014: 25–26). Labeling those who oppose the Syrian government and its policies as terrorists is well documented and has been imposed systematically in Syrian media platforms as well as the public sector, including schools (see Assad’s statements on Al-Jazeera Dec 12, 2015¹¹; and on the Syrian Observer Dec 15, 2016¹²). In light of Al-Baath supervision of schools and learning across education institutions in Syria, citizenship education designed and delivered by one narrative could be counterproductive. Assuming victory in this conflict, citizenship is becoming loaded with concepts that correspond to the principals of the ruling party. In this sense, “responsible citizenship” in Syria is measured by loyalty to Al-Baath Party and the regime it installed in Syria since 1963.

This reality inhabits a hostile environment for a citizenship education which draws from principles that are centered on learning to live together, rights, sense of belonging, social cohesion, and other principles outlined earlier in this chapter. Syria may need to develop long-term and short-term strategies. While emerging from war and conflict, the Syrian society is dealing with an abusive past which lasted for six decades. It has been demonstrated earlier in this chapter how the division of Northern Ireland’s society had been accentuated by the educational divide. In this sense, citizenship education becomes a societal necessity rather than educational need.

Building the capacity of Syrian citizens and communities through citizenship programs, community activities, and participation could potentially enable them to think critically and reflect on their present and past so they may foresee and construct a better future (Barat and Duthie 2017). Potentially, this could result in a level of

¹¹<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/12/syria-assad-rules-negotiations-terrorists-151211163831365.html>

¹²https://syrianobserver.com/EN/interviews/24582/assad_us_supports_terrorists_by_calling_them_moderate_opposition.html

awareness among Syrian community leaders, as happened in Northern Ireland, for the need to help Syrian students to think critically and avoid indoctrinating children in schools. This could be achieved in reliance on the civil society which has been suppressed in the country for decades but is emerging and gaining momentum amid the civil war. Various civil societies have been involved in extensive work with young people, adults, children, and vulnerable groups across the country. Vital social services they provide and their aloofness from politics could explain the regime's tolerance of the existence of such organizations.

For the moment, Syrian civil society concerns itself with maintaining community spirit among Syrians, spreading awareness and providing young people with vital practical skills as well as peacebuilding approach to disputes and conflict. This has recently extended to adults too, including parents and the family as a social agency. The role of parents and their influence on citizenship education (Gallagher et al. 2019) may be a promising factor for the future of citizenship education in Syria. Peacebuilding programs have become a common feature among programs designed and delivered by civil societies in Syria. Whether peacebuilding could be the door to access citizenship education is something the future will tell.

As might be the case, authorities in countries emerging from civil wars concerned themselves with establishing order and stability in their countries (O'Connor and Rausch 2007), and Syria does not seem to be an exception. In the short term, peacebuilding and community spirit may well correspond to the aspiration of the Syrian government in achieving order and stability. In the long term, implementing citizenship education in schools remains a necessity; however, while this may not follow the classical route through structure curriculum, it has promising potential if undertaken by Syrian civil societies. Plans and reforms in relation to education should incorporate critical evaluations of the impact of education and learning on a longer-term basis, taking into consideration periods of change and progress, as well as times of setback and stagnation, in the road to stability and peace. Citizenship education has the potential to be utilized as a tool that responds to the needs of the post-conflict generation and one that can enhance social cohesion and equality in post-conflict societies, where the conflict has left a legacy of sectarianism and division.

Conclusion

As the case studies of Northern Ireland and Syria demonstrate, citizenship education is a complex and complicated area, particularly for educators and learners in conflict-affected and post-conflict societies, where there may be contested identities and conflicting notions of citizenship. By utilizing the reflections on the challenges in Northern Ireland in relation to the development of an "appropriate" model of citizenship education, the Northern Ireland case study shines a light on what challenges there may be when navigating the development of an appropriate model of citizenship education for Syrian children. The chapter proposed in light of the changing power dynamics operating in societies during and following periods of conflict, the creation of social cohesion is a complex task. Those tasked with

designing and implementing citizenship education might well be navigating their own lost trust in politics, they may be challenged by dominant ideological perspectives, and educators may feel unable to engage with issues or topics areas deemed as “controversial” and, further to this, may be navigating working within the confines of limited resources (see Quaynor 2011). It is crucial that the meaningful inclusion of the youth voice in all aspects of reform and educational development is present. In order to work toward achieving meaningful democratic participation and ultimately ensuring that the “now” generation of children and young people have the uninhibited freedom to engage, challenge, and form their own views in relation to their citizenship and identity/identities, there is the need to embrace difference, challenge stereotypes, and ensure that the education system promotes critical thinking. As this chapter has argued, a great deal can be learned from the past to inform the future.

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Digital Citizenship and Education in Turkey: Experiences, the Present and the Future **30**

Zafer İbrahimoğlu

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Abstract

Since the late twentieth century, the use of technology has become widespread, affecting social life in different parts of the world, especially in countries with developed economies. As an economically developing country, the use of computers and the Internet in Turkey has increased rapidly since the 2000s. In this context, individual and social life is going through a process of digitalization. This process of technology-based change and transformation has added several new meanings of the concept and practice of citizenship. Today, which has been called an age of information-communication technologies, one of the new forms of citizenship is digital citizenship. This form of citizenship, which includes the use of Internet-based technologies in an effective, safe, and ethical manner, has begun to occupy an important place in Turkey's education system. The process of developing the technological competences of citizens and equipping them with the knowledge, skills, and values they need to use this technology correctly, namely, digital citizenship education, consists of two dimensions: the technical

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and effective. The technical dimension aims to teach computer and Internet-based technology knowledge to the students during the education process from primary school until university. The effective dimension includes focuses on students' ability to use technological tools, primarily the computer and the Internet, in a safe and ethical manner within the scope of social studies, the main aim of which to deliver an effective and democratic citizenship education. In examining the field, this chapter argues that both dimensions are important and should be provided to students within their digital citizenship education.

Keywords

Technology · Digitalization · Digital · Citizenship · Citizenship education · Social studies education

Introduction

Technology is a primary influence upon social and individual life and experiences and has been among the key factors that have impacted on change, transformation, and orientation over the last century (Selwyn 2013). The effects of technology on human life are increasing and are becoming more evident, leading the twenty-first century to be named as the age of information and communication technologies (Oladimeji et al. 2011; Büyükbaykal 2015). Due to advancements in technology, distances have been eliminated which has made it possible to know the unknown with a single click. Furthermore, processes of globalization have gained momentum, and, as McLuhan (1989) suggests, the speed of the world's transformation into a global village has increased.

Different standards have been set in order to define social strata within the context of Internet-based change and transformation processes. Prensky (2001) defines two main generations in terms of access to technology, adaptation, and use: digital natives and digital immigrants. Digital native describes people born after 1980 which are adapted easily to technological developments and who tend to use these innovations in their daily life (Burdick and Willis 2011). Digital immigrants are those born before 1980 and who tend to have a relatively reluctant attitude toward changes and transformations based on information and communication technologies and who have the potential to experience various problems in adaptation to technological developments (Arabacı and Polat 2013; Eşgi 2013).

As the usage and visibility of technology in daily life have increased, how these devices are used has become incredibly important, including for how citizenship is experienced and enacted. Considering today's developments, it is possible to say that the effect of technology in our lives will continue to exist, probably increasingly, in the medium and long term. This reality has brought about a new concept to the related literature: digital citizenship.

Following this introduction, the next section details a theoretical framework for understanding digital citizenship, which is argued as emerging as a result of the

reflection/consequence of computer- and Internet-based technological developments. In the remaining sections, important developments related specifically to digital citizenship in Turkey will be evaluated within the context of citizenship and citizenship education policies.

Digital Citizenship

In the last 20–30 years, digital citizenship has emerged as a new way of identifying individuals who can use technology effectively within the framework of Internet-based technological developments (Ribble 2009; Hui and Campbell 2018; Emejulu and McGregor 2019). One of the main topics of discussion has been whether the digital adjective that expresses technological competence can characterize citizenship or not. In other words, scholars ask whether it is correct to describe the concept of citizenship, which serves as a political/legal definition tool, within the framework of technological competences (Bearden 2016). In discussions of how to define digital citizenship, the concept is generally described through categorizing its different dimensions. In *Digital Citizenship in Schools*, one of the most important works in the related field, Ribble (2015, pp. 23–60) examines digital citizenship as comprising nine dimensions.

1. **Digital access:** The key concern of digital access is that all individuals and groups that make up the society should have adequate opportunity to access technology. Various disadvantaged groups in the society may not be able to have this opportunity. However, it is important to make access possible for digital citizenship and education (Ribble and Bailey 2004; Jones and Mitchell 2015).
2. **Digital trading:** One of the important properties that a digital citizen should possess is the ability to perform conscious and safe online shopping (John 2008). A digital citizen of the twenty-first century should, therefore, be equipped with the capacities to be able to conduct online shopping in a safe and conscious manner.
3. **Digital communication:** New forms of communication have emerged in the digital environment, with applications and the use of e-mails increasing significantly (Noonan and Piatt 2014; Poushter et al. 2018). Research from a variety of contexts has evidenced that the use of mobile phones and tablets starts from early age (Park and Park 2014; Aral and Keskin 2017; Yalçın and Duran 2017). Therefore, individuals' ability to use information and *communication* technology products properly and effectively in the context of digital citizenship education is understood as vital for digital citizenship.
4. **Digital literacy:** An efficient digital citizen should be equipped with the basic knowledge and skills regarding the technological means at hand. Here the criterion may be that each citizen should be aware of the information and communication technologies that can be used in their daily life and be able to use them effectively when needed (Meyers et al. 2013). Research conducted on the tools used in education have suggested that teachers who are unable to follow

technological developments have difficulty in carrying some of the properties needed for effective education to their classes (Çelikkaya 2013; Kubat 2018).

5. **Digital ethics:** The development and diversification of communication technologies has not been unproblematic. Issues such as the malicious use of technologies and improper use of social media are frequently observed. These issues have an ethical dimension, reminding us that users of technology may exhibit many unethical behaviors in digital environments, sometimes consciously in bad faith and sometimes unconsciously due to a lack of sufficient information (Budinger and Budinger 2006).
6. **Digital law:** Freedom in the digital world is not unlimited. As with standard definitions of citizenship, so too digital citizenship is shaped and governed by the existence (or otherwise) of various legal frameworks. For this reason, the twenty-first century digital citizen should be aware of legal frameworks when using communication technologies.
7. **Digital rights and responsibilities:** Connected with digital law, and again similarly to citizenship in general, digital citizenship involves rights and responsibilities. It is important to note that violations of rights in the digital world may stem from citizen interaction but may also involve cases such as the obstruction of Internet access without justified reason or the use of the wrong information through Internet sites to create public opinion.
8. **Digital health:** The use of computers and the Internet in violation of human anatomy and mental health may also have a negative impact on human health (Mustafaoğlu et al. 2018). Research suggests that children and young people may be particularly vulnerable from this impact (Ulusoy and Bostancı 2014; Erdal 2015; Kuyucu 2017). Other evidence suggests that people who spend a long time in front of the computer show increased risk of various health problems (Fowler and Noyes 2017).
9. **Digital security:** With the development and spread of Internet-based technologies, the risks faced by people have also increased, including those associated with certain fraud methods (Nkotagu 2011; Button et al. 2014; Atkins and Huang 2013). A core part of digital citizenship, therefore, is the possession of sufficient knowledge and skills to use the technologies securely (Jwaifell 2018).

As these nine dimensions suggest, the concept of digital citizenship is multifaceted and subject to competing theories aimed at understanding its evolving role. It is important, therefore, that education systems – which will be formed in an attempt to raise individuals and citizens who have the required qualifications and capacities for the twenty-first century information and communication age – should be cognizant of this multifaceted structure. As one of the countries where computer and Internet-based technological developments have led to significant impacts, especially in the last 30 years, the remainder of this chapter focuses on the context of Turkey. In this context, firstly the process of computer-Internet-based digitalization in Turkey will be discussed, and developments in computer and Internet usage rates will be analyzed. Then, activities central to e-government as a reflection of the digitalization of state-citizen relations are examined. Finally, digital citizenship as an aspect of citizenship education in Turkey will be evaluated.

Digitalization and Digital Citizenship Education in Turkey

Digitalization in Turkey

In Turkey, the first computer was used in 1960 (Engin et al. 2010). The *IBM-650 Data Processing Machine*, used by the General Directorate of Highways for various calculations in road construction works, had the capacity to make 78,000 addition-subtraction and 5000 multiplication per minute (<http://www.kgm.gov.tr/Sayfalar/KGM/SiteTr/Galeri/IlkBilgisayar.aspx>). Use of computers in Turkey, which started with the first computer used in public in 1960, increased rapidly during the second half of the 1990s.

Digitalization-based technological developments in Turkey are closely related with computer use. Although technology is not merely comprised of computers, the use of computers is highly important in terms of digitalizing work and transactions. Therefore, the history of digitalization in Turkey is parallel to the history of computer use. The first Internet connection in Turkey was installed in 1993 by the Middle East Technical University (METU) and then spread to other universities. In Turkey, the Internet primarily gained prevalence among universities for academic purposes (Demirdöğmez et al. 2018). However, the rapid spread of the Internet at almost all levels of society in Turkey took place after 2000s. In a study conducted by the Institute of Information Technology, while the rate of computer ownership in urban households in Turkey was only 6.5% in 1997, it was observed that this ratio increased to 12.3% in 2000 (Turan and Polat 2009) and has increased since. The implications of this for citizenship, and digital citizenship, are discussed below.

Table 1 shows information technology usage statistics in Turkey prepared by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT) between the years 2004 and 2018. As can be seen from the data in the table, the rate of computer use, which was only around 10% at the beginning of 2000s, increased significantly to 2018.

With advances in computer technology, the emergence of laptops and tablets as an alternative to desktop computers has led to a significant increase in the rate and number of portable computers. In addition, another important data about digitalization in Turkey is the figures of mobile phone usage. The ratio, which was around 50% in 2004, has now reached almost 99%. It can be stated that Internet technology has a significant contribution to this important increase in mobile phone usage; such that when Table 2, which shows the Internet usage rates in the same period, is analyzed, the parallels between the two is notable.

According to Table 2 which shows the computer and Internet usage rates in Turkey, it is seen that the rate of Internet usage, which was 18.8% in 2004, reached around 72% at the end of 14 years. The rate of non-Internet users is now around 27.1. Another data showing the increase in Internet usage is the number of Internet subscribers. The number of subscribers, which was around 300 thousand in 1998, has reached around 71 million in 2018. There are 71 million Internet subscriptions in a country with a population of 80 million (TURKSTAT).

It is seen that the use of computers, Internet, and Internet-supported technological products in Turkey increased significantly during the last 15–20 years. However, it is

Table 1 Availability of devices in households, 2004–2018

	%																
	Year																
	2004	2005	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018			
Desktop computer	10.0	11.6	24.0	28.1	30.7	33.8	34.3	31.8	30.5	27.6	25.2	22.9	20.3	19.2			
Portable computer (laptop, tablet PC)	0.9	1.1	5.6	9.1	11.2	16.8	22.6	27.1	–	–	–	–	–	–			
Portable computer (laptop, netbook, tablet)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	40.1	43.2	–	–	–			
Portable computer (laptop, netbook)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	31.4	–	–	36.4	36.7	37.9			
Tablet computer	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	6.2	–	–	29.6	29.7	28.4			
Mobile phone (incl. smart phone)	53.7	72.6	87.4	88.1	87.6	90.5	91.9	93.2	93.7	96.1	96.8	96.9	97.8	98.7			
Smart TV	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	7.3	12.4	20.9	24.6	28.5	32.1			

TurkStat, survey on Information and Communication Technology (ICT) usage survey in households and by individuals, 2004–2018

– Denotes magnitude null

Table 2 Percentages of computer and Internet usage by latest usage and sex, 2004–2018

	Year	%					
		Computer			Internet		
		Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Computer and Internet users	2004	23,6	31,1	16,2	18,8	25,7	12,1
	2005	22,9	30,0	15,9	17,6	24,0	11,1
	2007	33,4	42,7	23,7	30,1	39,2	20,7
	2008	38,0	47,8	28,5	35,9	45,4	26,6
	2009	40,1	50,5	30,0	38,1	48,6	28,0
	2010	43,2	53,4	33,2	41,6	51,8	31,7
	2011	46,4	56,1	36,9	45,0	54,9	35,3
	2012	48,7	59,0	38,5	47,4	58,1	37,0
	2013	49,9	60,2	39,8	48,9	59,3	38,7
	2014	53,5	62,7	44,3	53,8	63,5	44,1
	2015	54,8	64,0	45,6	55,9	65,8	46,1
	2016	54,9	64,1	45,9	61,2	70,5	51,9
	2017	56,6	65,7	47,7	66,8	75,1	58,7
2018	59,6	68,6	50,6	72,9	80,4	65,5	
Never used it	2004	76,4	68,9	83,8	81,2	74,3	87,9
	2005	77,1	70,0	84,1	82,4	76,0	88,9
	2007	66,6	57,3	76,3	69,9	60,8	79,3
	2008	62,0	52,2	71,5	64,1	54,6	73,4
	2009	59,9	49,5	70,0	61,9	51,4	72,0
	2010	56,8	46,6	66,8	58,4	48,2	68,3
	2011	53,6	43,9	63,1	55,0	45,1	64,7
	2012	51,3	41,0	61,5	52,6	41,9	63,0
	2013	50,1	39,8	60,2	51,1	40,7	61,3
	2014	46,5	37,3	55,7	46,2	36,5	55,9
	2015	45,2	36,0	54,4	44,1	34,2	53,9
	2016	45,1	35,9	54,1	38,8	29,5	48,1
	2017	43,4	34,3	52,3	33,2	24,9	41,3
2018	40,4	31,4	49,4	27,1	19,6	34,5	

TurkStat, survey on Information and Communication Technology (ICT) usage survey in households and by individuals, 2004–2018

also a fact that usage is not equitable across the population and that certain groups within Turkish society still cannot benefit from these technologies to the extent available to others. This pattern of usage both shapes and has important implications for digital citizenship, as will be explained in the next section.

Resulting from research conducted by TURKSTAT, the data in Table 3 shows that the occupational group that uses these technologies the least is composed of people working in agriculture, forestry, and aquaculture sectors. A recent project has been developed for agricultural sector employees, as one of the disadvantaged groups in terms of computer and Internet usage. Within the scope of the project, warning messages on weather-based meteorological forecasts and possible extreme weather

Table 3 Computer and Internet usage of individuals by occupation and sex, 2013–2018

	%													
	Computer users							Internet users						
	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018		
ISCO-08	91,2	93,1	93,7	94,1	95,9	94,5	90,5	93,6	94,0	96,0	97,8	96,7		
Managers	94,7	96,9	97,3	95,1	98,4	99,2	94,5	96,8	97,7	96,5	99,3	99,8		
Professionals	92,9	94,8	97,4	95,3	97,0	96,5	92,9	95,0	97,4	97,7	98,9	99,7		
Technicians and associate professionals	92,5	93,4	94,6	92,8	94,6	95,4	91,6	93,7	94,7	94,4	97,6	98,2		
Clerical support workers	74,5	75,8	78,6	77,0	78,6	81,1	73,4	76,8	80,3	83,9	88,1	92,4		
Service and sales workers	20,4	21,8	33,1	26,2	27,3	29,1	19,0	22,7	34,5	34,4	38,6	47,9		
Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers	72,1	68,0	75,1	73,7	74,0	76,0	70,9	69,8	78,9	84,5	86,0	91,2		
Craft and related trades workers	73,2	74,9	79,9	74,5	77,9	80,1	72,9	76,5	79,3	85,0	90,6	95,0		
Plant and machine operators and assemblers	49,4	53,2	52,0	53,2	50,8	56,5	48,7	54,4	55,7	64,2	69,0	75,8		
Elementary occupations														

TurkStat, survey on Information and Communication Technology (ICT) usage survey in households and by individuals, 2013–2018

The individuals expression in the table heading refers to the individuals in the 16–74 age group

events (such as hail and storm) will be sent to farmers' mobile phones on a daily basis (<https://www.tarimorman.gov.tr/Haber/1656/Tarim-Ve-Orman-Bakani-Bekir-Pakdemirli-Ciftcimiz-Sabah-Kalktiginda-Bizi-Yaninda-Gorecek>). In this context, it is hoped that farmers will have a more productive period benefiting from technological opportunities in their agricultural activities. Within the scope of the project, warning messages on weather-based meteorological forecasts and possible extreme weather events (such as hail and storm) will be sent to farmers' mobile phones on a daily basis. In this context, it is aimed that farmers will have a more productive period benefiting from technological opportunities in their agricultural activities (<https://www.tarimorman.gov.tr/Haber/1656/Tarim-Ve-Orman-Bakani-Bekir-Pakdemirli-Ciftcimiz-Sabah-Kalktiginda-Bizi-Yaninda-Gorecek>). Such projects for the transfer of digital technologies to daily life practices can also help to improve the competence of individuals in digital citizenship dimensions. If a farmer is able to follow the expectations of the weather on his mobile phone and be aware of possible risk situations, he will make progress in digital access and digital communication dimensions; moreover, he will have a gain on the digital trade (economy) dimension because they can achieve a more secure and profitable agricultural activity through technological literacy.

One of the examples of the impact of Information and Communication Technologies on social life and citizenship in Turkey is experienced in the banking sector. In Turkey, which introduced the automatic cash machine (ATM) in 1987, the first Internet banking service was started in 1997 (Armağan and Temel 2016). According to the data of the Banks Association of Turkey, as of 2017, there have been 51 million customers registered in the Internet banking system.

Another dimension for Turkish citizens effected by the information and communication technologies – one clearly relevant to digital citizenship and digital citizenship education – is the holding of public opinion and electioneering. Politicians and political parties, who try to reach and sway public opinion, also use the latest developments in information and communication technologies as an important tool in this regard. In Turkey, Internet environments are being used at an increasing rate especially in the elections after the 2000s. Within the scope of electioneering by the Justice and Development Party, which is the ruling party, Internet-based social media tools have been used increasingly. The fact that political parties have begun to prefer Internet-based technological channels to communicate with citizens emphasizes the importance of digital citizenship competence for citizens. An individual who is not adequately equipped in the dimensions of digital literacy and digital communication may not be able to engage fully. Therefore, in the rapidly changing and developing era of twenty-first century information and communication technologies, digital citizenship education constitutes one of the most basic dimensions of educating citizens who can guide the future.

E-Government as an Area of Digitalization of State-Citizen Relations in Turkey

In many countries of the world, the process of conducting government services over the Internet is spreading rapidly in direct proportion to the access and usage rate of

that country's information technologies (Rocheleau 2007; Machova and Lnenicka 2016; Chipeta 2018). In this new state form, which has been called e-government, relations between the state and citizens as well as the relations between the state and institutions and organizations are carried into the electronic environment. In the same way, systems are developed in order to execute internal works and transactions through Internet-based electronic systems.

E-government studies in Turkey started mainly after the 2000s. The spread of the e-government system reveals many advantages. In addition to citizens' being able to complete their transactions with the public institutions and organizations in a faster and more practical way, it can also be said that this utilization of digitalization-based technology is a very effective tool in terms of transparency, accountability, and savings (Erdal 2004; Kuran 2005). Moreover, communication in the traditional state-citizen relationship is often unilateral; the state can convey the messages it wants to give to the citizens through its various instruments. However, thanks to the e-government applications in the digitalized world, citizens can now convey certain requests, suggestions, and complaints to the relevant units of the state. In Turkey, BIMER (Prime Ministry Communication Center) and then CIMER (Presidential Communication Center) were created and operated as a digital platform where citizens can communicate their messages at the highest levels of the central administration. In addition to the central administration, many local units (municipalities and governorates) have developed systems in which citizens can communicate and trace their wishes and complaints in a digital environment.

The development of the e-government system through moving works and transactions of public administration to the electronic environment has also accelerated and facilitated processes within the state itself. Within this framework, the information needed by the judicial, administrative, and security units can be accessed more readily through Internet-based systems created on behalf of the institution. This possibility, on the one hand, carries the internal functioning of the state to a more systematic and auditable form, and on the other hand, has a positive effect on the citizen-state relationship. Many examples can be given in this regard. Problems with data access have been resolved with the new judicial system, with judges and prosecutors having the possibility to access the information they need faster than before. Although there are deficiencies with several dimensions and fields that need to be improved (Güngör 2014), Turkey has carried out significant studies regarding improvements and developments on e-state applications, especially in the last 10 years (Ekinci 2018).

However, in spite of digitalization and the increase in the usage level of computer/Internet-based technologies in the relations between citizen-state, some issues remain. A study by Kara and Yanık (2016) draws attention to variations in levels of computer and Internet usage based on educational background and sexuality. Groups trying to accomplish their official dealings on the e-state system may encounter various problems based on a lack of knowledge of technology usage (digital literacy) or issues with equal access (digital access). In order to get rid of such problems, technology integration trainings which include wide segments of the society should be provided (Yılmaz 2017). Besides, establishing the necessary

infrastructure support is vital for the adoption and usage of e-state applications. Studies carried out by Daştan and Efilođlu Kurt (2016) which focus on the determination of factors that are effective for adaptations to the e-state system reinforce the importance of infrastructure support, and it is stated that citizens adopt negative attitudes toward e-state applications which do not have sufficient infrastructure and which do not work with the desired productivity. Within the scope of infrastructural works, local governments have important duties as well. It is important that local government units, which are the first addressees of the citizen in many aspects of their engagement, update their activities in accordance with technology and perform certain works or studies to increase the awareness and usage level of citizens (digital literacy) in this transformation process. In studies that examine the current situation of mobile apps of metropolitan municipalities in Turkey providing services for their citizens, Gürses and Engin (2016) state that the current mobile applications fail to satisfy and need to be improved.

Consequently, it can be stated that e-state systems need to adapt and develop themselves continuously. In parallel with these development activities toward technological infrastructure, additional activities to increase the level of awareness of citizens toward e-state applications are also important. A great majority of citizens using the current e-state applications express that they are satisfied with these applications (Ekinci 2018). It is important to reflect this satisfaction to other segments of society, including those groups who have low levels of accessing computer-Internet-based technological applications.

Digital Citizenship Education in Turkey

In Turkey, citizenship education is basically taught through a social sciences course. Social studies, which emerged in the United States at the beginning of the twentieth century, also began to take part in Turkey's curriculum in the late 1960s. Social studies, which is formed by bringing together social and human sciences in a multidisciplinary or interdisciplinary structure at the student level, has to be closely related to many other courses in order to achieve the aim of educating citizens with the characteristics of the twenty-first-century age of information and communication technologies.

It can be stated that digital citizenship education in Turkey is designed in two dimensions: technical and effective. The *technical dimension* includes teaching the basic technical knowledge of information and communication technologies to students. The rate of computer and Internet usage in Turkey increased significantly after 2000s and nowadays especially that the Internet usage has reached high levels. Various changes, transformations, and improvements have been made in the curriculum of information technologies course in line with this development. In this context, the computer course, which was added to the curriculum as an elective course at the primary education level in the late 1990s, was found inadequate as a result of the differentiation in social dynamics and the increase in the provision of technology in daily life over time, and the curriculum has been subsequently updated

(Yeşiltepe and Erdoğan 2013). In 2013, with a new regulation in the curriculums made by the Ministry of National Education, the Information Technology and Software course took place in the curriculum for 2 h per week as a compulsory course in fifth and sixth grades and as an elective course in the seventh and eighth grades of the secondary school (Uzgun and Aykaç 2016). The change has not only involved the transition of the course as a compulsory lesson by taking it out of the elective pool, but also current technical developments have been tried to be reflected in terms of content and teaching method techniques.

In addition to making the information technologies course compulsory at some levels of education, the FATİH project was initiated by the Ministry of National Education and brought to a certain point as a larger project for the use of computers and Internet in schools. The scope of the FATİH project aims to provide Internet access to all schools and classes and equip classrooms with interactive boards (Kavak et al. 2016). With the completion of these technical infrastructure requirements, it is also made possible for teachers and students to benefit from information and communication technologies in the classroom outside the information technologies course. This ease and prevalence of technological access aimed by the FATİH project can also be expressed as an important step in terms of digital citizenship education. Ribble, in his dimensioning for digital citizenship, puts digital access as the first item. Therefore, one of the first steps of digital citizenship education is that students have access to technology. It is relatively difficult for students in disadvantaged areas to access this opportunity in social life. Within this framework, this project initiated by the Ministry of National Education aims to provide all students with possibilities close to each other, although not exactly the same, under the roof of school. The ability of students to have access to technology is key to the transition to other stages of digital citizenship education; therefore, within the scope of the same project, it has been aimed that the classrooms will be equipped with digital infrastructure, while on the other hand, that teachers get training to integrate information technologies into their courses (Alkan et al. 2011), and various courses and seminars have been organized in this framework (Saritepeci et al. 2016; Tatlı and Kılıç 2013). Various online portals have been created simultaneously with the training process for the services that teachers need to adapt their information technologies in their lessons and the necessary infrastructure created to enable teachers to share the materials they produced with their colleagues. The fact that students and teachers have access to digital access and communication forms the basis of the necessary infrastructure work for progress in other dimensions of digital citizenship education.

Another reflection of the digitalization process in education was put into operation with the e-school system. With this system, the Ministry of National Education has taken an important step for transferring its internal works and transactions to the electronic environment and thus transition to a more rapid and transparent management while establishing an alternative environment for teacher-student and teacher-

parent communication (Demirli et al. 2011). The system has enabled parents to follow the status of their children's success and follow up the notes of teachers and administrators about their children; thus, parent-school cooperation has been facilitated.

The second dimension of digital citizenship education is effective. The effective dimension includes how students, who learn how to use Internet-based technological tools technically in a basic sense in courses such as computer, information technologies, and coding, can use these tools in a proper, secure, and ethical way. In this framework, the first issue to be considered is Turkey Qualification Framework (TQF). The TQF, which contains information on what skills the students are intended to be equipped with by considering the education process as a whole, also serves as a guide for the curricular programs. In the context of TQF, eight competence areas have been determined, and one of these areas is digital competence. Regarding the digital competence area, the following information is included in the 2017 elementary and secondary school social studies curriculum (p. 5):

It includes the safe and critical use of information and communication technologies for work, daily life and communication. Such competence is supported by basic skills such as access to information and the use of computers for the evaluation, storage, production, presentation and exchange of information, as well as participation in and communication with the common networks via Internet.

In the light of the explanations given in the program related to digital competences, in addition to the ability to use computer- and Internet-based technological tools safely and properly, it can be stated that carrying these technologies into daily life and being able to use them actively in social participation issues are highlighted within the scope of the aim to develop the digital competences of the students.

Some of the specific objectives of the social studies course, whose main objective is to educate active, democratic, and participatory citizens, have been determined by also taking into account the competences set out in the TQF. One of the special objectives of the social studies course is to raise digital citizens. In the 2017 secondary school social studies curriculum, this objective has been clearly defined, and the following statements have been included in the 11th article of the course objectives (p. 8): "To use information and communication technologies consciously by understanding the development process of science and technology and their impacts on social life." To be compatible with this objective, one of the skills that are intended to be taught to students in the social studies course is determined as *digital literacy*.

In order to achieve these basic objectives in the social studies curriculum, some explanations were made for teachers in the implementation of the program. Among these explanations, there are also sections that draw attention to the issue of digital citizenship (p. 10):

In recent years, new situations related to citizenship rights and responsibilities (digital citizenship, e-government, virtual commerce, social media, etc.) and a number of problems

(digital division, identity theft, privacy of personal information, cyber fraud, cyber bullying etc.) have emerged due to developments in digital technology. In order to improve students' digital citizenship competences, the course should include in-class and extracurricular activities.

This explanation for the implementation of the social studies curriculum of primary and secondary schools can be understood as an indicator of the importance of digital citizenship in the social studies course. Teachers are asked to organize in-class and extracurricular activities to enable students to have the necessary equipment to use information and communication technologies properly, securely, and ethically.

In Turkey, social studies course is offered to the students starting from the fourth grade in primary school until the end of seventh grade in secondary school. When the 2017 elementary and secondary school curricula are analyzed in terms of digital citizenship, it is seen that there are many benefits aimed at helping students to be equipped with the knowledge, skills, and values required by the twenty-first century age of information and communication technologies (Table 4).

Table 4 Digital citizenship in 2017 social studies curriculum achievements

School year	Learning area	Achievement	Remarks
5	Science, technology, and society	Pays attention to the principles of academic honesty by recognizing that scientific works are protected by law	
5	Science, technology, and society	Discusses the effects of technology use on socialization and social relations	<i>While teaching this learning area, it should be ensured that the students acquire the values such as honesty, diligence and ethics of science, as well as skills such as self-checking and digital literacy</i>
		Questions the accuracy and reliability of the information reached in the virtual environment	<i>Topics such as distance shopping, secure Internet use, and identity theft are discussed</i>
		Obeys the security rules when using virtual environment	<i>The importance of giving references to the sources utilized and protecting the authenticity of the sources is emphasized</i>
		Acts in accordance with scientific ethics in his/her work	
5	Active citizenship		<i>Within the scope of the achievement, the e-government portal and the services provided through this portal are mentioned</i>

(continued)

Table 4 (continued)

School year	Learning area	Achievement	Remarks
7	Individual and society	Discusses the role of media in social change and interaction	<i>A selected communication channel (TV, Internet, smartphones, etc.) is discussed as to how it changes the communication between individuals and also the culture in social sense</i>
7	Production, distribution, and consumption	Uses his/her rights and fulfills his/her responsibilities while utilizing communication tools	<i>The relationship between the right to privacy, freedom of expression and right to information, and the freedom of mass communication is discussed</i>
7	Production, distribution, and consumption	Analyzes the changes of digital technologies in the production, distribution, and consumption network	<i>E-commerce (computer games virtual/digital products as much as real products) is emphasized</i>

When the achievements and explanations given in Table 1 are examined, it can be stated that the social studies course, which is aimed at students becoming digital citizens, includes key concerns of digital citizenship today, including social relations, ethics, and security dimensions.

Summary

Internet and computer-based technological developments have had serious effects on individual and social life forms, especially in the last 30 years. In Turkey, as one of the countries experiencing the process of technological change and transformation, increased digitalization has a number of dimensions meaning the digital citizenship is both complex and varied. The use of smartphones, Internet, and Internet-based technological tools has increased rapidly, especially after 2000, and the increased use of technological products is reflected in the relations between the citizens and the state. In this context, the process of digitalizing the works and transactions of the public sector has been initiated. The process of transferring the state services into digital environment, which is called e-government, is continuing rapidly in Turkey which has implications for how Turkish citizens are educated and how they come to understand themselves as digital citizens.

In Turkey, and as a response to the rapid change and transformation toward digitalization, one of the main objectives of the education system is to raise citizens with the qualifications required by the twenty-first century age of information and communication technologies. In this context, educational studies that are conceptualized as digital citizenship education and that enable students to use information and communication technologies in a conscious, secure, and ethical way are of essence.

Under the upper umbrella of digital citizenship education, there are two main dimensions: technical and affective. Within the technical dimension, the aim is to provide the students with the technical knowledge to use computer- and Internet-based technological products during their formal education, while the affective dimension includes knowledge, skills, and values for using these technologies in a secure and especially ethical way. That the ideal digital citizens of the future have the necessary qualifications in both of these basic dimensions can be stated as an indispensable necessity.

Cross-References

- [Discourses of Global Citizenship Education: The Influence of the Global Middle Classes](#)

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The Dilemmas of Americanism: Civic Education in the United States

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Campbell F. Scribner

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Abstract

The following chapter chronicles the history of civic education at the primary and secondary levels in the United States. While educators advanced broad notions of what it meant to be an American – embodied by notions of republican citizenship in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and democratic citizenship in the twentieth – in both eras the quest for broad political consensus rendered “Americanism” vapid, incoherent, or reactionary. Thus, the chapter argues the nation’s educators faced the dilemma of encouraging vital membership in a political body that eschewed their efforts. While the same dynamics continue today, the chapter concludes with lessons drawn from these earlier paradigms of civic education.

Keywords

Civics · Citizenship · Social studies · History · Culture wars

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Introduction

Civic education in the United States has from the beginning been beset by the contradictions of national exceptionalism. Training a unified and active citizenry took on outsized significance in a democratic republic, where each community member was expected to vote, deliberate on public matters, stand for office, and defend the interests of the whole. Yet thorny questions arose, both about the composition of that citizenry and its relationship to the nation's founding ideals. For example, how could the commitment to universal rights in the Declaration of Independence and Constitution accommodate the enslavement and exploitation of Africans, the theft of indigenous peoples' land, the subordination and disenfranchisement of women, or widening gaps of wealth and political power among freeholders? In a nation of immigrants, what constituted "American" culture? Did civics require the amalgamation of a "melting pot" and the abandonment of foreign heritage, or could it admit pluralism and hyphenated identities? Did political engagement require an adulatory or critical stance toward the nation's history and government? Was it a matter of preserving the legacy of the Founders, gradually expanding their ideals, or overcoming foundational injustices through moral confrontation and radical change? And how was one to do any of this in ways that sparked children's imaginations and won their loyalty? The following chapter both outlines and discusses how these dilemmas have produced cycles of reform in American civics. Continuing from the eighteenth century to the present, the chapter argues that Americans have experimented with dynamic approaches to civic education (from a variety of disciplinary and philosophical perspectives) only to abandon them as too divisive, confining most schools to unobjectionable, uninspiring, and inaccurate portrayals of citizenship. First, the chapter discusses the republican vision of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century educators, which emphasized individual duty, emotion, and moral character in preserving liberty and the common good. Next, it explores the emergence of social studies during the early twentieth century, which by taking a structural approach to social relations introduced a variety of critical perspectives on the nation's history and government. While these approaches stood in contrast, to be sure, the chapter argues that neither was implemented with sufficient fidelity to realize its promise. Rather, faced with pressure from organized political interests – and often taking a dim view of their students' intellectual capacities – schools backpedaled from any philosophically coherent approach to citizenship education. Finally, the chapter extends these lessons to the present, arguing that educators have tried to sidestep cultural conflicts by deemphasizing facts in favor of skills but, in the process, have lost the political goals that underlaid earlier reforms and, ultimately, are foundational to any civic education program.

Civic Republicanism in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Schools

In the wake of the American Revolution, the nation's leaders were understandably concerned with the education of citizens – as opposed to gentlemen or royal subjects, as earlier generations had been – and they spent a great deal of effort promoting

systems of public schooling, to be financed and governed by a combination of local and state agencies, culminating in a national university. These plans drew heavily from Plato's *Republic*, imagining schools that would instill virtue, cultivate loyalty to the state, and promote a nonhereditary ruling class. Benjamin Rush, a signer of the Declaration of Independence, famously wrote that proper civic education would "convert men into republican machines," while the author and editor Noah Webster envisioned a society so patriotic that "the first word [an infant] lisps [would] be Washington" (Johnson 1987; Justice 2013; Koganzon 2012; Moroney 1999; Pangle and Pangle 1993). Many wanted education to be available not only to men but to those who would rear them, a vision of "republican motherhood" that excited young women aspiring to full citizenship themselves (Nash 2005). All of these proposals for public schools failed, however, as voters rejected the taxes and centralized government necessary to sustain them. Most states maintained ad hoc educational provisions for another 50 years.

While the republican vision did not systematize American educational governance, it did suffuse the curriculum of colleges, academies, and one-room schoolhouses during the early nineteenth century. One sees its impact clearly in the books and materials published for students. Older, heavily religious texts (such as the *New England Primer*) and anthologies of European literature (such as Lindley Murray's *English Reader*) gave way to textbooks with explicit patriotic themes. Noah Webster's blue-backed spellers introduced American spellings of common words (Lepore 2002), for instance, while Emma Willard's geography lessons encouraged students to draw maps as a way of learning (and loving) national and state borders (Schulten 2017; Balmforth 2019). Civics also snuck into math and science lessons, which used American landmarks and the names of Founding Fathers in word problems (Cohen 1982). History and literature textbooks were the most explicit, presenting patriotic figures as moral exemplars for students, albeit with different shades of meaning as the nineteenth century progressed. At first, students were encouraged to ponder the actions of great men and, in keeping with the era's culture of self-improvement, to pattern their own lives after them. In his widely read *History of the United States of America*, the Reverend Charles Goodrich (1827) advised readers occasionally "to pause in our history, and consider what instruction may be drawn from the portion of it that has been perused." In the story of Columbus, for instance:

we are introduced to a man of genius, energy, and enterprise. We see him forming a new, and in that age, a mighty project; and having matured his plan, we see him set himself vigorously about its execution. For a time, he is either treated as a visionary, or baffled by opposition. But, neither discouraged nor dejected, he steadily pursues his purpose, surmounts every obstacle. . . . While we admire the lofty qualities of Columbus, and look with wonder at the consequences which have resulted from his discovery, let us emulate his decision, energy, and perseverance. Many are the occasions on which it will be important to summon these to our aid; and by their means, many useful objects may be accomplished, which without them, would be unattained. (1827, p. 17)

Passages like this one called for active deliberation, which in turn required an evenhanded presentation of historical facts and produced more nuanced depictions of the Revolution, Indian wars, and other sensitive topics than one might expect from

early American textbooks. By midcentury, however, the rise of publicly funded schools and Catholic immigration seemed to necessitate a more prescriptive patriotism, with blander forms of moralization and passive hero-worship (Nash 2009; Elson 1964). *McGuffey's Reader*, popular from the 1830s to the 1890s, became the source of many patriotic myths – such as the anecdote about young George Washington cutting down a cherry tree – which were easily digestible but demanded little in the way of moral discernment (Neem 2018). Because these stories were more attentive to children's imaginations and the dictates of public opinion than they were to historical accuracy, critics sometimes questioned their claims to authority. Indeed, some authors themselves wondered whether these stories oversimplified the past and implicitly deceived children about the nation's complex origins (Knupfer 2019; Pfitzer 2014). Samuel Goodrich, Charles's brother and the author of the popular *Peter Parley* series of textbooks, came to consider himself “nothing better than a falsifier of history, one who had relied too heavily on the ‘fictive or merely imaginable’” (Pfitzer 2014, p. 43). The tradeoffs confronting nineteenth-century civics, then, were the same confronting mass education as a whole: cultural and curricular standardization not only enshrined white Protestant norms but inhibited serious consideration of their merits, laying the groundwork for an unreflective, superficial conception of American identity, what the twentieth-century philosopher Alisdair MacIntyre (1991) would describe as “counterfeit virtue.”

Probably the most divisive question facing nineteenth-century textbooks was slavery, an issue that touched directly on the nation's civic ideals and could hardly be avoided in its curriculum. As Paula Connolly (2013) observes, between the turn of the nineteenth century and the Civil War, there were a variety of abolitionist sentiments presented in history and literature textbooks, beginning with Noah Webster's *Little Reader's Assistant* (1790), which included excerpts about the horrors of the Middle Passage and the ways in which white overseers mistreated enslaved Africans. As the issue gained traction, abolitionists released more specialized titles for children, such as *The Youth Emancipator* (1842), *The Anti-Slavery Alphabet* (1847), and *The Young Abolitionists* (1848). Pro-slavery Southerners and their sympathizers responded with books of their own, which foregrounded pastoral plantation scenes, with contented slaves and kind masters. Books with the largest market share tried to find a middle path between these opposing depictions. In the *Peter Parley* books, Samuel Goodrich focused his criticism on slave societies overseas or on the trans-Atlantic slave trade (outlawed since 1807) rather than on the ongoing regime of racial violence and oppression within the United States. Of his own country, Goodrich wrote, “No doubt many good people...have slaves. But slavery is a bad system” (cited in Connolly 2013, p. 38). That position satisfied no one and became increasingly untenable as the question of slavery pushed the country toward civil war.

The tension between ideals of republican citizenship and realities of social injustice was poignantly expressed not only in textbooks but through classroom oratory, which had long been an ornament of liberal education but took on newfound importance as a form of civic participation (Reese 2013). Recitation, speechmaking, debate, and affective gestures were necessary pedagogical techniques in classrooms

lacking uniform textbooks; more than that, however, they were vital skills for participation in the public sphere, in which speakers were expected to persuade and inspire their fellow citizens. For both reasons, the study and practice of oratory became integral to the curriculum (Eastman 2010; Neem 2017; Ong 1974), often taking the form of patriotic speeches, such as Patrick Henry's address to the Virginia House of Burgesses, or poetic renderings of national myths, such as Longfellow's "The Midnight Ride of Paul Revere" or "The Song of Hiawatha," which remained cornerstones of the curriculum for a century thereafter (Rubin 2007). So thoroughly was rhetorical eloquence associated with citizenship that, in an era when expanding the rights of white men meant subordinating the rights of others, republican oratory became a means for diverse groups, including women, African Americans, and Native Americans, to appeal for full citizenship through their own graduation speeches, poems, and essays (Eastman 2010; Moss 2009; Snyder 2017).

These appeals rarely succeeded – indeed, as Carolyn Eastman (2010) points out, schoolchildren were romantically eulogizing Native Americans even before Indian removal policies began – but they underscore two important lessons about nineteenth-century civics. First, insofar as republicanism was the era's animating educational idea, its tenets bounded debates about citizenship and education. Moral development and academic knowledge remained the expected outcomes of schooling, but they were always framed in terms of duty and the national creed. Ethnic or religious minorities could invoke republican virtue to gain access to schools and secure inclusion in the political community – and could accuse opponents of conceiving of republicanism too narrowly – but in doing so they had to reaffirm notions of American exceptionalism and individual excellence. Demanding that the nation live up to its ideals and honor the dignity and contributions of all members of society did nothing to question the basis of American citizenship or the possibility of a common culture, meaning that even progressive voices during the nineteenth century were not "critical" or "multicultural" in the current sense of those words. As the historian Jonathan Zimmerman (2002) observes, the same trend continues to the present: campaigns to reform history courses have often been less interested in challenging the myth of American benevolence than incorporating diversity into existing, triumphalist narratives.

The second lesson is that, while subsequent generations have enshrined nineteenth-century civics as an inviolable *status quo ante* – an object of innocence and nostalgia standing in stark contrast to contemporary "culture wars" – in fact the subject had always been contested, always in flux, with sharp questions even at the time about its portrayal of national heroes, white supremacy, and historical truth. Since the late 1950s, it has been fashionable for Christian homeschoolers and others to use reprints of the *McGuffey's Readers* instead of modern textbooks in history or American government. For conservative parents, these books derive authority from their age: written shortly after the events they describe and presumably before professional educators and historians could pervert the narrative, parents assume that they reveal truths about American history that were once known and agreed upon. "Because they are reprints from an earlier time," writes one mother, "I trust them to be more accurate than most of today's revised history books" (Pfitzer

2014, p. 9). That is utter nonsense. One can find political bias and many other shortcomings in contemporary textbooks, but to assume that they are less accurate than nineteenth-century texts reflects a profound misunderstanding of both eras. Acknowledging the complicated origins of the United States – and of citizenship education itself – neither invalidates nor endorses any particular ideological position, but it does force contemporary critics to refine their lines of argument. For the same reason that homeschoolers should engage with modern historical scholarship, modern educators should take time to consider nineteenth-century texts, not as objective renderings of the past or pillars of ideological orthodoxy, nor as outdated and oversimplified fictions to be scorned, but precisely for their moments of contradiction, blindness, and unexpected complexity, which can reveal truths both gained and lost in the century since. Americans should abandon the myths, racism, and assumptions of progress that structured nineteenth century schoolbooks, but would do well to remember the spirit of honor and duty to which they aspired.

Democracy and Social Science in the Twentieth-Century Classroom

By the turn of the twentieth century, new developments were reshaping civics education along lines that remain recognizable today. Immigration reached its apex during this era, with newcomers arriving from Eastern and Southern Europe, the Caribbean, and East Asia. Just as Catholic immigration had rallied support for (implicitly Protestant) common schools during the mid-nineteenth century, the influx of new languages, religions, and customs renewed calls for assimilation and explicit nationalism (Curren and Dorn 2018). These had significant implications for the teaching of civics. For example, there was a dramatic expansion of patriotic displays in the classroom, especially of American flags, which not only hung from the wall but adorned everything from pencil cases to lunchboxes (Schaefer-Jacobs 2017). In 1892, Francis Bellamy introduced the Pledge of Allegiance, which classes stood and recited at the beginning of the school day. The pledge was originally performed with the Roman salute – extending one’s arm at an upward angle, palm-down – but most schools shifted to the hand-on-the-heart gesture with the rise of Nazism in the 1930s. During World War I and World War II, several states passed laws compelling all students to say the pledge, violating the tenets of some Christian sects, which refused to swear oaths or pledge loyalty to the state. For their principled noncompliance, children from Jehovah’s Witness families were harassed and expelled from school. The judiciary at first upheld these mandatory pledge policies. In *Minersville School District v. Gobitis* (1940), the Supreme Court ruled that the pledge served a legitimate interest by “[promoting] in the minds of children who attend the common schools an attachment to the institutions of their country,” and that issues of citizenship training were ultimately under the purview of state legislature and local school boards rather than the federal government. Three years later, however, the Court reversed course with *West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette* (1943). “To believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic ceremonies are

voluntary and spontaneous instead of a compulsory routine is to make an unflattering estimate of the appeal of our institutions to free minds,” wrote Justice Felix Frankfurter. He continued:

We can have intellectual individualism and the rich cultural diversities that we owe to exceptional minds only at the price of occasional eccentricity and abnormal attitudes. When they are so harmless to others or to the State as those we deal with here, the price is not too great. But freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. . . . If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. (1943, p. 624)

The *Barnette* decision marked the Court’s first recognition that children have rights of speech and conscience in school, characterizing children as citizens and reminding schools of their duty not merely to local preference but to broader forms of national citizenship (Driver 2018). The same logic would underwrite civil rights cases from the 1950s to the 1980s – though despite their highflying rhetoric, courts continued to constrain students’ rights with a deference to order, local democracy, and a paternalistic view of education (Schumaker 2019).

Although their ideas did not take hold immediately, and one should not overstate the efficacy of either the old regime or the new, progressive educational reformers also introduced radically new conceptions of civic education at the turn of the century (Cuban 1993; Wineburg 2004). In 1916, the National Education Association Committee on Social Studies, led by the sociologist Thomas Jesse Jones, proposed a new, interdisciplinary approach to citizenship, with less emphasis on emulation and memorization and more on student interest, participation, and inquiry. Rather than conceiving of citizenship as the cultivation of individual character, social studies now emphasized collective responsibilities. This change became evident in the community civics movement and its “expanding circles” approach, in which children first learned about membership in their families, before turning to school, local, national, and international communities as they aged (Fallace 2011). Rather than imparting prescriptive lessons in patriotism, social studies also presented American government as a work in progress, with shortcomings to be investigated and solved, as suggested by the “Problems of Democracy” courses that swept the nation’s middle and high schools by midcentury (Evans 2004; Fallace 2018; Kliebard 2004). These changes corresponded with developments in associated academic disciplines. The professionalization of historical research during this period led to a new emphasis on interpretive frameworks, such as Frederick Jackson Turner’s “frontier thesis,” which ascribed America’s democratic legacy to the availability of land and questioned the viability of an increasingly urban society; and to critical approaches, such as Charles Beard’s analysis of the American constitution as a bulwark for monied interests. Studies like these signaled a shift from history as an exercise in antiquarianism or moral development to a recognition of its relevance in the present and from a narrow focus on military and political events to a more holistic understanding of social processes (Brown 2009).

While scholars have long associated the professionalization of history and education, respectively, with widening a gap between historians and schoolteachers, there was an ongoing exchange between their professional organizations through at least the 1940s (Tyrrell 2005). The shift from history to social studies also incorporated insights from newly formed social sciences, including sociology, anthropology, psychology, and economics, which were not only incorporated as high school electives but introduced new approaches to culture and political-economic systems throughout the curriculum (Burkholder 2011). Finally, social studies reflected the rise of education itself as a field of study. Following the writings of John Dewey and others, and eager to change the perception that public education was merely preparation for college enrollment, educators decentered academic disciplines as ends unto themselves and instead prioritized the child's experience of the world and the classroom community as organizing pedagogical principles (Kliebard 2004; Zilversmit 1993). Replacing history with social studies was perhaps their greatest success in transforming the traditional course of study.

The implicit critical bent of social studies produced a variety of liberal and even radical approaches. Following World War I, there was a concerted effort at peace education and international cooperation, with goodwill tours, foreign exchange programs, and model United Nations programs introduced in middle and high schools through subsequent decades (Borgwardt 2005; Bu 2003; Osborne 2016; Scribner 2017; Threlkeld 2017.) Starting in the 1920s, the educator Rachel Davis DuBois introduced a "cultural gifts" curriculum, in which students produced pageants honoring the heritage and contributions of African Americans, Native Americans, and immigrants, the first serious attempt at multiculturalism in the public schools (Selig 2008). At the same time, the historian Carter G. Woodson introduced Negro History Week, an outgrowth of the Harlem Renaissance and the "New Negro" movement, which corrected the erasure of African American accomplishment with lessons dedicated to black history and culture (Burkholder 2011; Givens 2019; Zimmerman 2002). During the economic crisis of the 1930s, social reconstruction theorists like George Counts, John Childs, and Harold Rugg transformed social studies into an explicitly Marxist – and potentially indoctrinatory – unmasking of capitalism, militarism, and racism in American society (Evans 2004; Fallace 2018; Hartman 2008). Less prominent but also present were the activist lessons of Communist and socialist groups, implemented in a range of clubs, study groups, scouting programs, and summer camps, which also sought to unmask the political and economic underpinnings of public education (Haas 2018; Mickenberg 2005; Mishler 1999).

Although social studies courses may have been more inclined to critical interpretations than earlier forms of civic education, they also suffered from contemporary prejudices. For progressive educators, much of the attachment to participatory democracy relied on idealized visions of small-town life, with an implicit endorsement of white, Protestant norms (Perlstein 2016). Likewise, many of their lessons on cultural difference remained grounded in nineteenth-century notions of social development, in which entire cultures were arrayed on a continuum from "savagery" to "civilization," or in emergent notions of biological difference, which questioned the mental and moral fitness of immigrants, ethnic minorities, and the poor. According to

either reading, marginalized groups seemed to lack capacity for full or immediate citizenship. Even well-intentioned reforms, such as the “cultural gifts” movement, traded in tokenism and cultural essentialism, praising the same ethnic stereotypes that others criticized. As with vague terms like “democracy” and “social efficiency,” a common language around “primitive” cultures admitted a variety of usages, from the literal and nakedly racist to the metaphorical and fairly progressive, but it is the certainly the case that social studies re-inscribed some of the injustices that reformers hoped to ameliorate (Fallace 2012; Kliebard 2004; Selig 2008).

Also limiting the critical potential of social studies lessons were organized pressure campaigns by nativist groups like the Ku Klux Klan and patriotic organizations like the Daughters of the American Revolution, which, while unsuccessful in attempts to outlaw Catholic education and eliminate foreign-language instruction, managed to introduce indoctrinatory “Americanism” courses in schools nationwide (Erickson 2006). These organizations drew funding and logistical support from an even smaller nexus of business interests – particularly the National Association of Manufacturers, founded in 1895 – and a patchwork of pamphleteers and grassroots auxiliaries, which would spark almost every major curricular controversy from the 1910s to the 1980s, most famously the rollback of Harold Rugg’s textbooks during the 1930s and 1940s (Evans 2004; Hartman 2015; Laats 2015; Nickerson 2014; Scribner 2016). Although conservative activism followed fairly narrow lines of influence, one should not ascribe longstanding conflicts over civics education to a shadowy right-wing conspiracy. The important point is the broader cooling effect of these campaigns. Public uproar convinced many teachers, principals, and school boards to avoid any sort of controversy, ensuring that social studies lost much of its critical bent and became a vehicle for vacuous platitudes, nonacademic life skills, and disjointed historical facts. As it had during the nineteenth century, citizenship training floundered when subjected to the democratic politics of mass institutions.

By the late 1950s, Cold War pressures overseas and burgeoning civil rights campaigns at home made the vapidness of mid-century civics seem unacceptable. Congress passed the National Defense Education Act (1958) following the launch of the Sputnik satellite, providing federal funds for curricular development in strategically important areas. A team of developmental psychologists and disciplinary experts leveraged these resources at the Woods Hole Conference, where, led by Jerome Bruner, they applied scientific methods, constructivist pedagogy, and systems-based thinking to dramatically reconceptualize the math and science curriculum. By the mid-1960s, their approaches had spread to social studies, producing an approach that the education scholar Edwin Fenton (1967) called the “new social studies.” There was much to praise in this work. Like Progressive-era reforms, the new social studies was inquiry-based, channeling student interest into rigorous research projects. It imbued history and politics with new developments in geography, anthropology, and psychology and encouraged multicultural perspectives, including racially diverse authors and comparative perspectives on foreign cultures. These reforms reached an apex with *Man: A Course of Study* (MACOS), a broadly humanistic curriculum that appeared during the early 1970s (Dow 1991; Evans 2011).

Unfortunately, the same academic expertise that made the new social studies appealing to curriculum reformers handicapped its implementation in schools and obscured some very real shortcomings. Designed by academics at elite institutions with little cooperation from teachers in the field, much of the material remained remote from the local context of schools. Meanwhile, the rigor of applied research required training and resources that many schools lacked. The new social studies were also beset by broader Cold War contradictions. Equating citizenship with critical thinking proved insufficiently patriotic for conservative groups, who launched waves of protests to ensure that discussions of Communism, world affairs, and American government remained more or less indoctrinatory. From the other end of the spectrum, teachers and students, invigorated by the program's methods, worried that its thinking was not critical enough and questioned its implicit faith in science, expertise, and liberal democracy in the face of the Vietnam War and racial injustice at home. While the new social studies provided an intellectual framework for debate, it lacked the activist bent that the era seemed to demand (Scribner 2012). A final critique, perhaps clearest in hindsight, was the way that the era's systems-based mindset promoted some disciplinary norms while undercutting others. Applying deductive logic and comparative perspectives to social problems encouraged questions, discussion, and evidence-based conclusions – all important elements of citizenship – but often did so without particular attention to the content under consideration. Many lessons were based on abstractions and typologies – for instance, teaching about the relationship between geography and economics with maps of imaginary countries – and emphasized transferrable knowledge rather than the incommensurable ways that historians, anthropologists, or others approached their subjects (Heyck 2015).

Conclusion

This chapter has outlined the central dilemma of civics education in the United States: namely, the nation's inability to reconcile competing calls for unity and diversity, facts and imagination, or criticism and patriotism. These divides are not static; they have been taken up by innumerable political and social movements across nation's history. Yet they seem to be intractable. For a nation whose political rhetoric and mythology stresses the importance of public deliberation, the United States rarely tests the vitality of its civic education programs. Broad consensus has emerged around dynamic visions of citizenship – republican duty in the nineteenth century, democratic activism in the twentieth – but these visions have usually regressed to bland platitudes at the first sign of controversy or challenge. Intent on preserving public legitimacy, public schools have avoided any serious reckoning about the meaning of being an American.

The same sort of avoidance has persisted since the 1970s. Civic educators have continued in the critical-thinking paradigm of the new social studies, addressing some criticisms that dogged that program but merely subordinating others. Attention to academically rigorous work has aligned well with the accountability regime and

attempts to professionalize teaching, and state curricular standards have codified general expectations for social studies and government classes. However, following a contentious debate around national history standards in 1994, in which recommendations for more multicultural representation were denounced as “political correctness” and met with unanimous condemnation in the United States Senate, social studies standards have noticeably shifted from *content* to *skills*, mandating general knowledge of government but omitting any specific references to historical figures or concepts that might be politically divisive. Academic rigor has become even more closely tied to disciplinary inquiry. Encouraging students to *do* history, for example, acknowledges the unique ways in which historians interpret the past, while at the same time honoring educators’ broader commitments to active learning, critical thinking, and joint deliberation (Levstik and Barton 2015; Wineburg 2001). This approach, too, emphasizes skills over content and, by sidestepping public controversy, has enabled the development of de facto national standards, appearing briefly in the English Language Arts section of the Common Core Standards, and more fully in the College, Career, and Civic Life (C3) Standards (2018), developed by the National Council for the Social Studies and other groups.

From a purely pedagogical standpoint, there is much to praise in recent developments, which have undoubtedly rationalized the social studies curriculum and perhaps improved children’s powers of discernment. As training for citizenship, however, contemporary reforms leave much to be desired. From the Left, one could criticize them for being insufficiently political, unwilling to subject structures of power and inequality to serious scrutiny, as social studies reformers did during the early twentieth century, and encouraging only shallow forms of participation and activism. From the Right, one could question whether critical thinking skills adequately ground students in the particular virtues of the American political tradition, and more so whether they instill the values of *pathos*, duty, or character to which nineteenth-century educators aspired. These criticisms draw from different ideological positions, of course, but both suggest that citizenship is more than a set of skills; it is a way of being. Authentic commitment to a just society requires both affective engagement to the body politic and a willingness to engage the difficult questions from which American civics has so regularly retreated.

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Towards an Education for Active Citizenship in Singapore

32

Siva Gopal Thaiyalan

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Abstract

Citizenship education, in its various forms, has always been given prominence in Singapore's education since its self-governance in 1959. In recent years, the Singapore government has increasingly drawn on notions of "active citizenship" in educational policies. This chapter examines this recent pursuit of active citizenship by the Singapore government, particularly since 2011 which marked the "student-centric, values-driven" phase in Singapore's ongoing journey of educational transformation. This pursuit is analyzed against literature on active citizenship and in consideration of Singapore's social, political, and economic context. As a result, three contradictions are identified in the conceptions of active citizenship as articulated in Singapore's educational policies and programs in

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Singapore. The chapter concludes with three recommendations to harmonize these contradictions in order to advance towards educating young Singaporeans as active citizens.

Keywords

Singapore · Active citizenship · Citizenship education · Confucian-inspired ideology · Twenty-first-century competencies

Introduction

Singapore is a small nation-state that has transformed itself into a First World economy within the three decades since its independence (Sim 2015). This unprecedented feat is widely attributed to a strong state governance (Sim et al. 2017). Singapore is founded on democratic ideals, but its political leadership has been critiqued as being authoritative, hegemonic, and elitist in its approach to citizenship (Han 2015; Lim 2016; Sim 2015). The ruling party in Singapore, the People's Action Party (henceforth, "the government"), has been in power continuously since Singapore's self-governance began in 1959 and has benefited from a remarkable political legitimacy resulting from a successful social and economic transformation within a short span, despite prevalent socio-political instability in the region. The government, through the strong hold of single-party rule, has been lauded for delivering economic success and material well-being to its citizen, who enjoys one of the highest standards of living in the world (Sim et al. 2017; Tan 2017). Similarly, the approach to nurturing of young Singaporean citizens has consistently prioritized a neoliberal agenda – that is to contribute to this enduring economic success (Tan 2017).

At the same time, the government's Confucian-influenced political ideology has been critiqued for the limits to democracy it has also imposed, where the government believes that citizens can and should sacrifice certain socio-political freedoms in exchange for this the country's survival and economic prosperity (Sim and Krishnasamy 2016). Consequently, Singapore has nurtured a delimited civil society, and the ways that citizens can participate in it are constrained and controlled by the government. For example, political participation is largely limited to voting, volunteerism, and voicing opinions through official channels (Han 2015; Sim et al. 2017). Such forms of citizenship are not characteristics of active citizenship, in which citizens are characterized as embodying a justice orientation, seeking to identify and address inequalities in society (Wood et al. 2013).

With this as a background, this chapter explores how Singapore is pursuing more active forms of citizenship in recent years, amidst its ongoing efforts of educational transformation. This chapter firstly examines conceptions of active citizenship in the literature. This is followed by a brief political background of Singapore which sets the context for the conceptions, and evolution, of citizenship and citizenship education in Singapore. A critique of three contradictions emerges as a result of an analysis of the pursuit of active citizenship in Singapore, and the chapter concludes with three suggestions to harmonize these contradictions.

Conceptions of Active Citizenship

Citizenship is a contested concept; there is no single definition because its meaning varies according to social, political, and economic contexts and reflects different historical legacies (Lister 2008). Despite this contested nature, citizenship has traditionally been expressed as a legal status, particularly of the nation-state, and is encapsulated in British sociologist T. H. Marshall's (1950) well-known definition from his essay *Citizenship and Social Class*: "a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed" (pp. 28–29). Marshall's (1950) conception of citizenship highlights the roots of a debate within citizenship studies. It has been argued that Marshall's conception reduces citizenship to taking ownership of rights and being active in the formal and public worlds; there is little focus on an individual's experiences with citizenship in their personal and private lives. Moreover, little attention is given to relationships among citizens in creating a better society; instead, the main relationship that is acknowledged is between the state and person and a top-down conception of citizenship from the state to citizens through rights.

In a stark departure from Marshall's conception of citizenship, more recent conceptions of citizenship and citizenship education, however, have focused on young people participating as *active* citizens. This is fuelled by growing concerns about perceived civic deficit and apathy among young citizens, hence leading to increasing prioritization by politicians and education policymakers in many countries in wanting to nurture young people to be active citizens (Jochum et al. 2005; Kallio and Häkli 2013; Nelson and Kerr 2006; Ross 2012). Similar to the contested conceptions of citizenship itself, the idea of active citizenship, too, is not clearly understood or well defined, particularly around its meaning and theoretical foundations (Nelson and Kerr 2006). This poses a challenge in analyzing conceptions of active citizenship.

Despite the lack of clarity over conceptions of active citizenship, the notion of active citizenship used within this chapter is drawn from the work of McLaughlin (1992) and Westheimer and Kahne (2004b). McLaughlin (1992) conceived of citizenship on a continuum from *minimal* to *maximal* interpretations. In a minimal interpretation, citizenship is defined narrowly in "formal, legal and juridical terms" (McLaughlin 1992, p. 236). Citizenship education at this end of the continuum is characterized by narrow and formal approaches that are didactic, dialogic to a limited degree, and strongly focused on formal assessment (Sim et al. 2017). In the maximal interpretation, citizenship is more broadly inclusive of groups and interests in society. Citizenship education at this end of the spectrum reflects a broad range of interactive and participatory approaches. There is a primary focus on nurturing students to "understand and enhance their capacity to participate as citizens" (Sim et al. 2017, p. 93).

Westheimer and Kahne (2004b), on the other hand, developed a three-part typology – namely, personally responsible, participatory and justice-oriented citizens – to describe and analyze the kinds of citizens that policies and programs aim to nurture. Personally responsible citizens are those who act responsibly in their

community, for example, by volunteering or participating in recycling programs. Such citizens are honest, law-abiding, and responsible; for example, they pay their taxes. Participatory citizens play different kinds of active roles in the community by leading and organizing community efforts to care for those in need. In this way, they are actively participating, by taking leadership roles within established systems and community structures. Justice-oriented citizens are associated with questioning, debating, and changing established systems and structures that reproduce patterns of injustice over time. Such citizens critically assess social, political, and economic structures to see beyond surface causes, seek out, and address areas of injustice and have knowledge about democratic social movements and how to effect systemic changes (Westheimer and Kahne 2004b).


Wood et al. (2013) have provided a unifying framework of conceptions of citizenship participation of both McLaughlin (1992) and Westheimer and Kahne (2004b), summarized in Table 1, which is useful in considering the merits of these two conceptions of active citizens through comparison.

In this framework, “minimal citizenship” equates with the “personally responsible citizen,” who is law-abiding and community minded, and participates in conventional citizenship activities such as voting and helping others. The “justice-oriented citizen,” who can be placed at the “maximal citizenship” end of the continuum, is one who is involved in “social change citizenship” (Nelson and Kerr 2006) and “political action” (Thomson and Holdsworth 2003). Typical activities include initiating petitions and protesting against political injustice. The “participatory citizen,” in the middle of the continuum, is one who is involved in volunteering, fundraising for social causes, and working with the community to improve society (Westheimer and Kahne 2004b).

Drawing on the conceptions of active citizenship in this framework, active citizenship in this chapter is then understood as one that involves a critical disposition that embodies a justice orientation and seeks to identify and address inequalities in society. Such a conception of active citizenship leans towards the maximal or justice-oriented citizenship end of the continuum in the framework of citizenship in Table 1.

While this understanding of active citizenship is helpful for describing and analyzing the nature of active citizenship, it is insufficiently nuanced for the specific context of Singapore for three reasons. Firstly, Westheimer and Kahne’s (2004b) conception of a “personally responsible citizen” can be interpreted differently in

Table 1 Framework of citizenship participation

Nature of citizenship (McLaughlin 1992)	Kinds of citizens (Westheimer and Kahne 2004b)
Minimal citizenship  Maximal citizenship	Personally responsible citizens
	Participatory citizens
	Justice-oriented citizens

Source: Wood et al. (2013, p. 86)

Singapore's context. For example, in a study of Singapore social studies teachers' understanding of citizenship by Sim and Chow (2019), it emerged that Singaporean teachers understand "participatory citizenship" as volunteerism, underpinned by relationality in the context of the wider community. This is a different conception of volunteerism than the one in Westheimer and Kahne's (2004b) framework, which is linked to a character trait of personally responsible actions, and not concerned with relationality in wider social contexts. Sim and Chow pointed out that volunteerism, as conceived in Singapore's citizenship, is a relational understanding that is particularly rooted in relationships with others. This involves individuals cultivating personal dispositions that allow them to relate with sensitivity and reciprocity to others, a pattern of behavior expanding out towards shaping humane relationships in wider community relations.

Secondly, ideas such as involvement in "democratic social movements" as described in Westheimer and Kahne's (2004b) "justice-oriented citizenship" are a common feature in the citizenship education discourse in Singapore. This is because of the government's beliefs that limits to democracy are necessary for Singapore's survival and prosperity, leading to citizens' participation in civil society being constrained and controlled, and dissent and activism discouraged (Sim et al. 2017). Sim et al. (2017) and Han (2015) have argued that this is consistent with how active participation is promoted, understood, and accepted in Singapore. They argued that, unlike other democratic nations, there are clear out-of-bounds markers as to what is legal and permissible social action and political participation. Further, the term "justice" does not feature in the Singaporean citizenship narrative.

Thirdly, the continuum from *minimal* to *maximal* interpretations of citizenship, as conceptualized by McLaughlin (1992), arguably represents a narrow conception of citizenship that overlooks the diverse everyday experiences with citizenship within specific social, political, and economic contexts (Wood 2014). As discussed earlier, citizenship remains a contested and complex concept that cannot be understood or practiced in a simple or straightforward manner because it can hold different meanings for different people, even within the same state (Faulks 2000; Kymlicka 2002). Similarly a simplistic continuum or typology will not be sufficient in capturing ideas of citizenship that are influenced by social, political, and economic contexts in Singapore, and elsewhere.

Together, these three factors made it an imperative to examine the social, political, and economic context of Singapore in order to understand its conceptions of citizenship and citizenship education.

Confucian-Inspired Ideology and Conceptions of Citizenship in Singapore

Singapore's political ideology, although not declared as an official policy, is undergirded by a Confucian-inspired pragmatism, in which individuals, communities, and the state share responsibilities and benefits (Gopinathan 2015). This Confucian-influenced pragmatism underpins social and education policies as

mechanisms to propagate a vision of a strong national identity, including attention to how Singaporeans learn their roles and responsibilities within the nation and global community (Lim 2016). This political ideology is manifested and communicated to Singaporean citizens through education, particularly in citizenship education, using what is commonly known as the Singapore Shared Values (Lim 2015). The five values espoused are societal over individual rights, nation before community, community before family, family before self, family as the basic building block of society, consensus instead of contention as a way of resolving issues, and racial and religious tolerance and harmony (► Chap. 35, ““Being Rooted, Living Global”: Citizenship and Education in the Singapore City-State”).

By drawing from the ideals of Confucian-inspired ideology, the government has justified the delimiting of democracy and the maintenance of a dominant, one-party rule as the philosophical origin of the country’s economic success, and prides itself as having constructed a unique model of an Asian democracy (Tan 2017). The government has adopted an attitude that the economic ends justify the means in making political decisions, without much room for alternative forms of analysis (Tan 2017). While Singaporeans generally trust and accept this approach, it has created the conditions for political obedience, acceptance of unpopular policies, and political apathy (Tan 2017). In essence, it has been argued that Singapore’s meteoric economic success has been built upon on a strong state but weak civil society, characterized by passive, responsible, and rule-following citizens (Gopinathan and Sharpe 2004). Also, the government’s paternalistic attitude of governance through which it takes responsibility for “taking care of its people” is characteristic of a Confucian ideology, extending the metaphor of the ideal Confucian family to the state (Lim 2016, p. 716). However, these pragmatic policies have also been credited for an increasingly disengaged citizenship characterized as “self-centered” and “materialistic,” who generally tend to uncritically agree with the government (Sim 2011, p. 225). It can be argued that Singapore’s political ideology, therefore, has promoted a more “passive” form of citizenship, rather than active citizenship as referenced in Table 1.

Citizenship Education in Singapore

This outline of the political ideology of the Singapore government provides an important context for the conceptualization of citizenship education in Singapore. In keeping with the strong hold of the government, education, including citizenship education, in Singapore is highly centralized, with a strong emphasis on academic achievement (► Chap. 35, ““Being Rooted, Living Global”: Citizenship and Education in the Singapore City-State”; Han 2015). At the same time, the structures, processes, and outcomes of education have a strong neoliberal influence, intended to serve the economy success of Singapore (Gopinathan 2007). The Ministry of Education provides a prescribed curriculum, controls curricular material, administers national exams, employs and deploys teachers, and fully funds all public schools. Pre-service and in-service teacher education is also largely centralized through one

institution, the National Institute of Education (► Chap. 35, ““Being Rooted, Living Global”: Citizenship and Education in the Singapore City-State”; Sim 2011). Gopinathan (2007) argued that the government has effectively utilized education policies to legitimize its economic focus and has played an interventionist role in the school curriculum by endorsing the government’s “soft authoritarianism” and its vision of a meritocratic, multicultural, and loyal citizenry (Han 2015). Singapore’s citizenship education has been critiqued as a “state-craft” that propagates the central message of Singapore’s success, particularly about Singapore’s modernization and economic success under the dominant single-party rule (Gopinathan 2012; ► Chap. 35, ““Being Rooted, Living Global”: Citizenship and Education in the Singapore City-State”).

Citizenship education in Singapore largely comprises prescriptive and didactic approaches to teaching values and moral conduct, such as loyalty to the state and prioritizing the “common good” (Han 2015). This represents a minimal form of citizenship when analyzed against the continuum from *minimal* to *maximal* citizenship interpretations by McLaughlin (1992). Through such prescriptive and didactic approaches, the government has used citizenship education to foster a common Singaporean identity in tension with the need to respect racial, religious, and cultural differences. This is particularly notable for a unique multi-ethnic, postcolonial nation-state that does not have the long history, shared traditions, and common language that are characteristic of other nations (► Chap. 35, ““Being Rooted, Living Global”: Citizenship and Education in the Singapore City-State”). Studies have shown that students demonstrate strong affiliation to nationalistic values and that teachers generally do not deviate from the prescribed national curriculum, predominantly relying on curricular material provided by the government (► Chap. 35, ““Being Rooted, Living Global”: Citizenship and Education in the Singapore City-State”). The theoretical underpinning of Singapore’s citizenship education is primarily communitarian, and active citizenship has been associated with contribution to Singapore society through volunteerism, rather than deep engagement with political processes (► Chap. 35, ““Being Rooted, Living Global”: Citizenship and Education in the Singapore City-State”). Active political participation and student activism are strictly discouraged by the government (Han 2015).

Evolution of Citizenship Education

Citizenship education has featured in various forms in Singapore’s education since its self-governance began in 1959, with a primary purpose of contributing to nation-building, and has evolved in response to changing national priorities and the demands of globalization (Deng et al. 2013; Han 2000; Lee 2015). Table 2 summarizes the changes in citizenship education policy and programs in Singapore over time, underpinned by its purpose of instrumentalization for social cohesion and economic success (Gopinathan and Mardiana 2013). This evolution is also explained in further detail by Gopinathan and Chiong (► Chap. 35, ““Being Rooted, Living Global”: Citizenship and Education in the Singapore City-State”), and Sim and


Table 2 Evolution of citizenship education in Singapore

Citizenship education initiatives	Year	Phases of Singapore's education	Characteristics
Ethics	1959	Survival-driven	The two decades since independence were characterized by social cohesion and nation-building
Moral education and civics training	1966		
Education for living (interdisciplinary)	1974	Efficiency-driven	The late 1970s and 1980s were focused on improving the system, with the introduction of standardized curriculum and industry-relevant skills
Review of moral education	1978		
Good citizens (primary)	1981		
Being and becoming (secondary)	1981		
Social studies (primary)	1981		
Religious knowledge	1984		
Civics and moral education	1995	Ability-based, aspiration-driven	With Singapore transitioning into a knowledge-based economy in the late 1990s, there was a shift in focus to developing a broader range of skills, e.g., critical thinking and creativity, and providing for a wider variety of students' interests and aptitudes
National Education	1997		
Social studies (upper secondary)	2001		
Character and citizenship education	2011 onwards	Student-centric, values-driven	The aim was to equip students with values, character and competencies to meet the challenges of the future

References: Kanagaratnam (2015); Lee (2015); Ministry of Education (2012c)

Lee-Tat (► Chap. 48, “The Development of Civic Participation Among Youth in Singapore”) in the other chapters of this handbook.

The most recent of these educational transformations, which is of importance for this chapter, is the “student-centric, values-driven” phase since 2011. This phase marked a response to a changing political landscape in which the ruling party was seen to be losing its grip, and at the same time more young Singaporeans seemed to be increasingly interested in politics, and political participation. It was just prior to this phase that the Ministry of Education also introduced the *Framework for 21st Century Competencies and Student Outcomes* (Ministry of Education 2009) (see Fig. 1). It is also important to note that the introduction of this framework also succeeded the announcement of the *Curriculum 2015 (C2015)* in 2008 which proposed the curriculum, pedagogies, and assessment that was necessary for the twenty-first century, in response to shifts in the global economy (Tan 2013). C2015 imagined that the central purpose of schooling is to nurture a confident person, a self-



Source: Ministry of Education (2009)

Fig. 1 Framework for 21st Century Competencies and Student Outcomes. (Source: Ministry of Education (2009))

directed learner, an active contributor, and a concerned citizen, with a focus on developing the skills and competencies required to live and work in a globalized twenty-first-century world (Deng et al. 2013). This aspiration was presented as the *Framework for 21st Century Competencies and Student Outcomes* produced by Singapore’s Ministry of Education.

The framework sought to develop skills and competencies that would prepare young Singaporeans to face the challenges and seize the opportunities of globalization (► Chap. 35, “‘Being Rooted, Living Global’: Citizenship and Education in the Singapore City-State”). This framework was envisioned to be implemented in more “student-centric” ways, away from traditional and didactic forms of education, and at the same time not deviating from the core values that had been enshrined in Singapore’s education. Lee (2013) argued that C2015, and this framework, was a “future-oriented” approach to citizenship education because it envisioned young citizens as active agents in society – “active with a sense of belonging, active in the sense of being concerned about the society, and active in participating in the co-constructing of a better society together with the state” (p. 256). These educational reforms were indicative of the government’s desire to pursue active citizenship in the wake of globalization.

However, despite the government’s heightened focus on active citizenship, growing concerns about young Singaporeans’ civic deficits and apathy, particularly their self-centered and individualistic nature, have persisted over the years (Han 2015). This has been further exacerbated by the declining rate of volunteerism and civic




Fig. 2 Bathtub effect. (Source: National Volunteer and Philanthropy Centre (2018))

participation beyond the formal schooling years (Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth 2014). At a parliamentary debate in March 2014, it was reported that volunteerism rates were high among young people aged 15 to 19, that is, while they were in school. However, volunteering and civic participation declined sharply in their post-secondary years and as they entered the workforce in their 20s and only picked up again when they were in their early 30s but never at the same rate as before (Kok 2015; Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth 2014; National Volunteer and Philanthropy Centre 2014; Wong 2016) (see notable dip for 25–34-year-olds in Fig. 2). This was described as the “bathtub effect” and gave rise to a pursuit of more active forms of citizenship and led to efforts to engage young people in social participation while they are in school and beyond their post-secondary years (Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth 2014). The concerns about young Singaporean’s civic deficit and apathy provided the impetus for a heightened focus on more active forms of citizenship participation among young people in Singapore, including into their post-secondary years.

Pursuit of More Active Forms of Citizenship

In order to understand the context for the government’s increasing desire to pursue active citizenship, we need to understand the political context of Singapore particularly in 2011 (► Chap. 35, ““Being Rooted, Living Global”: Citizenship and Education in the Singapore City-State”). This was a landmark year as the Prime Minister called on Singaporeans to take up larger and more positive roles in shaping the country’s future and to effect change in the community as active citizens (Prime Minister’s Office 2011). This call to action has to be considered in the context of the aftermath of the 2011 general election in Singapore, which was regarded as a watershed because it was the worst performance for the ruling party since independence (Tan 2017), reflecting a weakened mandate and a party seen by many as out of touch with citizens’ needs and aspirations (Gopinathan and Mardiana 2013). There were clear indications that young Singaporeans had a greater desire for and expectation of political participation, with many using social media to be politically active. This changing political landscape prompted the government to intensify its efforts to

engage its citizens, particularly young Singaporeans (Gopinathan 2012). In this context, a new approach from government was necessary.

The post-2011 election period was also characterized as the “big bang period” of education reform in Singapore (Gopinathan and Mardiana 2013, p. 26). A series of large-scale and systematic educational reforms aimed at promoting a more active citizenry were swiftly implemented (Tan 2013). It was during this time that the Ministry of Education (2011b) also announced a transition of Singapore’s education to the “student-centric, values-driven” phase, discussed earlier. Additionally, while values education had always featured in Singapore’s education system (Han 2000), Character and Citizenship Education (CCE) was given prominence and made central to Singapore’s education system. The then Minister for Education, Mr. Heng Swee Keat, announced these commitments at his inaugural work plan seminar for education officers. The following excerpt from his speech highlights this:

We want to make our education system even more student-centric and sharpen our focus in holistic education – centred on values and character development. We could call this Student-Centric, Values-Driven education. (Ministry of Education 2011b)

This announcement was reflective of a range of policy and organizational changes that represented the government’s commitment to advancing CCE. Importantly, the Minister for Education included these commitments in his speeches from 2011 to 2015. In addition, a new Character and Citizenship Education Branch within the Ministry of Education was established in 2012, aimed to unify the ministry’s various values and citizenship education initiatives, such as Civics and Moral Education and National Education, and to provide a more coherent, current, and responsive CCE curriculum in consultation with schools (Ministry of Education 2011a, b).

Despite its lofty vision and unprecedented attention, the new CCE curriculum remained largely content-oriented, didactic, and textbook-driven (Han 2015). Lessons had a continued focus on the teaching of values, social-emotional competencies, and twenty-first-century skills (see Fig. 1), with little room for truly student-centric learning (Sim et al. 2017). The CCE curriculum was complemented by other subjects such as social studies, history, vernacular language subjects of Chinese, Malay and Tamil, co-curricular activities, and special commemorative events such as Total Defence Day, Racial Harmony Day, International Friendship Day, and National Day. National Education was still seen as an integral part of CCE but remained as a didactic teaching of national values as before (Han 2015; Ministry of Education 2014a, b). CCE also represented a heavy focus on the inculcation of character, evident from its goal to “nurture Singaporean citizens of good character,” and there was also an enduring emphasis on the core values from the previous curriculum – respect, responsibility, integrity, care, resilience and harmony – which formed the basis of good character (Ministry of Education 2014a, b, 2016). Citizenship-related skills in the formal CCE curriculum were limited to community life, national and cultural identity, sociocultural sensitivity and awareness, and global awareness (Han 2015). All of these signaled that while the government had intended to move towards a more student-centric citizenship education, older orientations of didactic teaching of citizenship still persisted. Such forms of citizenship education

continued to focus on “personally responsible citizens” and “participatory citizens,” but “justice-oriented” type of active citizens (Westheimer and Kahne 2004b).

CCE also continued to be centralized, under the control of the Ministry of Education, and provided the government with an important ideological tool to continue to promote nationalistic values such as loyalty, patriotism, a sense of belonging, and a duty to contribute actively to national development (Han 2015; Sim and Krishnasamy 2016). Such an approach to citizenship education focused on nurturing Singaporean citizens of good character who contribute to nation-building in accordance with the government’s vision, as opposed to nurturing young citizens for active citizenship and political participation in a changing democracy (Han 2015).

Two other significant initiatives that were launched in the post-2011 election period that are intended to foster active citizenship among young Singaporeans are the Values in Action program and Youth Corps Singapore (see Table 3), spearheaded by the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth in 2012 and 2013, respectively. These initiatives signaled the government’s desire to engage its young citizens from their schooling years to post formal education as a

Table 3 Summary of Values in Action and Youth Corps Singapore initiatives

Initiatives	Owner	Ages	Aims
Values in Action (VIA)	Ministry of Education	7 years (primary 1) to 17 years (pre-university)	Values in Action (VIA) is learning experiences that support students’ development as socially responsible citizens who contribute meaningfully to the community, through the learning and application of values, knowledge, and skills. VIA fosters student ownership over how they contribute to the community. As part of VIA, students reflect on their experiences, the values they have put into practice, and how they can continue to contribute meaningfully Source: Ministry of Education (2014d)
Youth Corps Singapore (YCS)	Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth	16–35 years (post-secondary)	Youth Corps Singapore promotes volunteerism among young people through organizing volunteering opportunities and service projects as well as a structured youth leadership program. This structured program includes: A structured residential training program An overseas community project in one of the regional countries A community project in Singapore, undertaken in partnership with an existing non-profit organization or community group Source: Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth (2014)

means of addressing concerns about young Singaporeans' civic apathy and the bathtub effect already discussed. The Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth who were in charge of these initiatives pledged to work together to provide continuity and shared experiences for young Singaporeans' citizenship education (National Youth Council 2016a).

Values in Action was formed as part of the new CCE curriculum. It aimed at reframing the former Community Involvement Programme (CIP) to place a greater emphasis on values education through young people's formal and mandatory volunteer activities (Sim et al. 2017). It involves all students in Singapore public schools (ages 7–18), from primary to junior colleges and the centralized institute (pre-university). Values in Action aims to develop responsible citizens who can contribute meaningfully to the community (Ministry of Education 2014d). Students are encouraged to choose community matters that concern them, understand the issues in greater depth, and then decide how they can make a difference in a sustained way and see themselves as part of the larger community (Ministry of Education 2012a, 2014d). Students therefore “put into practice” the values learned in CCE.

Youth Corps Singapore became the first formal and national program to provide continuity for young people's citizenship participation in their post-secondary years (Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth 2014). Highlighting the importance of this national initiative, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong himself announced this at his annual National Day Rally Speech in 2013, which was broadcast live on national television. In his speech, the Prime Minister rallied young Singaporeans: “You are our future. You are idealistic, full of energy and passion. Go forth, change Singapore, change the world, for the better. To help you do that, we will set up a youth volunteer corps” (Prime Minister's Office 2013).

Despite their intents, Values in Action and Youth Corps Singapore continued to have an enduring focus on young people's volunteerism and participation in the community. These initiatives were seemingly the government's response to their concerns about having to “fix” young people's civic deficit and apathy (Bessant et al. 2016; Biesta 2011). While Singapore's education is supposed to be in a “student-centric, values-driven” phase, it is questionable how much of the spirit of this statement has been translated into actual citizenship education experiences for young people.

What Kind of Active Singaporean Citizens?

The previous sections outlined the government's heightened focus and efforts to promote active citizenship among its young citizens from their schooling until post-formal education years. These efforts are highly contextualized in the changing global and local social, political, and economic situations. However what counts as active citizenship can be interpreted in different ways and that also applies to the case of Singapore. The following sections highlight some of the contradictions that are inherent in the conceptions of active citizenship in Singapore, as articulated in educational policies and programs. Following that, three possibilities suggested in order to harmonize these contradictions so as to advance towards educating young Singaporeans as active citizens.

Overemphasis on Volunteerism

The first contradiction that arises from the analysis in this chapter is a worrying trend of an overemphasis on public and formal participation, such as volunteerism in the forms of Values in Action and Youth Corps Singapore, in Singapore's conceptions of citizenship education. Such a narrow focus tends to overlook young people's diverse experiences with citizenship in their personal and private everyday lives. Education that promotes active citizenship is concerned with young people being intrinsically involved in shaping their society, individually or collectively. This can be in a range of contexts, including schools, homes, and their local neighborhood, as well as in their wider communities at the national, regional, and international levels (Nelson and Kerr 2006; Vromen 2003). A simplistic and narrow focus on volunteerism and public participation alone does not fully capture young people's diverse forms of citizenship, and it particularly overlooks the richness of their private, domestic, and ordinary forms of active citizenship in their everyday lives (Wood 2014).

A related problem to this is that research on Singaporean young people's active citizenship has also primarily focused on measuring formal volunteerism rates in the forms of *Individual Giving Surveys* and *National Youth Surveys* (National Volunteer and Philanthropy Centre 2016; National Youth Council 2016b). Arguably, such reports only a narrow and partial form of young people's active citizenship. Even the assessment in Values in Action is focused on ensuring students adhere to a mandatory and stipulated hours of volunteerism and community service which varies for the different grade levels (Ministry of Education 2014c). Such a myopic conception of citizenship that is focused only on volunteerism has the potential of leading to a false perception that young people are apolitical, apathetic, and disengaged (Bessant et al. 2016; Wood 2014), resulting in a perception of a "crisis in democracy" surrounding young people (Bessant et al. 2016, p. 271). Consequently, such thinking might also wrongly imply deficiencies in citizenship education, possibly resulting in a knee-jerk response to introduce more citizenship education in order to "fix" the perceived civic deficit in young people (Bessant et al. 2016; Biesta 2011). This is, again, problematic because such thinking will continue to focus too much on the teaching of citizenship and places less emphasis on how young people actually learn in and through the everyday practices in their everyday lives (Biesta 2011). Moreover, Jerome (2012), for example, argued that an overfocus on formal and public forms of political actions may lead to a narrower definition of active citizenship that might not recognize that democracy is also lived in the acts of coming together to discuss, resolve, and take action.

Conflicting Conceptions of Confucian-Inspired Ideology and Active Citizenship

The second contradiction is concerned with Confucian-inspired conception of citizenship that focuses on values such as harmony (Sim et al. 2017), which is seemingly in conflict with to dispositions such as criticality that is a key feature of

active citizenship where citizens critically assess social, political, and economic structures to see beyond surface causes, seek out, and address areas of injustice (Westheimer and Kahne 2004b).

Westheimer and Kahne (2004a) argued that education for active citizenship should aim to nurture young people to be able to critically analyze and understand the structural causes of deeply entrenched social and political issues and to be equipped with the capacity and motivation to participate at local and national levels to act and effect change. On the other hand, citizenship education in Singapore, and Asia, has been characterized as one that has traditionally prioritized a relational focus of cultivating harmonious relationships with the “self, others, the state and nature” (Lee 2004a, pp. 280–281). This self-cultivation is meant to serve an important and active role in the “collectivity of the society and nation” (Lee 2004b, pp. 27–28). Therefore, it has been argued that the Asian conception of citizenship draws a direct connection between a good person and good citizenship, and as a result, citizenship education in Asia foregrounds morality over politics (Sim et al. 2017). This is said to contrast with a “Western” conception of citizenship in general, which has a long-standing focus on “individualism as rights and responsibilities in a political context” (Lee 2004b, p. 31). In reflecting a Confucian-inspired conception, values such as “care” and “harmony” feature as two of the six core values in Singapore’s citizenship education curricula as (Han 2015).

Sim and Chow (2019), however, argue that while the government has propagated Confucian ideals of harmony to its younger generation, harmony is seen as an important aspect of relational citizenship, and it does not necessarily refer to conformity or a homogeneous identity but involves embracing difference and even opposition through assuming multiple perspectives and dialogue. However, by prioritizing this conception of harmony, and in fear of risking harmony in society, criticality is limited to merely developing an awareness of the needs and diversity in the community, rather than more critical forms such as acting to question, or challenge, established norms. If any action is needed at all, it has to be done graciously, with sensitivity and with restraint in dialogue (Sim and Chow 2019). This presents a tension between harmony that is promoted in Confucian-inspired conception of citizenship and criticality that is central to conceptions of active citizenship.

Changing Appetite of Young Singaporeans for More Political Participation

The third contradiction is concerned with how young Singaporeans have been observed to be increasingly engaged in various forms of active citizenship in recent years that defy traditional conceptions of it. Han (2015) studied groups of young Singaporeans working collectively in small communities who were using new technology to push the boundaries of free speech and critical thinking, questioning the status quo, and, in some cases, openly opposing government policies. She observed that they were exploring and developing social and political values and

were debating current issues while also discovering the boundaries of what was acceptable in their society. They were seen to have developed the skills and knowledge required to engage in civic and political activism (Han 2015).

This changing appetite of young Singaporeans' citizenship expressions and engagement is in harmony with emerging global trends. Kennelly and Llewellyn (2011), for example, observed that young people were becoming involved in the politics in their lived worlds through unconventional means and modes, from crowdsourcing to online social movements, but current definitions of active citizenship overlooked the varied ways in which young people were increasingly engaging in contemporary social and political participation because such contemporary forms diverged from how active citizenship is defined in theory.

More clear evidence of young Singaporeans' changing appetite for political participation, from the previously perceived civic apathy, emerged from national-level focus-group-style dialogues, entitled *Our Singapore Conversations* in 2012. This engaged over 10,000 Singaporeans of diverse ages, but with a particular focus on young people, to understand their challenges and aspirations for the country (Ministry of Education 2013; Wong 2016). In a recent online newspaper article in Singapore, it was reported that young Singaporean's civic participation saw a new pattern of engagement (Kwek 2019). Young people were going beyond volunteerism and were starting non-profit groups to support the underserved communities, advocacy groups to push for policy changes, and public campaigns to challenge national narratives in social issues they care for. The most remarkable of these initiatives was a social media channel, Telegram, that served as a network of ground-up initiatives in the country and was subscribed by over 1,800 young people (Kwek 2019).

These contradictions clearly bring to light the need to redefine the current conceptions of active citizenship for young Singaporeans and reimagine an education that serves to nurture young Singaporeans as active citizens. Westheimer and Kahne (2000) have argued that to become truly effective citizens, young people should learn to "create, evaluate, criticize, and change public norms, institutions, and programs" (p. 3). Citizenship education that aims to foster maximal forms of justice-oriented citizens requires critical engagement with social and political issues and involvement in social movements, social transformation, and systemic changes (Westheimer and Kahne 2004a). Achieving such outcomes could be problematic for Singapore, given that Singapore has been characterized as a hegemonic state in which the government demarcates social and political participation of its citizens with clear "out-of-bounds markers" that limit citizens' democratic participation (Sim 2011; Sim and Krishnasamy 2016).

Towards an Education for Active Citizenship in Singapore

While there has been an increasing interest in prioritizing active citizenship across many countries in recent years, conceptions of active citizenship and how it has been enacted in citizenship education vary significantly, largely influenced by the respective social, political, and economic situations of the various countries and their government's motivation for pursuing more active forms of citizenship (Nelson

and Kerr 2006). This pattern is no different for Singapore which has explicitly expressed an active pursuit of active citizenship for young Singaporeans in recent years, with a focus on nation building and driven by its desire to ensure the continuity of its economic success. Yet this pursuit is muddled with contradictions and a lack of clarity. In keeping with a Confucian-inspired ideal of harmony, it is imperative then to attempt to harmonize these contradictions so as to advance towards an education for active citizenship in Singapore.

The first harmony that needs to be considered is one between didactic and dialogic pedagogy. Singapore's citizenship education is largely content-driven with didactic instructions and comprises lessons accompanied by textbooks that focus on nurturing values, social-emotional competencies, and twenty-first-century skills (Sim et al. 2017). In particular, citizenship education is concerned with propagating a singular narrative of the Singapore's economic success and what it means to be Singaporean through curricular uniformity (► Chap. 35, [““Being Rooted, Living Global”: Citizenship and Education in the Singapore City-State”](#)). One way to harmonize this contradiction is to allow the flourishing of the multiple meanings of being a Singaporean and how every young person can be an active citizen in multiple and diverse ways in their everyday lives. This requires a closer connection between national narratives and the lived realities of young Singaporeans through an authentic and engaging curriculum and pedagogy that is nonlinear, recursive and cumulative and that recognizes young people as citizens-now, and not passive recipients of citizenship teaching (Biesta 2011; Lister 2003). Another way of achieving harmony is to strive towards a mutually beneficial partnership with young people themselves in co-creating an authentic and meaningful citizenship learning experiences that would recognize and include their lived experiences with citizenship (Bessant et al. 2016; ► Chap. 35, [““Being Rooted, Living Global”: Citizenship and Education in the Singapore City-State”](#); Hartung 2017).

The second harmony is between formal-public participation and personal-private participation. Singapore's communitarian approach to citizenship education has encouraged a focus on public participation, such as Values in Action and Youth Corps Singapore, in order to foster national identity, rootedness to Singapore and commitment to social cohesion – all of which serves to ensure Singapore's continued economic success (► Chap. 35, [““Being Rooted, Living Global”: Citizenship and Education in the Singapore City-State”](#)). Yet this formal participation does serve as a conduit for some young Singaporeans to gain critical consciousness of social and political issues, which otherwise could be easily glossed over by these young people living in an affluent society such as Singapore where most young people are pressured to achieve academic and career success. Such formal and public participation is crucial to the formation of young people's citizenship identities. Yet, in order to enhance these experiences for more young people, one possibility is to imagine a citizenship education that connects learning and participation from the formal and public process promoted in schools into young people's everyday lives. Such a conception might lead to a continuum of praxis – sustained, critical, and reflexive forms of citizenship actions and imaginations that move back and forth on the continuum of the formal-public and the private-personal. Singapore's Minister for Education said:

A strong sense of citizenship will drive them to come together to write the next chapters of the Singapore Story. That is why we must sustain our efforts in Character and Citizenship Education [...] Let us work together to shape our education system for the future, to best equip our children to write a good next chapter of our Singapore Story. (Ministry of Education 2012b)

However, in a truly empowering sense, writing the next chapter of the “Singapore Story” would mean co-creating it with young Singaporeans themselves. That means politicians, policymakers, and program developers need a new and rather radical approach of recognizing and including young people’s everyday experiences with citizenship in the policies and programs that are meant to serve them. This is a possible pathway towards fostering active citizens who embody informed, engaged, and transformative citizenship (► Chap. 35, ““Being Rooted, Living Global”: Citizenship and Education in the Singapore City-State”; Wood et al. 2018).

The third and last harmony is between conformity and criticality. One of the biggest challenges for policies and programs of citizenship education in Singapore is striking a balance between the perceived need for citizens to conform to social order and stability and the messiness and criticality that will inevitably be a characteristic of more active, informed, and critical citizens that the same government is pursuing (Gopinathan 2015). In the same vein, there is a real need for criticality to flourish in Singapore’s citizenship education instead of instrumentalizing critical thinking. For example, “critical and inventive” thinking is one of the core competencies within the Framework for 21st Century Competencies and Student Outcomes, which underpins the vision for CCE in Singapore (Ministry of Education 2009). Yet, significant studies in Singapore have signaled that critical thinking in Singapore is used only as an instrument for economic productivity in the global knowledge economy through education (► Chap. 35, ““Being Rooted, Living Global”: Citizenship and Education in the Singapore City-State”). In his research of young Singaporeans’ perceptions of citizenship, Baars (2017) found that nurturing critical thinking in young Singaporeans was not a priority of the government. He also found contradictions regarding what was articulated by the government as a desired citizen, who is a critical citizen, and what was experienced by young people in their everyday lives. These examples suggest that more genuine efforts are required to authentically nurture critical Singaporean citizens, both in policies and in reality.

Conclusion

The term “active citizen” implies that people will possess understanding and knowledge about civic processes in order to engage in political participation (Wood et al. 2018). In keeping with that understanding, it can be concluded that policies and programs for citizenship and citizenship education in Singapore reflect a “minimal citizenship” that focuses primarily on developing “personally responsible citizens” and “participatory citizens” (Wood et al. 2013). Such conception is driven by the need to serve the country’s agenda of preparing its citizenship to contribute to its

nation-building project of social cohesion and ensure the continuity of its economic success. It also emerged, from the analysis in this chapter, that the pursuit of active citizenship in Singapore has an enduring emphasis on didactic forms of teaching even in the recent iterations of citizenship education, as well as a continued focus on public and formal volunteerism. Such approaches are not “student-centric” as professed in the policies and program outcomes and are a far departure from nurturing “maximal citizenship,” akin to “justice-oriented citizens” (Wood et al. 2013). Chong et al. (2016) contended that education for active citizenship could extend beyond volunteerism or community service to include other forms of critical and active engagements such as lobbying, advocacy, and participation in demonstrations. That is not the case in point for the conception of active citizenship in Singapore yet. An aspiration towards active citizenship, and an education that would nurture active citizens in Singapore, could therefore be possibly be achieved by harmonizing three contradictions in the conception of citizenship and citizenship education, namely, didactic versus dialogic pedagogy, formal-public participation versus personal-private participation, and conformity versus criticality.

Cross-References

- ▶ “Being Rooted, Living Global”: Citizenship and Education in the Singapore City-State
- ▶ The Development of Civic Participation Among Youth in Singapore

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Part III

**Citizenship and Education in Transnational
Contexts**



Discourses of Global Citizenship Education: The Influence of the Global Middle Classes **33**

Miri Yemini and Claire Maxwell

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Abstract

This chapter examines the intersections between a growing “global middle class,” their emplacement within national education systems, and subsequent changes within provision of education due to the emergence of this new prominent social group. We begin with an analysis of the discourses that call forth notions of global citizenship and global citizenship education – concepts often associated with both the experiences and needs of the global middle classes. We then examine how the growing presence of global middle-class students and their families across educational contexts may be shaping the provision of education and potentially altering its intended purposes in some cases. This argument is illustrated by a

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discussion focusing on the increasing prominence of International Baccalaureate programs worldwide, the integration of cosmopolitan values in local curricula, and a consideration of how mobilities reshape the imaginaries of future destinations.

Keywords

Global middle class · Global citizenship · International schools

Introduction

The rise of multinational corporations, which have come to dominate the global economy in the last decades, has been accompanied by the emergence of a new class of globally mobile professionals. This global professional class provides the expert knowledge and skills needed to facilitate these business and organizations and consists of highly skilled professionals who circulate the globe – mostly between key cities such as New York, London, and Hong Kong (Beaverstock 2017; Devadason 2017; Meyer 2000). In recent years, researchers have begun to examine this emergent social group which plays a key role in globalization (Beaverstock 2005; Favell 2008), but still relatively little empirical research exists on this group (Yemini and Maxwell 2017). The published studies, however, highlight two key features of this emergent class: frequent mobility and the fostering of a cosmopolitan identity. In other words, critical to conceptualizing this social group is their hyper-mobility and their tendency to distance themselves from holding a single, rigid national identity (Savage et al. 2005).

This chapter critically reviews the contemporary literature in the field of global citizenship education, with a focus on the emergence of global middle classes and their increasing presence within local education systems. We begin with an analysis of the discourses and theorizations that call forth notions of global citizenship and global citizenship education, as these are linked to the kind of identities and experiences associated with the “global middle classes” and what they are seeking from educational provision. We then discuss the possible consequences of the growing presence of global middle-class students and their families across educational contexts. This argument is illustrated by a discussion focusing on the increasing prominence of International Baccalaureate programs worldwide, the integration of cosmopolitan values in local curricula, and a consideration of how mobilities reshape the imaginaries of future destinations.

Discourses and Theorizations of Global Citizenship Education

The increasing globalization of education (Oxley and Morris 2013) has led to the reimagining of notions of “citizenship” in classrooms across the world. There is evidence of a shift from a focus on a unitary national identity within citizenship

education to the introduction of cosmopolitanism as a core aspect of relations to those around us (Bromley 2009). The promotion of nationalistic values is now being replaced, or supplemented, in many schools, with a more cosmopolitan narrative about belonging, driven by a concern to prepare students for the changing nature of modern society, which is viewed by a number of scholars as dominated by competition at a global level for jobs, economic growth, political power, and so forth (Brown et al. 2011; Dvir and Yemini 2017; Myers 2016).

Taking a more globally oriented approach to the teaching of citizenship is often referred to as global citizenship education (GCE). Broadly stated, GCE can be described as curricular inputs that aim to prepare students to maneuver their way through a global society, by developing an understanding of global issues, being empathetic toward people of different origins, having an appreciation of the multicultural, and being able to demonstrate a set of skills relevant to work and interactions in the global sphere (Dill 2013; Oxley and Morris 2013; Yemini and Furstenberg 2017). GCE-related contents may also include knowledge of other cultures (Veugelers 2011), being proactive in raising awareness for the need to protect human rights and the environment, and seeing the self as responsible for issues that affect other people around the world (Schattle 2008). Many countries now promote GCE as an overarching goal of education, in general, and specifically through subjects such as civics and social studies, while others offer variants of GCE, differentially named the “global dimension” and “global awareness” (Goren and Yemini 2017c; Oxley and Morris 2013).

Oxley and Morris (2013) offer a useful typology of GCE by creating an integrative model of previous conceptualizations (see Osler and Starkey 2003; Veugelers 2011). Their typology categorizes conceptions of global citizenship as either cosmopolitan or advocacy modes. While cosmopolitan conceptions refer to identification, global consciousness, and understanding of global relations, advocacy-based conceptions focus more on global problem-solving. Each category Oxley and Morris (2013) suggest is subdivided into particular aspects of global citizenship – covering moral, political, cultural, environmental, and other issues. As in previous typologies (Veugelers 2011; Dill 2013), here also the links between citizenship education and global citizenship education are reinforced through attention to global human rights (Gearon 2016) and environmental education (Jimenez et al. 2017).

Meanwhile, Andreotti (2006) offers a broad conception of GCE, differentiating between soft and critical GCE. Here, soft GCE could be defined as education *about* global citizenship (providing students with an understanding of the world and cultural tolerance). Arshad-Ayaz et al. (2017: 21) expand on this by suggesting that soft GCE “...proposes the idea of a common humanity heading toward a common ‘forward,’ in which a privileged few are responsible for the many in a quest to achieve ‘modernity’ and ‘progress’ for all.” Meanwhile, Andreotti (2006) argues that critical global citizenship requires a deeper engagement with and unlearning of common understandings (in other words, education that copes with the world’s complexities and multidimensionality). Thus, critical GCE, shaped by post-critical and postcolonial frameworks, seeks to provide students with the skills to reflect upon and engage with global issues that involve conflict, power, and opposing

views. Such an approach facilitates an understanding of the nature of colonial, liberal, and western assumptions and demands that young people strive for change.

Stein (2015) maps the existing discourses that define GCE, concentrating on the critical angles of these, and suggests a framework that differentiates between entrepreneurial, liberal-humanist, and anti-oppressive dimensions. While entrepreneurial GCE focuses on the students' skills for success in a global market place within a neoliberal logic, the liberal-humanist dimension addresses the concepts of intercultural understanding, empathy, and global human rights. According to Arshad-Ayaz et al. (2017), dimensions of GCE, such as these two, are heavily inclined toward a Eurocentric point of view, prolonging and embedding the effects of colonialization and existing power relations. Thus, the anti-oppressive dimension focuses on identification and analysis of the existing power relations and calls for action that will lead to the redistribution of power and equality of access to resources. Additionally, Stein (2015) emphasizes the "incommensurable" dimension through her analysis, which promotes a questioning of the concept of GCE. This concept Arshad-Ayaz et al. (2017: 22) argue "points to epistemic racism inherent in the articulations of GCE that results in an absence of other perspectives, voices, and positions – especially from the colonized populations and knowledge systems."

Both academic and political actors have criticized the concept of global citizenship, arguing that it could weaken nation-states by providing citizens with an alternative identity or that the concept itself is moot in the absence of any global governance structures facilitating the "global society" GC seeks to promote (Bates 2012; Bowden 2003). Critics emphasizing global citizenship's underlying perils note the possibility that like globalization, global citizenship could ultimately benefit the world's dominant social classes while excluding others (Bates 2012; Goren and Yemini 2017b; Rapoport 2009; Stein 2015), thereby further extending the social inequality it arguably seeks to challenge. Other critiques of GCE emphasize its ambiguity to both latent and explicit Eurocentric assumptions (Andreotti 2006). In light of these challenges, arguably the whole essence of GCE might be questioned, and perhaps central to GCE is facilitative work with young people to engage critically with the concepts of the global, of citizenship and of the purpose of education itself.

The Encroachment of the Global Middle Classes within Local Educational Landscapes

Migration, a phenomenon with a very long history, figures centrally as a key social, economic, and political question in today's world (Burrell 2010; Kunz 2016). Diverse motivations drive people's migratory practices, including war and persecution in their home countries, the quest for greater opportunities, the prospect of better living conditions, and the desire to gain educational qualifications. Traditionally, research on migration has focused on immigrants from less developed countries who moved to Western Europe and North America (Burrell 2010; Massey et al. 1993). More recently, researchers have also begun to explore the mobility practices of other groups, including various economic elites and highly skilled professionals who

migrate between more economically developed nations and have been estimated to total 57 million people in 2017 (Finaccord 2014). For example, Koh and Wissink (2017) investigated how the mobilities of the global elites are shaped by the role of professional intermediaries in their surroundings, while Kunz (2016) addressed the configurations of race, gender, class, and nationality, in such mobilities.

With the “deterritorialisation of capital” (Embong 2000: 991), it has been argued, comes the emergence of a transnational capitalist class (TCC) (Sklair 2001) – those whom control global organizations – and a global middle class (GMC) (Ball 2010). The GMC, as a transnational service class, facilitates the dominance of the TCC by providing the necessary expertise and management support for those groups controlling the resources in a global network of production, consumerism, and bureaucracy (Ball 2010; Sassen 2000). This global middle class can be understood as primarily providing the expert knowledge and skills needed for the operation of multinational organizations and the maintenance of global networks of production, consumption, and bureaucracy. It consists of highly skilled professionals who circulate the globe – mostly moving between key global cities – and serve as the financial and legal specialists, managers, engineers, and other professional roles, required in the global economy and system of governance (Beaverstock 2005; Sassen 2000).

In today’s world, mobility has become a key dimension of stratification (Urry 2007). It can be argued that the reasons behind the “push” to exit the nation state will affect the type of mobility that is initially conceived of. It may also be suggested that these initial conceptualizations will become malleable following the experiences of migrants who have of lived elsewhere, including the “pull” factors encountered along the way. Thus, the extent to which mobility is perceived to have been forced onto a person (provision of a potential employment opportunity that is critical to promotion, a strong political motivation to exit), will affect how they potentially struggle to let go of the ties that bind them to “home” or seek to embrace the opportunity to accumulate additional and even new types of resources on which they can later capitalize or in words of Savage et al. (2005) develop “elective belonging” (p. 46). Even families who strategically seek out trajectories of mobility may differentially conceptualize the costs and benefits of this for themselves and their children (affected potentially by the ages of the children, the needs of their particular employment sector, their experiences once they have settled in a new geographical space, and the extent to which they experience a *habitus clivé* (see Soong et al. 2017) and thus develop a range of strategies to mitigate against these costs and capitalize on the benefits.

Researchers have found that individuals worldwide employ a range of strategies to increase their mobility rights, practicing varied ways of entering and exiting certain states (Harpaz 2013). These might include gaining additional citizenships in more “prestigious” countries or gaining access to positions that allow such mobility. GMC’s frequent – and legally sanctioned – mobility across borders sets them apart (Beaverstock 2005). Mobility not only has the power to stratify groups and individuals, but it also shapes subjectivities. The experience of visiting, working, and residing in different countries can lead individuals to form new conceptions of themselves and their national and ethnic identity (Ball and Nikita 2014; Harvey and Beaverstock 2017;

Maxwell and Aggleton 2016). Studies of mobile professionals with families note the importance of the “imagined future” that begins to shape motivations and concerns around their mobility (Doherty and Shield 2012; Favell 2008). Thus, GMC parents might seek to ensure their children have access to the resources that could facilitate their continued high-status mobility in the future and in their own work lives and to guard their futures against increasing uncertainty. Hence, parental strategies might focus on developing a proficiency in foreign languages and experiences of frequent travel, potentially a second passport, and developing a cultural openness and cosmopolitan attitude to interactions with others.

With regard to identity, the literature on these global professionals has suggested they experience fluidity in their relationship to the concepts of “home” and “belonging” and are likely to maintain multifarious ties with their countries of origin, new countries of residence, and via their professional and social networks (Ball and Nikita 2014). The concept of “global citizenship” has emerged as one that could describe an alternative identity mode for these individuals and their families which replaces notions of national citizenship with something more global in scope (Goren and Yemini 2016; Goren and Yemini 2017a, b, c). Some scholars describe mobile individuals as cosmopolitan, who hold no strong ties to a specific place or nation (Andreotti et al. 2013). Though Favell’s (2008) research on “Eurostars” – young professionals moving around the European Union – found that they still articulate a connection to their home nation, while also celebrating that mobility had “liberated” them from some of its more oppressive aspects.

Members of the global middle classes, variously defined, have been estimated to total 57 million people in 2017 (Finaccord 2014). Thus, we can confidently suggest that there is an increasing presence of students from GMC families in classrooms across nation states, particularly in larger urban spaces. Given the size of this population, it is imperative we examine further their schooling choices and education practices, but also more specifically how local schools, and, in turn, national education systems, respond to these demographic changes. How do educators and educational institutions interact with this dominant social group and respond to their articulated values and desires? How do the reimaginings of education and desired futures promoted by the GMCs shape the wants and needs of local populations in terms of curricula provision, the kinds of relations that are fostered between various members of the school community, demands for particular educational credentials, and the kinds of knowledges and skills that are promoted (Maxwell 2018). In the next sections, we offer some suggestions for the ways the presence of the GMC is reshaping education provision and specifically citizenship education.

The Possible Influence of the GMCs Within Education System

Given the increasing presence of GMC within local education systems and the growing engagement over the possible modes of teaching and conceptualizing global citizenship education in local and international schools worldwide, it would be wise to consider possible influences of such transformations on schools. Here we

highlight two such visible influences, namely, the abundance of IB in local education provision and the integration of cosmopolitan outlook into curricula and pedagogy. We carefully outline each of those phenomena, addressing current scholarly contributions and potential future research directions.

International Baccalaureate (IB)

According to the IB website, the IB organization is described as a “non-profit educational foundation, established in 1968 offered four programs” of “international education that develop intellectual, personal, emotional and social skills needed to live, learn and work in a rapidly globalizing world” (www.ibo.org). The IB organization has grown substantially through the years, now providing programs in 4775 schools for more than a million students worldwide (data for October 2017 from www.ibo.org).

With a mission “to develop inquiring, knowledgeable and caring young people who help to create a better and more peaceful world through intercultural understanding and respect,” the IB organization’s focus had been transformed over the years from a previously largely perceived elite, private, international solution for mobile professionals to a form of provision that seeks to provide a valid alternative to national education systems worldwide (Yemini and Dvir 2016). The IB organization continues to hold a dual, some claim, contested role of providing rigorous academic curricula together with idealistic elements of peace promotion and the facilitation of mutual understanding (Tarc 2009). According to the IB organization data, today 56% of the accredited schools are public, and IB is constantly being engaged with as a valuable curriculum and credential by governments and national school systems in different places and contexts (Dvir et al. 2017; Prosser 2018). Moreover, the IB organization has strategically invested in increasing the recognition of its flagship diploma program (DP) by higher education institutions around the world, thereby potentially further embedding the appeal it makes to states’ and individual institution’s developments to their curricula (Resnik 2016).

One of the major criticisms leveled at the IB organization and the governments who promote the IB provision in state education systems is that it is elitist and exclusionary, which in turn will reduce efforts to increase equality through education (Doherty and Shield 2012; Prosser 2018). Critics identify, for instance, the direct costs of participation in the IB programs incurred by institutions and therefore local communities (on students’ fees, cost of “buying” the program to the schools and for training teachers to facilitate the curriculum) (Kotzyba et al. 2018). Others argue that the IB is disproportionately promoted to more academically able students (usually from higher socioeconomic groups), who enter more selective and exclusive IB tracks within local schools or (private) international schools (Goren and Yemini 2016; Resnik 2016; Yang 2016).

However, the relatively recent expansion of the IB beyond its provision in international or elite schools has demonstrated its attraction as a credential to middle-class parents more broadly, looking to secure global competitive advantages

for their children (Yemini and Dvir 2016). Its perceived high status, international branding, securing of a high proficiency in English and additional languages, and the established links between this credential and securing admission to elite higher education institutions therefore enthruse a broader range of parents to consider IB schools or IB tracks in local schools. Additionally, the overrepresentation of pupils from GMCs in these schools/tracks who already possess “cosmopolitan capital” (Weenink 2008) gained through previous and planned experiences of mobility appears to fuel the desire for more nonmobile families to take up the IB (Kebler and Krüger 2018). Thus, the IB’s expansion is likely to continue to be further demanded by both local nonmobile and mobile/GMC families, often through knowledgeable exploitation of governmental funding mechanisms in order to make this possible (Dvir et al. 2017).

The IB’s mission is constructed in global terms – viewing the “world” instead of a specific nation as the arena in which young people should be educated. If provision of, and desire for, the IB is growing – how does this affect the provision of citizenship education not only in IB schools or institutions with IB tracks but also in other schools who are competing for recognition in their local/regional/national/international market? How are these schools – even within local, or nationally, set curricula engaging with what the IB represents – a global education for a global future? How might a focus on the global undermine an engagement with local citizenship issues and conflicts, which young people should arguably be engaging with? These questions have yet to be fully investigated theoretically and empirically. Specifically, such examinations must attend to how the nature and character of the global citizenship education that is delivered which might directly or inadvertently be reinforcing existing power relations at the local, national, and global levels.

Integration of Cosmopolitan Values Within the Local Curricula

Maxwell (2018) argues that the internationalization of education now flows well beyond the fenced-off domains of elite private schooling, affecting national and local education spaces. Internationalization processes can be distinguished as focused on “internationalization at home” and “internationalization abroad” (Nilsson 2003). Thus we need to carefully untangle the interpretations and outcomes of internationalization processes within education institutions, spaces, and systems (Yemini 2015). For instance, the integration of cosmopolitan values and a desire to create globally oriented curricular materials through local curricula can be understood as an example of “internationalization at home.” Cosmopolitanism, in such a reading, which for many is seen as synonymous to the intended outcomes of global citizenship education, can be defined as a set of skills and values that enable people to maneuver through a range of spaces and interactions with “others” (Maxwell and Aggleton 2016). It is often theorized as a form of cultural capital in Bourdieuan terms (Weenink 2008).

However, other scholars would challenge this conceptualization of cosmopolitanism as a disposition facilitating the development of comfortable social relations with “others.” Appiah (2006), for instance, has claimed that particularly since the events of

9/11 in the USA, cosmopolitanism should involve an obligation to others beyond the boundaries of national citizenship and emphasizes the need for a commitment to open, respectful, intercultural understandings and sensitivity. Appiah's notion of cosmopolitanism is similar therefore to many conceptualizations of global citizenship in that it encourages individuals to consider themselves cosmopolitans and promotes empathy and intercultural knowledge; however, it goes beyond most articulations of global citizenship through its focus on the ethical aspects of being a member of a global society and seeks not to emphasize the development of practical skills as a necessary aspects of navigating and competing on a global stage.

Overall, most implementations of global citizenship education arguably conceive of cosmopolitanism as a form of capital. Particularly in more elite or highly resourced education spaces, cosmopolitan capital is promoted as critical in the "global war for talent" (Brown et al. 2011: 9; Bühlmann et al. 2013). However, across education systems the world over, acquisition of cosmopolitan skills and orientations can be found within curricula (Friedman 2017; Kotzyba et al. 2018; Prosser 2018). Thus, teaching and extracurricular opportunities are often focused on meeting this goal – fostered by parents, further embedded through schools (Keßler and Krüger 2018; Windle and Nogueira 2015). While traditionally it is the upper (middle) classes who have been demonstrated to successfully capture and transmit the benefits of different forms of capital through schooling (Lareau and Weininger 2003; Reay et al. 2011), data is emerging which suggests that other groups are articulating a desire for the acquisition of cosmopolitan forms of capital – both mobile and less mobile members of the middle class (see Yemini and Maxwell 2017).

Parental desires for a cosmopolitanism-infused education, as well as national education systems' orientation to the global due to the pressures exerted by international policy demands such as PISA (Münch 2018; Sellar and Lingard 2014), are interpreted and differentially facilitated within individual education institutions and in particular through the practices of teachers (Goren and Yemini 2016). Various studies have shown that schools teach students the skills and dispositions they perceive to be relevant to their students' respective "imagined futures" (Ball 1993; Doherty and Shield 2012; Goren and Yemini 2017b). Thus, teachers as critical agents within these spaces are likely to acknowledge and promote cosmopolitanism for children to whom such dispositions are deemed most relevant to their current and anticipated future social status – we see this, for instance, in studies in Israel (Goren and Yemini 2017b) and Germany (Kotzyba et al. 2018).

Linked to the integration of cosmopolitanism in variable ways within local curricula is the specific teaching of citizenship education. Ichilov (2002) and Levinson (2005) have argued that in many countries, schools are perpetuating a civic/citizenship education gap, where students from higher socioeconomic status backgrounds are being taught to become active and involved citizens, while students from lower socioeconomic strata are less well informed of their rights, the structural conditions that reinforce discrimination, or how their own experiences might have value beyond "the local." Goren and Yemini (2017b) have found that the teaching of GCE is differentiated by the perceived future physical mobility and access to opportunities for global engagement (i.e., imagined futures) of the students in the

classroom. In this way, access to national or local curricula ostensibly infused by a commitment to the development of cosmopolitan values and orientations will be differentially taken up and experienced by students. In what ways, therefore, does the promotion of GCE actually increase and embed inequalities within education?

The Rising Global Middle Classes – a Positive Development for Global Citizenship Education Goals?

The rise of the global middle classes as a dominant social group across various education spaces requires a closer examination of how they are affecting the provision and experience of local schooling. Research should be undertaken which tracks possible changes and transformations at a multi-scalar level – types of schools and credential frameworks being offered at a local, regional, or national level; kinds of values, knowledge, and skills being taught; the social relations experienced within and across school communities; and the imagined futures being fostered. Potentially, the increasing presence of GMCs within local schools might encourage a more in-depth engagement with notions of global citizenship, cosmopolitanism, and mobility (Ball and Nikita 2014; Yemini and Maxwell 2017) – due to the experiences of these children and young people but also because of GMC parental desires. The presence of GMC families, and the increasing focus on GCE found in so many education spaces, should open up the discursive possibilities for all young people to see themselves as mobile future subjects and consider the broader world as their frame of reference (Savage et al. 2005). However, some of the research to date calls into question the extent to which the “encroachment” of the GMC within education systems (previously usually educated in international schooling enclaves) could benefit the broader “local” and, usually, less mobile populations.

Three critical questions emerge from our review of the issues. First, as local communities, especially in urban centers, become more diversified in terms of socioeconomic status, extent of mobility (mobility in one direction as part of a migration trajectory which is oftentimes a type of “forced” mobility, compared to frequent, more privileged, and financially secure forms of mobility), and histories of “belonging,” what notions of “citizenship” should schools be engaging with and facilitating discussion about? Are notions of global citizenship accessible or even relevant to all, compared to making a commitment to fostering local relations of citizenship? Second, as demand for an IB education grows – partly driven by the desires and needs of the GMC – to what extent can this be done in ways that promote access to all for an education that remains relevant to a diverse set of future trajectories? Third, how can we support teachers to teach “cosmopolitanism” to all their students, regardless of background, that engage with their past experiences, frames of references, and aspired-for futures? In these ways, the emplacement of the GMCs in our education systems requires scholars, policy-makers, and practitioners to critically reflect and further develop our teaching to connect students to both the local and global, as well as imagine futures and foster orientations that will enable them to navigate the various intersections of the local and global they will encounter.

Cross-References

- ▶ [Educational Mobility and Citizenship: Chinese “Foreign Talent” Students in Singapore and Indian Medical Students in China](#)
- ▶ [International Students: \(Non\)citizenship, Rights, Discrimination, and Belonging](#)

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Contested Citizenship Education in Settler Colonies on First Nations Land

34

Sophie Rudolph and Melitta Hogarth

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Abstract

Citizenship education in British settler colonies is no straightforward issue. The history of colonization, imbued with racism, and the ongoing presence of settler peoples and their institutions and government on unceded First Nations land, creates deep citizenship dilemmas. For many years British settler states, such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and America, have sought to silence and subdue First Nations peoples through policies and practices that marginalize Indigenous languages, knowledges, and histories. The institution of education has played a key role in these acts of marginalization. This chapter explores the ethical and political dilemmas of citizenship and education in these contexts. It examines the citizenship tensions produced by settler colonies occupying First Nations land, the making of the settler citizen through education systems dominated by whiteness, and the limit points for citizenship education under these conditions. It is

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argued that justice and citizenship education may be incompatible and that a stance of “anti-citizenship” may be the only possibility for a pathway toward justice in these settler colonial contexts.

Keywords

Indigenous sovereignty · Settler colonialism · Whiteness · Self-determination

Introduction

We want hope, not racialism,
 Brotherhood, not ostracism,
 Black advance, not white ascendance:
 Make us equals, not dependants.

...

Make us neighbours, not fringe-dwellers;
 Make us mates, not poor relations,
 Citizens, not serfs on stations.
 Must we native Old Australians
 In our own land rank as aliens?
 Banish bans and conquer caste,
 Then we'll win our own at last.

Excerpt from *Aboriginal Charter of Rights*, Oodgeroo Noonuccal. (This poem can be viewed in full here: <https://www.poetrylibrary.edu.au/poets/noonuccal-oodgeroo/poems/aboriginal-charter-of-rights-0719030>)

In the above poem, famous Australian Aboriginal poet Oodgeroo Noonuccal calls to attention the racism of the settler state and the marginalizing effects of such racism. The full poem is worth a read. This draws attention to the way in which “citizenship” is attributed differently to the people held within a settler state and how certain characteristics have counted toward citizenship recognition. In this chapter, we argue that these contexts of the settler state raise ethical and political dilemmas for citizenship education that can have challenging consequences in the classroom.

Citizenship education has already been proven to be a difficult thing to define. For example, it may refer to teaching about democracy, governance, and parliamentary and legislative processes. Smyth describes this as curriculum “about” citizenship and a kind of learning that is frequently passive (Smyth 2016, p. 308). Other conceptions of citizenship education focus on “active” citizenship or youth civic and political action (see ► [Chap. 57, “Education for Youth Civic and Political Action in Australia,”](#) in this handbook by Peterson, Black, & Walsh). As Zembylas (► [Chap. 58, “Affective Citizenship and Education in Multicultural Societies: Tensions, Ambivalences, and Possibilities,”](#) this volume) points out, an interest in “affective citizenship” has also emerged in recent years. Affective citizenship is linked to the idea of belonging to the nation and the feelings that are encouraged and experienced in relation to such belonging (► [Chap. 58, “Affective Citizenship and Education in](#)

Multicultural Societies: Tensions, Ambivalences, and Possibilities,” this volume). This present chapter is also interested in the notion of belonging, however, it centers on the dilemma of belonging within the context of settler colonial states and, in particular, settler states connected to the British Empire.

What we hope to do in this chapter, therefore, is to firstly in the section following the introduction illustrate the ways in which settler states produce an unsettled citizenry due to the tensions produced by invasion and occupation of First Nations land. Next, we will examine some of the silences and erasures in education systems in settler colonies that contribute to the making of the settler citizen. In the third section, we will raise and discuss some of the ethical and political dilemmas for citizenship education that arise in settler colonies. And we will conclude with a contention that in order to address these dilemmas, anti-citizenship education is a possibility worthy of consideration. We will outline what we see as some options for anti-citizenship education and what this may enable in terms of creating a citizenry in settler colonial contexts that is more aware of the tensions of belonging and more able to navigate the knowledge and relationships necessary to shape futures in which First Nations peoples experience justice.

Citizenship within a settler state is complex because sovereignty and belonging are contested. As Canadian scholars Eve Tuck and Wayne K. Yang have pointed out, settler colonialism insists on making a home and asserting sovereignty over land that has not been ceded by Indigenous communities (2012, p. 5); “settler colonialism is the specific formation of colonialism in which the colonizer comes to stay, making himself the sovereign, the arbiter of citizenship, civility, and knowing” (Tuck and Gaztambide-Fernandez 2013, p. 73). The settler state, therefore, creates a set of citizenship requirements that overlook the settler relationship to First Nations communities and the laws, lore, and obligations such communities uphold on their land. The strong ties between citizenship, sovereignty, laws, rights, and belonging, therefore, create many tensions to navigate in settler colonial states. As Australian First Nations scholar Aileen Moreton-Robinson has pointed out:

Citizenship is more than a status associated with a bundle of rights; it is also the formal contract by which the sovereignty of a nation is extended to the individual in exchange for being governed. Who can and who cannot contract into this status and what rights are able to be exercised is also shaped by who possesses the nation. (Aileen Moreton-Robinson (30 May, 2017, para 14), Retrieved from <https://www.abc.net.au/religion/citizenship-exclusion-and-the-denial-of-indigenous-sovereign-rig/10095738>)

Moreton-Robinson has argued that the settler nation is socially, culturally, and politically constructed as a white possession such that settlers within this nation derive a sense of belonging from ownership of land/property understood within the logic of capital (2015).

New Zealander scholars Alison Jones and Te Kawehau Hoskins (one Pakeha and one Maori), working within these tensions of the settler state, point out that these conditions and operations of a settler state mean that speaking to (or writing to) an audience of both Indigenous and non-Indigenous people has challenges (2016, p. 78). This is a dilemma for us here too. For a sense of belonging in a settler state

for a non-Indigenous person rests on the denial of belonging by the settler state for an Indigenous person. Indeed, even in our writing team, we confront these tensions as each of us is positioned differently within the settler state and its governing apparatus. The first author is a white, settler Australian, who is positioned within the “Australian citizenry” as belonging to the Australian settler state. She has been schooled as “fitting in,” speaking the “right” language, and having the right to speak. However, while officially belonging to the settler state, she also feels the tension that exists through having been born on and now living and working on unceded First Nations land. The second author is an Aboriginal woman whose experience of the settler state is frequently one of denial, silencing of Indigeneity, denial of sovereignty, and so forth. However, she also must work and act within the institutions, laws, and governance of the settler state and vote in a system that does not recognize her peoples’ sovereignty or adequately represent her peoples’ views and voices. In this chapter we explore the effects of these positionalities and how education might better attend to and understand the ways citizens are shaped and how they might imagine new relationships.

First Nations Sovereignty and Settler Colonies: An Unsettled Citizenry

O Canada!
 Your home’s on Mi’kmaw land
 True genocidal drive
 By all your Queen’s command
 . . .
 O Canada, our Nation is still here
 O Canada! We stand guard against thee.
 Excerpt from *Oh Canada! Your Home’s on Mi’kmaw Land* by Pamela Palmater

The persistent denial of Indigenous sovereignty and the usurpation of Indigenous lands by white settler states maintain a narrative of “salvation.” As the poem by Canadian First Nations poet Pamela Palmater above demonstrates, the sovereignty and survival of Indigenous peoples continues. Palmater reminds the colonizer that they are on the unceded lands of Mi’kmaw land. The relationship with, and responsibility to, Mother Earth does not cease because of the presence of non-Indigenous peoples, their laws, and governing apparatus.

Maaka and Andersen make apparent the complexities produced by colonization stating that “understanding both historical and contemporary forms of colonization is essential to understanding Indigenous Peoples, as their place in both national and global societies has been framed by their displacement by other more dominant political-ethnic groups, a process commonly referred to as colonization” (Maaka and Andersen 2006, p. 13). British sovereignty over what it claimed as its colonies created a situation in which Indigenous sovereignty was overwritten. First Nations people have never ceded their sovereignty to Britain; however, through domination

and exploitation, British colonists set up a “home” (Tuck and Yang 2012) on Indigenous land.

This “homemaking” is perhaps most stark in the case of Australia in which the claim of “terra nullius” was made in order to justify colonial occupation (see Moreton-Robinson 2011). Colonists in each of the British colonies, therefore, chose to ignore the rich cultural and educational practices that already existed on the lands they invaded. While the interactions between colonizers and Indigenous peoples were different in the various British colonies with some negotiating treaties, the overarching experience was one in which British systems, knowledges, and laws dominated, while First Nations peoples, their knowledges, and practices were oppressed and frequently suffered deep violences. Over time they would make Indigenous peoples subjects of the British Crown and then enable them to vote and ostensibly hold the rights and responsibilities of citizenship. However, deep tensions remained, and violences perpetrated by the settler state toward Indigenous peoples have not ceased. For example, Indigenous peoples in all of the British settler colonies discussed in this chapter continue to be overrepresented in the prison system and experience racism in a range of settler institutions, including schools, hospitals, and aged care (see Moodie et al. 2019; Blagg and Anthony 2018).

The acts of domination that characterized invasion and occupation in British colonies created the settler colonies of today in which the presence of First Nations communities – their survival, strength, and ongoing reminders that they have not ceded sovereignty – creates tension for the settler state. Settler colonial theorist Patrick Wolfe has proposed that settler colonialism has relied on a “logic of elimination” in which Indigenous peoples are seen to be in a process of assimilation into the settler state, effectively removing their presence (1994). However, while the settler state may be governed or propelled by this logic, First Nations communities have defied the settler state and refused to be assimilated, and it is this tension that illuminates the problems of the authority of the settler state.

Drawing on the notion of self-determination advocated within the United Nations Declaration on the rights of Indigenous peoples, Indigenous peoples have the right to “freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development” (United Nations General Assembly 2008, p. 4). While the power of the settler state may make this right difficult to enact, First Nations communities in British settler colonies have found creative ways to refuse and resist the settler state’s definition of their status and subjectivity within the settler colony.

For example, Canadian Mohawk scholar Audra Simpson examines the complex process of political sovereignty and governance practiced by the Kahnawà:ke Mohawks of the Haudenosaunee or Iroquois Confederacy in North America (2014). She argues that these sovereign practices exist within the settler colonial sovereignty and create challenges and tensions over power and recognition (Simpson 2014). Similarly, Indigenous peoples asserting their self-determination and resistance are evident with the occupation of Alcatraz Island on the west coast of the United States. The island was occupied in 1964, albeit briefly by five Sioux men, and then two occupations occurred in November of 1969 (Johnson 1994). The initial occupation occurred with a misinterpretation of the 1868 Sioux Treaty

whereby Alcatraz was reclaimed as traditional lands because of administrative tardiness by settler colonial governmental institutions. Despite only lasting 4 h, the protesters called for a cultural center and an Indian university to be established. In doing so, the protesters unsettled the settler state and established their sovereignty on stolen lands.

Zoe Todd, Métis anthropologist and scholar of Indigenous studies and human-animal studies, has examined the ways that First Nations people in Canada continue to use Indigenous legal orders and philosophies to maintain relationships and responsibilities to place (2018). She recounts how “Paulatuq is where I learned about how people and fish, together, work to disrupt, refuse and challenge the ways in which the Canadian state imposes its understandings of land, property, conservation, and law” (2018, p. 61). Thus the relationships and responsibilities envisioned through settler citizenship are disrupted and disputed through First Nations practices. In similar ways Megan Bang and colleagues explore the urban spaces of what is now known as Chicago, re-storying the city as Indigenous lands (2014). These creative First Nations responses to colonization mean the settler colonial logic of elimination cannot be realized, and this positions the settler state as always less settled than it imagines it might be.

In Australia, Aboriginal nation-building projects have emerged in recent decades that assert Indigenous sovereignty. The Ngarrindjeri Regional Authority in South Australia exemplifies how nations (re)building has been operationalized; their traditions and knowledges are listened to and respected by countering colonial governance structures and entities through the privileging of their rights as traditional custodians of Country (see Bauman et al. 2015; Hemming et al. 2017, 2019). Another example of Indigenous nation building in Australia is a Wiradjeri project that utilises digital creativity to strengthen nationhood and bring the past, present and future together (Akama et al. 2017). These refusals of settler citizenship privileges an Indigenous notion of belonging through responsibilities to Country.

Further examples of resistance have sought to proffer provocations about Western education systems illustrating how dominant ideologies and practices become common understandings through education. Hogarth (2019) calls attention to the prominence of Standard Australian English within the Australian education system. While Australia does not have an official national language, it is assumed within the public sphere that all citizens will speak, write, and learn in the colonizer’s language. She questions the acts of citizenship and the position of the settler state within education spaces where Standard Australian English is an expectation and measure of success.

These examples demonstrate how unceded First Nations sovereignty in settler colonies produces a settler state that is constantly unsettled by First Nations resistance and survival. The presence of First Nations communities reminds the settler state that it is on stolen land and therefore the settler citizenry is unsettled and uncertain. The First Nations community, which refuses to be defined and captured by the settler state, but still has to function within their governing practices much of the time, may also be unsettled by this unresolved tension and the constant struggle for justice.

The unsettled citizenry that is produced by the largely unresolved tension of settler states existing on unceded First Nations land raises questions for education and citizenship education, in particular. For example, what are the options for asserting belonging and citizenship in Australia for both Indigenous and settler people? How are these options for belonging and citizenship constrained for both Indigenous and settler peoples by the unresolved and ongoing colonizing forces of the settler state over First Nations land? We will explore these questions in greater detail below. In the next section, we examine what happens in the education system to enable settler citizenship to be made and maintained.

Silences and Erasures: The Making of the Settler Citizen

And no matter what happens in these times of breaking
No matter dictators, the heartless, and liars
No matter—you are born of those
Who kept ceremonial embers burning in their hands
All through the miles of relentless exile.
Excerpt from *For Earth's Grandsons*, by Joy Harjo. (This excerpt can be found on this website: <https://www.americanindianmagazine.org/story/strong-words>)

The excerpt from the poem by American First Nations poet Joy Harjo that begins this section highlights the violence of the colonial process, the losses and the grief, and yet also the continuing strength of First Nations ancestors. The institution of education is known to have contributed to the violences of colonialism through silencing and erasing Indigenous histories, knowledges, languages, and cultures (see Herbert 2012; Rose 2012). And it is through the systematic denial of Indigenous sovereignty, cultural, intellectual, and spiritual traditions that the schooling system in settler colonial contexts became a place to produce the white settler citizen (and not only through citizenship education).

The settler state thus uses education – in particular schooling, but also other forms of education – to shape the settler citizen. This can happen through citizenship education curriculum and in the form of particular civics and citizenship initiatives, such as “values education” that was introduced into Australian schools by the Howard government in the early 2000s. (See *Battlelines drawn on values* (2005, September 5). *The Age*. <https://www.theage.com.au/education/battlelines-drawn-on-values-20050905-ge0t1o.html>.) However, the school curriculum is also designed to “normalize” and protect certain kinds of knowledge and values that uphold settler subjectivity as “superior” to other ways of knowing, being, and doing. This was evident in the review of the Australian National Curriculum in 2014 in which (conservative, white, settler) reviewers appointed by the government called for a renewed emphasis on Judeo-Christian values and knowledge (see Donnelly and Wiltshire 2014). As discussed in the previous section, American school systems also bolster the settler state through the silencing of histories such as the reclamation of Alcatraz Island in 1964 and later by the larger organized grouping known as Indians of All Tribes (Johnson 1994).

The curriculum in settler contexts is making not only the settler citizen but a certain kind of settler citizen. By focusing on and defending schools and school curricula as places for Western knowledge and values, the settler state uses the education system to bolster white supremacy. White supremacy is shaped through domination. As North American scholar Zeus Leonardo explains, it is made through a historical process, and “it does not form out of random acts of hatred, although these are condemnable, but rather out of a patterned and enduring treatment of social groups” (2004, p. 139). Thus the historical and sustained treatment of First Nations communities in settler states as inferior to whites – an idea enhanced through the education system – means citizenship education, and education more broadly sees and acts for the white, settler citizen. And in doing this, it also tries to make those deemed “non-white” fit into its citizenry through assimilation.

Leonardo uses Charles Mills’ theory of the Racial Contract to argue that part of this contract involves an “epistemological subcontract.” He suggests:

In Mills’ estimation, the RC [Racial Contract] is an agreement among Whites to misinterpret the world as it is. It is grounded on an epistemology that lacks consistency and defies logic but does not produce cognitive dissonance because it remains consistent with the RC [Racial Contract]. (2015, p. 92)

And through this process, it is argued that a “willful white ignorance” is produced (Leonardo 2015, pp. 92–93). This can be seen in the research discussed by Licho Lopez Lopez and colleagues in which a school in Melbourne, Australia, enacted curriculum that privileged a settler perspective, encouraged students to take on a settler subjectivity, and erased Indigenous sovereignty and self-determination (López López et al. 2019).

Another example of the willful white ignorance used to produce the settler citizen in schools is research carried out by Gumbaynggirr scholar Lilly Brown, with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander young people in New South Wales, Australia. Here, high school students reported the continued silencing and erasure of Aboriginal history and knowledge and the violence of colonialism in their classrooms (Brown 2018). They also reported experiences with teachers who enacted willful white ignorance, demonstrating the intergenerational power of a schooling system to maintain the dominance of a white settler citizenry.

These circumstances of settler schooling have resulted in many First Nations communities calling for schools and universities to be part of a “truth-telling” process in which students learn about the history of their nation-state that has been willfully held away from schools and curricula (see, e.g., Appleby and Davis 2018). In the next section, we demonstrate how this situation creates ethical and political dilemmas for citizenship education in these contexts and education more broadly.

Ethical and Political Dilemmas of Citizenship Education

So tell us to be quiet and know that we won’t.
This is our language. We are reclaiming it. We will speak it.
Because our bodies weren’t built for silence. We will speak it.
Until every ear drop is bruised. We will speak it.

Excerpt from poem by Ngā Hinepūkōrero. (This poem is performed by a slam poetry group and can be accessed here: <https://www.renews.co.nz/reo-read/>)

The poem excerpt that begins this section is by a collective of young Maori women who perform poetry in Te Reo Maori and discuss the importance of language for building strong identities and asserting self-determination on Indigenous land, governed by the settler state. This poem demonstrates their defiance and highlights the violence that settler citizenship education can do if it does not account for the issues we have raised above.

The situation that these British settler colonies we have discussed are in, where the settler state cannot fully recognize the sovereignty of First Nations peoples due to the risk of unsettling and undermining its imposed sovereignty and governing power and authority, creates some major challenges for citizenship education in settler schools. The most basic of these is the question of who is actually considered a citizen. If the settler institution and curriculum only ever recognize a citizen as one who has assimilated into the processes and practices of the settler state, then First Nations students will be marginalized by the citizenship curricula, somewhat like the students who Lilly Brown spoke to about the history curricula in Australia (2018).

Citizenship curriculum that is premised on a stable and authoritative settler state both undermines First Nations sovereignty and, as we have discussed above, reinforces white supremacy. This creates a problem for schools that are both trying to include Indigenous knowledges, histories, and cultures in the curriculum and also teach citizenship education that denies the value of Indigenous knowledges, histories, and cultures. This may also point to why the inclusion of Indigenous content in the curriculum in British settler states has been difficult to achieve in any deep and lasting way (see, e.g., Maxwell et al. 2018). These unresolved sovereignty matters even make it difficult to name nations, as to talk of Australia, Canada, America, or New Zealand is to invoke the colonized land and to talk of a settler state within these contexts is also to reinforce the dominant frameworks and practices.

Another problem that emerges through citizenship education that focuses on the settler state and does not address the tensions of ongoing First Nations sovereignty and knowledges in the current nation-states is that the colonial binary of “us” and “them” is reinforced. As First Nations Australian scholar Shino Konishi has shown, subjectivity in settler governed contexts is not often straightforward (2019). She points out the challenges of accounting for the diversity of local histories and the “supple and complex nature of both Indigenous identities and the ways in which we form connections to country, culture, kin, and newcomers” (2019, p. 20). At the same time by creating the colonial binary of us/them, or Indigenous/settler, those who are settlers in these contexts (which is also an incredibly diverse and complex subjectivity) may decide they do not want a part in citizenship that continues to do the violence of the settler state.

Citizenship education that does not or cannot engage with these complexities of subjectivity, identity, and belonging in contemporary First Nations/settler colonial environments risks reinforcing colonial binaries and continuing the silencing and erasure of First Nations knowledges and sovereignty. Thus, we suggest citizenship

education that is actively interested in these tensions, complexities, and challenges should consider teaching also about anti-citizenship. When citizenship is about upholding the violences of the settler state through the continual denial of First Nations sovereignty, self-determination, rights, and recognition, we see citizenship education as unviable in our current moment. Citizenship education asks young people to foster a sense of belonging to a nation-state that does not take responsibility for its history and allows institutional racism and violence to continue. Anti-citizenship education is opposed to the requirements of belonging that are written into the citizenship contract in settler colonial settings.

Anti-citizenship education would therefore open a space for confronting the truth-telling that First Nations communities have called for, it would highlight the acts of resistance and refusal from First Nations communities, and it would demonstrate the limitations of the authority of the settler state. It also gives settler students a way of standing in solidarity with First Nations communities, rather than their belonging as citizens resting on the denial of the rights of their fellow community members. In this way, anti-citizenship education provides a much more likely path to justice and reconciliation than does citizenship education. It also allows for the tensions of settler governance on First Nations land to be visible rather than covered over or pushed aside.

Anti-citizenship education may not be a long-standing educational necessity. It may instead be a short-term project, in which students are exposed to the histories of violence that were perpetrated by the settler state (truth-telling) and to the acts of resistance by First Nations communities that defy assimilationist logics (survival and endurance). Anti-citizenship education may, therefore, be a door into a future that imagines citizenship differently; that seeks relationships between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples and between First Nations communities and the state; that does not repeat the violences of the past, but takes account of those violences and seeks to remedy them. This would be a future in which belonging was not predicated on the authority of the settler state but also a future that does not ignore the history, politics, and complexities of belonging.

Conclusion

This chapter has considered the thorny problem of citizenship education within the context of British settler states on First Nations Country. It has examined the complexities that this situation poses for citizenship and belonging. The challenges that arise through an unsettled citizenry in these contexts were illustrated through looking at both the ways the settler state maintains its authority and the ways First Nations communities have refused the confines of settler governance. The way in which the education system in settler contexts works to shape and maintain a settler citizenship was demonstrated through examples of curriculum silencing, erasure, and white dominance. Finally, the chapter explored some of the ethical and political dilemmas that arise for citizenship education within the contexts of First Nations/settler colonial spaces. While it is difficult to resolve these challenges easily, it was

proposed that an anti-citizenship element to citizenship education might better enable the tensions discussed here to be present and explored in the classroom. It was also suggested that this orientation to citizenship education may enable stronger possibilities for the inclusion of Indigenous content in the curriculum and the pursuit of truth-telling initiatives in schools, opening up a better avenue for justice for First Nations communities in British settler states.

Cross-References

- ▶ [Affective Citizenship and Education in Multicultural Societies: Tensions, Ambivalences, and Possibilities](#)
- ▶ [Education for Youth Civic and Political Action in Australia](#)

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“Being Rooted, Living Global”: Citizenship and Education in the Singapore City-State

35

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Abstract

Singapore was first described as a “global city” in 1972 and remains highly-ranked today according to various globalization indices, such as openness to international trade (S.T. [The Straits Times], Singapore jumps two spots to rank

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sixth in Global Cities index. *The Straits Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.straitstimes.com/business/singapore-jumps-two-spots-to-rank-sixth-in-global-cities-index>. Accessed 11 May 2018, (2017). Citizenship education in Singapore partly reflects this global orientation; for instance, preparing its future workforce for the “global knowledge economy” is a key objective of citizenship education in Singapore. Yet, seemingly paradoxically, an orientation towards national interests and the development of national identity is strongly reflected in citizenship education. Politically, Singapore is described as a “strong,” developmental state that exercises ideological leadership over society, including the education domain (Lim, *J Educ Policy* 31(6):711–726, 2016; Gopinathan, *Glob Soc Educ* 5(1): 53–70, 2007; Gopinathan, *Are we all global citizens now? Reflections on citizenship and citizenship education in a Globalising world (with special reference to Singapore)*. Hong Kong: Centre for Governance and Citizenship/The Hong Kong Institute of Education, 2012).

This chapter synthesizes literature on how the Singapore state is managing globalizing forces, in and through citizenship education. First, we provide a historical perspective on this question. Second, we identify and discuss four ongoing challenges attributed in literature to globalization and globalizing conditions, in the state’s project to develop ideal citizens: (1) developing national identity and rootedness, (2) balancing autonomy and control in teaching and learning citizenship, (3) fostering deep, genuine critical thinking in a system with performative and instrumentalist orientations, and (4) building social cohesion amidst growing inequality. Finally, we draw on literature to develop recommendations on ways to develop forms of citizenship education that are more responsive to current sociopolitical realities.

Keywords

Singapore · Globalization · Citizenship education · Global knowledge economy · Social cohesion

Introduction

The Republic of Singapore has a population of 5.6 million, and a multiethnic composition of 75% Chinese, 13% Malay-Muslim, and 8% Indian. Singapore gained independence in 1965, following a short-lived, politically fraught merger between Chinese-majority Singapore and Malay-majority Malaya. The merger’s abrupt failure meant that nearly overnight, the Singapore state, headed by the People’s Action Party (PAP), which remains in power today, became responsible for a small country in precarious circumstances: a Chinese-majority city-state surrounded by potentially hostile Muslim-majority neighbors (Rahim 2012), with high unemployment levels and no natural resources except for a port (Gopinathan 2012). Indeed, the government characterized this as the “survival” period. Over the next three decades, Singapore underwent a rapid transition from a third-world ex-colony to a first-world economy and “global city” (Sim and Ho 2010).

Yet, Singapore's relationship with the "global" is complex. The Singapore state has been described as "conservative," "soft authoritarian," "paternalistic," and "strong" (see Wee 2001; Lim and Apple 2016); it exercises ideological leadership over economy and society, including the education domain (Gopinathan 2007). Much research suggests that despite recognizing the myriad challenges of inherently-divergent globalization and making "tactical" adjustments (Koh 2007), the state retains an ultimately nation-centric "convergent" conception of citizenship education (Sim 2013).

Understanding "globalization" in a specific context is valuable in grasping the concrete instantiations of "global" trends (Sassen 2007) and how these trends intersect with a nation's sociopolitical and historical fabric. In this chapter, "globalization" is defined as the spatio-temporal processes of increasing interdependence and interconnectedness of human activity, in economic (hyper-liberalism), political (governance without government), and cultural (consumerism and diversity) domains (Dale 2000; Verger et al. 2011). "Citizenship" refers to a status entailing rights and responsibilities that define how individuals should relate to specific polities (local, national, or global) or fellow citizens. Thus, "citizenship education" refers to education aimed at preparing individuals for this ideal relationship to particular polities or fellow citizens.

This chapter draws on theoretical and empirical research to understand how the Singapore state is managing globalization-related challenges vis-à-vis its own national interests, in and through citizenship education. The chapter has three aims: firstly, to provide a historical perspective on the question; secondly, to identify key globalization-related challenges and ways in which the state is managing these challenges; and thirdly, to summarize recommendations on more relevant (and thus more effective) forms of citizenship education.

Setting the Context: Historical Overview of Citizenship Education in Singapore

In order to contextualize Singapore's current challenges regarding citizenship education, this section provides a brief overview of the historical development of citizenship education (for a more comprehensive history, see Gopinathan 2012; Lee 2013; Chia 2015). A summary of reforms is presented in Table 1.

The "Ideal Citizen" (1965–1978)

Following independence in 1965, political leaders frequently referenced the small city-state's vulnerability. This laid the groundwork for an enduring state-citizen social compact, whereby the state provides material benefits and security, in exchange for citizens' economic productivity, contribution to social order, and support for the current government (Weninger and Kho 2014).

In the city-state's early days, then-Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew conceptualized attributes of the "ideal citizen" as disciplined, hardworking, and submissive to

Table 1 Citizenship education policy reforms. (Adapted from Lee 2013)

Phase	Emphasis of policy reform	Citizenship education curriculum	Pedagogic approach
The “ideal citizen” (1959–1978)	Developing “good” citizens Nation-building and civic knowledge	“Ethics” (1959)	Didactic/instructional ↓ Values clarification (deliberation, debate, arriving at own conclusion) ↓ Emphasizing shared values ↓ Reasoning, criticality ↓ Multiple process-based teaching approaches
		“Civics” (1967)	
		“Education for living” (1973)	
		“Review of moral education” (1978)	
“Asian values” and social cohesion (1979–1996)	Refining and clarifying multiculturalism and values National solidarity and cohesion	“Good citizens” (1981)	Emphasizing shared values ↓ Reasoning, criticality ↓ Multiple process-based teaching approaches
		“Being and becoming” (1981)	
		“Religious knowledge” (1981)	
		“Social studies” (primary) (1981)	
Coping with globalization (1997–2011)	National solidarity and cohesion Balancing global (economic) and national agendas	“Civics and moral education” (1994)	Multiple process-based teaching approaches
		“National Education” (1997)	
		“Social studies” (secondary) (2001)	
Coping with anti-globalization (2011–present)	National solidarity and cohesion Balancing global (economic) and national agendas Twenty-first-century competencies	“Character and citizenship education” (2014)	

leaders. Collective (national) responsibilities, rather than individual rights, were emphasized; such values had a deliberate, distinctively “Asian” flavor (Gopinathan 2012). The choice of English as the administrative language was viewed as potentially corruptive, especially to the Chinese-educated; yet, the largely English-educated political elite argued successfully that it provided access to Western knowledge, technology, and markets. The balancing between “Western” and “Asian” traditions became a crucial, persistent strand in citizenship education policy debates.

Furthermore, public education – a “common space” – was viewed as a key site for nation-building. Thus, a centralized system emerged, where schools were expected

to closely implement Ministry of Education (MOE) directives. Citizenship education programs in this phase focused on fostering national identity, loyalty, and civic consciousness.

"Asian Values" and Social Cohesion (1979–1996)

As Singapore rapidly modernized, and its interactions with Western economies intensified – political discourse on "Asian Values" (emphasizing community, duty and morality) against "Western" (decadent, individualistic) values grew increasingly prominent (Chia 2011). The political elite were concerned that young, affluent Singaporeans would become individualistic, materialistic, and "Westernized." Furthermore, given the plural, immigrant nature of Singapore society, Singaporean politicians urgently focused on developing a communitarian framework for citizenship education, based on "Asian Values" (Weninger and Kho 2014).

Comprehensive moral education programs focused on nation-building emerged (Chia 2011). Values/moral education and citizenship education are typically (and continue to be) conflated in Singapore (Chia 2011; Tan and Tan 2014). The 1991 "Shared Values" White Paper, for example, summarized Singapore's core values as "nation before community and society above self," "consensus not conflict," and "racial and religious harmony"; this document shaped the "ideal citizen" citizenship education was intended to develop.

Coping with Globalization (1997–2011)

With global and regional developments such as the 1997 Asian financial crisis, emerging challenges generated by globalizing forces became prominent. These challenges included: growing economic unpredictability, widening income inequality, managing an immigrant influx into Singapore as per "foreign talent" policies to increase manpower for the knowledge economy, growing class-based stratification via schooling policies, religious radicalization and the rise of cultural and identity politics (which introduced notions of multiple, hybrid identities, against a singular conception of shared Singaporean identity).

In response, the "Thinking Schools, Learning Nation" (TSLN) policy framework was launched in 1997 – a marker of serious state engagement with the economic and noneconomic challenges of globalization (Deng et al. 2013b). Noteworthy features of TSLN include: (1) developing skills for the global knowledge economy – especially critical thinking and information technology skills, (2) National Education (a form of citizenship education), aimed at developing strong national identity and confidence in Singapore. Social Studies, a subject that remains compulsory for Singaporeans aged 15–17 years old, was introduced. Its motto: "Being rooted, living global" conveys the complex global-local relations that continue to operate in Singaporean citizenship education.

Coping with Anti-Globalization (2011–Present)

In the 2011 General Election, while the PAP retained overall power, it received a significantly smaller proportion of popular votes than expected. This decline may be attributed to unpopular immigration policies, fueled by broader discontents concerning slowing social mobility and high costs of living, and sentiments that policy-makers were out of touch (Koh and Chong 2014). Young Singaporeans demonstrated that they were not a passive citizenry in a “strong” state; they actively attended rallies and voted against the PAP (Zhang 2013).

In the most recent curriculum iteration, Curriculum 2015, the MOE introduced the “Framework for 21st-Century Competencies” – a compilation of a range of higher-order competencies students should develop – under the rationale that globalization is a key driving force of the future; as such, “students will have to be prepared to face these challenges and seize the opportunities brought about by these forces” (MOE 2015). Accompanying this framework was the “Character and Citizenship Education” (CCE) program, which emphasized familiar themes of national identity, community relationships, and the common good (Ho 2017).

Overall, we argue the Singapore state has played an active, interventionist role in citizenship education policy reforms. To an extent this is understandable, given Singapore’s history and the nation-building imperatives that arose from this. Rapid reforms between 1965 and present-day demonstrate the state’s anxiety to develop appropriate civic skills and values, in response to what was often viewed as supranationally-constituted challenges (Alviar-Martin and Baildon 2016). Most literature exploring the relationship between globalization and citizenship education in Singapore focuses on *how* the state is managing various challenges related to globalization – which is what the next section examines.

Managing the Challenges of Globalization

Drawing on existing empirical and theoretical literature, this section discusses four ongoing challenges generated by globalizing forces for citizenship education provision in Singapore – and summarizes how the state is managing these forces alongside its own national agenda. There is substantial literature discussing these tensions at different “curriculum” levels (Doyle 1992):

1. Policy curriculum: ideals articulated in policy documents (e.g., Alviar-Martin and Baildon 2016)
2. Programmatic curriculum: guidance documents given to schools (e.g., Sim and Ho 2010)
3. Classroom curriculum: what actually happens in classrooms (e.g., Ho 2013)

Much research on citizenship education in Singapore is critical in nature, problematizing citizenship education as “state-craft” (Tan and Chew 2004); tellingly, while “grand theory” is not often drawn upon, an exception is Foucauldian concepts

of “governmentality,” “discourse,” and state “tactics” (e.g., Koh 2007; Koh and Chong 2014; Weninger and Kho 2014). Most empirical research on citizenship education focuses on Social Studies. There is some, though less, literature on History (e.g., Goh and Gopinathan 2005; Han 2007; Chia 2015) and CCE (e.g., Ho 2017).

Developing National Identity and Rootedness

The philosophical basis of “citizenship” in citizenship education in Singapore is primarily communitarian (Chia 2011; Tan 2013; Tan and Tan 2014; Weninger and Kho 2014; Chia 2015), built on shared national values and a unified conception of national identity to foster feelings of rootedness to the nation. While some studies suggest the additional presence of aspects of civic republicanism, due to the emphasis on loyalty and “active” participatory citizenship (Han 2000; Sim 2011b), “active” citizenship is portrayed mainly as contributing to Singapore society through voluntary work, rather than through deep engagement with political processes. This may, in part, be rooted in memories of student radicalisation and activism in the fifties and sixties. Moreover, globalizing forces have been viewed by politicians as straining young Singaporeans’ loyalties (Gopinathan 2007). The state manages this challenge in two ways – by managing engagement with foreign entities and interests *beyond* Singapore and engagement with national values and interests *within* Singapore.

Managing Engagement with Foreign Values and Interests, Beyond Singapore

Arguably, strong transnational discourses that call for cosmopolitan values and universal human rights are shaping curricula in many developed economies (Abowitz and Harnish 2006). In contrast, current citizenship education curricula in Singapore offer only limited, superficial engagement with the “global” or supranational (Ho 2013). While there are some transnational, critical civic perspectives emerging (Alviar-Martin and Baidon 2016), citizenship education in Singapore does not deal explicitly with “identity” on global or regional scales. National Education (Deng et al. 2013b) and Social Studies curricula (Sim 2011b) are driven by the nationalistically-oriented “ideology of survival,” rather than cosmopolitanism and global citizenship education discourses.

Various qualitative studies illustrate this orientation towards the “national” rather than the “global,” at policy, programmatic, and classroom curriculum levels. Sim (2011b) suggests that the “common good” espoused in Social Studies (programmatic) curricula is framed by national, rather than global or regional interests. Through examining curriculum documents, policy statements and official rhetoric, Alviar-Martin and Baidon (2016) find that citizenship education values and goals are more nationalistic than global/cosmopolitan, instrumentally focused on nation-building and economic development.

At the classroom level, Ho’s (2013) interviews and classroom observations suggest that students possess a stronger affiliation to national, rather than cosmopolitan values (such as concern for economic, social, and political justice on a global

scale). Furthermore, students shared strong views on the importance of national survival and their duty to protect their country, expressing distrust in other nations' willingness to aid Singapore in crisis. Classroom observations suggest that teachers did not deviate significantly from the national curriculum, relying nearly exclusively on MOE curricular materials (although some teachers had more cosmopolitan conceptions than others). Indeed, some studies suggest that any "cosmopolitan" values are narrowly focused on developing "economic cosmopolitans" – individuals who can take advantage of economic possibilities created by globalization, to develop Singapore's economy (Ho 2013; Alviar-Martin and Baildon 2016). It could be argued therefore that instrumental, "de-politicized" approach to citizenship education is viewed in Singapore as "inoculating" nation-states against vulnerabilities created by globalizing conditions (Alviar-Martin and Baildon 2016).

Managing Engagement with National Values and Interests, Within Singapore

As a multiethnic, postcolonial state without the shared traditions, a common language and cultural and historical representations on which nation-states are typically built, it has been a long-standing project of the Singapore state to use citizenship education to foster a common identity, while respecting ethnoracial differences (Sim 2011b).

Research suggests that the Singapore state copes with globalization pressures through building a strong national identity, based on shared "Asian Values," while explicitly preserving cultural difference between ethnic groups (Tan 2013; Tan and Tan 2014) – an approach described in literature as "Asian Communitarianism," and exemplified in the current CCE curriculum (Tan and Tan 2014). In this phrase, the word "communitarian" emphasizes a national identity built on a homogenous, unified understanding of Singaporean history and success, and on values viewed by political elites as shared, "Asian Values" (Chia 2011). The word '*Asian*' in "Asian Communitarianism" denotes an ideological framework that may be interpreted as having close parallels, and possible philosophical underpinnings, in Confucianism (Tan and Tan 2014; Ho 2017). For instance, values such as diligence, thrift, and considerateness are valorized (Sim and Ho 2010). Moreover, the Confucian concept of "harmony" suggests that discrete parts are valued in their own right; however, the collective is prioritized (Tan 2013) – thus, self-actualization is encouraged, though not in the individual-liberalist, politically liberal way. Within this concept of "harmony," Singaporean "multiracialism" follows a "hard multiculturalism" model, whereby there is public affirmation of ethnic differences through celebrating festivals, holidays, and heroes from each ethnic group (Tan and Tan 2014).

However, existing literature has highlighted various tensions within the relationship between the *communitarian* emphasis on the "common good," and the *multiculturalism* that celebrates diversity and difference (Tan and Tan 2014). Tan and Tan (2014) argue that "hard multiculturalism" results in a "surface culture" approach where superficial, essentializing representations of culture emerge that do not deal with less observable aspects of culture and often perpetuate stereotypes, especially amongst younger students. Sim and Ho's (2010) analysis of Social Studies curricula

suggest a possible reason for this superficial treatment of cultural questions: cultural, racial, and religious issues are frequently alluded to, in upholding "common good" values of "social cohesion" and "meritocracy," but upon deeper analysis, pragmatic, economic concerns underpin the pursuit of "social cohesion" and "meritocracy." Ironically, such an approach results in shallow, individualistic, and materialistic-oriented citizenship (Sim and Ho 2010).

Some authors have problematized the seemingly communitarian "Asian Values" discourse as thinly veiled "Confucian values" (Chia 2011), which maintains the cultural hegemony of the majority Chinese population. A related strand of critique views "Asian Values" as state-crafted political and social control, to foster a disciplined citizenry that is economically productive and submits to political leadership (Ong 1999; Sim and Ho 2010). Others draw on Banks' (2008) argument that in late-modernity, the younger generation view themselves as possessing plural, overlapping, or hybrid identities across gender, class, and race lines; however, current citizenship education provision does not account for this dynamism and multiplicity of identities (Gopinathan 2012; Alviar-Martin and Baildon 2016). Finally, another critique (not directly located in citizenship education literature but with implications for citizenship education and, specifically, its silences) suggests that post-9/11, there is overly-vigilant surveillance over Islam due to state anxieties concerning Islamic radicalization (e.g., Rahim 2012). Thus, we find that existing research identifies multiple problems with the state's nationalistic, instrumental "Asian Communitarianism" approach to managing globalizing forces.

Balancing Between Autonomy and Control in Teaching and Learning

Citizenship education provision (and the broader education system) in Singapore is highly centralized. The MOE provides a prescribed curriculum for curriculum subjects and remains largely in control of textbook use and other curriculum materials, the administration of national examinations, and even teacher employment and school funding, in most mainstream government schools (Sim 2011a, b; Ho 2012; Tan and Tan 2014). Teacher education and professional development provision is also centralized as there is only one teacher education institution, the National Institute of Education. In the case of citizenship education, one area particularly critiqued in literature is the singularity of the "Singapore Story" taught in Social Studies curricula – the state's version of how Singapore modernized and developed successfully under PAP leadership; this narrative has largely been unchallenged by counter-hegemonic narratives (Ho 2010, 2017; Gopinathan 2012).

However, some research indicates that the state has provided more leeway for pedagogical innovation in curriculum implementation. Partly responding to supra-national neo-liberal trends, the state has given school leaders and teachers greater professional autonomy in teaching – particularly in elite, independent schools (Gopinathan 2007, 2012). Less voluntarily on the state's part, state-sponsored narratives in citizenship education are increasingly challenged by social media. Unlike many liberal democracies where there is declining political participation

among younger generations, Singaporean young people are increasingly politically engaged, spurred on through social media (Gopinathan 2012; Skoric and Poor 2013; Zhang 2013). While there is yet to be empirical research examining how social media is transforming young people's conceptualizations of citizenship and their rights and responsibilities – an area requiring further research – studies illustrate that the Internet is an important source of alternative viewpoints on “citizenship,” in a nation-state where traditional mass media is largely state-dominated (Skoric and Poor 2013; Zhang 2013).

Notwithstanding the above, various interview-based studies with teachers and students suggest that citizenship education practice tends to tightly cohere with state views. Sim and Print's (2009a, b) interviews with Social Studies teachers in Singapore suggest that teachers exercised some agency in interpreting and teaching citizenship – but this agency was exercised in “safe” ways; none exhibited a “transforming” position challenging the status quo. Ho's (2010) interviews with students representing different socioeconomic, ethnic, and academic stream backgrounds shared similar understandings of key events in Singapore's developmental narrative and of what citizenship meant and entailed (i.e., loyalty and service to the nation). They also either avoided “controversial” topics around meritocracy, harmony, and progress – or shared state views on these topics. Neither teachers nor students in these studies contested the meaning of citizenship or the “Singapore Story.”

This may be due to climate of censorship (Ho 2010) and a centralized education system where teachers and schools are expected to be implementers of policy (Sim and Print 2009a). Moreover, high-stakes Social Studies and History examinations within a meritocratic system, where academic merit is highly valued, constrains teachers' and students' development of reflective, broader perspectives on what “citizenship” means (Ho 2013).

Sim's (2011a) study suggests a slightly different finding. Sim (2011a) found that different Social Studies teachers conceptualized citizenship differently (three conceptualizations of citizenship were identified: nationalistic, socially concerned, and person-oriented) and enacted a corresponding variety of pedagogical approaches (e.g., expository and highly controlled, interactive and participative, constructive and interactional). Thus, despite being state employees, teachers are not mere “transmitters” of a parochial definition of citizenship – despite facing various structural constraints in exercising this agency.

Fostering Deep, Genuine Critical Thinking Skills

Increasingly, critical thinking skills are perceived as closely connected with meaningful citizenship. States view critical analysis skills as an important form of intellectual capital, crucial in navigating increasingly complex, interdependent societies and economies (Ho 2013). There is growing research grappling with what it means to develop “thinking citizens” in the “soft authoritarian” state of Singapore; most studies cast doubt on the current system's potential to develop deep thinking skills (e.g., Sim 2011b; Lim 2013, 2016), as discussed below.

Obstacle 1: Economic Instrumentalism

The structures, processes, and outcomes of education in Singapore are tightly coupled with the economy (Gopinathan 2007). Economic development is viewed as the ultimate end-goal of teaching cosmopolitan values (Ho 2013) and of key Social Studies themes, such as social cohesion and meritocracy (Sim and Ho 2010). There is substantial literature discussing the instrumentalization of critical thinking in Singapore, as primarily valuable for economic productivity in the global knowledge economy.

These studies delve into the specific pedagogic approach of teaching critical thinking. Drawing on ethnographic methods (Lim 2013, 2016), interviews with Social Studies teachers (Baildon and Sim 2009), and analyses of Social Studies (programmatic) curricula (Sim 2011b), these studies derive similar conclusions. Exploring critical thinking at the programmatic (e.g., Sim 2011b) and classroom curriculum level (e.g., Baildon and Sim 2009; Lim 2013, 2016), these studies suggest that the dominant pedagogic approach in most schools focuses on teaching technical "skills" of logic and argumentation. This highly structured, formulaic, and decontextualized approach is described by all four studies as highly instrumentalist in nature, to prepare future workers for the global knowledge economy – rather than for active participation in political processes; indeed, Alviar-Martin and Baildon (2016) argue that the Social Studies syllabus implies minimal citizen participation in politics.

Emerging research discusses the equity implications of this instrumentalist, economistic approach. Sim (2011b) and Lim (2013, 2016) agree that such an approach results in socialization into prevailing sociopolitical norms and the capacity to *rationalize*, rather than *question*, these norms. Moreover, Lim's (2016) study highlights differences between approaches adopted at a mainstream government school, compared to the approach at an elite "independent" school (a school that is granted greater autonomy in school management by the MOE, popularly viewed as elite). While the mainstream school adopted a more formulaic approach, the independent school focused on developing dispositions and competencies for deep intellectual engagement, and even potential critique, of the existing system. Hence, we argue that existing research uncovers a strong need to address issues of elitism and equity in the distribution of civic competencies.

Obstacle 2: Performativity

A smaller body of literature discusses how performative features of Singapore's education system form barriers to developing deep, genuine thinking skills. Arguably, the state sends contradictory messages: it supports critical inventiveness (particularly as vital to global economic competitiveness) – yet maintains a performative system characterized by high-stakes examinations and content-heavy curricula, premised on a narrow conception of academic "merit" (Baildon and Sim 2009; Lim 2016). These structural features restrict time for fostering critical thinking and could result in superficial teaching of these skills. Furthermore, Singapore is unique amongst developed economies in positioning "twenty-first-century competencies" as *reinforcing*, rather than *supplanting* academic content; hence, to cope with time pressures, teachers often resort to a "hybrid" pedagogy which more strongly emphasizes transmission and instruction, over constructivist learning (Deng et al. 2013a).

It is not uncommon in developed economies for the two reform trajectories – a growing emphasis on higher-order thinking skills and greater education performativity – to co-exist (Gopinathan 2007). However, these reform trajectories in the Singapore context should not be interpreted as a surrendering to neoliberal logic, but as “tactics” to enhance efficiency of governance, to co-opt globalization forces to the state’s own advantage (Tan 2008).

Building Social Cohesion Amidst Growing Inequality

Singaporean politicians have long-recognized the costs of transitioning towards a “global city”: widening socioeconomic inequalities, discontent over tightening academic and job competition (particularly due to the influx of “foreign talent”), and the unhappiness of the “sandwiched” middle class who lack both the rapidly growing wealth of elites and the welfare support of the most disadvantaged. As such, there is clear need to maintain social cohesion and ensure young Singaporeans do not become alienated, through citizenship education.

On one hand, the state attempts to foster social cohesion through ensuring curricular uniformity concerning the *central, primary meaning* of what it means to be “Singaporean” and in how the “Singapore Story” should be understood (as suggested earlier). On the other, studies highlight the differentiated nature of citizenship education for students from different academic streams (Ho 2012; Sim 2013) and between elite and mainstream government schools (Ho et al. 2011b; Ho 2012). Ho (2012) advances the notion of “differentiated citizenship,” where there are different imagined future-citizens (and citizenship education curricula), corresponding to different academic streams:

1. *Elite cosmopolitan leaders* (for the academically highest-achieving students at elite schools following the “Integrated Programme” – where students are permitted to by-pass O-level examinations to provide more curricular space for developing intellectual autonomy)
2. *Globally oriented but locally rooted mid-level executives/workers* (in the two academically more competitive “Express” and “Normal-Academic” streams)
3. *Local “heartlander” followers* (in the least academically competitive “Normal-Technical” stream)

Differences in curricula include, for high- and low-attaining students respectively: high versus low levels of civic knowledge and efficacy; opportunities for developing deep critical reasoning and autonomy versus being taught sanitized, predetermined knowledge and technical skills; engagement with global perspectives and issues versus engaging with local, domestic issues (e.g., housing, education); leadership-oriented citizenship versus follower-oriented citizenship (Ho et al. 2011b; Ho 2012; Alviar-Martin and Baildon 2016). Furthermore, within Singapore’s centralized education system, students’ understanding of their rights and responsibilities are similar to the rights and responsibilities embedded in the curriculum of their

academic stream (Ho et al. 2011a). Given the positive relationship between one's socioeconomic position and academic performance, such explicitly delineated "differentiated citizenship" could exacerbate existing inequalities, weakening social cohesion (Ho 2012).

Recommendations to Improve Citizenship Education Provision

Most empirical and theoretical literature contains recommendations on how to enhance citizenship education provision. This section synthesizes these recommendations; each offers ways in which, we argue, citizenship education stakeholders might more effectively respond to present-day challenges.

Reconceptualize "Citizenship" for a Changing Social Reality

The current conceptualization of "citizenship" promulgated through citizenship education curricula is instrumental, narrow, economically oriented, nation-centric (e.g., Sim and Ho 2010), as well as effectively monocultural (Alviar-Martin and Baidon 2016), despite having a multicultural appearance. Problematically, such a conception only has the philosophical power to reproduce and "make thinkable" the ruling elite's conceptions for Singapore society and nation (Lim 2016).

Apart from the political hegemony critique, another critique highlights the growing disconnect between students' lived realities and official curricular discourse. In an age of greater self-reflexivity and accessibility to ideas (such as global and transnational discourses that develop a cosmopolitan consciousness), young people are likely to see themselves as having shifting, multiple or hybrid identities (Gopinathan 2012). Notwithstanding current discourses of economic and cultural nationalism, it continues to be a "fact" of social reality that there is political and economic interdependency between states.

Thus, states should look beyond national boundaries and goals in developing citizenship education policy (Ho 2013), while simultaneously being attentive to the constraints of school contexts. If curricular conceptions of citizenship do not dynamically evolve with fast-changing sociopolitical realities, including the changing nature of Singapore society – citizenship education risks becoming irrelevant (Gopinathan 2012; Ho 2013; Alviar-Martin and Baidon 2016).

Involve More Voices in Reshaping Citizenship Education

At present, in spite of increased school autonomy, the Singapore education system remains highly centralized, adopting a top-down approach in conceptualizing and enacting curricula (e.g., Tan and Tan 2014). However, Singapore's state-citizen social compact (whereby material benefits are provided in exchange for political compliance) has been weakened by the unpredictability of globalization.

As such, education policy-makers and practitioners should help students feel like active, genuine stakeholders, with real agency to reshape notions of “citizenship” and Singapore’s future – instead of viewing students as passive recipients of citizenship teaching (Sim and Ho 2010; Gopinathan 2012; Lee 2013; Alviar-Martin and Baildon 2016). Providing greater agency in developing and exercising “citizenship” is more likely to foster strong and affective national ties (Sim and Ho 2010).

Additionally, school educators, academics, policy and curriculum officials, and civil society organization representatives should be involved in reconceptualizing “citizenship” and highlighting weaknesses in the existing curriculum (Alviar-Martin and Baildon 2016). In particular, analytical questioning of the “Singapore Story,” and allowing alternative conceptions of Singapore’s history to emerge, allows more authentic engagement with notions of citizenship (Ho 2010; Gopinathan 2012). Though an alternative literature contesting vital aspects of the “Singapore Story” has emerged, the state has largely ignored this. While plurality or complexity for its own sake is not necessarily desirable, the need to develop richer notions of citizenship, built on multiple actors’ viewpoints, is clear.

Develop a Deep, Contextualized Approach to Teaching Citizenship for All

Instrumental approaches to teaching citizenship fail to develop genuine critical thinking (Lim 2013, 2016) as well as affective ties to the nation (Sim and Ho 2010) and reinforce political hegemony (Lim 2013, 2016). While socialization into national and constitutional norms is understandably desirable to states, especially young states like Singapore, socialization processes should be balanced with genuine independent thinking and active reasoning (Sim 2013). More sociopolitically, historically contextualized teaching of critical thinking would thus be valuable (Lim 2013, 2016).

In teaching multiracialism, replacing “surface culture” and “hard multiculturalism” approaches with a “deep culture” approach (Tan and Tan 2014), where there is engagement with heterogeneity within cultures, offers a more promising way of engaging with diversity. Additionally, the Singapore state must invest in developing richer programs of citizenship education for those from socioeconomically disadvantaged and academically weaker backgrounds (Ho 2012). As awareness of inequalities grows, curricular silence on how socioeconomic background problematizes the core assumptions of “meritocracy” is also untenable (e.g., Alviar-Martin and Baildon 2016).

Furthermore, in order to develop the active, engaged citizens idealized in citizenship education policy, a detailed examination rather than superficial tinkering of multiple factors influencing citizenship education policy enactment is required (Deng et al. 2013b). Factors particularly pertinent in the Singapore context include:

- Wider Singapore society and culture, which emphasizes academic results and qualifications (e.g., Deng et al. 2013b).

- Structural features of the existing system – such as high-stakes examinations (e.g., Ho 2013) – constrain in-depth citizenship teaching and learning and shape institutional features of schools and school communities (Deng et al. 2013b).
- More effective teacher education is crucial in shaping teachers' pedagogical beliefs and expertise (Deng et al. 2013b; Tan and Tan 2014).

At present, there is weak convergence between policy visions and classroom enactment, highlighted through numerous empirical studies of classroom practice (see Deng et al. 2013a). These policy-practice gaps underscore the need to pay detailed, specific attention to various curriculum levels (Doyle 1992) and school and classroom realities (Deng et al. 2013b), in sustaining deep reform.

Develop a Whole-School Approach to Citizenship Education

Meaningful, sustainable citizenship education reform requires a “whole-school,” “total curriculum” approach (Lee 2013) where attitudes and values are “caught” rather than “taught” (Sim 2013). This whole-school approach to citizenship education is the intended approach of Curriculum 2015, the most recent curriculum reform. In Curriculum 2015, there is recognition that, in light of the challenges of globalization, schools should avoid compartmentalizing citizenship education and take seriously the urgency of developing genuine, rich, relatable citizenship education programs (Lee 2013). However, we believe the foremost challenge in adopting a whole-school approach lies in ensuring this existing policy ideal materializes in classroom practice.

Conclusion

Overall, existing research suggests that in the “strong” state of Singapore, the *nation-state* remains key in understanding citizenship education provision (Gopinathan 2012; Deng et al. 2013b). In managing globalizing forces, the state makes “tactical” (Koh 2007) adjustments in two ways:

1. Viewing these forces as straining national loyalties, the state seeks to strengthen national identity and feelings of rootedness in Singapore.
2. Viewing these forces as creating opportunities for greater efficiency and flourishing of the nation-state – the state seeks to equip students for the global knowledge economy and provide greater flexibility and autonomy to schools to encourage innovation and efficiency.

In our view, these adjustments work to tactically “strengthen” the “strong” state of Singapore – and examples of how this occurs in Singapore citizenship education research are manifold. For instance, students are encouraged to become “economic cosmopolitans” (capable of maximizing opportunities in the global knowledge

economy) – but not “political” or “cultural” cosmopolitans. The extent to which young Singaporeans are encouraged to engage with cosmopolitan dimensions also appears dependent on their academic stream and school type. Furthermore, even in fostering “economic cosmopolitans,” aligned with Singapore’s state-centered approach to citizenship education, “economic cosmopolitans” are ultimately encouraged to attract global capital *in order to* maintain Singapore’s competitiveness in the global economy.

While the Singapore state’s approach to the governance of citizenship education has, to an extent, been successful in fostering social cohesion and economic growth thus far – new challenges have emerged in the last decade or so. The rise of economic and cultural nationalism suggests that the “globalization wave” may have peaked; as new contexts of “anti-globalization” emerge, research is required to unpack what this means in the Singapore context. Furthermore, despite Singapore being a major trading hub and a prominent member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), citizenship education in Singapore remains largely Singapore-centric. With the rise of regional powers such as China, India, and Indonesia, Singapore’s regional ties should be strengthened. However, the present curriculum does not provide sufficiently deep knowledge of the surrounding region and how to relate to these regions. A parochial, Singapore-centric vision of citizenship education is increasingly untenable. Even as the Singapore state grapples with anti-globalization anxieties, there is need to establish a thoughtful, robust balance between national, regional, and global perspectives.

The task for educators and researchers now is to delineate new forms of curriculum and pedagogy that are responsive to this new environment – specifically: *how should the Social Studies curricula change? What kind of meaningful experiential learning is required to develop deeper, more authentic understanding of diverse cultures? What contextual factors require change, to facilitate such learning?* Large-scale, multi-level analysis (Deng et al. 2013b) can offer a broader, more detailed perspective of pertinent problems in citizenship education, particularly in policy enactment; current empirical research, while valuable, is almost entirely qualitative (based on interviews, observations, or curriculum and policy analyses). Ultimately, more research is required to understand the bigger picture of what “being rooted, living global” means, in light of recent sociopolitical and socioeconomic transformations in the Singapore city-state.

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Constructions of “Youth” and “Activism” in Lebanon

36

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Abstract

This chapter contributes to the understandings of youth activism through an examination of constructions of youth and activism in Lebanon. Lebanon provides an interesting case study given the role of youth in the uprisings in the region since 2011, as well as the demography of Lebanon and the region, where youth under the age of 18 make up over 40% of the population. Lebanon faces challenges as a postconflict sectarian society, with a large Palestinian and Syrian refugee population. There is high youth unemployment and high levels of youth alienation, yet there is also a vibrant youth civil society. Civil society organizations both protest against government and often take over the role of the state’s welfare provision. Drawing on existing theoretical and empirical research, the chapter illustrates the need to take a context-dependent approach to understandings of “youth” in contrast to universalized definitions of youth based on age. The

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chapter also provides an overview of examples of youth activism in Lebanon – including gender justice work, trash-related protests, environmental activism, and the role of bloggers. Drawing on these examples, the chapter argues the case for a socio-politically nuanced approach with regards to understanding what counts as “activism” in Lebanon. The arguments presented challenge dominant approaches to the study of youth and activism in the Arab world typically framed in relation to Western and international initiatives supporting democracy promotion.

Keywords

Activism · Citizenship · Civic · Lebanon · Youth

Introduction

Across the Middle East, there has been substantial political and academic attention to “citizenship” and “participation,” which has increased over the last decade, in the context of the Arab uprisings which began in 2011 (Kiwan 2018). While not the only participants in the uprisings in the region, youth have played a significant role in contesting traditional notions of citizenship. This contestation has been witnessed in various forms, including street protests, artistic representations and graffiti, social media, and other forms of cultural expression (Kiwan 2015). As such, there is also keen academic and policy interest in the category of “youth” – of particular relevance given the demography of the Middle East region, with over 40% of the population being under the age of 18 (Faour and Muasher 2012). Youth unemployment in the region is the highest in the world, on average 25% (IMF 2012), and high levels of youth alienation and despair are often attributed to poor educational opportunities, high levels of unemployment, and denial of political and civil rights (Teti and Gervasio 2011). The concomitant interest in civic participation and youth comes both from within the region and internationally, through initiatives funded by international organizations, NGOs, and foreign governments. Philanthropic support for civic change in the Middle East and Lebanon which focuses specifically on youth is a significant area of funding in the region. Such funding, especially by international organizations, is often constructed and implemented through partnerships with local NGOs (Kiwan et al. 2014).

A brief historical and socio-political overview provides a contextualization for understanding youth activism in Lebanon. Lebanon is typically characterized as a divided, “postconflict” society, with a “weak” state (Pearlman 2013). The 16-year long Lebanese civil war ended in 1990, with the Ta’if agreement stating as an objective the renouncement of political sectarianism. While this failed to gain approval, the agreement set a basis for modifying the balance of powers between the different sects (Traboulsi 2007). There was an estimated death toll of 20,000, 76,000 people were displaced, and an estimated 1 million people left Lebanon during the civil war (Kiwan 2016a). With the end of the Lebanese civil war, there was an optimistic vision arising in the 1990s that Lebanon could focus on

reconstruction, reconciliation, and revision of its political system, yet this has not been realized – in part attributed to regional instability and the hardening of sectarian divisions (Khalaf 2014). With the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri in 2005, and public protests leading to Syria’s withdrawal, sectarian hostility intensified. With the ongoing Syrian and regional crisis, these sectarian tensions continue. Furthermore, Lebanon has undergone significant demographic change, with the influx of approximately 1.5 million Syrian refugees since the start of the Syrian conflict in 2012. This new refugee population is in addition to the preexisting Palestinian refugee population of several generations of approximately 500,000. The majority of these refugee populations are youth, with 75% of the Syrian refugee population being women and children (UNHCR 2014).

Formal education for citizenship in Lebanon typically tends to be delivered didactically and has low status in the curriculum, with an emphasis on knowledge of political institutions and the inculcation of patriotism. There is relatively little opportunity for learner-directed civic engagement. Nonformal civic learning and participation in the form of international and Western initiatives has been framed in terms of democracy promotion, with funding for youth engagement prioritized to local NGOs. There is a common assumption – without empirical evidence in support of it – that Western funding for local NGOs will result in pressure on the government for reform, and that in turn this will result in political transformation. According to this logic, civil society is seen as the “magic bullet against Arab autocracy” (Yom 2005, p. 16). However, the priorities of funding reflect the priorities from the perspective of the donor, rather than priorities from the perspectives of the local population (Altan-Oltay and Icdygu 2012). These global neoliberal approaches rationalize the “responsibilization” of citizens and communities emphasizing compliant and rational behavior (Kennelly and Llewellyn 2011). There is an emphasis on depoliticized identities in postconflict contexts, resulting in the hollowing out of citizenship (Jessop 2002; Staeheli and Hammett 2013). Yet such attempts to “govern” citizens do not necessarily go to plan, in particular in nonformal pedagogical contexts with young people (Clarke 2010; Pykett 2010; Staeheli and Hammett 2013). Pedagogical relationships between educators and learners, and between learners, are fluid and relational, disrupting a straightforward translation of policy into practice.

There is an active civil society in Lebanon, where civil society organizations, on the one hand, protest against government, but also often take over the role of the state’s welfare provision. A most recent example of this was in 2015–2016, referred to as the “trash protests.” Protests began when a landfill just south of the capital Beirut was closed as it had reached capacity, and the government did not extend the contract of the private company in charge of trash collection and no alternative landfill or trash collection company had been found. The protests that followed were not only about a problem of waste management, but were an expression of people’s despair with political corruption, business interests, and sectarianism (Kiwani 2017). However, civil society organizations often reflect the sectarian divisions within society, rather than necessarily being opposed to sectarian politics. Given the relationships of funding between international organizations and local civil society

organizations, NGOs have become highly bureaucratized, reflecting the “NGO-ization” of civil society (Jad 2011).

This chapter challenges traditional constructions of youth and activism, illustrating the critical importance of taking account of the Lebanese context. The chapter demonstrates the need for socio-political and historical contextualization through the illustration of examples of different forms of activism engaged in by youth in Lebanon. The chapter concludes with the consideration of possible futures for youth activism in Lebanon.

Conceptions of Youth

Youth is a socially constructed category, and as such is contested (Roberts 2012; Threadgold 2011; Wyn 2011). It is used to signify an intermediate phase of the lifecycle between childhood and adulthood; however, in terms of age, there is no standard agreement and the designated age range often varies, from 14 to 25, 16 to 24, or 18 to 30, for example. Bray-Collins (2016), in her research on youth politics in Lebanon, operationalizes the category of youth in terms of marital status, rather than chronological age, where youth corresponds to the unmarried. There is a cultural expectation and common practice that young people live at home until they are married, and are commonly considered to be “youth” up until this time. Mulderig (2011) proposes that youth in the Arab world are being “denied” their adulthood due to the socio-political realities of poor educational opportunities, high levels of unemployment, delayed marriage, and delayed sexuality. For example, the social expectation of marriage and raising a family is a significant economic cost, and with increasing marriage costs, people are marrying later, which has been referred to as “waithood” (Joseph 2011). While reflecting a dominant heteronormative discourse in society, this is being challenged by youth – both through individual youth practices breaking dominant moral codes and through youth activism on LGBT issues. Such challenges to accepted norms of sexuality and sexual behavior illustrate a challenge to the authority and the status quo of the state.

Tracing the historical development of youth movements in the Middle East usefully illustrates the organized and nationalist origins of youth activism. Joseph (2011) notes that from the 1920s, when nationalist movements were mobilizing for independence, youth organizations were set up in Lebanon and Syria modelled on fascist German and Italian youth movements. In the 1950s and 1960s, governments in the region promoted youth organizations with the policy aims of promoting economic development. As such, youth represented hope for the future. With the failure of various nationalist projects in the region and the Lebanese civil war in the 1970s, antigovernment movements, often using force, have arisen involving youth. Since 2000, with 9/11, the war on terror and the “Arab Spring,” Arab, and in particular Muslim youth have been conceived of globally as a risk in public discourse as well as in international and national policies.

In methodological terms, the dominant approach to the study of youth since the nineteenth century in the West has been psychological, although increasingly

sociological literatures exploring youth and social media/technology, education, and economics are developing. A review of conceptions of youth between 1964 and 2009 in the United States illustrates changes in the use of language used to denote the idea of youth (Lesko 2013). "Adolescents" as a term was commonly used between the 1960s and 1980s and continues to be used in disciplines aligned to psychology and medicine, while "youth" is the term used more commonly in education and the social sciences. Sociological literatures are increasingly challenging constructions of youth as a chronological age-based population, with the particularistic characteristics of middle-class, white and male masquerading as universalistic characteristics (Lesko 2013).

Youth studies in the Middle East context is largely framed in relation to socio-political and economic institutional concerns, for example, education and training to meet the needs of the labor market (Joseph 2011). These foci can be understood given the region's recent history as well as the central place of the family unit and the instrumental economic and social roles the family fulfills within Middle Eastern cultures (Joseph 2011). In addition, a major challenge faces policymakers in the region given the mismatch between the potentiality of a large young labor force, and being the region with the highest youth unemployment rate in the world (currently at 25%). The "mismatch between the skills accumulated through public investment in education on the one hand, and the available economic opportunities on the other" (Campante and Chor 2013), has been hypothesized to play a critical role in leading to political instability. The relationship between unemployment and the phenomenon of many educated, overqualified, and frustrated young people is significant here (Kiwani 2014). These points also relate to Joseph's (2011) notion of "waitthood" and adulthood being on hold.

Key concepts associated with youth globally include the notion of potentiality for the future in economic and developmental terms (Joseph 2011). On the other hand, there is a literature and dominant international public discourse of the "dangers" of youth (Beck 1998), associated with "moral" conceptions of citizenship where youth reflects a notion of "deficit" (Kiwani 2008). Other conceptions include the concern of the exclusion of youth and youth's "vulnerability." These varying albeit inter-related conceptions are reflected in international and national youth policies in a wide range of policy domains from health policy, to education policy, immigration policy, and well as community cohesion initiatives. The idea that youth is associated with "risk" or "danger" (Wyn 2011) is also evident in public discourses in Lebanon. Writing about youth in Lebanon in a postmodernist frame, Khalaf and Khalaf (2011) reflect on how youth identity "acquires a defiant posture" (p. 12). Yet at the same time, they note that a sizeable number of young people suffer psychological/behavioral disorders, as well as engage in risky activities or practices. Although defiant, youth also "need the comfort and solace of religious faith" (*ibid.*, p. 13). Bayat (2011, p. 13) calls this "creative inbetweenness" in order to describe how youth attempt to reconcile their "youthful desires... within the existing moral order" (p. 13). This conception reflects the point made by Bray-Collins (2016) that youth activism is not always progressive – a common assumption – and that in fact, in the Lebanese sectarian context, youth actually contribute to the reproduction and renewal of

sectarianism. The following section examines how activism is conceptualized in Lebanon, situated in relation to the socio-political context, and how this shapes understandings of youth and youth practices.

Conceptions and Practices of Activism

This section highlights the multiple and intersecting sites for activism in Lebanon, how activism is practiced through the lens of sectarianism and what counts as “politics,” and the effect of citizenship status on forms of activism. As noted in the introduction, there is a dominant international dimension to activism in Lebanon and the region. Western governments and international organizations have worked through local NGOs in promoting democracy through youth and gender participation initiatives. Research conducted on mapping philanthropic support for civic change has illustrated that civic change in the Arab world is also increasingly being supported by business leaders and transnational/diasporic organizations, as well as through Western governments and international organizations (Kiwan et al. 2014). While there is a growing literature on grassroots protests and movements, as well as more organized forms supporting civic change, the resilience of authoritarian, sectarian, and corrupt practices in politics is also well documented in the Arab world and Lebanon specifically (Pearlman 2013). The resilience of formal politics and its associated institutions can in part be attributed to disregard for electoral rules, co-opting of business elites, and the strength of state security institutions. Emigration has also been highlighted as playing an important role in perpetuating the structure and practice of politics in Lebanon, with over 25% of Lebanese nationals living outside of the country, and about 45% of Lebanese households having a family member who has emigrated abroad (Pearlman 2013). Effects on national politics and movements can be seen through the mechanisms of remittances – which contributes up to a quarter of Lebanon’s GDP, return migration and the shaping of ideological movements (Pearlman 2013). Pearlman (2013) proposes that emigration contributes to the resilience of existing politics and practices in Lebanon through ameliorating socio-economic hardship through remittances. In addition, local challenging conditions and the possibility of emigration provide an “opting out” option for disengagement, as opposed to local conditions contributing to agency and an impetus for change. Emigration is also a form of “brain drain.” In addition, the diasporic community directly props up the status quo through contributing financially to political parties.

In order to analyze the multiple and intersecting sites for activism in Lebanon, how activism is practiced, and what counts as “politics,” this chapter examines discourses and practices of sectarianism as a key lens through which to examine youth activism in Lebanon. While in political terms, sectarianism refers to political power-sharing between the dominant sects, it can be understood more holistically as a discourse arising out of a particular history and socio-political context which pervades contemporary Lebanese society. Bahlwan (2014, p. 28) describes “sectarianism” as being “political, institutional and affective,” best understood as a

“practice” (Makdisi 2000). Antisectarian movements have utilized the concept of “secularism” to denote politics separate from religion, and in this context is conceived as the means by which Lebanon can reach unity rising above “primitive” and “tribal” loyalties. Yet the assumed opposition between sectarianism and secularism is not so straightforward. Rather than being ruled by religious elites, Lebanon can be seen as a “secular oligarchy deriving its monopoly in politics and economy from the religious divisions” (Bahlawan 2014, p. 30). The content of sectarianism, as such, is not fixed, but can be thought of as a category with fluidity, that can be transformed over time.

Bray-Collins (2016) examines youth activism in three domains: on university campuses, as youth-led civil society movements, and in youth wings of political parties in Lebanon. She illustrates how youth contribute to the reproduction and renewal of sectarianism in politics, arguing against the idea that the resilience of sectarianism is due to elite manipulation. While activism is typically constructed as challenging the status quo within a progressive framework, the study of more “illiberal” forms, as with Bray-Collins, arguably complicates our conceptions of activism. While certainly there exists progressive forms of youth activism exist in Lebanon, Bray-Collins (2016) argues that such forms tend to capture the attention of scholars and the popular press. However, the reproduction of the status quo is not an exact copy of what has come before, but rather it is adapted to suit the interests and changing contexts of young people themselves. Even when the university campus context prohibits sectarian political parties from operating, student politics is organized very much through the structure of sectarian politics, using various strategies to work around these rules (Bray-Collins 2016). This sectarianism is also evident in youth-led civil society movements, where in fact an antisectarian framework was adopted which paradoxically served sectarian interests. Furthermore, the scope for autonomy is relatively more restricted within the youth wings of political parties where youth have been frustrated from introducing more substantive change (ibid., 2016).

Related to the contestation between sectarianism and secularism is the issue of what counts as politics. In public discourse, youth are often described as being politically apathetic, but this is often asserted in relation to narrow definitions of what counts as politics. In Lebanon, an antipolitics stance is typically equated with being against sectarianism and corruption (Kiwani 2017). Acting as an individual – as opposed to being an NGO or political party – is often also a part of this conception. Antipolitical approaches are criticized by some as avoiding the challenging issues and instead taking an instrumental or more technicist approach (Kiwani 2017). More positive accounts of civil society “apoliticality” in the Asian context, in contrast, propose that it can be understood as a response – usually under repressive regimes – to addressing social problems and bringing about social change under these conditions (Heaton Shrestha and Adhikari 2010). Here ethics is given primacy over politics, not merely that “apoliticality” is avoiding the real issues (Kiwani 2017).

After the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri in 2005, there was a surge of youth activism calling for reform and participatory democracy (Khalaf 2014). The

trend of heightened youth engagement subsequently waned, which Khalaf (2014) attributes to the dominance, intransigence, and corruption of formal politics. There is a wider pattern in the region of youth exclusion, as well as the exclusion of women from formal politics, where politics is typically controlled by family-based elites, authoritarian political parties, or the military (Joseph 2011; Kiwan 2015). Khalaf (2014, p. 99) describes as one response to this exclusionary politics how a hedonistic youth culture of defiance has developed in the form of the themes of “recreation, pleasure, self-indulgence, having fun and emigration” (Khalaf 2014, p. 99). These activities can also be seen as defiance of formal politics and the status quo, an example of the “antipolitical” stance discussed above. Concerns have been expressed of the dangers of such youth exclusion from formal politics; it has been argued that this creates a vulnerability which coupled with poor socio-economic prospects provides motivation and incentive to recruitment to extremist movements.

Activism through education in Lebanon – both formal and nonformal – is increasingly being recognized as a critical one for socio-political transformation and civic change (Kiwan 2014). Youth initiatives are a significant domain for funding, as already noted. With regards to initiatives for refugee youth, the United Nations Relief Works Agency (UNRWA) has been the main education provider for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, with UNRWA operating 69 schools in 12 camps across the country (UNRWA 2013). Fincham (2013) has examined constructions of citizenship for Palestinian youth living in the UNRWA refugee camps in Southern Lebanon, where she highlights how Palestinians are typically educated through the Lebanese curriculum, yet they are invisible in this curriculum. However, through the hidden curriculum, Palestinian identity is made visible through symbols such as maps and flags, as well as rituals, clothing and school activities. Beyond formal schooling, the mosque, the local community, and social media are nonformal sites for citizenship learning and activism. Youth encounter the contradictions between formal education for citizenship with an emphasis on peace-building and promoting unity and informal learning within divided communities in Lebanon as a postconflict society. The ongoing Syrian refugee crisis has resulted in over 300,000 Syrian school age children out of school in Lebanon (Watkins 2013). Educational programs offered through NGO initiatives for refugees are framed in terms of an “education in emergencies” paradigm typically focusing access to schooling, psychological counseling, and community integration.

Examples of Youth Activism

As previously argued, examining youth activism within its socio-political context is critical in contributing to situated understandings of youth activism, and further our understanding more universally of youth activism. This section outlines four examples of contemporary youth activism in Lebanon, across a range of domains. These include: (i) gender justice work, (ii) trash protests, (iii) environmental protests, and (iv) bloggers/social media commentators. These examples illustrate the need for

socio-political and historical contextualization in nuancing conceptions of youth and activism in Lebanon.

Gender Justice Work

“Nasawiya” was set up as a feminist collective, made up of a range of people from different backgrounds, united through their marginalization, including students and professionals, single mothers, refugees, migrant workers, sex-workers, those of nonconforming genders and sexuality. The collective describe themselves as a “group of young feminists who are working together to recreate a world free from sexism, and all other forms of exploitations and discriminations that collaborate with it: classism, heterosexism, racism, capitalism, etc. We see all these problems as interrelated and equally oppressive, yet we insist on addressing them from a progressive grassroots feminist perspective” (Nasawiya 2018). Nasawiya has engaged in a range of initiatives such as training programs for women to learn how to bring about social change, whether through legal reform, grassroots campaigning, or becoming involved in formal politics. Another program focused on ICT in promoting women’s careers in technology, as well as learning how to use ICT in support of feminist change. Resources such as “Sawt al Niswa” is a web-based resource to pool knowledge, while “Feminist House” provides a physical space for women to meet for various activities, and the Women’s Resource Centre holds documents, newspapers, and online resources. Nasawiya is also known for its sexual harassment awareness-raising campaign called “The Adventures of Salwa” in the form of a series of videos. Nasawiya also takes part in International Women’s Day and the annual march for secularism.

Trash Protests

In Beirut in July 2015, a landfill just south of the capital Beirut closed as it had reached capacity, and the government did not extend the contract of the private company in charge of trash collection. As trash piled up on the streets with no solution in sight, protests erupted. These protests were not only about a problem of waste management, but were an expression of people’s despair with political corruption, business interests, and sectarianism. The trash protests illustrate a tension in approaches, where some actors focused on the technicalities of waste management, framing their activism as “nonpolitical.” In contrast, others argued that the trash problem is the embodiment of the failure of the political system in Lebanon.

Individual activists, NGOs working on gender and LGBTQ issues, refugees’ rights, youth participation, artists, and ordinary members from all social classes of the general public protested in a variety of creative and emotive ways, including cultural production, the use of social media, as well as hunger strikes, artistic interventions, political cartoons, and political songs (Kiwani 2017). Interviewing activists on their understandings of social change, particular emphasis was given

to the notion of protest as a process with no quick results. The idea of contributing to social change and activism was also conceived of as a way of living rather than a discrete activity (Kiwan 2017). In addition, many activists viewed a range of social justice issues as interconnected and stressed the concomitant importance of raising awareness and changing attitudes as well as working within formal structures for reform. Activism was not solely viewed as acting to ensure a demand is met, but to redefine how issues are publicly understood – a contribution to the production of knowledge (Kiwan 2017). The emotional nature of protest was emphasized as playing an important role, evident in a range of public artistic interventions, for example, the “Beirut Wall,” so dubbed in reference to the Berlin Wall which was erected on 24th August after the street protests of the 23rd August. This was mocked across social media, and in addition, the artist Philippe Farhat responded by painting pictures of people with their mouths taped shut with the names of the political parties on the tape (International Business Times 2015).

Environmental Activism

Environmental concerns are a significant area of activism in Lebanon since the end of the civil war. Activities include nature conservation, youth hiking and camping, and campaigning for public access to green spaces. Environmental discourse in postcolonial contexts reflects both anticolonial resistance and attempts at neo-colonial control. Nagel and Staeheli (2016) examine how environmentalism in Lebanon is informed by Western-educated activists working in international NGOs. They highlight how green space is theorized as a neutral site for promoting intersectorian cohesion and therefore is seen as promoting national cohesion and citizenship. For example, there has been a campaign to open “Horsh Beirut” one of the few green spaces in the city. Yet the history of “Horsh” during the civil war has been a specter over the campaign, with Nagel and Staeheli (2016, p. 255) noting on interviewing activists that “the park was reportedly used as a dumping ground for bodies during the civil war, and many of the trees were destroyed during the war for use as fuel. After the war, the French government sponsored reforestation efforts, but the park has remained mostly inaccessible to the public, except for occasional, planned events.” Horsh Beirut is now imagined as a nonsectarian space. Yet similar to the arguments made by Bray-Collins (2016), Nagel and Staeheli (2016) suggest that Lebanese environmentalism cannot stand outside of the frame of sectarianism, despite efforts (in some cases) to dismantle it. Environmental activists typically frame their activism as “nonpolitical,” as also seen in the discussion on the trash protests. This attempt to dissociate from the sectarian political system idealizes the environment as a nonsectarian domain. Yet activism in this field becomes contested by a range of actors, the government, activists themselves, and foreign funders, and as such is highly political in that it is proposing a new political vision (Nagel and Staeheli 2016). Rather than overcoming sectarian politics, environmental activists are enmeshed in its political dynamics.

Bloggers/Social Media

Blogging is a relatively new phenomenon in the region, with blogging taking off in Lebanon after 2005 following the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri and a second wave of blogging after the Israeli war of 2006 (Riegert and Ramsay 2012). In their study of bloggers in 2010 and 2011, Riegert and Ramsay (2012) identified several well-known and popular bloggers and found several common themes, notably the criticism of the sectarian political system, violations of human rights, and challenging Lebanese social and religious norms relating to gender, sexuality, and the environment. Also of note are the intersecting sites at the local, national, and transnational levels, with key transnational themes identified relate to the Palestinian cause, critiques of Arab leaders as lacking legitimacy, and environmental activism. In addition, the blurring of entertainment/humor and politics characterizes many of the blogs. Riegert and Ramsay (2012) propose these blogs construct an “alternative” or “counter” public allowing for the expression of civic activism. Bloggers describe their motivations as creating a space to express themselves and expressing frustration with mainstream media, typically aligned with the different political parties/sects.

Youth-generated media is another arena of youth activism in Lebanon. Focusing on the July 2006 war with Israel, Khalil (2012) examines how youth blur traditional and newer forms of media creating their own narratives challenging dominant political, religious, and social institutions. These include Facebook, Twitter, blogs, graffiti, songs, and videos. Khalil (2012) argues that these forms go beyond the concept of “citizen journalism” to provide a medium for collective youth activism.

These examples illustrate a range of dynamic forms of youth activism in Lebanon. While a dominant theme of the trash protests and of environmental activism more broadly use a discourse of anti-sectarianism, activists cannot stand outside of the political frame of sectarianism in Lebanon, even when appealing to “secular” politics. It is also evident that activism often takes an intersectional form, with a range of different interest groups joining forces, and a range of new media and technology are utilized in challenging dominant discourses, often with humor. In considering young people’s responses to a restrictive political order, another dominant theme can also be seen in the discourse of “antipolitics,” evident on the one hand in actors focusing on technical solutions to societal problems, while in other cases, youth seemingly rejecting politics for leisure, material consumption, and risky acts of “defiance” (Khalaf 2014).

Concluding Thoughts

This chapter has examined youth activism in Lebanon, taking into account the wider regional context of the Arab uprisings, Lebanon being a postconflict divided society, having a large youthful population, as well as a large population of Palestinian and Syrian refugees. Recognizing the socially constructed nature of the concepts of “youth” and “activism,” this chapter argues for a historically, socially, and politically contextualized examination of youth activism in Lebanon. As such, this approach challenges understandings of youth constructed purely in terms of chronological age.

In addition, given that formal education for citizenship in Lebanon emphasizes knowledge of political institutions and the inculcation of patriotism, the chapter highlights that there is more scope for learning about active citizenship through nonformal contexts in civil society. Yet rather than Western democracy promotion youth initiatives being the “magic bullet against Arab autocracy” (Yom 2005, p. 16), such attempts to pedagogically “govern” citizens do not necessarily go to plan (Clarke 2010; Pykett 2010; Staeheli and Hammett 2013). Young people use the skills gained through such initiatives and are self-directed in applying this learning to domains of concern to themselves, as exemplified for example in the campaigning for civil marriage initiative (Staeheli and Hammett 2013).

While not always conforming to traditional constructions of “activism,” some of the activities discussed in this chapter can be understood as forms of agency in resisting the political status quo. Such acts also can challenge commonly accepted understandings of what counts as “politics.” An expanded construct of politics refers to those “acts” through which young people construct their subjectivity in the public sphere, rather than indicating political apathy. Highlighting the importance of understanding the transnationality of activism, the assumption that youth is associated with progressiveness is also highlighted in this context.

The contextualized examples of youth activism challenge dominant approaches to the study of politics, political action, and activism in the Arab world which has largely been through the lens of democratization or “transitology” – where events are interpreted as developing in a linear fashion from authoritarian rule towards liberal democracy (Cavatorta 2012). The study of youth activism in Lebanon contributes towards the challenge of this paradigm. Indeed, it is being argued that a new political subjectivity is emerging, characterized as “reflexive individualism” (Hanafi 2012), distinct from neoliberal conceptualizations of individualism “predicated on anti-patriarchal, anti-tribe, anti-community or anti-party sentiments” (p. 198). Both Khalaf’s (2014) and Bray-Collins’ (2016) work illustrate this reflexive individualism. In addition, new paradigms of “citizenship after orientalism” offer innovative ways of thinking about how citizenship is understood outside of Western contexts (Isin 2008, 2012). Isin (2008, 2009) challenges traditional constructions of citizenship in purely legalistic terms, through his concept of “acts” of citizenship, whereby those who are socially and legally excluded, such as marginalized youth, refugees, or illegal immigrants, “act” in the public sphere whereby they constitute themselves as political actors (Kiwan 2016b). Through a lens of “acts of citizenship” that challenges traditional notions of citizenship defined solely in terms of legal and political membership and traditional forms of civic participation, the contextualized examples of youth activism in Lebanon challenge our understandings of youth engagement in the public sphere.

Cross-References

- ▶ [Education for Youth Civic and Political Action in Australia](#)
- ▶ [The Development of Civic Participation Among Youth in Singapore](#)

- ▶ Youth Civic Engagement and Formal Education in Canada: Shifting Expressions, Associated Challenges
- ▶ Youth Engagement and Citizenship in England

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Inequality, Civic Education and Intended Future Civic Engagement: An Examination of Research in Western Democracies

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Abstract

All educational systems *socialize* young people to become active members of their society. Schools are expected to teach “active citizenship,” “civics” or “social education.” The *context* of this type of socialization may however differ. Differences in individual resources, institutional and/or contextual settings are at the core of social inequalities. Existing research suggests that patterns of social inequality influence the *outcomes* of civic education. Research has also begun to report the *consequences* of inequalities for civic engagement. The effects of social inequality are visible in a gap between more and less civically engaged pupils that is already present at secondary school age. The unequal civic engagement in adolescence tends to linger until adult age. The inability of these civically disadvantaged groups to actively voice their concerns questions the legitimacy and stability of democratic systems that aim to be representative and responsive.

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This chapter reviews recent scholarship linking forms of academic and social inequality, unequal civic outcomes, and civic education for secondary school students in Western societies. Implications for future research and challenges ahead are also identified.

Keywords

Social inequality · Civic education · Western Europe · Secondary school · Civic engagement

Introduction

With the seminal work of Almond and Verba (1963), scholars of democracy became aware of a key task of modern democracies: to promote and sustain a “civic culture.” Educational systems in democratic countries have the fundamental task of *socializing* young people, preparing them for an adult life as full and equal citizens. Schools are explicitly expected to equip children with the necessary knowledge and skills to become active members of their society. In most school systems, schools try to reach this goal through “active citizenship,” “civics” or “social education” courses and/or by adopting a cross-curricular approach to reach the same goals (Schulz et al. 2017).

Empirical evidence, however, suggests that some young people benefit more from civic activities than others. That is, some children have more opportunities and tend to become more active than their peers. This “civic empowerment gap” can be found across all domains of civic outcomes: knowledge, skills, and, attitudes and behavior. This gap runs along most salient social divides in each society (Levinson 2010). Levinson, for example, has reported extensive differences in participation and knowledge according to the social-economic “usual suspects,” such as ethnicity, gender, immigrant background and/or socioeconomic status. As a result, minorities, immigrants and socio-economically disadvantaged citizens tend to be less civically engaged than those from dominant and socio-economically advantaged backgrounds. Brady et al. (2015) corroborated this finding, documenting an intergenerational pattern of reproduction of unequal competencies.

These differences in civic empowerment and engagement according to social background have been a source of growing concern in established democracies. That is, there is concern that those groups which are already disadvantaged by social structures (e.g., those that have lower status and/or fewer resources), tend, by this “deficit” in skills, knowledge, participation, attitudes etc., to also lack political representation. The inability of these groups to actively voice concerns has, however, implications for the legitimacy and stability of democratic systems that aim to be representative and responsive (Dahl 2007; Levinson 2010; Lijphart 1997; Putnam 2000; Sloam 2016; Verba et al. 1995, 2003).

This chapter examines recent scholarly literature linking issues of inequality, citizenship and civic education at secondary school level, in Western consolidated democracies (the United States and Western Europe). In part, this is a pragmatic

choice, considering the amount and accessibility of research from a global perspective. The choice is, however, also driven by theoretical concerns. Western democracies share similar country-level factors linked to differences in civic outcomes such as political regime and economic development (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Isac et al. 2014; Schulz et al. 2011). Western democracies also experience similar issues that can lead to unequal youth civic engagement, for example: growing immigration, segregation, low voter turnout and political disengagement of youngsters in conventional forms of political participation (Delli Carpini 2000; Putnam 2000).

This review focuses on the secondary school level. Although academic and social inequality can emerge at all educational levels, both forms of inequality tend to intersect and reinforce each other after grade 6 in most educational systems (Driessen et al. 2008; Boone and Van Houtte 2013). One of the defining moments is the emergence of separate tracks according to levels of academic achievement. In some early tracking (streaming) systems (such as in Austria or some German *länder*) this occurs at the age of 9 and becomes more prominent at the transition from primary to secondary school. In other systems, tracking tends to be organized at the secondary school level. It is also at the secondary level (after grade 6) that courses specifically designed to promote civic content are more commonly found. The secondary school also encompasses adolescence, which is a crucial developmental stage for civic attitudes and beliefs (Flanagan and Sherrod 1998; Hoskins et al. 2017; Sears and Brown 2013).

The current review includes only those studies that discuss the interrelationship between the variables of interest: civic education, inequality and civic outcomes (knowledge, attitudes and behavior). In general, studies that examine the link between civic education, inequality and citizenship focus on the effect of different sources and contexts of inequality on civic outcomes. A way to classify these studies is to look at the identified *source of inequality*. Inequality can, after all, be attributed to a difference in individual resources, but can also be the result of the institutional setting and differences in the contexts of socialization. The next paragraphs look at these different approaches.

The Individual Resources Approach

One body of research focuses on the impact of demographic characteristics or social markers on the degree of civic engagement of youngsters. Differences in “civic outcomes,” such as participation in elections, are found to be influenced by the *individual resources* available to young people. These resources are linked to socioeconomic status, immigrant background, ethnicity, gender and age (Levinson 2010; Verba et al. 1995). Variations in access to resources such as money, knowledge, networks etc. are at the core of differences in civic engagement among adults (Leighley and Nagler 2014; Schlozman et al. 2012; Verba et al. 1995, 2003) and adolescents (Hooghe and Dassonneville 2013; Isac et al. 2014).

Since the sources of inequality in this view depend heavily on “ascribed” (as opposed to achieved) conditions, civic outcomes tend to be skewed from the

start (Verba et al. 2003). Not only are the differences in resources and opportunities to be civically engaged unequally distributed, low patterns of participation also tend to be reproduced from generation to generation in the disadvantaged groups (Schlozman et al. 2012). The role of education in overcoming unequal civic outcomes is limited, according to this view, because early childhood factors are seen as the most determining influence in the political socialization of youngsters. Institutional aspects, such as factors related to the educational system, are considered only as proxies for social markers of difference (see Persson 2012).

Research addressing the issue of inequality in civic outcomes has stressed the role of socioeconomic status (SES) as the most relevant factor explaining, for example, conventional forms of political participation (Brady et al. 2015; Verba et al. 1995, 2003). Degrees of political participation vary systematically by social class or socioeconomic status; members of the lower social strata tend to be less inclined to vote, while the propensity to vote increases on the higher rungs of the socio-economic ladder (Verba et al. 1995). Resources in terms of time, money and civic skills, and opportunities to learn and exercise these skills, are consequently seen as important conditions in relation to voting or other forms of conventional political participation (Verba et al. 1995, 2003). This “civic gap” has also been found for adolescents. Using the International Civics and Citizenship education Study 2009-data (ICCS 2009), which surveyed pupils in grade 8 in 43 countries, several studies found that children with a higher socioeconomic status tend to express more intentions of future electoral participation (Hooghe and Dassonneville 2013), exhibited a higher intended participation in political and social activities and reported a higher degree of “civic knowledge” than their low SES peers (Isac et al. 2014; Manganelli et al. 2014).

Studies aiming to test the potential role of schools in mitigating SES-based civic inequalities have examined Campbell’s (2008) *compensation hypothesis* of education. This is the (testable) assumption that schools and elements from the schooling environment can compensate for the resources offered at home. In a single-country case study, the presence of an “open classroom climate,” as the degree to which classrooms are receptive to the discussion of social and political issues, was found to address some elements of the civic competence gap between high and low SES pupils in the Czech Republic (Kudrnáč and Lyons 2017). This compensation effect did not, however, pertain for all civic outcomes. Low SES pupils tended to benefit more from an open climate classroom, but this improved their chances of matching high SES civic outcomes only regarding future electoral participation, and did not make up for lower degrees of civic knowledge and other forms of political participation. While the compensation hypothesis emphasizes the potential of education to reduce political inequality, using a cross-national study, Hooghe and Dassonneville (2013) found an *accelerating effect* of education. More advantaged pupils benefit *more* from civic education, which fosters their intended electoral participation. Further research seems necessary to determine whether the compensation or the acceleration effect prevails, under what circumstances, but also for what types of civic outcomes.

A second individual characteristic related to differences in civic outcomes is the immigrant background of children and adolescents. Analyses using the 1999 CIVED (US and Swedish sample) and 2009 ICCS (full sample)-data (both samples targeted

at grade 8 pupils), show that immigrant pupils tend to exhibit less civic knowledge (Barber et al. 2015; Friedman et al. 2013; Isac et al. 2014). This holds true for both first and second-generation students (Friedman et al. 2013). A more disputed issue is whether there is a participation gap between immigrant and non-immigrant pupils. Across the ICCS 2009 participating countries, immigrant students showed lower levels of intended participation in political and social activities (Isac et al. 2014). Using the same data, immigrant pupils were found to have on average stronger intentions to participate in political activities and informal political activities, but lesser intentions to engage in future electoral activities than non-immigrant pupils (Friedman et al. 2013). Studies using survey data found that young immigrants in three European countries (Belgium, Germany and Turkey) tend to be more civically engaged in less institutional and conventional forms of political participation than their native peers (Eckstein et al. 2015). US-Survey data found, however, that pupils of non-white minority groups show higher intentions of future electoral participation (Cohen and Chaffee 2013).

While the presence of an open classroom climate (for example, a climate which is student-centred and encourages discussion) has received some attention, the association between ethnicity and civic pedagogical practices has scarcely been researched in the European context. The limited amount of existing research suggests that civic educational practices foster different civic outcomes for ethnic minority pupils. For example, a single case-study in Germany found that an open classroom climate was related to political attentiveness and political trust, but not to the civic engagement or collective efficacy of minority groups (in this case, the sizeable Turkish community in Germany) (Jugert et al. 2016). More knowledgeable immigrant pupils were found to be influenced by their family context (speaking the dominant educational language, discussing politics at home), while their attitudes were stimulated by certain school conditions (again, the presence of an open classroom climate for discussion) (Barber et al. 2015). To conclude, there is a considerable degree of variation in the *types* of civic outcomes (knowledge, attitudes, behavior), the ethnicity or origin of the immigrant populations (Turks, North-African, other “non-white minority groups”) and the “host society” (Western-European welfare states, Turkey, international comparative) that is examined. Patterns of political participation of immigrant youngsters, thus, need to be further examined considering these substantial differences in predictors, contexts and generation of the immigrant adolescents. These factors are heavily influenced by the status of a minority group in the hosting society and related to differences experienced by different generations (Wray-Lake et al. 2015).

Together with social class, gender-differences have been extensively reported in the empirical literature on political participation (see Andersen 1975; Campbell and Wolbrecht 2006; Hahn 1998; Kent-Jennings 1983; Verba et al. 1995). Gender differences in political participation seem to be diminishing over time in Western countries (Marien et al. 2010). More recent studies, however, suggest that gender remains a factor associated with unequal civic outcomes among adolescents. 2016 ICCS data revealed that while girls have higher levels of civic knowledge than boys, female students have lower expectations of future political involvement than their male counterparts (Schulz et al. 2017). Similarly, a cross-national study in Europe

using 2009 ICCS data has found that intentions of future electoral participation are higher among girls than boys. However, girls are less willing to run as candidates in elections. Here, an open classroom climate positively contributed to voting intentions, but not to the intention to be a candidate (Hooghe and Dassonneville 2013). It therefore does not influence the dimension in which girls lag behind in political participation. The results reveal a gap in political representation along gender lines, mainly on guaranteeing female inclusion in elected positions. Other single-country studies found no significant differences in civic engagement between boys and girls (Manganelli et al. 2014).

Studies starting from an individual resources perspective have not reached a consensus regarding the most important predictor of unequal civic outcomes. This could be due to the disparate ways in which the social markers of difference are applied. In addition, there are deficiencies in the methods used to test the effect of belonging to these social categories. These categories are analyzed in isolation from each other and are primarily understood as individual features. They are detached from the wider settings in which they are embedded. However, markers of social differences are highly dependent on the broader societal, economic and cultural context. Moreover, instead of being static, these factors are relational and evolve along with the surrounding context(s)- thus necessitating an analysis that jointly considers all the social markers and their interactions with different contexts of political socialization (family, school, neighborhood, etc.). This kind of analysis can help us understand mechanisms of inequality (Bukodi et al. 2018), but will also provide insight into how education could compensate for inequalities.

The Institutional Resources Approach

A second approach conceives of inequality as linked to differences generated by the institutional context. The features of the educational system are considered to be salient in shaping inequalities between youngsters. This more recent approach has revealed the school to operate in a context in which different levels and sources of inequality intersect. These studies have highlighted that structural features of educational systems can reinforce or mitigate the unequal effects of social background on civic outcomes. Within this approach, studies can focus on the *structure* or the *functioning* of the educational system as a source of inequality. If they refer to the structure, they focus on the stratification (tracking/streaming) of the educational system. If they refer to the functioning of the educational system, they focus on the level of standardization of curricula and the access to learning practices which promote civic involvement.

Stratification and studies on educational stratification are longstanding (one might say since Durkheim 1925, 1938). Marxist scholars such as Bowles and Gintis (1976) saw the educational system as an essential cog for Capitalist societies, since schools were tailored to fuel the economy by providing an educated workforce and by reproducing an ethos fit for the economy. Schools are seen as having an explicit function to reproduce the system (Bourdieu and Passeron 1999-orig. 1970) or to

sustain the hegemony (Gramsci 1978 – see for an overview Kavadias 2004). These studies tend to disregard civic education in schools as a field of inquiry, since civic education is only destined to produce a form of ‘false consciousness’.

Recently the role of stratification and stratification patterns in schools have been examined in relation to unequal civic outcomes. This body of studies has emerged mainly focusing on Western Europe, where the tracking system is characteristic of certain secondary school-systems. Studies in this tradition have attempted to disentangle the effect of tracking on civic and political engagement. They diverge on whether the effect of tracking is independent from social markers (Hoskins et al. 2014; Janmaat et al. 2014; Kavadias et al. 2017; van de Werfhorst 2017) or whether it reflects early socialization factors (Persson 2012, 2015). If indeed civic inequalities are due to the features of the educational system, as the former perspective argues, then education can have a role in mitigating those inequalities. Those studies seem to suggest that late tracking (comprehensive secondary school systems) can be beneficial for disadvantaged groups. However, if these inequalities are merely the result of pre-school factors, as the later perspective suggests, this would imply that education cannot compensate for these differences between social groups. Children from less advantaged backgrounds will always perform worse on these indicators.

Cross-national studies along the first line argue that early tracking systems are stratified contexts that can lead to unequal civic outcomes. Tracks separate (or segregate) children by academic merit, but achievement is in itself determined by social background (Hoskins et al. 2014; Kavadias et al. 2017; Witschge and van de Werfhorst 2016). These studies however, differ in the mechanisms that are said to explain this civic gap. The features studied include the timing of the sorting into tracks; the extent of the tracked curriculum; the vocational orientation of the educational system; the civic-related content and skills (the degree of standardization) learned in each of the tracks; the social status ascribed to different tracks; the overwhelming allocation of low SES pupils to vocational tracks; and their rigid separation.

Differences in the curriculum (less critical and politically-oriented content in the vocational tracks) and in peer socialization (disproportionate allocation of low SES to the vocational tracks/social segregation) between pupils in the academic and vocational track have been found to explain inequality in civic outcomes. This gap is present for electoral participation in England (Janmaat et al. 2014) and in 24 European countries for civic engagement (electoral participation, political interest and political activism) (van de Werfhorst 2017). The findings of these studies imply that different tracks do not provide equal skills and opportunities to build the networks that are key for civic engagement.

Cross-national variations in the institutional features of the educational systems have also been found to impact on the extent of the civic gap between tracks. School systems differ in the age (timing) when pupils are sorted into tracks and the duration of the tracking. Systems with early tracking are those when separation occurs in the transition between the primary and secondary school -such as those in Germany, Austria and Flanders (Belgium)-, and late tracking if this separation takes place along the secondary school -such as England or Sweden-. The earlier the sorting of

pupils (Janmaat 2011; Kavadias et al. 2017) and the lengthier the tracked curriculum (van de Werfhorst 2017) – which both result in higher levels of school segregation – the more pronounced the civic engagement gap between tracks has been found to be (Janmaat 2011; van de Werfhorst 2017). In addition, earlier and lengthier tracking has been found to correlate with more negative attitudes towards immigrants and ethnic minorities across European countries (Kavadias et al. 2017).

Educational systems also differ in the status that distinct tracks have within society. A comparative study in Western Europe (Denmark, England and Germany) on upper-secondary education found that differences in civic outcomes between academic and vocational tracks are related to the status assigned to each of the tracks in the different national contexts (Hoskins et al. 2014). In countries where the vocational track has high social prestige – such as in Denmark or Germany – the relationship between vocational education and unequal voting intentions is less strong. However, in contexts where the vocational track has a low social status – such as in England – pupils following the vocational track express lower voting intentions than those in academic track. Previous experiences of inequality in the educational system may be the mechanism that links feelings of pessimism among pupils in vocational tracks with a lower sense of general and political efficacy and lower voting intentions (Hoskins et al. 2014).

The status of an educational track does not depend solely on features of the educational system, but also on the institutional set-up of the welfare state and political economy. The negative status associated with vocational education is not present in countries, such as Germany or the Netherlands, that have extensive vocational programs (van de Werfhorst 2017), and small income differentials between graduates of the vocational and academic tracks (Österman 2018). Studies occupied with examining the durability of the effects of the tracking system have conducted longitudinal (Janmaat et al. 2014) and panel studies (Quintelier and Hooghe 2013). Both types of studies have found that political inequality driven by the tracking system extends after pupils are no longer exposed to it.

Overall, these studies contribute to the argument that inequalities in civic outcomes, though related to background differences and pre-school socialization factors, are not entirely explained by these. A main problem of these findings is that most of the studies did not control for levels of the outcome variable prior to the sorting into tracks (e.g., Janmaat et al. 2014), though some have overcome data limitations with qualitative interviews (Hoskins et al. 2014). The studies suggest a direct effect of tracking because there is no effect of SES on the studied civic outcomes (Hoskins et al. 2014); the inclusion of SES does not eliminate the effect of the tracking system on civic outcomes, and/or this civic gap is not only explained by differences between tracks but also by institutional differences in the degree of tracking (weaker or stronger) among educational systems (van de Werfhorst 2017). Nonetheless, with this research design, the net effect of the tracking system is difficult to disentangle from that of SES (Persson 2012).

Conversely, studies in line with an early socialization perspective have tested the direct causal effect of the type of education on intended political participation (Langton and Jennings 1968; Persson 2012, 2015; Sears and Funk 1999).

Differences in intended political participation are present before students get allocated to distinct tracks. This body of research suggests that differential civic outcomes are not related to the educational context of the tracks, but rather to background differences (such as SES) that were present *before* the allocation to different tracks in secondary school. These studies, however, draw on a non-representative sample from a single country and have not yet found extensive evidence in cross-national studies.

Literature concerned with studying the *functioning* of the educational system as source of inequality has further investigated the “civic learning opportunity gap” argument raised by Kahne and Middaugh (2008). There is increasing concern regarding how differential access to civic learning opportunities, their content and level of standardization are related to unequal civic outcomes and their offset.

In this line of inquiry, one perspective has investigated the relationship between the *standardization* of the citizenship education curriculum and unequal civic outcomes. Citizenship education is extremely variable from country to country in terms of standardization, i.e., the degree of centralization and the accountability of the educational system. Results from a European cross-national study showed that the centralization component is linked to less inequality in non-cognitive civic outcomes (interest in social and political issues and participation in the community). The more centralized the curriculum, the less differences in non-cognitive outcomes. The “accountability component,” has been measured by the level of sanctions and rewards of an educational system for the performances on the civic education outcomes. Systems with a high external accountability are *less* equal in cognitive civic outcomes. Researchers have suggested that more external accountability enhances the competition between schools, which make differences in school resources more salient: schools with more resources tend to use those resources to outperform the other schools (Witschge and van de Werfhorst 2016).

Another perspective in this area concerns *access* to learning practices which seek to promote civic participation. Inequality here is related to access to pedagogical practices that are more relevant for enhancing civic outcomes. From this perspective, initial civic outcomes are primarily shaped by family SES, creating a civic engagement gap, where low SES pupils tend to be less politically engaged. Education can *compensate or increase* this gap, depending on whether disadvantaged youngsters gain more from civic pedagogical practices. Disadvantaged youngsters are defined by a low SES and by having less access to political learning resources at home, inversely advantaged youngsters have a higher SES and more opportunities for political learning at home and, thus, they are better prepared for political engagement (Eckstein and Noack 2016; Hoskins et al. 2017; Schlozman et al. 2012). Although formal citizenship education, an open climate classroom and political activities in school foster civic engagement of pupils (voting intentions), only formal citizenship education was found to reduce this gap between SES groups of adolescents in England (Hoskins et al. 2017). The findings can be explained by the compulsory nature of citizenship education in England, which does not exhibit an unequal access by socioeconomic background. The presence of an open classroom climate can be predicated on the school resources or pupils composition, while the participation in

voluntary political activities, can be influenced by socioeconomic background of the pupil. The potential of citizenship education to reduce social disparities in intended electoral participation found in this study cannot, however, be generalized, since these strategies, and whether or not they are compulsory, differ across countries. It is also difficult to discern the durability of the effects, namely whether they will remain even after pupils are no longer exposed to the pedagogical intervention in question.

Studies analyzing the structural features of the educational system linked to unequal civic outcomes conclude that education has a role to play in addressing the civic gap linked to social background. After all, some of the inequality is explained by the institutional features of the educational system. Existing studies also show that in educational contexts, unequal civic outcomes do not only depend on the socioeconomic status of students and they are related to the structure and functioning of the institutional setting (Bukodi et al. 2018; Hoskins et al. 2014; Janmaat et al. 2014; Kavadias et al. 2017; Österman 2018; van de Werfhorst 2017). Policy implications thus converge on standardization of the curricula with higher levels of centralization (Witschge and van de Werfhorst 2016). These studies also highlight the importance of compulsory approaches in guaranteeing equal access to different strategies of civic related education to compensate for a civic engagement gap between advantaged and disadvantaged pupils (Hoskins et al. 2017).

A Multi-Layered Approach

Recently some studies have amplified the scope of possible factors that lead to unequal civic outcomes. The predominant focus on individual level variables has been expanded to consider other settings, beyond the school, where these factors can intersect, including the neighborhood or the national context. This kind of approach identifies not only separate sources/contexts of inequality. It also considers a *multi-layered interaction between the different contexts* in which youngsters' political socialization and civic engagement takes place (Wilkenfeld and Torney-Purta 2012).

These studies, in addition to demographic variables, examine contexts relevant for political socialization, such as the family, peers, civic learning experiences in school and the neighborhood. This multi-layered approach embraces a broader view of the political socialization process, recognizing that the socialization that takes place both in the family context (primary socialization) and in the school or the neighborhood context (secondary socialization) are all relevant for civic outcomes (Corsaro 2010; Lenzi et al. 2012; Mahatmya and Lohman 2012; Rossi et al. 2016; Wilkenfeld and Torney-Purta 2012).

These studies stress the importance of considering multiple contexts of socialization and demographic variables in order to obtain a full picture of the primary and secondary factors that explain different pathways of civic involvement. Within this body of research, family, school, and neighborhood features were found to be associated with civic involvement in adolescence in a cross-national study (Lenzi et al. 2012), a country-study in Italy (Rossi et al. 2016) and in early adulthood in a US longitudinal study (Mahatmya and Lohman 2012). However, these associations

were either stronger at the contextual level and varied across countries (Lenzi et al. 2012), or were found to depend on neighborhood, gender and ethnicity features (Mahatmya and Lohman 2012).

By focusing on different levels of analysis and socialization contexts, these studies are more suitable to identify elements that can be a source of inequality or can compensate for unequal civic outcomes. This argument is based on the idea that disadvantage or lack of resources of one type can be replaced by resources of another type (e.g. civic skills, knowledge, competencies provided by education can compensate for lesser economic resources) or by resources from another source or context (e.g., peers, school) (Erola and Kilpi-Jakonen 2017).

In a US-study using survey data, pupils with a profile of accumulated disadvantages (poor school, neighborhood and low SES) were found to benefit more from civic learning opportunities than pupils that are well off: the gap in cognitive civic outcomes tends to be less pronounced in schools providing more learning opportunities, while they were wider in the schools lacking these opportunities (Wilkenfeld and Torney-Purta 2012). Schools, thus, have the potential to narrow this gap through conducive civic learning strategies.

Key Challenges for Further Research

Although a growing body of studies has examined the link between inequality, education and civic outcomes, the evidence is not conclusive. Differences across studies draw attention to the methodological challenges and shortcomings. Many of these studies make causal inferences based on cross-sectional correlations. They do however not conform to a design appropriate to test causality and the effectiveness of pedagogical interventions. Ideally, future studies should consider longitudinal, panel or experimental designs.

Another issue facing these studies is the lack of uniform operationalization of key explanatory variables (e.g., socioeconomic status) and outcome variables (such as, political participation). The lack of uniform operationalization of key variables makes it difficult to identify clearly the mechanisms leading to civic inequality. Measurements of civic outcomes concentrate on traditional forms of political participation, such as intended voting. Fewer studies measure non-conventional forms of participation, illegal forms of participation or a combination of these (Persson 2012). A disproportionate focus on traditional forms of political participation can be problematic, since youngsters tend to be underrepresented in these forms of participation (Delli Carpini 2000; Putnam 2000; O'Toole et al. 2003) and instead may use alternative channels as their preferred form of engagement (Amnå and Ekman 2014; Sloam 2016).

Questions about the external validity of indicators of political participation have also been raised, for example, in relation to how measurements of intended participation materialize in actual participation (Persson 2012). Nonetheless, these concerns are not widely discussed in the literature since there is a shared assumption that the impressionable years for political socialization are the pre-adult years. However,

to draw conclusions as to the effectiveness of civic learning practices in promoting participation, measurements must be validated with reported political behavior in adulthood.

Conclusion

In reviewing existing literature, this chapter has examined the manifold explanations that recent scholarship has given for unequal civic outcomes in youngsters. These explanations have been linked to features at the individual, the institutional or the multi-context levels. These three approaches share the assumptions that the formative years are the most relevant for people's political socialization and that pre-adult factors and experiences account for differences in adult civic and political engagement. While in general terms, political and civic knowledge, attitudes and competencies are understood to be acquired primarily during childhood or adolescence and are viewed as leading to relatively stable pattern of civic engagement in adult life, the assumed durability of the effects of these early socialization processes (in the family or in the school context, for example) is still mostly untested. There are no conclusive findings in this regard, and most of the studies face the challenge of drawing conclusions from cross-sectional data that are not suited to perform a longitudinal analysis.

Within the studies surveyed in this chapter, the *accumulation or multiplication* of advantages and disadvantages from different sources and contexts in the youngster's profile are viewed as central to explain unequal civic outcomes. Studies differ, however, as to whether education can compensate for the accumulation of disadvantages, and how effective education can be in this regard. Therefore, studies in this area are structured around a restricted number of debates. The debate regarding the most relevant agents and age for political socialization is linked to the discussion on the effectiveness of civic education initiatives in mitigating (Niemi and Junn 1998) or not mitigating (Langton and Jennings 1968) unequal civic outcomes. Overall, the literature cannot agree on whether education and school-based civic and citizenship education can help develop more civically engaged youngsters (Campbell 2008).

The dilemma between the school as a keeper of civic equality (Neundorf et al. 2016) and the attribution of life chances based on academic achievement (Durkheim 1925, 1938) has consequences for civic education. Questions remain open, therefore, regarding whether formal education can meet its role in forming informed and active citizens, and whether in doing so it can compensate for – or rather exacerbate – inequality in other spheres of life.

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International Students: (Non)citizenship, Rights, Discrimination, and Belonging

38

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Abstract

International students are subject to the condition of transnational mobility that constructs their legal, social, cultural, and economic status in a unique way. They have to temporarily move away from their country of citizenship and reside in the host country where they do not have citizenship status and are accordingly subjected to restricted entitlements. In policy discourse, international students are often seen as valuable economic and cultural subjects by host countries and as important human capital by home countries. However, in reality, international students (now over five million in numbers) are vulnerable citizens as their transnational mobility occurs in a world which lacks a coherent and coordinated mechanism to protect their rights entitlements and well-being. Drawing on the context of Australia as an illustrative case, this chapter explores how the condition of non-citizenship has led to international students’ disadvantage, marginalization, intimidation, and discrimination from segments of the Australian population. The study shows that the growth of international students and their non-citizenship in the host country triggers anxiety about (un)employment, job competition, university place allocation, housing, and migration. Using

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Antonsich's conceptual framework of belonging, we analyze the nature and forms of (non)belonging in relation to international students' (non)citizenship status. The chapter concludes by discussing implications for the mutual responsibility of involved parties to create inclusive and favorable conditions to support international students in navigating through the transnational space and capitalizing on new opportunities as well as new life "possibles" created by international education and transnational mobility.

Keywords

International students · Discrimination · Rights · Belonging · Citizenship · Non-citizenship

Introduction

In the twenty-first century, student mobility is not only a geographical and educational concern but also a social, political, and economical phenomenon. Trends in the commercialization of education, offshore online international education, migration policy, post-study work rights policy, and changes in economic, political, and education policies in both host and home countries impact transnational student mobility. There are over five million international students undertaking tertiary education worldwide, and this number is projected to reach eight million by 2025 (OECD 2017). The number of international student enrolments in Australia reached 839,784 in October, 2018 (Australian Government 2018). International education is the nation's biggest services export sector, generating over AUD 34 billion between September 2017 and September 2018 (ABS 2018) and more than 130,000 jobs (Australian Government 2017). Within this context, international students play a crucial role in generating revenue for education providers in the host country. However, international students have been described as "valuable" but "vulnerable" subjects in the host country (Sherry et al. 2010; Abo 2017; Tran and Nyland 2011). Our discussion to follow is premised on the officially and widely accepted definition of international students as individuals who have voluntarily migrated for the specific purpose of study, and their study-related activities take place in a country of which they do not hold citizenship or permanent residency (OECD 2017).

International students are said to live constantly in a legal limbo (Marginson 2012; Pejic 2012; Soong 2017) as their citizenship is situated in the conditions of transnational mobility. Their cross-border condition and non-citizenship status can place international students in a vulnerable situation and affect their entitlement to rights, protection, and services that can apply to other residents in the host country. Marginson argues that international students' rights vulnerability is a result of temporarily moving away from their national citizenship and becoming situated in a transnational condition while entitlements and protection of rights in the current world are primarily framed nationally (Marginson 2012, p. 11). Echoing Marginson, Urry (2012) states that existing policies of citizenship framed by the national society

are limited and restricting the rights of citizens, especially those who are moving across national borders to pursue study or work. Tran and Gomes (2017) argued for the need to move away from the nation-centered approach to viewing student mobility, in which international student citizenship is embedded, since “it oversimplifies the interrelated nature of this phenomenon and ignores the ways in which student mobility intersects with multiple and transnational logics of social and economic practices” (p. 16). As international students enter new spaces and navigate their positionality related to the interaction between different economic, and social conditions and rules associated with the original and new localities in the home and host countries, new ways of framing international students and their transnational citizenship are needed.

Various empirical studies have found that international students are at risk of intimidation and discrimination from segments of the Australian population due to their non-citizenship status (Marginson et al. 2010; Marginson 2013; Tran and Vu 2017). Non-citizenship status is often seen by people from the host community to be associated with the aspiration for citizenship in the host country, especially in cases when student mobility is from the Global South to the Global North or when international students from developing countries pursue education in a developed country. The presence of international students and their non-citizenship in the host country triggers anxiety about (un)employment, job competition, housing, and migration for some segments of the local community. However, when the stigma of international students as mere “PR hunters” [permanent residency] who are only interested in securing citizenship in the host country dominates the interaction between international students and the classroom, workplace or the wider community, then injustice, discrimination, and marginalization arise. This situation may also be accompanied with the risk of international students’ skills, knowledge, aspirations, and potential contributions to host communities being undermined or un-recognized (Tran and Vu 2017). The stigma of international students as mere “PR hunters” is still prevalent despite official visa data showing that five out of six international students leave Australia for opportunities elsewhere after their graduation (The Australian 2018).

While much has been discussed about the financial benefits international students bring about (Australian Government 2015), their adaptation (Arkoudis and Tran 2007; Tran 2011), their intercultural integration and identity (Soong 2013; Soong et al. 2015; Tran and Pham 2016), and their well-being (Forbes-mewett and Sawyer 2016), the dynamics and complexities arising from international students’ non-citizenship status and its implication for international education policies and practices have been less addressed. This chapter aims to critically examine how aspects of international student’s human rights, well-being, and belonging are shaped and re-shaped by their (non)citizenship status as a result of engaging in transnational mobility and international education. It draws on Antonsich’s (2010) five-factored framework of belonging to analyze the nature and forms of international (non)belonging in relation to their citizenship status. The chapter concludes with some recommendations for related stakeholders to consider in their coordinated efforts to safeguard the rights, well-being, and belonging of international students in the host community.

“Second Class” Citizens, Marginalization, and Discrimination

Citizenship status impacts the conditions of belonging. A sense of belonging/unbelonging to the host country then affects international students’ learning, well-being, career plan, and life aspirations including the decision of whether to stay on and secure citizenship in that country. Existing literature suggests international students have been regarded as “second class citizens” (Tran and Vu 2016), “outsiders” (Tran 2013), or “aliens” (Marginson 2012). International students’ self-perceived image as “second class citizens” (Tran and Vu 2016) has resulted from being marginalized in the community and at the workplace. In the report entitled “A national disgrace: the exploitation of temporary work visa holders,” the Australian Education and Employment References Committee highlighted two finance-related factors faced by international students which make them vulnerable in their host country. International students have to pay rising international student fees, while their non-citizenship status in Australia restricts their access to some public services. Also international students have “limited authority to work and a breach of this restriction could give the employer leverage to exploit them” (2016, 204). Interviews with international students in Tran’s (2017) and Tran’s (2018) studies echo these observations, indicating common causes for feeling marginalized and subordinated are having to pay high tuition fees while not being entitled to public transport concession, being exploited in the workplace, being excluded from certain domains of rights such as free public schooling for their children, being treated unequally in the classroom, and being excluded in peer interaction.

The anti-migration sentiments from a proportion of the local population in countries like Australia perpetuate the stigma that international students are only interested in migration, take university places away from Australian citizens, and, as Kinnaird (2015) contended, are in competition with local people in the labor market. This situation echoes Marginson’s view that “non-citizen status enables not only official discrimination but also unofficial Othering by holistic elements in the local population” (2012, pp. 21–22). There have also been reoccurring reports that international students are being subjected to both exploitation in the labor market and racism in the wider community (Bass 2017; Groch 2017; Berg and Farbenblum 2017). Over the past decade, various incidents of abuse and violence against Indian and, more recently, Chinese students have been brought to the attention of the Australian public (Gail 2012; Groch 2017; Needham 2017). This has led the Chinese government to request their Australian counterpart and education providers to take protective steps to provide Chinese students with a safe study environment. Baas (2017) pointed out that the claims of violence, racism, and othering, tied to Australia as a study destination, could potentially damage its international education sector as the nation’s biggest services export “industry” (p. 197).

Key areas in which international students experience exclusion and/or marginalization as compared to their domestic counterparts include access to standard accommodation and employment opportunities, medical services, student loans, schooling for international students’ children, and subsidized transport (Kuestenmacher 2014; Poljski et al. 2014; Marginson et al. 2010; McFadden and Seedorff 2017; United Voice

Victoria 2013b; Wall et al. 2018). In a similar vein, the Australian Human Rights Commission identifies some key domains of rights where international students are disadvantaged: access to safe, adequate, and affordable housing, personal safety and security, access to physical and mental health services, safe and fair employment, and privacy (2012, p. 9). International students may be at risk of discrimination, exclusion, and exploitation in dealing with the local community, healthcare providers, migration agents, real estate agents, landlords, employers, and education providers (Szoke 2012; Pejic 2012). These forms of discrimination are often on the grounds of international students' temporary and non-citizenship status in the host country (Tran 2017; Tran and Nyland 2011) but can also be due to race, color, culture, religion, language, or sex (Jakubowicz and Monani 2010; Szoke 2012).

Marginalization with regard to access to adequate housing and restrictions when making housing decisions is often identified as areas of vulnerability due to international students' temporary residence status. Existing research points out four primary inhibitors to their housing decisions (Kuestenmacher 2014). First, many international students rely on the option of seeking accommodation within walking distance to campus to save travel costs because they are not eligible for concession fares on public transport in some states including Victoria and New South Wales. Second, housing options for under-aged students are restricted to homestays, as required by student visa regulations, which in some cases results in low housing satisfaction. Third, some international students are placed in the position of having to move house due to financial difficulties and rising rentals. Fourth, some international students have to make housing arrangements from overseas, but there are limited types of accommodation available for overseas bookings (Kuestenmacher 2014).

Evidence suggests that international students also face difficulties in accessing primary school education for their children, as well as medical services (SA Health 2013; Marginson et al. 2010). International students (except for higher degree by research students) and other visa holders have to pay fees for their children to attend primary school in Victoria. According to the State of Victoria (2012), this is a form of discriminatory treatment which conflicts with Australia's obligations under the international Convention on the Rights of the Child to make primary education compulsory and freely available. Research by Poljski et al. (2014) shows that female international students received unequal access to sexual and reproductive health information and services due to the limitation of their mandatory health insurance. This situation is at odds with Australia's human rights obligations which highlight the importance to take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination and to ensure appropriate services in connection with sexual health (Poljski et al. 2014).

Discrimination in Relation to Employment Opportunities and in the Workplace

Existing empirical studies suggest that international students value the opportunity to get some work experience in the host country. For many international students, part-time work experience is seen as a form of return from investment in

international education (Tran and Soejatminah 2016, 2017). According to Tran and Gribble (2015), instead of merely providing international students with an additional income, part-time work in the host country helps them to be exposed to the labor market and develop their professional, social, and communication skills as well as local networks, which is critical to their employability and career development. However, it should also be recognized that concerns have been expressed regarding whether international students are taking jobs away from Australians or are making it difficult for local youths to get entry-level jobs. One Nation Senator Pauline Hanson, for example, mentioned:

These people are supposed to be self-supporting when they come into Australia. But they are given the opportunity to do twenty hours work a week and they can actually have unlimited work when they're not studying. That is wrong because that is impacting the other Australians getting jobs. (SkyNews)

Echoing this view, Kinnaird argued that international students compete with and take up jobs of local people in low-skilled sections of the labor market. Views such as those expressed by Hanson and Kinnaird are challenged by scholars who argue that “to assume international students are taking the jobs of locals is narrow and ignores the role of international education in job creation” (Tran and Gribble 2015, p. 1). According to an Australian government report, international education and international student-related activities help to create more than 130,000 Australian jobs, not only for the education sector but also for ancillary service sectors such as accommodation, hospitality, and increased travel and tourism (2017).

The presence of international students can enrich the workplace through their diversity and the potential to develop the intercultural capability and outlook of the local workforce (Tran and Gribble 2015). However these benefits are often either neglected or not fully capitalized upon. Instead, being marginalized and treated less than equally at the workplace seems to be the most common form of discrimination international students experience in their host country. Existing research suggests that employers are reluctant to take on international students or international graduates on a post-study work visa because of concerns over these students' unfamiliarity with the host country's workplace culture, their English proficiency, and their nonresidency status. In addition, some complexities are associated with international students' visa conditions and restrictions in work entitlements, and there is a lack of recognition of their potential contributions to the organizations (Tran 2013; Tran and Soejatminah 2016, 2017; Blackmore et al. 2014; Gribble 2014; Patrick et al. 2008; Tran et al. 2016; Campbell et al. 2016).

In a submission to the Commonwealth Australia's Education and Employment References Committee, Tham argued that the vulnerable status of temporary migrant workers, including international students, stems from interrelated structural factors and includes:

Dependence on a third party for the right of residence
Limited right of residence
Limited authority to work
Limited access to public goods. (Parliament of Australia 2016, pp. 143–144)

As already suggested, international students have long been reported as a vulnerable army of workers in their host countries due to their financial position and profile as temporary migrants (Tran 2017; Tran and Soejatminah 2018; Reilly 2013). Their non-citizenship status has resulted in their disadvantage in securing employment in host countries. Furthermore, international students' status as non-citizens means that their scope to participate in the political system that determines their work rights, in addition to their lack of security of residence in the host country, is limited (Reilly 2013, Nunes and Arthur 2013). The restrictions placed on international students' visas have been identified as among the key factors that position this workforce in a vulnerable and exploitable situation, since these restrictive conditions can force international students to accept cash-in-hand jobs and to keep quiet about any injustices and harassment they may experience at work (Reilly 2013; Li and Whitworth 2016). In addition, language and cultural barriers possibly encountered by international students, as well as a lack of awareness of workplace rights in the host country, can make it less likely for them to speak up and assert their rights against a local employer (Reilly 2013). In a study on Chinese international students, Jolene (2012) identified the major problems facing international students within the labor market of the host country, including the potential exploitation of international student labor through wage payments below the minimum wage limit, challenges in keeping up with their educational obligations as they balance work and study, lack of understanding/access to student employment support services and information, limited local employment experiences which act as a barrier to entry, the physical demands of work, and workplace discrimination.

In the Australian cleaning industry, for example, international students are working "for sub-contractors function as a kind of invisible 'ghost workforce' at the bottom of the city office cleaning industry" (United Voice Victoria, 2013a, p. 6). Up to 56% of Melbourne's CBD cleaners are international students from India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Colombia (ibid). According to United Voice Victoria, the subcontractors are "shadowy, fly-by-night" employers who ripped off international student cleaners by up to \$15,000 a year in earnings. United Voice Victoria identified fear, intimidation, and secrecy as the main factors underpinning international students' invisibility and decisions not to speak out.

International students have explored alternative forms of communication in order to raise awareness in the public about structural inequalities and elements of vulnerability in their lived experience. Loneliness, racism, and poverty were the themes emerging from a series of public performances in 2017 and 2018 (Mills 2018), in which international students in Melbourne acted out their life stories by way of drama and dance, making headlines on mainstream media such as City of Melbourne's social media platforms Facebook and YouTube, ABC Radio Melbourne, and *Meld Magazine*. In addition, the comedy series produced by Australia's national television titled *Ronny Chieng: International Student* is another representation of international student's marginalization when they feel at odds with the university campus culture while having to constantly juggle connection obligations from overseas family and their life aspirations, as well as the practicalities involved in living and studying in Australia (Australian Broadcasting Cooperation 2017).

Belonging, Inclusion, and Exclusion

While “educational outcomes framed in human experiences are much more difficult to measure on institutional or system scales, [and thus], are neglected or ignored” (Liyanage et al. 2018, p. 7), it is nevertheless important to apply the frame of human experience when examining international students in which belonging/non-belonging plays a crucial part in safeguarding their well-being and educational outcomes. In alignment with this humanistic approach in education, we apply the scholarly concept of belonging to further exploration and analysis of the marginalization, exclusion, and disadvantages experienced by the population of international students discussed in the above sections. Mobility sees international students operating within transnational spaces and contexts that are very different from the ones in which they grew up. Therefore, it is important to understand “the structural and subjective processes that shape the possibilities for individuals to belong” (Wyn 2018, pp. 35–40).

In the following, we provide a summary of theories and theorizations of belonging across disciplinary and interdisciplinary areas. We then turn to examine the structures and forms of belonging related to international students, focusing on issues which concern notions of inclusion/exclusion in the case of international students in Australia. The section ends with a discussion of the relationships between mobility, international student belonging, and politics of belonging.

Belonging – as a scholarly concept – has been applied as a frame of reference in various approaches to research. Belonging is used in describing not only psychological need (Baumeister and Leary 1995; Karen 2000; Walton et al. 2012) but also human identity formation (Ignatieff 1994; Anthias 2013, 2016; Shanthi 2013). Belonging is also used as a relational metaphor and is well applied in critical studies of youth transition (Cuervo and Wyn 2014; Reay et al. 2010; Yuval-Davis 2006), in which belonging is used to elucidate the quality of relationships and connections as part of the resources that young people draw upon to build their lives into adulthood. The common thread running through these approaches suggests belonging, as a concept, is related to human need; is embedded in ethnic, cultural, and social identity; and involves several processes and practices in which human beings try to find bases of security, value, and recognition in their lives and usually in an unfamiliar context.

Building on our literature review in previous sections, we attempt to describe and align the structural conditions that create international student’s belonging/non-belonging against the well-cited five-factored framework of belonging advanced by Antonsich (2010). Antonsich, from the discipline of human geography, asserts that structural conditions for creating belonging are founded on five factors: legal, economic, cultural, relational, and autobiographical. This framework resonates with influential work from the field of sociology (Pollini 2005) and anthropology (Buonfino and Thomson 2007), as well as in several other streams of studies in humanity, social, and political science.

The first factor, legal status, is a formal “structure of belonging” (Fenster 2002) since this factor ensures an individual is categorized properly, for instance, as

temporary resident, permanent resident, or citizen and is entitled to rights to fully or partially participate in certain educational and/or social activities, such as to stay indefinitely, to work, to study, or to obtain certain social benefits (Rubenstein 2000). Legal status is therefore important in generating feelings of belonging. Legally, international students are citizens of other countries but come under different jurisdictions in the host country. International students' belonging raises concerns with regard to their legal status because they are under a different resident category that requires specific administrative control, monitoring, and reporting. They require student visas (Australia, the UK, the USA), student's pass (Singapore), or study permits (Canada, EU) in order to migrate to the host country, primarily for studying (but also working) purposes. These visas or permits usually consist of strict conditions, and if in breach, the student visa could be canceled, such as specified in the Australia's National Code of Practice for Providers of Education and Training to Overseas Students 2018, Standard 9 (Minister of Education and Training 2018). The rights and responsibilities outlined in the Act could be seen as a formalized and legitimized non-citizenship status of international students, whereby non-belonging is expressed. Enacting the Act would require a process of "differential exclusion" (Castles 1995, p. 294), meaning that non-citizen minorities are given access to certain areas but rejected access to other areas, notably welfare and political participation (Castles 1995). Echoing this perspective, Paltridge et al. (2012) state that international students' temporary status in effect "creates the conditions for social exclusion, that is, an inability to engage fully in the economic, cultural, social and political aspects of Australian life" (Paltridge et al. 2012, p. 29). From her extensive research on international students in Singapore, Gomes (2018) states that they are conscious of their status as foreigners, subject to visa conditions, and this guest status constrains their participation in local political discourse, where they generally choose to remain silent regarding any experiences of racism or hostility. Gomes' research suggests that non-belonging due to legal status is experienced by international students regardless of the sociocultural contexts of the host country.

The second condition for creating belonging concerns the economic factor. International students in Australia are differently located economically, since they pay significantly higher tuition fees than domestic students (Wade 2018). The financial commitments for undertaking their educational program overseas have more impact on international student's engagement with both academic work (Devlin et al. 2008) and nonacademic activities than domestic students (Bista 2018). There is a rich body of literature that challenges the public discourse about the wealthy Asian middle class and which speaks eloquently about international students experiencing severe financial difficulties while studying in Australia (Forbes-Mewett et al. 2009) "with a significant proportion having a nonwage income less than half the Henderson Poverty Line" (A threshold for measuring a person's relative poverty, founded by Melbourne Institute's founding Professor Ronald Henderson. Henderson Poverty Line, Melbourne Institute, retrieved at <https://melbourneinstitute.unimelb.edu.au/research-programs/labour-economics-and-social-policy/henderson-poverty-line>) (McCrohon and Nyland 2018, p. 19). Further to this, Tran and Nyland (2011) found in their research that many international students

lack knowledge about local work practices, pay rates, or work conditions; thus, they are under financial pressures as well as experiencing limited employment opportunities while studying, falling vulnerable to exploitation by employers who rely on part-time and casual employees. Marginson et al. (2010) consider financial issues and work experiences as the social and economic security of international students, which is also linked to belonging. When the formal legal framework and institutional practices restrict international students' capacity to create a stable economic condition, it is an illustration of creating non-belonging.

The third factor in Antonsich's belonging framework is also known as the structure of social belonging in Pollini (2005) and describes the "sense of affinity, or we-feeling" (p. 499). This sense of affinity is believed to generate social belonging and/or non-belonging, but research evidence suggests that it may be a false binary. While some studies have positively suggested the role of cultural affinity to co-ethnic groups who are citizens of the host country (González Motos 2016; Gonzalez and Morrison 2016), other studies have found differing results. Gomes' (2015) studies of Asian international students in Australia and Singapore found that many international students have little affinity with their co-ethnic, domestic peers since "both groups have evolved differently because of varied communal experiences based on time and place" (Gomes 2015; Tran and Gomes 2017, p. 528). Other studies that resonate with this view also highlight that international students may encounter ideological barriers in their relationships with students from similar cultural backgrounds (Richardson and Rosalind 2007). Therefore, cultural affinity may not always necessarily lead to a sense of belonging as it is generally assumed in the literature.

The fourth, relational factor deeply impacts international student belonging, as it refers to the personal and social ties of individuals. The relationships that connect international students to their transnational family and friends have been found to be an indispensable part of their daily life. A significant body of research examines how international students form friendship networks. Findings suggest that international students struggle to form relationships with local students, yet they endeavor to form relationships with international students from their home nation or home region (Wang and Hannes 2014; Gomes 2015; McFaul 2016). Existing research evidence concerning relationships to the institutional and academic community suggests that truly meaningful interactions and relationships in the intercultural context have been a challenge to achieve (Pham and Tran 2015). It is possible to infer from this perspective that there is a lack of sense of belonging that could have been created between international students, faculty, academic, and local peers. Previous studies have found that students with weak English language skills are less likely to participate in social clubs or extracurricular activities, to build local social networks (Blackmore et al. 2015). This lack of participation indicates non-belonging to the local community. Policies regarding institutional support services may also hinder international students' perception of belonging. In 2012, a number of universities in Australia changed their model of service provision from specialized to mainstream in order to reduce costs. On the surface, the move resonates with the ideal of fostering a whole campus sense of belonging, when all students are treated as one cohort and

can access the same services. However, both staff and international students have voiced the tensions and challenges associated with this move (Forbes-mewett 2016). This is another illustration of perceived non-belonging circumstances, in which international students have not been adequately informed nor consulted in regard to policy changes that impact them directly.

The last factor in the structural belonging framework is the autobiographical factor, which relates to personal experiences, memories, and attachment to a person or a place (Antonsich 2010). There is a need to rethink the way that the autobiographical factor generates a sense of non-belonging in the case of international students. Since the early 2000s, literature has focused upon a younger generation of international students who are the face and driving force of the international secondary schooling growth (Arber and Blackmore 2010; Abelmann et al. 2015; Tsong and Liu 2009; Waters 2003, 2005). A growing cohort of international students is the “third culture kids” (i.e., children of globally mobile families in the pursuit of business, education, humanitarian missions) (Pollock and Van Reken 2009). Since this younger generation of international students spend part (or whole) of their adolescent years living and studying in different cultures, the autobiographical factor has distinctive meaning for their sense of belonging (Hannaford 2016, 2017). These third culture kids find belonging in the relationships they form with others who share a common life experience (Pollock and Van Reken 2009) and have also been found to be “future-oriented and have plans for an international career and mobile lifestyle” (Fail et al. 2004, p. 5). Their avenues for belonging lie in their goals and aspirations more than in their backgrounds. They view themselves as cosmopolitan people who feel comfortable in a variety of environments, but lack a sense of belonging in any one. This new trend of “globally mobile youth” (Witherell 2017) speaks to the need to reconsider the meaning of citizenship and belonging.

The mapping of international student belonging against five foundational factors illustrates the intertwining nature of belong and non-belonging in international student’s perspectives and lived experience as well as highlights the systemic barriers that exclude international students legally, economically, and socioculturally. Findings from literature throughout this chapter illustrate that international student belonging and/or non-belonging can have significant implications for their lived experience in the host country. The protection of international students’ rights and well-being is central to their sense of belonging to the host country and host communities.

Protection of Rights, Well-Being, and Belonging

In response to the recurring issues of international student discrimination and exploitation, the Australian government has made a number of efforts to protect the rights and well-being of this group of temporary residents. In particular, the government has reviewed and amended the Education Services for Overseas Students (ESOS) Act and the National Code of Practice for Registration Authorities and Providers of Education and Training to Overseas Students 2007 (National Code)

with a focus on strengthening the protective elements in these regulations. National policy texts on international students including International Student Strategy for Australia 2010–2014 and National Strategy for International Education 2025 both stressed the rights of international students (Australian Government 2010, 2017). The Overseas Students Ombudsman (OSO), a *specialist role of the Commonwealth Ombudsman*, was established to protect the rights of international students. Other significant developments include the commissioning of ISANA (International Student Advisers Network of Australia Inc.) to produce videos and materials to raise international students' awareness of their rights and responsibilities under the ESOS Act and the National Code.

As a legislative instrument made under the Education Services for Overseas Students Act 2000, the National Code 2018 supports the protection of international students' work rights and rights with regard to quality education and training. Under the ESOS National Code 2018, education providers have compliance obligations to educate international students about work rights and workplace regulations. The Commonwealth Government (2018) stresses that the ESOS National Code "protects the rights of international students in Australia . . . [and] covers everything from financial protections and laws protecting the rights of international students through to work rights, student welfare and complaints." The latest action from the government is the release of the "Working in Australia Package" by The Fair Work Ombudsman (FWO). This package comprises (1) working in Australia presentation slides, (2) working in Australia video, (3) fair work information statement, and (4) a guide to starting a new job. The resource is designed to assist those who work with migrant and multicultural communities – including international students – to educate these communities about workplace laws in Australia (Fair Work Ombudsman 2018). These are significant moves from different government bodies to better protect international students' rights, enhance their welfare, and empower this cohort in their participation in different aspects of the host society.

Conclusion

The rich body of literature reviewed in this chapter suggests three main areas that shape the structural exclusion of international students stemming from their non-citizenship status. These areas are barriers to access standard accommodation and the local labor market; difficulties in negotiating education, health, finance, public schooling, and public transport service provisions; and social disadvantages when dealing with certain stakeholders and some segments of the local community that reinforce the "outsider" (Tran 2013a) position of international students. These structural conditions largely contribute to the vulnerability of international students as a minor group in a host country's social, cultural, and educational setting (Sawir et al. 2012).

Based on our narrative synthesis of scholarly work and national policies in relation to international students' visa and citizenship, rights, and their different aspects of life, we propose some recommendations for related stakeholders to

enhance the well-being, rights entitlements, and belonging of international students. First, there is a critical need for a more coordinated approach among the involved parties including institutions; government organizations such as the migration and visa department, department of education and training, and trade department; human rights organization; and various professional organizations involved in international education. Institutions, government agencies, and involved parties must work collaboratively not only to develop a more coherent and efficient mechanism to manage and protect the welfare of international students but more importantly to educate international students on their rights and enhance their agency in participating in different aspects of life in the host country. Second, inclusion is reciprocal in nature, and unless there is a welcoming mind-set from the host population toward international students, it is difficult to realize the goal of making international students feel included and valued in the host society. Therefore, there should be more coordinated efforts among the related parties to showcase the value of international students and international education and the various untapped potential to the wider Australian community.

Third, it is essential to have targeted policies and specific strategies to facilitate international students' participation in aspects of the host society and to encourage different communities in the host society to actively facilitate international students' participation in their communities. Finally, we advocate for the need to bring in the principles of social inclusion into policies and practices regarding international students, to support the structural dimensions of social belonging. Our premise largely contends with Marginson's (2012) call for two areas of social inclusion for international students in terms of public and private discourse as well as institutional practices and in terms of a global dimension to complement the national regulation. This perspective is closely related to providing international students' with access to a broader range of rights (Jakubowicz and Monani 2010), which equals to "quasi-citizenship status," whereby "their rights and entitlements are aligned as closely as possible to those of local students" (Marginson 2012, p. 11). Within the context of "Advance Australia's Fair," another valuable reference point would be the framework and resources developed by the Australian Social Inclusion Board. These consist of valuable principles to define and measure the extent of being socially included, meaning having access to resources and opportunities in order to realize one's potential to learn, work, connect with communities, and participate in civic discussions on decisions that affect them (Australian Social Inclusion Board 2012).

Soong (2015) indicates that despite challenges, many students are able to imagine a variety of life opportunities and exercise different forms of agency to realize their aspirations (p. 4). International students are engaged in dynamic and wide-ranging strategies to navigate through different aspects of life in the host country, overcome the disadvantages of non-citizenship status, and capitalize on new opportunities as well as the new life "possibles" created by international education and transnational mobility. However for international students to fully realize these potentials, it is the shared mutual responsibility of all, including the involved parties in the host community, to create the inclusive and favorable conditions for international students to participate and make a contribution.

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Socialist Citizenship in the Post-socialist Era Across Time and Space: A Closer Look at Cuba and Vietnam 39

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Abstract

This chapter examines the construction and cultivation of socialist citizenship as a top-down national citizenship project that promotes collective political identities in Cuba and Vietnam. Focusing on the post-socialist era, it highlights how the meanings of socialist citizenship have continued to evolve in the educational contexts of each country since the collapse of the former Soviet Union. The chapter compares the ways in which Cuban and Vietnamese citizens, particularly young generations, as constituents of a political community are socialized and engaged in state-sponsored political and civic activities. The implementation

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aspect of the socialist citizenship ideals uncovers the increasing challenges that citizenship education faces and the complexities of changing citizen identities in each national context. The chapter also provides an analysis of existing research on the transnational factors that may have shaped the development and current direction of socialist citizenship in Cuba and Vietnam.

Keywords

Socialist citizenship · Post-socialist · Citizenship education · Cuba · Vietnam

Introduction

The international literature on citizenship studies has covered a wide range of contexts with differing historical, economic, social, political, and cultural conditions and educational systems. Likewise, it has also examined varied approaches to *do* and promote citizenship education in diverse settings. As a sub-theme within citizenship studies/education, nevertheless, the literature on socialist citizenship remains rather limited. This chapter pays particular attention to socialist citizenship in the post-socialist era. Since the collapse of the Communist Bloc in the late 1980s, China, Cuba, Laos, North Korea, and Vietnam have continued to identify themselves as communist states heading toward socialism. To date, each is governed by a single party structure that adopts distinctly Marxist-Leninist philosophy as official state ideology, though they may pursue different economic development models. Within the scope of this chapter, we shall focus on the cases of Cuba and Vietnam, leaving the other national contexts for future endeavors.

We adopt Silova's (2010) view of post-socialism as a conceptual lens. Post-socialism is neither a temporal marker of a historical period nor a European-centric focus on a geographic area. Rather, as Silova (2010) argues, it is "a space from which we can further complicate (not clarify) our understanding of ongoing reconfigurations of educational spaces in a global context" (p. 20). With globalization studies attracting increasing attention, post-socialism continues to serve as a relevant resource and "unique space" to study the diversity of social and educational phenomena in both former Soviet countries and current communist contexts (p. 4). Indeed, communist nations such as Cuba and Vietnam have pursued different paths of development since the late 1980s (Carnoy and Samoff 1990; Bunck 1996). This post-socialist lens, therefore, could offer nuanced understandings of the complexities of citizenship developments in (post)socialist education settings that have been subject to multilayered impacts from sociopolitical factors in the context of globalization.

Acknowledging that citizenship can be understood differently, we draw on (socialist) citizenship as a political identity in particular. Smith (2004, p. 302) sees political identity as "the collective label for a set of characteristics by which persons are recognized by political actors as members of a political group." The formation and transformations of senses of political identity are both products and instruments of people-making processes that political leaders seek to engage in to build an

enduring political community (Smith 2003). Socialist citizenship, like other forms of identity, is largely constructed and promoted by political actors, who determine how governing power would be created and exercised to sustain such a community.

The Formation of the *New Human Being* and the *New Socialist Person*

Following the successful revolt against the US-backed Batista government in 1959, Fidel Castro became Cuba's new president. Since 1961, Cuba has officially declared a one-party communist country. Vietnam, on the other hand, underwent significant political turmoil to gain its entire independence. Specifically, in 1945 Ho Chi Minh declared Vietnam's independence after an almost 100 years under French colonization followed by Japanese occupation during the World War II. However, in 1946 France reoccupied Vietnam, leading to another 9 years of war, taking place mostly in the North of Vietnam. The Dien Bien Phu victory against France in 1954 led to the Geneva Accord that ended France's involvement in Vietnam and the temporary partition of Vietnam into North and South. This partition, however, led to the formation of two Vietnams: North Vietnam – officially known as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) – and South Vietnam – officially known as the Republic of Vietnam (RV). Like Cuba since 1961, North Vietnam since 1954 officially adopted and increasingly embraced socialist communist ideals based on Marxist-Leninist principles as state ideologies. The communist governments of Cuba and North Vietnam, viewing cultural change as the main and foremost goal that would come before economic foundations, attempted to transform their people in radical ways (Laymon 1999; Breidlid 2007). Though approaches to transforming the citizenries varied in each case, the common ultimate goal was to create loyal and committed generations for an egalitarian, classless society as the following paragraphs explain.

In both Cuba and Vietnam, education was highly valued and formal education was structured as a centralized system. Together with other channels of communication available (radios, posters, newspapers, etc.), education was utilized for its potential to forge senses of political identity and community. In the context where the expansion of formal education was linked to the development of modern nation-states in the twentieth century, citizenship education was seen as a primary means in the process of ideological formation of young Cubans and Vietnamese, particularly in the anti-colonial and anti-imperialism struggles for national independence. In other words, as a top-down national identity project, citizenship education in Cuba and Vietnam played an important role in the process of nation-building and transforming human mentality (Vasavakul 1994; Pérez 1999). Thus, revolutionary education in each national context was intimately connected to various efforts to develop the economy that ultimately served political imperatives of socialist revolution (Carnoy and Samoff 1990; Richmond 1990; Vasavakul 1994).

In the case of Cuba, the traditional Cuban, perceived as agrarian and respectful for culture, was also seen as having “a faith in the power and justice of education” (Kapcia, cited in Richmond 1990, p. 107). The traditional person was educated to become a “new human being” (Gasparini 2000, p. 12) who was imbued with a

communist *conciencia* (consciousness). This new socialist citizen was to be “selfless and cooperative, obedient and hardworking, gender-blind, incorruptible, and non-materialistic” (Bunck 1994, p. 4). In other words, as Ernesto “Ché” Guevara made clear, the *New Man* was motivated by self-sacrifice and moral incentives rather than by individualistic materialism (Breidlid 2007; Malott 2007). For Cuba, cultivating a new cultural ideological mentality and developing a stable economy were considered to be important and critical to escape national dependency from the United States and also to “fire the people’s enthusiasm” to build socialism (Mtonga 1993, p. 392). Cuba’s expanding education in the 1960s mainly focused on primary and secondary education because these education levels were considered favorable to develop socialist consciousness congruent with economic growth.

In the case of Vietnam, *guerilla style* work-study schools combining labor production with academic studies had been prevalent in North Vietnam since 1946. Schools served a special purpose, which was to contribute to economic production aimed at financing the army. Throughout the ensuing several decades, this school model was gradually replaced with centralized general education, the *new cultural life* and the education system continued to promote the ideal of a patriotic laborer who loved the country, loved labor, and was committed to the march toward socialism (Vasavakul 1994). The socialist project promoted by North Vietnam’s communist leadership since 1954 was largely informed by Marxist-Leninist ideologies and revolutionary morals (Vasavakul 1994) in parallel with nationalism and anticolonialism ideologies. It aimed to create the *new socialist person* and was energetically incorporated in North Vietnam’s formal education and its comprehensive social engineering agenda at all levels. Through this process, socialist citizenship was cultivated and sustained. After the end of the anti-American War (also known as the Vietnam War) in 1975, the *new socialist person* model became the official educational goal of the newly unified Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The Communist Party declared its vision of *new culture of socialism* to be the superior social system shaping its new socialist citizenry. In particular, the new socialist Vietnamese were to have a high degree of political and moral consciousness, work hard, and always seek to improve themselves to contribute to the goals of the state (*Education in Revolution Vietnam: The New Socialist Person*, 1978). Importantly, the *new socialist person* was expected to show his or her ultimate patriotism and commitment to socialism and proletarian internationalism.

In brief, Cubans and Vietnamese in the high communist era of the Cold War were educated with similar socialist principles and values. Such ideals were integral to the strengthening of socialist ideologies and the building of solidarity and internationalism among the socialist bloc members and among communist parties internationally.

The Ideal Socialist Citizen and Youth Socialization: The Post-Soviet Decade

The collapse of the former Soviet Union led to political and social economic chaos in the whole communist world including Cuba and Vietnam, the long-time Soviet allies. Focusing on individual national context, this section features the

different socioeconomic landscapes and the evolving foci of socialist citizenship education in Cuba and Vietnam during the 1990s.

Cuba

The fall of the Soviet Bloc in 1989 was accompanied by the withdrawal of Russian funding and an intensified US comprehensive blockade for Cuba. Cuba entered an economic crisis known as “The Special Period” from 1996 to 2004. In 1993, after legalizing the US dollar and allowing direct foreign investment in a limited number of sectors, Cuba reintegrated into the global marketplace. While tourism significantly helped save Cuba from the crisis, several observers characterized the Cuban society of this period as becoming “polluted by the capitalism” caused by the influx of foreign businesses and tourism (Frederik 2005, p. 403). In response to the situation, the Cuban government reasserted the political will by efforts to strengthen the economy and political structure, and to develop a citizenry with a “strong sense of social responsibility” (Martin 1991, p. 99) that drew on Marxist socialist and Cuban revolutionary spirit.

Specifically, the Cuban government sought to develop the role of youth, particularly their participation in the construction and leadership of schools, mass organizations, and the society as a whole. With strong “confidence in human beings and their ability to find solutions to problems,” schools aimed to advance socialist consciousness as the “truly strategic objective” for the Cuban youth (Martin 1991, pp. 98–99). As a separate subject, *Values Education* taught students values, attitudes, and practices that aimed to strengthen internationalism, national identity, work morality, solidarity, and defense against external threat (Gasperini 2000). Citizenship education across the curriculum continued to incorporate ideological education and was thus considered a form of political indoctrination (Bunck 1994). Indeed, almost all (social science) subjects of the early grades through university years included aspects of the Marxist-Leninist ideals and the Cuban revolution (Medin 1990; De Varona 1992; Lutjens 1996). Yet, as a Marxist scholar Malott (2007) indicated, such an indoctrinating function of Cuban schools was necessary to create consent among people in terms of producing labor power with willingness.

In the post-Soviet decade of the 1990s, good socialist Cubans were expected to participate in at least one mass communist organization. For example, most elementary school children joined the Union of Cuban Pioneers, while students of higher levels of education might be members of the Federation of University Students, the Committees for the Defense of Revolution, or the Youth Labor Army (Rosendahl 1997; Fernandez 1993). As one of the key channels of communicating the revolutionary message, these (party-affiliated) organizations socialized the younger generation into socialist values, patterns of conduct, and emotions supportive of the regime (Fernandez 1993). For example, the 1999 campaign “The Battle of Ideas” mobilized young Cubans, many of whom were members of youth organizations participating in the defense of the revolution (Kapcia 2005). The students’ membership in these organizations was rigorously evaluated throughout the school year, reflecting a relevant level of political-ideological integration. The evaluation was

extremely important because inactive participation was synonymous with low levels of political integration, which could affect students' opportunities to enter university. While Cuba's basic education system was known for being high-performing and inclusive, De Varona (1992) noted going to university in this country was a privilege, rather than a right, based on one's commitment to state ideology.

Vietnam

Meanwhile, just several years before the Soviet's entire dissolution, in 1986, Vietnam already took on a different path that transformed the Soviet centrally planned economy to a market-oriented one. The economic reform (Doi Moi) included the privatization of many state-owned enterprises and expansion of economic cooperation with the world. Indeed, Vietnam overcame the domestic economic crisis and engaged in economic reforms at a more open and faster rate than Cuba. By the mid-1990s, Vietnam became the fastest growing economy in the Southeast Asian region. Despite the fact that the state remained the largest provider of education, Vietnam's education transitioned from public financing to a hybrid system that combined state and non-state elements. Central to this transition was the promotion of the "socialization" of education (*xa hoi hoa giao duc*) in which household and other non-state sectors were called to share financial responsibility and related resources for education (London 2011; Duong 2015).

In this system, the idealized model of a Vietnamese person had been characterized by a high level of intellect and morality. In fact, Vietnamese socialist beings were portrayed in state policy and curriculum as having a pair of fundamental qualities, i.e. "red mind and expertise" (*hong va chuyen*) (Doan 2005; Lucius 2009; Phan et al. 2011). While the latter refers to one's professional capacity, the former – red mind – represents socialist ideology and values. This set of values were drawn on the principles and philosophies of Confucianism, Marxism-Leninism, and Ho Chi Minh's Thoughts (Nguyen and Nguyen 2014; Lucius 2009). Because of a long-lasting cultural influence of ancient Chinese philosophies, moral cultivation plays an important role in Vietnamese people's character and personality building. Therefore, a significant part of Vietnam's citizenship education focuses on moral education which is also taught as a stand-alone subject in primary schools. Meanwhile, from secondary schools to higher education, the emphasis has been on socialist morality in order to develop socialist citizens. In other words, although many aspects of socialism were diminished as the result of Doi Moi, the socialist citizen remains the primary outcome of the Vietnamese educational system. Representations of the good socialist citizen of Doi Moi were for the most part not much different from that of the pre-Doi Moi period: a person who loves labor and the country, has absolute loyalty to the state ideology, the regime, and the construction of socialism. In brief, and similar to the Cuban case, education in Vietnam during the decade from Doi Moi in late 1986 was explicitly used for the political socialization of youth, whether aimed at cultivating patriotism and values (Nguyen and Nguyen 2014; Nguyen 2015) or instilling morality (Doan 2005).

Another notable feature regarding the socialist citizen ideal in the early years of Doi Moi is that pursuits for materialistic benefits and individualism were still considered antithetical to traditional and socialist values. On the one hand, the state asserted that citizens were encouraged to participate in all forms of economic sectors, including household businesses, cooperatives, and private businesses. Such state-socialist rhetoric was in line with the privatizing practices of Doi Moi that endorsed a *multi-sectoral market economy* and the national slogan of *wealthy people and a strong nation* (Nguyen 2006; Kleinen 2015). On the other hand, Party members were not allowed to be involved in the operation of the private sector which was seen as related to capitalism. While many young people were already excited about and engaged in self-employment and *fortune making* opportunities, political leaders faced considerable perplexity to come up with the best model of citizen in a new time (Pham and Thai 2011).

Unlike Cuba where the work-study program was still promoted in the post-socialist period, the integration of study with physical labor was no longer present in Vietnam's national curriculum in the 1990s. Nevertheless, Vietnamese youth were involved in various voluntary movements, one of which was the large-scale Green Summer Campaign. These movements were primarily led by mass organizations for youth, for example the Ho Chi Minh Young Pioneer Organization, the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth League and the Students' Association, which served as a "transmission belt" between the Party and the youth (Rosen and Marr 1999, p. 177). Through voluntary work, students were called to contribute to improving living conditions particularly in poor and remote regions and also to enhancing their own revolutionary spirit (Doan 2005). While the youth were anecdotally inspired by these voluntary activities, Nguyen (2006) observed that such campaigns and movements were not popular beyond state organizations and had limited impact on the youth's daily life.

The Ever Newer Citizens, Educational Reforms and Challenges of Citizenship Education in the Context of Increasing Globalization

Cuba survived the tough decade of the 1990s, but a parallel economy based on the dollar has contributed to increasing income inequities and social stratification (Rosendahl 1997; Lancaster and Sanyal 2012). Social policy reforms of the Special Period brought the devaluation of traditional labor and its replacement with employment in the tourism industry. The application of market principles created opportunities for certain groups of people but also brought challenges for the education sector. For example, education met considerable difficulties because of a declined budget and a shortage of teachers, many of whom moved to a more lucrative tourism sector (Breidlid 2007). In addition, commitment to socialist ideals and revolutionary values, such as solidarity and sacrifice, deteriorated significantly (Lancaster and Sanyal 2012). As a result, as collective perceptions and representations of life changed and faced erosion, citizenship education struggled to nurture revolutionary

spirit in young Cubans who underwent a “sense of loss and anxiety about their identities” (Martín 1995, cited in Pintado 2005, p. 149).

By the end of the last century, Vietnam had become integrated deeply into the global economy. Vietnamese people were increasingly exposed to global commodities, including music, fashions, consumer products, and foreign cultural contents (Rosen and Marr 1999). A growing number of Vietnamese have access to the Internet and social media, entailing greater influence from Western concepts of citizenship and democracy (London 2014; Bui 2016). Gaining remarkable economic and social achievements during the Doi Moi era, Vietnam’s opening-up has also been accompanied by growing social inequalities and social problems that the Vietnamese state has perceived as an important challenge in need of address (Thayer 2003; Nguyen 2005; Taylor 2004).

Though emerging problems in Vietnam and Cuba alike should be understood within a larger context of global disparities, the widening market economy, particularly in the Vietnamese context, has had a tremendous impact on perceptions of values concerning individuals’ life goals and ideals (Nguyen 2006; Napier and Vuong 2013; Wallengren 2017). Specifically, research surveys of youth values in Vietnam between mid-1990s and 2000s showed modern Vietnamese youth began to depart from what the state had expected of them. Profoundly transforming the society, the booming economy gave rise to a new middle class who have access to jobs and resources without subscribing to the Party’s pronouncements and propaganda. Particularly, young Vietnamese in a market-oriented society, while encouraged by the state to start their own entrepreneurs and to *get rich*, have expressed increasing alienation to politics and socialist ideals. In other words, they were more interested in employment and entertainment opportunities than previous generations (Thai 1995; Nguyen 2006; Pham and Thai 2011). Rosen and Marr (1999) also remarked that the ideals of young Vietnamese since Doi Moi were “less clear-cut, less altruistic and more self-centered than those of previous post-revolution generations” (p. 196). Accordingly, the Party’s grassroots-level organizations had difficulty recruiting new members, among whom high school and college students accounted for only 1.87% (Thayer 2003). A large-scale nationwide survey with college students in the early 2000s found about half of the participants stressed the importance of revolutionary ideals; yet only 34.7% of them regarded revolutionary ideals to be necessary in students’ life (Dang 2008).

Meanwhile, the socialization process of Cuban youth through both formal and nonformal citizenship education appeared to yield mixed results. As Báez (2004, p. 142) argued, the Cuban people, despite economic hardship, maintained, for the most part, their support of their government. On the contrary, Bunck (1994) showed after more than 30 years of failed attempts to establish a revolution culture, Cuban youth “remained largely resistant and hostile to Cuba’s leaders” (p. 85). In Fernández’s (1993) accounts, Cuban youth of the 1990s had not embraced the values and behavior patterns expected of them. They were deeply disillusioned by the social realities which were far from promises made by the state. This disillusionment led to the circumstance that Fernández (1993, p. 192) called the “desocialization” of Cuban youth, which gave rise to internal contradictions between ideology and praxis.

Examining the informal arena of political socialization, Fernandez (1993) claimed it was the non-state-controlled spaces of daily life that most clearly manifested resistance to state dogma and policies. This was evidenced in situations where Fernandez discovered that the networks of Cuban youth, many of which originally growing out of state socialization initiatives, became private spaces where the youngsters developed practices and identities that transcended state control or even challenged state orthodoxy. The resulting widespread social disaffection and disconnection between the Cubans and the state were deemed to fail the ultimate goal of the revolutionary moral absolute for the nation, suggesting an unfulfilled outcome of socialist socialization (De Varona 1992; Fernandez 1993).

In response to rapid socioeconomic changes, political leaders in each national context have taken steps to manage and direct the youths' behaviors and practices. The Cuban state, resisting the globalization of neoliberal capitalism, attempts to withstand all forms of privatizing education with a view to maintain control over achievements of the Revolution's social programs. As a result, since the 1960s there has been almost no change in the level of stated policy commitment to public education provision (Malott 2007). However, fears of a creeping capitalism and individualizing tendencies made the Cuban government introduce a new educational transformation program in 2001. One of the main aims for this reform was to rebuild collective participation, particularly to reengage young Cubans in revolutionary spirit and values (Breidlid 2007; Kapcia 2005). As Breidlid (2007) indicated, decisions to have smaller class sizes and to turn most upper secondary schools in the countryside into boarding schools were drawn on both pragmatic and ideological considerations. In addition to the quality improvement purpose, such changes sought to facilitate teachers to take more ideological control of the students who were also expected to receive more focused formal citizenship education by living in boarding schools (Breidlid 2007).

In the early 2000s, Vietnam continued to developed rapidly though its economy slowed by the mid-2000s, which many scholars attributed to the limited and cautious political reforms of the party-state (Nguyen and Pham 2016). In 2002, the country also implemented a curricular reform that overhauled all textbooks that had been used during Doi Moi (Salomon and Vu 2007). Producing a socialist citizenry continues to be the intended outcome of the new national curriculum despite the country's ongoing commitment to market-oriented development. New elements of citizenship have been added, though with modest content. These new elements include knowledge about human rights and environmental protection at both national and international levels (Nguyen and Nguyen 2014). In practice, it appears that the Vietnamese state has adopted a more relaxed approach to managing youth. For example, the authorities have given youth a greater scope of flexibility in expressing their ideas and desires. Nguyen (2006), drawing on field studies in Hanoi, shows how the state and Party have become rather tolerant with students' *unauthorized* gatherings and demonstrations, suggesting that the party-state has also reformed itself to accommodate youth (Thayer 2003).

In both the Vietnamese and Cuban contexts, at the turn of the twenty-first century, citizenship education faced unprecedented challenges. Critiques of Vietnam's

citizenship education include obsolete learning content, political dogma, teacher shortage, and low quality teaching (see, for example, Nguyen and Nguyen 2014). Many teachers of citizenship education received dated professional training (ibid). Notably, like Cuban students, Vietnamese counterparts increasingly found the principles and ideologies taught at school to be contradictory to what they aspire and experience in real life (Smith 2016; Doan 2005). Both local and foreign observers attribute these challenges to the fact that while education in both nations is persistently attached to the inflexible goals of an authoritarian governance model, education has to accommodate young people's changing needs and identities in a highly globalized society (Nguyen 2006; Lucius 2009; Nguyen and Nguyen 2014). More importantly, citizenship education teachers operate in the context of a dilemma as they attempt to work within the contradictions of state-society relations resulting from a growing dissonance between received state rhetoric and its practices.

In addition, the contemporary Cuban education system also struggles with “trying, on the one hand, to accommodate students’ interests while, on the other hand, serving society’s needs” (Blum 2011, p. 115). Still, Cuban education has to cultivate in students revolutionary morals while attempting to integrate new values and priorities that help students succeed in a changing society. Lancaster and Sanyal (2012) summarized the complex dilemmas of Cuba’s values education (which are also shared by Vietnam’s citizenship education, though with a different degree) in the following terms:

Values education bears the important responsibility of creating youth that can take on the task of continuing the socialist system while connecting to students’ individual lived experiences and perspectives. And while students’ realities often contradict traditional socialist ideals, they must still learn to see themselves as actors in the service of the larger socialist society. This process underlines the complexity of values formation and the difficult task of values education. (p. 43)

During the 2010s, updated conceptions of the *new citizen* in both national contexts have emerged. In fact, there has been an ongoing process of redefining what it means to be a good citizen and what socialist values should be transmitted through citizenship education or through the education system as a whole. In Vietnam, state discourse continues to call upon the youth to be the vanguard in the construction of socialism. Yet it does so through the promotion of a well-rounded citizen who espouses not only state orthodoxy but also *modernity* and collective national identity (Nguyen and Nguyen 2014; Le 2016). In addition, the recent proposal to revamp the citizenship curriculum, based on a competency approach and planned to implement throughout Vietnam in 2018, has included components of the twenty-first century skills, values, and civic virtues that align with Vietnam’s *market economy with socialist orientation* and global integration.

In comparison, Cuba’s education system, inspired by the Marxist revolutionaries in Latin America, continues to advance the spirit of internationalism in support of national liberation struggles against globalization and imperialism (Blum 2011; Smith 2016; Sant and Valencia 2018). The Cuban government’s take on internationalism stresses global collaboration or solidarity, a core principle of international

organizations and movements that provide humanitarian assistance or anti-capitalism support to alliance countries in need. This stems from the fact that young Cubans learn to perceive the world as divided between the core (wealthy) capitalists and the peripheral. In this world, the peripheral needs to unite to resist the former which is considered the cause of social inequities and injustice (Sant and Valencia 2018). Accordingly, this version of global citizenship in Cuba has resulted in many well-trained experts in such fields as education, health, or defense having been sent abroad on *internationalist aid* missions (Blum et al. 2017; Sant and Valencia 2018). At the same time, more and more young Cubans, while “jettisoning the altruistic image promoted in education of national emissaries, [. . .] take advantage, as educated global citizens, of the opportunities capitalist nations are seen as offering” (Blum et al. 2017, pp. 291–292). This complex sense of self cultivating as a global Cuban citizen, and the international and global opportunities and aspirations associated with it, has also posed challenges. Though there is an emergence of a dynamic process in which “official ideology is flexibly negotiated at the classroom level to fit the realities of the teachers and pupils” (Lancaster and Sanyal 2012, p. 38), many highly educated young Cubans, on turning themselves into a worthwhile *export*, find it hard to reconcile perceived tensions related to the resistance to and reproduction of power relations in the world. This particular issue is discussed in detail in another work that the authors of this chapter are simultaneously developing.

To a large extent, present-day Vietnamese and Cubans develop their values through negotiation and compromise with the authorities as well as the workings of social change and market forces (Nguyen 2006; Blum et al. 2017). As a result, many young Vietnamese, appealed greatly by individualistic values, entrepreneurship, and consumerism, still “show a sense of community, interest in politics and generally youthful idealism” – values used to be upheld by previous generations and now strongly endorsed by the state (Nguyen 2006, p. 338). Likewise, the combination of emerging capitalist mechanisms with a socialist system in Cuba seems to necessitate a type of citizen who embraces *doble conciencia* (double conscience) (Blum 2011). *Doble conciencia* means that the youth, particularly those who do not totally reject revolutionary values yet face difficulties reconciling the current reality, have to adopt a dual identity with contradictory ideological values so as to function effectively in society.

Conclusion

The two case studies of this chapter, Cuba and Vietnam, though taking different economic and social development trajectories in the post-socialist time, seem to share common citizenship conceptions and citizenship education aims, emphases, and challenges. The notion of socialist citizenship, originated in the Soviet Union and linked to transnational politics of the Cold War, was reinterpreted by the local communists to attend to local politics and realities. Over the past three decades, socialist citizenship has continued to fuel state efforts that promote a sense of collective political identity and direct the goal of the education systems. However,

existing scholarship on Cuban and Vietnamese citizenship and education has provided scant evidence regarding how such top-down national citizenship projects have met their objectives. Instead, the practice side of socialist citizenship, at least in relation to education, demonstrates a shifting version of socialist realism. It is evident that young generations in the two post-socialist contexts have navigated between competing discourses while experiencing a great level of ambivalence in a complex process of changing citizen identities.

Although the extent to which young people play a role in the mutation of the dominant discourse around socialist citizenship is not clear, current academic scholarship shows citizenship education introduced in Cuba's and Vietnam's public schools has been undergoing profound changes in terms of philosophy and curriculum. In fact, through different ways, both the states and the people in Cuba and Vietnam are engaging in the reshaping of the meanings and practices of socialist citizenship. Yet, to better understand the role, the agency, and the engagement level of citizens, including teachers and educators, it is necessary to explore how they come to negotiate tensions between the old and the new, aspirations and challenges, absolutes and pluralities, the prescribed and uncertainties in an evolving and highly globalized world. In addition, more work should be done to shed light on visions of citizenship and approaches to citizenship education that Cuban and Vietnamese people would want to take for the betterment of their countries, and just as importantly, the impacts of current transnational factors on these visions. Such research would reveal nuanced and important insights from local actors – those who participate in the post-socialist transformation processes in which personal, national, and transnational elements interact and construct alternative forms of citizen identity.

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Educational Mobility and Citizenship: Chinese “Foreign Talent” Students in Singapore and Indian Medical Students in China

40

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Abstract

This chapter builds a conceptual framework for understanding the relationship between educational mobility (with a focus on international student mobility) and citizenship based on an exploration of existing literature and applies this framework to examine empirical findings. Conceptually, citizenship is conceived on two varied levels: narrowly as a nationally based *legal* status and more broadly as an *informal* sense of belonging and agency in transnational contexts. It is argued that citizenship in the narrower definition intersects with student mobility mainly around the issues of skill formation and population strategies under the framework of the nation-state. In contrast, educational mobility relates to the broader notion of citizenship through the concept of “global citizenship,” which in turn comprises two different emphases – the *cultural* and the *political*. Having set out such a conceptual scheme, the chapter uses two recent empirical studies of student mobilities within Asia – a case of Chinese “foreign talent” students in

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Singapore and a case of Indian medical students in China – to provide insights into how individuals experience the complex and sometimes conflicting relationships between international educational mobility and citizenship. To date, intra-Asia educational mobility has received limited research attention, and thus potentially offers a unique perspective on citizenship and education.

Keywords

International student mobility · Educational mobility · International education · Citizenship · Global citizenship

Introduction

This chapter attempts to both conceptualize and illustrate the relationship between citizenship and a key contemporary phenomenon of education in global contexts – international student mobility (ISM). International student mobility in higher education (HE) has undergone significant expansion over the past decades: the number of students enrolled in tertiary education outside their countries of citizenship grew from 1.3 million in 1990 (OECD 2013) to an estimated 5 million in 2014 (ICEF Monitor 2015). This figure has been projected to increase further to 8 million by 2025 (Institute of International Education 2015). This rapid rise in the number of internationally mobile students in HE worldwide has significant implications for the question of citizenship.

In line with Peterson and Brock (2017), we take a two-level conception of citizenship. Narrowly defined, citizenship refers to the formal membership of a political state (almost always a *nation-state*) in the form of legal status, which entitles the citizen to certain rights and privileges, but also obliges them to certain responsibilities in relation to the state. In contrast to this technical/formal/legalistic definition, citizenship may also be defined more broadly as informal community membership, inclusion, and participation in a much wider range of contexts and situations. Even in the absence of legally defined status and rights, it is possible to speak of citizenship as a form of belonging to, and participation in, certain communities that allow the “citizen” to feel a sense of *agency*. We emphasize the notion of agency – or the ability to act upon the world and potentially make a difference (Isin 2009; Ortner 2005) – to distinguish citizenship from mere *membership*, which may be passive. The narrower and the broader definitions of citizenship overlap with each other, further complicating the ways in which ISM and citizenship(s) intersect.

We first outline a conceptual framework for understanding the relationship (s) between international student mobility and citizenship. We then elaborate on this conceptual structure with reference to existing literature. Subsequently, the framework is applied to empirical case studies from an Asian context, drawing on the first author’s two recent studies of international student mobility. Finally, we conclude by summarizing the chapter briefly.

International Student Mobility and Citizenship: A Conceptual Scheme

Building on a preliminary survey of existing scholarship, we argue in this chapter that there are mainly two ways in which citizenship is implicated in the studies on International Student Mobility (ISM).

Firstly, given a world in which the sovereign nation-state remains the foremost source of political authority, international student migration, like other types of discretionary (im)migration (see Blake 2002), is primarily regulated by national states. When an international student migrates across national borders, the receiving state sets out the rules governing the legal statuses of international students, including those pertaining to their potential obtainment of citizenship rights. In today’s knowledge-driven global economy in which nation-states compete with each other for talent (Kuptsch and Pang 2006), many countries – especially economically more developed ones – integrate international student policies into broader strategies of skilled migration and population management (She and Wotherspoon 2013). In general, international students with advanced qualifications and desirable skills tend to be favored by immigration systems when it comes to the granting of partial (e.g., permanent residency) and/or full citizenship (e.g., naturalization). Thus, studying abroad has become a route for immigration, with obvious implications for citizenship in its formal and legal sense. In fact, the prospect of acquiring such formal/legal citizenship rights in the destination country can be a major consideration – sometimes even the primary motivator – in some students’ pursuit of international educational mobility (“A” in Fig. 1). Since the nation-state remains the principal anchor of formal/legal citizenship (Heater 2002), this first way in which ISM and citizenship intersect each other entails a notion of citizenship that is mainly *nationally* based or defined (“A1”).

A second way in which educational mobility has been linked to citizenship in existing research has to do with the role study abroad supposedly plays in relation to *global citizenship* (“B”) (Lewin 2009). Global citizenship is an ambiguous term (Lilley et al. 2017), having been conceptualized somewhat differently by different scholars, as shall be unpacked subsequently in this chapter. Despite this ambiguity, it is nevertheless clear that global citizenship is not primarily about formal or legal status, considering the fact that there is no viable global authority to serve as an anchor for such a status in the same way nation-state does provide a viable basis for nationally based formal/legal citizenship. Indeed, a scan of academic discourses on global citizenship reveals broader definitions of citizenship that de-emphasize legal/technical status in favor of informal participation, inclusion, and agentic belongingness (“B1”) situated in sociopolitical domains and spaces stretching beyond the national. Suffice it to say here, global citizenship is for the most part a matter of perspective, disposition, and commitment (Rhoads and Szelényi 2011), short of legal/formal entitlements and obligations (“B2”). In converse, legal/formal citizenship in relation to a nation-state often also entails *informal* citizenship in one way or another (“A2”), although such informal citizenship is not equivalent to *global* citizenship.

International Student Mobility and Formal/Legal Citizenship

Citizenship in its formal/legal sense is implicated in international student mobility not only for the obvious reason that foreign students enter and reside in the host country according to the latter’s immigration/citizenship laws, but also because international student recruitment has been increasingly linked with strategies of skill formation and population management in many national contexts. These latter strategies about skills and population are often materialized through policies and legislations in the areas of immigration and citizenship incorporation.

Research on the linkage between international student mobility and immigration began to emerge since the early 2000s. Explaining the background to the rise of this linkage, Tremblay (2005) observed that by the late 1990s, many Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries faced shortages in highly skilled labor due to sustained economic growth and the development of information technology industries. Faced with the additional challenges of low birth rates and ageing population that typically confronted developed economies, these countries responded by relaxing immigration laws to attract skilled migrants from abroad. International students already studying in these countries are naturally favored because they have the advantage of being familiar with the host country society and labor market. Conversely, favoring international students as potential high-skilled immigrants also serves to further enhance the ability of these countries’ HE institutions to recruit more foreign students, which bring in significant tuition fee revenues as well as talent. Thus, in various developed countries, the recruitment of international students and skilled immigration became intertwined phenomena.

A number of scholars have examined in detail how this education-immigration intertwinement manifests in several key countries in the world that receive significant numbers of both international students and skilled migrants, such as the USA, the UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and France (She and Wotherspoon 2013;




Fig. 1 International educational mobility and citizenship

Tremblay 2005; Ziguras and Law 2006). Among them, it has been said that “Australia’s immigration and international education policies have become enmeshed to a degree not (yet?) found elsewhere” (Ziguras and Law 2006, p. 73). Scholars in Australia have described the system variously as “education-migration nexus” (Robertson 2013), “two-step migration” (Hawthorne 2010), or “study-migration pathway” (Hawthorne 2013), whereby it has been observed that many international students went to study there with the explicit objective of subsequently obtaining permanent residence (PR). Coupled with Australia’s policy of treating international education overtly as a revenue-generating “export service industry,” this has led to the mushrooming of substandard private colleges which were essentially “PR factories” with particular appeal to under-qualified students (Baas 2006, 2010, 2017). Later on, such problematic developments triggered a backlash, leading to policy changes that sought to “de-couple” international student mobility and immigration in Australia (Gribble and Blackmore 2012; Robertson 2011). In the context of some other countries, such as the UK and Japan, the education-immigration linkage is configured somewhat differently. In the UK, for instance, while non-EU international students are strongly desired, the state is more reluctant as a labor-importer and thus imposes more restrictive rules governing the student-to-immigrant transition (She and Wotherspoon 2013). In Japan, a country noted for its closed and homogenous notion of citizenship, the state taps into international students as a major supply of labor to address domestic shortages while remaining highly conservative towards immigration and citizenship through naturalization (Liu-Farrer 2009, 2011).

Such variation in approaches shows that a certain country’s way of understanding and managing the relationship between international student mobility on the one hand and immigration and citizenship on the other is not exclusively determined by the logic of human capital accumulation. With regard to this, She and Wotherspoon (2013, pp. 11–12) summarize usefully: “Managing international student mobility as part of the strategy to manage highly skilled migration goes beyond merely a matter of skill formation and in fact represents specific social relations and power struggles in each host nation.” As shall be illustrated in the empirical section of this chapter, the two cases of student mobility to Singapore and China exhibit, each in its own way, contextually specific social, cultural, and sometimes political forces that collectively shape what citizenship might mean in relation to the mobile students.

As we asserted in the previous section, in one way or another, formal/legal citizenship entails or implies some form of informal notions of citizenship. In the context of educational mobility, this may manifest in the ways in which *both* the narrowly defined (formal/legal) citizenship and citizenship more broadly conceived (informal/social/cultural) are the objects of international students’ aspiration and desire, such as is the case for youths from China’s urban singleton generation (Fong 2011). Alternatively, it could be expressed through ways in which students’ legal citizenship status profoundly impacts their educational experiences and their subsequent perceptions of inclusion/exclusion within the school community, the education system, and host country society at large. For example, Torres and Wicks-Asbun’s (2014) study of undocumented Latino students in North Carolina, USA, unpacks the poignant manners in which these legally liminal students negotiate a “liminal citizenship” whereby their legal status relegates them to discrimination and

marginalization in school, yet they sought to recoup senses of legitimacy and agency through their status as successful and meritocratic deserving students. In the Australian context, Robertson (2011) has shown how international students exercised forms of “activist citizenship” through lobbying activities such as protests, in response to perceived discrimination.

Suffice it to say, although international student mobilities are often initiated and regulated under frameworks hinging on formal and legalistic citizenship, the broader and multifarious social consequences of such mobilities often entail wider ideas of citizenship involving the notion of *agency* at its core.

International Student Mobility and Global Citizenship

Scholarly discourse linking international student mobility to global citizenship generally revolves around the claim that study abroad fosters global citizenship among students (e.g. Lewin 2009; Stoner et al. 2014; Tarrant 2010; Tarrant et al. 2014, 2011). However, scholars do not seem always to define global citizenship in the same way, except for the commonly held – though often unstated – assumption that global citizenship is not primarily a matter of legal status or formal rights. The linchpin for understanding various scholars’ different approaches towards global citizenship seems to be the notion of *cosmopolitanism*. According to cultural anthropologist Hannerz (2006), the protean concept of cosmopolitanism has principally two faces: culture and politics. When the cultural is emphasized, cosmopolitanism refers to an openness to and appreciation of cultural “others” and hence the ability to move between cultures and be at ease with difference. Political cosmopolitanism, on the other hand, derives from Kantian philosophical ideals about “citizens of the world” and perpetual world peace based on a commitment to universally valid human values and moral principles – often manifested in contemporary terms as “human rights” (Vertovec and Cohen 2002). Indeed, we find existing scholarly discussions of global citizenship to fall roughly under these two categories, which we venture to call respectively the *cultural-cosmopolitan* and the *political-cosmopolitan*.

We use the label “cultural-cosmopolitan” to describe the perspective of those scholars of international education who generally equate global citizenship with cultural cosmopolitanism, which in turn refers essentially to intercultural awareness and practice. For example, writing in the context of UK, Caruana (2014) discusses global citizenship mainly as an issue of “intercultural sensitivity” and competence amidst multicultural learning environments and student diversity. Killick (2012, p. 384) similarly takes “global citizenship learning” to mean the forging of bonds with “‘cultural’ others” and the formation of identity for international students as well as their host-country counterparts amidst negotiating differences. Since mainstream research on the relationship between intercultural sensitivity/competence and study abroad has been dominated by a positivistic paradigm stressing measurement and assessment (Deardorff 2006; Williams 2005), one important contribution by scholars such as Caruana (2014) and Killick (2012) is their qualitative and ethnographic investigative foci on students’ experiences in situ – for instance, in the multicultural university campus.

In contrast, political-cosmopolitan conceptualizations of global citizenship tend to invoke more politically charged vocabularies such as “responsibility,” “commitment,” “social justice,” and “activism.” Lyons et al.’s (2012, p. 361) following definition of global citizenship – as a “viewpoint that suggests that global forms of belonging, responsibility, and political action counter the intolerance and ignorance that more provincial and parochial forms of citizenship encourage” – serves well as an example. The civic and political face of cosmopolitanism that is largely obscured in the cultural-cosmopolitan view on global citizenship is foregrounded here. Synthesizing scholarly literature on global citizenship thematically, Morais and Ogden (2011, p. 447) provide a comprehensive conceptual model of global citizenship from this political-cosmopolitan perspective. They argue that global citizenship encompasses three key dimensions: *social responsibility* (including global justice and how it relates to personal responsibilities felt by a “global citizen”); *global competence* (comprising self-awareness, intercultural communication, and global knowledge); and *global civic engagement* (referring to involvement in global civic/political actions). Such formulations are echoed by other educational scholars writing about global citizenship from the political-cosmopolitan angle too (e.g., Davies 2006; Shultz 2007). Interestingly, while educationalists have written a fair deal about global citizenship as a kind of political cosmopolitanism, there are far fewer attempts to link it specifically with student mobility. The few who have done so concentrated on demonstrating the *measurability* of global citizenship through conceptual refinement (Streitwieser and Light 2016) or conceptual framing/modeling (Stoner et al. 2014; Tarrant 2010). What remains missing so far is more empirically grounded reflections on how global citizenship has been experienced – if it is deemed relevant in the first place – by international students. In particular, qualitative or ethnographic accounts seem scarce.

To sum up this survey of literature on ISM and global citizenship, two observations can be made. First, global citizenship in the educational context has been conceptualized in close relation with the idea of *cosmopolitanism*. What we have termed the “cultural-cosmopolitan” take and the “political-cosmopolitan” take are not mutually exclusive or conflictual, but represent two different emphases educational scholars have used. While the cultural-cosmopolitan strand has delved deeper into mobile students’ experiences through ethnographic and qualitative studies, research in the political-cosmopolitan strand has remained largely conceptual. Secondly, regardless of which strand, virtually all the studies mentioned above involved white students situated in developed, Western, English-speaking countries (see ► Chap. 33, “Discourses of Global Citizenship Education: The Influence of the Global Middle Classes”). There seems to be little insight into how internationally mobile students who do not occupy such privileged structural positions in the world – such as those of less affluent backgrounds from non-Western developing countries – experience “global citizenship.”

Empirical Illuminations: Two Views from Asia

This section shows how some of the abstract conceptual ideas above are manifested in empirical data. We do so by offering brief accounts of two cases of international student mobility in Asia based on the first author’s research. Intra-Asian student

mobility has received limited research attention so far due to its relative marginality vis-à-vis West-bound student mobilities (Yang 2018b). Thus, looking at the neglected experiences of students moving between Asian countries can potentially offer unique insights. Yang conducted both studies using an ethnographically inspired methodological approach, with qualitative interviewing and participant observation as the main data collection methods. The first study on Chinese youths recruited as “foreign talent” students by city-state Singapore was conducted mainly during 2010–2012 (for details see Yang 2016), whereas the second study about Indian youths pursuing medical degrees in China was carried out more recently between 2014 and 2016 (for details see Yang 2018a).

In narrating these two cases below, we seek to cover succinctly the general background and overviews of the form of student mobility in question before proceeding to key findings and analyses pertaining to the question of citizenship. Our analyses shall be loosely structured to answer the following broad questions: What role does formal/legal citizenship play in both cases of student mobility? How does informal and transnational citizenship factor into the mobile students’ experiences – educational or otherwise? To what extent, and in what ways is global citizenship – be it the cultural-cosmopolitan or political-cosmopolitan variation – relevant for both groups of students?

Case Study 1: Chinese “Foreign Talent” Students in Singapore

The case of Chinese students being recruited by the Southeast Asia city-state Singapore as “foreign talent” instantiates well the intertwinement between education and the receiving state’s strategies of skill formation and population management. Not dissimilar to situations confronting developed economies elsewhere, the Singapore state faced with challenges of low domestic birth rates and shortages of skilled human capital, responded by seeking proactively to attract foreign talent since the 1980s (Quah 1984). As part of a wider range of foreign talent policies, a series of scholarship schemes were developed in the 1990s to recruit students from Asian developing countries such as Singapore’s neighboring Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, India, and China (Yang 2016).

In particular, China stood out as a major – possibly the largest – source of foreign talent students for Singapore, with three scholarship schemes instituted in the 1990s. Known as the SM1, SM2, and SM3 schemes (with SM standing for “senior middle”), these schemes, respectively, recruited junior middle school graduates, second-year senior middle school students, and senior middle school graduates across dozens of provinces and cities in China. Feeder schools for these schemes were academically distinguished ones locally and sometimes nationally, and scholarship applicants had to undergo a competitive selection process consisting of written examinations and interviews administered by officials from the Singapore Ministry of Education. Upon being selected, SM1 scholars would be channeled into upper secondary schools in Singapore and subsequently junior colleges, with full financial assistances on tuition and board. SM2 and SM3 scholars would be

channeled into studying engineering and science courses at public universities, also with all expenses exempted and living allowance provided. The intake scales of these scholarship programs increased over time, rising from an estimated 100 students per year per program at initial stages to 300–400 students annually per program in more recent times, although the numbers have dropped slightly in the past 5 years or so. At the time of writing, the SM1 and SM2 programs are believed to be ongoing, whereas the SM3 program had terminated after 2011. Cumulatively, these programs could have brought an estimated total of some 20,000 Chinese youths into the Singaporean education system – not an insignificant number considering the compact size of the local system.

From the outset, it is clear that the Singaporean government selected these Chinese scholars not only as academically competitive talent, but also as potential future citizens. All three schemes have built in some mechanisms or features serving to tie the students to the city-state in the long run. As part of the scholarship terms and conditions, SM2 and SM3 scholars are required to serve a “bond” by working in Singapore for 6 years upon completing undergraduate studies. Until relatively recently, SM2 and SM3 scholars had also been automatically issued with invitations to apply for permanent residency (PR) upon graduation, and application success is more or less guaranteed as long as they secure employment in Singapore. Although scholars under the SM1 scheme are not required to serve a bond, they are also given the option of becoming PR. Because of their younger age, male SM1 scholars who take up this offer would also be required to register for National Service in the Singapore military – arguably the ultimate citizenship rite. Furthermore, all these should be seen in a broader picture wherein the Chinese has consistently had the lowest reproductive rates among various ethnic/racial groups in Singapore (Yang et al. 2017), which makes naturalizing ethnic Chinese foreign talent crucial to maintaining the *status quo* racial profile of the Singapore citizenry (Yeoh and Lin 2013; Yim 2011). Thus, for these Chinese students on Singaporean scholarships, educational mobility is not only a privileged pathway to citizenship, it could even be said that Singapore’s strategies about citizenship and population fundamentally underpinned this form of mobility in the first place.

Taking a wider definition of citizenship, the Chinese scholars’ experiences are more mixed. The first author’s work has shown that receiving various privileges from the Singapore state and institutions sometimes makes them targets of local society’s resentment and criticism (Yang 2014a, c), which can impede their achieving a sense of inclusion and belonging. Due to academic competition and differences in sociocultural backgrounds, the Chinese scholars encounter some instances of discrimination and marginalization in university life, although it is also found that they exercise agency through carving out their own social and symbolic spaces to counter perceived exclusion (Yang 2014b). On a broader societal level, the rise of anti-immigrant sentiments in Singapore in recent years (Yang 2017a) inevitably affected how the Chinese student-turned-migrants perceive their ambiguous positionality in their adopted home (Yang 2017b).

Notwithstanding these mixed experiences, according to Yang’s ongoing observation, this group enjoyed overall positive life outcomes in terms of career

progression and rise in socioeconomic status (Yang 2018b). The academic credentials and professional skills they developed through studying and working in Singapore serve as the basis for them to claim social and economic citizenship in a city-state that upholds the principle of meritocracy. Culturally, Chinese students and student-turned-immigrants are in a uniquely advantageous position to be able to use their native language and culture knowledge to establish social connections with the Singaporean society, which remains Chinese to a significant degree culturally and linguistically. Thus, despite embodying marginal identities such as foreign students and immigrants, this group's actual experiences turn out to be characterized more by fulfillment, agency, and inclusion, than by marginalization or exclusion.

Finally, with regard to global citizenship, there is relatively little evidence in Yang's research to link the Chinese students' educational mobility in Singapore and *political-cosmopolitan* global citizenship, insofar as the latter emphasizes global social awareness, responsibility, and civic engagement. As a polity that consciously distances itself from liberal Western values and ideologies, Singapore does not fully embrace all the key tenets of global citizenship in the first place (Chua 2017). Indeed, scholars have argued that global citizenship education in Singapore tends to be subsumed under nation-centric objectives and agendas, defined largely in neoliberal and instrumental terms (Alviar-Martin and Baildon 2016). As such, Singapore hardly represents a conducive environment for the Chinese students to learn political-cosmopolitanism. However, when it comes to global citizenship in the *cultural-cosmopolitan* sense, receiving their pretertiary and/or tertiary education in Singapore often proves to be transformative for the Chinese students in terms of exposing them to diverse cultures, peoples, and places that were simply not accessible in China. Through studying and working in Singapore's highly multicultural and globally connected environments, and through opportunities for venturing further afield using Singapore as a springboard, the Chinese foreign talent students get to hone their intercultural awareness and competence, verily becoming "global citizens" in a cultural sense (Yang 2017b).

Case Study 2: Indian Medical Students in China

The case of Indian students heading to China for bachelors' degrees in medicine (MBBS) contrasts strongly with the above case in many regards.

Since early 2000s, each year hundreds of Indian students have been heading to China to enroll in English-medium MBBS programs offered by second-tier and provincial-level Chinese universities (Aiyar 2006). By the 2010s, China had become the top destination for Indian students seeking medical training abroad (Mishra 2012), overtaking traditionally favored destinations such as Russia and Ukraine. By 2015, there were a total of 16,694 Indian students in China (CAFSA 2016), the majority of whom could be safely assumed to be on MBBS programs. One common characteristic of Indian students who pursue medical education in such non-Anglophone overseas destinations is that they are typically academically not-high-performing students coming from not-so-affluent, lower sections of India's

emerging middle classes (Sancho 2017; Yang 2018a). This means that neither India’s affordable but extremely competitive public medical schools, nor the academically easier-to-enter but prohibitively expensive private medical colleges are accessible to them. Thus, attending overseas colleges with relatively lax admission criteria and affordable fees such as that offered in China became a “second chance” for these students and their families to realize their middle-class aspirations through entering the esteemed medical profession.

Citizenship in the formal/legal sense does not play as significant a role here as compared with the Singapore case. From the outset, the Indian students were *not* recruited as potential immigrants. This does not mean that international student mobility is not linked to China’s national strategies and interests in some ways. Indeed, higher education is one sphere in which China seeks to project its soft power globally (Yang 2015), with the emblematic example being the active recruitment of African students (Haugen 2013). However, at least based on the first author’s investigation at one provincial university in eastern China which had several hundred Indian students enrolled in its MBBS program (Yang 2018a), there was little evidence that the Indian students were treated as potential bearers of international good will towards China. Instead, the said provincial Chinese university seemed primarily interested in the tuition fee revenues and the superficiality of “internationalization” that the Indian students brought. The MBBS program suffered from many issues with regard to admission process/screening, quality of instruction and assessment, student service, and program management in general. Students on the program typically had low levels of satisfaction. However, being acutely aware of their own lack of choice, they generally acquiesced into a cynical and resigned state. As a result, the Indian students typically did not report any meaningful sense of agency or citizenship in the university campus setting or more broadly. There were also conspicuous patterns of segregation between the Indian medical students and the local Chinese students, owing to language barriers and, allegedly, race/nationality-based prejudices. Although the Indian students tended to have a strong community bonding among themselves which helped them cope with various practical and psychological challenges associated with studying abroad, it is nevertheless difficult to describe their positionality vis-à-vis the program, the university, the city, and the country they find themselves in, in terms of “citizenship.”

Lastly, when it comes to the question of global citizenship, Yang’s observation points towards a generally pessimistic picture, but with some interesting “bright spots.” Insofar as political-cosmopolitanism is defined prevalently in Western liberal democratic terms, an experience of educational mobility to China added little to the Indian students’ global citizenship. However, in fieldwork, Yang often heard praises from his Indian research participants for China’s superior socioeconomic development compared to that of India, which were usually attributed to China’s one-party political system and the associated political stability that the Indian students’ raucous democratic homeland apparently lacked. Although this is certainly not an instance of political-cosmopolitan global citizenship to be found in existing literature, it *is* an example that studying and living in China has to some degree made Indian students – possibly other foreign students too – reflect on diverse political systems and their merits.

As for global citizenship of the cultural-cosmopolitan variation, it would appear studying in China benefited the Indian students modestly. While most Indian students did learn about Chinese culture and society through some local travel and other explorations, they seldom established meaningful connections with local society members, nor indeed with other international MBBS students from the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Africa, which were all present on the campus which Yang studied. Thus, even though traveling afar to China surely widened the horizons of these youths hailing from small-town/rural India, they were certainly not in as privileged a position to gain cultural global citizenship as the Chinese students in Singapore. Exceptions do exist: in his ongoing observations, Yang has also encountered a minority of Indian students who either achieved high levels of proficiency in Chinese language or used their social and professional networks in China to launch transnational professional or business endeavors.

Conclusion

To conclude, in this chapter, we have ventured to address the relationship(s) between educational mobility (mainly, international student mobility, or ISM) and citizenship. We conceived of citizenship principally in two ways: as a formal and legal status under the framework of national states and as an informal sense of belonging and agency in a variety of contexts and on multiple scales not restricted to the national. We argued that ISM intersects with these two different notions of citizenship in distinct ways. Drawing on existing scholarship, we suggested that under the nation-state framework, ISM has been closely linked to national strategies about skilled migration and population management. Accordingly, study abroad has often become a pathway for immigration, or at least a component of the receiving state's manpower policies or strategies. On the other hand, concerning the informal and broader definition of citizenship, extant literature mostly points to the relationship between student mobility and the cultivation of "global citizenship." We further differentiated the *cultural* and *political* emphases in conceptualizations of global citizenship. Existing scholarship notes that ISM fosters both cultural global citizenship and political global citizenship; however, we maintained that such assertions tended to be insufficiently grounded in qualitative and ethnographic data. In addition, we also noted a lack of attention to less privileged mobile students such as those from nonelite backgrounds and who move primarily within Asia. To address these gaps, drawing on recent research done by the first author, we sought to illuminate the various ways in which student mobility intersects with citizenship using two empirical cases of intra-Asian student mobility: Chinese "foreign talent" students in Singapore and Indian medical students in China. Taking an implicitly comparative view, our accounts have sought to highlight the contrasting experiences of "citizenship" by these two groups of Asian students under contrasting circumstances. Notwithstanding various nuances, on the whole, the Chinese "foreign talent" students are found to have somewhat more positive experiences of "citizenship" when compared with the Indian medical students thanks to the former's more privileged structural positions.

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Bringing the Citizen Back In: A Sociopolitical Approach to Global Citizenship Education

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Abstract

Global citizenship education has gained prominence in educational research in recent years, mirroring a comparable trend of expansion in education systems internationally. The vitality of the field of global citizenship education research has been marked by the use of a wide range of approaches in a variety of contexts. However, this expansion has come at the price of mounting confusion in defining key analytical terms, starting with the concept of “global citizenship.” After reviewing the challenges raised by this conceptual laxity, this chapter proposes to return to the concept of citizenship to provide solid theoretical foundations for the field. From a sociological point of view, citizenship can be defined as a relationship between a social group and a state. This relationship is based on four key constitutive elements: membership, rights, duties, and legitimate

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political participation. Theoretical labor on the concept of citizenship offers the triple benefits of distinguishing global citizenship education from related but distinct forms of education, facilitating the construction of a rigorous conversation on global citizenship education, and opening new avenues for research on global citizenship education. The analytical implications of bringing the concept of citizenship back in are then illustrated in the cases of the UNESCO, OECD, and Oxfam frameworks for global citizenship education. A sociopolitical approach to citizenship also highlights the importance of specific social processes and struggles in shaping the contours of a global form of citizenship.

Keywords

Global citizenship · Global state · Rights · Duties · Membership · Participation · Cosmopolitanism · Political education

Introduction

In recent years, “global citizenship education” (GCE) research has made a place for itself in educational research. In 2018, the *British Journal of Educational Studies* released a special issue on GCE, and Ian Davies et al. (2018) edited *The Palgrave Handbook of Global Citizenship and Education*. This field of research is very diverse. Rather than being a unified conversation centered on key concepts and research questions, GCE research is best conceived as a loose space bringing together a range of research traditions, approaches, and interests having in common the use of the term “global citizenship.” In the introduction to the aforementioned special issue on GCE in the *British Journal of Educational Studies*, Yemini et al. (2018) classified the main strands of research as “GCE skills and pedagogies,” “cosmopolitanism,” “educational for sustainable development,” and “multiculturalism and internationalization.” Throughout the field, the dispersion of meanings associated with “global citizenship” is a standout feature.

This chapter argues that a rigorous definition of citizenship is a prerequisite to the progressive development of our scientific understanding of GCE. The chapter offers a sociologically constructed definition of citizenship and draws the implications of this approach for GCE research. It then illustrates how this definition can be applied to specific frameworks or models of GCE and concludes by emphasizing specific points of analysis that a sociologically informed model of GCE can focus on, starting with the state as the framework for citizenship.

Delineating the “Global Citizen” in GCE

In GCE research, the use of the term “global citizenship” suffers from substantial terminological imprecision. Surveying the field a few years ago, Oxley and Morris (2013, p. 302) concluded that “both GC and GCE are used ambiguously and

understood differently both within and across contexts.” This lack of clarity and precision in the use of “global citizenship” does not facilitate the consolidation of GCE as an integrated research space. Dill (2018, p. 559) recently reiterated this verdict, arguing that the core concept of GCE has become “a site for contested and confused dissonance.”

Other authors have explored the notions often associated with (and not always distinguished from) global citizenship. For Dvir et al. (2018, p. 458), “‘international mindedness,’ ‘intercultural competences,’ ‘global consciousness,’ etc.” come close to the meaning of global citizenship. In the field, cosmopolitanism is often used as a synonym to global citizenship (Bowden 2003), even though it has been found that in various contexts, dispositions and values are typically considered as cosmopolitan function as cultural capital rather than as citizenship attributes (e.g., Friedman 2017; Weenink 2008). In the same vein, the OECD explicitly associates global citizenship with global mindedness (OECD 2018b).

Variation in the lexicon associated with GCE is also evident among teachers, students, and families. Goren and Yemini (2016) report cases of school teachers in Israel considering that GCE means providing students with “global competencies,” while Yemini (2018, p. 283) finds that GCE is taken to mean “the integration of multicultural, multilingual, and global dimensions into education” in a London school. Western expatriates enrolling their children in local schools in Hong Kong have been found to rely on “an imaginary of what it means to be a ‘global citizen’” (Groves and O’Connor 2017, p. 2), in which global citizenship largely operates as a metaphorical signifier. Meanwhile, Rapoport (2010, p. 186) found that teachers in Indiana, USA, believe in the need to “infuse global dimensions into all aspects of citizenship education” despite being unclear about the meaning of global citizenship.

What emerges from this brief overview is that a range of terms is used to describe ideas, practices, values, feelings, and dispositions that are somewhat related but not identical. This implies that researchers may use the same term to refer to different things, complicating the work of accumulation of scientific findings on the “global upscaling” of citizenship education. The potentially adverse implications of the lack of clear engagement with the concept of global citizenship have been noted by Goren and Yemini (2017, p. 180) in their systematic review of empirical GCE research, warning that without “specific definitions and taxonomies, the term GCE could become simply a token term, arbitrarily chosen from a list of similar generic terms (i.e., cosmopolitanism, global mindedness, global consciousness, transnationalism, global competencies, global education etc.)” Semantic arbitrariness is particularly troublesome when it has to do with a – and perhaps the – foundational concept of a field of research, making terminological clarity in the use of “global citizenship” that much more essential.

In an attempt to bring order to the field and clarify the meaning of global citizenship, Oxley and Morris (2013) built a typology of theories of global citizenship in GCE research based on an extensive review of GCE publications. They distinguished between the cosmopolitan types of definition of global citizenship, encompassing political, moral, economic, and cultural models, from the advocacy types, bringing together the social, critical, environmental, and spiritual conceptions.

But while this categorization can be useful to *map* the field, it remains descriptive and provides little guidance for assessing the respective merits of different definitions and engaging in the labor of conceptual elaboration. Nevertheless, this extensive typology suggests that improved clarity in the use of the concept of global citizenship may be an important avenue to improve GCE research. A useful starting point for doing so may be to reconsider the concept of “citizenship.”

Reshaping the Structure of GCE Research

To bring some order to the conceptualization of GCE and thus facilitate both research and educational practices, a return to the core concept of citizenship is essential to the development of a rigorous use of “global citizenship.” The simultaneously political and analytical uses to which the concept of citizenship has been put partly explain its contested meaning. Yet, from a sociological point of view, the use of the term should be informed by social reality and citizenship as it has actually existed historically. From this perspective, citizenship can be understood as “membership of a particular kind of political community – one in which those who enjoy a certain status are entitled to participate on an equal basis with their fellow citizens in making the collective decisions that regulate social life” (Bellamy 2008, p. 1). This specific political status is the core of citizenship, which cannot be conceived without consideration of the associated political structures, political opportunities, and political power relations that make citizenship a reality and define the regime of inclusion into and exclusion from the citizen body. Moreover, in modern times, citizenship is simultaneously a political and legal status, suggesting the need to reflect on the relationship between nation-state citizenship and global citizenship.

As a specific form of citizenship, global citizenship too gains from being conceived as a political (and legal) status. GCE, in turn, can thus be defined as education for global citizenship (either toward its advent, if global citizenship does not yet exist, or toward its fuller realization if global citizenship is already partially accomplished). However, what could help researchers determine whether specific educational practices promote global citizenship? Here, social scientists’ reflections can help.

Citizenship as a political status has not been a continuous and ever expanding reality since its birth in Ancient Athens. It has receded in certain places and times and re-emerged in others. In Western Europe in the Middle Ages, for instance, as new political forms and social relationships developed, “citizenship was temporarily almost lost as a political concept” (Heater 1990, p. 20), even though reflections on political organization and membership certainly did not disappear. Citizenship appears to have been a reality primarily when and where *states* have existed, may they be city states, nation-states, or other realizations of the state. This has led a number of social scientists to define citizenship as a *relationship* between social agents and a state (Bourdieu 2014; Tilly 1996, 1997). Accordingly, global citizenship equally benefits from being conceived as a relationship, a link between social agents and a state, although the latter may not necessarily be a nation-state (e.g.,

a hypothetical “global state”). GCE research, if it is committed to being rigorous in its use of the term “global citizenship,” can draw important implications from such a definition for the analysis of GCE in schools and other educational spaces.

What are the essential features of this specific political relationship that characterizes “citizenship”? What kind of social agent-state relationship is distinctive of citizenship? The four components generally mentioned are membership, rights, duties, and specific forms of political participation (O’Byrne 2003; Wiesner et al. 2018). Membership refers to the criteria determining who belongs and who does not belong to the community; rights to what the state owes its citizens; duties to what citizens owe the state; and political participation to the modalities of citizens’ legitimate political expression. Researchers are, therefore, best equipped to analyze GCE based on a rigorous concept of global citizenship when they consider the following four key research questions:

1. How does education for global citizenship approach the question and modalities of membership to a global political community of citizens?
2. How is the topic of the rights of global citizens addressed in global citizenship education?
3. How is the theme of global citizens’ duties considered in learning for global citizenship?
4. What place and role are given to the forms of legitimate global political expression in the learning experiences aimed at developing global citizenship?

According to the definition of global citizenship presented above, these four research questions could play a key role in structuring the field of GCE research (as opposed to being addressed more or less tangentially depending on the definition of global citizenship at hand). In addition to bringing order and clarity to the field, two other benefits could emerge from this clarification of “global citizenship.” The first would be the possibility to articulate more clearly the relationships that exist or could exist between GCE and other forms of education, such as education for multiculturalism, multilingual education, education for “global mindedness,” education for “global competency,” and “sustainability education.” In what ways (if any) are these other forms of education contributing to GCE? To what extent does GCE contribute to these other educational agendas?

The second would be the opportunity to elaborate a rich discussion between GCE and research into other forms of citizenship education. For instance, what are the common points and differences between GCE and the citizenship education experiences of expatriates, refugees, or asylum seekers living outside of their country of citizenship? What tensions and common points can be found in nation-state citizenship education and GCE? What is the distribution of forms or types of citizenship education across various educational spaces (e.g., nation-state schools, “international” schools, community education, vocational education, university education, etc.)? What can GCE research learn from supranational citizenship education research, such as research on European citizenship education? Can GCE gain insight from the experiences of students who underwent citizenship education in schools

in more than one country? As this list of question suggests, elaborating GCE research on a rigorous definition of global citizenship has the potential to vastly enrich the agenda of the field in at least three ways: by offering new lenses for exploring GCE, by proposing original and often unexplored research areas, and by fostering the ability to establish a meaningful dialogue between GCE research and adjacent fields.

To illustrate how this conception of GCE can be applied to specific approaches to GCE, the following section reviews three prominent international and non-governmental policies, programs, and curricula dedicated to GCE: the *PISA Global Competence Framework* by the OECD, the UNESCO GCE agenda, and Oxfam's *Education for Global Citizenship*.

Examples of International and Nongovernmental GCE Models and Frameworks

Influential international and nongovernmental organizations have invested the space of GCE. A number of them have developed their own models and frameworks for GCE, often expecting or enjoining state school systems to implement some or all of their agendas. In this section, the potential benefits of adopting the sociopolitical approach to global citizenship outlined above are illustrated with the case of three important programs: the UNESCO, OECD, and Oxfam GCE frameworks.

UNESCO

In 2014, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) released a blueprint for GCE entitled *Preparing learners for the challenges of the 21st century*. In this document, UNESCO (2014, p. 10) argues that, beyond disagreements, GCE ought to be about “how to promote universality (e.g., common and collective identity, interest, participation, duty), while respecting singularity (e.g., individual rights, self-improvement).” At first sight, this model seems to pay attention to the questions of rights, duties, and participation, i.e., three of the key four components of citizenship. Only the question of political membership is not explicitly raised. However, looking at the UNESCO blueprint more closely, these different building blocks of citizenship are seldom articulated at the global level, so much so that it is hard to see what makes UNESCO's definition of citizenship distinctively “global” and how this differs from what the authors consider simply as good and virtuous “globally aware” citizenship.

Part of the challenge is that the document generally does not engage with the political and legal aspects that would underpin global rights, duties, membership, and participation. In fact, UNESCO (2014, p. 14) argues that “there is a common understanding that global citizenship does not imply a legal status” and, instead, “refers more to a sense of belonging to a broader community and common humanity, promoting a ‘global gaze’ that links the local to the global and the national to the international.” This view is at odds with the fact that modern citizenship is precisely a legal-political

category (Bellamy 2008). While the preferred politico-legal structures to underpin the status of “global citizen” are national to some and supranational to others, GCE cannot ignore the legal and political facets of citizenship. UNESCO (2015b, p. 66) claims that the role and place of the state in the constitution of citizenship is “being increasingly challenged by the emergence of transnational forms of citizenship,” but this largely ignores the relational nature of citizenship. While citizenship can certainly exist beyond the nation-state, the realization of global citizenship is likely to depend on the emergence of a global state, understood as a global monopoly holder of “the legitimate use of physical and symbolic violence over a definite territory and over the totality of the corresponding population” (Bourdieu et al. 1994, p. 3), a status that no supranational or international institution can assume to date.

The UNESCO (2014) version of GCE is driven by the goal to foster competencies in learners (i.e., an attitude of tolerance, an understanding of alterity, knowledge of “global issues,” and cognitive and social skills) as opposed to reflection on the *political, legal, and social conditions of possibility* of the conduct and attitudes that UNESCO expects to see in global citizens. The stated objective of their model of GCE is in line with their expressed desire to progress toward “a global common good” (UNESCO 2015b), but the educational means imagined to accomplish this outcome are not well aligned with the objectives.

At a more practical level, the UNESCO GCE framework is operationalized into specific topics and learning objectives in a related document listing different domains of learning (cognitive, socio-emotional, and behavioral), key learning outcomes, key learner attributes, topics, and learning objectives by age or level of education (UNESCO 2015a). This operationalized framework comes closer to critical elements of GCE listed above. In terms of knowledge, the UNESCO brand of GCE wishes to enable learners to “develop an understanding of global governance structures, rights and responsibilities” (UNESCO 2015a, p. 16), albeit as they currently exist as opposed to how they would have to be to make global citizenship a reality. Interestingly, the nine key topics include “local, national and global systems and structures,” “different communities people belong to and how these are connected,” and “actions that can be taken individually and collectively,” which have the potential to build clear bridges toward some of the four constitutive elements of citizens. Yet, while critical reflection on the reality of nation-state citizenship around the world and the way power and political structures and systems shape the supranational relationships between nation-state citizens is addressed, consideration of the possibilities and modalities of membership to a global political community of citizens remains feeble. In other words, while this curriculum has the potential to raise learners’ awareness of the gap existing between the current international order and the realization of global citizenship, the opportunities given to students to *imagine* the change required to enable global citizenship are limited.

OECD

In line with its interest in shaping education policy and practice across the world and as part of its Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), the

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD 2018b) recently released its *Preparing our Youth for an Inclusive and Sustainable World* GCE agenda. This document proposes a “PISA Global Competence Framework” and is associated with a “PISA Global Competence Questionnaire” (OECD 2018a) constructed to evaluate the extent to which GCE is implemented and successful in countries participating in PISA.

Inspired by the Delors report (1996, p. 15), in which it was claimed that “people need gradually to become world citizens without losing their roots and while continuing to play an active part in the life of their nation and their local community,” the *PISA Global Competence Framework* wishes to “prepare young people to become global citizens” without relinquishing their existing nation-state citizen status (OECD 2018b, p. 6). Here, the global community of citizens is imagined as coexisting with the global order of nation-states. This raises the important question of the hypothetical relationships that could emerge between the institution of nation-state citizenship and the institution of global citizenship.

As with UNESCO, the OECD considers “global competence” as the cornerstone of global citizenship. The four dimensions of global competence include (1) learners’ capacity to examine issues of “local, global and cultural significance,” (2) their ability to consider “different perspectives and world views,” (3) their ability to interact with different people, and (4) their capacity to take action toward “sustainable development and collective well-being” (OECD 2018b, pp. 7–8). Here, too, it is the individual learner equipped with specific knowledge, skills, attitudes, and dispositions who makes global citizenship a reality, irrespective of the political and social structures that are required for citizenship to manifest itself. Unlike the UNESCO brand of global citizenship, however, the OECD pays little attention to the existing polities of the world. The fact that the current global order is an international order is largely absent from the OECD model of GCE, and so are reflections on global citizen membership, rights, and duties. At the same time, reflections on political participation for global citizens are also largely unexplored. From the point of view of a rigorous conception of global citizenship, the OECD framework is thus significantly frailer than the UNESCO model.

The *PISA 2018 Global Competence Questionnaire* confirms the shortfalls of the corresponding framework. In the questionnaire, the “global” is defined in cultural, linguistic, ethical, and economic terms but almost never *politically*. The nation-state polities that organize the world – let alone the idea of a global state – are mostly ignored in what the OECD deems essential for global competence and, ultimately, global citizenship. The focus on “global issues” is prominent, but the reason for making these global issues a core feature of GCE remains unclear once the politico-legal nature of global citizenship is considered.

Oxfam

The Oxfam charity has proposed its own model of GCE in *Education for Global Citizenship* (Oxfam 2015). Designed as a guide for schools, it lists a set of attributes

that define the global citizen. As with the previously reviewed frameworks, Oxfam's identifies a range of skills, attitudes, dispositions, knowledge, and values that make up a global citizen, and as with the OECD framework, Oxfam seldom focusses on existing nation-states and nation-state citizenship.

To implement its conception of GCE, Oxfam (2015, p. 8) proposes a curriculum structured around 21 key elements (7 in each of the categories of "knowledge and understanding," "skills" and "values and attitudes") including "globalisation and interdependence," "human rights" and "power and governance." The hypothetical rights of global citizens are conceived in terms of human rights (as opposed to state-bound rights), while global citizens' imagined duties are articulated in moral or ethical (as opposed to legal and political) terms. Here, the rights of global citizens are conceived as being immanent in their humanity (as opposed to being determined by global citizens' membership to a specific global political community), while citizens' duties are also divorced from a specific global political framework. As with the OECD framework, the specificity of what political participation could mean in the context of global citizenship (as opposed to nation-state citizens acting "globally" or responding to "global issues") remains unclear, but the dimension of global citizenship most conspicuously absent from Oxfam's model is the question of global polity membership based on political equality and structured around a citizen-state relationship.

Oxfam comes closer to the UNESCO model than the OECD in the extent of attention paid to the political sphere. For instance, its curriculum expects students to "learn about power and governance, and analyze the causes and consequences of unequal power relations" (Oxfam 2015, p. 12). Yet, this learning outcome is not contextualized as part of the existing international order, and the political conditions of possibility for realizing global citizenship are under-examined. In other words, consideration of the forms of political expression of power relations and the political means by which legitimate political action is and can be exerted at the supranational scale is too scarce. Even though the document describes a detailed curriculum with specific indicators for each learning outcome across year levels, nation-states are only mentioned twice, when stating that learners should understand "state obligations on human rights" and "how unequal power relations between nation states affect global issues" (Oxfam 2015, p. 17). The need for reflection on nation-states' possible relationships with a global polity that would make global citizenship a reality is never explicitly mentioned.

General Remarks

As the section above shows, a clear definition of global citizenship based on the four key components listed above enables researchers to identify the strengths and shortfalls of various models of GCE. Importantly, these four essential questions for GCE are also applicable to educational practice in schools, higher education, and other educational spaces. In the same way, these questions can assist researchers in revealing the gaps or divergences that may exist between prescriptive frameworks or

models of GCE (as embodied in curricula or examination structures) and GCE as it is effectively practiced in the spaces governed by such frameworks and models.

What trends are discernible across the three international or nongovernmental GCE framework briefly analyzed above? While the focus on curriculum and the organization of learning is central for Oxfam and UNESCO, and while the OECD instead places a clear emphasis on assessment and evaluation through its PISA evaluation regime, common points exist across all three frameworks. First, all three have the explicit desire to promote the advent of global citizenship through education, and all three expect nation-state school systems to be the main vehicles through which GCE is to occur. Second, the major political transformations required to make global citizenship a reality enshrined in political and legal institutions are largely absent from these frameworks, as is the reflection on the different global political structures required to enable global citizenship. These frameworks thus provide limited structured opportunities for learners to reflect on the *gap* that exists between the current global state of affairs and the global state of affairs required for global citizenship to exist *de jure*. Third, and relatedly, it is clear that out of the four key elements of citizenship described earlier, consideration of the contours and conditions of membership to (and exclusion from) a global polity of citizens is the most common missing link.

Lack of attention to the conditions for becoming a *member* of the global community of citizens is a major limitation of the three models examined in this chapter. Again, this appears to be based on a rather naïve conception of global citizenship as a universally inclusive political group. Social scientists examining the empirical reality of citizenship, however, have been at pains to emphasize that citizenship is necessarily an *exclusionary* political category. Bellamy (2008, p. 12), for instance, insists that citizenship involves “membership of an exclusive club,” and Balibar (2004, p. 76) concurs that “every institution of citizenship involves the institutionalization of exclusions, following different historical modalities.” If history is to be trusted, a global polity of citizens would not erase the exclusionary nature of citizenship, for belonging is, in itself, a principle of discrimination between those who do and those who do not belong (Lordon 2015, p. 276). Yet, consideration of the modalities of global exclusion that would be necessarily associated with global citizenship (i.e., who is refused the status of global citizen, and what relationships does that imply between those who are global citizens and those who are not?) is nowhere to be found in the models reviewed here. This suggests that such frameworks for global citizenship rely on an idealized view of citizenship rather than one grounded in historical reality.

Among the four defining features of citizenship, Oxfam, UNESCO, and the OECD focus primarily on citizen rights and duties. While the question of political participation is frequently discussed, there remains a clear deficit of attention to the specific political *spaces* or *arenas* in which global citizenship is to be performed. Here, Bourdieu’s (2014, pp. 355, 357) reflections on the emergence of parliaments in constituting nation-state citizenship are relevant:

Alongside the appearance of a juridical space as a set of citizens bound by rights and duties towards the state and towards one another, you have to take into account the appearance of parliament as site of an organized consensus, or rather, the site of a regulated dissension.

[...] The state as juridical space and parliament, are in a sense the foundation of citizenship. To have the citizen in the modern sense of the term, you need to have these two things that are in no way automatic.

What are the implications of this argument for the question of the political participation of global citizens? Would a global parliament be a requirement for the emergence of global citizenship? Whether the answer is yes or no, these are important areas to consider in frameworks and practices of global citizenship education.

Finally, while all three frameworks consider that global citizenship can and should coexist with nation-state citizenship, critical scrutiny of this assumption and its implications are largely absent. How is national citizenship to coexist with global citizenship? History suggests that non-nation-state citizenship receded and eventually disappeared as nation-state citizenship became a dominant political organizer. Indeed, the increasingly dominant role of nation-states in the global (i.e., international) order since the French Revolution has been matched by a parallel decline of other forms of citizenship (i.e., guilds, cities, and local communities) (Prak 2018). If this is to be trusted, reflecting on what the advent of global citizenship would or could imply for nation-state citizenship is primordial in GCE.

The Scope of Global Citizenship

Since insight from historical and sociological analysis is important for understanding the empirical reality of citizenship, it is also a precondition for imagining global citizenship. This is important not only in identifying the defining features of citizenship and the rise and decline of different forms of citizenship or for examining the relationships that develop as various forms of citizenship coexist. It is also essential for perceiving the changing scope of citizenship, in particular as regards rights and duties, and feeding off this reflection to ponder the idea of global citizenship.

The nature and extent of the rights and duties associated with present-day citizenship in different nation-states is a relevant starting point for educating toward global citizenship. It can facilitate reflection on the duties and rights that could link the global citizens with their (global) political community. These issues probe at the core of the meaning of global citizenship. In current societies, the most common duties of citizens include conscription, participation, and taxation (Isin and Nyers 2014), while since the publication of Marshall's (1950) typology, citizen rights have typically been characterized as political rights, civil rights, and social rights. The social rights, civil rights, and political rights of global citizens and their *enforcement* by a legitimate political authority are central themes of reflection for GCE. Similarly, the global duties of taxation, participation, and conscription for global citizens, and the question of *who* would ensure these demands made on global citizens are met, are just as essential.

Historical variation in the scope of rights and duties of citizenship can be an important source of knowledge and imagination for GCE. At the same time, the

social sciences can also contribute to explaining *how* the perimeter of rights and duties associated with citizenship changes. Instead of the moral and ethical conception of duties (and rights) often seen in models of GCE, they suggest that it is *political struggle* that primarily determines the contours of citizens' rights and duties. Tilly (1997, p. 600), for instance, explains that "military service, eligibility for public office, voting rights, payment of taxes, public education, access to public services, and protection of rent-producing advantages – all frequent items in contracts of citizenship – have engaged serious struggle for centuries." Isin and Nyers (2014, p. 2) add that "the combination of rights and duties is always an outcome of social struggles that finds expression in political and legal institutions," emphasizing the connection between (global) citizenship and (global) institutions. There is little doubt that the topic of political struggle – including the very struggle for establishing a global polity of citizens – would benefit from being at the forefront of educational models and practices for global citizenship. This would enable learners to reflect not only on the gap existing between nation-state citizenship and global citizenship but also on the path that could lead from one to the other.

Conclusion

This chapter has explored a possible way out of the terminological confusions and ambiguities in GCE research. Its starting point has been the fact that, although they do not mean the same thing, concepts such as "global education, cosmopolitanism, cosmopolitan and world citizenship, transnational citizenship, global mindedness, and others are intertwined within the discourse of GCE and often used as synonyms" (Goren and Yemini 2017, p. 181). This chapter has argued that precision in the use of key concepts (e.g., global citizenship, cosmopolitanism, global mindedness, etc.) is crucial to enable researchers to engage in a rigorous conversation about GCE and related forms of education and learn from one another's findings. If the idea of "global citizenship" is different from "globally minded" citizenship, as Bowden (2003) points out, how can the field of GCE research be built on solid and specific foundations? From a theoretical perspective, paying greater attention to "global citizenship" as a concept provides one way of doing so.

The definition of global citizenship presented in this chapter outlines four key ingredients of citizenship and argues that, although it may be unlike its nation-state counterparts, a global state is a required condition for global citizenship. Accordingly, I argue that a good GCE model should help learners consider four key questions:

1. What would be the modalities of inclusion into and exclusion from a global polity of citizens?
2. What rights are to be associated with global citizenship?
3. What responsibilities are to come with global citizenship?
4. What forms and spaces of legitimate political participation could structure global citizenship?

This set of questions has been put to the test by taking the example of three prominent international and nongovernmental models of GCE, suggesting that participation and, above all, rights and duties are more often considered than the question of membership. The validity of this provisional finding would certainly gain from being challenged, qualified and/or confirmed based on empirical research on other conceptions and practices of GCE. This could assist researchers interested in GCE in forming a comprehensive yet context-sensitive view of the strengths and limitations of GCE as currently conceived and practiced across contexts. At the same time, the limitations of the conception of global rights and global duties found in these three frameworks have been revealed, highlighting their lack of political foundations and the overall inattention to the question of a “global state” associated with global citizenship. This also suggests that important global citizenship themes may be largely unexplored in current GCE.

This chapter has understandably left many important questions for GCE research unexplored, including those aiming to *explain* the kinds of GCE existing in frameworks, curricula, and classrooms. In a relevant inquiry, Peterson et al. (2018, p. 10) revealed the existence, in countries like Australia and New Zealand, of a gap between policy rhetoric and curricula in GCE partly caused by the desire of “preparing students for economic life.” This disconnect is also manifested in the selective interest displayed toward the various components of global citizenship, and it is reasonable to hypothesize that this may be an element of explanation for the kinds of models of global citizenship embodied in the three frameworks analyzed in this chapter. In particular, it is plausible that the specific demands of preparation for economic life placed on schooling and educational institutions more broadly contribute to explaining the relative erasure of core GCE themes, starting with the role of political struggle in the making of (global) citizenship and the conceptualization of citizenship as relationship between a group of social agents and a state. A major implication of this state of affairs is that it is likely to provide few opportunities for learners to *imagine* the realization of global citizenship and the path that could lead to such a transformation of the global order.

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Global Citizenship Education Between Qualification, Socialization, and Subjectification

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Sara Franch

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Abstract

Today there is a renewed interest in a global notion of citizenship, particularly in “global citizenship” or “cosmopolitan citizenship.” While the concept of global citizenship is contested, ambiguous, and conceptually vague, education is one of the fields where this idea is most seriously used, particularly in the literature that theorizes the need for a globally oriented citizenship education. Global citizenship and especially its “associated construct,” global citizenship education (GCE), have become prominent concepts in educational discourses and policies. This chapter discusses different perspectives on global citizenship and its relevance in terms of a reconfiguration of citizenship education. Three different pedagogical frameworks are presented that construct GCE in terms of the qualification, the socialization, and the subjectification function of education. The chapter argues that GCE can provide educators with the perspectives necessary to help young people make sense of the contemporary world and take conscious decisions about the role they want to have in it. It highlights that GCE practice tends to focus mainly on qualification and socialization, thus merging a discourse

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centered on global competences with one emphasizing the qualities of “good global citizenship.” GCE demands that teachers and educators foreground also a subjectification approach centered on a political perspective grounded in social justice and the critical deconstruction of the dominant discourses that shape our understanding and actions.

Keywords

Citizenship · Citizenship education · Global citizenship · Global citizenship education · Cosmopolitanism · Postcolonialism

Introduction

The world has evolved into a globalized system characterized by high levels of interconnectedness but also dominated by great poverty, inequalities, and transnational challenges such as migration, climate change, rising nationalism, xenophobia and racism, radicalization, and violent extremism. In this context, the last two decades have witnessed a resurgence of interest in a global notion of citizenship. Global citizenship has become a popular term in academia (Goren and Yemini 2017) but also a buzzword in a variety of sectors, including private companies, educational institutions, international organizations, governments, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Indeed, a quick search on Google of the term global citizenship clearly illustrates how it is “subject to a wide range of interpretations in the diverse contexts in which it is appropriated and promoted” (Oxley and Morris 2013: 301–302) and “reflects different ideologies and ideas of what is and ought to be desired of citizens” (Pashby 2016: 70). The concept of global citizenship is therefore ambiguous and conceptually vague. The difficulty in conceptualizing global citizenship is linked to the fact that the key components of this construct, global and citizenship, are “contestant concepts that spark vigorous debates” (Rapoport 2015: 28). The words global and citizenship represent contested discursive fields (Pashby 2016). Language and in this case the words global and citizenship do not just describe reality but rather “construct (different) realities” (Andreotti 2010: 240). A concept like global citizenship is therefore not universal but, as Andreotti (2010) underlines, is rather *situated* in a specific culture, era, and/or geopolitical context, is *partial* and liable to be seen differently by others, is *contingent* as its understanding and use depend on the context, and is *provisional* because its understanding and use can and do change.

Education is one of the fields where the concept of global citizenship is most seriously used. Global citizenship and particularly its “associated construct,” global citizenship education (GCE), have “taken on the status of a ‘global’ or ‘travelling’ educational policy” (Oxley and Morris 2013: 301–302). From its emergence in the 1990s, GCE has rapidly become a prominent concept in Europe and in the Americas in educational discourses (Andreotti de Oliveira and De Souza 2012) and in international educational policy (Tarozzi and Torres 2016). This chapter discusses different perspectives on global citizenship and its relevance in terms of a reconfiguration of

citizenship education. It critically presents three different pedagogical frameworks that construct GCE in terms of the qualification, the socialization, and the subjectification function of education (Biesta 2009). It highlights that GCE practice tends to focus mainly on qualification and socialization, thus merging a discourse centered on global competences with one emphasizing the qualities of “good global citizenship.” The chapter ends stressing that GCE demands that teachers and educators foreground also a subjectification approach centered on a political perspective grounded in social justice and the critical deconstruction of the dominant discourses that shape our understanding and actions. This is necessary to help young people acquire a critical understanding of the contemporary world and of global interconnectedness and develop the ability to understand and interact responsibly with others while being self-critical of their own perspectives and positions (Pashby 2011).

Global Citizenship or Globally Oriented Citizenship?

The tension between different views on global citizenship indicates that, from a sociopolitical perspective, global citizenship is an essentially contested concept. For some scholars global citizenship implies universality and a deep commitment to a broader moral purpose. Others underline that global citizenship is more than a global ethic, or a moral imperative, and offer a political conceptualization (Dower 2000). Global citizenship in this view “is a key element in the quest for a new language of politics which challenges the belief that the individual’s central political obligations are to the nation-state” (Linklater 2002: 317). Dower (2000) maintains that scholars have worked with “a false dichotomy between a merely moral definition of global citizenship (commitment to a global ethic) and a fully-fledged institutional definition, where the appropriate institutions are already in place” (Dower 2000: 567). He maintains that global citizenship may be defined in terms of intentions and aspirations and suggests that because of the nature of today’s global situation and challenges, there is a need for global citizens who work for global goals. This requires “using existing institutions appropriate to this and creating and strengthening institutions to the same end” (Dower 2000: 567). Global citizenship is therefore necessary to institutionalize moral commitments to outsiders and is desirable in order to democratize the already existing and emerging global governance institutions (Dower 2000).

Other scholars contest the concept of global citizenship and emphasize that citizenship makes sense only in a given political community within defined territorial boundaries, essentially “within a bounded territorial space, in which citizens see themselves as part of a common demos” (Leydet 2014). Miller (2011), one of the main critics of the concept of global citizenship, underlines that citizenship is a political idea, whereas global citizenship is essentially apolitical, a “ghostly shadow” of real citizenship (2011: 2). Citizenship, according to Miller (2011), is a political relationship between co-citizens, and as such it involves weak and strong forms of reciprocity. He underlines that these forms of reciprocity do not characterize global citizenship. They are neither in the growing networks of international organizations and groups that pursue political objectives at the global level, what is generally

referred to as “global civil society,” nor are they present in the “everyday global citizenship” expressed by people who try to live in a way that recognizes the equal rights and claims of all the world’s population. Miller (2011) believes that global citizenship is not an alternative to local or national citizenship as we cannot have a citizen to citizen relationship to all our fellow human beings and concludes that “what we can do is identify with them, show ethical concern for them, arrange our institutions to avoid global harms . . . we can have citizenship that incorporates global concern” (Miller 2011: 21). He concedes that we do need to reconceive citizenship, although not by changing the central arenas in which it is practiced: “not the global citizen, but the globally concerned citizen, is the ideal we should be aiming to promote” (Miller 2011: 23). Similarly, Bowden (2003) and Parekh (2003) believe that the notion of a global citizen or citizen of the world is not a viable one and support the idea of “globally minded” or “globally oriented” citizens, who are first citizens of a particular state.

So, as stated by Gaudelli (2016), global citizenship can be understood in a “totalizing manner” (2016: 13), meaning that an individual will have the rights and privileges of citizenship everywhere. Or, more pragmatically, global citizenship can be seen as the development of an individual’s identity, as “rooted in a particular community but with a sense of connection, responsibility and concern for people elsewhere” (2016: 13). From an educational perspective, scholars use the term global citizenship, but they generally mean globally minded or globally oriented citizenship (Gaudelli 2016; Peterson 2016; Pike 2008a).

Pike (2008a), for example, underlines that the concept of citizenship has been very adaptable overtime; has changed to meet various geographical, political, and cultural pressures; and has moved from an exclusionary force toward ever greater inclusion. In a context characterized by ever-increasing interdependence, Pike (2008a) underlines that “it is time for our understanding of citizenship – and citizenship education – to shift once more, to expand as an ideal that more closely benefits the world we have created” (2008a: 47). But, for Pike, expansion does not mean “dismantling the present construction of citizenship” (2008a: 48); he does not call for an end to national citizenship nor for the institution of a world government. Rather he takes a pedagogical approach and in particular a new perspective on citizenship education. He urges educators to help students explore the implications of global trends in terms of “their rights and responsibilities, their allegiances and loyalties, and their opportunities for meaningful participation” (2008a: 48). For Pike, citizenship, in a constitutional sense, will remain national; it is the state that will continue to provide citizens with their primary sense of belonging, but the challenge is to develop also an ethos of global citizenship, i.e., “to imbue the concept of citizenship with an ethos – a set of moral principles and codes of conduct – that is global in scope” (2008a: 48). Similarly, Peterson (2016) talks about the need for citizenship to be shaped by, and to in turn shape, “a global imagination” (2016: 259). He talks about focusing citizenship education on a “globally oriented citizenship” that “is intimately intertwined with other forms of citizenship, (whether local, regional or national), which are mutually reinforcing” (Peterson 2016: 261). He maintains that a global-oriented citizenship is in fact political and will occur primarily through the political structures and processes of the nation-state (2016: 258). For Peterson:

rather than being “post-national”, global citizenship only makes sense when conceived in relation to one’s other loci of citizenship, including the national. It is, at least in part, the relationships and structures, as well as the skills and capacities, either provided or restricted by our special duties as national citizens, which make it possible, challenging or impossible ... to meet our global obligations. (2016: 259)

A global orientation to citizenship is generally constructed as an expansion of national citizenship, so while the nation-state remains the main site of political organization, the key tenets of citizenship – rights, duties, participation, and identity – are reimagined, from an educational perspective, “in new and multiple ways that are not limited to the spaces defined by the nation-state” (Pashby 2008: 23). But citizenship, or “the project of citizenship” as Pashby (2016: 73) calls it, is caught in “a paradox of belonging”: it is “complicit with perpetuating inequalities and reinforcing who does and does not belong” (Pashby 2016: 74). Pashby (2011) therefore raises the question of whether a global orientation to citizenship does indeed constitute a new theory of citizenship. Constructing global citizenship as an expansion of national citizenship may in fact reinscribe the exclusionary nature and the privilege of earlier applications of citizenship and retrench rather than transform power inequalities:

global citizenship is often conceptualized as an expansion of national citizenship and it is unclear whether or not a revised democratic citizenship education that “expands” to take up a politics of difference in a global orientation or that adds a global orientation to a national model of citizenship actually alters the status quo. (Pashby 2011: 428)

In conclusion, in the context of increasingly culturally diverse societies and a global world, scholars are stressing the need for a globally oriented citizenship education. Global citizenship education (GCE) is presented as a new “educational agenda for schooling for citizenship in a global era” (Pashby 2008: 23).

Global Citizenship Education: Diverse Purposes and Pedagogical Frameworks

Global citizenship education is essentially an alternative to nation-centric approaches to citizenship education. As an ideal, GCE facilitates the acquisition of “a sense of global-mindedness that encourages students to develop a consciousness of global connectivity and responsibility” (Pashby 2008: 17) and become “active national citizens with an informed global conscience” (Pike 2008a: 48). This means students having a dialogic, complex, and dynamic understanding of their own identities and the ability to understand and interact responsibly with others while being self-critical of their own perspectives and positions (Pashby 2011). Globally conscious citizens have a critical understanding of globalization, are aware of global interconnectedness and the ways they and their nations are implicated in local and global problems, are conscious of the role of humans for the future health of the planet, and engage in constructive actions to promote social change at the local, regional, national, and transnational levels (Pashby 2011; Pike 2008a).

However, inheriting the contested nature of citizenship, the opacities of global citizenship, and the complexities of fostering citizenship through education, GCE “becomes a complicated idea that is infused with various meanings” (Pashby 2016: 71). It operates as a “nodal point in policy discourse – a floating signifier that different discourses attempt to cover with meaning” (Mannion et al. 2011: 443):

“education for global citizenship” (EGC) is functioning as a nodal point . . . As a “nodal point” . . . it works as a privileged reference point (or signifier) that attempts to partially fix meaning and bring together different discourses. A nodal point is also malleable and unstable discourse, varying depending on the context and how power is gained in organising a socio-discursive field. (Mannion et al. 2011: 444)

As the ideas behind theoretical conceptualizations, policy initiatives, or educational programming are never a neutral endeavor, the “discourses of global citizenship, as an institutionalized way of speaking about citizenship and education, are being engaged in ways to establish particular meaning and practices” (Shultz et al. 2011: 3). Different agendas and theoretical frameworks construct different meanings to the words *global*, *citizenship*, and *education*, and this implies different curricula and education practices (Andreotti de Oliveira and De Souza 2012). Drawing from Biesta’s (2009) work on the functions and purposes of education – qualification, socialization, and subjectification – Sant et al. (2018) identify three discourses within GCE: GCE as qualification, GCE as socialization, and GCE as subjectification. The following section critically presents and expands these three GCE discourses and provides examples of pedagogical frameworks broadly in line with each of them. The chapter argues that these three discourses within GCE (qualification, socialization, and subjectification) should not be seen as entirely separate. On the contrary, in both pedagogical frameworks and in practice, they are deeply intertwined and overlapping. While synergy is certainly possible and indeed has the potential to facilitate a comprehensive approach to GCE, one should note that there are also contradiction and potential for conflict between the three discourses, particularly between the qualification and socialization dimension on the one hand and the subjectification on the other (Biesta 2009). So, a GCE practice that blindly supports qualification and socialization without analyzing the current global dynamic, questioning its tenets, and exploring alternative perspectives will likely depoliticize citizenship practices therefore undermining a GCE approach pursuing subjectification.

GCE as Qualification: OECD PISA Global Competence Framework

In an approach centered on qualification, the purpose of education is to facilitate the acquisition of a certain set of knowledge, skills, and dispositions to “do something” and to “function” in society (Biesta 2009). In terms of GCE, these knowledge and skills pertain to the acquisition of global and intercultural competences (Sant et al. 2018). GCE as qualification is clearly associated with a discourse that foregrounds the global competences that students need to acquire “for life in a global society and work in a global economy” (Marshall 2011: 418). Equally important in this discourse is building a pool of human resources with the competences that a country needs to position itself in

the global market and be a competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy (Sant et al. 2018). This perspective responds to the technical-economic instrumentalist agenda of GCE identified by Marshall (2011) and has the purpose of creating economically competitive citizens who are advantaged because of particular knowledge, skills, and attitudes. Within this framework, education institutions emphasize that in an increasingly interconnected and competitive global market, a knowledge of the world, of foreign languages, and skills such as adaptability and cross-cultural sensitivity are highly beneficial to students, as they “foster a kind of border-free mobility seen to enhance individual (economic) success in the world” (Jorgenson and Shultz 2012: 3). This understanding of GCE tends to permeate the educational discourse of many third-level education institutes (Jorgenson and Shultz 2012; Pike 2015), although this global competences approach is a dominant discourse also in schools (Dill 2013; Marshall 2011; Standish 2014). This perspective can be criticized as it is not so much about fostering a global citizen committed to social justice but rather a global entrepreneur that reaps the benefits of the current global society.

An example of GCE as qualification is the new OECD PISA 2018 Global Competence Framework (OECD PISA 2018), which stresses that global competences are required by students to learn to live in the interconnected, diverse, and rapidly changing world of the twenty-first century. The OECD PISA framework provides a definition of global competence on the basis of a prescriptive set of knowledge, skills, attitudes, and values and a set of tools and criteria to assess and certify adolescents’ global competences. Schools have a key role to play in helping “students cope and succeed in an increasingly interconnected environment” (OECD PISA 2018: 5), and global competences are required by students so that they can live harmoniously in multicultural communities, thrive in a changing labor market, use media platforms effectively and responsibly, and support the sustainable development goals (OECD PISA 2018).

The OECD PISA global competence framework can be criticized from a pedagogical perspective. Bamber et al. (2018) underline that “when reified, frameworks tend to become reductive and somewhat hegemonic ‘regimes of truth’” (2018: 205), which encourage unreflective and performative attitudes that are antithetical to a transformative education. Moreover, the “outcome-focused audit discourse” that characterizes frameworks such as the OECD PISA results in an excessive focus on measures, metrics, and league tables. This results in giving visibility and normalizing certain educational processes and outcomes, while “offering a reductive account of both transformation and indeed ‘education’ itself as a political and philosophical project” (Bamber et al. 2018: 205).

GCE as Socialization: UNESCO Global Citizenship Education Framework

In an approach pursuing socialization, the purpose of education is to impart certain norms and values to become members of particular cultural, social, and political “orders” (Biesta 2009). In terms of GCE, these norms and values relate to becoming “good citizens of the world.” The main emphasis here is on fostering citizens that are

committed to a world culture based on human rights, pacifist values, cohesiveness, and sustainability (Sant et al. 2018). GCE as socialization has points in common with the global consciousness interpretation of GCE identified by Dill (2013), which draws from humanistic values and assumptions, and aims to provide students with a global orientation, cultural sensitivity, a vision of oneself as part of a global community of humanity, and a moral conscience to act for the good of the world.

The OECD PISA Global Competence framework includes this perspective and therefore merges GCE as qualification with GCE as socialization, but a more fitting example of GCE as socialization is the UNESCO GCE pedagogical framework (UNESCO 2015). While deeply situated in a socialization perspective, the UNESCO GCE framework pursues also qualification through the promotion of particular global and intercultural competences. These are framed within a perspective that focuses on humanistic and cosmopolitan values (human rights, tolerance, peace) and a clearly identified positive identity of the “good global citizen” as somebody that demonstrates understanding and commitment to those values. The “good global citizen” is defined by UNESCO in relation to three domains of learning (cognitive, socio-emotional, and behavioral). The “good global citizen” is “informed and critically literate, socially connected and respectful of diversity, ethically responsible and engaged” (UNESCO 2015: 23–24). Despite being constructed around the three domains of learning, the socio-emotional domain is the most relevant as the “learning outcome” of this domain is substantially a repetition of UNESCO’s global citizen definition: “Learners experience a sense of belonging to a common humanity, sharing values and responsibilities, based on human rights” (UNESCO 2015: 22; see also 2015: 14). This focus on universal human values, according to Bamber et al. (2018), is problematic because it fails to “recognise the liquidity, historicity and evolution of difference” (2018: 207).

UNESCO’s GCE framework recognizes the unfairness and unsustainability of the current global system, but the approach is essentially about a better distribution of resources within the system to alleviate poverty, rather than a fundamental questioning of the system, or political action to achieve social justice. While at first sight the UNESCO framework combines the political analysis of global issues and governance systems and structures, with motivation, willingness, and capability to act effectively and responsibly at local, national, and global levels, the emphasis is on humanistic values such as peace and sustainability, rather than social justice. So, according to Eis and Moulin-Doos (2017), the intended “actions” envisaged within the UNESCO framework “tend to be reduced to non-politicized ‘actions’ within civil society such as ‘community work’ and ‘civic engagement’” (Eis and Moulin-Doos 2017: 56). The behavioral domain of the UNESCO framework is “dominated by the social – individual and interpersonal – ‘behaviour’ and not the political ‘action’ and power struggles of communities” (ibid). The primary focus is therefore on individual ethical behavior and action, rather than systemic change to disrupt the way global inequalities are reproduced by political decisions and everyday economic activities. Postcolonial scholars such as Andreotti (2016) emphasize that UNESCO’s GCE work reproduces colonial ontological and epistemological assumptions and depoliticizes citizenship practices:

UNESCO have adopted the rhetoric of GCE in ways that still reinforces ethnocentric, paternalistic, ahistorical and depoliticised practices based on a single onto-epistemic grammar that naturalises modern institutions, cognitive frames, structures of being and economic models. (Andreotti 2016: 105)

Pedagogically, GCE as socialization reproduces the main shortcomings that characterize mainstream approaches to citizenship education. First of all, GCE as socialization understands global citizenship as a “problem” of individuals and their behaviors and therefore sees the “solution” in terms of knowledge, skills, values, and behaviors that young people need to acquire. But this perspective is problematic. Talking about citizenship education, Biesta and Lawy (2006) underline that citizenship learning is “situated within the lives of young people” (2006: 73). It depends upon the perspectives that young people have developed through previous learning and meaning-making. But it is also determined by the wider social, cultural, economic, and political order that influences and impacts upon young people’s lives. Applying Biesta and Lawy’s idea of citizenship learning to GCE means that a “problem” of global citizenship cannot be attributed only to an individual but rather concerns “the individual-in-context” (Biesta and Lawy 2006: 74). Hence it should address the knowledge, skills, values, and dispositions of young people but also, and more importantly, the social, cultural, and economic situation in which they live and act. And the context where young people live is not conducive to being globally conscious and responsible. Young people are immersed in a context characterized by a dominant legend. Pike (2008b) uses the term “legend,” what others call the “single story of progress, development and human evolution” (Andreotti 2015: 222), to describe the dominant postindustrial and scientific revolution legend of “the world.” This legend is shaped by patriarchy and colonialism, is driven by the free market forces of capitalism, and is based on the “short-term exploitation of the earth’s resources, the confident reliance on technological solutions, and the relentless pursuit of economic growth” (2008b: 226).

The second problem with GCE as socialization arises from the assumption that global citizenship is the outcome of an educational process. This perspective assumes that global citizenship is an aim that young people need to achieve. Seeing global citizenship as an outcome suggests that before “being educated,” young people are not global citizens (Sant et al. 2018). This perspective fails to recognize that young people are implicated in the wider social, cultural, economic, and political world and already engage as citizens with these global dynamics. Young people do not learn about global citizenship only in school but rather from their life experiences and practices. Global citizenship as an outcome is also problematic because it assumes that what constitutes “good global citizenship” is something already defined once and for all by policy-makers, scholars, and educators. This raises the question: By whom and for whom is GCE being developed? Pashby (2011) underlines that in the GCE literature, it is generally conceptualized as a Western education for a western citizen subject:

the assumed subject of GCE pedagogy is the autonomous and European citizen of the liberal nation-state who is seen as normative in a mainstream identification as citizen and who must work to encourage a liberal democratic notion of justice on a global scale by “expanding” or

“extending” or “adding” their sense of responsibility and obligation to others through the local to national to global community. (Pashby 2011: 430)

Pashby (2011) stresses the importance of drawing from a range of epistemologies and ontological traditions so that “multiple ‘global citizen selves’ are conceptualized not solely through the Western norm, but also through diverse perspectives that challenge Western humanism and that employ non-Western ontologies to define global citizenship” (2011: 439). From a pedagogical perspective, similarly to what Biesta and Lawy (2006) recommend for citizenship education, the definition of global citizenship, and what constitutes “good global citizenship,” should not be assumed a priori and taken for granted by educators but should rather become an integral part of GCE. The meaning of global citizenship should be the object of continuous interrogation by students in relation to their contexts and life experiences.

GCE as Subjectification: Global Citizenship Education Otherwise

In an approach that pursues subjectification, the purpose of education is to facilitate independence from “existing orders” and support “those educated to become more autonomous and independent in their thinking and acting” (Biesta 2009: 8). In terms of GCE, this means promoting “a global citizenship from below” and a space for “counter-practice,” i.e., “education on non-dominant knowledges and values” (Sant et al. 2018). Andreotti’s (2010) postcolonial and postcritical GCE, or “global citizenship education otherwise” (Andreotti 2015: 221), is an apt example of GCE as “counter-practice.” The post-traditions, in particular poststructuralism and post-colonialism, according to her, have in fact the potential to provide educators with conceptual tools that will help them “pluralize epistemologies and possibilities for thinking and practice” (2010: 245). Andreotti (2010) advocates “decolonising the imagination” of teachers and students involved in GCE who have been:

cognitively shaped by Enlightenment ideals and have an emotional investment in universalism (i.e. the projection of their ideas as what everyone else should believe), stability (i.e. the avoidance of conflict and complexity), consensus (i.e. the elimination of difference) and fixed identities organised in hierarchical ways (e.g. us, who know, versus them who don’t know). (Andreotti 2010, 246–247)

Andreotti’s postcolonial and postcritical GCE does not provide learners with normative ideals of democracy, freedom, rights, and justice that are presented as universal but rather is meant to facilitate “the emergence of ethical, responsible and responsive ways of seeing, knowing and relating to others ‘in context’” (Andreotti 2010: 239). A postcolonial and postcritical GCE (Andreotti 2010) stimulates learners “to imagine otherwise” (Andreotti 2015: 221) and is based on four types of learning: learning to unlearn, learning to listen, learning to learn, and learning to reach out (Andreotti de Oliveira and De Souza 2008). *Learning to unlearn* is about learning to perceive that what we consider “good and ideal” and “neutral and

objective” is only one perspective, a worldview that is related to where we come from socially, historically, and culturally. We carry a “cultural baggage” that affects who we are and what we see (Andreotti 2010; Andreotti de Oliveira and De Souza 2008). *Learning to listen* is about learning to recognize the effects and limitations of our perspective and to be receptive to new understandings and conceptual models (Andreotti 2010; Andreotti de Oliveira and De Souza 2008). *Learning to learn* is about learning to receive new perspectives and to rearrange and expand our own. It is about “going into the uncomfortable space of ‘what we do not know we do not know’” (Andreotti 2010: 247), engaging with different “logics,” thinking outside the box, seeing through other eyes, and rearranging our cultural baggage (Andreotti 2010; Andreotti de Oliveira and De Souza 2008). *Learning to reach out* is learning to apply/adapt/situate/rearrange this learning to our own contexts and in our relationships with others while continuing to reflect and explore new ways of being, thinking, knowing, doing, and relating (Andreotti 2010; Andreotti de Oliveira and De Souza 2008).

Andreotti’s GCE otherwise is a fascinating alternative to the mainstream GCE as qualification and socialization dominant in educational theory and practice. However, a number of pragmatic concerns limit its translation into pedagogical practice. Marshall (2011) raises three concerns: (1) The critical reading of current GCE practice is sometimes overcritical and therefore not helpful for those teachers striving to make their classrooms more sensitive to global issues and trends that affect their students by incorporating global citizenship activities and curricula. (2) Some of the postcolonial and postcritical theorizations of GCE incorporate a seemingly relativist, anti-universalist position, which contradicts teachers’ pedagogical need to work with notions of right, wrong, and truth. (3) The postcolonial theorization and critique underestimate the embedment in schools of hegemonic and traditional pedagogy, curriculum, and exam-oriented practice.

In sum, postcolonial and postcritical GCE “can become preoccupied by theory, abstraction and by an alternative educational ideal, without fully taking into account the economic contexts, and pedagogic and curricular realities and traditions within schools” (Marshall 2011: 424). It may not move beyond experimentation by individual educators and teachers as, according to Marshall (2011), a more systematic translation in curricula may currently be unrealistic and unworkable given that schools are located in wider societies, which are “reproducing powerful corporate cosmopolitan ideals entrenched in a set of neo-liberal and knowledge-economy norms” (2011: 424).

Conclusions

The growth of extremism, rising populism, the threat of neofascism, and assaults on basic human rights, coupled with ever-increasing inequality both within and across countries and with environmental issues like climate change that threaten our very survival, seem insurmountable. So, what role can education and GCE play in this scenario? Is it naïve to think that education can contribute to addressing some of

these challenges? Young people are particularly in danger of accepting the inexorability of the dominant global world order and seeing today's sociopolitical and environmental challenges as insurmountable. Seeing no alternative may result in uncritical adaptation and urge to "fit in" and "thrive" in today's global world or in hopelessness, despair, and possibly violent radicalization as a result of marginalization and exclusion.

In this context, GCE is essential. Focusing on a global outlook is a concrete way to overcome the limitations of a national citizenship perspective. GCE can provide educators with the perspectives necessary to help young people make sense of the contemporary world and take conscious decisions about the role they want to have in it. In much of GCE practice, teachers and educators tend to focus on qualification and socialization, thus merging a discourse centered on global competences with one emphasizing cosmopolitan values and "good global citizenship." A qualification approach to GCE allows teachers to focus on the knowledge, skills, and dispositions essential for global citizenship (knowledge and understanding of global systems, structures and issues, and skills required for civic literacy). A socialization conception of GCE with its focus on humanistic and cosmopolitan values allows educators to bring to the fore human rights, our common humanity, and shared values. But GCE demands that teachers and educators foreground also a subjectification approach centered on a sociopolitical analysis of the root causes of global poverty and inequality. A political perspective grounded in social justice is in fact necessary if GCE is to take political agency seriously. Moreover, a subjectification conception of GCE is required to facilitate the critical deconstruction of the dominant discourses that shape our understanding and actions. Educators and teachers do not need to situate their practice completely in a qualification, a socialization, or a subjectification approach to GCE but can rather merge the perspectives. While synergy is certainly possible, teachers and educators should also be cognizant of the potential for conflict between the three dimensions, particularly between the qualification and socialization dimensions on the one hand and the subjectification on the other. A GCE practice that blindly supports qualification and socialization without analyzing the current global dynamic, questioning its tenets, and exploring alternative perspectives will likely depoliticize citizenship practices, therefore undermining a GCE approach pursuing subjectification. By foregrounding political knowledge and critical thinking skills (qualification) and human rights (socialization) while drawing also from voices that have been silenced by colonial epistemic violence, GCE can become a space that helps young people become more autonomous and independent in their thinking and acting (subjectification). GCE can thus help young people acquire a critical understanding of globalization, awareness of global interconnectedness and the ways they and their nations are implicated in local and global problems, and consciousness of the role of humans for the future health of the planet (Pashby 2011; Pike 2008a). It will also help them develop the ability to understand and interact responsibly with others while being self-critical of their own perspectives and positions (Pashby 2011).

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Existing Research on Italian Migrants in the USA and Australia: A Critical Overview

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Simone Marino

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Abstract

This chapter provides a brief overview of the literature on Italian migrants in the USA and in Australia and the theoretical reference points on which different research studies are based. US literature was historically characterized by concepts of social change and assimilationist approaches whereby immigrant groups were expected to merge into general American culture. Some academic assumptions were maintained by later American sociologists studying Italian groups, although with new terminology, including urbanization, adaptation, accommodation, and social adjustment. In Australia, the rise of multicultural policies in the 1970s contrasted with the laissez-faire attitude to ethnic pluralism in the USA and led Australian literature to focus more on issues of cultural transmission and the construction of Italian ethnic groups. Australian studies, ranging across different disciplines, have examined the social organization of Italian migrants, mainly those from a working-class background and with a focus on domestic and family dynamics. More recently, both US and Australian studies have touched on matters of transnationalism, looking at issues such as the contemporary migration to the USA referred to as *la fuga dei talenti* (“the flight of the talented”), coexisting transnational contexts, gender, globalization, and matters of citizenship.

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Introduction

Research into Italian immigrant groups remains substantial and interdisciplinary touching on many different themes, including language, culture, and ethnicity. Consequently, this chapter focuses only briefly on some of the more significant works and approaches to the study of Italian migrants and immigrant groups in Australia and the USA.

Research on immigration to the USA was traditionally characterized by a focus on social change, with many authors working within assimilationist approaches which predicted that minority groups would merge into mainstream American culture. However studies have expanded well beyond these ways of thinking, particularly in the past few decades. Section “[Studies of Italian Migrants in the USA](#)” gives a concise review of previous research on Italian migrants undertaken primarily in the USA (although it includes some studies related to Canada), taking very much a historical view to show the changes in theoretical approach over time.

Section “[Studies of Italian Migrants in Australia](#),” on the other hand, summarizes a few of the more significant studies of Italian immigrants in Australia. While early research had an assimilationist stance, the development of multicultural policies in Australia in the 1970s brought Australian literature to focus strongly on matters of cultural transmission and the formation of Italian ethnic groups. This section on Australian research is structured principally by field of study, to give an idea of the range of research approaches that have been taken within different disciplines looking at diverse topics, including issues such as transnationalism, coexisting transnational contexts, globalization, citizenship and belonging, gender, and the contemporary migration referred to as *la fuga dei talenti* (“the flight of the talented”).

Finally, the chapter concludes by considering some of the limitations of previous studies and reflects on the ways in which the current literature of Italian migration to Australia and the USA can be extended to provide a holistic view of Italian migration.

Studies of Italian Migrants in the USA

According to Devoto (1993), Italians began migrating to the Americas in massive numbers after the reunification of Italy in the 1870s, a period of great social and political upheaval. This migration reached its peak in the decade and a half between the turn of the century and World War I, when each year approximately 250,000 migrants arrived in the USA from Italy, and their presence had an impact on the social life of the country.

Early sociological studies on immigrants conducted in the USA, such as Thomas and Znaniecki (1927/1966), and the studies reproduced in Coser and Rosenberg (1969) focused on the immigrants' ability to adapt to "the American way of life." The research by Thomas and Znaniecki has been considered the most innovative piece of sociological research and theoretical analysis ever undertaken and served as a model for many other studies undertaken in the inter-war years (Chiro and Smolicz 1998). Their book, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, analyzed the assimilation of Polish immigrants in the USA, particularly focusing on social matters of control and change: "The idea of social theory is the analysis of the totality of social becoming into such causal processes and a systemization permitting us to understand the connections between these processes" (p. 36). American sociological research of ethnic groups at this time was thus characterized by the concept of social change and the adaptability of immigrant groups (although, as Chiro (2008) has noted, assimilation theory is not peculiar to the USA and is to be found in some form in all immigrant-receiving English-speaking countries). However a rival theory, that of the "melting pot," gained adherents among those who were disturbed by the elements of racism and forced compliance to an ideal of Anglo-conformity in assimilation theory.

US scholars such as Forester (1919), Mariano (1921), and Rose (1922), advocating assimilation and melting pot theories, all stressed the need for Anglo-conformity and the desirability of maintaining the institutions of the traditionally English-speaking USA (which were inherent in the legacy of the American Revolution). The English language and English-oriented cultural patterns that were dominant and standard in American life were considered to be the patterns that would be followed in the USA (Gordon 1964), even as it was assumed that all traditions and cultures brought into the USA by the many immigrant groups would eventually meld into a new American society. Both melting pot and assimilation theories thus assumed a mainstream perspective and tended to emphasize the ease or otherwise with which the new groups could merge into general American culture. These academic assumptions were maintained by later American sociologists studying Italian groups, who focused on processes of assimilation, although often proposing their own terminology. Thus Ware (1935), Whyte (1943), and Child (1943/1970), for example, developed their ideas by stressing matters of urbanization, adaptation, accommodation, absorption, social adjustment, and integration.

This focus on assimilation had implications for citizenship. To explain the dynamics by which nationality and immigration laws conferred different rights on the citizens of a country and noncitizens (foreign nationals), and to understand the effects of such policies, literature began to examine immigration and citizenship policies. This included speculation on related matters and in particular questions about "what it means to be a citizen" in different contexts and in different times. Unpacking the meaning of citizenship (as a marker of entitlement or belonging, within a specific area of residence) led to reflections on whether it is the key axis of advantage or disadvantage among individuals within and across the borders of nation states (Shutes 2016; Helbling 2016).

An important study focused on Italian communities was conducted by Gans (1962). In his research on the social structure of an urban Italian community, Gans stressed the distinct ethnic-historical characteristics of migrants and ethnic groups, pointing out that southern Italian peasants had different values and characteristics from northern Italians. This led to a focus in the American sociology of migration on features such as religion, politics, criminal and economic systems, and patriarchal family orientation.

However, despite Gans's work, there was still a tendency to consider the Italians as a homogenous ethnic group, with a continued focus on the cultural systems of "the Italians." There were studies that focused heavily on the family and its ties, notions that were considered to be outmoded in general society (e.g., Campisi 1948; Covello 1944/1972; Gross 1973). The ethnocentric interpretation of scholars who lacked an emic orientation toward the subject of the study was sometimes displayed in negative attitudes toward the group, characterizing it in terms of "traditional values" such as collectivism and cohesiveness or focusing on *omertà* (the "code of silence"). Other scholars, such as Banfield (1958), Vecoli (1964), and Tomasi (1972), focused more on the importance of religion in the family structure of Italians in the USA. Their research pointed out the different patterns of leaving and the processes of acculturating from the old world to the new, such as urbanization and a fusion of diverse elements.

American sociologists and anthropologists really only began to dedicate attention to issues such as intergenerational conflicts between immigrants and their descendants from the 1940s. Scholars such as Child (1943/1970), Covello (1944/1972), and Gambino (1973) examined intergenerational conflicts within Italian-American communities, characterizing them as resulting from a dislocation between the so-called traditional (sometimes referred to as familistic) values of the old country and the modern (individualistic) values of the advanced capitalistic state. Such a disjuncture between country of origin and cultural expectations has implications for how citizenship is conceived and negotiated. If, for migrants, legal citizenship does not lead to a sense of full incorporation into mainstream society, the gap between legal citizenship and personal identity has implications for both governmental policies and theorization in relation to the nature of citizenship. However, as claimed by Dejaeghere and Tudball (2007), views of citizenship have changed over the last few decades, from an idea of national loyalty where one has only one citizenship to a notion of "global citizenship," and this does, of course, affect Italian-Americans as much as any other migrant group.

Gabaccia (1984) and Orsi (2010) approached issues of intergenerational conflicts, and also gender, using concepts from both anthropology and psychology; for example, Gabaccia (1984) highlighted the psychological dilemma of the descendants of Italian-American immigrants, who in her opinion seemed to be undergoing a significant identity crisis. These new sociological and anthropological approaches stressed the social and historical aspects of ethnic groups without reifying them as objects of study. Gambino (1973) emphasized the disequilibria and psychological struggles that affect immigrants and their descendants, pointing out that blame is heaped upon those parents who continue to bear their childhood burden of wearing

two masks. On the other hand, Gabaccia (2016) analyzed aspects of gender and migration over the centuries in depth, by demonstrating that variation in the gender composition of migration reflects not only the movements of women relative to men but larger shifts in immigration policies and gender relations in the changing global economy. She also suggests that children of the first generation, by maintaining the precarious balance of conflicts that had become their lifestyle, accentuate the cultural isolation and social loneliness that many third-generation Italian-Americans experience when they attempt to enter the mainstream of American life. A different focus, more related to “traditional values” vis-à-vis collectivism and education, was developed by Cohen (1982) who claimed that the large Italian migrant community in Manhattan, with respect to the education for their children, preferred to take them out of school as soon as possible to put them at work.

In addition to anthropological or sociological studies of Italian-Americans, there have been some studies from a more strictly sociolinguistic perspective, where researchers have approached migratory discourses by focusing on the language systems. For example, Biondi (1975), largely from an acculturation approach, investigated the ways in which monolingual and bilingual children of the Italian-American community of North End (Boston) speak English.

The bulk of the evidence from the studies on Italian-American ethnic groups discussed here, and many others, indicates that neither assimilation theory nor the melting pot theory has operated in practice. Despite the social adjustments and cultural adaptations that most ethnic groups have needed to make in order to adjust to their new reality, their ethnic group identity and ethnic traditions have proven to be quite resilient. In fact the assimilationist mindset naturally had an impact on Italian (and other) migrants, since it assumed a fundamentally monolingual point of view.

A variety of studies of Italian-Americans have criticized US assimilationist and melting pot policies, which they claim have contributed to the alienation of generations of American ethnic groups (e.g., Caporale 1986; Crispino 1980; Gabaccia 1984; Gallo 1974; Orsi 2010). Other studies (see De Jong 2013) criticize those policies because of the monolingualism of the education they produced. Specifically, assimilationist policy “for the education of migrants” had created, in many instances, collusion; as suggested by De Jong (2013), language in education policy has changed substantially over time and has shaped its forms with discourses that might largely be defined as assimilationist and pluralist (or monolingual and multi-lingual) views of the role of linguistic and cultural diversity in schools.

Other studies have focused on the ethnic identity of Italian-Americans and the ways in which the Anglo-American majority has stereotyped ethnic minorities (e.g., Alba 1985; La Sorte 1985; Nelli 1983). Moreover, the changing political climate in the USA, in particular with the rise of the civil rights movement and the black power campaigns of the 1960s, led Americans to experience an ethnic revival and to search for their historical roots (Lopreato 1970; La Gumina 1979; Rolle 1972).

The USA still represents the fourth most popular destination for emigrants, after Germany, the UK, and France (Tirabassi 2015), and Italians with different levels of education continue to emigrate to the USA. Some more recent US literature is focusing on this contemporary migration, sometimes referred to as *la fuga dei talenti*

(“the flight of the talented,” seen from the Italian point of view). According to Fiore (2012), there are three main categories of new Italians in the USA: those with relatively low qualifications (e.g., workers in the food business); those with high academic qualifications (seen as a “brain drain” from Italy); and those with some qualifications who are seeking chances that may be attainable but are not automatically certain (students, artists, temporary workers in the service sector). These more recent migrants, particularly those in this final category who left Italy since the 1990s, are sometimes referred to as “new Italians,” a term in which “new” is intended to serve as a time qualifier indicating their recent relocation (Ruberto and Sciorra 2017).

In the last decade or so, some North American (and Australian) studies have focused on the experiences of Italian immigrants through the investigation of an abundance of micro-narratives. The focus of these studies can be characterized as reflecting transnational approaches, rather than national, emphasizing the ongoing dialogue between “home” and “host” communities (Ruberto and Sciorra 2017; Tamburri 2014; Gardaphe 2012). Over the last decade, the application of theoretical concepts such as diaspora (see Luconi 2011) to the Italian migration phenomenon and broader comparative and transnational approaches to studying Italy’s migrants have begun to challenge and deprovincialize Italian migration studies in a range of contexts, including the USA (e.g., Gabaccia 2013).

Studies of Italian Migrants in Australia

As with Italian migration to the USA, the settlement and social incorporation of Italian migrants in Australia have been researched over an extended period through a large number of studies. Pioneering Australian studies of immigrant groups often reflected the approach of assimilation research in other English-speaking host countries, discussed more fully for the USA (see section “[Studies of Italian Migrants in the USA](#)”), focusing on how Italian immigrants assimilated into the dominant way of life. For example, Borrie (1954) suggested that because of the diversity of the immigration program, Australians would be compelled to consider their attitudes toward the non-British, and his work offers a significant understanding of the dominant attitudes of “old” Australians toward their new, non-British neighbors.

Another important early study is Price (1963), which focused on southern Italians in Australia, noting the patronizing attitude of local Australians who felt hostile toward the “dago.” He explored ethnohistorical features of immigrants’ values and introduced the concept of chain migration, which he identified as a three-step model: “the arrival of the sole man, the calling out of wives, and the subsequent calling out of elderly parents once the family was established in Australia” (Price 1963, p. 59).

Despite the early similarities in research programs between the USA and Australia, however, Australia in the 1970s saw the rise of multicultural policies that allowed for the management of ethnic difference among immigrants; this contrasted sharply with the USA, where a *laissez-faire* attitude to ethnic pluralism was adopted, as a variety of scholars have noted (e.g., Castles 2000). As a result,

much of the research literature in Australia from this time became more concerned with issues of cultural transmission (including through education; see below) and the construction of Italian ethnic groups. Research on the first generation of Italian migrants peaked in the 1980s and 1990s, with much subsequent research from a range of disciplines focusing on their children as well.

Among the pioneering sociological research on Italian-Australians was Severino and De Corso (1985), which focused on the working-class experience and particularly on the children of immigrants, finding that young Italian-Australians had low self-esteem compared to their peers from Anglo-Saxon backgrounds. Many other studies have examined aspects of the lives of Italian-Australians from sociological and anthropological approaches (e.g., Baldassar 2001; Baldassar and Gabaccia 2011; Baldassar and Merla 2014; Bertelli 1987; Marino and Chiro 2014; Marino 2018, 2019; Sala and Baldassar 2017). One specific issue which has seen a great deal of research is that of gender, particularly in relation to the second generation, the children of Italian migrants to Australia (e.g., Vasta 1995; Baldassar 1998, 2001).

Some research has been undertaken in the field of the sociology of religion; for example, Pittarello (1980) stressed the cultural strategies of the minority group, drawing attention to the differences between the religious value systems of the minority and those of the Anglo-Celtic cultural institution. Other work has been interested in cultural values more broadly. Smolicz and his associates published numerous papers on the cultural and linguistic systems of ethnic minority groups. The key ideas of Smolicz (1981) and later Chiro and Smolicz (1998) were that every ethnic group has a nucleus of values that are fundamental to the cultural group's existence and which act as distinctive values symbolizing membership of the group (see also Chiro 2008). In advocating that every ethnic group has a nucleus of values, however, core value theory would seem to objectify cultural groups.

From the 1970s, with the emergence of multicultural policies, many studies have investigated aspects of Italian language and culture in Australia, with in-depth analyses of sociocultural practices, patterns of language usage, and interaction with the dominant culture. A notable background reference is *Australia's Italians: Culture and Community in a Changing Society*, edited by Castles et al. (1992); the various chapters examined the Italian community in Australia from historical, sociopolitical, and economic perspectives. Other works have similarly focused on the history of Italians in Australia (e.g., Ricatti 2013, 2018; Cresciani 1986) or looked at particular issues from the perspective of political studies (e.g., Battiston 2005; Mascitelli and Zucchi 2006).

There has been a great deal of research specifically focused on issues of language, in fields such as linguistics and narrative analysis. For example, Bettoni (1981) examined code-switching among Italian-Australians in North Queensland, while Tosi (1991) carried out a sociolinguistic study of Italian in English-speaking countries; and there have been many other language-focused studies (e.g., Bettoni and Rubino 1996; Kinder 1990; Marino et al. 2013; Rubino 1989, 2010; Scarino and Mercurio 2004).

When it comes to the field of education, much of the Australian research on migration has revolved around Australia's multicultural policy and the changes that

Australian immigration policy has experienced over the last 50 years, from its early expectations that immigrants would assimilate to models of multiculturalism, introduced by Immigration Minister Al Grassby in 1972, and the incorporation of immigrant minorities and their children into society (Inglis 2009) – with the very high number of migrants from Italy to Australia over this period, many general studies on migration have often included a large contingent of Italian migrants. There have been many studies on so-called ethnic or community schools in Australia, set up by specific migrant communities, with government funding, to ensure cultural transmission and specifically language maintenance (e.g., Smolicz et al. 2001; Clyne 1991; Scarino 2014). Chiro and Smolicz (2002) focused on Italian values in Australian schools, where specific “family values” and ethnic identity were shared among a group of tertiary students of Italian ancestry in Australia. The authors highlight how, in the students’ personal narratives, the participants comment on their past and present experiences with respect to their Italian culture maintenance efforts and their attitudes toward Italian cultural values. Interestingly, the study follows in the humanistic sociological tradition, seeking to understand the relationship between structure and agency through an analysis of both the activation of cultural values and their evaluation by active and reflective social agents.

In addition to these, Cahill (1988) conducted a sociopsychological study of the family environment and the bilingual skills of Italian-Australian children. Cahill’s work consisted in an investigation on the potential and prospective issues of intellectual impairment gravitating around bilingual children. Studies have also looked at the strong expansion of higher education in postwar Australia and its effects on social mobility (e.g., Forsyth 2015), and this is reflected among the Italian community as well; for example, Baldassar (2001) pointed out that there have been strong increases in the rates of Italian-Australians attending tertiary education with the change from first, second, through to the third and fourth generations and a correspondingly lower percentage of the community involved in manual trades.

The majority of Australian research on Italian migrants and their descendants in all disciplines has been carried out on non-differentiated “Italian-Australians.” However, some studies have looked more precisely at specific communities. Two such works, both with an anthropological approach, are Cronin (1970) and Huber (1977). The former compared the social organization of southern Italian migrants from Sicily, while the latter investigated two groups of Italians from Treviso in northern Italy who had settled in Australia. Cronin (1970) found that there was evidence of some change toward egalitarianism in the husband-wife relationship and a separation of the world of adults from the world of children. Huber (1977) stressed the relevance of social class and examined the patterns of acculturation.

In more recent research, an awareness of globalization has provided new paradigms for interpreting transnational histories and the impact on immigration. Studies highlight that in today’s globalized era, what is new about migration is that people are no longer “one-way trip” migrants, as migration often involves a circular pattern of returning to visit home (cf. Hugo 2014). As Baldassar and Pesman (2005) point out in their study of granting belonging, “doing belonging,” and second-generation transnationalism, the Italian migration process does not end with the first generation;

it needs to be considered as a continuous process, rather than considering it in the traditional way as consisting of a departure and a permanent settlement. Robertson (2014) has noted that migrants to Australia are becoming more professional and skilled, corresponding to the current migration agenda, where an array of new “temporary visas” have taken pride of place in migration policy, replacing a focus on family migration.

Global and transnational approaches have resulted in the development of a solid and innovative research program in Australia (see Iuliano and Baldassar 2008; Ricatti 2018), where concepts such as transnationalism and diaspora have been used in interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary approaches, proposing new theoretical ideas through a critical use of transcultural, decolonial, gendered, and anthropological theoretical reference points. For example, while Marinelli and Ricatti (2013) provided a reinterpretation of Italian transnational spaces and “the emotional geographies of the uncanny,” Vanni’s (2016) theorization of “the transcultural edge” and Marino’s (2019) theory of institutional positionality are essential new tools for understanding “transculturation” and ethnic identities. Recent Australian research literature is characterized by a multidisciplinaryity that goes beyond economic, assimilationist, or objectifying factors. For example, Baldassar et al. (2007) focused on Italian families in transnational contexts in a way which interconnects gender, globalization, and aged care, in response to matters of (trans)national links, while a study by Marino et al. (2013) investigated the relevance of intra-ethnic networks among migrants and their descendants within the diasporic society by focusing on the role played by nuclear, extended, or *comparatico* family alliances. Marotta’s (2014) study of the transcultural subject challenges previous theories of acculturation characterized by the tendency to reify groups. By highlighting the “the dark side” of transculturation, Marotta’s transcultural subjects are seen not as abstract entities, but agent entities.

Conclusions and Reflections

Research has looked at Italian migrant communities in both US and Australian society, although the literature has followed different paths. Initially much of the research was strongly characterized by the concept of social change and considerations of the ways in which immigrant groups were expected to merge into the more general culture. Such academic approaches were maintained for longer in the US literature, although American sociologists developed new terminologies and ideas, such as urbanization, adaptation, accommodation, absorption, and social adjustment.

This academic ethnocentrism was gradually replaced in the USA by approaches that focused on the psychological struggles that affect immigrants and their descendants and also the lived experiences of Italian immigrants, including micro-narratives. Recent US literature has turned to examine contemporary Italian migration and *la fuga dei talenti* (“the flight of the talented”). Transnational approaches emphasizing the ongoing dialogue between “home” and “host” communities have begun to challenge and deprovincialize Italian migration studies in the USA.

In Australia, after pioneering studies of immigrant groups characterized by assimilationist approaches, the rise of multicultural policies in the 1970s led research to be focused more on issues of cultural transmission and the construction of Italian ethnic groups. This research peaked in the 1980s and 1990s, by which time there was an additional focus on the second generation, the children of the Italian immigrants.

As in the USA, more recent transnational approaches have resulted in the development of a solid and innovative research program in Australia, with interdisciplinary studies looking at concepts such as diaspora, gender, and decolonization. What is lacking in research, though, is a consideration of the impact of the transnationalism of Italian migrants in the field of education – Zembylas et al. (2012) have demonstrated that the entanglements of transnationalism have important consequences for educational policy, but this has not yet found its way into research on Italian migration in Australia or the USA.

While there are exceptions, in both US and Australian research, there is still a tendency to consider the Italians as a homogenous ethnic group. Approaches often place a great deal of emphasis on traditional values, language, and family, and this ethnocentric interpretation lacks the emic orientation essential to a holistic understanding of contemporary global patterns of migration. Little comparative and qualitative analysis among Italian minority groups has been conducted from a small-scale ethno-anthropological perspective involving extended periods of fieldwork.

Within the framework of citizenship, Castles and Davidson (2000) investigated the sociopolitical complications of globalization, emphasizing the implications for the notions of citizenship and belonging. Although with no specific reference on Italian migrant communities, they reflected on the fact that in contemporary democracies, citizenship is usually institutionalized as a means of “ensuring individual rights and of balancing them with community obligations” (Castles and Davidson 2000, p. 1).

Despite the growing multidisciplinary literature, notions of transnationalism often seem to be analyzed from a historical perspective that divides the migratory history of Italians into groups or classes, creating a narrative that ignores the complexities of transculturality. However, emerging transnational approaches to Italian migration may encourage scholars to look beyond the local and make connections across Italian migrants in a broad range of international settings.

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Advancing Diversity Through Global Citizenship Education and Interfaith Dialogue

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Mehmet Aslan and Mark Van Ommen

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Abstract

Global citizenship education (GCE) has been the response of governments and educational systems around the world to address issues resulting from globalization in contemporary society. Some of these issues include a lack of social cohesion, parallel living, and religious intolerance. While GCE is viewed by many as a vehicle to develop students as empathetic and caring global citizens, the effective implementation of GCE programs for students remains a challenge.

Interfaith dialogue (IFD), which can be understood as a structured conversation designed to foster respect and cooperation among individuals of different faiths, offers a way to address some of the challenges in implementing effective GCE for students. Both IFD and the global consciousness approach to GCE have similar intended outcomes, with dialogue seen as important learning experience in GCE. Similarities between the intended outcomes of both GCE and IFD

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will be noted, as this information may add further weight to the hypothesis that both concepts are complementary. Finally, an IFD experiential framework and example will be presented as a way to respond to some of the challenges of GCE.

Keywords

Global citizenship education · Interfaith dialogue · Globalization · Diversity · Peace

Introduction

We live in a time where globalization is shaping our lives in new and profound ways. Globalization is a multifaceted phenomenon (Hanson 2010) which can be understood as a homogenization of economic, cultural, social, and political areas locally and nationally (Guttal 2007). The hopes and dreams of migrants, transnationals, and displaced peoples have, in theory, provided the conditions for greater connectedness and communication between people from different language and cultural backgrounds (Dabrowski 2015). In addition to this, the advent and use of the Internet, social media, and mass media is seen as a key factor in creating a feeling of connection to more remote parts of our world (Rizvi 2008).

While interconnectedness is more prevalent in our contemporary lives, the authentic integration of our communities has not always been successful. There continues to be friction, division, and conflict between different individuals, groups, and countries (Michaelides 2009; Orton 2016). Often these disagreements arise from religious, cultural, and linguistic distinctions which have resulted in an apathy for others locally and globally (Dabrowski 2015). Locally, this has resulted in a separation of communities in some countries into enclaves. The consequence of this separation is that people may live alongside each other but never interact in a meaningful way. This phenomenon of people living separate lives despite being in close geographical proximity to each other is termed “parallel living,” a phrase first suggested to describe the disturbances in a number of British towns in 2001 (Cantle 2001).

The phenomenon of parallel living due to religious affiliation is supported by the research that suggests people in the world today still identify with a particular religious group. The Pew Research Centre (2012) found that globally, more than eight out of ten people associate themselves with some religious group. There has been a shift over time in religious affiliation in some parts of the world, but not necessarily increased secularization. As Turner (2011) argues, some may see Western Europe as becoming more secular, but it is more accurate to say that Europe is becoming de-Christianized. Australian religious affiliation has also transformed in the last 50 years, with census data showing a decline in those who identify as Christian and a rise in those who categorize themselves as nonreligious (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017). This rise in the nonreligious population is significant if Australians are to see themselves as global citizens. The rationale is that

to connect with other people globally, Australians must acknowledge and try to understand the role that religion and other belief systems play in their lives.

Global citizenship education (GCE) and interfaith dialogue (IFD) are two approaches being used to combat the climate of mistrust and friction resulting from globalization. Education, particularly school education, has a critical role in raising awareness of global issues (Lapayese 2003). Education and schools can reinforce dominant norms and the status quo, but they can also be an effective and sustainable way of connecting individuals, cultures, and communities across borders (Hanson 2010). GCE, the pedagogical response to globalization, develops the consciousness of students to prepare them for the opportunities and challenges of a global society (Dill 2012). IFD, another response to the challenges of globalization, is viewed as vehicle which can facilitate cultural diplomacy (Biljana et al. 2017) and build more cohesive communities (Orton 2016) through transformative conversations (Heckman et al. 2008). Communal cohesion, the facilitation of empathy, and the fostering of peaceful relations underpin key beliefs in most of the world's faith traditions. Islam's concept of brotherhood, Buddhism's notion of humanism, South Africa's philosophy of ubuntu (or humanity toward others), dharma in Hinduism (Dabrowski 2018), and "love thy neighbor" for Christians are examples of key beliefs from different faith traditions and cultures that promote human connectedness.

Despite the potential for a connection between GCE and IFD, as a response to the challenges of globalization, there is very little research into how the two concepts can complement and enhance each other. This chapter will argue that IFD and GCE are complementary concepts. A review of the literature around the definitions, intended outcomes, and approaches to and the challenges in implementing GCE and IFD will be presented. Similarities and divergences in definitions, approaches, and outcomes will be noted. Using this information and viewing both GCE and IFD through the lens of student experience, we present the case that IFD should be a component of GCE. Furthermore, we will argue that a process for IFD could be used as a way to facilitate GCE.

Global Citizenship Education

Global citizenship education (GCE) has emerged out of the global citizenship movement. Global citizenship dates from the time of the ancient Greeks, with some ancient Greek philosophers stating all human beings as having the same worth, respect, and dignity regardless of political boundaries (Dabrowski 2015; Schattle 2008). Today more individuals are seeing themselves as belonging to and connected with the global community (Dabrowski 2015). Consequently, global citizenship is defined as "awareness, caring, and embracing cultural diversity while promoting social justice and sustainability, coupled with a sense of responsibility to act" (Reysen and Katarzaska-Miller 2013, p. 858). GCE, which emerges from the broader concept of global citizenship, is seen as a pathway for policy makers and governments to promote action on social justice and shared responsibility through the education of young people.

This paper adopts an expanded definition of GCE that is based on the intended outcomes of global citizenship. A global citizen can be described as someone who understands interconnectedness, respects and values diversity, has the ability to challenge injustice and inequities, and takes action in a way that is personally meaningful (UNICEF USA 2018). Schattle (2008) suggests similar qualities but includes the concept of empathy for those who are suffering beyond one's immediate surroundings. Reysen and Katzarska Miller (2013) include environmental sustainability as another outcome of global citizenship. Therefore, we define GCE as a pedagogical response to globalization that results in students being motivated to act to:

- Promote the interconnectedness of all life
- Respect people of different cultures and countries while maintaining their own identity
- Advocate for those beyond their own surroundings who are suffering.

There are two main approaches to GCE, the global competencies approach and the global consciousness approach (Dill 2013). The global competencies approach involves a neoliberal perspective of globalization. In this neoliberal globalization perspective, the individual is a global traveller who wants to access the political, social, environmental, and economic benefits of being a global citizen through the acquiring of skills that can be transferred across national boundaries. The global competencies approach to GCE occurs through dialogue and participation in programs such as "student exchange, teacher exchange, and international student participation" (Shultz 2007, p. 251). The global consciousness approach can be understood to have two perspectives on globalization. The first perspective is the radical/conflict approach which adopts a "strong ethical position on social justice" (Shultz 2007, p. 253), challenging economic globalization and building solidarity across marginalized groups to fight oppression and suppression. In this radical/conflict perspective on globalization, GCE is seen as a proactive effort with civic engagement constituting a central element of institutionalized programs, at both the global and local levels (Caruana 2014). The second perspective is critical/transformationalist which acknowledges that globalization has often facilitated complex relationships that have resulted in the exclusion/inclusion of groups locally, nationally, and internationally. Through the critical/transformational globalization perspective, GCE is seen as a vehicle to address issues such as inequity, marginalization, and poverty (Shultz 2007) by transforming not only institutions and systems but also personal and cultural mind-sets (Andreotti 2006).

Challenges in Implementing Global Citizenship Education

Although the global consciousness approach to GCE should address the issue of parallel living through improved interconnectedness, respect, and advocacy between people, the reality is that GCE programs do not always meet their intended

outcomes. There are three reasons for this. The first is that although GCE is taught, opportunities for engagement with those from different cultural, religious, and social-economic backgrounds are not always part of the GCE experience. The use of verbs such as dialogue, participation, effort, engagement, and fostering suggest that GCE programs involve action on the part of the student to engage with people from different cultural, political, and social backgrounds. Massey (2014) found that the inclusion of the global education component in a Canadian year 12 geography class fostered in the students a stronger global awareness and sense of belonging to the wider world. But when asked about acting as a global citizen, student responses were limited to such actions as buying fair trade products, being a volunteer, or making a donation to a charity. This suggests a lack of understanding either that GCE should involve interaction with someone from another culture or that opportunities for this sort of interaction are limited. Similarly, Al-Maamari (2016) sought to examine how the social studies curricula could enhance diversity or develop prejudice in the Sultanate of Oman on the Arabian Peninsula. By examining 12 textbooks, which were the main teaching tools used by teachers, he found that although there were many intercultural elements prevalent in the teaching units, due attention was not given to conflict, democracy, and human rights. In summary he states that that intercultural education cannot be solely left to curricula to be effective in fighting prejudice. Rather there is a great need for different pedagogical approaches including dialogue, which are more student-centered. Again, this study points to a need that GCE needs to be taught as well as experienced by the students to realize its intended outcomes.

The second challenge to the implementation of GCE is that the concept itself can be problematic which can result in the philosophical ideals of GCE not being fully addressed by those seeking to implement policies and curricular and environmental factors. Abdi and Shultz (2008) argue that the global citizen is a “problematically concocted figure” where a “greater focus on developing an ethic of care and an ethical global space” (p. 49) will help realize the ideals of GCE. Global citizenship has the potential to spur on the global economy with economic competitiveness (Rizvi 2008). However, if the goal of GCE is to facilitate economic competitiveness, this could be also viewed as a barrier because GCE would lose its moral imperative as it would be driven by the external “forces of globalization” (Standish 2014, p. 167). An articulation of human rights beliefs and the concept of moral universalism would greatly benefit those working in (the global consciousness approach) to GCE to have a voice in framing the conversation and policies regarding its scope, methods, curriculum, and direction (Landorf 2009). To address philosophical issues, Goren and Yemini (2017) suggest that a starting point for any discussion on GCE is the adoption of a theoretical framework and the identification and definition of GCE terms like cosmopolitanism, cosmopolitan and world citizenship, transnational citizenship, and global mindedness. However, these concepts are often overlooked.

Third, GCE cannot be divorced for contextual factors. For example, in many industrialized countries, increasingly nationalist thinking and narrowing of international perspectives are prevalent. This is further compounded by the fact that GCE

has been sidelined in the school curriculum and funding has been minimalized to support GCE in schools since 2014 (Buchanan et al. 2018).

Considering the barriers to authentic GCE, there is increasing momentum from the United Nations and its agency UNESCO for educational authorities to promote global citizen education. In Australian secondary schools, there is limited evidence that the nature of student learning achieved by programs or projects in GCE is having an impact (DeNobile et al. 2014). By impact we refer to GCE achieving its intended outcomes. Therefore, we need to ask ourselves how we can design programs and experiences so students will have the best chance to realize the outcomes of GCE. Interfaith dialogue could be seen as an integral component of GCE and could provide a way to bridge the gap between the rhetoric and reality of GCE.

Interfaith Dialogue

Interfaith dialogue (IFD) is defined as “an intentional encounter between individuals who adhere to differing religious beliefs and practices in an effort to foster respect and cooperation among these groups through organized dialogue” (Agrawal and Barratt 2014, pp. 571–572). The use of the term “dialogue” rather than conversation is deliberate. Dialogue is defined as an encounter between two or more persons or groups of different views with the primary purpose of learning and transformation (Ingram and Yagi 1992; Massoudi 2006; Michaelides 2009). Thus, authentic IFD is characterized by cooperation, respect for difference, and desire to overcome conflict (Seljak 2009).

The terms interfaith and interreligious are often seen as interchangeable in the literature (Michaelides 2009), but some authors view these as different concepts (Agrawal and Barratt 2014; Biljana et al. 2017). Firstly, there is not a consensus about the groups each encompasses. For example, the Archdiocese of Chicago presents interfaith as referring to relations among adherents of the Abrahamic faiths of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, while interreligious relations refer to relations of these faiths with other world religions, including Hinduism and Buddhism (Chicago 2012). The World Council of Churches presents the opposite, indicating that interreligious is between Christian denominations and interfaith referring to relations between different faiths (Biljana et al. 2017). For this paper, the importance is on the intended outcomes of IFD. If, in some instances, interreligious dialogue has similar outcomes, then both concepts could be viewed as the same.

Considerations when Facilitating Interfaith Dialogue

Since IFD is an intentional encounter, it has an organized and structured process (Massoudi 2006). There can be formal and informal encounters with people from different religious affiliations (Biljana et al. 2017). Examples of the informal include encounters at schools and places of work and relations between neighbors. However,

IFD is a formalized conversation (Agrawal and Barratt 2014); therefore it has a deliberate process. Considering interfaith dialogue as having a certain structure allows the facilitators to effectively plan the pre-dialogue, dialogue, and post-dialogue phases so that the participants experience truly transformative conversations (Krebs 2015; Orton 2016). This formal approach is used to ensure that all aspects of the dialogue are addressed. Massoudi (2006), using a systems approach, suggests there are three phases to the process of IFD:

- Pre-dialogue: agreement on basic dialogue guidelines involving evaluating one's views while being open to the views, perspectives, and opinions of others
- Dialogue: being attune to one's emotions and having courage to see and change previously held opinions
- Post-dialogue: reflect and review what one has learned from the interaction and plan the next dialogue. (pp. 427–432)

In the pre-dialogue phase, consideration should be given to who is involved, who is missing, what is the dialogue for, and what are the conditions required for effective dialogue (Orton 2016). Thought should also be given to the location of the dialogue, different dialogue formats (weekly discussions, coffee and conversations, book clubs, sacred text studies, and interfaith retreats), experiential opportunities, religious literacy, and the inclusion of a secular viewpoint (Krebs 2015). One example of how the dialogue phase could be structured is through Cambridge Scriptural Reasoning (CSR). The CSR assists people to read together the sacred texts from the Abrahamic faiths (Islam, Judaism, and Christianity) so that, in conversation with others, bonds and mutual understandings between different religious backgrounds are enhanced (Saragih et al. 2018). Considering interfaith dialogue as having a certain structure allows the facilitators to effectively plan the pre-dialogue, dialogue, and post-dialogue phases so that the participants experience truly transformative conversations (Krebs 2015; Orton 2016). To achieve authentic learning and transformation through IFD remains challenging. Orton (2016) suggests barriers to authentic dialogue including our past experiences of people from different faiths, worldviews, personal and community agendas, and status in society. Sometimes being engaged in interfaith dialogue can come at a high personal cost due to isolation from our own faith community, especially in the eyes of the more fundamental or radical sections of that community. Another barrier is the religious literacy of the organizing organization, which can result in an age or gender bias (Weller 2009). Sometimes the male elders of a religious group are included rather than the youth or females. Ironically, Michaelides (2009) believes that youth involvement in interfaith dialogue is crucial for sustainable peace and harmony.

These challenges could be alleviated if interfaith dialogue is seen as a structured process, requiring consideration of certain elements at each stage. However, dialogue is an encounter between people who bring different lived experiences to the conversation, which can result in a certain amount of unpredictability.

Interfaith Dialogue and Global Citizenship Education

There is a strong case that IFD should be seen as an important component of GCE and the processes of IFD could serve as a model to facilitate GCE. The rationale for this is threefold. First, the intended outcomes of global consciousness approach to GCE have strong parallels with the outcomes of IFD. Second, both concepts involve action on the part of participants. Third, IFD provides the framework for people from different faiths to engage in dialogue, thus providing a situation of experiential learning, experiential learning being one of the barriers or challenges of GCE.

Both IFD and GCE education are viewed by governments as ways to combat many of the issues that face society today. Lack of social cohesion, parallel living, and religious intolerance are global challenges facing many countries and communities within countries. GCE is the pedagogical response to issues of globalization: migration, global social problems, and cultural difference (Dill 2012). The global consciousness approach to GCE which aims to provide students with a global orientation, empathy, and cultural sensitivity, stemming from humanistic values and assumptions (Dill 2013), has outcomes of promoting peace and harmony between peoples (Dabrowski 2018). IFD, as an intentional encounter between people of different faiths, is seen by governments as a way to combat conflict and division between different religious groups in an increasingly globalized world by building more cohesive communities (Orton 2016). Therefore, although both concepts are defined differently, they have very similar intended outcomes of peace, mutual understanding, and respect for difference. This is not surprising since global citizenship borrows heavily from the traditions of different religions and cultures (Dabrowski 2018).

To realize the ideals of GCE and IFD, participants are required to act. This is another similarity between both concepts. A global citizen “takes action in a way that is personally meaningful” (UNICEF USA 2018). Dialogue is the action that is suggested in both the global competency and global consciousness approach to GCE. Similarly, IFD involves action on the part of the participants because by definition, dialogue involves communication through discussion (Massoudi 2006). Other forms of engagement that should be considered so that IFD initiatives have more impact are field trips for students to places of worship. Actions from educational authorities that can lead to IFD having an impact include the embedding of IFD in schools’ syllabi and programs, included in preservice teacher training, and providing ongoing professional development in IFD. As noted by Ghiloni (2011), “while it is one thing to hold religiously inclusive sentiments, it is quite another to formally develop curricula around such views” (p. 476). A study of teacher and student training of the Islamic Religious Community in Italy by Abu-Nimer and Smith (2016) describes some of these curricular developments. The study identified pedagogical strategies and learning opportunities which lead to successful IFD experiences for students. These strategies and opportunities included training on how different religions have contributed to art, culture, and knowledge both in the past and the present. Fields trips were also organized to places of worship, thus making them a place of learning. This approach shifts the focus from comparing and contrasting doctrines, history, and tradition to meaningful and human engagement.

The benefit of IFD in realizing the goals of the global consciousness perspective of GCE is that it provides an experiential framework with which to engage with people from different cultural backgrounds, absence of a theoretical framework (Goren and Yemini 2017) being one of the identified issues in GCE. Experience has two aspects, the objective and subjective (Botturi 2012; Csikszentmihalyi 2006; Riva 2012). Using this conceptualization of experience in simple terms means that our “environment” (objective) shapes how we “feel” (subjective) which results in our responses to situations. Using the systems approach (pre-dialogue, dialogue, post-dialogue) to IFD presented by Massoudi (2006) could be applied to facilitate GCE. Consider immigration in Australia:

Pre-dialogue phase:

- Students discuss their own perspectives on immigrants.
- Learn about living in different parts of the world through the Internet, social media, and mass media (Rizvi 2008).
- A field trip, recommended to increase the impact of IFD (Abu-Nimer and Smith 2016), could be organized to a community center for immigrants.
- The selection of questions to ask during dialogue with immigrants.

Dialogue phase:

- Formal discussion with immigrants either in small groups or as a class.

Post-dialogue phase:

- Reflective exercise looking at initial perspectives and feelings and post-dialogue personal perspectives and feeling
- Ways to address some of the challenges immigrants face in living in Australia
- Discussion on what needs to occur for immigrants to return safely to their country of origin

IFD creates the environment to present different perspectives. By learning and empathetically reflecting on the viewpoints of others, we may alter our feelings about people from different faiths and cultures, resulting in changes to how we act in certain situations. Thus, dialogue is a vehicle to develop empathy which is one of the central outcomes of both GCE (Schattle 2008) and IFD (Seljak 2009).

There is potential to overlap some of the drivers of globalization with IFD. Consider the IFD framework suggested by Massoudi (2006). In developing the parameters for pre-dialogue, it would be important to have some religious literacy and knowledge. Gaining a deep knowledge of cultural norms from different parts of the world, the reasons for these norms and exploring the historical drivers behind these variations can give an empathetic insight into other faiths. But the same knowledge can also be applied to other cultures and the reasons why people live the way they do in other parts of the world. An initial understanding of ways of living in different parts of the world can occur through the Internet, social media, and mass

media (Rizvi 2008). Ideally, though, students would be exposed to experiences of different cultures and religions through mandated curricular opportunities. Using these technology media and providing intercultural experience can set the basis for the pre-dialogue phase of IFD as a way to develop empathy for the challenges and realities of people from different cultures. Another consideration in the pre-dialogue phase could be to consider the moral imperative. Maintaining the moral imperative, when economics can drive global citizenship, has been identified as a challenge for GCE (Standish 2014). If participants understand the ethical and moral considerations of IFD before they enter into the process, then there is a greater chance of the dialogue meeting its intended outcomes. Again, the side effect of this learning can be a deeper knowledge of different cultures, which can facilitate GCE.

Discussion and Conclusion

The phenomenon of globalization and advances in technology and communications would seem to have provided greater opportunities for interconnectedness and empathy for the way people around the world live their lives. However, this has not always been the case with friction, division, and conflict between nations and peoples within local communities. One approach to addressing the issues arising from globalization is GCE. However, for students to understand interconnectedness, respect and value diversity, challenge injustice and inequities, and take action in a way that is personally meaningful (UNICEF USA 2018) remains problematic. The lack of experiential opportunities, problems with the concept itself and contextual factors can be a barrier to successful implementation of GCE programs. Needless to say, there is a collective will from stakeholders from both government and non-government institutions to overcome the obstacle of embracing diversity in our communities, and while there has been a substantial amount of work already done to raise awareness and promote education around our identities, it is clear that we need to find new ways to develop empathy and respect for diversity.

IFD could serve as a way to rethink GCE initiatives. Considering that eight out of ten people globally still identify with a religious group (Pew Research Centre 2012), GCE should incorporate some understanding of the religious views and resulting lifestyle implications of other people. IFD is seen as a vehicle to facilitate cultural diplomacy (Biljana et al. 2017). Both IFD and the global consciousness approach to GCE are similar in intended outcomes. Dialogue, as strategy that is suggested for all approaches to GCE, is an action that leads to experiential learning for those involved. The systems approach to IFD could be applied to a deeper understanding of societal and global issues such as immigration.

The potential that IFD offers to address some of the challenges in the effective implementation of GCE needs further investigation. The development of GCE programs in schools that incorporate IFD into a single cohesive education program would be a good starting point. However, for this to occur, there needs to be clarity around the concept of GCE and the approach to GCE used as this will shape the intended goals the educational institution is hoping for. Different models of IFD may need to be developed based on the age of the students and the affiliation of the educational

institution. Government and educational institutions have a pivotal role to play here. If they truly believe that GCE is a way to transform society to become more tolerant, empathetic, and harmonious, then they need to devote resources and provide opportunities to make this happen. Opportunities must include experiential encounters with people from different cultural and religious backgrounds. Our suggestion is that providing opportunities for IFD for students is one way to possibly achieve these outcomes so that diversity in our global communities is recognized and celebrated.

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Civic Theory and Educative Processes in Informal Spaces: A Case Study in Three Italian Realities

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Abstract

This chapter presents a reconsideration of the formation of civic practices within public spaces, using the works of Habermas (The structural transformation of the public sphere: an inquiry into a category of bourgeois society. Polity Press, Cambridge, 1989) and Dewey (The public and its problems. Holt, New York, 1927; Experience & education. Touchstone, New York, 1997) in relation to an elaboration of a civic theory to explain civic behavior, in particular in new generations. This localizes the concept of public space within a reflection on informal educational processes, overcoming a concept that is excessively confined to urban studies. More specifically, the intent is to understand if institutional spaces, such as schools, and primary social spaces should be considered environments of socialization and civilization processes exclusively or if other relational and civic contexts where citizenship practices are experienced should also be included. It is a question of considering the mechanisms through which learning processes for social skills, like trust and civic values, are determined and whether

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they can be acquired through non-institutionalized pathways, where there can be a generative exchange between different places and spaces, both formal and informal.

Keywords

Adolescents · Civic dimension · Informal education · Public spaces

Introduction

A broad discussion about the privatization process of public space is ongoing. This phenomenon has been defined as *Disneyfication* and implies the transformation of places into semblances, the hyper-realities dominated by the logic of consumption, and the construction of safety through surveillance (Sorkin 1992). More recently the transformation of public space in common spaces has been defined as *domestication by cappuccino*, based on the diffusion of new spaces like bars, restaurants, and so on, characterized by control and the exclusion of citizens who are not consumers (Atkinson 2003). The privatization of public space does not necessarily imply a direct desire for profit, but it does reinforce models of spatial segregation that are evident in the marginalization of peripheral areas in *gated communities*. What is interesting to highlight is that the economic and spatial privatization process is also configured on a social plane that assumes the characteristics of a minimal social reality, more and more restricted into specific self-referenced affective and relational fields that exclude diversity and heterogeneity. This all translates into an analysis primarily of public space. Studies that focus on the relationship between space and the process for building civic practices and the consequence that the crisis of public space has on introjection processes in civilization are far less frequent (Giardiello 2017). For this reason it is necessary to expand the study of civic education in school to include experiential and nonformal types of learning, not only focusing attention on formal learning processes but also on how the civic dimension for youth is modeled by spatial encounters.

To this purpose the conceptual field of the civic dimension is extended to a research direction based on the idea of associating the introjection of civic-mindedness, common rules respecting common property, and institutional spirit with practices that develop within the informal spaces in the city or community. In this case, the concept is a civic culture founded on the possibility to practice spatial citizenship intended as a complex phenomenon that extends beyond the formal definition of citizenship (Maestri and Hughes 2017, p. 629) as it involves “the dialectic of space, citizenship and identity” (Sbicca and Todd Perdue 2014, p. 310). It is expressed through the socio-spatial processes of recent social and political movements that are based in opposition to the privatization and economic homologation of public spaces but also through the various alternative forms of youth citizenship linked to the daily activities that take place in the micro-territories

where they operate and live (Harris and Wyn 2009; Baker 2015, p. 1000). In this sense spatial citizenship is often associated with the condition in which the individual experiences a good level of social, territorial livability, emotional well-being, and sustainability (Rowntree Foundation 2011, p. 15). These elements highlight how the quality of the growth process of a citizen and his/her relationship with institutions and the civil/social quality of the public space are closely correlated. The general presumption of this chapter is that the relationship between public space and the civic dimension (Civic dimension “can be defined as a set of competences which have to do with knowledge, values, attitudes and behaviors and that allow citizens’ active participation in the political, social and civil spheres of a society” (Azzolini 2016).) produces citizens, but the continuous erosion of the relationship also generates limits in the development of social and civil skills in youth and an increase of self-referencing in the modern individual. The transformation of public space into a space dedicated to the education of civic-minded mentality raises important theoretical questions about the pedagogical and civic role of spaces and places (Giardiello 2017), and more in general about the need to reformulate civic theory to a form that acknowledges the connection between the formal level of institutions and social mentality, and focus attention on the fact that the *modus vivendi* of a society is created from the ground up, from the total of deeds and actions (Butler 1997) by individuals in the different spaces in where social interaction, conflict and participation take place.

The chapter is organized into seven sections. The first section introduces the concept of public sphere, while the second describes the relationship among informal learning, civilization, and the public sphere. The third section develops the concept of educational and civic practices in informal contexts. The fourth section highlights the crisis of public space as a process of *decivilization*. The fifth section introduces hypotheses and methodology of a case study about civic practices in informal contexts of adolescents in three Italian realities. The sixth section illustrates the results of the case study. The last section is about the concluding remarks about the topic of the chapter.

The Concept of the Public Sphere

Literature on civic participation demonstrates the growing crisis in democracies caused by the reduction of critical thinking in the public sphere, which continues to take on a more private and monopolized character based on the culture of consumption (Atkinson 2003; Barber 2007; Bauman 1998; Furlong 2013). According to a critical perspective, the reduction of this aspect is only apparent because it has often represented not the universal sphere but also the place where factions and exclusionary practices are generated (Fraser 1992). Despite its evident problematic nature, the presence of an active and aware public sphere is considered an essential element for a democratic country. This is because theoretically the public sphere represents a place where based on its discursive nature

individuals meet freely to discuss problems and issues of general interest, peacefully and heatedly, through a rational and democratic process. It can certainly be affirmed that the public sphere is the arena, where, from a sociological perspective, the social mentality that legitimizes the institutional frameworks of the state/nation, in particular the constitutional democracy, is formed. Among the most meaningful reflections in this scope, we can certainly cite the work by Habermas *Storia e critica dell'opinione pubblica* (Habermas 1989), which considers the birth of the bourgeois public sphere as an integral part of a wider construction of the state/nation. According to Habermas, the public sphere was born in French, English, and German historical contexts from the eighteenth century to the early nineteenth century, with the formation of a public of readers with significant critical skills, directed not only toward the reading of classic works but also a rational analysis of the surrounding reality. It “may be conceived of above all as the sphere of private people coming together as a public” (Habermas 1989, p. 27) governed by rational communication. Its fundamental characteristic is being governed and having a potential for emancipation that can promote civic participation and cooperation (Susen 2011, p. 45). The central theme is constituted by the preoccupation with the development of a public sphere conceived of as the necessary condition for the constitution of a true democracy, apparent as the product of debating the values and standards that go beyond their function exclusively as part of a formal judicial framework (Douglas 2000; Lo Schiavo 2010). The critical analyses that evolved in response to the scarcely plural nature of the public sphere of Habermas should definitely be considered (Fraser 1992; Calhoun 1992). They open up a different perspective on the various public spheres and raise questions about which public participates actively, which is excluded, and which is in decline.

In light of the important rethinking offered in the works of Habermas (1989) on the transformation of the public sphere in the modern era, we cannot deny that the public sphere is undergoing colonization by a part of the consumer market, which in the commercialization of social relations degrades the critical potential in this same relational space, transforming it into “a decorative appendage of a disenchanting world” (Susen 2011, p. 50). From the point of view of the socialization process toward civilization, this affirms a certain “civic privatism” (Corchia 2007, p. 142) where the citizens “are abandoned to a world of anonymously in between systemically generated options with their preferences interconnected networks in which they must choose between systemically generated options with their preferences” (Habermas 1999, pp. 124–125).

Informal Learning, Civilization, and the Public Sphere

The education of *homo civicus*, founder and custodian of the common good, in contrast to “the idiot of the Greeks, who lives isolated in his own private world” (Cassano 2004, p. 21), experiences a long and dynamic process of civilization within the modern public sphere characterized by a gradual passage from the model of social constraint no longer centered on hetero-constraint, but rather self-constraint

(Elias 1988). It is a profound informal and nonformal, non-scholastic educational process based on an implicit, unintentional experiential dynamic, which caused the introjection of rationality as a specific aspect of the mentality and structure of the personalities of modern individuals. This favored the formation of a public sphere based on the combination of “for me” with “for everyone” (Perone 2012b, pp. 111–127) where the dimension of the universal interest also includes the interest of the single. This means that the public sphere must be conceived of as the place where through discussion, “an order in relations is instituted starting from the subject” (Pagano 2012, p. 45). The theoretical basis referred to in the elaboration of the concept of the public sphere as an educational sphere is not articulated only along the model of civic virtue and social relations but also along the idea of informal learning based on relational practices that materialize in meeting places and spaces. According to this line of thought, the public sphere cannot be conceived of in an abstract framework but must instead be traced back to a factual dimension, within which the spoken practices that are part of the process of civilization take place. The spatial translation of the public sphere is fundamental to civic practices, from the moment that it can be assumed “a positive and incremental relationship between space and the public sphere which above all links the variety and openness of the former to the emancipatory and democratic character of the latter” (Cremaschi 2008, p. 1). Confirmation of the mutually constitutive character of the public sphere and public space can be traced back to a common thread that connects public space to the education of citizenry and the creation of a common civic culture (Jacobs 1961; Sennett 2002). In this context, it is important to bear in mind how the development of spatial reality over the last several years in the field of social theory has resulted in a growing interest in issues concerning the relationship between public space and democracy. Parkinson (2012) shows that democracy in a surprising measure depends on physical and public space, especially in a digital world, where evolution in a democratic sense requires anchoring in space, an incorporation of social structures and relational power within the constructed space and environment.

On the basis of these fundamental concepts, it is assumed that the public sphere is configured as a cognitive phenomenon, based on the possibility to create discursive relationships among individuals and groups in places that are spatially and temporally contextualized. From this perspective, recent international research has demonstrated how the public space not only promotes physical, psychological well-being, and quality of life (Dines et al. 2006), but also determines the socialization of civic values that are considered precursors to the development of citizenry.

Educational and Civic Practices in Informal Contexts

The civic dimension not only assumes a micro character as it develops in the daily practices within the defined temporal spaces but also recalls a prelegal (or, rather, precontractual) conception of the formal civic contract, encoded into standards and rules. This assumption defines a perspective where attention on the practices enacted by the subjects in a specific space focuses interest not only on the role

that their cooperative action plays in reproducing civic culture but also on the possibility of recognizing the process that reproduces specific educational experiences (provided that not all experiences can be associated with educational practices) (Dewey 1997), with the objective of generating knowledge and producing common educational practices. This point requires critical and reflexive thought, considered by Dewey to be fundamental in conscious cognitive processes, because the subject proceeds with production of knowledge not through a priori forms but through the “active, persistent, and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge” (Dewey 1933, p. 6). Continuing in this perspective, the experience becomes the “place where the living organism develops methods of intelligence, or the method that determines the choice of values based on co-evolutive transformations of the subject and the environment” (Burza 2007, p. 24).

These considerations lead to Dewey’s concept of the public sphere, with a framework that is less demanding than that of Habermas, since it is “composed simply of those who are directly or indirectly involved in the consequences of an event, who are interested in regulating it collectively and who take action for this purpose” (Pellizzoni 2005, p. 22). According to this meaning, the public sphere “consists of describing actions and their consequences that derive not so much from presumed metaphysical and ontological causes, but more from cooperative practices and trust based on a constant process of experimentation and exploration” (Cuceu 2011, p. 104). From this point of view, according to Pellizzoni, “it is the sharing of a problematic situation, as opposed to political values, a framework of rights and duties, reciprocally acknowledged, that constitutes the public sphere” (2005, p. 22).

It is the nonformal and experiential character of the educative process that allows the conceptualization of the public space as a realm of educational practices. The public space involves informal educational processes that develop through interactive practices within a given situation because to which and through which diverse populations form public space. From this perspective, Dewey offers an illuminating insight into the formation of democratic institutions and the corresponding mentality for these to be conceived of in a non-abstract manner but instead as the product of a configuration of practices centered on constant experimentation of reality. At this point it is important to consider a question that has emerged within social sciences about the identification of the fundamental environments for socialization to the civic dimension (Biesta et al. 2014; Giardiello 2017). More specifically, the problem is understanding if these are only institutional environments and primary social relations or also include other relational and civic contexts where the practices connected to civic culture are experienced. The issue is to comprehend the mechanisms through which learning processes for social skills are generated, fostering the ideas of trust and civic values, which can then be inserted into non-institutional pathways for learning, with the presence of an energetic exchange among different places and spaces, both formal and informal. In this context, it should be pointed out that recent research focusing on micro spaces (Harris and Wyn 2009) has demonstrated the presence of a different variety of alternative ways in which youth learn through experience how to practice citizenship.

The Crisis in Public Space: “Decivilization”

Habermas’s conception of the public sphere is considered not very attentive to the evident pluralization in modern society (Fraser 1992; Calhoun 1992). This critic once again raises the question of which public actively participates, which is excluded, and which is in decline. Recent international literature regarding the use of public space has demonstrated a decline in its use, especially among adolescents (Dee 2015). This category appears to be less able to appropriate the space, to actively participate in the formation of public opinion, configuring themselves not as citizens but as consumers in a privatized, mercified public space.

In light of the important rethinking offered in the works of Habermas (1989) on the transformation of the public sphere in the modern era, we cannot deny that the public sphere is undergoing colonization by a part of the consumer market, which in the commercialization of social relations degrades the critical potential in this same relational space, transforming it into “a decorative appendage of a disenchanting world” (Susen 2011, p. 50). In this context, privatization, according to Barber, “is more than just an economic ideology. It acts in league with the ethos of infantilization to embrace and reinforce narcissism, personal preference, and puerility. It misconstrues liberty and thereby distorts how we understand civic freedom and citizenship, often ignoring and sometimes undermining the very meaning of public goods and the public will.” (Barber 2007, pp. 127–128).

It should be acknowledged that relationships among adolescents and public space are structured similarly. That latter transforms more and more into simulated versions of reality due to the “Disneyfication” effect (Sorkin 1992) or into places for consumption based on the diffusion of so-called “domestication by cappuccino” (Atkinson 2003). In this context lies the fundamental problem of the civilization process, which can be weakened and overturned into decivilization, also where it is normally diffused, primarily assuming (but not exclusively) two characterizations: diffusion of the infantalist ethos (Barber 2007, pp. 3–37), which subverts the ethos of responsibility, and withdrawal of the state, followed by the decay of public space and citizenship. It follows that civilization of space may be subject to different intensity levels of forms of decivilization. All of the above is the basis for a fundamental consideration about the nature of the civilization process, which must be conceived of as a resource that is continuously regenerated, because to perform its necessary functions, it is not enough that it is rooted in a specific society. It must instead be continuously recreated. In this regard, the possibility to generate or consume the civilization process depends greatly on the quality of the existing interconnections and practices (educational and civil) that the various subjects who make up society implement in their own life contexts.

As it is easy to see, these considerations are aligned with the reflections developed by Dewey (1933), who conceives of the formation of state (and also democracy) as an experimental process and not as the product of idealistic providentialism. In particular, in a society where the more the conditions of action and investigation in the production of knowledge are continuously evolving, the more the state continuously needs to reinvent itself. The result is a vision of the constructivist

social subject who based on their specific vocation and field of intervention produces (or consumes) the bases of the civilization process. It should also be acknowledged that this practice generally activates in those contexts where the place of the civilization process holds within itself a capacity for reactivating generative processes.

A Case Study in Three Italian Realities

The international literature has revealed a decline in the use of public space, especially among adolescents, due to significant privatization and connected safety policies (Dee 2015). One of the consequences of the decline is the weakening of public space civic functions. It should also be acknowledged that the recent international debate not only focuses on the role that public space plays among the younger generations in the development of civil activities and instilling a social climate characterized by free movement but also highlights how the decline in public space is equally common in large cities and small communities (Batsleer 2008, p. 55).

Despite the important resonance that the scientific debate on the decline of public space has assumed at an international level, in Italy the discussion has remained in the confines of urban studies, primarily focused on the transformation of the city. Except for a few exceptions (Forni 2002; Perone 2012a; Mazzette 2013), public space has never been considered as a place for educational processes for leaning about civil systems among adolescents (Giardiello 2017). This knowledge deficit is even more evident when the study is circumscribed to the concept of public space as a place for socialization of civilization practices among the younger generations. For this category the spatial crisis translates into deprivation of the opportunity to use the city (erosion of the right to the city), decreased autonomy, increased fear, blocked exploration, participation, and increased surveillance. This crisis generates a blockage in the transition process toward adult life and active citizenry and a reflux into the private realm symbolized by the fortress home that protects the person from society, an unpredictable and unsafe place, the place of diversity.

Based on these considerations, an empirical analysis of the mechanisms that reproduce civic practices among adolescents in three territorial contexts was carried out in Bari, Rome, and Benevento. It was presumed that the civic dimension must be understood as the expression of civic values, trust, and social cohesion structured into a mental idea, interiorized by social subjects and groups, and rendered immanent within the public space through socialization practices. In line with this definition, several hypotheses were formulated on the processes that reproduce civic practices linked to the civic view of adolescents.

The first hypothesis (Hyp. 1) focuses on the value orientations of adolescents: reproduction of values seems mainly characterized by civic and universal values of a restricted form of social relations, where the home is dominant, as a privileged space, with the family as the significant realm of social relations.

The second hypothesis (Hyp. 2) regards the type of assessment that adolescents express about social spaces and institutions, both private and collective: the relationship between adolescents and public spaces is characterized by erosion in civic practices in favor of consumption.

The third hypothesis (Hyp. 3) regards the level of social cohesion and its quality among adolescents: the relation between adolescents and social cohesion is expressed through social practices and close connections that generate domestic social cohesion, self-referencing as opposed to inclusive.

Verification of these hypotheses was based on the results of a pilot qualitative-quantitative research study carried out during the 2011–2012 academic year among adolescents from 11 to 14 years old, in three territories in southern Central Italy.

Crisis in the Civic Dimension of Public Space in Italian Adolescents

The diffusion of a private conception of social life in adolescents and the consumer takeover of public space that impedes its educational dimension is widely confirmed in the study's quantitative data. This aspect was analyzed by focusing attention on the field of values, on the meaning connected to practices implemented in the places, and on the quality of social relations and social cohesion.

The dominating tendency of family values to the detriment of collective values (Hyp. 1) was analyzed through posing the question: "What are the most important values in life?" Even though values are a complex concept dealt with in a controversial body of literature, it is still possible to identify, especially in sociology, scientific accord in the idea that values "are general criteria that concern the desirability of action" (Sciolla 2010, p. 54) able to offer one or more basic value structures for illuminating the direction of our individual or collective action. From this point of view, analysis of adolescents is easier understood in light of the study of the realm of values that guides their social practices. This is even more relevant in the case of studying processes that generate civic mentality among adolescents, because "it has much to do with the way in which the individual immersed in a specific socio-cultural context thinks about the world and construct their hierarchical values" (Di Donato 2014, p. 74). It is the affirmation of a universal syndrome affecting values, mostly family-oriented, that determines the level of civic-mindedness among the social practices of adolescents.

In light of these considerations, the study focused on the value structure of adolescents through the reconstruction of the semantic space within which the values used for analysis on the principle components were grouped. More specifically, based on how they fall along the scale of importance, some areas of similarity can be defined in the three territories in question (see Fig. 1).

The results demonstrate on the one hand the presence of values like family and love falling within the maximum importance area and, on the other hand, civic and social values falling within the "little" or "sufficient" importance area. From this perspective, it is relatively easy to claim that the results of the research confirm Hypothesis 1, with a structure of values primarily based on family




Fig. 1 (a) Level of importance of values in the Bari sample. (b) Level of importance of values in the Rome sample. (c) Level of importance of values in the Benevento sample

and intimacy over social and civic values prevailing and subsequently profiling a socialization process that develops around a domestic, self-referencing center.

These results are aligned with the IARD study on the state of Italian youth (Buzzi et al. 2002) and the study of values in the Italian adult population, which recorded a percentage lower than the European average for public involvement, as well as for interpersonal trust (Janmaat 2006). In addition, this is evident in the historical reconstruction relative to the understanding of the formation of the Italian social mentality, demonstrating how it is composed of a family-based view of the world (Aiello 2015).

With the intent to link value structures to concrete practices, the interviewees were administered a qualitative scale to identify the subjective definition of places and measure their attendance. This analysis was designed to corroborate the hypothesis (Hyp. 2) according to which a process is underway where the practices of adolescents are trending toward self-referencing spaces of consumption, to the detriment of public spaces, with subsequent loss of the educational aspect of public space in the formation of civic practices.

Examining Fig. 2, which reproduces the relationships of adolescents to social places in three territories on a diagram, it is evident that there is a common phenomenon in assigning meaning to space. In this context, space is divided into two social spheres with two different meanings. The second and third quadrants in the left of the diagram clearly demonstrate that places like the home, sports centers, shops, bars, and shopping malls were defined by adolescents from all three analyzed areas as the places where they form intense, positive, fun relationships. In the first and fourth quadrant, a second trend is evident that speaks to the crisis in the relationships between adolescents and institutions, like the municipality, the church (described as boring or indifferent), as well as other public spaces,




Fig. 2 The meaning of places in the three territories (S, Benevento; B, Bari; R, Rome)

especially streets and town squares (with the exception of the adolescents in Benevento, who gave a positive meaning to the town square). Comparative analysis demonstrates a general framework in the world of adolescents where a consumerist pseudo-integration process emerges, as opposed to a civil process, where adolescents become part of the public sphere not as citizens but as consumers. It should also be noted that the research data confirm the second hypothesis, according to which a consumerist, self-referencing space prevails in the world of adolescents, to the detriment of public space with subsequent drop in civic practices.

The research data analyzed up to this point seem to corroborate the hypothesis of a weak process generating the civic dimension among adolescents, highlighting a progressive crisis in civic value and an affirmation of domestic and consumer spaces around which self-referencing practices are constructed. The research also demonstrates the presence of a process of generative corporative practices and offshoots that constitute a domestic social cohesion, within which adolescents develop a mental concept based on distrust and on self-referencing solidarity (Hyp. 3). Data analysis clearly demonstrates that public space is no longer a place for social cohesion where different perspectives come to reciprocally learn about one another, since the generative process that is produced is conservative or limited to the confines of an extremely introverted dimension. These results confirm the tendency to privatize the public sphere, highlighted by Habermas, and the consequent crisis of its educational practices and the emergence of the decivilization process, as illustrated in sections two and three of the article. In the three areas examined in the study, social cohesion does not represent the basis for public life, because it is confined within a domestic system, both fragmented and weak. Social cohesion is the fundamental basis for the civic dimension in which “every citizen feels part of a project that transcends one’s own individual interests” (Di Donato 2012, p. 42); however this research demonstrates a fragmented social fabric formed of micro-territories and social relationships unable of acting within socialization processes designed to reinforce a sense of trust and solidarity. This brings us to a preliminary, brief consideration, based on which the adolescents in the study were found to have scarce or lacking interiorization of social mechanisms that generate the civic dimension, as well as a crisis in the places where informal education can actually occur.

Conclusion

Theorization of space as an educational place is rarely considered in sociology, despite recent research carried out within the scope of youth studies that has indicated space as an environment for emotions and relationships (Woodman and Wyn 2015, pp. 144–145; Giardiello 2017). Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the process of constructing a civic culture undoubtedly cannot be fully defined within the relationship between the public sphere and spaces, but it is also true that this problem assumes an important role in the field of studies on the formation of a social and civic mentality among the younger generations. Another

essay would be necessary to thoroughly analyze the socialization process toward civic practices and critically debate the crisis in educational practices in public spaces. What is important in this study is the idea that the educational process toward a civic dimension is learned through educational practices within social contexts. This is evident in an articulated explanation of the birth of the public sphere proposed by Habermas and Dewey with an approach to public space from which the direct implication with the civic dimension emerges clearly and therefore with the formation of the citizen and his/her ability to exercise. Nevertheless, this process is not generated in an abstract context, since public space is the product deriving from the action of social actors, both in individual and aggregated terms, who through the exercise of civic practices negotiate the processes of inclusion and exclusion, reproducing the *modus vivendi* of civic cohabitation.

The nonhomogeneous nature of the process of civilization was also highlighted, in particular in a context like Italy. It is within these contexts that an analysis was made to demonstrate how the practices of adolescents in public spaces could be considered as educational experiences that regenerate the civic education process or an affirmation of a progressive process of consumerist appropriation and micro feudalism (Di Donato 2010, p. 33). The research data reflect the limits of a quantitative-qualitative and explorative study, which cannot produce empirical generalizations but can eventually create a theoretical basis, outlining research hypotheses useful for the development of subsequent research. In spite of these limits, the research makes it possible to delineate important consideration about the quality of the civilization process among adolescents. In general terms, the study demonstrated a diffused mental mindset, an expression of family-based values that create a cohesive domestic framework in spaces that are more and more circumscribed to the home or spaces mainly dedicated to consumers. These are not so much civic practices as a form of pseudo consumerist integration into a public space that continues to be more asocial and emptier, placing adolescents outside of civic participation processes.

In conclusion it is important to acknowledge the need to reconsider an educational policy that prioritizes cognitive learning based on individual and community-based experience, rendering public space a co-educator that intervenes and participates together with the other entities dedicated to socialization and the difficult process of cultivating citizenship. In this perspective, the fundamental value of public space must go beyond, to become an educational space with the duty to act as an experiment in the education of citizenship through practical experience within the public space (where space being used transforms into educational space).

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Part IV

Youth Advocacy, Citizenship, and Education



Undocumented Students and Youth Advocacy in the USA

46

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Abstract

This chapter focuses on conceptions of citizenship as they relate to undocumented student characteristics. In particular, and with a specific focus on the Californian context, it examines undocumented youth activism for access to higher education, including key legal dimensions and allies of students, as well as the use of social

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biliteracies via media in English and other world languages. The body of literature on undocumented students challenges conceptions of citizenship by highlighting the resilience of this student population through their activism and determination to traverse the legal, social, and educational barriers and opposition they face. After a summary of the literature in these areas, the chapter identifies practices through which undocumented youth have enacted advocacy for themselves and others through civic identities and responsibilities for citizenship and education. While much of the existing literature focuses on access and opportunity, some literature on advocacy provides impact evidence of key legislation that promote higher levels of access and equity for marginalized youth. These include the California DREAM (Development, Relief and Education for Alien Minors Act) (2011), which provides eligible youth state aid, and the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) (2012), which provides a conditional protective order from deportation and access to work permits. Some features of advocacy include undocumented student education, socially responsible biliteracies, and youth empowerment for the making of citizens and the interpretation of citizenship. Where pertinent, such features are elaborated upon further with contextualization; for instance, activism and advocacy for access to higher education may differ according to citizenship status, thereby creating specific challenges for undocumented youth in civic communities.

Keywords

Activism · Advocacy · Citizenship · DACA · DREAM Act · Higher education · Latinx · Legal residency · Postsecondary education · Socially responsible biliteracies · Undocumented students · Youth empowerment

Introduction

This chapter focuses on the youth activism and advocacy of undocumented students in California. Drawing from citizenship and education studies research on undocumented students, the goal of this chapter is to provide an overview of the characteristics of the undocumented student population, political activism, and fight for educational access and offer suggestions for educators and allies working with students identified as undocumented. In the context of this chapter, undocumented students refer to youth who were not born in the USA, but reside in the country without proper US legal citizenship status. The chapter's emphasis is on youth between the ages of 12 and 21 years and in pursuit of postsecondary education, or higher learning.

In 2001, the Texas Legislature passed Senate Bill 1403, a law to permit in-state tuition and state financial aid for undocumented students, thereby making college more affordable for many families who no longer faced international student fees. Other states enacted similar laws with California passing Assembly Bill 540 the same year. However, since then, a number of bills have been introduced against undocumented

youth pursuing higher education, with the most recent example being the Arizona Supreme Court, which denied DACA students in-state tuition in a 7–0 ruling (Romo 2018). Research has established that many undocumented students find out about their immigration status in adolescence while attempting to get a driver's license, find a job, and apply for college. Asking their parents for their social security number elicits the devastating news that causes students to experience a myriad of emotions from anger and shame to depression and hopelessness – each of which impact their schooling (Perez 2009, 2012, Perez and Cortes 2011; Gonzales 2016).

The terms undocumented students and undocumented youth are used interchangeably in this chapter to refer to school-aged people who are in the USA without authorization, may be with or without their parents, and who face the challenges of public education and immigration law in need of reform. Pabón López and López (2010) note that to classify undocumented youth as “immigrants” would be incorrect, since under immigrants are noncitizens lawfully permitted to enter and remain in the USA on a permanent status under US immigration law. The terms “alien” and “illegal” are not used due to the harsh connotation of bias, dehumanization, and pejorative treatment. Citizenship in US society calls for legitimate proof and document-based evidence, which Chang (2018) calls “hyperdocumentation, an excessive production of documents, texts and papers in an effort to compensate for a feeling of unworthiness. [and] undocumented immigrant status” (p. 3). In short, the requirement for “hyperdocumentation” for both residency and citizenship calls for strict surveillance of both underdocumented and undocumented students through state-sanctioned authorities. A second goal of the chapter is to present the socially responsible biliteracies of the undocumented student population as a means to improving their educational experiences in the K–20 pipeline. Socially responsible biliteracies consider English and another world language, which influence identity and power to “critique, question, and respond to issues of social injustice and inequality to take action” and also to “emerge as ‘good citizens’ who engage in the critical participation demanded of citizenship” (Selvester and Summers 2012, p. 4). The chapter is organized in the following order of content and contexts pertaining to undocumented students: (1) perspectives on citizenship and education studies; (2) undocumented students’ education; (3) research on activism of undocumented youth; (4) legal dimensions toward citizenship in California; (5) youth advocates and allies for citizenship; (6) socially responsible biliteracies in action; and (7) conclusion on youth activism in the pursuit of US citizenship.

Perspectives on Citizenship and Education Studies

As a result of continuous globalization, international migration, changing immigration laws, and perceptions and reception of immigrants, the concept of citizenship continues to be reconceptualized and theorized in academic scholarship. The traditional definition of citizenship suggests lawful recognition of a person's social and

political membership to a nation (Bosniak 2000). However, scholars of undocumented immigration problematize this conception for its failure to recognize undocumented immigrants as citizens of a nation due to a lack of documentation, such as a green card or citizenship certificate, despite full integration and contribution to society. Menjívar's (2006) scholarship on Guatemalan and Salvadoran undocumented immigrants documented their efforts to gain residency in the USA and posits that the complexities of immigration laws perpetuated a "legal limbo" or gray space, which leave immigrants in a constant state of precariousness.

Similarly, Coutin's (2000) work examined restrictive immigration policies and suggested varying degrees of citizenship and its afforded benefits based on categorizations such as US citizens, permanent residents, and undocumented immigrant. For example, when Central American immigrants are granted temporary legality, they can legally work and live in the USA but are unable to receive social services. This places immigrants in a liminal legality – an ambiguous space, where they are neither undocumented nor documented but have characteristics of both. Moreover, when these permits expire, undocumented immigrants are once again relegated to an undocumented status that makes them susceptible to deportation. Menjívar (2006) argued that this position explicitly excludes them from being viewed as citizens and affects their sense of belonging in the host society, an issue that impacts not only adult immigrants but youth as well.

Solis's (2008) work on undocumented youth conceptualization of citizenship complements Menjívar (2006). Through ethnographic research in a community organization serving Latina/os in New York City, Solis (2008) found that in sharing each other's understanding of citizenship, youth rationalized their definitions of citizenship based on their positionality as immigrants in a societal-historical context. For instance, in the study, 12-year-old Karina maintained that length of time in country established citizenship. In her perspective, it was a minimum of 10 years. Her 14-year-old brother, David, challenged her ideas and argued that birthplace established citizenship. He explained to Karina that their youngest sibling who was born in the USA is a citizen. After debating their ideas and including their family's immigration status, these two siblings concluded that undocumented immigrants were citizens too. Solis's (2008) work features the sense-making process and countering of societal definitions by youth, thus sustaining the idea that undocumented and immigrant youth who have been raised in the USA view themselves as citizens despite their immigration status. As he debated with his sister, David explained, "Karina, I didn't say I was a legal citizen!" (Solis 2008, p. 10). This clarification emphasizes that "illegal" citizen is a more accurate descriptor of him, but that he was, nonetheless, still a citizen.

Moreover, in the context of education studies, citizenship has been viewed through the political engagement of students (Figueroa 2017; Rogers et al. 2008). Figueroa (2017) argues that it is crucial to examine the impact legal status has in the schooling experiences of immigrant students in order to better understand their outcomes. Rogers et al. (2008) chronicle the civic development of undocumented

high school youth and their parents in Los Angeles and argued that public schools are a fundamental site for civic engagement. Formal education, the authors explained, sustains democracy via academic and civic preparation for the next generation of leaders. Denying undocumented children education (see “*Plyler v. Doe*” subsection) prevents them from being part of the social and political fabric of the country Figure 1: (Fairey and Majorado 2018).

Rogers et al. (2008) found that education provided opportunities for undocumented youth to learn, practice, and develop skills toward causes they cared about. For example, the Lopez family featured in their work. Leticia, a high school student, was a campus leader who founded a tutoring club and was actively engaged in causes, such as youth incarceration, that impacted her peers. Her parents, Gracia and Arturo, were active in the school community and advocated for resources that would benefit immigrant students in particular. Undocumented students face numerous hurdles and challenges in the pursuit of public schooling and higher education that include transparency about their legal status and knowledge of financial aid for postsecondary studies.

Fig. 1 *We the people defend dignity* poster, 2018.

A collaboration between artist Shepard Fairey and photographer Arlene Mejorado, Fig. 1 captures the original image of Maribel Valdez González to advance social equality, equity, and justice via the We The People Campaign. (Image courtesy of artist Shepard Fairey and photographer Arlene Mejorado. Used with permission, <https://obeygiant.com/people-art-avail-download-free/>)



Undocumented Students' Education in the USA

Presently, it is estimated that approximately 11.3 million undocumented immigrants reside in the USA, accounting for roughly 3.5% of the country's population (Krogstad et al. 2017, Pew Research Center). Of the 11.3 million, 1.8 million are believed to be undocumented youth under the age of 18 (Krogstad et al. 2017, Pew Research Center). It is projected that every year approximately 80,000 undocumented youth reach the age of 18, of which roughly 65,000 graduate from high school (Oliverrez et al. 2006; Passel 2003; Passel and Cohn 2008). Moreover, it is estimated that roughly 200,000–225,000 undocumented students are enrolled in higher education (Súarez-Orozco et al. 2015). Scholars from various disciplines have addressed the multitude of challenges faced by undocumented students, as these challenges pertain to their educational experiences throughout the K–20 pipeline (Perez 2009, 2012; Perez and Cortes 2011; Gonzales 2016).

The youth were brought to the USA by their parents who were seeking a better life for themselves and their children. Recent research suggests that most undocumented youth entered the USA before the age of five. Given the false and widespread assumption that illegal immigration is a Mexican issue, combined with the heavy policing of the US-Mexico border, one limitation to existing research is that the vast majority highlights the plight of Mexican and Central American youth (Súarez-Orozco et al. 2015), though there is a steady growth documenting the experiences of other race/ethnicities. The settlement patterns of undocumented immigrants in California, for example, suggest reunification with established family members and friends from the native country. It is common for enclaves from the same country, state, and town to live together in cities throughout California. For example, areas of Los Angeles have a critical mass of Guatemalan, Salvadoran, and Mexican enclaves. Due to their status and with limited access to community resources and public services, undocumented communities live at or below poverty level, and children and adolescents often attend under-resourced, overcrowded schools, which impact their academic prospects and life chances (Perez 2009, 2012; Perez and Cortes 2011; Gonzales 2016).

Perez (2009, 2012), Perez and Cortes (2011), and Gonzales' (2016) extensive scholarship indicates that undocumented youth are highly motivated, exemplary students who are in college-bound courses, participate in extracurricular activities, such as student leadership and sports, and have aspirations to pursue prestigious careers. For the most part, the K-12 educational journey of many of these students is smooth until they approach high school graduation. Perez (2009, 2012), Perez and Cortes (2011), and Gonzales (2016) have documented the shared experience of when undocumented youth find out about their immigration status. Several personal accounts – including those recounted in the studies by Perez and Gonzales, reveal that as youth begin preparing for the joys of rites of passage such as college admissions and their first job, they ask their parents for their social security number and are shocked to find out that they do not have one; they learn firsthand that they

are undocumented. Shaken by the news, many experience shame, anger, depression, anxiety, and hopelessness for their futures. This life-changing news negatively impacts their academics and contributes to students' social and emotional well-being (Gonzales 2016; Perez 2009, 2012; Perez and Cortes 2011).

The high school experience is pivotal to the success of undocumented students. It is crucial to ensure that undocumented students have proper academic and guidance counseling that includes accurate and updated information about legislation that benefits them, such as (and in California) Assembly Bill 540, the California DREAM Act, and DACA (see "[Legal Dimensions Toward Citizenship in California](#)" section). Having counselors, teachers, and staff that can educate students on their options can circumvent some of the hurdles undocumented students' experience. One of the biggest challenges for undocumented youth is the cost of higher education (Perez 2009, 2012; Perez and Cortes 2011; Gonzales 2016). As a result, youth who decide to continue their education post-high school, often choose to attend a community college due to its affordability or attend 4-year universities and colleges (Teranishi et al. 2011; U.S. Department of Education 2015). In their transition from high school to higher education, undocumented youth are often confronted with increased financial responsibilities that include contributing to the household, paying bills, and paying out of pocket for their education. The financial demands cause many students to attend school part-time or to withdraw in order to work, thus prolonging or reducing degree to completion rates for this student population (Terriguez 2015). Moreover, beyond the financial burden, students also find themselves feeling isolated and frustrated when campus faculty and staff do not know how to cater to their needs. For example, financial aid and registrar personnel commonly tell students they must pay out of state tuition or reject scholarship applications based on the students' immigration status.

The inability to properly help and guide students through their college careers results from ill-informed educators (Perez and Cortes 2011). Such experiences become additional unnecessary hurdles that inhibit their college retention and completion rates (Perez 2009, 2012; Perez and Cortes 2011; Gonzales 2016). Despite the many obstacles they face throughout their educational journeys, undocumented students within the education system typically demonstrate high levels of determination and persistence that make them extraordinarily resilient despite the odds stacked against them (Gómez et al. 2017). One area which illustrates the determination of undocumented students is political and social activism.

Research on the Activism of Undocumented Youth

As a result of the additional hurdles undocumented youth encounter as they progress through the educational pipeline, California youth have been at the forefront of several struggles that have significantly improved their access to higher education. In fact, the strategic mobilizing and activism of undocumented youth is credited for

the passage of state legislation that benefited this student population (see “[Legal Dimensions Toward Citizenship in California](#)” section). Seif’s (2004) ethnographic research chronicled a youth community-based coalition involved with Get Smart! a group affiliated with a Nongovernmental Organization (NGO). Seif reports the case of one participant, David, who, despite the marginality of undocumented youth, became an active member of Get Smart! and lobbied for the passage of California’s Assembly Bill (AB 540). David and his high school peers mobilized their South Los Angeles community to fight for the access to higher education for undocumented students. Their activism caught the attention of the California Latino Legislative Caucus, who helped them on the journey to successfully passing AB 540 in 2001, which granted higher education in-state tuition privileges for eligible undocumented youth in the state. This made the cost of a college education more affordable, and thus increased access to public colleges and universities.

Despite being undocumented, the leadership skills of the Los Angeles-based youth Seif (2004) followed represented a challenge to the perception of citizenship. She asserts that this victory challenges two assumptions: (1) that activists are adult citizens, and (2) that legislators only serve citizen voters. Seif (2004) traces this activism back to the Chicano Movement of the 1960s that saw an uprising in political activism among Latina/os who similarly fought for a better education and societal inclusion. The legislators and staff members that worked in solidarity with the youth of Get Smart! were part of the Chicano Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s, additional and local movements for social justice, and shared characteristics such as working-class origin, immigrants or children of immigrants, first-generation college students. These commonalities and their shared interest in advocacy and leadership empowered both parties to move forward with pushing for the signing of AB 540 and celebrating its passage into law for the immediate benefit of undocumented students and families in pursuit of higher learning.

Nicholls (2013) documents the start and growth of the national DREAMer movement and their leading role as the face of the ongoing immigration debate. His book discusses the DREAMer movement in the context of the larger immigration rights movement which helped politicize youth across the nation and helped train them on mobilization techniques and creating support and advocacy groups that became powerful in national and state level efforts to push for legislation such as the federal DREAM Act, California’s Assembly Bill 540, and the California DREAM Act. Managing to work in solidarity, the DREAMer movement differentiated themselves from the immigrant rights movement by drawing attention to intersecting issue that were unique to undocumented youth, such as sexual orientation and generational differences.


Seif’s (2004) and Nicholls’ (2013) work demonstrates the significance and power of the undocumented youth movement to gain access and opportunity in California and to serve as a model for youth and communities in other states across the country. Although many of these youth were ineligible to vote due to immigration status and/or age, their leadership and advocacy extend conceptions of citizenship

and civic engagement to be more humane and inclusive in the pursuit of higher learning success.

Legal Dimensions Toward Citizenship in California

According to the US Department of Homeland Security, California is the state with the largest immigrant population in the country (DHS 2016). In 2015, California had 10.7 million immigrant residents; of these, 4.3 million were under the age of 18 (Zong and Batalova 2017). As a result of the critical mass of immigrants in the state, California legislators and youth activist have been at the forefront of establishing policies that benefit undocumented students in the state. Highlighted below are examples of Californian legal cases and legislation that have helped advanced access to education for undocumented students and their fight towards citizenship Figure 2: (Stanley 2017).

Fig. 2 Eduardo is a dreamer poster, 2017. In Fig. 2, the portrait of Eduardo, a DACA recipient, appears as illustrated by the artist Pablo Stanley to increase public awareness about his story as well as more than twenty others in the series titled *Dreamer Stories: Portraits of American Dreamers*. (Image from the collection *Dreamer Stories: Portraits of American Dreamers* and courtesy of artist Pablo Stanley. Used with permission, <https://www.dreamerstories.com>)



Plyler v. Doe

The 1982 *Plyler v. Doe* is recognized as the landmark case of undocumented student education in the USA. The Supreme Court struck down a statute that sought to deny education funding for undocumented children in K-12 public schools. Justices argued that excluding undocumented children from public education would maintain an underclass of citizens that would prevent social and economic integration in society that did not align with the 14th amendment (Lopez 2005; Madera et al. 2008).

Leticia A. v. UC Regents

In 1985, undocumented students filed a lawsuit against the University of California and California State University systems upon learning that they were required to pay nonresident tuition due to their immigration status. Central to the case was the interpretation of the 1983 California Education Code section 68062(h), which states that an alien may establish California state residency, unless the Immigration and Nationality Act prevents them from establishing residency in the country. Since its creation, code 68062(h) has posed problems of interpretation for college admissions. The plaintiffs of this case had all graduated from a California high school and had 7 years of continuous residence in the state and were not permitted to demonstrate proof of long-term residency. The Alameda County Superior Court decision was the first major challenge to the California Education Code section 68062(h) and ruled it unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause of the California Constitution. The court sustained that immigration laws and student residency requirements were distinct issues (Madera et al. 2008; Rosas 1995).

Assembly Bill 540 (AB 540)

In 2001, California passed Assembly Bill 540 (AB 540) and granted eligible students to pay in-state tuition at higher education institutions in the state. Eligibility criteria requires applicants to have: (1) 3 years of consecutive attendance and graduation from California high school or its equivalent, (2) 3 years or more of full-time high school coursework, and elementary and/or secondary school attendance, (3) fulltime attendance at an accredited institution of higher learning in California, and (4) file affidavit with college/university stating they have or will file an application to legalize their immigration status when eligible (Madera et al. 2008; California Assembly Bill 540 (2001)).

California DREAM Act

In 2011, the California DREAM Act was passed, which provides eligible students with state financial aid such as University of California and State University grants,

Cal grants, and Board of Governors fee waivers. Some colleges/universities also use the DREAM Act application to award private scholarships. Eligible students must (1) have attended and/or graduated from a state public or private high school for at least three consecutive years or 3 or more years of cumulative attendance at a state elementary or secondary school, (2) have graduated or graduating from a state high school or completion of General Education Development (GED), High School Equivalency Test (HiSET), or Test Assessing Secondary Completion (TASC), and (3) file an affidavit with college/university stating that they have or will file an application to legalize immigration status. Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) recipients need to file the Dream Act Application even if they have a Social Security number (California Student Aid Commission; U.S. Congress 2011).

Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)

In 2012, President Obama announced Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), an executive order that granted eligible undocumented youth with a work permit and protection from deportation available for renewal every 2 years. Similar to the state policies and legal cases described above, the force of the national mobilization of undocumented youth resulted in the DACA announcement, benefiting youth across the country. Eligibility required applicants to: (1) have proof they arrived in the USA before the age of 16 and were younger than 31 years of age when the program began in August 2012, (2) have 5-year consecutive residency in the country, and (3) have enrolled in high school, GED or have high school diploma. Applying for DACA required a lengthy application process and a fee of \$465. Once approved, recipients had to separately apply for a social security number, driver's licenses, and bank accounts (Gómez et al. 2017; Gonzales et al. 2014).

Echoing Menjívar's (2006) concept of liminal legality, Gonzales et al. (2014) argue that DACA is limited because it is not a pathway to citizenship and must be renewed every 2 years.

Thus, DACA is a perfect example of liminal legality – youth are neither citizens nor undocumented, but fall in an in-between gray space. DACA's inability to provide lawful status excludes the opportunity to apply for federal financial aid.

Through the National UnDACAmented Research Project (NURP), Gonzales et al. (2014) collected surveys from 2,684 DACA recipients and young adults who were eligible and were awaiting a response or chose not to apply. Their findings on DACA recipients suggest that this executive order relieved some of the social and economic barriers for well-resourced beneficiaries, such as finding legal employment. On the other hand, those with less resource gained less from DACA. The NURP survey revealed that over one fifth secured internships, almost half opened a bank account, a third got a credit card, and over half received a driver's license. All of these afforded benefits improved their social mobility, via educational and employment prospects, thus increasing college going and completion rates.

Although DACA assisted with the social and economic mobility of its beneficiaries, President Trump announced in September 2017 that the program would be phased out, and in April 2018, he declared that resources for this program would be redirected to build a wall at the USA-Mexico border.

Youth Advocates and Allies for Citizenship

The success of undocumented youth is contingent on advocates and allies in every facet of their journeys to attain higher education and gain US citizenship. Undocumented youth face additional barriers that can overwhelm and stifle their success. Specifically, in the realm of education, there are practical and policy modifications that can be made to improve the educational advancement and experiences of this student population.

Fear and mistrust of school personnel can greatly limit opportunities for relationship-building with teachers and counselors who have power over coursework options, student grading and reporting, college admissions information, and scholarship and grant funding opportunities. Figueroa's (2017) ethnographic research uncovered that undocumented students may face consequences if and when they decide to disclose their immigration status in elementary school. She argued that children start making decisions about the information they share early in their education, and these choices affect how they participate and experience school. Moreover, these decisions are influenced by the culture of schools and teacher pedagogy. Figueroa (2017) profiles Lupe and Ruth, two fifth-grade students who were strategically selective about addressing immigration status and citizenship during the school day. Her findings suggest that a child's immigration status affects what they disclose about themselves and their families in school. Thus, Figueroa (2017) argues that the curriculum and pedagogical choices teachers make are opportunities for conscious efforts to support children in deepening their understanding of immigration and citizenship in the context of history and politics. For example, in the classroom she studied, the teacher incorporated topics such as belonging, identity, and social change in language arts and social studies lessons. Conversely, assignments, activities, and teacher comments can also have the unintended consequence of making students uncomfortable, such as expressing anti-immigrant views. However, student responses of resilience and fear can also serve as learning opportunities for educators who may not otherwise be aware or knowledgeable about the day to day struggles of undocumented families.

Educator preparation and empathy must be present for all students to ensure their academic success. For undocumented students in particular, it is pivotal that teachers and counselors attend professional development opportunities to become aware of their unique challenges and stay up to date on policies, legislations, and resources specifically tailored for undocumented students in all grade levels to support undocumented families in the pursuit of public schooling and higher learning. Gamez et al. (2017) and Stableton and Aleixo (2015) underscore the important role of mentors for

undocumented youth in and outside of school. Their studies highlight the ways that mentorship helped undocumented students stay on track and what students wished educators did to provide the additional guidance and support they need to succeed. For example, one of their participants, Laura, an undocumented student throughout her undergraduate and graduate studies, credited her academic success to her high school librarian with whom she had disclosed her status and concerns. The relationship that transpired from her sharing her story led her librarian to deeply understand what it was like to be undocumented and resulted in the librarian doing research on the topic and circumstances to work with, understand, and support more students like Laura. In addition, the librarian sought scholarships and established relationships with community organizations that helped Laura leverage her education.

Drawing on Stableton and Aleixo's (2015) research, we provide another example confirming that relationships and allies benefit undocumented students in postsecondary studies, too. Once in college, finding support from professors early on goes a long way, as was the case of Tatiana who shared:

One of the professors that we had just coming into college was our Chicano Studies professor, – I don't know I just love her. She's kind of like my *tia* or my grandma, and she was always so welcoming to all of us – she respects who you are and she values your experiences. In her class, we're able to share what it's like to be an immigrant. Or just even through the literature that we read, we saw so much of ourselves reflected in it because you're reading about all these people who came from México, or all these other countries and they're kind of dealing with the same things that we are – and so she's always drawing parallels with our lives, not necessarily like immigrants because not everybody in our class was. I hold her (the professor) really high in esteem – she makes you want to strive to do better'. (Stableton and Aleixo 2015, p. 267)

Suarez-Orozco's et al. (2015) nationwide research on improving the experience of undocumented undergraduate students provided student participants the opportunity to offer recommendations to help 2- and 4-year public and private college and universities create "undocufriendly" campuses. The ten recommendations they offered were:

1. Listen and learn
2. Train staff
3. Endorse publicly
4. Equitable treatment
5. Empathy
6. Respect privacy
7. Safe spaces
8. Information
9. Financial aid
10. Counseling (p. 449)

The overarching theme that emerged from these ten recommendations was the importance of recognizing and validating the presence of undocumented students

Fig. 3 Adie is a dreamer poster, 2017. (Image from the collection *Dreamer Stories: Portraits of American Dreamers* and courtesy of artist Pablo Stanley. Used with permission, <https://www.dreamerstories.com>)



and their challenges. Students suggested that faculty, staff, and administrators attend trainings on immigration laws and policies, related rallies/protest, community and campus student-led workshops and meetings, and attentively listening to the stories, concerns, and recommendations of students that are open about their status. Taking such steps can help demystify students' experiences and help eliminate stereotypes among school administrative leadership.

The second theme focused on resources. Students stressed the importance of having sympathetic and well-prepared staff and mental-health counselors, increase in available scholarships and workshops on changing immigration laws, policies, and financial aid options that affect them, as well as creating a safe space, or center, on campus where students can gather to support each other (Fig. 3).

Socially Responsible Bilingualities in Action

In the quest for documentation, higher education, legal status, and citizenship in the USA, undocumented students meet numerous allies in their schools and universities of study and in the greater civic community. Nonetheless, in their quest, youth

meet opposing forces and numerous barriers to gain access to basic services, including education, and citizenship. Wong et al. (2018) note the dramatic rise of both discrimination and attacks on US immigrant communities, including division and dehumanization, during times of upheaval and war with examples from World War I and World War II to the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. They argued:

The labeling of immigrants as “illegal” is a distortion and violation of their personhood and shared humanity. The discursive processes of representation into “us” and “them” serve to divide newer immigrants from people born in the USA and to divide working people who have the most to gain by uniting. Through the process of “othering,” dehumanization occurs (p. 4).

To challenge the dehumanization process and rhetoric, many undocumented youth engaged in social and political activism to tell their goals, plights, and stories as contributors to American society and how they challenge misrepresentation and marginalization. Their approach can be described as the practice of “socially responsible biliteracies” with bilingual versatility in English and an additional world language to challenge bigotry, dehumanization, and misrepresentation in the quest for higher education and US citizenship (Rodríguez 2017). In addition to knowing English, youth make use of additional world languages they know to communicate their concerns and to be heard in communities beyond their immediate one. Some of the world languages they put into practice to advance their stance and US citizenship goals include Arabic, Korean, Spanish, and Urdu, languages relevant to the US economy and global influence (New American Economy 2018).

As an example of socially responsible biliteracies in action, an immigrant youth activist named Ileri Unzueta organized young people to share solidarity and to bring public awareness about immigrants in plight and on the margin due to their citizenship status and limited access to public resources. Unzueta described her rhetorical literacies approach with a blend of ethos, logos, and pathos, and she shared one of her strategies as follows:

We started shouting. “No papers, no fear, immigrants are marching here!” And then alongside hundreds of people, we finally chanted loudly and proudly, “undocumented and unafraid, undocumented and unafraid!” (Muñoz 2015, p. 1)

The rhetorical literacies of undocumented youth seeking citizenship include various media to communicate their life narratives, ranging from the graphic, literary, and performing arts to social media and public campaigns, protest demonstrations, and messaging platforms. Their purpose is to inform the public about their everyday circumstances and to utilize various modes of persuasion to gain citizenship in US society (Caminero-Santangelo 2018; Vargas 2018). The socially responsible actions of the youth reflect efforts to sway public opinion in their favor and to reduce the mischaracterization that appears in articles, statements, and

photographs, which can malign them as criminal with the intent to cause greater civil disobedience and public unrest (Jordan 2017).

The most recent example maligning immigrant youth occurred during a White House meeting with local California officials on May 16, 2018. US President Donald Trump stated the following about populations of undocumented immigrants: “These aren’t people. These are animals” (McCarthy 2018). Such misleading rhetoric at the executive level of government further dehumanizes people in the USA seeking improved life chances and opportunities. In fact, it is a reminder of past and current US immigrants who become scapegoats and targets of violence and deportation as they lawfully seek citizenship and a democratic way of life via DACA and as DREAMers.

A growing body of literary works and criticism provide new ways of understanding and supporting undocumented youth and introduces perspectives not heard often in mainstream media and reflected in the US literary canon (Delacre 2017; Sánchez 2017; Rodríguez 2018). Contributions by artists and authors follow what Mahiri (2017) noticed about race, ethnicity, and immigration, including citizenship status, for “‘writing the wrongs’ of hierarchy and hypocrisy perpetuated by how these children are socially constructed in U.S. society” (p. 2). In the pursuit of higher education and US citizenship, Nicholls (2013) argued that DREAMer youth were also:

“coming out” and demanding that they be recognized as human beings who belonged in the country. They were “good” immigrants who deserved permanent residency status, but they were also human beings who had the right to a public and political life. No longer would they accept their fate silently. They were asserting their “right to have rights”: the right to have public existence in a country that had banished them to the shadows. (p. 1)

Families immigrate to the USA due to the instabilities created by an international superpower and other countries in the parts of the world that future US immigrants currently inhabit (Mignolo 2000). Vargas (2016) described his immigrant journey as follows:

I struggled with conflicting realities of belonging and exclusion and still do. My mother and I have not seen each other in person for over 20 years, not from deportation, but from an equally unyielding US immigration policy that prevented her, a single parent with limited means, from legally joining me in California when my grandfather smuggled me over from the Philippines at age twelve. I weathered the transition as best I could (pp.xi-xii).

Vargas’s perspectives about belonging, inclusion, and exclusion are prevalent in the life narratives of undocumented and underdocumented youth seeking citizenship and new conceptions of it in the USA. The challenges faced by youth are ongoing across the country and within their own families as well as in schools and civic communities as undocumented noncitizens.

Conclusion

Much of the research on undocumented students focuses on students' citizenship status and means of gaining greater participation in US society, such as through higher education and gainful employment (Perez 2009, 2012; Chang 2018). This is certainly the case with research on the conceptions of citizenship for undocumented students that includes various characteristics and legal dimensions, especially in the context of California. Both undocumented students and their allies continue to challenge conceptions of citizenship and obstructionist policies through activism, messaging, and policy changes as they face numerous barriers across in the executive, judicial, and legislative branches of government at local, state, and national levels. Their stories and dreams become more humanized and vivid as they are displayed via socially responsible biliteracies and in movement-led demonstrations and rallies held across the country. The rhetorical literacies of undocumented students permit bilingual messaging and increase public awareness about their plight and call for citizenship that is dignified, equitable, humane, and just.

Although youth struggle daily in gaining their civic identities and education, undocumented youth face uncertainty and stagnant policies that affect their social and emotional learning and participation. The quest for citizenship becomes a question about equity and justice in gaining legitimate proof and document-based evidence of deserving citizenship as Nicholls (2013) argued. The research shows the positive aspects of citizenship for undocumented youth is strongly focused on their contributions to the greater good and to "establish a more perfect union" and to "promote the general welfare" as written in the Preamble (1787) to the US Constitution. The legal dimensions of gaining citizenship are called into action via artifacts that include undocumented students' inalienable rights and rulings that include state law and the US Supreme Court. To further elaborate on Chang's (2018) "hyperdocumentation" argument, the state guarding its citizenship and students seeking citizenship must produce documentation leading to full rights as citizens.

A positive institutional approach to providing access to higher learning for undocumented youth occurred through in-state tuition and also through additional academic advising and counseling for students who are undocumented in many states across the country. Furthermore, the emphasis on social activism and rhetorical biliteracies of undocumented youth for a public voice and to change public opinion gained greater momentum in recent years in higher education settings and state legislatures. Future research may benefit from an increased focus on how undocumented youth are influencing definitions of citizenship, the adoption of socially responsible biliteracies, and the manifestations of becoming a citizen in the USA and in state of increased incarceration, obstruction, surveillance, and xenophobia.

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Informal Educational Infrastructure: Citizenship Formation, Informal Education, and Youth Work Practice

47

Ben Arnold Lohmeyer

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Abstract

This chapter examines the literature surrounding Informal Education and Youth Work, discussing the implications for citizenship of the “educational infrastructure” (Jeffs and Smith, *Informal education: conversation, democracy and learning*. Educational Heretics Press, Nottingham, 2005) within social services. The chapter introduces the principles of Informal Education and how it has influenced the development of Youth Work practice in Australia. As an educational infrastructure, Informal Education is located on the “Structural” (Wong, *Youth Stud. Aust.* 23: 10–16, 2004) end of the Youth Work practice spectrum. This location has implications for the formation and participation of young people into active citizenship within Youth Work practice. This chapter highlights tensions within the Youth Work literature around young people’s democratic rights and participation. Furthermore, this chapter considers the potential for the principles of Informal Education to enhance the emancipatory goals of Structural Youth

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Work practice. The chapter concludes with a brief example of the implementation of Informal Education in the Australian Youth Work context.

Keywords

Youth Work · Informal Education · Democracy · Dialogue · Rights · Participation

Introduction

Jeffs and Smith (2005) argue that “democratic systems require an educational infrastructure” (44). Education is essential, they argue, for forming knowledgeable and committed citizens who can debate issues and select suitable representatives. However, a significant amount of learning takes place outside of formal education settings. Furthermore, in 1950, Marshall proposed a three-part model of citizenship. The three elements were civic, political, and social citizenship. He argued, “education systems and social services” are the “institutions most closely connected” with the social element of citizenship which should ensure the ability to “live the life of a civilized being” (Marshall 1950, 11). This chapter provides an overview of the “educational infrastructure” within Youth Work practice outside and alongside the formal education system, that is, through Informal Education. Informal Education is underpinned by Paulo Freire’s critique of the “banking model of education” (2005, 72) and, as will be explored in this chapter, has implications for the formation of young people into active democratic citizens. It should be noted from the outset that there is debate surrounding an exact definition of Informal Education. A useful starting point for this chapter is to think of Informal Education as “the learning that flows from the conversation and activities involved in being members of youth and community groups and the like” (Jeffs and Smith 2005, 5).

This chapter introduces the principles of Informal Education and how it has influenced Youth Work practice. As an educational infrastructure, Informal Education is aligned with the “Structural” (Wong 2004) end of the Youth Work practice spectrum. This alignment has implications for citizenship formation within Youth Work. Youth Work continues to be a profession with flexible professional boundaries (White et al. 1991). Historically, youth workers have leaned away from imposing boundaries regarding practices that are, and are not, Youth Work (White et al. 1991). Furthermore, Youth Work has been slow to professionalize, with some practitioners and academics arguing professionalization risks the problems of regulation and exacerbating power asymmetries between young people and youth workers (Quixley and Doostkhah 2007).

Despite the diversity of Youth Work practice, Informal Education is a framework that has had international influence. This framework encourages young people’s active participation in democratic dialogue and approaches young people as full and capable citizens (Jeffs and Smith 2005; Batsleer 2008). However, the blurry and contextual boundaries of Youth Work also allow space for paternalistic practices which position young people as risky, incapable, and not yet citizens (Bessant 2011).

Furthermore, the influence of neoliberal social policy in countries like Australia further positions young people in these deficit terms (Brennan 2009; Lohmeyer 2017b).

The implications of Informal Education in Youth Work for young people's participation and citizenship formation will be explored in this chapter by first providing an overview of the boundaries and tensions within Youth Work and its distinction from the teaching profession. Following this is an introduction of Informal Education as a practice of intentional conversation without a set curriculum with the distinct purpose of developing critical consciousness. Subsequently, the implications of this educative practice for citizenship formation within Youth Work will be discussed. Finally, this chapter concludes by considering the current application of Informal Education in Youth Work in the context of the modern Australian neoliberal social policy landscape.

Youth Work: Boundaries and Tensions

The exact boundaries of Youth Work – as a distinct professional practice – are blurry and contested. Youth Work practice varies between international and national contexts. For example, Australia currently has (at least) three different Youth Work professional associations and codes of ethics operating in six different states, with one state holding an antiprofessionalization position. The variance within Youth Work ethics and practice has implications for young people's citizen formation and democratic participation. White, Omelczuk et al. (1991) argue that the diversity in Youth Work practice is in part because of the historical development of the work and a disinclination to define who is and who is not involved in Youth Work. Bessant (2011) agrees that the straightforward answer to “what is youth work?” (52) (i.e., those who work with young people) is not as straightforward as it seems. Not least among the concerns with a simplistic answer to this question is the long-standing sociological debate regarding who should be included in the socially, politically, and biologically mediated period called “youth” (White et al. 1991; Wyn and White 1997; White and Wyn 2011; Nilan 2015). In spite of the complexity of the category “youth,” White et al. (1991) suggest that Youth Work can be defined by firstly identifying the target group (young people); secondly, describing the specific ways of working with young people (content of practice); and thirdly, defining the self-identity of practitioners (the consciousness of a specific field of practice). This approach to defining Youth Work aligns with a definition offered by Sercombe:

Youth work is a professional relationship in which the young person is engaged as the primary client in their social context. (Sercombe 2010, 27)

In this definition, it is possible to broadly identify the target group (young people), the way of working (through relationship), and the identity of the practitioner (as a professional). However, this definition is not prescriptive about the way of working with young people. The vagueness of working through “relationships” allows space

for a range of practices including Informal Education. Furthermore, this definition allows space for a range of contexts in which Informal Education and Youth Work takes place including refugee or indigenous services, disability support, legal services, casework, employment, training, community development, and recreation services (Bessant 2011). Jeffs and Smith (2005) argue that this diverse range of services makes up the broader educational infrastructure required for democracy.

In contrast to Sercombe's definition of Youth Work, other attempts to define the profession do not fit as well with the formula offered by White, Omelczuk, and Underwood. Martin (2002) defines the distinction between Youth Work and other professions that work with young people in this way:

Other professionals will build a relationship in order to effectively deliver a service. A youth worker will offer a service in order to build a relationship. (Martin 2002, 15)

Martin makes a distinction between Youth Work and other professionals who work with young people. However, Martin's definition does not fit White, Omelczuk, and Underwood's formula. The target group (young people) in Martin's distinction is present in the broader context of his writing. Martin's emphasis on the relationality of the work leaves considerable space for variations in practice. Finally, this definition does not prescribe a professional identity for youth workers. However, one thing is clear in Martin's definition, not all professionals who work with young people are youth workers. Youth Work requires prioritization of the relationship between the youth worker and the young person. This definition of Youth Work makes a clear distinction between youth workers, who might utilize principles of Informal Education, and teachers in formal educational roles. Corney (2010) states that there are tensions between the pedagogical and ideological approach of youth workers and teachers. Corney identifies a range of areas in which these professions are at odds. Critically important is the notion of "primary client" and a distinction between teaching as "formal education" with a set curriculum and Youth Work as "informal education" without a set curriculum (Corney 2010, 298–304).

The Fairbridge Code of Youth Work Ethics, an influential code in the Australian context, describes this commitment to prioritizing the relationship with the young person as a commitment to "primary client."

Many people working in the youth field do not recognize the young person as their primary client, but see them as one of many stakeholders. That's okay; it just means they are not a youth worker. (Youth Affairs Council of Western Australia 2003, 4)

This prioritization of primary client and the contrast between formal and informal education provides some clarity around the boundaries of Youth Work. Corney (2004) also points out that some youth workers in schools operate out of a welfare model which focuses on making the young people fit into the mainstream education, "rather than changing or reforming the school itself" (299). Corney (2004) is highlighting two contrasting practice modalities in Youth Work. Wong (2004)

describes these two distinct approaches to Youth Work as (1) Personal Youth Work and (2) Structural Youth Work.

Wong defines Personal Youth Work as an approach that ultimately is focused on transforming the young person. Personal Youth Work is about providing young people with the skills and knowledge to fit into mainstream society. In contrast, Structural Youth Work is focused on engaging with young people to transform society. This approach is interested in supporting young people to take control and make decisions about things that affect them (Wong 2004). The principles of Informal Education align with the Structural Youth Work paradigm.

Informal Education

Informal Education is often contrasted with formal education. Formal education takes place in schools, colleges, and universities and usually involves a prescribed curriculum, a nominated teacher, and results in a formal qualification (Sapin 2013). In traditional classrooms, the teacher provides information through a monologue and students are required to remember this information and then repeat it back in a formal assessment process (Batsleer 2008). Paulo Freire described this kind of education as a “banking model of education” (2005, 72) in his groundbreaking work *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. Freire argues that in this model the learner is required to file and store information and as such is robbed of the opportunity to “become collectors or cataloguers” (2005, 72) of knowledge. Furthermore, he argues that this model also sacrifices the learner’s creativity, the possibility for personal and social transformation, and ultimately their humanity.

Freire offers a “problem-posing” alternative which has come to inspire the modern concept of Informal Education (Beck and Purcell 2010, 28). Freire (2005) describes a process of “conscientization” (65) whereby the learner and teacher participate in a dialogue about social structures to raise their collective level of critical consciousness.

In problem-posing education, people develop their power to perceive critically the way they exist in the world with which and in which they find themselves; they come to see the world not as a static reality, but as a reality in process, in transformation. (Freire 2005, 83)

Beck and Purcell (2010) describe Freire’s problem-posing education as a process of “questioning answers rather than merely answering questions” (80). It is a mutual conversation or dialogue around “generative themes” (Freire 2005, 105). Generative themes are ideas of “immediate significance” that guide conversation because they have a “life-giving” (Batsleer 2008, 8) quality. Both the learner and educator engage in the conversation voluntarily because it is relevant to their lives.

This problem-posing conversation can take place in a formal education setting (Jeffs and Smith 1997, 2005, 2011). However, it is most likely to take place spontaneously in informal settings and without a set curriculum (Jeffs and Smith 1997, 2005, 2011). Jeffs and Smith (1997, 2005, 2011) argue that the problem-

posing conversation is driven by “being with others.” This conversation is not task driven but emerges through responding to feelings, experiences, and relationships. Informal Education can be utilized by professionals such as teachers, nurses, or social workers but is likely to take place at the margins of their central activity (Batsleer 2008). Batsleer (2008) argues that professional informal educators are unlikely to have a job title that reflects this profession and instead are likely to have a title associated with their client group or project. These titles might include Youth or Community Worker, as well as Arts, Sports or Health Development Worker (Sapin 2013). These kinds of roles can be designed to achieve a range of social, physical, and emotional outcomes. However, Jeffs and Smith (2005) point out that there is always a larger purpose to their work. The larger purpose of Informal Education is “fostering democracy and enabling people to live a life worth living” (Jeffs and Smith 2005, 7). Jeffs and Smith’s emphasis here reflects the underpinning Freirean (2005) principles which conceptualize education as ideally a humanizing and participatory process.

Informal Education has – at its center – the aims of developing participatory and democratic educative relationships between educators and learners. Corney (2010) argues that informal educators “work with people – not for them, let alone on them” (301). Informal educators are “facilitators of learning” (Batsleer 2008, 5) enabling people to become “creators not consumers of their society and their world” (12). Informal Education is a conversational learning process that democratically engages participants as active and capable citizens to change their world.

There is contestation regarding the term Informal Education and other similar terms including formal education, nonformal education, and informal learning. Sapin (2013) describes informal *learning* as “unintentional learning from life’s experiences” (243). Informal *learning* is distinct from informal *education*, as informal learning happens “without being consciously organized” (Jeffs and Smith 2005, 8). Jeffs and Smith (2005) go on to add “incidental learning” and “self-education” as parallel processes that occur spontaneously alongside informal learning (9). They argue informal educators are interested in these processes, which are a starting point for conversation and further exploration but are not the same thing as Informal Education. Coombs and Ahmed (1973) define nonformal education as an “organized, systematic, educational activity” (8) that takes place outside of a formal education system. While nonformal education occurs outside the formal education system, it is still driven by an organized curriculum, making it distinct from the curriculum-free informal education. However, Coombs and Ahmed’s definition of informal education does not make a distinction between it and informal learning.

In contrast to Jeffs and Smith, Coombs and Ahmed consider informal education as simply any learning that occurs outside of formal and nonformal education settings. Even when these ideas are carefully defined, they can still overlap in practice. For example, formal education could incorporate (at least at the margins) elements of informal learning and informal education, but not Coombs and Ahmed’s definition of nonformal education. Coombs and Ahmed’s definition of nonformal education logically could include practices from Jeffs and Smith’s understanding of informal learning and Informal Education, but not formal education. Informal

Education as defined by Sapin can occur in any of these spaces but has a distinct purpose. Likewise, informal learning can happen continually. Despite the complexity here, there are three important points of distinction. The first distinguishes between learning in a formal or informal setting. The second identifies the role of a curriculum as the driver (or not) of learning. The third differentiates between spontaneous or intentional learning. In general, learning occurs from Informal Education outside of the formal system, without a set curriculum, but is intentional.

In addition to the overlapping terms in-/nonformal education/learning, there is a range of terms used to describe essentially the same practice (Informal Education) in different global contexts. In the UK, Informal Education can be referred to as “community education,” “community learning,” or “popular education” (Batsleer 2008, 1). Popular education is the preferred term utilized in South America (Batsleer 2008; Beck and Purcell 2010). In other parts of Europe, this practice has been referred to as social pedagogy or “animation” (Jeffs and Smith 2005, 6). Still in other contexts, Informal Education is referred to as “life-long learning” (European Commission and Council of Europe 2011; European Commission 2015).

There are likely to be nuances and minor variations in principles and practices between these different terms. Moreover, these differences are likely to reflect local and national contexts. Academics, policymakers, and practitioners need to be conscious of the variation in language and seek to understand the underpinning principles and practices. To summarize, Informal Education in this chapter refers to the practice of engaging in democratic dialogue without a set curriculum, to develop critical consciousness and to pursue a more just and peaceful world.

Citizenship Formation and Democratic Participation in Youth Work

Central to Structural Youth Work and to Informal Education is a commitment to democratic participation and valuing young people as active capable citizens. Jeffs and Smith (2005) articulate this commitment to democracy as being built on the foundational belief that all human beings have the right to self-govern and that, in turn, Informal Education “fosters democracy through experiencing it” (95). Hence, Jeffs and Smith (2005) argue that Informal Education is underpinned by explicit values: respect for persons, the promotion of well-being, truth, democracy, fairness and equality.

Discussion about young people’s right to democratic participation commonly starts with the United Nation’s Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) (UNCRC) (Batsleer 2008; Harris 2009; White 2010; White and Wyn 2011; Fox 2013). The articles of the UNCRC enshrine particular rights for young people to participate in civic life. Article 12 describes the young person’s right to participate in decisions which affect them, and Article 29 defines the right to education. Harris (2009) argues that the UNCRC was drafted and ratified after a growing interest in youth participation in the 1970s and 1980s. She goes on to describe a shift in the following decade from youth *participation* to youth *citizenship*, which stressed the

development of “civic and political knowledge and responsibilities” (302). Finally, Harris describes a further shift in the 2000s where *civic engagement* became the new focus.

The shift from youth *participation* to *citizenship* then to *engagement* has implications for educational practices like Youth Work. For example, Van de Walle et al. (2011) argued that at times “participation” in Youth Work practice (e.g., young people participating in recreational or educational activities) has represented “a marker of cultural aptitude” (224), rather than practices that promote young people’s control in decision-making processes. Van de Walle et al. (2011) are referring to a divergence between two types of Youth Work in the Flemish context post-WWII. One approach focused on promoting participation in recreational pursuits, while the other was focused on young people’s political participation. The former, they argue, was driven by the concerns of the middle class and a desire to prepare young people for “entering the real world” (224). White and Wyn (2011) point out that citizenship is regularly taught in schools as a means to prepare young people with the “skills and understandings they will need in the future as citizens” (109). This approach tends to focus on the civil and political element of citizenship that involves the activities of voting and compliance with the law.

Practices that focus on educating young people for compliance and voting processes position them as “not-yet-adult[s]” (Tait 1993; Wyn and White 1997; Sercombe 2010; White and Wyn 2011). Fox (2013) argues that the shift from youth *participation* towards youth *engagement* reflects the attempt to “train” (987) young people and to ensure they have the appropriate “skills” (987) to be the right kind of citizens. The right kind of citizen, Fox argues, embodies the behaviors and values that “society wants” (987) and who do not challenge the status quo.

White and Wyn (2011) critique citizenship education in schools on the basis that it overlooks the third element of Marshall’s (1950) model: social citizenship. However, Marshall also states that children are by definition not citizens. He asserts that children have the right to education “because the aim of education during childhood is to shape the future adult” (Marshall 1950, 25). In contrast, Hannam (2000) describes this kind of citizenship education as being like “reading brochures in prison.”

Unless you are about to be let out or escape, [it’s] quite frustrating and seem[s] pointless. (Hannam 2000, quoted in White and Wyn 2011, 109).

The issue here is summed up in what White and Wyn (2011) describe as the “futurity” of youth (105). This approach values young people as future citizens and “ignores the important role that young people play in society – as youth” (117). In contrast, Structural Youth Work and Informal Education explicitly approach young people with the intention to value their current contribution (Bamber and Murphy 1999; Cooper 2012).

Alongside the UNCRC, the case for young people’s civic participation is built on a broad understanding of citizenship. As mentioned above, Marshall’s (1950) model describes citizenship as containing three elements: civil, political, and social. The

civil element describes the rights of an individual (i.e., legal rights). The political component refers to participation in political processes (i.e., voting). The social element refers to a broad range of “social heritage” (11) in the life of social beings. These three elements are also discernible in the description of citizenship offered by Peterson and Brock (2017) as legal membership which endows rights and responsibilities within a political state.

These broad conceptualizations of citizenship underpin Structural Youth Work and Informal Education. However, broad definitions also raise questions about education for, and lived experience of, citizenship. Coady (2015) argues that historically the “two most important criteria for citizenship in the modern state were being male and being adult” (380). Particular social groups have historically been excluded based on perceived incompetence and vulnerability. Some groups have challenged their exclusion (i.e., women and indigenous groups). However, children are still excluded from formal politics (Coady 2015; Smith 2015). Coady (2015) describes narrow conceptualizations of citizenship as “identification” (378) models. She goes on to argue for an alternative broader “participation” (378) model of citizenship. Within an identification model, citizenship is attached to association with a particular country. Coady argues that citizens are guaranteed protection (rights) within a country’s legal system, but not necessarily participation. Participation, she argues, is only offered if the citizen can fulfill certain responsibilities. Thus, young people under the age of responsibility (typically 18 years in western countries like Australia) are protected under the law but deemed ineligible to participate in the formation of law (i.e., voting).

Structural Youth Work and Informal Education attempt to enable a full citizenship experience for young people by “embod(ing) the fundamental values of democracy, justice and equality” (Bamber and Murphy 1999, 227–28). As mentioned above, the process of dialogue in Informal Education where teachers and students engage as equals “fosters democracy through experiencing it” (Jeffs and Smith 2005, 95). Furthermore, Corney (2010) describes the well documented links (Azzopardo 1998; Stacey 2001; Corney 2004) between Paulo Freire’s concept “conscientization” (2005, 65) and what he describes as “empowering” (Corney 2010, 299) models of Youth Work.

Despite the similarities between Structural Youth Work and Informal Education, Batsleer (2008) points out that some youth workers have turned away from using Informal Education as a model for practice as a result of the association with *empowerment*. Empowerment as a principle for Informal Education in Youth Work implies a disempowered a-priori state for young people (Batsleer 2008; Lohmeyer 2017a). Batsleer (2008) argues that this reflects understandings of empowerment and the concept “knowledge is power” (9) as something akin to “qualifications give access to status” (9). Furthermore, she argues that in social and health services empowerment has on occasion been reduced to simply representing “consumer choice” (9). This focus on choice and the acquisition of power, she argues, is a misunderstanding of the complexity of power dynamics and a loss of the “democratic and collective moorings” (9) of Informal Education and citizenship.

In contrast, Batsleer (2008), as well as Beck and Purcell (2010), defends the use of the term empowerment in Informal Education and Youth Work practice. They draw on the Foucauldian conception of “power-knowledge” (Foucault 1979, 2000, 2008) in which power is not something that is held but rather is a feature of relationships. Batsleer (2008) argues that in democratic dialogue between equal citizens “sparks fly in conversation and understandings shift and change” (9). On this view, Informal Education is a mutual conversation between equals, through which both parties learn from each other (Jeffs and Smith 2005; Batsleer 2008; Beck and Purcell 2010). In the context of a mutual conversation between equals, empowerment makes little sense as the outcome of transferring power or knowledge from the teacher to the student. Instead, empowerment might be conceived as a process through which all participants become more cognizant of the operations of power-knowledge.

A central shared principle within Informal Education and Structural Youth Work is the valuing of young people as citizens with rights and the capacity to contribute, in part, because they are young. This shared principle is informed by the history of rights of the child and a broader conception of citizenship that includes civil, political, and social rights. In this view, education is less a process of forming future citizens and more an experience of citizenships and democratic participation. Citizenship formation occurs in Youth Work through equal participation in democratic and educative processes, rather than citizenship representing an outcome of compulsory education.

Informal Education in Australian Youth Work

Informal Education has been primarily influential in Youth Work in the UK and Nordic countries. The influence of Informal Education in Australia has been much less. In particular, Informal Education has been prominent in both the UK and in Nordic countries in the form of “detached” Youth Work. *Detached* Youth Work broadly represents work that is conducted on the street or other locations where youth workers meet young people where they are rather than requiring young people to come to a youth service/center (Beck and Purcell 2010; Sapin 2013). Informal Education also underpins the “youth club,” a drop-in style recreation-based one-stop-shop (Kiilakoski and Kivijärvi 2015; Hart 2016). Both detached Youth Work and the youth club have an emphasis on less formal interaction with young people through recreational pursuits and a commitment to more radical and critical forms of Youth Work (Beck and Purcell 2010). This view is contested. As Forkby and Kiilakoski (2014) have argued, the youth club is a product of social policy. Kiilakoski and Kivijärvi (2015) argue that it is important to remember that the youth club has its origins in the welfare state. As such the youth club can be understood as an instrument of citizenship formation (i.e., developing skills and knowledge), but also at the same time, a means for a critical social educational practice (Forkby and Kiilakoski 2014).

In Australia, Youth Work is heavily influenced by the country's colonial legacy (Bessant 2011). As a result, Bessant (2011) argues that there has been greater emphasis on "child saving practices" (54) and welfare models of intervention (White et al. 1991). Youth services in the 1970s and 1980s were primarily funded and staffed by religious organizations (Bessant 2011). Staff were mostly untrained volunteers who were motivated by religious moralities or a sense of altruism. During the 1980s, there was a shift towards formal qualifications for youth workers and formal funding arrangements between governments and non-government agencies (Sercombe 2004). This shift in funding was arguably the result of the broader transformation of government from the welfare state to the neoliberal state.

Before the modern influence of neoliberalism, in the wake of World War II, countries like Australia began providing support to families in light of the "complexity of modern life [which] exceeded the capacity of the family . . . to remedy social problems" (Fawcett et al. 2010, 16). However, Fawcett et al. (2010) contend that countries like Australia, UK, Canada, and New Zealand are typically classified as "liberal welfare regime[s]" (17) as their welfare systems are designed to preference market solutions and only intervene when the family and market breaks down. This approach contrasts "social-democratic welfare regimes" in which welfare is "coupled to citizen's rights" (17). Fawcett et al. (2010) argue that Nordic countries provide social entitlements to all citizens, rather than interventions based only on "demonstrated need" (17). However, Fawcett et al. (2010) also argue that Australia is "exceptional" in that it could better be described as a "radical fourth world of welfare capitalism" (17) due to the degree of marketization of welfare services driven by the desire to reduce costs to the taxpayer. Australia's prioritization of market solutions to ensure "maximum services" at "minimum cost to the taxpayer" (17) is an exemplar of neoliberal welfare service provision.

Following the tenants of neoliberal policy, governments in Australia (as elsewhere) have moved from being the "provider of services to a purchaser of services" (Healy 2009, 402). In this neoliberal context, to be competitive in a marketplace of service providers contesting for government grants (Skelcher 2000; Roberts and Devine 2003), youth service providers increasingly promise to do more for less (Lohmeyer 2018). For some, this leads to a situation in which efficiency is prioritized over justice, participation, and equity (Skelcher 2000; Taylor 2000; Lohmeyer 2018). As a result, young people are not encouraged to participate as equals in decision-making processes as they would be in Informal Education and Structural Youth Work. Under neoliberal social and education policy, teaching and Youth Work become practices that produce "future economic citizen[s]" (Brennan 2009, 355). Structural Youth Work practice and Informal Education are squeezed out in a climate of "methodological pragmatism (what works)" (Taylor 2000, 48).

Wilkins (2018) provides a detailed discursive analysis of neoliberalism, citizenship, and education describing the influence of neoliberalism as a "form of government" (4) and the resulting reorganization of welfare in Western social democratic countries. A prime example of this reorganization of welfare and social services through neoliberal principles in Australia is the "Youthpass" program. Piloted in Victoria (Australia) in 2016 Youthpass is a European Informal Education strategy

“for recognition and validation of nonformal learning that takes place in the youth work context” (2018). Youthpass was the keynote attraction at the Victorian Youth Workers’ Association 2016 conference “Youth Work & Non-Formal Education: Evidencing Outcomes for Young People” (Youth Workers’ Association 2018), and Youthpass continues to feature as the example of Informal Education in Youth Work in Australia by the Youth Workers’ Association (2018). Underpinned by the principles of Informal Education, Youthpass is designed around eight key competencies that support “personal fulfillment, social inclusion, active citizenship and employment” (2018). Regarding language, competence is defined as developing “knowledge, skills, and attitudes” (2018). By mixing the language of Informal Education, informal learning, and nonformal learning, as well as promoting the value of the program through assessable outcomes, Youthpass represents a mix of Structural Youth Work, Personal Youth Work, and Informal Education. Also emerging in the mix of language is a justification of the program within the neoliberal social policy context through its capacity to fulfill accredited education and employment outcomes.

As a result of the need to justify the program’s outcomes in terms of the neoliberal education/employment agenda, the Youthpass citizenship education program arguably fits better in Harris’ (2009) “engagement” model of citizenship, rather than the “participation” model. The program is ultimately justified by equipping young people with the right skills to engage with modern society, rather than being targeted towards enabling young people’s participation and control over decision-making processes and social life. This education infrastructure shapes young people into a particular type of citizen. Youthpass might not be essentially neoliberal, but the policy context places pressure on youth services to compromise on core principles in favor of outcomes that are valued by neoliberal funding arrangements. The funding of youth services under neoliberal social policy prioritizes economic engagement over empowerment and participation. As described by Van de Walle et al. (2011), Structural Youth Work, such as Informal Education, enables young people’s social and civic emancipation “precisely because it [does] not have to focus on (economic) outcomes” (226). In contrast, the strain on youth services to conform to neoliberal discourses is visible in the attempt to justify Youthpass through education and employment outcomes.

Conclusion

This chapter has provided an overview of the influences of Informal Education on Youth Work practice and considered the implications of education systems and social services for the promotion of citizenship and civic life. Youth Work is an important feature of the “educational infrastructure” (Jeffs and Smith 2005, 44) that enables young people’s participation in democracy. The principles and practices that make Youth Work distinct from other professions that work with young people locate it outside of the formal education system. While youth workers may work in or alongside schools, their practices are likely to be informed by the principles of

Informal Education. Informal Education has an explicit values orientation, and this highlights tensions within Youth Work practice that have implications for the citizenship formation and democratic participation of young people.

Youth Work that is informed by Informal Education is aligned with a “Structural Youth Work” (Wong 2004) paradigm. This kind of Youth Work approaches young people as capable and active citizens who have something valuable to contribute *now* and *because they are young*. However, not all Youth Work is practiced this way. Youth Work, particularly in Australia, is shaped by neoliberal social policy, by Australia’s colonial legacy, child saving practices, and by the need to “protect” young people who are vulnerable or at risk. These social, historical, and political realities continue to present challenges for citizenship formation and participation in educational and social services. Nonetheless, practices like Informal Education, which draw on broad and participatory conceptions of citizenship, create space for youth workers to resist exclusionary and economically driven citizenship models. Young people can be engaged in citizenship formation as co-learners through democratic dialogue in the pursuit of critical consciousness and a more just and peaceful world.

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The Development of Civic Participation Among Youth in Singapore

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Jasmine B.-Y. Sim and Lee-Tat Chow

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Abstract

The development of active participation in citizens hallmarks the endeavor of formal citizenship programs, equipping citizens with the relevant knowledge, skills, and values to participate in their communities. Such attempts to formulate an ideal citizenry are especially apparent in Singapore, a small city-state whose success owes much to the role that formal citizenship education played and continues to play as an instrument of state formation. This chapter will discuss the development of youth participation in Singapore, specifically within the education context, and more generally among the youth. We will trace how the Singapore government has carefully molded what began as a politically bustling

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arena of activism among youths during the pre-independence era into a pervasively depoliticized understanding of participation in Singapore's young citizenry today. We highlight how several key aspects of education in Singapore – namely, National Education, the Community Involvement Program, Character and Citizenship Education, and the Values in Action initiatives – have attended to civic participation in reformulating the notion of an ideal citizen. Finally, we will briefly discuss the shift in civic participation brought about by the New Media Age in more recent times.

Keywords

Civic participation · Active participation · Youth activism · Citizenship education · Singapore

Introduction

The phase of youth marks a definitive stage in a person's development, a time when young people seek a sense of purpose, exploring identities, causes, beliefs, and commitments and connecting with like-minded others in organizations or social groups (Erikson 1968). In this exploratory phase, youths' political ideologies are passionately formed and pursued – a period most ripe for the birth of activists who strive for social change (Flanagan and Levine 2010).

However, the habit of active participation in youths does not occur as a matter of course; more often than not, it is contingent on youths' exposure to multiple perspectives, as well as feeling impelled to address and take a stand on social issues they believe in (Flanagan 2009). The exploration of multiple perspectives and development of motivation for civic participation, in turn, requires political space for youths to contest for change. In Singapore, which is a constitutionally democratic society, these conditions – especially the availability of political space – may not be present as the authorities increasingly proscribe the space for young Singaporean's active engagement in society, as will be discussed in this chapter (Huang 2006; Zhang 2013). Cherian George, a former journalist with *The Straits Times*, Singapore's mainstream newspaper, and now Professor of Journalism in Hong Kong, wrote “[w]inter is here” (George 2017, p. 58). George argued that since the 2011 general election, a chill has descended on political debate in Singapore, and dealings by the government with the press, the Internet, academia, the arts, and civil society have shown signs of tightening.

Since Singapore's independence in 1965, the People's Action Party (PAP) has been the ruling party governing the nation. In less than three decades, Singapore was transformed from an economically developing to an economically developed country, with its citizens enjoying one of the highest standards of living in the world (Lee 2000). This success owes much to the deployment of education as the primary instrument for state formation. Through education, the PAP government (henceforth, referred to as the government) has not only trained a technically adept citizenry for

economic development but, more significantly, a citizenry that is inculcated with a common sense of identity, committed in attitude and motivation for national development (Gopinathan 2007; Green 1997). Indeed, the government often reminds its citizens of the roles they need to play in order to sustain the country's stability and survival (Chan 1971; Gopinathan 2007; Han 2007; Hill and Lian 1995). To this end, participation in Singapore's context largely emphasizes the practice of consensual politics among its citizens; "active participation" is depoliticized and reduced to grassroots volunteerism, or alternatively, providing feedback to the authorities for the purposes of fine-tuning pre-existing policy initiatives (George 2017; Goh 1979; Ho 2000; Sim 2011). However, youth participation in Singapore did not start out depoliticized in nature; the 1950s to 1970s was marked by fervent and political student activism; it was through the governments' subsequent efforts to reshape civic participation that the latter took on a depoliticized nature. As Lee Kuan Yew, the first Prime Minister of Singapore, once remarked:

The two factors in the formative influences of a young man or a young woman's life are the home and the school. We cannot do very much about the home, *but we can do something about the school.* (Lee 1966, p. 1)

As with states around the world, education is not neutral, often designed and utilized to direct its citizens toward particular agendas. In Singapore, the mission of the education service is "to mould the future of the nation by moulding the people who will determine the future of the nation" (MoE 2018, n.p.). This chapter traces the development of youth participation in Singapore, specifically within the education context, and more generally among the youth. We discuss several key aspects of education that attend to participation, namely, National Education, the Community Involvement Program, Character and Citizenship Education, and the Values in Action initiatives. Through these discussions – by drawing on existing research – we wish to highlight that the survivalist rhetoric which frames youth participation in Singapore, while containing positive social and educational consequences (e.g., greater social cohesion in a multiracial society), does not hold the democratic principles adequately with its depoliticized rendering of civic participation for youths. In this chapter, we use youth participation and civic participation interchangeably and broadly to mean the same thing.

What Is Civic Participation?

The active participation of citizens is crucial to the sustenance of a healthy democratic society. A recurring consensus among scholars settles on the importance of an active citizenry and the need for civic education to equip citizens with the relevant knowledge, skills, and values to participate in their communities (Hahn 1998; Torney-Purta et al. 2001; Parker 2003). However, with disagreements in the academic literature about what a good citizen actually *is*, the ways in which civic participation is understood and what it ought to be remain a contested issue (Davies

2010). To further complicate matters, the term civic participation casts a broad net over a large range of meanings, encompassing a variety of goals, values, behaviors, attitudes, actions, knowledges, and motivations (Brady et al. 2012; Checkoway 2010; Youniss et al. 2002). Some conceptual clarification on the subject of civic participation is thus necessary.

Fundamentally, a conceptual schism can be traced in the debates between the ways in conceiving civic participation as political or non-political, along with the normative claims attributed to them. Proponents of non-political participation tend to conceive civic participation as nurturing youths to become active citizens by serving the community, especially through volunteerism, emphasizing the need to sustain social harmony and loyalty to the community. On the other hand, proponents of political participation stress the importance of a critical citizenry, actively involved in the political processes of a democratic society, emphasizing the need to challenge the status quo and address social injustices at a structural level. It should, however, be noted at the outset that this distinction is never so simple nor binary in reality (Ishizawa 2015). For instance, non-political participation can lead to indirect political socialization (Youniss et al. 2002) or serve as a catalyst in eliciting skepticism and dialogue (Pykett 2010). What we hope to accomplish with this distinction is to provide a conceptual road map that emphasizes the main aspects of civic participation and utilize it as a context for tracing the development of participation among youth in Singapore.

Non-political Participation

Westheimer and Kahne (2004) conceive the personally responsible citizen as one who behaves responsibly by contributing to society through individualized rather than collective efforts. Typical instances of participation for these citizens include “picking up litter, giving blood, recycling, obeying laws, and staying out of debt,” as well as participating in volunteer efforts such as charity drives for the underprivileged (p. 241). Akin to the personally responsible citizen, Westheimer and Kahne observe, is the participatory citizen who goes a step further by initiating and coordinating collective- and community-based efforts. Where personally responsible citizens participate in charity drives, participatory citizens organize them.

Between these two types of citizens, the participatory citizen constitutes a definitive goal for many citizenship youth programs and education policies. Driven by the agenda of fostering greater connection between youths and their communities, the production of participatory citizens is commonly identified as a remedy to an increasingly individualized society, by “[forging] a sense of belonging among young people to something wider than their individual selves” (Brady et al. 2012, p. 13). Active civic participation in this sense stresses the need for youths to be instilled with care and concern toward the community, manifesting typically through community service. Here, active “participation” is non-political to the extent that it operates at the level of “personal lives and local communities” while eschewing attention toward deeper power structures (Boyte 1997).

Non-political civic participation thus places emphasis on developing the characters of its citizens. This form of participation conceives the need for change on an individual rather than structural level, pinning social problems to the shortcomings in individuals' characters (Westheimer and Kahne 2004). In this sense, social problems – including a lack of social engagement – are reduced to deriving from deficits in individual character. In turn, resolutions are sought through the shaping of individual characters via the inculcation of desirable knowledges and values. Notably, this approach often operates within the norms of the community, enacting prevailing values that are "...common sense, unarticulated and often unchallenged. . ." (Buire and Staeheli 2017, p. 176; Pykett 2010).

In such cases, the prevailing norms and values of the community constitute a dominant narrative. Knowledge is conceived to be objective, where the learning process for youths involves an assimilation into a "correct" stream of knowledge (Westheimer and Kahne 2004). Youths are viewed with a "deficit" mentality that does not treat them as resources until they reflect the prevailing values of society (Brady et al. 2012; Harris et al. 2010).

Political Participation

In theorizing about acts, Isin (2008) distinguishes between activist citizens and active citizens; while the former "engage in writing scripts and creating the scene," the latter "follow scripts and participate in scenes that are already created" (p. 38). The distinction between political and non-political participation is analogously similar: although both are "active" in the sense of dedicating additional effort outside of one's routine activities toward the community, non-political participation operates within the established framework of existing structures, while political participation aims to turn participants' attention toward these structures, particularly for the purposes of unraveling and addressing structural inequities. In contrast from non-political participation (i.e., the personally responsible citizen and the participatory citizen), political participation typified through the justice-oriented citizen de-emphasizes the imperative for charity and volunteerism and emphasizes instead for the need to dissect the root of social issues and effect systemic change (Westheimer and Kahne 2004).

Critical scholars have problematized non-political participation, especially in the form of community service, for its potential to obscure the development of important democratic priorities, as well as failing to prepare youths for the complexities of a world riddled with diversity and tensions (e.g., Boyte 1997; Buire and Staeheli 2017; Kahne and Westheimer 1996; Westheimer and Kahne 2004). Overemphasis on the non-political aspect of participation, Boyte (1997) contends, "lacks a vocabulary that draws attention to the public world that extends beyond personal lives and local communities" (p. 766). As a consequence, volunteers are seldom equipped to critically reflect on the structural causes of inequities and address the real issues beyond a symptomatic level. In effect, the rhetoric of altruism potentially serves to "back a conservative political agenda that denies a role for government," eschewing the need to address structural injustices (Kahne and Westheimer 1996, p. 596).

Where non-political civic participation adopts a deficit view toward its citizens – seeking the development of character at an individual level to reenact the “correct” values of society – proponents of political civic participation remain critical of the overemphasis on the individual’s role at the expense of deeper structural issues. For instance, Edwards (2007) problematizes the youth deficit approach toward youth participation, arguing that refusal to engage youths as resources by seeking to change their characters according to prevailing norms disenfranchises them and relegates their inefficacy as citizens to an individual rather than structural issue. Similarly, other scholars have contended that the overemphasis on developing individual characters detracts from the need for collective and public mobilization to effect change at on a structural scale (Harris et al. 2010; Mirra et al. 2013). Granted, the social aid delivered through the development of caring and concerned citizens, though important, constitutes a transient solution for injustices and potentially veils the need to address the root causes of problems at the level of policy and politics (Barber 1992; Boyte 1997; Schram et al. 2010; Westheimer and Kahne 2004).

Political participation thus stresses the need for citizens to be part of the political process, definitive of a democratic society. This form of participation recognizes the diversity of interests in a society and the tensions that stem from it, highlighting the need for dialogue and negotiation. Knowledge in political participation is then constructed rather than fixed; it recognizes that values are constructions, prone to fallibility and revision (Appiah 2008).

In sum, while being “active” is equally advocated within non-political participation and political participation, the difference hinges on how activity is construed. Where non-political participation focuses on cultivating an ideal citizenry by instilling its participants with desirable (and often prevailing) values and traits, political participation stresses the need for its participants to challenge social injustices and address them structurally. In Singapore, political participation that challenges the status quo and power structures is treated by the authorities with heavy caution, especially when viewed through the ideological construct of national survival and vulnerability. Consequently, civic participation in Singapore finds itself almost exclusively within the domain of non-political participation, promoted through numerous initiatives and citizenship education programs, and serving as a catalyst to bolster national and social stability. We will here proceed to trace the journey that youth civic participation in Singapore takes in its transformation from a political to non-political form of participation.

Historical Overview of Youth Participation in Singapore

1950s to 1970s: Turbulent Student Activism

Huang (2006) noted that political activism was apparent among the youth in Singapore in the pre-independence era. With the end of World War II, and the beginning of the decolonization process, the 1950s saw students taking keen interest

in political matters. Specifically, there were two major student protests in 1954, first by Chinese-educated youths, followed by English-educated youths, against the colonial government. Both groups approached a young lawyer for legal advice – this lawyer was Lee Kuan Yew, who subsequently went on to form his own political party with supporters. Lee and his People’s Action Party (PAP) grew in power, forming self-government in 1959.

From self-government to early independence, a new wave of political activism was set off among Singaporean youth. Much of this revolved around educational changes instituted by the ruling party’s government, most particularly the phasing out of Chinese medium schools, as well as lack of support for newly established Nanyang University. The latter was in part due to problematic academic standards; more importantly, the newly established university was perceived to be a seedbed for communism (National Library Board 2018). As Huang (2006) noted: “Students from different institutions often banded together to launch manifestos, classroom boycotts, hunger strikes and street marches so as to protest against government raids, arrests, expulsions, and dissolution of student unions and publications” (p. 404).

In 1974, student leaders in the University of Singapore Student Union (USSU), Tan Wah Piow and Juliet Chin, brought campus activism to new levels, with students campaigning against various social causes. Tan was arrested while Chin was deported along with four others. This prompted widespread protests and agitation by students from various tertiary institutions. The official narrative attributes these activities to Communist motivations. Immediately following the student protests, the government amended the constitutions of all student organizations at the universities. Among other things, the amendments curtailed the scope of activities of these bodies. Specifically, The University of Singapore (Amendment) Act, passed by Parliament on 20 November 1975, ended the autonomous status of USSU; its finances were reallocated under the university administration, and the constitution of any student organization was subject to the approval of and revision by the administration. Most importantly, the structure of USSU was modified to decentralize student leadership, compartmentalize student power, and limit political participation (Liao 2010). Youth activism since that time has not been politically oriented, causing one historian to remark that 1975 signaled “the end of student activism” (Turnbull 1989, p. 309). However, there continued to be intermittent political activity involving some youths, such as the Marxist Conspiracy of 1987, where 16 people (including a few students) of a Christian social group were arrested for being part of an alleged secret Communist network (Huang 2006).

1980s: The Ideal Citizen

Rapid industrialization in the 1970s and 1980s raised concerns among the government that the adoption of science and technology and the increasing use of English were causing young Singaporeans to become too “westernized.” The perceived threat came in the form of “Western” individualism that was thought to deculturize and destabilize society, thereby jeopardizing social cohesion and national progress

(Hill and Lian 1995). This perceived threat urged the government to refocus its notion of the ideal citizen, presented through two key education reports in 1979, the Goh Report and the Ong Report. We quote the former at length:

What kind of man and woman does a child grow up to be after 10-12 years of schooling? Is he a worthy citizen, guided by decent moral precepts?..[The] litmus test of a good education is whether it nurtures citizens who can live, work, contend and co-operate in a civilised way. Is he loyal and patriotic? Is he, when the need arises, a good soldier, ready to defend his country, and so protect his wife and children, and his fellow citizens? Is he filial, respectful to elders, law abiding, humane, and responsible? Does he take care of his wife and children, and parents? Is he a good neighbour and a trustworthy friend? Is he tolerant of Singaporeans of different races and religions? Is he clean, neat, punctual, and well-mannered? (Goh 1979, pp. iv–v)

Citizenship education programs – *Being and Becoming*, *Good Citizen*, and the short-lived *Religious Education* and *Confucian Ethics* – were consequently introduced. These programs emphasized the acquisition of moral values, especially “Asian values,” as a “necessary ballast against the inroads of undesirable Western influence” (*Singapore Parliamentary Debates*, 22 February 1977, col. 369, 370, cited in Yeow 2011, pp. 390–391; see also, Teik 1999). Values such as communitarianism, hardwork, thrift, and self-sacrifice were heavily emphasized. Conceived this way, these values provided the groundwork to prescribe a specific understanding of civic participation leading into the 1990s. It perceived a lack on the youths’ part – in morals and character – and sought a resolution by compensating them with the “correct” stream of knowledge and values.

1990s: National Education and Community Involvement Program

From the 1990s onward, youth activism tended toward government-sanctioned activities, retaining a depoliticized texture; in this sense, civic participation encouraged by the state focused heavily on servicing the prevailing structures in the community while simultaneously diminishing the importance for political dissent and democratic opposition among the citizenry. Tarulevicz (2010) attributed this to the twin strategies by the ruling party – one being the encouragement of young citizens to be consumers of Singapore’s growing globalized charms and the other being the effective policing of youth behavior, such that the young are ensured not to challenge the existing power and political base. He wrote:

Encouraged and disciplined by the People’s Action Party (PAP) to behave, to conform, and to consume, the youth of the nation ultimately confirm the PAP’s role in guiding the nation into the future. (p. 24)

Numerous scholars have attested to the official narrative in Singapore that was constructed around the nation’s fragility and the need for a strong government to maintain stability and security (Rodan 2006; Tarulevicz 2010; Chua

2010). The central ideas in this narrative feature strongly in Singapore's National Education initiative (Sim 2011). National Education (NE) sought to educate a generation of youths to be cognizant of "the Singapore Story," a state-endorsed version of Singapore's history. Its scope covered Singapore's global, economic, social, and political position vis-a-vis the world, presented as "understanding Singapore's unique challenges, constraints and vulnerabilities, which makes Singapore different from other countries" (MOE 2012, n.p., cited in Sim 2013, p. 71).

While previously the government had adopted strategies to "mould the young" and "transmit values" through individual subjects or programs, the introduction of NE in 1997 signaled the advent of a more structured and comprehensive approach to infuse both the formal and informal school curriculum with appropriate citizenship attitudes, skills, and values in schools (Weninger and Kho 2014). NE approached citizenship education with a youth deficit model; the impetus was young Singaporeans' lack of knowledge and apparent disinterest in Singapore's recent history and nation-building issues, suggesting that young people took peace and prosperity for granted (Sim and Print 2005). Then Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong argued that an understanding of historical knowledge was essential to commit young people to such ideals as meritocracy, multiracialism, and the Singaporean way of life (Lee 1997).

With an agenda of securing national cohesion and economic development, NE focused on imbuing Singaporean youths with, as Lee (1997) put it, "the instinct for survival" (p. 3), reproducing a survivalist and nationalist discourse by instilling in the young "the core values of our [Singapore's] way of life" (p. 6). Six NE messages framed how young Singaporeans should view the nature of citizenship responsibilities in Singapore:

1. Singapore is our homeland; this is where we belong.
(We treasure our heritage and take pride in shaping our own unique way of life.)
2. We must preserve racial and religious harmony.
(We value our diversity and are determined to stay a united people.)
3. We must uphold meritocracy and incorruptibility.
(We provide opportunities for all, according to their ability and effort.)
4. No one owes Singapore a living.
(We find our own way to survive and prosper, turning challenge into opportunity.)
5. We must ourselves defend Singapore.
(We are proud to defend Singapore ourselves; no one else is responsible for our security and well-being.)
6. We have confidence in our future.
(United, determined, and well-prepared, we have what it takes to build a bright future for ourselves and to progress together as one nation.)
(MOE 2012, n.p., cited in Sim 2013, p. 71)

Integral to NE was youth participation through the Community Involvement Program (CIP). Launched in 1997, the CIP involved a mandatory program for all

students from primary school to preuniversity, making it compulsory for students to fulfill a minimum of 6 h of community service as part of their graduation requirements. The type of volunteer work varied according to age group. Primary school pupils were engaged in activities such as peer group tutoring, tending to the eco-garden, maintaining school facilities, and making handicraft to raise funds. Secondary school students helped out in public libraries, welfare homes, or self-help groups, as well as teaching senior citizens computer skills or adopting a community project such as maintaining a section of a beach or park. Older students in preuniversity (Preuniversity education comprises 2 years of junior college or 3 years in a centralized institute course which prepares students for the Singapore-Cambridge General Certificate of Education Advanced Level examinations.) may assume leadership roles in youth groups or camps for younger students or help out at grassroots events (National Library Board 2018). The intent was that through active participation and involvement in community service, young people would become “good citizens,” developing a strong social conscience, a sense of civic duty, belonging, and commitment to the nation (Koh 2006).

Noteworthy was the absence to develop students democratically, that is, to be skillful and effective in fulfilling the National Pledge of Allegiance, to “build a democratic society, based on justice and equality” (National Library Board 2014). With NE, active participation emphasized distinctly personal and social dimensions through volunteerism, echoing Isin’s (2008) conception of the “active citizen” who reenacts the pre-existing status quo, as opposed to the “activist citizen” who engages in reshaping existing structures (p. 38). Congruent with Boyte’s (1997) contention with volunteerism, the themes of helping “personal lives” and contributing to the “local communities” featured heavily in NE in Singapore. While these are desirable traits, they are not inherently democratic (Westheimer 2015). In fact, as Westheimer argues, volunteerism and kindness have been used to avoid thinking about politics and policy altogether. Under these conditions, which could be applied to Singapore, the political development crucial for a critical and democratically active citizenry is avoided, inadvertently risking the promotion of mere civility or docility rather than democracy (Boyte 1997; Kahne and Westheimer 1996; Westheimer and Kahne 2004).

Zhang (2013) notes that participation for Singaporean youths was actively shaped by the government. Where the older generation of activists who participated in oppositional politics were portrayed by the authorities as “being radical, antagonist, and unsuccessful,” young activists were “expected to be different” (p. 256). Young activists were continuously circumscribed to maintain the “spirit of promoting social change,” while “the practicalities of being oppositional [were] neutralized” (p. 256). In this regard, Koh (2006) criticizes that the “dominant ideology” transmitted by NE, which mutes opposition, “may produce parochial citizens who reproduce current government policy and ideology,” instead of a critical citizenry capable of making informed judgments on Singapore’s long-term issues (p. 367).

Differentiated Participation in National Education

Weninger and Kho (2014) saw the influence of NE as changing the meaning of civic participation itself:

... NE is a continuation of a disciplinary strategy whose aim is to ‘nurture’ responsible citizens via regimented participation in socially charitable and morally upright behaviour. But engagement itself needs to be understood as a regulatory mechanism deployed by the state to control political participation. In other words, the new political rationality of consensus that has supplanted a purely economic pragmatism has necessitated the regulation of the range of legitimate activities that make up participatory politics. (p. 621)

Weninger’s and Kho’s (2014) contention on the state’s “regulation” of participation finds resonance in Singapore’s centralized student tracking and the dissemination of differentiated citizenship curricula to youths. Justified by meritocratic principles, students are sorted based on their academic performances into various tracks at the secondary level; these include the elite Integrated Programme (Students who are academically strong may opt for the Integrated Programme which exempts them from the prerequisites of the GCE “O” Levels (ordinarily required for entry into preuniversity); instead, students in the Integrated Programme undergo a 6-year track that leads them directly to the GCE “A” Level examinations. Curricula in the Integrated Programme are often more project-oriented and student-centric; students here are also not required to follow the state-mandated curriculum.) track, the mainstream academic track, and the vocational track. Each track is in turn lined with different citizenship curricula that prepare students for different citizenship roles (Ho et al. 2011; Ho 2014). Accordingly, while the minority of students in the elite track (10–15% of the cohort) are envisioned as “cosmopolitan leaders,” students within the mainstream academic track (70%) are “globally oriented but locally rooted midlevel executive and workers” and students in the vocational track (13–15%) “local ‘heartlander’ followers” (Ho 2014, p. 31; see also Han 2000, pp. 65–66).

Students in each track subsequently undergo different and hierarchically framed citizenship programs. Only students in the Integrated Programme are exempted from adhering to the mandated national curricula and, as such, “are taught to critique government policies, analyse societal problems, and conduct research into fairly controversial topics” through programs autonomously crafted by their schools (Han 2000, p. 65). In contrast, students in the academic and vocational tracks are required to complete the national social studies curricula, culminating in a high-stake examination for those in the academic track. Adhering to the mandated curriculum, the civic exposure afforded to students in the latter tracks take a qualitatively different path, where “democratic principles are not explicitly incorporated in the curriculum or the textbooks” and bear a heavy inclination toward “issues such as social cohesion and economic development” (Ho et al. 2011, p. 217). Particularly noteworthy is the emphasis which “focuses exclusively on Singapore and promotes a set of relatively conservative values (e.g., loyalty and compliance)” among students in the vocational track (Ho 2014, p. 32).

A study conducted by Ho et al. (2011) found that the majority of students remained unaware of their roles as democratic agents – knowledge of political rights and democratic processes – instead preferring a strong government and cohesion for political and economic stability. Students in the vocational track were further removed from the democratic equation when they, under the hierarchically differentiated educational structure, demonstrated a lack of interest and confidence to affect change in society owing to their (perceived) diminished intellect and, along with it, their “right” to participate (pp. 222–223; see also, Alvar-Martin et al. 2012). This self-perception echoes Edwards’ (2007) argument that the apparent lack of civic interest among youths stems from disenfranchisement at a systemic, rather than individual level.

Students in the elite minority subsequently comprise the remaining political life-force of Singapore’s society. Yet, within a highly monitored political environment, education in the elite track does not guarantee a sufficient understanding of democratic priorities. Interviews with elite students found that while they demonstrated better mastery in civic knowledge compared to the majority of students, were more empowered by the system, and displayed an active desire to participate in the community, they nonetheless avoided the political in their conceptions of civic participation and eschewed the importance of activities which challenge existing structures such as lobbying or non-violent protests (Sim 2012). Active civic participation in Singapore thus revolves around the domain of the participatory citizen, ultimately functioning within the logic of preestablished power structures without necessarily addressing the deeper issues at play. Han (2000) wrote:

...the notion of active citizenship, as used in Singapore, is among the more *passive* among the various uses of the term, particularly with respect to the degree to which the citizen is encouraged to participate in the political process at a national level. (p. 70)

It is noteworthy that while this quote was taken from Han’s article published more than 15 years ago, it retains its relevance in present times. This “more *passive*” notion of citizenship participation continues to persist in Singapore today, characterized by involvement in social movements which largely protect the status quo, rather than actively seeking to challenge it.

2014 and Beyond: Character and Citizenship Education

More recently in 2014, Character and Citizenship Education (CCE) was implemented by the Ministry of Education. Unlike NE which was nation-centric, CCE is comparatively more student-centric and values-driven, focusing on developing students holistically in five core values – Respect, Responsibility, Resilience, Integrity, and Care and Harmony (Ministry of Education 2014). The practical aspect of CCE is applied through Values in Action (VIA), a reframing of the former Community Involvement Program (CIP) to give greater focus on acquiring values. Like CIP, the kind of participation encouraged is volunteeristic in community

service, with the emphasis on putting values into practice. Students are directed to reflect on their community service experiences, the values they put into practice, and how they can continue to contribute meaningfully. Such an approach is driven by the objective to develop students to be socially responsible and foster student ownership over how they contribute to the community.

It is noteworthy that a shift has taken place in CCE where the value of the individual has been afforded greater attention. For instance, principles such as “self-worth” and “the intrinsic worth of all people,” recognizing that “he [the citizen] has a duty to himself,” and demonstrating “moral courage to stand up for what is right,” are articulated when defining the core values. The adoption of multiple perspectives on issues and the civil sensibility to “graciously agree to disagree” have been encouraged (Ministry of Education, Pre-University CCE Syllabus, 2014, p. 18). However, despite these changes, political participation continues to remain muted, with participation still retaining a depoliticized texture. Here, the “active” citizen is limited within the context of community work, as one who “demonstrates a sense of responsibility towards the community,” “is civic minded,” and “contributes through community- and nation-building activities” (ibid, p. 7).

However, given that CCE is still in its early years of implementation, there will be several revisions to update the curriculum. One important aspect for consideration and revision within the curriculum remains the notion of participation, particularly given that the local landscape has evolved dramatically in recent years, with greater social class differences and the emergence of new lifestyles, reflecting greater affluence and individualizing tendencies. Youths today are better educated, more widely traveled, and technologically savvy: they harbor diverse needs and aspirations, with many wanting more control in personal spheres and more say in the decision-making processes in the collective arena (Loh 2013; Sim and Print 2009; Varma 2015). A healthy and sustainable society requires youths who are passionately invested in its future, limiting the young’s opportunities and abilities to speak out and collectively wrestle with issues which shape the future risk of their disenfranchisement or, worst, their departure. In order to secure Singapore’s future and survival, it is thus, arguably, imperative to engage Singapore’s youth more politically or risk some of these young, skilled, and mobile Singaporeans emigrating overseas (Teng 2014).

Recent Times: Social Media Activism in the New Media Age

With the launch of a high-speed broadband network by late 1998, digital technology has made steady inroads into Singapore. By 2006, for example, about 71% of the population was already using the Internet at home, and by 2010, 84% had at least one computer at home (Infocomm Media Development Authority 2017). Youths growing up in the era of digital technology are more media-savvy and sophisticated when compared with youths from the earlier generations. In a number of countries, the young have taken up the spaces afforded by social media to carry out activism projects, most particularly of a political nature (Tufekci and Wilson 2012; Valenzuela et al. 2012).

In Singapore, young people participate in online activities such as blogging, putting up posts on Facebook and Twitter, as well as looking for information on political sites such as The Online Citizen. In a paper examining activism trends in Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia, Weiss (2014) wrote, “The availability of new media has thus far reshaped activism itself more than Singapore’s political culture or policy outcomes” (p. 98). She contended that the Internet offers space for critical public debate, thus supplementing the constrained spaces in print media in the form of letters to the editor, as well as the “semi-free” physical space of the Speakers’ Corner at Hong Lim Park. For Weiss, the very act of making a commentary online on an opposition party, for example, is already activism:

Simply presenting otherwise-suppressed information online represents more transgressive an act in Singapore than in either Malaysia or Indonesia. Reporting and activism merge. . . . (p. 96)

Using Weiss’ relatively loose standard as a yardstick for youth activism in Singapore, it can be argued that young people here do engage in activism. However, this participation is also more likely to focus on social activism and advocacy, such as LGBT causes or environmental issues, rather than political issues that “directly challenge the ruling power” (Zhang 2013, p.267; see also, Weiss 2014). Few politically oriented activists have come to the public’s notice, but one who did was 24-year-old Nicole Seah, who contested in the 2011 Singapore elections as a candidate for the opposition National Solidarity Party (NSP). Seah was popular with the public as a “straight-talking young woman who has impressed Singaporeans through her dealings with the media. . . and comparative substance” (Russell 2011). However, Seah ultimately failed to win a seat and has since maintained a low profile, giving up all connections with politics. The bright but all-too-brief presence that Seah impressed upon Singapore’s political horizon highlights the fragile state of political contestation among youths in the country; political participation aimed at fruitful structural change requires sustained effort and, for this reason, needs to be habitually developed from a young age.

Two other instances involving young people on social media are worth noting. In November 2014, a 33-year-old blogger, Roy Ngerng, was found guilty of defaming Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong when he published an article on his blog that questioned the management of the Central Provident Fund (CPF). Ngerng had to pay \$150,000 in damages to PM Lee.

In 2015, several days after former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew had passed away, a 16-year-old blogger, Amos Yee, uploaded an 8 min video entitled “Lee Kuan Yew is dead.” In the video, Yee denounced Lee as a negative influence for Singapore and also compared Lee and Jesus Christ in what was considered to be an offensive manner. Many Singaporeans were shocked by the video and several filed police reports. Yee was arrested, tried, jailed, and later also sent for psychiatric counseling. While some political commentators have labeled Yee as “just an attention-seeking teenager” (Tan 2016, p. 246), it cannot be denied that Yee’s loud and unrestrained production jolted the public consciousness to reflect, even a little, on the hegemonic nature of Singapore’s politics.

Both these cases received a fair share of attention within Singapore and also abroad. There was much concern over the curtailment of freedom of expression and also over the treatment of the two youths in general (Tan 2016). The heavy hand dealt – by society and the authorities – to Ngerng and Yee sets a stern tone for independent youth political participation in Singapore, particularly when the latter seeks to directly challenge political power in a confrontational manner perceived to threaten the country's stability.

Conclusion

We began by thematically tracing the distinction between non-political and political participation to contextualize the development of youth civic participation in Singapore. We visited the hotbed of youth activism that defined the pre-independence era in Singapore, where youths politically agitated against the colonial powers. This political fervor continued into the post-independence years, as university students actively stood up against perceived social injustices. However, the grip on activist action subsequently tightened, accompanied by the articulation of the ideal citizen at a curricular level which sought to inculcate desirable character and morals in youths. By the end of the 1980s, youth activism had simmered down.

In the 1990s, the government initiated NE and CIP formally focused on developing good citizenship attitudes, skills, values, and practices in the young. During this time, youth activity was depoliticized, reallocated, and promoted non-politically as community service through government-sanctioned channels. Tailing this redefinition of participation, student tracking, and differentiated citizenship education limited political participation to the elite student minority, which even then eschewed democratic activities in the form of, for example, lobbying or non-violent protests. This trend carried on into the revamped CCE and VIA which retained its limited notion of civic participation. Finally, we discussed the age of new media where young activists are engaging the community largely via social media, albeit centered on social issues rather than political change, reflecting a limited space for political contestation.

In Singapore, political activism has a particularly narrow definition, being confined to any opposition party politics that attempts to challenge the ruling PAP's dominance (Chua 2017). While non-political participation is amply emphasized for youths in Singapore, the development of a democratically competent citizenry capable of engaging in political dialogue – especially oppositional dialogue with the authorities – and challenging the structural inequities beyond, leaves much room for improvement. The promotion of civic participation as an almost exclusively non-political endeavor fails to equip the young with critical skills to positively challenge and reshape structural problems, instead encouraging them to perpetuate the existing social *logos* through temporary volunteer efforts. It is thus crucial for Singapore's youth to be provided the space – especially political space – to rationally and passionately explore their views on the one hand and be exposed to a more nuanced and meaningful notion of what it means to actively participate beyond the

non-political. It is only then that we can say we have taken a step toward the goal in our National Pledge of Allegiance, where citizens pledge “to build a democratic society based on justice and equality” (National Heritage Board 2018).

Cross-References

- ▶ [Constructions of “Youth” and “Activism” in Lebanon](#)
- ▶ [Education for Youth Civic and Political Action in Australia](#)
- ▶ [Youth Civic Engagement and Formal Education in Canada: Shifting Expressions, Associated Challenges](#)
- ▶ [Youth Engagement and Citizenship in England](#)

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Rural Youth, Education, and Citizenship in Sweden: Politics of Recognition and Redistribution

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Abstract

When young people are studied in relation to citizenship and education, geographical location is not always considered. When the emplacement of youth is addressed, a disproportional focus on schools and civic youth practices in city settings further mirrors an unreflected urban norm within the field. There is however a burgeoning literature that examines youth, education, and citizenship in rural settings that speaks to issues of the inclusion and participation of young people in society. The current chapter reviews Swedish literature on rural youth and tracks its theoretical and political underpinnings. The areas covered move

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from stereotypical representations of rurality to rural youths' experiences and participation in formal and nonformal education to the ways in which neoliberal market logic results in an uneven distribution of educational and employment possibilities for young people on the countryside. The chapter argues that a divided empirical and analytical focus in previous research results in inconclusive arguments regarding the remedies suggested for overcoming geographic inequality. It is posited that a call for the cultural recognition of rural youth's experiences of marginalization as a remedy for justice needs to be complemented with an argument for economic redistribution.

Keywords

Youth · Rurality · Spatiality · Inequality · Identity politics

Introduction

A growing body of work interested in youth, citizenship, and education is bringing attention to the role of place in young people's lives and has pointed out that a disproportional – and at times unreflected – focus on schools, youth centers, and leisure activities in city settings mirrors what seems to be an underlying, but often unpronounced, urban norm within studies of youth and education (Cairns 2012; Pini et al. 2016). Spatial hierarchies render the rural and its inhabitants peripheral, and while such marginalization results in complex experiences of citizenship (cf. Weller 2004), the emplacement of youth is seldom discussed in relation to their experiences of social disengagement.

Furthermore, the recent orientation toward space and place in youth studies has resulted in a small but growing literature in Sweden that examines young people, rurality, and education, which speaks to issues of citizenship and particularly the inclusion and participation of young people in society. This scholarship points to important questions of representation and of youth's experiences, opportunities, and identity work in places continuously marked as being in the geographic, economic, and moral periphery. In this review, we track the theoretical and political imperatives that underline this recent Swedish research on rural youth.

This review does not represent all scholarship on youth and rurality in Sweden. Instead, the literature included has rather been chosen as it in different ways talks to rural youth's citizenship, as defined in public policy, formal and informal institutional practices, and by rural youth themselves. In Swedish previous research, these have been divided into ones related to the negative stigma associated with rurality and those with political and market-related dimensions (e.g., access to education, employment, and leisure-time activities; cf. Helve 2003). The current chapter follows this rationale and first highlights spatial hierarchies through a focus on representations of rurality, urbanity, and young people. Second, research examining how the lived experiences of rural youth are informed by both cultural and structural conditions is discussed. Third, the chapter focuses on structural and material

conditions on the countryside, often informed by economic perspectives and attentive to the distributive effects of national policy making.

In a concluding discussion, these three areas of research are discussed in relation to the recent increase in use of Honneth's (2007) theory of recognition as a means for remedy. Honneth argues that a fundamental human need in Western societies is to be acknowledged as an individual – to have one's status as a subject recognized – in relation to different social spheres (i.e., within jurisdiction, the work force, and in intimate relationships). Some scholars have argued that many young rural inhabitants have their citizenship status continuously misrecognized, which may lead to new populist political collectives. Acknowledging the voices of marginalized rural youth would enable geographical justice and avoid this gloomy trajectory (e.g., Vallström and Svensson 2018). While agreeing with this claim, this chapter argues that the repeated insistence on the *recognition* of young people's (rural) identities and experiences as a remedy for justice obscures economic issues as well as the historical contingency of subject formation that may also play a role in spatial injustice. Studies that are attentive to the structuring forces of (neoliberal) economic incentives may contribute to arguments for a politics of *redistribution* (Fraser and Honneth 2003) and offer the economic security needed for marginalized rural youth to navigate educational and employment possibilities and practice participatory citizenship.

Representations of Rural Youth

In Sweden, and internationally, rural studies have primarily focused on rural-urban migration and the labor market, often leaning on theories of economic profit maximization where urbanization is seen as an inevitable consequence of societal development (Tinagli et al. 2007; cf. Ceccato et al. 2000). As a response to this research, scholars have started to explore rurality from a cultural perspective, especially focusing on representations of the countryside and its inhabitants in media and policy discourse (Eriksson 2010; Lundgren and Johansson 2017; Nilsson and Lundgren 2015; Rönnblom 2014). The aim is often to scrutinize common stereotypes of rurality and rural youth and to promote more nuanced representations of young people (Svensson 2017). This line of research has focused on the relation between nature and childhood, the othering of the rural and notions about post-industrial rural mill towns.

“Natural” Childhoods and Urban Youth

Representations of rurality are diverse and often somewhat contradictory, as the rural is simultaneously idealized and stigmatized. In a Swedish setting, ideals of a “good” childhood are informed by the Rousseauian connection between the child and “untamed nature,” as opposed to the equally strong connection between “the adult” and “civilized culture” (Halldén 2011). In accordance with this romantic

idea of nature as a beneficial milieu for children, the countryside is often understood as an ideal site for family formation and child rearing. In public discourse, “the rural idyll” represents play and freedom as well as a sense of security, community, and belonging (Cedering 2012; Hjort and Malmberg 2006).

While the city is often understood as an unsafe and unsuitable place for younger children (Joelsson 2013), there is a strong connection between urbanity and youth lifestyles, as cities offer more opportunities for consumer culture and diversity in identity expression (Eriksson 2010, 2017; Waara 1996). This link has in part been reproduced within research in Sweden, which has been characterized by an unrecognized urban norm or, when taking a spatial perspective, has focused on young people, education, and urban segregation (e.g., Bunar and Sernhede 2013; Jonsson 2007). The rural is often understood as authentic in relation to the rather “artificial” values of urban lifestyles, and connections between rurality, (heterosexual) family formation, and idyllic childhoods might be arguments for migration to the countryside, but the rural is also seen as a place that young people should leave in order to fulfil themselves (Kåks 2007; Svensson 2017).

Otherring the Rural

Sweden is internationally renowned for its social welfare and gender equality policies (e.g., Hausman et al. 2012). This image of Sweden as a center for modern and progressive values and an exceptionally egalitarian nation has been largely critiqued (Hübinette and Lundström 2011; Pierre 2015) and argued to be dependent on the construction of rural areas and its inhabitants as morally inferior others that instead are characterized as inherently backward and reactionary (Eriksson 2010). These representations are both classed and gendered. For example, it has been argued that middle-class women are often portrayed as the future of rural communities as they are seen as bearers of modernity (Dahl 2007). But rural women can also be stigmatized when embodying “unrespectable” working-class positions, evident in discourses of “white trash” trajectories (Sohl 2014) or in narratives where racialized female migration to rural areas is reconfigured as exploitative prostitution (Dahl 2007; Nordin 2007). However, rural men in Sweden are more generally understood as archaic in relation to their progressive urban counterparts (Nordin 2007). Recent research has documented how rural men are often described as backward, uneducated working class and portrayed as reactionary, homophobic, and sexist (Stenbacka 2011). More recently, they have also been accused of racism, where right-wing currents are argued to primarily be found in the peripheral provinces of Sweden (Gottzén 2014). Eriksson (2010) therefore argues that rural masculinity in particular constitutes an exception to the Swedish national self-image; in order to present Sweden as a progressive and modern center in a globalized world, rural men who are not seen to fit these standards are marginalized and described as radically different others (Eriksson 2010). This discourse may have aggravated effects in relation to young rural men. In public representations, youth are often presented as characterizing progression (Lindgren 2002). As a result, “traditional” or

“reactionary” youth constitute something of an oxymoron, and their (lack of) aspirations are often rendered unintelligible in public discourse (cf. Vallström 2011).

The Postindustrial Standard Narrative and the Mill-Town Mentality

A common narrative that stigmatizes rural youth is what Vallström and Svensson (2018) call “the postindustrial standard narrative.” This narrative speaks in part of the boom in industrial manufacturing that employed large portions of the (male) working-class after WWII but also emphasizes the benefits of recent developments, particularly the rise of knowledge economies in a globalized world. While often presented as a success story, the narrative also contains elements of failure as many industrial regions in the global North have been severely affected by the economic decline and subsequent structural transformations of the labor market in the late twentieth century, through which large parts of industrial production have been outsourced to the global South. In Sweden, where much manufacturing was located in rural areas, young men growing up on the countryside are often considered to become particularly affected due to their vulnerable positions on the labor market (Kåks 2007; Svensson 2006; Vallström 2011; Vallström and Svensson 2018).

This narrative is found in many Western societies, but in Sweden it draws particularly on the well-spread notion of “mill-town mentality” (Swedish, *bruksandan*), which refers to a culture said to prevail in smaller towns and rural areas previously dominated by one single industry (i.e., mill towns). While the term has some positive associations, including community bonds, security, and loyalty, it mostly implies that members of such communities lack motivation, entrepreneurial skills, and flexibility – traits that are idealized in contemporary postindustrial societies (Vallström 2014). Mill-town mentality also denotes strong social cohesion and a “monoculture” suspicious of newcomers and new influences, which is argued to explain everything from sexism to resistance to education (Forsberg 1997; Forsberg et al. 2012; Gottzén and Franzén 2019).

Recognizing and Countering (Status) Injuries

As mentioned, the literature that troubles stigmatizing stereotypes of rurality, particularly in reference to young rural men, can be seen as a response to mainstream research that emphasizes urbanization and profit maximization. As a response, critical scholars have therefore developed cultural analyses that demonstrate how representation matters for geographic inequality as well as offering more nuanced perspectives of rural life. For instance, Forsberg et al. (2012) trouble the perception of rural villages and small towns as uniform, monocultural, and predominantly white, arguing that the Swedish countryside is not necessarily ethnically homogeneous (since it has a long tradition of immigration) and that racism is not exclusively a rural issue. Similarly, Ekman (1997) argues that the strong cohesiveness at times found in rural areas is not necessarily inherent of the local community. Instead,

spatial identity can be strengthened when a community perceives itself to be under attack by, for instance, industry shutdowns, dismantling of welfare systems and negative representations.

Focusing on young people, Vallström and Svensson (2018) discuss how neoliberal market logics result in state and corporate withdrawal from rural areas since they are considered less competitive. In addition, population decline has major negative effects on small rural communities since it enforces increased taxes and decreases the ability to attract corporate investors and to offer welfare services and education. Yet, the main impetus for spatial inequalities is argued to be urban-centered norms and attitudes (Svensson 2017). The postindustrial narrative is seen as the base for these developments as its verdict of geographic (and individual) deficiency informs policies and investments (Vallström 2011; Vallström and Svensson 2018). While research that attempts to trouble urban-centered norms and negative representations of rurality can be understood as political, not all researchers explicitly discuss remedies needed for overcoming geographic inequality. However, with reference to Honneth's (2007) theory of recognition, Vallström and Svensson (2018) posit that a first step toward countering the (status) injuries that rural areas suffer from is to acknowledge the ways in which rural youth and the places they inhabit are misrecognized within the hegemonic urban-centered narrative and to allow for counter-narratives to be recognized in public discourse. The next section is concerned with research that aims to do this.

Lived Experience Among Rural Youth

Another strategy to nuance the dominant narratives about rural youth in Sweden has been to highlight young people's own perspectives, suggesting they negotiate negative representations of the rural in their everyday lives (Kåks 2007; Waara 1996). When emerging in the 1990s, this research often problematized the "individualization thesis" (e.g., Giddens 1991), which argues that late modernity is characterized by the "disembedding" of social and spatial relations and that we are becoming less bound by tradition based on, for example, class and place. For instance, Trondman (1995) argues that boys in the countryside are still highly influenced by structural conditions as they lack the specific cultural capital demanded in society. While working-class boys adopt different strategies in relation to education and employment, the ones who stay often cultivate identities that may provide momentary affirmation but simultaneously make them marginalized in a globalized society. Trondman asserts that both cultural norms and spatial and material conditions work to reproduce stigmatized working-class rural identities. Structural conditions, including geographic inequalities, affect young people's chances to fulfil educational expectations, but youth are simultaneously held individually responsible – and often hold themselves responsible – for their failures (Andersson and Beckman 2018; Svensson 2017).

Rural Youth and Education

Although education is not a guarantee for future employment for rural youth (Lundh Nilsson and Westberg 2015), there has been an enhanced public emphasis on formalized merits. As a result, the gendered educational pattern has caused public anxieties as the mill-town mentality is said to affect particularly boys' attitudes toward formal education and cause lower academic achievement (Ivener 2014). Differences between what are considered to be female and male professions affect rural youth's attitudes to education and future employment. Girls often experience pressure to perform well in school, while boys may see themselves in future occupations that do not demand academic achievement (Härnsten et al. 2005; Trondman 2001). It should however be noted that this has partly to do with the fact that occupations that are traditionally coded as feminine, such as work in health care and primary education, now demand a university degree, in contrast to traditionally male occupations where upper secondary education is sufficient. In Sweden, upper secondary education is not compulsory, but labor market demands on professionalized work force have increased attendance at this educational level. Both vocational and academic secondary educational programs enable further studies at university level. It is often necessary to move to urban areas for higher education that is why migration patterns mirror these gendered educational and employment tendencies (Forsberg et al. 2012). Waara (1996) notes that while the young people in the northern border country between Sweden and Finland in his study challenged pre-given gender positions, many argued that staying in the area implied the need to conform to traditional gendered patterns of education, work, leisure, and (heterosexual) family formation. A more recent study nevertheless found that rural youth – particularly working-class girls – chose formal education and work trajectories that did not follow traditionally gendered scripts, implying that these may be in a process of reconfiguration (Rönnlund et al. 2018).

Some researchers have problematized the so-called anti-school culture that is considered particularly prevalent in industrial and farmland regions. For instance, while rural working-class boys are often positioned as “unwilling, unaccustomed, and weak readers” (Asplund and Pérez Prieto 2018, p. 1061) in their reading practices, it has been documented that young rural men may interpret literature in less gender stereotypical ways than young urban men (Asplund and Pérez Prieto 2013). Similarly, Ivener (2014) analyzes working-class men's life histories and relations to education in a mill town severely affected by the economic crises of the late twentieth century. She argues that they are not resistant toward learning but the embodied knowledge they value, such as craftsmanship and workplace collaboration, is not easily validated in a labor market that rather cherishes formal education. Similarly, in a recent ethnography with boys involved in the rural “greaser” subculture, Joelsson (2013) shows that while they developed advanced practical skills and knowledge about motors and driving, their knowledge was seldom appreciated. Instead they were continuously constructed as being a risk to their communities and to themselves.

On a structural level, rural youth seem inclined to follow traditional gendered and classed lines of education, work, and leisure-time activities. However, qualitative studies of youth in formal and informal education in rural settings suggest that young people's learning experiences are complex and diverse and build on ideals that are not always recognized as valuable in public discourse.

Mobility, Employment, and (Un)desired Trajectories

As a consequence of young people's patterns of education, rural-urban migration is also largely gendered, classed, and connected to (heterosexual) family formation. As noted, middle-class youth (particularly girls) generally seem more inclined to move to cities for work and higher education than young people (particularly boys) from the working-class. However, young people themselves rather link migration to individual identity processes and coming of age than to structural realities enforcing them to relocate (Svensson 2017). Kåks (2007) argues that small-town youth draw on two different life scripts to evaluate their decisions. While both scripts revolve around establishing a (heterosexual) family, what differentiates a desirable script from an undesirable one is *when* and *where* settling down takes place. Desirable life scripts include moving away for higher education and postponing parenthood, and it is only the ones that have aligned with this trajectory that see themselves as autonomous and as having made proper individual choices (Kåks 2007).

Migration patterns are clearly gendered, but Forsberg et al. (2012) suggest they may not be as differentiated as often assumed. Although women seem to realize their plans to move at a relatively early age, men however tend to follow later. Women also tend to move back to a somewhat larger extent than men. In addition, there is a continued gender-segregated labor market in rural industrial municipalities – also among young people – which reproduces a considerable wage gap where men tend to earn more regardless of whether they have stayed or moved (Forsberg et al. 2012). However, a study with young unemployed rural men show that they wanted to work in caring professions, which were easier to obtain without having to move. This suggests that traditionally gendered lines of professions might be transgressed in order to stay close to family and friends (Andersson and Beckman 2018).

Recognizing Young Rural Citizenship(s)

The norm of rural-urban migration affects local policies, as municipalities privilege the young people who have moved from the community. Moving from the countryside is seen as an active choice; individuals who relocate (primarily young middle-class women and men) are therefore considered to be self-sufficient and driven people, and, hence, former inhabitants that rural municipalities want to return (Svensson 2006, 2012). In contrast, municipal discourse often constructs young working-class men and women who stay as passive – both with regards to their own and the community's future – and as liabilities rather than assets. This latter

group may want to develop their local community, but they seldom feel appreciated (Svensson 2006; see also Reay 2005; Skeggs 1997, for discussions on institutional reassertion of working-class practices in the UK context). Instead, they are marginalized and often ashamed over their rural domicile and their inability to leave. This may also cause young people in the countryside to lose their faith in the democratic system and embrace populist and right-wing sentiments (Swedish National Board of Youth Affairs 2010).

At the same time, rural political and citizenship activism may also be progressive and rural youth might be empowered by the use of social media and create positive counter-narratives of life in rural areas (Lundgren and Johansson 2017; Svensson 2016). Forsberg (2017) offers new ways of understanding – and politicizing – the question of rural migration by discussing how her young (working-class) interviewees spoke of their future in terms of a struggle to stay and claiming their “right to immobility” (p. 323).

Rural youth’s experiences and political identities are, as we have seen, gaining attention within academic discourse. Different expressions of citizenship practices, such as rural youth’s use of digital media, have in some research been understood as “struggles against placeist representations” and as a fight for “reappropriation” of rurality (Lundgren and Johansson 2017, p. 80). Such attempts of resignification of the rural are often seen as linking youth together and having “their experiences and opinions acknowledged and their rural identities not only re-constituted, but recognized and valued” (Lundgren and Johansson 2017, p. 81). By offering narratives that counter the urban norm, it is argued that rural youth may create a renewed sense of pride and recognition of their ways of life could make the rural worthy of political investment (Vallström and Svensson 2018).

As discussed, research attentive to the lived experiences of rural youth has highlighted the workings of social class, gender, age, and place when discussing youth’s educational and employment trajectories, migration patterns, and citizenship practices. This literature emphasizes that both spatial and material conditions and cultural norms work to reproduce stigmatized working-class rural identities. However, the focus on lived experience tends to posit spatial and material conditions as rather static and determining “backdrops,” while cultural norms, such as the postindustrial narrative, are perceived as possible to change and therefore deserves to be questioned. This results in an overemphasis on the recognition of rural identity, experience, and citizenship as a remedy for geographic justice, while arguments for a politics of economic redistribution, both to rural areas and the working-class, are much less pronounced.

Material Conditions and Economic Incentives in Youth’s Spaces

While arguments for a politics of recognition may be valuable to rural youth and their citizenship, they mainly work at a cultural and discursive level and partly obscure the economic and material characteristics of geographical injustice. The following section therefore focuses on research that analyzes some of the marketized

arenas that rural youth participate in and that structure their everyday lives: the school market, labor market, and the marketing of the countryside.

Decentralized and Deregularized School System

Educational reforms of the late twentieth century brought extensive decentralization and deregulation that affected the supply of rural schools in Sweden. They were partly based on the democratic argument that citizens had the right to greater influence over schools and other local welfare institutions. Consequently, municipalities were given freedom to locally organize educational investments and content (Andræ Thelin and Solstad 2005). The reforms were also founded on a neoliberal economic logic, mainly evident in the marketization of education through the introduction of the voucher system (Swedish, *skolpeng*), which made it radically easier to start and run private schools (Swedish, *friskolor*), as they also could now receive public financing for their students. As a result, within a few years, Sweden went from having a relatively centralized and completely public school system to having one of the world's most liberal educational systems. This would allow parents to choose the best education for their children through market-oriented competition which, in turn, would result in better teaching and increase Sweden's ability to compete internationally (Holm 2013).

These neoliberal reforms did not benefit schools in the countryside but rather augmented existing inequalities (Beach 2018). Since municipal budgets primarily consist of tax revenues from their citizens, rural communities suffering from depopulation often struggle to provide welfare services of the same quality as well-populated areas. Municipalities have therefore been forced to centralize education and close down smaller village schools (Cedering 2012). This has created longer commutes (or boarding solutions) for rural students, which have been shown to have negative effects on their physical health and their ties to their community (Andræ Thelin and Solstad 2005). Another consequence is that some rural youth do not afford travel or accommodation and in practice therefore have difficulties "freely" choosing upper secondary schools outside their local municipality (Holm 2013). It is however important to note that research on small rural schools in Sweden does not support the idea that the quality of education and students' academic performances are lower in rural areas compared to schools in urban areas. Small rural schools often manage to compensate structural obstacles, such as difficulties in attracting highly educated staff, with smaller student groups and more teacher time per student (Åberg-Bengtsson 2009).

The Labor Market

As mentioned, the mill-town mentality is often used to explain young men's resistance toward formal education and the lack of entrepreneurship. However, this could not be explained solely by cultural representations but is also as a result of

historical economic changes. According to Bergström (1997), Swedish industry grew during the industrial boom of the postwar era not only due to increased demand for Swedish-manufactured products but also because wage and taxation politics stimulated large industries to reinvest their profit. This allowed for high employment rates in industry towns but also locked up capital in the companies, which had a conserving effect on many rural and industrial communities. In addition, supported by national regulations, the basic industries rewarded workers' loyalty by offering safe employment and high salaries. Consequently, Bergström posits that mill-town mentality cannot only be seen as an inherited mental state but also a product of particular industrial relations and national policies.

It is also questionable whether Sweden could be described as a postindustrial society. Numerous manufacturers have indeed moved their production to other parts of the world, but many industries remain in the country where it is rather technological development, mechanization, and rationalization that account for large parts of the increased unemployment rates (Westholm 1997). Swedish industry is not downsizing, but the corporate structure has changed. The share of international companies without ties to the local communities where the production is based has increased, partly due to Sweden's relatively generous corporate taxation policies. The basic industries do not offer employment to same extent as before, and their revenues are not disposed locally due to globalized corporate structures (Lundberg 1997). This does not only affect the possibilities for many young people in rural areas to gain employment and to practice participatory citizenship (Andersson and Beckman 2018) but could also be used as an argument for economic redistribution to rural industrial areas (and rural inhabitants) as national policy contributed to these developments.

Appropriation of Local Culture in Marketing

Decentralization of the school system and the globalization of manufacturing industries have affected many rural municipalities in Sweden negatively. As municipalities are increasingly dependent on tax revenues from their inhabitants, those suffering from depopulation are forced to compete with each other for potential migrants. Municipalities promote themselves through emphasizing what is considered attractive with their local region, rather than directing attention toward the negative effects of current distributive politics (Svensson 2017). Such marketing strategies, based on neoliberal values of competitiveness and growth, tend to reproduce urban/rural binaries, for instance, through making use of the image of rurality as idyllic and traditional (Eriksson 2010). In some parts of northern Sweden, which are associated with depopulation and high unemployment rates and where the Sámi people live, both municipalities and travel agencies exoticize this indigenous culture in their marketing. In contrast to otherwise negative representations of these areas, Sámi culture has become an asset in tourism and has "transformed ethnicity and exotic cultural difference into an 'easily approachable form of colonialism'" (Eriksson 2010, p. 93). Such marketing strategies may obviously enable positive

place identity and provide job opportunities but also obscures the fact that the indigenous people have lacked civil rights historically, which produced the structural inequality that underpins Sámi youth's living conditions today (cf. Viken 2006).

Concluding Discussion

During the last decades, Swedish research on rurality, youth, education, and citizenship has problematized how norms and values structure geographies and construct rural places as stagnant, outmoded, and unsuitable for political, corporate, and civic investments. Dedicated to unveiling how cultural representations produce these spatial hierarchies, scholars have demonstrated the negative effects that such imaginaries have on identity formation and self-understanding among rural youth. It is important to let marginalized voices be heard, but the continued emphasis on rural identity and the call for a politics based on the recognition of these experiences may simultaneously serve neoliberal interests.

Rural youth scholars are of course well aware of how neoliberal market logics have constructed rural areas and inhabitants as irrelevant (Vallström and Svensson 2018) and at times develop both social and economic critiques (e.g., Vallström 2014). But as demonstrated in this review, they tend to focus on cultural representations and misrecognition of young people's everyday lives. Neoliberalism is analyzed as a subjugating discourse (as in the postindustrial standard narrative), and capitalism is primarily addressed in terms of rural youth's classed experiences (e.g., Vallström and Svensson 2018). Exploring marginalized positions based on place, class, gender, and age is important, but when neoliberal and urban norms are primarily (and sometimes only) addressed as "placeist" discourse, misrepresentation is presented as the primary origin of rural youth's subordination. This approach, often legitimated through reference to Honneth's (2007) theory of recognition, argues for the need to make rural youth's experiences and choices culturally intelligible. Implicitly and explicitly, emphasis is thus put on the "performative" power of verbalizing rural experience (cf. Lundgren and Johansson 2017). Some also call for conscious-raising practices among rural inhabitants in order to create citizenship mobilization built on rural identity (Vallström and Svensson 2018).

Cultural recognition is important, but this type of identity politics also needs to be problematized. Firstly, neoliberalism is not only a set of systemized economic policies but something that goes beyond the market. Neoliberal discourse, epitomized in the postindustrial standard narrative, subordinates individuals and makes some actions and aspirations culturally valued and others devalued. However, inherent in neoliberal governing is also the imperative of profit maximization (Brown 2005), which to an increasing extent structures spaces that rural youth inhabit. While, for instance, Svensson (2017) argues that deconstructing the urban norm may lead to the state protecting the rural population from "the market's misrecognition" (p. 53, authors' translation), much responsibility is implicitly put onto local civic organizations and individuals to provide rural youth a sense of

security and belonging (c.f. Rönnblom 2014). A claim for cultural recognition must, therefore, not obscure the need of economic redistribution in order to make this support possible (cf. Fraser and Honneth 2003).

Secondly, the “identity” and political collectives based on shared feelings of rural marginalization need to be troubled, as the (rural) subject to be acknowledged is diffuse. By questioning the postindustrial narrative, Svensson and Vallström critique the individualized and neoliberal idea of the enterprising self (Svensson 2017; Vallström 2011; Vallström and Svensson 2018). While such recognition troubles this neoliberal narrative, it does not problematize that the subject to be recognized is still characterized by qualities idealized within neoliberal discourse. As Brown (2006) points out, the ideal neoliberal citizen is a liberated entrepreneur and consumer capable of making autonomous and rational choices. Rural youth who stay in their communities despite limited opportunities are to be recognized as making “deliberate” choices (Svensson 2016, p. 447), but by emphasizing rational and autonomous choices, the urban citizen is still the blueprint for liberated action. If “rural identity” is to be made culturally recognizable, it runs the risk of (re)producing neoliberal citizenship, that is, exploitable, consuming subjects seen as worth financial investment.

Finally, it has been argued that new political collectives could be created through conscious-raising practices of shared experience of exclusion and rediscovered communalism among rural inhabitants (Vallström and Svensson 2018). But, rural identity and rural experience do not naturally exist “out there”; they have to be continuously created. Since identity is often constructed through difference, we have no way of guaranteeing who or what will serve as a differing “other.” Acknowledging rural identity and experience thereby runs the risk of enhancing already visible antagonisms. Experiences of marginalization, but also of care and communalism, are important features of racist and xenophobic mobilization (Mulinari and Neergaard 2014). The question then is what separates rural identity politics from right-wing and populist collectives and how one can surely be said to be desirable and the other not (cf. Edenheim 2017). Youth politics arguing for endurable lives on the countryside can not only be based on the performative power of recognition as it may continue economic dispossession and provide the basis of future precarious alliances. A call for the recognition of rural youth as citizens also needs to encompass an argument for economic redistribution and an awareness of how our historical and geographical moment affects the subjectivities imaginable.

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Youth Civic Engagement and Formal Education in Canada: Shifting Expressions, Associated Challenges

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Abstract

In this chapter, we explore shifting expressions of youth civic engagement in Canada and the variant ways in which educating for youth civic engagement has been envisaged and approached in formal education (K-12). Attention is also given to those personal and contextual factors propelling these changes over time. We contend that while expressions of youth civic engagement have been for the most part moderate, varied, local, institutional, and tempered historically through a filter of personal and social responsibility, there has been a gradual shift of emphasis towards less formal, digital, and rights-based representations.

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Educating for civic engagement through formal education in Canada has also undergone a gradual transition. This transition has moved from an emphasis on civic duty, deference, and formal political structures and processes *as they are* to more recent characterizations that encourage more informal, exploratory, and critical understandings of engagement with public issues, from the local to the global. Interwoven in these understandings of engagement are themes such as identity, cultural diversity, pluralism, and issues of social justice and equity. Indicators of these changes are found in spheres of Canadian educational research, curriculum policy reform, and strengthened pedagogical practices.

Moving towards these broadened and more complex characterizations of civic engagement through formal education has proven to be complicated. Curriculum ambiguity, undertones of compliance, an avoidance of controversial concepts and issues, and varied understandings of engagement among students with differing identity affiliations, for example, all signal uneven and fragmented access to particular learning experiences. These complications are further exacerbated by a variety of factors associated with educational change that have mobilized and/or inhibited steps forward.

Keywords

Youth civic engagement · Youth activism · Youth participation · Citizenship education · Civics · Formal education · Pedagogy · Canada

Introduction

Today, youth worldwide are civically engaged in a variety of community activities and with a range of public issues. While the focus of this engagement remains for the most part local, youth voices are increasingly evident in national and international matters (e.g., democratic governance, racism, indigenous rights, sexual assault and harassment, gun control, refugee settlement, environmental and social justice). Expressions of youth civic engagement reveal significant variation and shifting patterns, guided by cultural and historical traditions and influenced by changing local and global pressures including globalization, changing forms of democratic governance, populist nationalism, and the rise of digital media (Davies et al. 2014). Recent studies highlight a range of personal factors also affecting youth engagement and disengagement (e.g., different socio-cultural understandings of participation, living in contexts where poverty and/or violence predominate, deficiencies in civic education, youth mistrust of politics and politicians), illuminating the intricacies involved in better understanding these variant expressions and shifting patterns (Ménard 2010; Sherrod et al. 2010).

According to Kahne et al. (2016), patterns of youth engagement, in general, are shifting toward more informal, participatory forms of political activity (e.g., volunteering with community groups and organizations, service to community projects, blogging and circulating political news online) and less so toward formal,

institutional ones (e.g., voting, political party membership, working on a political campaign). New digital tools have provided an expanded range of opportunities for youth across the political spectrum to circulate information, articulate personal political viewpoints, and mobilize social networks in ways that exert pressure on issues of public concern (Vromen 2017). We have seen evidence of this, for example, in the form of movements such as Black Lives Matter, Idle No More, and Me Too. This expanded range of opportunities for youth, according to Kahne et al. (2016), is different from institutional politics in that they are “peer-based, interactive acts, and not guided by deference to traditional elites and institutions” (p. 1). They “empower individuals and groups to operate with greater independence in the political realm, circumventing traditional gatekeepers of information and influence” (p. 3).

Not surprisingly, there has been increasing attention paid to, and deliberation about, the role formal education *is playing* and *ought to play* in assisting youth develop a deeper understanding of public issues and the capacities needed to meaningfully engage in and respond to often complex and conflictual civic questions. Educational stakeholders worldwide are increasingly encouraging careful consideration of the curricular and pedagogical shifts that would be helpful in facilitating effective and equitable civic engagement in teaching and learning. In this chapter, we explore shifting expressions of youth civic engagement in Canada and the variant ways in which educating for youth civic engagement has been envisaged and approached in formal education (K-12). Attention is also given to forces propelling these changes over time and to some of the associated challenges that are currently confronting educational stakeholders. Lastly, we offer our concluding reflections.

Biesta’s (2011) reminder that democratic learning in schools “represents a small proportion of the environment in and from which young people learn” (p. 14) acknowledges that a good deal of civic engagement learning takes place in less formal contexts outside of education (e.g., through family activities, interaction with peers, community teams and organization, TV and social media). In light of this, we acknowledge that this chapter presents at best an introductory and partial sketch of the relationship between youth civic engagement and education in Canada.

Early Developments

Canadian political culture, influenced by European, North American, and Indigenous beliefs and practices, has continued to evolve gradually and pragmatically. While contrasting theories and debates over the nature of Canadian political culture have been evident, constitutional law, a federal, parliamentary, democratic system of governance, personal rights and freedoms (e.g., women, visible minorities, Indigenous), dualism (French and English), cultural pluralism, regionalism, a mixed economy, and continentalism have been prominent themes in this evolution, tempered by traditions of (neo) liberalism, conservatism, and social democracy (at different times and to varying degrees). Public issues related to topics such as environmental concerns, discrimination protections, poverty and welfare, health

care, alcohol and drug use, electoral reform, hate speech, guns in Canada have posed ongoing governance questions and challenges. Within this context, Canadians have tended to participate moderately in formal political processes although principles of political efficacy and support through electoral participation (e.g., voting, joining a political party, volunteering) have been valued.

Expressions of civic engagement among youth in Canada have also been moderate and varied, tempered historically through a filter of personal and social responsibility. Youth civic engagement in the early part of the twentieth century was characterized by personal responsibility and more compliant modes of engagement, closely linked to the broader colonial project of encouraging and supporting nation-building, social and political initiation and, outside of Québec, a pro-British assimilationist orientation. Expressions of youth civic engagement often occurred outside of formal education in organizations like Boy Scouts and Girl Guides and through church affiliations. Civic learning in schools during this same period reflected a similar orientation. Schools were expected to *pass on* understandings that youth would need to be productive members of the newly emerging Canadian society. Attention to formal civic structures and processes and civic duty and obedience, for example, were key features of civic learning (Clark and Case 1997; Evans 2006). Civic learning intentions included “deference to authority, limitations to the freedom of individual and family norms, devolution of their authority to the demands of the state, and the development of an orderly and compliant public culture in the public space of the school” (Llewellyn et al. 2007, p. 7). More directive and less active forms of learning and teaching were the norm. Teachers were expected to transmit certain content and students were expected to receive it (McLeod 1989). Osborne (1996) describes this period in the development and implementation of civic learning in Canadian schools as the “Canadianization of children as a vehicle of assimilationist nation-building” (p. 36).

Repercussions of the First World War, a sense of growing national autonomy and patriotism, difficult labor conditions, and other factors led to a deepened emphasis on personal responsibility, an extension of civic entitlement (e.g., the declaration of women as “persons” under the British North America Act in 1929), and dutiful expressions of civic engagement. This shift in emphasis, according to Osborne (1996), served to depoliticize forms of engagement by paying limited attention to political concepts such as conflict and power. He states, for example,

one could serve through volunteer work, through charity, through church membership, and other forms of non-political activity. In this view, a good person, defined as someone who was kind, neighbourly, law-abiding, and so on, was by definition a good citizen, thus ignoring the long philosophical tradition that holds that good citizenship demands more than this (p. 43).

Civic learning and teaching continued to support personal responsibility and more compliant modes of engagement, national intentions of coherence and social harmony, and knowledge about government institutions and processes through Social Studies curricula and the introduction of student councils. Predictably,

teaching practices focused on *knowing about* the mechanisms of government and one's responsibilities to others and to Canada. While provincial curriculum policies developed incrementally, attention to learning experiences that encouraged more active and critical expressions of civic engagement was minimal (Tomkins 2008). It should be noted, however, that not everyone accepted the civic message of schools during this time and various groups, including First Nations' peoples, Québécois, and trade unions, often voiced concerns (Strong-Boag 1996).

Shifting circumstances and issues arising during the second half of the twentieth century fostered a renewed interest on citizenship and civic learning across Canada. Escalating American influence over the Canadian economy, increasing ethno-cultural diversity, the Quiet Revolution in Québec, and First Nations land claims, for example, prompted increased youth engagement in both formal and less formal political contexts. For a brief period during the late 1960s and early 1970s, university campuses across Canada became sites of protest and conflict (e.g., rallies, marches, sit-ins) as student activism reached heightened levels, influenced by developments mostly south of the border (e.g., civic rights movement, racism, the American war in Vietnam, the New Left). Although these developments helped to politicize a generation of citizens and offered a critique of existing political structures and decision-making processes across Canada, expressions of engagement among youth soon returned to more moderate forms. Around the same time, recommendations from the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (1963–69), the Constitutional Act and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982), and the Canadian Multicultural Act (1988), in particular, assisted in re-shaping notions of citizenship. Themes such as cultural diversity, pluralism, human rights, civic conflict and controversy, global perspectives, and democratic engagement became gradually more intertwined in the public rhetoric and policy about citizenship.

These developments created a renewed interest in civic learning across Canada. Schools were "most often recognized as the public institution best positioned to reach the majority of young Canadian citizens" (Llewellyn et al. 2007, p. 9). Attention to civic learning in formal provincial and territorial curricula began to reflect this broadened civic mandate, constituting what Osborne (1996) referred to as "the beginning of a trend" and "a new conception of citizenship education" (p. 52). Recommendations from the Report of the Commission on Canadian Studies (Symons 1975) led to the provincial development of new "Canadian Studies" curricula, creating more opportunities for teachers and students to explore Canada's expanding cultural diversity, the complexities of French-English relations and Canadian-American relations, and Canada's emerging role in a global community. (Many countries speak of national education systems within nation-state contexts. It should be noted that education in Canada is the responsibility of provincial and territorial governments operating within a federal system. This means that each of the ten provinces and three territories has developed its own distinctive education system and administers its own educational curricula and programs, although some degree of commonality exists across them (e.g., some shared policy development by region).) Civic engagement was gaining attention as a curricular goal (e.g., local inquiries, critical thinking, province-wide simulations like the Southern Ontario

Model Assembly) although implementation in classrooms and schools remained embryonic and uneven. *Engaging in civic matters* usually meant increased awareness of aspects of participation related to formal politics (e.g., voting, joining a political party) and the possibility of some minor form of involvement in school governance (e.g., student councils) (Broom 2016; Hodgetts 1968; McLean et al. 2017) as curriculum priorities increasingly focused on employability skills and preparing students to be productive workers for an emerging global economy (Osborne 2001).

More Recent Developments

From the late 1990s onwards, a variety of issues and contextual pressures (e.g., globalization, issues of inclusion and exclusion, the rise of populist nationalism, increasing attention to Canada's enduring colonial legacy and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (2008–2015)) prompted ongoing conversations about citizenship and its purposes and practices in Canada. While expressions of civic engagement among youth remained moderate and varied (A few recent examples include the Youth Impact Summit/Studio Y– MaRS Ontario (<https://studioy.marsdd.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/MaRS-YIS-Public-Report-2.pdf>), the 2017 Youth Action Gathering/Canadian Council of Refugees (<http://ccrweb.ca/en/youth/welcome>), and the Canadian Roots Exchange Conference on Truth and Reconciliation (2107/ 2018) (<http://canadianroots.ca/conference/>)), a variety of empirical studies reported important concerns about and shifts in how and why young Canadians were engaging in civic matters (Ménard 2010; Turcotte 2015a, b; Llewellyn et al. 2007; Llewellyn et al. 2010). On the one hand, these studies reported increasing disengagement in formal political contexts among youth (e.g., voting and membership in political parties). Some of the contributing factors cited included a general mistrust of politicians among youth, not seeing how formal political decisions affected youth directly, an increasing sense that youth have little impact on the decision-making process, and experiencing a lack of connection to election platforms or attention to issues important to youth (Ménard 2010). On the other hand, these and other studies also reported an increasing level of youth engagement in what is referred to as informal or nonelectoral or participatory political activities in areas of personal interest (e.g., antiracist initiatives, environment, Indigenous peoples' concerns, LGBTQ rights, access to higher education), enhanced by the emergence of social media platforms which have facilitated the development of rights-based interest groups in particular.

Turcotte's (2015b) study, based on data from the 2013 Statistics Canada General Social Survey (GSS), for example, corroborated that while younger people (15–24) in Canada have been less likely to vote than older individuals during the past decade, "these trends in electoral political engagement conceal a relatively high degree of engagement in other (nonelectoral) activities" (p. 11). This shift is characterized by,

(1) an emphasis on specific causes and issues (for example, the environment, access to education or gender equality) as opposed to the more general political issues discussed in an election; and (2) participation in social groups or movements that are less hierarchical and less officially organized (for example, interest groups) as opposed to involvement in traditional political organizations, such as political parties or unions (p. 7).

“Younger people,” according to Turcotte, are “less likely to vote than older individuals. . . and tend to be less interested in politics than the older counterparts” (2015b, p. 6). They are, however, more likely than older people to participate in nonelectoral civic and political activities (face-to-face and online). In 2013, “74% of youth aged 15 to 19 and 64% of youth aged 20 to 24 were part of a group, organization or association. This compared with 65% of individuals aged 45 to 54 and 62% of individuals aged 65 to 74” (2015b, p. 9). Forms of involvement included volunteering, engaging in community projects, and/or joining various community groups and/or NGO organizations operating outside of formal politics. In most instances, these studies also revealed that while engagement remains mostly face-to-face, there is evidence of increasing online engagement with a broader range of civic issues, from local and indigenous to international and global (Depape 2012; Friedel 2015; Tossutti 2007; Tupper 2014). Not surprisingly, these shifting patterns and understandings of youth civic engagement in Canada raised questions for educational stakeholders in terms of what formal education *is doing* or *might do* to support the types of learning needed to assist young people meaningfully engage in civic matters.

Attention to civic learning in formal education contexts continued to increase gradually in Canada during this period. Broadening understandings of civic learning, often associated with “western” liberal and civic republican traditions, became increasingly evident in different spheres of Canadian education (Bickmore 2014; Osborne 2001; Sears 2004). Civic engagement experienced heightened consideration, motivated in part by research undertaken in Canada and internationally revealing increasing disengagement among youth in formal political activities and increased interest in informal, participatory, and digital expressions of engagement (e.g., Hughes and Sears 2008; International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA), Torney-Purta et al. 1999; Torney-Purta 2002; Rothwell and Turcotte 2006).

Next, we explore briefly this heightened consideration of civic engagement in relation to formal education as evidenced through educational studies, curriculum policy reforms, and strengthened pedagogical practices undertaken within the Canadian context in recent years. Doing so reveals a gradual transition from a focus on engagement primarily as personal and social responsibility and learning about formal political structures and processes *as they are* more so than *what they could be* towards characterizations that encourage more active and critical expressions of engagement through public issues, community service, and other more informal and participatory expressions of engagement.

Educational studies. From the early 1990s onwards, notions of civic engagement received increased attention in educational studies, in both Canadian and

international scholarship. Internationally, McLaughlin's (1992) "minimalist" and "maximalist" frame, Parker's (2008) "traditional," "progressive," and "advanced" continuum, Westheimer and Kahne's (2004) distinction among "personally responsible citizen," "participatory citizen," and "social justice-oriented citizen," and, more recently, Banks' (2017) "failed," "recognized," "participatory," and "transformative" model provided contrasting understandings of civic engagement within broader theoretical citizenship education frameworks. In Canada, Sears (1996) distinguished "elitist" from "activist" conceptions of citizenship education. The "elitist" conception prioritizes prevailing narratives of nationhood and government, voting as a key mechanism for citizenship participation, and preparing students to communicate common facts and values, whereas the "activist" conception privileges students as those who construct knowledge about citizenship and who learn to question the function of institutions and structures in determining social organization. Strong-Boag (1996) critiqued what she interpreted as elitist conceptions of citizenship education that tended to exclude "pluralist" and "inclusive" elements of engagement such as feminists, First Nations peoples, working-class groups. Shultz (2007) drew attention to differences between neoliberal, radical, and transformationalist orientations within transnational contexts. More recent scholarly inquiry into educating for civic engagement in Canada has focused more closely on the interconnections between and among civic engagement and youths' ethno-cultural and national identities, issues of social justice, students' lived experiences and concerns, learning practices, and in some instances, transnational considerations (Bickmore 2014; Broom 2016; Eidoo et al. 2011; Llewellyn et al. 2010; Peck et al. 2010).

Curriculum policy reforms. Broadened and more nuanced notions of citizenship and civic learning have also become more evident in provincial and territorial curriculum policy reforms (Bickmore 2006, 2014; Evans 2006; Hughes and Sears 2008; Llewellyn et al. 2007; Sears 2004). While earlier conceptions of citizenship and civic learning remain, more recent reforms have encouraged greater attention to some of the emerging connective themes mentioned earlier (e.g., cultural diversity and pluralism, issues of social justice and equity, indigeneity education, democratic engagement with conflict, global interdependence). Bickmore (2014) noted that,

although they still generally embed mainstream liberal individualist assumptions, Canadian social sciences and citizenship curriculum policy documents reveal an increasingly nuanced, inclusive picture of Canadian society and citizenship, rather than a simple master narrative of nationalistic political history (p. 261).

While civic engagement as a learning goal has received continuing attention through history, social science, and civics curricula, increased attention to youth engagement has also been evident through other subject areas, cross-curricular policy documents (related to such areas Character education, Equity education, Sustainability education), and day-to-day school-based governance, discipline, and community service guidelines.

In Ontario, for example, a *Citizenship Education Framework* was introduced in 2013 to provide general curriculum guidance (K-12) to "bring citizenship

education to life, not only in Social Studies, History, and Geography, but in many other subjects as well” (The Ontario Ministry of Education 2018, p. 10). Four main themes of citizenship education are highlighted in the Framework: (1) active participation (work for the common good in local, national, and global communities), (2) identity (a sense of personal identity as a member of various communities), (3) attributes (character traits, values, and habits of mind), and (4) structures (power and systems within societies). This framework is complemented by a range of core learning goals and specific topics for each grade and subject (Ontario Ministry of Education 2013, p. 7). This deepening attention to civic engagement has also been evident in broader system-wide policy documents such as *Achieving Excellence: A Renewed Vision for Education in Ontario* (Ontario Ministry of Education 2014) where creating “actively engaged citizens” (p. 1) is identified as a fundamental purpose of Ontario’s schools.

While an increasing commitment to civic engagement in education policy across Canada is evident, a variety of concerns have been voiced. Provincial policy guidance is often viewed as strong in rhetoric but vague in terms of what goals are to be given priority and/or what depth of coverage is expected. Such uncertainty, coupled with teachers’ considerable autonomy in how curriculum is interpreted, leaves teachers to choose what types of civic learning are experienced by students. Consequently, learning experiences remain uneven and fragmented. Learning intentions that intersect with understandings and practices of civic engagement such as identity, power, social justice, and controversial issues are given low priority and are often avoided and/or omitted in practice altogether (Bickmore 2006; Evans 2006; MacDonald 2013; MacDonald et al. 2015; Priestley et al. 2012).

Some scholars have also pointed to continuing undertones of harmony building, compliance, and a privileging of certain kinds of knowledge. Llewellyn et al. (2010), for example, suggest that civic engagement,

is almost always preceded or coupled by concepts of the informed, responsible, and dutiful citizen (Llewellyn et al. 2010, 11–12). The implication is that only when students have “procedural knowledge” and “legislative knowledge” (know how to do something), they are ready for civic engagement (p. 798).

Only occasionally do government documents interrogate courses of action that confront complex relationships of power that are fundamental to the democratic process. Even rarer are occasions when guidelines explore student aptitude for civil disobedience, protests, or boycotts; actions that are often considered unpatriotic, regardless of the political stakes at play (p. 803).

Llewellyn et al. (2007, p. 31) have noted that behavioral codes of conduct (e.g., *Ontario Schools Code of Conduct*),

tend to envision ideal civic behaviour as being compliant and obedient. The critical-thinking skills enumerated in all of the curriculum guidelines do not appear to apply to the regulations governing students’ behaviour in schools. The behavioural guidelines, then, tend to be consistent with the vision of *personally responsible* citizenship...while civic education guidelines tend, occasionally, toward more participatory visions... (p. 32).

The intent here seems to be to guide youth behavior both in school and in the community, generally in relationship to adhering to laws, and respecting others – conforming to human rights codes.

In their study analyzing the ways newly mandated civics course guidelines in the provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, and Ontario interpreted active citizenship, Kennelly and Llewellyn (2011) found that active citizenship is consistently coupled [in course documents] with cautions about the importance of compliant behavior (i.e., ethics, duty, and responsibility) and is distanced from seemingly inappropriate participation in civic dissent. These concerns have been further complicated by questions being raised about colonialism, aspects of difference, about whose knowledge counts, and whose interests are being served through curriculum policy reforms and schooling practices (Abdi 2014; Dei 2014; Kennelly 2009; Peck et al. 2010).

Strengthened pedagogical practices. Although a continuing focus on civic engagement in relation to formal politics in local and national contexts is evident, a variety of classroom, schoolwide, and community-based resources have been developed by educators that support more informal and participatory civic learning experiences. These resources often reflect a variety of inquiry-oriented, interactive, and sometimes, experiential learning approaches and practices that often take students beyond the classroom into the community and in some instances, internationally (through online and first-hand experiences). (Three examples of interesting work underway to support inquiry and participatory-oriented civic learning experiences in schools are Maximum City (<https://maximumcity.ca/>); Leave Out Violence Everywhere (LOVE) (<https://leaveoutviolence.org/>); The Social Innovation Student Symposium (2015) (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P1yTuXhTrAs>). It should be noted that these examples represent only a small proportion of pedagogical work underway and offer varying perspectives about and approaches to the types of learning to be encouraged.) Public issue/action projects, model town councils, peace-building programs, public information exhibits, community participation activities, online international linkages, involvement in day-to-day school-based governance, and youth forums, for example, are some of the practices that have been developed to assist students to become better informed, to promote inquiry, and to engage in a range of current civic themes and issues (Bickmore 2014; Chen and Goodreau 2009; Evans 2008; MacDonald 2013; Molina-Girón 2013). A wide range of stakeholders, including teacher federations and provincial subject councils (e.g., British Columbia Teachers' Federation, Ontario History and Social Science Teachers' Association), organizations and NGOs (e.g., CIVIX, Samara Centre for Democracy, War Child Canada), the education divisions of local and national media organizations (e.g., CBC, TVOntario, Toronto Star), and various government departments (locally, provincially, and nationally), have supported this direction.

Widespread implementation of these types of approaches, however, remains limited. Various studies point out that classroom teaching and learning practices continue to be largely teacher-directed, mostly emphasizing knowledge acquisition and skill development (e.g., political structures and systems, governmental history, legislative processes, improving skills in communication and collaboration), suggesting that teaching and learning practices continue to focus more on *knowing about* and *thinking about* rather than *engaging in* (Faden 2012; Hughes and Sears 2008; Kennelly 2009; Llewellyn et al. 2010; Molina-Girón 2013; Sears 2004). *Engaging in*, if practiced at

all, is linked to increased awareness of aspects of participation related to formal politics (e.g., voting, joining a political party), community service (which may or may not enhance participation of civic engagement), and/or the possibility of some minimal form of engagement in school governance (e.g., student council). Bickmore (2014) has noted that there is often little attention to, or consideration of, how school-based citizenship learning opportunities implicitly communicate students' lived citizenship curriculum in the form of patterns of discipline, conflict management within the school, school councils, and community service programming.

Results from various studies have found that civic learning experiences for Canadian students remain varied among students with differing identity affiliations (e.g., race, class, culture, gender, religion, region), signaling variable learning opportunities (Bickmore 2014; Claes et al. 2009; Kennelly 2009; Kennelly and Llewellyn 2011; Peck et al. 2010; Tupper et al. 2010). These studies have shown how Canadian students' civic learning experiences are often not responsive to and/or are disconnected from their lives and own ideas of democracy and citizenship. In their three-year study, Tupper et al. (2010) examined "the relationship between formal citizenship education programs and students' perceptions of themselves as citizens, especially as these relate to issues of equity and difference" (p. 337) in two Saskatchewan urban high schools. Jackson is a school in a diverse working-class neighborhood with a sizeable indigenous population, and Mackenzie is a school in a mostly white, middle class neighborhood. Results revealed that while students articulated similar "official" liberal notions of "universal" citizenship at an abstract level, their experiences varied given their social location. The authors concluded that,

Students at Mackenzie are better able to take up citizenship in uncomplicated, less ambivalent ways because of their social location: their experiences, visions for the future, and understandings of themselves fit with the official discourses articulated through citizenship education in the curriculum . . . Students at Jackson understand in similar ways the rights and responsibilities of the citizen but their social locations complicate their ability to take up 'good' citizenship: their experiences, visions for the future, and understandings of themselves do not fit with the discourse of citizenship available in officially sanctioned curriculum. Because of this, citizenship becomes a site of ambivalence for these students (p. 357).

While on the one hand youth are often seen as playing a leading role in contributing to re-defining and authoring the meaning and scope of civic engagement and forms of civic engagement, they continue to be predominantly regarded as passive recipients within formal education spheres of an education intended to prepare them for a particular (more formal) form of civic engagement.

Additional Issues and Challenges

In relation to the shifting expressions of youth civic engagement in Canada and the variant ways in which educating for youth civic engagement has been envisaged and approached in formal education (K-12), different studies have provided further explanation and clarification of some of the subtleties associated with emerging

understandings and foci of youth engagement and disengagement (Kennelly 2009b; Llewellyn et al. 2007, 2010). Some of these studies, for example, illustrate how youth civic engagement and/or disengagement is distinctly nuanced, linked to a variety of factors including, for example, gender, race, cultural background, education, household income, family civic participation influences, and contextual circumstances (Broom 2016; Dlamini et al. 2009; Eido 2016; Hanvey and Kunz 2000; Hall et al. 2001). Some highlight a growing disconnect between youth' and politicians' values and interests and democratic institutions, while others consider the availability of new approaches to civic engagement, including the increasing use of the internet and social media (Loader and Mercea 2011; Raynes-Goldie and Walker 2008; Uldam and Askanius 2013).

Accurate understandings of how young Canadians are engaging in civic matters are further complicated by the lack of comprehensive data on young Canadians' engagement in civic matters beyond voting and ongoing discussions about what should be considered as civic engagement. According to Llewellyn et al. (2007), research studies often "conflate involvement in charitable direct-service volunteering, community organizations and even sports with involvement in political interest groups" (p. 14). Their study found that involvement in charitable and co-curricular activities is high but also found little evidence that these activities translate into increased engagement in civic matters. Some scholars of youth civic engagement have indeed advocated for a broader definition of civic engagement that includes engagement with emerging institutions and activities that achieve the same purpose as larger, longstanding "normal political" organizations (Ho et al. 2015; Turcotte 2015b).

Additional issues are also evident in relation to formal education contexts. Studies conducted with youth across Canada have suggested that many students have developed only initial and partial notions of civic engagement and its value. For youth themselves, notions of civic engagement are often associated with good behavior such as volunteering in community, cleaning up parks, assisting the elderly, and voting (Chareka and Sears 2005, 2006; Llewellyn et al. 2010; Llewellyn and Westheimer 2010). In one study, students from various backgrounds from two high schools in Regina were invited to create and explain visual images depicting their perceptions of "good" citizenship. The majority of these students reproduced mainstream citizenship notions such as national pride, official multiculturalism discourse, and caring for the environment, family, and neighbors. These young people tended to understand citizenship in individual rather than social or political terms and reported believing that democracy and social justice had been already realized (Tupper and Cappello 2012).

Additional studies also reveal that teachers report concerns about their own preparedness for teaching citizenship and civic engagement and identify a need for ongoing professional learning support (Bickmore 2005; Evans 2006; Hughes and Sears 2008; Peck et al. 2010). Teaching and learning practices that attend to the critical purposes of civic learning and engagement, including inquiry, equity and social justice themes, controversial issues, experiential civic engagement activities, are complicated to implement. Learning about and having opportunities to practice

civic engagement can also be very controversial and many teachers are concerned about the broader implications in terms of how, for example, parents and community members will respond (MacDonald 2013). While some professional development opportunities and resources have been developed in Canada to support teachers' work in this area, concerns continue to be raised about the provision of suitable professional learning in initial teacher education and in-service professional learning programs to effectively address the complexities of teaching and learning for democratic engagement in classrooms and school communities. Lastly, these issues and challenges are further exacerbated by a variety of factors associated with educational change that can either mobilize and/or inhibit steps forward in schools. Inadequate financial/resource support, low curricular status/priority, the hierarchical nature of formal education, and other factors influence the extent to which steps towards engaged citizenship for all students can be realized (Claes et al. 2009; Stolle and Cruz 2005).

Concluding Considerations

This chapter has briefly explored shifting expressions of youth civic engagement in Canada and the variant ways in which educating for youth civic engagement has been envisaged and approached through formal education (K-12). We have contended that while expressions of youth civic engagement have been for the most part moderate, varied, local, institutional, and tempered historically through a filter of personal and social responsibility, there has been a gradual shift of emphasis towards less formal, digital, and rights-based representations. This shift of emphasis has been influenced by a variety of personal and contextual factors over time.

We also considered how understandings of educating for civic engagement through formal education in Canada have also undergone a gradual transition, moving from a focus on civic duty, deference, and formal political structures and processes *as they are* to more recent characterizations that encourage more informal, exploratory, and critical understandings of engagement through public issues, from the local to the global. Interwoven in these understandings of engagement are themes such as identity, cultural diversity, pluralism, and issues of social justice and equity. Indicators of these are found in spheres of Canadian educational research, curriculum policy reform, and strengthened pedagogical practices.

Moving towards these broadened and more complex understandings of educating for civic engagement through formal education have proven to be problematic, complicated by a variety of associated challenges. Curriculum ambiguity, undertones of compliance, an avoidance of certain controversial concepts and issues, and varied understandings of engagement among students with differing identity affiliations, for example, all signal uneven and fragmented access and learning experiences. Systems-wide implementation remains mostly random and minimal. These challenges are further exacerbated by a variety of factors associated with educational change that can both mobilize and/or inhibit steps forward.

As research undertaken in Canada and internationally continues to reveal deepened understandings of youth civic engagement, it is imperative that educational stakeholders acknowledge and be responsive to the disconnects between the ways that youth are participating in civic affairs (and the reasons why) and the learning opportunities they are provided in formal school contexts to make meaning of these experiences and to propel deeper civic engagement in public affairs across local, national, and international spheres, while at the same time keeping in mind, as Biesta (2011) has reminded us, that a good deal of civic engagement learning takes place in contexts outside of formal education.

Cross-References

- ▶ [Constructions of “Youth” and “Activism” in Lebanon](#)
- ▶ [Education for Youth Civic and Political Action in Australia](#)
- ▶ [The Development of Civic Participation Among Youth in Singapore](#)
- ▶ [Youth Engagement and Citizenship in England](#)

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Supporting Active Citizenship Among Young People at Risk of Social Exclusion: The Role of Adult Education

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Abstract

This chapter examines different conceptualizations and perspectives from the literature and reflects on findings from a recent European research project while considering the role of adult education in promoting active and participatory citizenship among young people considered at risk of social exclusion. Promoting active citizenship (alongside equity and social cohesion) is an objective of the European Union’s lifelong learning strategy, but the concept is not clearly defined, and there are a range of different interpretations, framings, and discourses associated with it. Critical analyses suggest that contemporary contexts

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of neoliberalism support limited versions of active citizenship which focus on adaptation and accommodation to economic imperatives, casting adult education mainly in the role of promoting skills and knowledge for “employability.” The chapter explores the links between discourse types of social exclusion suggested by Levitas (*The inclusive society? Social exclusion and new labour*. Palgrave, Basingstoke, 1998) and framings of active citizenship, as well as considering implications for the role of adult education. Selected findings from a recent EU-funded international research collaboration which involved educational programs in 20 European countries are analyzed, identifying instances of how promoting active participation may be framed differently, for example, as focusing on the responsibility to make contributions or as emphasizing equality and rights.

Keywords

Adult education · Active and participatory citizenship · Social exclusion · Young people and young adults · Europe · Neoliberalism

Introduction

This chapter explores the role of adult education in supporting active participatory citizenship, focusing on programs aimed at young people considered at risk of social exclusion in different European countries. “Active citizenship” is a broad concept which features in policy documents on education and lifelong learning of the European Union (EU), such as the ET2020 Strategic Framework European Council (2009) and the subsequent Joint Implementation Report (European Union 2015). However, while adult education has a tradition of being linked to social justice and democratic participation, its contemporary role and function as a vehicle toward inclusion and active citizenship is subject to debate (Field and Schemmann 2017; Martin 2003; Olssen 2006; Mikelatou and Arvanitis 2018).

The chapter will start with definitions, key concepts, and discourses, before moving on to reflections on a recent European research project, “Adult Education as a Means to Active Participatory Citizenship” (EduMAP), conducted between 2016 and 2019 across several EU countries and Turkey. (EduMAP, in which the author was involved as a researcher, was funded under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation program (EduMAP, H2020-YOUNG-2014-2015/H2020-YOUNG-SOCIETY-2015), Grant Agreement number 693388. The research involved academic and industry partners from Finland, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Turkey, and the UK. <https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/200113/factsheet/en>. This chapter expresses the author’s own views.) This research focused on a variety of educational programs for young people and young adults considered at risk of social exclusion – a concept which will be discussed in this chapter.

The definition of adult education used in this chapter is broad, referring to both formal and informal learning activities beyond compulsory (school) education which take place in a variety of settings and contexts. This may include, for example, courses at centers or colleges aimed at supporting basic skills (e.g., literacy, language courses); so-called “second chance” education aimed at obtaining qualifications (e.g., school leaving certificates); vocational education and training; through to more informal programs, projects, and initiatives, such as sociocultural and youth education (Kersh and Toiviainen 2017). While higher education may be considered as part of adult education in its broadest sense, this is not a focus in this chapter. Lifelong learning is sometimes used interchangeably with adult education in the policy and academic literature, but as discussed in this chapter, the former term has been critiqued for its ideological connotations (Biesta 2006; Desjardins 2013; Mikelatou and Arvanitis 2018).

Furthermore, definitions of “young people” and “young adults” are diverse in terms of their starting and end ages. One of the widest ranges (13–30) is reported by the Council of Europe and EU (2019) joint *Youth Partnership* for the purposes of youth policy, while Eurostat (2019) uses the range of 15–29 for statistical report purposes. Such wide age ranges have some obvious implications given the multitude of life contexts within such a “cohort,” adding to the many other factors of diversity characterizing the experiences and situations of young people and young adults in Europe. Acknowledging this diversity, this chapter follows the age range of the earlier mentioned EduMAP research program, which considered educational programs for young people and young adults between 16 and 30 (Kersh and Toiviainen 2017).

Active Participatory Citizenship: Concepts and Models

Concepts of active and participatory citizenship are diverse, owing not least to the variety of traditions and notions of citizenship across different geographical, historical, and ideological contexts. Peterson and Brock (2017) suggest that citizenship can be seen both as a (legal) relationship between individuals and the state and as a wider relational practice of active human engagement with their communities, thus taking place at a variety of levels. Hoskins et al. (2012), undertaking to develop a clearer definition of what constitutes the idea of participatory citizenship within the European Union, also highlight the importance of framing the concept beyond legal perspectives and consider the influences of *liberal*, *communitarian*, *civic republican*, and *critical* traditions. They find that recent models of participatory citizenship in countries such as the UK and the Netherlands have blended liberal and communitarian models, emphasizing community volunteering in combination with reduced state involvement, while France is typically cited as a key context for the civic republican model, focusing on democratic structures and processes. Critical models of citizenship highlight issues of social justice and power dynamics, and as such they correspond less to national traditions but rather to critiques thereof. Hoskins et al.’s (2012, p. 17) proposed definition is to consider active and participatory citizenship as

involving “[p]articipation in civil society, community and / or political life, characterized by mutual respect and non-violence and in accordance with human rights and democracy,” which may involve activities ranging from volunteering through to civil protest.

Jochum et al. (2005) delineate different domains to map active citizenship practices, such as formal versus informal engagement and individual versus collective forms of action. They outline three main dimensions: the political level denoting the relationships between citizens and the state; the social level concerning the relationship between individuals and communities and/or wider society; and the individual level, where themes of agency (e.g., the choice to get involved or not) and subjectivity (of defining specific acts as citizenship practice) become apparent. A model highlighting different dimensions of active and participatory citizenship was also used as part of the EduMAP research project, distinguishing between socioeconomic, sociocultural, and politico-legal dimensions (Toiviainen et al. 2019; Schmidt-Behlau 2019). These refer, respectively, to participation in systems which contribute to meeting individual and communal material needs; to interactive practices taking place across diverse communities and societies; and to participation in decision-making processes at formal and informal levels, based on an understanding of rights and values underpinning democracy.

Various models consider the interaction of agency, opportunities, and structure in either promoting or posing barriers to participation. Rubenson and Desjardins (2009), in the context of participation in adult education, describe a model of *bounded agency* which focuses on the interactions between structural conditions (set through the nature of welfare, economic, and educational policies in particular countries) and individual capabilities and situations. They argue that regimes based on the “Nordic” welfare state model are more likely to foster conditions which help resolve barriers both at structural and institutional levels or in the situational contexts of individuals. Boeren (2017) considers participation through a model of three levels: the micro-level of individual agency, circumstances, and capabilities, the macro-level of state policies, and the meso-level of available participation opportunities and institutions providing them, including their flexibility and accessibility.

Active Citizenship and Adult Education in Contexts of Neoliberalism

The range of models highlights the complex multilevel and multifaceted character of citizenship participation. Implicitly underlying many models is the notion of active citizenship as an emancipatory practice linked to fostering social inclusion. However, there are also perspectives raising concerns about the risk that active citizenship is liable to be instrumentalized as a form of governance or governmentality in the context of neoliberalism, where individual responsibility is emphasized without structural conditions fostering equality (Olssen 2006; Mikelatou and Arvanitis 2018; Biesta 2006; ► Chap. 10, “Neoliberalism, Citizenship, and Education: A Policy Discourse Analysis” by Wilkins). Neoliberalism has spread

globally from the 1970s and 1980s onward as an ideology which transfers the logic of economics, specifically in market-oriented forms, across domains of everyday life.

Wendy Brown (2015, 2016) argues that in its most unbridled contemporary form, neoliberalism resembles the business model of an investment bank, affecting both the governance of states and expectations on the self-governance of individuals – a shift from political to economic conceptualizations of citizenship. These processes are riddled with paradox, as part of which neoliberalism leads new *binds* which tie individuals into the fate and logic of corporations and state organizations following profit- and growth-maximizing strategies. As a result, Brown argues, the needs of the individual are liable to be sacrificed if they conflict with interests such as national economic growth. Examples in recent years include the rhetoric of austerity and the rollback of the welfare state in various European countries. Neoliberalism bundles individual agency and blame in a way that forces people to “fend for themselves” (Brown 2016, p. 10), potentially facing blame not just for their own misfortune or lack of success but also bearing responsibility for the role they play in promoting or “downgrading” the health of their national economies. At the extreme, citizenship under neoliberalism “is stripped of substantive political engagement and voice, and citizen virtue becomes uncomplaining accommodation to the economic life of the nation” (ibid.).

In the field of (adult) education, neoliberalism affects policies and practices in a number of ways. Education becomes a key policy tool for influencing productivity and competitiveness, described by Biesta (2006) in the term *learning economy*, leading to a greater emphasis on formal education perceived as promoting the skills levels and qualifications required for economic growth (Desjardins 2013). Thus, while EU lifelong learning policy documents include the promotion of active citizenship and social inclusion as stated aims, at operational levels they focus on employability and adaptability to economic demands (Field and Schemmann 2017; Mikelatou and Arvanitis 2018; Biesta 2006).

The discourse shift from education as a *right* to learning as an individual *responsibility*, or citizen duty, has implications in a range of areas: on the one hand, it leads to a focus on programs deemed to promote employability, rather than being based on the aspirations and needs of individuals and communities. Martin (2003) describes this as an overemphasis on “learning for earning” as opposed to learning for *yearning*. Potential adult learners are positioned as responsible for their own self-management, development, and adaptability, with a view to maximizing their chances to compete on the job market, reducing reliance on welfare systems and thus contributing to national economic growth as *worthy citizens* (Walker 2009). Not participating in learning and employment, on the other hand, constructed as attributable to individual failings or self-exclusion, becomes “tantamount to non-citizenship” (ibid., p. 346). Young people who neither engage in education, training, or employment are labelled through the negative acronym “NEET,” a term which (having spread from its initial UK policy context to other European countries) emphasizes what they are *not* doing (Yates and Payne 2006; Thurlby-Campbell and Bell 2015). In the context of their individualized

responsibilization (Brown 2016), they are not only seen as disturbing their own future prospects but constructed as a collective threat to the economic success of nations or supranational entities such as the EU.

There is widespread consensus that neoliberalism is not a singular concept, but rather heterogenous, diverse, and interacting with a range of other factors and influences in different contexts and locations around the world (Brown 2016). This includes “softer” forms which may formally emphasize values such as social inclusion and participation but still retain the key tenets of a market-oriented ideology, with the effect of privileging economic profitability over social justice concerns such as universalizing and equalizing access to public resources (Walker 2009; Mikelatou and Arvanitis 2018). At the same time, despite the widespread character of neoliberalism, there is also resistance toward its ideology. Thus, while both active citizenship and adult education are significantly affected by contexts such as austerity, individual responsabilization, and the dominance of economic concerns across life domains, responses to these contexts are more diverse than Brown’s bleak picture of *uncomplaining accommodation*.

Before turning to perspectives from professionals and young adults in selected adult education programs in Europe, the following section considers the framings of active and participatory citizenship and of adult education as responses to social exclusion. As a conceptual pair which gained prominence in European policy discourse from the 1980s onward, social inclusion and exclusion feature in the lifelong learning policy documents of the European Union alongside active citizenship, considered as related and interacting (Mikelatou and Arvanitis 2018). However, as the framework by Levitas (1998) discussed below indicates, discourses of social exclusion are varied and in their intersections with neoliberalism may emphasize, respectively, the need for processes of redistribution of power and resources, integration through labor market participation, or focus on the modification of individual behaviors and values. These competing and overlapping discourses can be linked to different conceptualizations of active and participatory citizenship, with implications for the role of adult education.

Redistribution, Employability, or Influencing Values: Framing Active Citizenship as Response to Social Exclusion

Levitas’ (1998) framework of three ideal-type discourses of social exclusion was developed in the context of the then New Labour government in the UK in the late 1990s, which placed particular emphasis on social exclusion in public policy debates. As part of this, a dedicated *Social Exclusion Unit* was established which in its subsequent form (the *Social Exclusion Taskforce*) continued until its disbandment under the incoming Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government in 2010, at which point the policy language shifted to other terms (notably the “Big Society” and austerity). The European Union similarly adopted social inclusion and exclusion as key policy concerns as part of the Lisbon process (Levitas 2004).

The first discourse (which Levitas termed *redistributionist* or RED) arose from the field of critical social policy and maintains a strong conceptual link with poverty. It focuses on the *processes* through which people are shut out (fully or partially) from participation in systems which could bring about their social integration in a society (Walker and Walker 1997). While poverty may be one reason for exclusion, other factors such as inequalities and discrimination are also significant (and overlapping). Thus, the contrast to exclusion is a “version of citizenship which calls for substantial redistribution of power and wealth” (Levitas 1998, p. 7), implying resistance to the trends and processes which Brown (2015, 2016) outlines as being central to neoliberalism. Applied to adult education policies and practice, this discourse type emphasizes the transformative power of education to bring about greater social justice and promote resistance against inequalities – a “critical and progressive adult education [. . .that is] part of the process of fighting back and showing that there is never no alternative” (Martin 2003, p. 577). Similarly, in his discussion of the role of citizenship in further education in the UK, Hopkins (2014) argues that active citizenship goes beyond uncritically following established norms and beliefs but rather involves recognition of the possibility of *social change* and action toward it.

The second type of discourse emphasizes social integration through the labor market, positioning paid work not only as the key remedy against poverty but also as a form of social and cultural integration (Levitas 1998). In doing so, the *social integrationist discourse* (SID) downplays inequalities and exclusion which may persist or even worsen through paid employment (such as wage exploitation or potentially negative impacts on health or care responsibilities). SID thus links with softened versions of neoliberalism, such as inclusive liberalism (Walker 2009), which emphasize social integration but maintain the dominant status of economic perspectives. In the context of adult education and active citizenship, this discourse type promotes a focus on employability as a route to socioeconomic participation but focuses less on capabilities of “controlling conditions of existence [. . .than on] choice within existing conditions” (Brown 2015, p. 206). Integration thus becomes a form of adaptation to optimize life chances.

The third discourse, termed, perhaps somewhat provocatively, *moral underclass discourse* or MUD by Levitas (1998), focuses on issues such as dependency on the welfare state or other forms of deviance from key cultural norms (e.g., involvement in crime, unemployment) and attributes this to problematic behaviors or deficient moral values of individuals or groups, as infamously coined in Murray’s (1990, p. 5) claim that the underclass represented “a subset of poor people who chronically live off mainstream society. . .without participating in it.” MUD easily becomes gendered and racialized, through tropes such as single (teenage) mothers as long-term benefit recipients, while in multiethnic societies the exclusion of migrants and minority groups may be blamed on their own failures to assimilate rather than on discriminatory structures and practices. The individualizing of responsibility and blame reflected in this discourse links with Brown’s (2016) characterization of neoliberalism in its most unbridled forms, although the language chosen by Levitas for this discourse also alludes to the double value standards inherent in English Victorian society. Both active citizenship and adult education viewed through this

lens emphasize adherence to and active promotion of values and behaviors based on models of virtue, which may or may not be framed in nationalized terms. In England, the requirement of publicly funded educational institutions to actively promote “Fundamental British Values” may be seen as an example of assimilatory practice aimed at preventing perceived deviance particularly among Muslim young people (McGhee and Zhang 2017; ► Chap. 27, ““Fundamental British Values”: The Teaching of Nation, Identity, and Belonging in the United Kingdom” by Habib, in this volume).

The variable manifestations of neoliberalism and their intersection with a variety of contexts geographically and over time mean that the discourses, while competing, also appear in ways that are enmeshed and overlapping. It is also important to point out some significant *limitations* of the social exclusion concept overall, highlighted by Levitas (2004) as (1) the dichotomy of insiders and outsiders, casting the latter as a minority and the former as the mainstream; (2) the neglect and subsequent legitimization of inequalities among those seen as “included”; and (3) the failure to focus on what sets the very rich apart from the “mainstream” (i.e., ownership of productive property). Notwithstanding these limitations, social exclusion and inclusion have maintained currency in policy and academic discourses, which may be attributed in part to their conceptual elasticity (ibid.), and in a broader view, Levitas’ framework of discourses can be applied to delineate a range of perspectives on participation and its barriers.

The Role of Adult Education in Promoting Active and Participatory Citizenship Among Young Adults: Perspectives from a Recent European Research Project

Background

The EduMAP research considered the perspectives of young adult learners, educational practitioners, and policy makers involved in 40 educational programs in 20 countries (Schmidt-Behlau 2019; Tacchi et al. 2019). The research followed a qualitative framework and was conducted through semi-structured individual and focus group interviews, reaching over 800 participants, including 475 young people and young adults. The programs ranged from formal (including vocationally focused, “second chance,” basic skills and language programs) to informal contexts (e.g., sociocultural, mentoring, or youth work-based programs). The life contexts of young people and young adults participating in the programs were diverse and included having experienced public care over the course of their childhood and youth; having left formal education without or with limited qualifications; unemployment; experiences of migration, including as refugees; belonging to an ethnic or other minority group (e.g., young people from Roma communities); homelessness; experiencing health difficulties or disabilities; or being in prison. Thus, their situations were liable to being considered by professionals and policy makers as potentially vulnerable or at risk of social exclusion, even though this was not necessarily

the young people's own view of their situation (EduMAP 2017; Schmidt-Behlau 2019; Tacchi et al. 2019).

The research focused on the conceptualization and operationalization of active citizenship and related concepts in adult education contexts; on perceptions and experiences of barriers, vulnerability, and social exclusion; and on the ways in which the selected programs promoted competences and skills relevant to participation. For the latter aspect, the research differentiated between socioeconomic, socio-cultural, and politico-legal dimensions of citizenship (Schmidt-Behlau 2019). Interviews with young people and young adults focused on exploring their life situations and experiences, not least because few of them directly related to abstract terms such as "active citizenship."

Overall, it is important to stress that the full findings of the research were rich and wide-ranging, indicating diversity across contexts as well as some common themes, and it is far beyond the scope of this chapter to report on these in any detail. Instead, the following focuses on particular instances of framing participation, which do not necessarily correspond to the overall approaches of programs, nor can they be taken as representative for the perspectives of professionals and young adults involved with these programs. Further publications related to findings from the research can be found both on the project website (<https://blogs.uta.fi/edumap/>) and on the European Commission's project platform (<https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/200113/results/en>).

Perspectives on the Meanings of Active and Participatory Citizenship

Even setting aside the multitude of linguistic contexts across the countries and communities in the research, the vocabulary and conceptualizations of active citizenship were found to be diverse and context-dependent. These contexts include, similar as in Boeren's (2017) model of participation, the macro-level context of state and international policies relating to adult education, citizenship, and social inclusion; the meso-level of institutions and organizations involved in the particular field of adult education; and the micro-level of the specific program and of young adults' individual experiences.

A key finding was that for the young adults involved in the research, ideas related to active and participatory citizenship were rooted in their everyday life contexts and linked with their aspirations, goals, needs, and participation barriers they had experienced (Schmidt-Behlau 2019; Tacchi et al. 2019). For example, for many young adults who had overcome situations of adversity with the help of someone they considered a role model, active citizenship involved qualities such as being helpful and supportive to others or aspiring, themselves, to act as role models. Attributes of personal agency such as autonomy and self-responsibility were significant aspects of active citizenship practice for many young adults across country and program contexts. Socioeconomic dimensions of citizenship participation, particularly employment, were emphasized by many learners and educators, not just in vocationally related programs (e.g., Schmidt-Behlau and Endrizzi 2018; Zarifis et al.

2018a; Sabiescu 2018; Kuusipalo and Niiranen 2018a; Huegler et al. 2018a; Lawson 2018). One argument for this, provided by an educational practitioner in the UK, was that meeting basic socioeconomic needs may be a prerequisite for considering other forms of citizenship participation, following the logic of Maslow’s “hierarchy of needs”:

... first of all I would imagine you have to have a roof over your head and you have to have employment, and then maybe you’d want to think about citizenship [...] The bottom part needs to be addressed first ... (Huegler et al. 2018b, p. 8)

Views on sociocultural dimensions were more diverse: for example, young adults in Roma communities in Spain and Romania emphasized the significance of their immediate family and community contexts which provided a source of strength and security, mitigating against experiences of discrimination and marginalization in wider society to which they felt less connected (Sabiescu 2018; Gordano 2018). For many young people, ideas of active citizenship linked with a sense of belonging, often at a local level, to a community or neighborhood. Concepts of identity and belonging linked to national citizenship were more complex: for example, individual young people in programs in the UK connected citizenship to a sense of national pride, while ethnic minority young people and some professionals interviewed in Ireland spoke of an ambivalent relationship with the term “citizenship” itself, often grounded in experiences of hostile bureaucracies within immigration systems (Huegler et al. 2018a; Huegler 2018a).

The greatest diversity of perspectives (among young people, but also among professionals) existed in relation to political participation, and there are indications from the research that this dimension is most sensitive to the context, settings, content, and pedagogies of specific programs (Schmidt-Behlau 2019). While participation in the job market or in groups or communities seemed to be accepted almost universally as key aspects of citizenship practice, involvement in processes or structures linked to democratic decision making or influencing societal conditions held lower levels of priority among some. In some instances, this translated into a disinterest in voting or expressed distrust in politicians and political systems (Zarifis et al. 2018b; Huegler et al. 2018a; Schmidt-Behlau 2019). However, for other young people, engaging politically and seeking to influence social change took a central role – often in program contexts which actively supported political participation through their content and the methods and pedagogies involved (e.g., informal education program using democratic and participatory structures and approaches).

‘Activating’ Individuals to Make Contributions or Creating Level Playing Fields: Selected Instances of How Promoting Participation May Be Framed

Similar as with conceptualizations of active citizenship, perspectives on the role of adult education in promoting participation also varied. Young adult learners were

often focused above all on concrete aims such as gaining skills or a qualification (if the program offered this), finding employment, or improving their life situations in other ways. Among educational practitioners and policy makers, providing support with integration and adaptation (e.g., learning how to find and keep employment for unemployed young people, or learning the local majority language for young refugees and migrants) were key themes in some programs (Schmidt-Behlau 2019), with some perspectives linking to what Levitas (1998) described as the social integrationist discourse on social exclusion. This took the form of focusing on skills for employment, on further participation in adult education or *making contributions* to the community. The following views from an educational practitioner and a local policy maker, respectively, in a program in the Netherlands demonstrate this focus:

I think to be part of the society, to be an active and effective member of the society, you must have a job. I think [this program] aims at integrating you in the society through job creation... (Lawson 2018, p. 5)

Whether you have a job or whether you're on social support, you should be able to contribute to the community. Because if you are on social support, it's the taxes of a lot of people that [are] coming to you, right, then, how would you be able to kind of give [a] hand or help. (Lawson 2018, p. 4)

The onus in this perspective is mostly on individual learners to increase their levels of “choice within existing conditions” (Brown 2015, p. 205) through work or other contributions to the community. However, in the second quote, there is also clear suggestion that the right to welfare support should come at the price of community involvement (e.g., through volunteering), as repayment in lieu for having received tax moneys paid by other citizens. This perspective juxtaposes “active” citizen involvement with concerns about “passive” receipt of welfare support and dependency, pointing to an intersection with Levitas’ (1989) “moral underclass” discourse. A similar concern is also evident in the following view from a local policy maker in the UK:

I do not want to create a dependency culture for learners on this program. We need to develop them into active citizens, which is also about independent learning and taking responsibility. And many people actually know all their rights but don't always recognise what their responsibilities are. (Huegler et al. 2018b, p. 13)

The perspective that it was up to young people to take responsibility for their learning and life paths sometimes went hand in hand with a view that young people's own values, beliefs, or behaviors played a significant, or perhaps even the most significant, role in their experiences of exclusion. Young people not in education, employment, or training were a key example, with perspectives among some educational practitioners and policy makers that problematized cultures of *entrenched worklessness*, life path expectations *from school to dole*, or *chaotic lifestyles* among some communities or young people (Huegler et al. 2018b). Another example was perspectives on refugee integration in which specific groups, such as single young men, were considered at risk of marginalization because their perceived

norms and values were seen to conflict with those dominant in the “host” societies (Kuusipalo and Niiranen 2018b).

While contributing to social change and social justice were part of many programs’ broad aims and visions, explicit reference to strategies for influencing societal structures and conditions was less common. For example, two programs in Ireland addressed issues of discrimination and racism experienced by ethnic minority young people, in one case through sports-based projects and in another through a project which culminated in the production of an awareness-raising video resource by young people (Huegler 2018a, b). In both cases the programs used informal and youth-led approaches aimed at creating networks of solidarity, with educators acting as facilitators rather than knowledge experts. The issues to be tackled through the programs were based on young people’s own definitions and experiences, and exclusion was above all considered through the prism of structural barriers and of discrimination perpetuated by majority groups against minority groups, highlighting, for example, the discrimination experienced by *hijab*-wearing young women in employment contexts, sports, and public spaces. In both programs, young people, supported by educational practitioners, advocated for equal access to opportunities and resources and an *even playing field*, for themselves but also for future generations. A young woman on one of the programs explained how her realization that other ethnic minority young people were facing similar issues influenced her motivation to raise awareness on issues of discrimination:

I thought it was just me who faced it, or it was where I was living [. . .]. But the more people I talked to, the more I realised it was actually like everybody had felt, or dealt with it, in different ways. So that was one way I think it really impacted me, I was like ‘no, what happened to me doesn’t necessarily need to happen to the next generation.’ (Huegler 2018b, p. 10)

In another programme, based in the UK, a director highlighted the role of adult education in relation to redistributing opportunities and resources. Referring to the image of *two banks of a river* that is *deep* and *fast-flowing*, she described, on one side, the range of participation opportunities, including further or higher education, while on the other side, there were communities and individuals who felt incapable of accessing them:

. . . on the other side of the river are some of our communities who don’t have access, don’t believe they have access because [. . .] they still feel quite a distance between what that is, there’s a river, it’s quite deep, it’s fast flowing and the conditions. . . [. . .] they think that is not for them. Poverty in particular immediately impacts confidence, self-esteem. So for me, you need to build a bridge between active citizenship and where actual communities are and not be arrogant to think ‘why are you not coming across, you’ve got all this funding and stuff to do.’ (Huegler et al. 2018b, p. 12)

Adult education, in this view, is considered as a possible means to bridge the gap between opportunities and resources for participation on the one hand and individuals and communities on the other. Facilitating this form of redistribution, however,

requires policies and programs to be flexible and accessible, taking into account the concepts of bounded agency by Rubenson and Desjardins (2009) and Boeren (2017) discussed in this chapter. This is complicated by the fact that, through a multitude of factors, adult education programs and educational practitioners themselves experience the constraints of bounded agency in contexts of neoliberalism.

Overall, what emerges from looking at these instances of how active participatory citizenship may be framed by professionals and young adults is that adult education as a potential means to promoting participation is subject to an array of contestations regarding its role, purpose, and its own constructions of young people as agentic citizens. At a time when adult education is facing a multitude of constraints, pressures, and limitations in many countries (not least of funding, in contexts of austerity), it is faced with – albeit limited – choices about which models and forms of citizenship, participation, and inclusion it supports. The starting points for these choices link to examining the range of discourses and meanings which abstract concepts and policy statements may harbor.

Conclusions

This chapter has debated different conceptualizations of active and participatory citizenship and their implications for the role of adult education. While lifelong learning policy documents at European level make reference to promoting active citizenship and social inclusion, the meanings of these concepts for different actors and at different levels have remained underexplored. In contexts of neoliberalism, adult education risks being reduced, first and foremost, to a strategy to enhance employability and productivity. There are also justified doubts about whether “active” and “participatory” citizenship is necessarily linked to ideas of greater social justice or focuses predominantly on integration into existing systems or remedial interventions for those considered particularly at risk of social exclusion. Reflecting on the findings of recent European research on the roles which adult education may take in promoting active and participatory citizenship among young adults highlights the diversity and contextuality of understandings and approaches. The young people and young adults in the research across programs in 20 European countries related to active participation and citizenship above all in the context of their own aspirations, goals, and experiences. Similarly, the very different contexts of the programs researched have led to highly diverse approaches, and discussing these with the level of detail in which they deserve to be considered goes far beyond the scope of this chapter. While it is not suggested that distinct discourses are representative of the approaches of specific programs or of individual educational practitioners, the chapter has identified selected instances of how promoting participation may be framed in adult education contexts. These instances include (1) supporting the capacity of learners to make optimal use of available (albeit potentially limited) opportunities and maximize choices as a result (especially in relation to employment); (2) promoting specific attitudes, behaviors, and values which support learners’ adaptation to societal norms and expectations in order to

increase their participation; and (3) facilitating participation based on strategies that aim to equalize and redistribute opportunities and resources, often starting with processes of awareness raising. In the former two instances, active participatory citizenship is more likely to be viewed as a responsibility, while the latter perspective focuses on participation as a right.

Cross-References

- ▶ “Fundamental British Values”: The Teaching of Nation, Identity, and Belonging in the United Kingdom
- ▶ Neoliberalism, Citizenship, and Education: A Policy Discourse Analysis

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Youth Citizenship in Sierra Leone: Everyday Practice and Hope **52**

Alice Chadwick

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Abstract

This chapter draws upon existing theoretical and empirical literature to explore youth agency and citizenship in Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone's young population, alongside a history of civil-conflict, has led to anxieties about young people and their role within society, making Sierra Leone an important case for exploring how youth citizenship is conceived in a context in which young people's inclusion became a key focus of development agendas. First, some definitions of the key terminology are provided making use of existing theoretical literature followed by a brief outline of the relevant historical and sociopolitical context. The chapter then engages with three case studies that provide insight into how young people engage with citizenship in Sierra Leone; firstly, through an exploration of informal employment and citizenship in Freetown – the country's

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capital; secondly, through an examination of the growth of youth-based civil society after the civil-conflict; and finally through an examination of how the Ebola epidemic (2014–2016) shaped young people’s enactment and experience of citizenship through volunteering. Through these case studies, an argument is made for the need to interrogate *how* young people navigate the gap between experiences of citizenship and expectations or hoped-for alternatives, acknowledging young people’s hope for a different future, while appreciating the difficulty for young people of everyday citizenship encounters. The gap identified raises questions about the contradictions between often unobtainable global citizenship ideals and the difficulty of the everyday practice of citizenship.

Keywords

Sierra Leone · Sub-Saharan Africa · Youth Agency · Citizenship · Employment · Civil Society · Volunteering

Introduction

There has been a huge growth in research, both academic and policy, regarding how young people in Sub-Saharan Africa understand and experience citizenship. Research in this area has been ignited both by the young populations of Sub-Saharan African countries, alongside questions of what this abundance of youth means for society. Two sides of this argument can be characterized: the “youth bulge” and the “youth dividend.” The former considers youthful populations as inherently unstable and problematic, while the latter, not necessarily rejecting this claim, suggests that youthful populations can be harnessed to promote and achieve economic development and growth. Given the connection often made between youthful populations and instability, research and theory in this area has particularly been concerned with young people’s participation and citizenship within conflict and post-conflict settings, given that conflict is often caused by a breakdown or failure of the citizen-state contract. Conceptions and practices of citizenship in Sub-Saharan Africa are also impacted by how global citizenship ideals and discourses are understood and interpreted. Acknowledging this wider regional context, this chapter considers the case study of youth citizenship within Sierra Leone, a country with both a youthful population and contested understandings of belonging and citizenship – resulting from the slave trade, colonial domination, civil-conflict, and post-conflict development agendas. By reviewing both theoretical and empirical research, the chapter argues that citizenship among young people in Sierra Leone moves beyond definitions based upon membership and relations with a political state and towards understanding citizenship through the everyday interactions between young Sierra Leoneans and the authorities and institutions that shape their lives and sense of identity. This is in line with Peterson and Brock’s (2017) conceptualization of citizenship as the practice through which humans actively engage within their communities. This definition brings forward the relationship between agency and

citizenship. Young people, in Sub-Saharan Africa especially, are often presented in binary fashion as either autonomous agents or as a group dependent on and controlled by others (Durham 2000). However, and as this chapter seeks to do, agency in citizenship practice also needs to be considered in terms of the relational and contextual constraints that shape young people's ability to navigate citizenship claims within the social milieu in which they live.

This chapter first provides definitions of the concepts of youth, agency, and citizenship within the contexts of Sub-Saharan African and Sierra Leone specifically. Next, it outlines the historical and sociopolitical context of Sierra Leone relating to youth identity, agency, and citizenship from colonial experiences to the civil-conflict in the 1990s and the post-conflict focus on youth development. Then, tapping into contemporary empirical work, it discusses three case studies, exploring how young Sierra Leoneans show agency in navigating the informal networks and institutions that are necessary for the everyday practice of citizenship, while maintaining and identifying with hoped-for imaginaries of how citizenship should or could be. Finally, it discusses how interrogating this gap between the informal or everyday mechanisms through which young people enact, contest, and experience citizenship and the hoped-for alternatives can support academic and policy development of youth citizenship discussions that start from the basis of how citizenship is experienced and imagined by young people themselves as opposed to how it is conceptualized within global development discourse.

Youth: Age and Marginalization

Youth relates to chronological age, with global institutions and national governments using age brackets to categorize youth, for example, UN 15-24 (UN 2013) and Sierra Leone government 15-35 (GoSL 2003). However, scholars and practitioners in youth development have argued for an appreciation of youth that extends beyond age and reflects social and economic status and experiences of marginalization. Examining youth in this way allows for an appreciation of the category as socially constructed and flexible, with definitions of youth shifting between contexts (Durham 2000; Lovell 2006; Philipps 2014). The category of youth in Sub-Saharan African has been described as “a moveable feast” (Argenti 2002, p. 125). The same individual is an adult in one context and yet a youth in another – rendering the achievement of adulthood as neither fixed nor secure (Shepler 2010; Waage 2006). In this way, “age interacts with status, which in turn is tied to access to material resources and social and political connections” (Boersch-Supan 2012, p. 31). This understanding allows for an appreciation of youth as a category of marginalization.

In Sierra Leone, a youth is often “any individual who is unmarried, landless and lacking political and economic power” (Manning 2009 cited in Tom 2014 p. 329), although this is not as true in urban contexts. This definition shows the connection between youth and marginalization from economic or social resources and networks, and it positions youth as a negative category – defined in terms of what it lacks or

what it is not. Increasingly, scholars argue for the need to understand young people and youth as a valuable stage of life in and of itself, positing youth identity and experiences as meaningful for what they are rather than what they lack (Christiansen et al. 2006; de Boeck and Honwana 2005). Moving away from seeing youth in terms of deficiency is important for an exploration of youth citizenship practice within Sierra Leone, where for the marginalized achieving the status of adulthood is by no means guaranteed.

Agency, Citizenship Practice, and Hoped-For Alternatives

For the purposes of this chapter, a definition of citizenship adapted from Peterson and Brock (2017) is used which puts forward two views of citizenship. Firstly, citizenship is theorized as a legal categorization representing membership of a political state and suggestive of certain responsibilities on both the part of citizens and the state body. Secondly, this approach acknowledges that citizenship is often conceptualized in a broader framework as a practice – how people engage with other citizens and institutions in a given context. This framework of citizenship practice is relevant for an exploration of youth citizenship in Sierra Leone, where the everyday practice of citizenship works alongside hoped-for conceptualizations of citizenship. As recognized by Luisa Enria (2018), in Sierra Leone, people’s expectations of the state are shaped both by their experiences and comparison between these experiences and how people feel the state should function – what Enria calls “citizenship imaginaries.” In this sense when defining citizenship, a distinction can be drawn between the everyday practice of citizenship in terms of community networks of belonging and identification, and the hoped-for relationship that people feel they should have with state or state-like structures, which is more aligned with the theorization of citizenship as membership of a political state.

The definition of citizenship as a practice is linked to agency, as it suggests people enacting citizenship through both their everyday interactions and the cultivation of hoped-for alternatives. Agency can be linked to ideas about “the autonomous and self-sufficient neo-liberal subject” and as such is connected to conceptualizations of the free-will of the individual (Bordonaro and Payne 2012, p. 367). However, this reading can conceal the social and contextual constraints in which individuals are operating. Furthermore, attempts to inculcate agency through policy and practice are not neutral but suggestive of an understanding of how society should or ought to be organized (Ahearn 2001). Therefore, agency needs to be considered as both relational and contextual. Relational in the sense that individual freedom to act can be both constrained and bolstered by social networks and institutions in which people are embedded. Contextual in the sense that what is considered as agency is often dependent upon the hegemonic norms of “positive” or “correct” behavior that operate within a certain society.

To address the contextual and relational constraints of youth agency, Henrik Vigh developed the analytical device “social navigation” (2006a, b, 2009). “Social navigation” allows for an appreciation of the fluidity of the environments within which

people are moving and how people interact with them and adapt their actions accordingly, enabling an assessment of “the way people not just act in but interact with their social environment and adjust their lives to the constant influence. . . of social forces and change” (Vigh 2009, p. 433). The framework is useful for considering young people’s agency in navigating citizenship practice and their social environment in a context where the variables impacting change are outside their control. Theorizing youth agency as contextual and relational acknowledges how citizenship is understood both through the “social navigation” of everyday practice with the contextual constraints it embodies, and through the inculcation of meaning through cultivation of hope for better conditions in the future.

After a consideration of the historical and sociopolitical context of Sierra Leone in relation to youth agency and citizenship, three empirical case studies are presented, exploring young people’s everyday practice of citizenship and hope in relation to employment in an urban setting, youth-based civil society organization in rural settings, and finally citizenship experiences and claims during the Ebola epidemic (2014–16).

Sierra Leone: Historical and Sociopolitical Context

Any analysis of citizenship needs to be rooted in a discussion of the historical origins that have shaped current practice, experience, and hoped-for alternatives. In terms of Sierra Leone, Luisa Enria and Shelley Lees describe its historical and contemporary experiences as a “testing ground for what it means to be a political subject” (2018, p. 34). Sierra Leone’s history is made up of series of contested ideas about what it means to belong and be a citizen or subject. These contested ideas stem from regional migratory practices, the slave trade, colonial domination, and then post-independence resource accumulation by both local elites and external entities. These experiences are crucial for understanding citizenship practice and claims in Sierra Leone.

Sierra Leone was involved in global trade prior to colonial domination by the British through regional and global trading networks in both commodities, and then from the 1400s and increasingly in the mid-1700s, through the Atlantic slave trade (Howard 2017). The slave trade was externally driven but played a role in shaping regional and local political structures – especially concerning the power and domination of the marginalized by elite groups (Lovejoy 2000). For example, the return of slaves from the Americas and elsewhere in the late 1700s to Sierra Leone created a division between the elite settler population in Freetown (the capital), the *Krios*, and the native population elsewhere. The establishment of Freetown as a crown colony (an area under direct colonial rule by the British) in 1808, only served to intensify these divisions, with the extension of the colonial state outside of Freetown relying upon indirect rule, eventually leading to the establishment of the protectorate in 1896 (Fanthorpe 2001, p. 379; see also Mamdani 1996). The division between the colony and the protectorate led to citizenship being conceived of and experienced differently in Freetown in contrast with the rest of the country. In Freetown, the

colonial apparatus provided employment and some citizenship rights, especially for the *Krio* elite, whereas the protectorate was indirectly ruled through colonial officials' relationships with chiefs, through whom the colonial state ruled its subjects. This system remained intact, to a large extent, following independence – Richard Fanthorpe and Roy Maconachie state that:

Successive post-colonial governments have conserved institutions characteristic of colonial 'indirect rule' to a remarkable degree, using chieftaincy and customary law as instruments for maintaining political control over the countryside. (2010, p. 253)

The adverse impact that this exploitative and often gerontocratic form of governance had on young people particularly, especially when it came to obligations within chieftaincies around forced labor, led to the widely supported assessment that:

Youths, disenfranchised by customary traditions and law, in dire need of empowerment resorted to armed rebellion to revenge against a system that oppressed them and blocked their upward social mobility, aiming to gain respect, power and status over the 'big men' and also as a survival strategy. (Tom 2014, p. 330)

The causes of the civil-conflict (1991–2002) have been much debated, with external factors and economic grievances both being cited (Enria and Lees 2018). However, arguably contested ideas of belonging and the dissatisfaction of young people as regards their inclusion within governance structures were factors. This led to the war being characterized as a “crisis of youth” (Fanthorpe and Maconachie 2010; Maconachie 2014; Peters 2011), with young people's lack of economic and educational opportunities, alongside barriers to political participation, resulting in a revolt of youth (Abdullah 1998; Bangura 2016; Finn and Oldfield 2015; Richards 1996). This diagnosis of the civil-conflict's cause played a large part in subsequent post-conflict development efforts initiated by external actors, with a focus on youth employment, political participation, and citizenship. These policies and programs were deeply embedded within normative assessments of youth as a threat to social stability but also embraced the idea that youth had the potential to be mobilized towards positive developmental ends. Youth-focused institutions were established to reform the exclusionary governance structures that had led to youth disaffection; this included the Ministry of Youth Affairs in 2003 and the National Youth Commission and District Youth Councils in 2009 (Bangura 2016). These institutions aimed to open up the governance process to young people. Despite the appearance of progress in terms of young people's political inclusion, scholars have argued that the establishment of these institutions has not necessarily led to tangible changes in the lives of young people, their ability to participate in society, and to have a say over the issues affecting their lives (Bangura 2016; Fanthorpe and Maconachie 2010). Young people are still very much a marginalized group in Sierra Leonean society, with some going so far as to say that there has been a re-marginalization of youth through the reassertion of traditional authorities' power, particularly in rural areas, as argued by Patrick Tom:

The chieftaincy system has remained an integral part of the local government system in the country with chiefs continuing to be central actors in the chiefdoms and also having a lot of influence on daily lives of rural Sierra Leoneans. (2014, p. 332)

Alongside the changes in governance structures, there has been a vast growth in youth-focused civil society organizations since the end of the conflict (Boersch-Supan 2012; Fanthorpe and Maconachie 2010). Many of these organizations are concerned with citizenship education exemplified by the rise in “sensitization” workshops for young people across the country focusing on raising awareness of citizen rights and responsibilities and the creation of “active” and engaged citizens (see Bolten 2012; Shepler 2005). Sensitization forms part of participatory development agendas that aim to create responsible and “active” citizens working towards their own development. This focus on civil society and citizenship education stems from the theorization that bolstering these areas will lead to greater inclusion within the political and social sphere, enhanced accountability of state institutions, and the strengthening of the citizen-state contract (Datzberger 2015; Mamdani 1996; Remi Aiyede 2017). The post-conflict concern with youth led to the category of youth becoming a means of resource accumulation, making being a youth an “aid taker category” in and of itself (Vigh 2006b, p. 17). It has been argued that the youth-focused development agenda, alongside the flexibility of youth as a social category, has led to the co-option of youth development by elite actors (Boersch-Supan 2012; Tom 2014). In this sense, being a youth contains citizenship claims and demands for rights and resources whether they are through civil society and NGO structures or through the state. Although, arguably these rights and resources can and often have been, co-opted within existing elite power structures.

Additionally, Catherine Bolten has argued that the “sensitization” approach, which was key to post-conflict development, did not engage with a discussion of the realities of people’s experiences of war or marginalization but rather could be considered as social marketing of a certain discourse of peace (Bolten 2012, p. 497), situating youth sensitization and empowerment within the discourse of the liberal peace promoted internally and externally post-conflict. As argued by Tom (2014), this discourse of peace has led to a conceptualization of a disciplined and self-governing youth citizen, sensitized to the language and practice of post-conflict development agendas and working tirelessly to fulfil this vision. This discourse of youth citizenship is found within the Sierra Leone Blueprint for Youth Development (2014), in which the Ministry of Youth Affairs in the country states that a program of youth development aims to create “2 million active young citizens” by 2018 (Ministry of Youth Affairs 2014). The idea that active citizens can be externally formed is emblematic of the categorization of perceived “right” and “wrong” ways in which young people should show agency and participate in society.

Another outcome of the civil-conflict was mass migration into Freetown from other areas of Sierra Leone, as people sought to escape from rebel-controlled areas. Freetown is now a much larger city than it was prior to the civil-conflict, and inward migration from other areas of the country especially for young people in search of work continues (Peeters et al. 2009; Peters 2006). This movement into Freetown has

changed the fabric of the city, which is now more diverse and youthful. The altered demographics have also deepened connections between urban and rural areas, enhanced by improvements in transport and communication.

From this brief historical overview, citizenship among young people in Sierra Leone is shown to be laden with external and elite observations of how young people should behave, a view deeply rooted in constructions of young people as a potential threat to social stability, and as a group needing to be formed and shaped into productive citizens or assets. To enhance this contextual basis, this chapter now turns to empirical case studies to try to tease out young people's everyday citizenship practice and the institutions and networks that these everyday claims are connected to, alongside how young people cultivate hope for alternatives. The first case study will focus on Freetown, and the subsequent one will look at young people in rural areas, while the final case study will explore how the Ebola epidemic has shaped youth citizenship claims and experiences.

Case Studies of Youth Citizenship in Sierra Leone

Navigation of Informal Labor: Youth Citizenship Practice and Hope in Freetown

This case study considers how young people working in the informal economy in Sierra Leone's capital Freetown enact and experience citizenship both in terms of connections to the state but also concerning parallel links with other powerful networks and authorities. It then goes on to explore how this everyday practice of citizenship works alongside citizenship imaginaries. Luisa Enria (2018) argues that work is at the center of citizenship claims among young people working in the informal economy in Freetown. Citizenship claims are enacted in terms of demands and hopes around the right to employment. A key part of post-conflict development efforts coalesced around the need to provide young people with adequate employment to prevent them becoming a threat to social stability. In post-conflict development, employment programming often took the form of skills-based training and livelihood interventions. However, this approach has been criticized for not reflecting the economic context of the country, with a failure to accompany training with private sector engagement around job creation (Fanthorpe and Maconachie 2010; Peeters et al. 2009). Arguably, employment programming has led to not enough jobs being available in certain sectors for which lots of people have been trained by NGO interventions – e.g., mechanics and tailors. The paucity and stagnancy of the domestic formal employment market means that most young people are employed in informal and ad hoc ways (Finn and Oldfield 2015). In her ethnography of youth employment in Freetown, Enria (2018) talks to motorbike (*okada*) drivers, sellers of second-hand goods (*jewman dem*), and petty traders – all informal and insecure forms of employment. She investigates the role of employment-based associations in shaping young people's experiences and interactions with authorities, proffering that associations act as mediators between young

people and the state, while also providing some state(like) services, including managing disputes and social welfare. However, importantly, power in these associations was seen by young people as the preserve of “big men,” due to the co-option of employment-based organizations into politics and the lack of agency of young people, as a marginalized group, to have a voice in shaping these organizations and their agendas. It is worth noting that just as “big men” are nearly always men, youth in this context of informal employment often becomes synonymous with male youth, with female youth often being less publicly visible and less of concern to development agendas focused on avoiding or preventing violence. Additionally, Enria found that due to the devaluation of informal labor, many young people in these positions saw their situation as a stop gap, with plans and hope for an alternative more desirable career. This hope meant that these youth often did not fully invest in their employment identity, seeing it as a temporary situation, which meant a lack of incentive to organize and create alternative associational forms representing young people’s interests (Enria 2018).

However, young people in informal employment in Freetown are not without agency in their enactment of everyday citizenship, but rather their agency is enacted through the development of a personal identity and cultivation of expectations and hopes for how citizenship should be, in counter-distinction to the status quo. Enria states how:

Showing oneself as respectable and as being within the law was a key aspect of young people’s search for the recognition they felt was denied to them by their engagement in marginalised economic activities. (2018, p. 174)

It seems that it is in the everyday presentation of oneself as a good citizen and as being pro-development that young people’s agency can be found. In many cases, the cultivation of this identity runs concurrently with the daily reality that for many young people working in Freetown’s informal economy, the state is more of a threat than a support (Enria 2018). This threat is not imagined, as operations to clear up Freetown have involved limiting the areas in which *okada* drivers can operate and clearing petty traders from streets (Finn and Oldfield 2015). Young Sierra Leoneans in the informal economy balance the everyday practice of negotiating a livelihood and navigating through networks, both governmental and nongovernmental, controlled by “big men,” with the hoped-for materialization of a better situation both for themselves and their country. Through this process of navigation, they balance the immediate constraints of making a livelihood with the co-option of global discourses of development and citizenship which provide an identification with a different future.

Navigation of Youth-Based Civil Society: Realizing Citizenship in Rural Sierra Leone

This case study of young people’s citizenship in rural settings explores how engagement with youth-based civil society is closely tied to citizenship practice and

livelihood rights, as well as the cultivation of hoped-for citizenship alternatives. As discussed in the context section, the post-conflict development environment in Sierra Leone was heavily pro-youth – with this focus of donor funding creating incentives for associational development (Fanthorpe and Maconachie 2010). The development of rural youth-focused civil society, as argued by Tom, “has created new opportunities and alternative social spaces for youths (and other marginalised groups such as women) to challenge and negotiate with traditional authorities” (Tom 2014, p. 334). Furthermore, the language and discourse of empowerment and human rights has “not only generated a language of resistance and self-confidence for youth, but also initiated a shift in intergenerational relations” (Boersch-Supan 2012, p. 46). These changes in youth-based civil society raise questions about how young people in rural areas of Sierra Leone are developing and enacting citizenship claims.

In his research about youth relations with rural chieftaincies, Tom found that “youths have...registered their grievances through collective action using non-violent protests including boycotting communal labour (e.g. road rehabilitation projects) in chiefdoms, as a tool to effect positive changes in chiefdom governance” (Tom 2014, p. 333). Additionally, as argued by Joanna Boersch-Supan, youth-based organizations have been “crucial in unifying and representing youth as a social group in the community” providing “mediation, community service provision, and representation” (2012, p. 34). In research within the diamond mining district of Kono, Roy Maconachie (2014) found evidence of youth-based civil society organizations engaging in activism around exploitative extractive industries – highlighting the link between citizenship rights and livelihood rights. These forms of organization are also utilizing mass media and technology as a tool for accountability and connection to international advocacy networks (Fanthorpe and Maconachie 2010). So, through youth-based civil society, young people are demanding citizenship rights (including the right to a livelihood), providing a route towards participation and accountability.

Although undoubtedly changes have occurred through the emergence of youth-focused civil society organizations in rural areas of Sierra Leone, as with associational bodies in Freetown’s informal employment networks, there are concerns about who has access to such associations and which groups they serve. Fanthorpe and Maconachie (2010) have argued that given the lack of material change in living conditions in Sierra Leone, it is not surprising that the aid economy post-conflict became entwined with patrimonial obligations. This view is supported by Boersch-Supan, who argues that “many youth organisations are deeply enmeshed in local patronage politics and often induce only limited change to the power asymmetries between youth and elders” (2012, p. 36). These political dynamics bear similarities with the elite and political co-option of employment-based associations discussed in the urban case study. Thus, it seems there is a need to distinguish between what Fanthorpe and Maconachie have described as “the real-world efficacy of youth agency in Sierra Leone from that constructed within the political imaginary of international development and human rights,” which has focused uncritically on the flourishing of youth-based civil society without adequate engagement with how the economy of aid and the resources that come with it have made “youth” a valuable category for resource accumulation (2010, p. 272). The co-option of youth

development agendas does not mean that young people are necessarily excluded from civil society organizations but rather that their agency needs to be understood through how they navigate the everyday practice of citizenship. This process of navigation of local power structures leads to youth-based civil society being itself a valued livelihood strategy. This is especially true for those educated and versed in global discourses of citizenship and human rights.

So, young Sierra Leoneans are enacting citizenship through the navigation of youth-based civil society organizations, which are enmeshed within local power dynamics due to the potential of youth as a category of resource accumulation. But alongside this young people are actively engaging with global discourses of human rights and citizenship which open up livelihood opportunities within development, while also providing identification with a different future.

Navigation of Crisis: Volunteering During Ebola and Changing Narratives of Youth Citizenship

This final case study considers how the Ebola epidemic (2014–2016) in Sierra Leone has shaped how young people understand and imagine citizenship.

The enormity of the Ebola epidemic has undoubtedly impacted the social, economic, and political landscape of Sierra Leone. The outbreak in West Africa (2014–2016) became the most widespread and deadly since the virus was discovered in the 1970s. The virus is thought to have arrived in Sierra Leone via its border with Guinea. The first reported case was in May of 2014 in Kenema, the second largest city in the East of the country (Maconachie and Hilson 2017). The virus spread quickly and by April 2016, there had been over 14,000 cases and around 4000 deaths in Sierra Leone (Centers for Disease Control 2017). The speed and extent of the outbreak's spread caught governments, international institutions, and communities off guard. This was due to a combination of factors including: Ebola had never been seen before in the affected countries (Piot et al. 2017); the weak healthcare infrastructure of the region (Boozary et al. 2014); failures of the global health apparatus (Rashid 2017); and inequality within the affected societies reflected in a small Western elite pitched against the majority of citizens (Wilkinson and Leach 2014).

The crisis highlighted the poor relationship between state institutions and citizens in Sierra Leone, exemplified by how the official narrative of the cause of the outbreak blamed its spread on the citizens of Sierra Leone. An instance of this is the intense focus on people's funeral practices within the narrative of how the disease was spreading (Rashid 2017). Corpses in Sierra Leone are usually washed by close relatives – this meant that relatives came into contact with the disease as corpses of those who have died from Ebola remain infectious. Focusing on burials fed the narrative that people's behavior, and their unwillingness to change it, was to blame for the disease's spread. This understanding of the crisis produced divisionary practices within the Ebola response and competing subjectivities, with those who resisted the technologies of the response being physically contained through quarantine and militarized operations, whereas in counter-distinction those who accepted

the causal narrative and took part in sensitization of others, were framed as responsible and model citizens (Enria 2017) – this included Sierra Leoneans who volunteered to take part in the response.

Young Sierra Leonean volunteers were a crucial part of the Ebola response, taking on roles including but not limited to: medical positions, cleaning treatment centers, burying bodies, tracing people who had come into contact with the disease, enforcing quarantine, and community sensitization. However, the Ebola “crisis” exacerbated the “high rates of unemployment and scarce opportunities to be involved in meaningful work” that already existed in Sierra Leone (Kingori and McGowan 2016). In this context, volunteering, especially for young people, became a means of navigating increasingly restricted livelihood options, which in turn led to the perception that volunteers were benefitting from the crisis. In a blog, Enria (2015) describes how in the Northern District of Kambia there is a distinction between those who are seen to have benefitted from the tragedy of Ebola, through employment or volunteering positions within organizations involved in the response, and those whose lives have been destroyed by it. This distinction was exacerbated by the hazard pay and stipends which many volunteers received during the outbreak. Enria has argued that young people made claims for inclusion during the crisis through volunteering (2018, p. 236). But equally young people’s involvement with volunteering can be seen as a form of responsabilization shaping young people into the right kind of citizens, demanded by the crisis and the global response. In this way, volunteering during Ebola was not just a form of economic navigation but also served people’s self-identification as modern, rational citizens in a context in which the knowledge and behaviors of the majority were being questioned as causal of the Ebola virus’ spread (Chadwick 2017). Arguably, young people volunteered during Ebola as both a means of navigating a constrained livelihood context, alongside identification with the responsibilities of citizenship, patriotism, and compassion for fellow citizens. During the Ebola crisis, young Sierra Leoneans enacted citizenship through volunteering, which in some instances provided an immediate economic benefit. However, alongside the economic benefits volunteering offered visions of citizenship described through discourses of inclusion and responsibility, allowing young people to identify with a different future outside of the context of the Ebola crisis (Chadwick 2017).

The three case studies demonstrate how young people in Sierra Leone navigate the realities of constrained citizenship ambitions through the cultivation of relationships with powerful networks and institutions, whether they are related to employment, civil society, or voluntary practice. Young people’s enactment and understanding of citizenship in such settings arguably serves a dual purpose, fulfilling what Morten Bøås has described in the context of youth in West Africa as a “double” (2013). Engagement with employment associations and youth-based civil society provides everyday support for young people navigating insecure and informal livelihood contexts and in need of support that the state is not able to offer, even if they are often co-opted by elders or elites. This was especially pertinent during the Ebola outbreak, when forms of stipend-rewarded volunteering provided a means of navigating an extremely constrained socioeconomic context. Additionally, the forms

of citizenship described in these case studies provide a means of identification with global citizenship discourse, whether it be through employment, youth-focused civil society, or volunteering, offering a space for the enactment and cultivation of citizenship alternatives. Young people adopt and adapt the discourse of youth empowerment within the reality of their marginalization – tapping into local and global discourses to create new forms of identity and meaning. In this way, young people’s citizenship practice operates as both an immediate strategy for the “social navigation” of constrained livelihood opportunities, while also offering the possibility of identifying with and participating in a different future.

These case studies of young people’s citizenship practice and hope for alternatives in Sierra Leone evidence the importance of understanding the local meanings ascribed to global citizenship discourse. Citizenship does not have a fixed meaning in time and space but rather is ascribed with context dependent layers of meaning by different actors showing resourcefulness and agency in utilizing the discourses and practices available to them to create their own sense of meaning and value. What young people’s conceptualization of citizenship in Sierra Leone can offer broader scholarship is the need to not only investigate the lived experience of citizenship claims in comparison with idealized understandings held within global citizenship discourse, but also to interrogate how such hoped-for citizenship alternatives work alongside everyday practice and serve their own purpose in young people’s cultivation of meaning and identity.

Conclusion

Young people in Sierra Leone show agency in navigating the everyday practice of citizenship, by negotiating with informal networks, state institutions, and civil society organizations that often still exclude them. But alongside this everyday practice, young people also show agency in their identification with how they think citizenship should be experienced – their conceptualization of how they should be participating in society and how the state should be engaging with them. Young people, the majority of whom are striving to build livelihoods in informal settings (whether urban or rural), are balancing this hoped-for desired state of citizenship with the everyday practice which they must engage with to get by in their daily lives. This act of balancing is shown in how young people in Freetown need to engage with the politics of informal employment networks but at the same time identify with developmental futures and the desire for an improved state for themselves and their country. In other parts of Sierra Leone, young people’s participation within youth-based civil society offers a means of negotiating with local power structures and resources, while utilizing the language of youth development programming to advocate for their own interpretation of human rights and citizenship claims. Finally, youth volunteering during the Ebola epidemic (2014–16) shows how volunteering during a crisis both serves as a means of navigating a constrained livelihood context and a means of identification with citizenship based upon inclusion and responsibility. By interrogating how young people navigate the gap

between experiences and expectations of citizenship, and acknowledging the contradictions this gap contains, citizenship education in Sierra Leone and sub-Saharan Africa more broadly can work to engage with young people's hope for a different future while acknowledging the difficulty of everyday citizenship encounters. Such discussions about citizenship should neither idealize unobtainable citizenship rights nor ignore the difficulty of everyday citizenship practice. Furthermore, approaches to citizenship education should acknowledge the meaning that hoped-for citizenship alternatives offer young people in terms of their identification with an improved future state for themselves and their country while they go through the everyday struggle to maintain a livelihood. It is in this space between the ideal and the everyday where conversations about youth citizenship can become more productive.

Cross-References

- ▶ [Constructions of “Youth” and “Activism” in Lebanon](#)
- ▶ [The Development of Civic Participation Among Youth in Singapore](#)
- ▶ [Youth Engagement and Citizenship in England](#)

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Youth Engagement and Citizenship in England

53

Ian Davies

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Abstract

Drawing on and analyzing existing theoretical and empirical research literature, this chapter explores the relationship between youth engagement and education in England, principally during the period 1998 to 2017. Following some general remarks about the meaning of key terms, there are contextual comments about recent political developments and the history of educational initiatives relevant to youth engagement. The chapter then examines several issues that influence the ways in which young people's engagement is framed. It discusses ways in which a positive relationship between youth engagement and education could be developed and concludes by raising some questions about what work in this area needs to be done.

Keywords

Youth engagement · Education · England policy · Professional practice

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Introduction

Drawing on and analyzing existing theoretical and empirical research literature, this chapter explores the relationship between youth engagement and education in England, principally during the period 1998 to 2017. While the importance of youth engagement and education has formed a core part of policy and practice during this period, the relationship is one which has been characterized by different approaches at different times. These differing approaches have frequently been influenced by the particular agendas of key actors – including governments, representatives of nongovernmental organizations, and schools. In order to provide a foundation for the argument in this chapter, I make some general remarks about the meaning of key terms related to youth engagement, provide some contextual comments about recent political developments, and outline the history of educational initiatives relevant to youth engagement. The chapter then examines several issues that influence the ways in which young people’s engagement is framed with references to levels of engagement, styles of engagement, and engines of engagement. I provide an overview of some of the research about young people’s engagement in England (in amount and type) and the factors that are seen to be associated with such engagement. It is argued that while there is some clarity in understanding about the extent, nature, and cause of engagement, there are also some indications that research that has led to that understanding has been ignored through a party political process in which ideological considerations are emphasized. Finally, I discuss ways in which a positive relationship between youth engagement and education could be developed and conclude by raising some questions about what work in this area remains to be done.

Background: The Meaning of Key Terms

In England, since about 2008, there has been less official interest in citizenship education than existed in the previous decade. The central government department responsible for education has devoted less time and energy to citizenship education (the ways in which that has happened and the reasons for it are discussed below). That said, there is nationally and internationally significant work still being done in this area. The continued attention to young people’s engagement with citizenship beyond official policies may be seen in initiatives taken by international bodies (e.g., Carnegie – see <http://carnegieendowment.org/specialprojects/civicrosearchnetwork/>), academia with recent issues of the journals *Citizenship Teaching and Learning* (Sears 2017), and the *Journal of Social Science Education* (Davies et al. 2014), and new networks (e.g., Partispace, see <http://partispace.eu/>). These various activities, in some ways, relate very positively to earlier government policy developments that were aimed at developing active citizenship (e.g., DfEE/QCA 1998 and <http://www.parliament.uk/citizenship-civic-engagement>). However, it should be noted that much of the work in citizenship education and, more precisely, education that encourages understanding of contemporary society and engagement in it, remains

contested and controversial in England, as elsewhere. As such, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of key terms.

The quotation below gives an overarching sense of what is involved when engagement in contemporary society is referred to. According to Marquand (2004), engagement is:

...a dimension of social life, with its own norms and decision rules... a set of activities, which can be (and historically has been) carried out by private individuals, private charities and even private firms as well as public agencies. It is symbiotically linked to the notion of public interest, in principle distinct from private interests; central to it are the values of citizenship, equity and service...It is ... a space for forms of human flourishing which cannot be bought in the market place or found in the tight-knit community of the clan or family. (p. 27)

Therefore, in short, engagement in general terms means participating in one's social communities beyond the immediate family. Of course, further clarification is needed about many things including, referring to the above quotation, the distinctions to be made between "public" and "private," and the meaning of "social life." It would be unwise to suggest that engagement does not occur within family or other personal groups and indeed those contexts are often the places where identity is given clearest expression through power-related inter-personal action.

One of the principal debates about the meaning of engagement is focused on location. In other words, there are questions about where one may take part, and, more generally, this raises issues about the boundaries between legally framed characterizations of engagement and affectively oriented perceptions of thinking and action. Some academics, such as Tarrow (2005), emphasize the significance of transnationalism, whereas Crick (2000, pp. 136, 137), for example, cites Hannah Arendt, to assert that "a citizen is by definition a citizen among citizens of a country among countries." Furthermore, there are many contemporary contexts (e.g., Catalonia; Corsica) in which it is hard to identify the preferred formulation of the country in which one may take part. Indeed, such formulations are not always fixed, as the 2014 referendum on Scottish independence and continuing discussion about the border between Northern Ireland and Eire shows within the UK context.

In reference to citizenship and engagement, these arguments about the role of place connect with discussions about the degree to which pluralistic societal coherence may be achieved. Much of the debate which manifested in educational policy documents about young people's engagement in England since the late 1990s has focused on engendering a sense of togetherness through:

a society in which there is a *common vision and sense of belonging* by all communities; a society in which the diversity of people's backgrounds and circumstances is appreciated and valued; a society in which similar life opportunities are available to all; and a society in which strong and positive relationships exist and continue to be developed in the workplace, in schools and in the wider community. (DCSF 2007, p. 3)

This said, some of these overarching goals as stated in policy documents tend to hide the different meanings of community within which engagement may occur. Annette, for example, has pointed to the different meanings of community:

as a place or neighbourhood ... as a normative ideal linked to respect, inclusion and solidarity ... as something based on a politics of identity and recognition of difference ... as a political ideal linked to participation, involvement and citizenship. (2003, p. 140)

It is important to recognize these different meanings in order to be able to make judgments about what sort of fundamental issues are at stake. Heater (1999, p. 77), for example, has explained that certain characterizations of community can mean something that is very challenging:

Communitarianism extracts from the republican tradition the concentration on a feeling of community and a sense of duty, though omitting from its programme the strand of direct political participation and, some would argue, crucially, the central republican concern for freedom.

Of particular significance to my view of engagement are *political* issues. In this regard, the following definition can be viewed as particularly apt: “Youth activism refers to behaviour performed by adolescents and young adults with a political intent” Hart and Linkin Gullan (2010, p. 67). In order for the connection between youth activism and the political sphere/discourse to be considered meaningfully there is a need to give a fairly simple – but nevertheless dynamic – characterization of the terms “politics” and “citizens”:

Politics then can simply be defined as the activity by which differing interests within a given unit of rule are conciliated by giving them a share in power in proportion to their importance to the welfare and the survival of the whole community. (Crick 1964 p. 21)

Citizens may be described in the following terms:

Individuals are citizens when they practise civic virtue and good citizenship, enjoy but do not exploit their civil and political rights, contribute to and receive social and economic benefits do not allow any sense of national identity to justify discrimination or stereotyping of others, experiences senses of non-exclusive multiple citizenship and, by their example, teach citizenship to others. (Heater and Oliver 1994, p. 6)

A focus on politics allows for engagement to be centrally about power, to recognize the primacy of the individual in human rights discourses, to see the vital importance of groups acting in a range (geographically based and other) of diverse communities, to value the rights and responsibilities of a legally framed status of citizenship and to embrace the dynamism offered by considerations of politics in everyday contexts. The focus on politics allows for a helpfully precise characterization of what I think is important in engagement. Moreover, the risk of embracing too many things and achieving only a rather woolly sense of what engagement means

might well be avoided by interpreting all that we do through the lens of the fundamental concepts of politics.

Background: The English Political Context

In the UK, successive Prime Ministers have consistently argued for young people to engage in society. (In the United Kingdom, certain legislative powers remain with the central UK Parliament, while others – such as education – are devolved to the Scottish Parliament, Welsh Assembly, and Northern Ireland. On these devolved powers, the central UK Parliament legislates for England.) During his period in office, Labour Prime Minister, Tony Blair (1997–2007), was committed to what he considered a communitarian approach. Broadly, this approach consisted of the attempt to steer a middle course between the excesses of both unfettered neoliberalism, with its commitment to solving everything through market forces, and certain forms of socialism in which opportunities for individual or private group-based activity were not encouraged or allowed. In this approach, Blair was influenced by sociologists, including Giddens (2000) and Etzioni (1995), who had also influenced other politicians including Clinton in the USA. A commitment to youth engagement and activism was also explicitly stated by Blair's successor as Labour Prime Minister, Gordon Brown (2007–2010), who argued that:

It is my ambition to create a country in which there is a clear expectation that all young people will undertake some service to their community, and where community service will become normal part of growing up. (Brown 2009)

Leader of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition (2010–2015) and Conservative (2015–2016) governments, Prime Minister David Cameron seemed to continue, broadly, this approach, creating the *National Citizen Service* and also focusing on what he called “the Big Society” which, in part, was designed to engage people in their communities. According to Cameron:

The Big Society is about a huge culture change, where people, in their everyday lives, in their homes, in their neighbourhoods, in their workplace, don't always turn to officials, local authorities or central government for answers to the problems they face, but instead feel both free and powerful enough to help themselves and their own communities. (Cameron 2010)

It is possible that the intention for the Big Society was for citizens to feel free, able, and empowered to help their communities, but the Big Society also linked to the desire for a healthy economy (in that engaged people create wealth). The nature of the desired enterprise was of a particular type, while the sort of action Cameron was looking for was driven by certain agendas which had their limits. One agenda can be seen, for example, in certain reactions to the 2011 riots in English cities, as the following critique highlights:

Mr Cameron will also blame “children without fathers; schools without discipline; reward without effort; crime without punishment; rights without responsibilities; communities without control”.

Mending that “broken society”, Mr Cameron will say, is his fundamental aim in politics. (Kirkup et al. 2011)

The above indicates some of the challenges of, and different ways of framing, arguments for engagement. Successive governments in England have wanted to promote particular sorts of engagement that emerge from particular ideological perspectives. As has been suggested above, a broad-based communitarian agenda shaped the desire for youth engagement under Blair and Brown, but after the General Election of 2010, the agenda became more precisely focused on a political project in which young people’s action that was not contributing to established norms was not accepted.

The current Prime Minister (January 2018) Theresa May, while opposing votes at 16, is also in favor of the more limited form of youth engagement which has framed government discourse since 2010:

people can get engaged in politics in a whole variety of ways and I would encourage young people to do so.

I think it is important young people watch politics, pay attention to politics, get to think about their own views and where possible start to get involved. (Stone 2017)

The hesitation and caution of May in suggesting young people think about things and “where possible start to get involved” mean that low-level traditionally framed actions to support established systems and processes are being promoted. The government’s position here is not an open-ended commitment to democratic engagement. One of the most obvious ways in which the more limited commitment to youth engagement can be seen is to consider politicians’ actions about perceived radicalism. It is likely that the determination to achieve youth engagement in a society in which law and order is emphasized is connected to fears about the rise of perceived radical groups (Kyriacou et al. 2017). The complex relationship between engaged, cohesive, and inclusive democracy and attempts to achieve more precisely focused predetermined “good” actions is thrown sharply into relief by the above. While it would be naïve and simplistic to suggest that there are unsophisticated divisions between conservative and radical conceptions of engagement, what is evident from official sources in recent years is an emphasis on what is deemed as good behavior and an absence of encouragement for critique. Furthermore, unwanted behavior in the form of radicalization has been presented principally, and overly narrowly, as a concern with certain groups in society – particularly Muslims (Qurashi 2016).

The financial crisis since 2008 has been significant for changing attitudes and opportunities, and this has been particularly noticeable in European matters. Hoskins and Kerr (2012) note that:

the global economic and financial crisis . . . has been allied with a change in the political philosophy of governments across Europe in the past few years. This has seen more

governments favouring support for community activity, as opposed to conventional political participation, with a smaller perceived role for government in society overall. The combined consequence of the economic crisis and the smaller perceived role of the state have meant that the field of Participatory Citizenship has fallen from prominence as a policy priority at national and local level and, as a consequence, there has been much less funding for the whole domain including through national, local and private sector contributions. The strains of the cuts in funding have been noted within civil society across Europe and at the European level. (p. 8)

A significant feature of the current political landscape in England relates to the departure of the UK from the European Union. The sort of transnational citizenship that was narrowly rejected by voters in the 2016 referendum on membership of the European Union probably occurred in light of fears about migrants taking jobs and putting pressure on public services, as well as an attempt to take back control in a context where there was anger expressed against elites (see <https://ec.europa.eu/euipa/en/blog/brexit-and-its-implications-citizenship-education-across-europe>). The populism that fed the Brexit campaign is, of course, clear evidence of a sort of engagement. And that campaign took place in the context of negative attitudes towards immigrants:

Existing evidence clearly shows high levels of opposition to immigration in the UK. In recent surveys, majorities of respondents think that there are too many migrants, that fewer migrants should be let in to the country, and that legal restrictions on immigration should be tighter. (Blinder and Allen 2016, p. 4)

The 31st NatCen Social Research British Social Attitudes survey was reported as indicating that “British attitudes harden towards immigrants” (<https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/jun/17/immigration-british-attitudes-harden-benefits>) and the campaign itself saw allegations of xenophobia in, for example, the activities of the UK Independence Party and the murder of a member of parliament by a member of an extreme right wing group. This general picture is not necessarily to suggest that young people hold such views and take such actions. The fact that 71% of young people aged 18–25 in the UK voted to remain in the EU is perhaps an indication, first, of divisions in society and, second, about differences concerning to what outcomes societal engagement should lead.

Youth Activism in England: The Educational Context

Within England there have been many attempts historically to align youth engagement with their formal education. For example, the work of Henry Morris in the Cambridgeshire village colleges in the 1930s, the work of Leicestershire Community Colleges, and Eric Midwinter’s and others efforts to establish urban community schools, all illustrate an approach to education in which engagement in communities was promoted.

The types of education explicitly relevant to youth activism and engagement have seen extreme variations. The general neglect of an explicit approach prior to the 1960s was followed in the 1970s by an emphasis on political literacy (skills and issues about politics in everyday life), a string of educations about and for peace, the globe, anti-sexism, anti-racism, and so on in the 1980s and promotions of youth volunteering in the early 1990s. The highly influential Final Report of the Advisory Group on Education for Citizenship and the Teaching of Democracy in Schools (known commonly as the DfEE and QCA, 1998) which led to the statutory inclusion of Citizenship education in the National Curriculum for secondary (11–16-year olds) schools emphasized social and moral responsibility, political literacy, and community involvement. From 2010, there has been a return to civics, financial literacy, volunteering, and character in government discourses and policies on youth engagement.

Legislation has been passed to ensure that a version of professionally responsible engagement is maintained. Sections 406 and 407 of the 1996 Education Act insist on the duty to secure balanced treatment of political issues. The Equality Act (2010) with associated Advice for Schools and the Prevent Strategy (June 2011) (which sees British values as democracy; the rule of law; individual liberty and mutual respect; tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs) are relevant to these matters. An official document on Promoting fundamental British values as part of spiritual, moral, social, and cultural education in schools (DfE 2014), as well as the School Inspection Handbook (Ofsted January 2015) carry significant guidance for schools and teachers. Teachers are required to insist on the sort of engagement that has been explained above: an opposition to perceived radicalization and a commitment to young people starting to get involved in a context which is influenced by anti-immigrant views.

Citizenship education is currently, in early 2018, part of the National Curriculum but there have been very recent dramatic changes. Up to 2014, there was a strong conceptual core (democracy and justice; rights and responsibilities; identities and diversity). The work was inspired by political literacy, emphasizing communities at local, national, and global levels and which is contemporary, public, participative, and reflective. The current National Curriculum for Citizenship (since September 2014) emphasizes civics (knowledge of constitutional politics and the legal system), volunteering, and personal money management together with a nonstatutory character education that highlights perseverance, resilience, and grit. This emphasis on character, which has been explored by Kisby (2017), may be part of a neo-conservative moral agenda. While character education may have positive potential, there are reservations about its nature which are acknowledged in attempted rebuttals by its proponents (e.g., Kristjansson 2013). This moral agenda may also be connected with adult fear of young people (Halsey and White 2008). In addition, it has been argued on the basis of empirical research that increasing levels of mental health issues following the 2008 recession may make engagement more difficult (Katikireddi et al. 2017).

Levels, Styles and Engines of Engagement

The need to understand engagement (its levels and styles) is the subject of wide ranging debate, with many academics coining phrases and framing characterizations. Fallahzadeh (2016) has summarized a range of work such as “mundane citizenship” (Bakardjieva 2012), “self-actualizing citizen” (Bennett et al. 2011), “networking citizen” (Loader et al. 2014), “critical citizen” (Norris 1999), and “everyday-maker” (Bang and Sorensen 1999). These formulations are placed against overarching characterizations of engagement which make use of, for example, models of micro and macro participation. The micro emerges from the relationship between individual citizens and the state in which, for example, engagement would be revealed by an individual parent approaching a teacher to request (or demand) help for their own child. The macro includes collective action, such as voting and trade union or pressure group activity. Either implicitly or explicitly, these models may connect with bonding capital (i.e., people with similar characteristics) and bridging capital (i.e., people with different characteristics) in the interests of promoting engagement.

It is not straightforward to identify the level of youth engagement in terms of civic action that is taking place. In part, this is because there is developmental discontinuity rather than a clear and simple process as people age (Sherrod et al. 2010). In other words, the nature of engagement may develop variously, and the meanings, interpretations, and perceptions about engagement may shift. There are also hard to interpret differences between people’s social capital. It has been argued that young people from lower socioeconomic backgrounds are less likely than others to engage in certain forms of civic action (Andrews 2009). Those with low levels of social capital are less likely than others to engage in established associational activity. High status charitable bodies, for example, may not be approached by young, working class men and women from some ethnic groups. Cremin et al. (2009) have emphasized the key determinant of engagement as being “whether or not the young person has the knowledge, networks, and skills to be able to act upon a civic issue of concern.”

Of perhaps greater significance than the challenges of identifying clear patterns of engagement is the issue of the characterization of engagement itself. Many surveys take fairly crude measurements of engagement to indicate that approximately half or more of young people have experience of volunteering (see Davies et al. 2013 for a fuller exploration). However, this may include involvement in sports and exercise, hobbies and recreation, youth and children’s services, and health and social welfare, which may be regarded as not fitting easily alongside the political essence of civic engagement. Nevertheless, using a broad interpretation of engagement, there are positive indicators:

... many young people of all types and backgrounds are involved in informal voluntary and community action. Studies show around three quarters of young people have been involved in ‘constructive social participation’ through community networks, neighbourliness, campaigning or informal political action. (Gaskin 2004, p. iv)

And even when these activities are described with a little more precision, there exist some encouraging data for those who think that levels of youth engagement are positive, including that “42% of young people aged between 10 and 20 years participated in ‘meaningful social action’ in the UK – this is slightly broader than volunteering” (<http://www.ivr.org.uk/ivr-volunteering-stats/177-how-many-young-people-volunteer>, accessed 11 September 2016). However, perhaps the key challenge is to interpret these statements by knowing more precisely what is meant by “engagement,” “volunteering,” and “meaningful social action.” Perhaps, depending on one’s definition and preferred measurements, it is almost impossible not to engage in society. If that is the case, then survey data about engagement may merely indicate levels of acceptable, or social class defined, involvement. The possibility thus exists of unhelpful circularity in an exclusionary process (where, for example, working class people cannot be engaged in “real” activity). As such, when connections are made between engagement and health, life satisfaction and educational level, this may only be deemed to be a reasonable interpretation when engagement is seen as the effect of positive lifestyle rather than the cause.

What facilitates participation for young people in England? In addition to those factors already referred to above (perhaps especially distribution of social capital), evidence suggests that there are broad engines of engagement. There are general societal factors that help or hinder engagement. In their work outside the English context, but which is highly apt to it, Amnå and Zetterberg (2010) argue that there are various perspectives on what promotes involvement including modernization (as people become better off, they want more of a say in public affairs); the public institutional hypothesis (the design and performance of democratic systems may facilitate or hinder engagement); the social capital hypothesis (the connections between individuals facilitate or hinder engagement); and civic volunteerism (the resources – especially time and money – available to people determine their capacity to engage). Within these perspectives, there are significant trends that may explain engagement. For example, consumerism (including decisions to buy or not buy certain products and although dismissed by some as mere “clicktivism,” e.g., <https://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/sep/24/clicktivism-changed-political-campaigns-38-degrees-change>) may be one of the major ways in which public expression occurs, and there are many NGOs which deliberately emphasize this approach.

Engagement may emerge not from broad societal factors as above but in relation to the possibility of personality traits and emotion. In this sense, it is possible we have moved some way from resource mobilization theories in which money, communications, and public support are seen as key factors. Emotion in the identification of common enemies; establishment of personal relationships; and performance of group rituals are seen as significant (Edwards 2014). Russo and Amnå (2016) identify different personality traits and relate them to the likelihood of engagement. Briefly, and not necessarily applied to people in England, those who are agreeable and conscientious are perhaps less likely to take political action than those who are extravert and open to experience.

Several research projects including the National Foundation for Educational Research's Citizenship Education Longitudinal Study (see <https://www.nfer.ac.uk/research/projects/cels/>) suggest that practical factors may be significant for individual and group engagement. These include, peer group advocacy, publicizing opportunities, an inclusive ethos, a welcoming physical environment, a willingness to deal realistically and honestly with issues that affect individuals and communities in contemporary society. In addition, youth workers who use high-level interpersonal skills to create a positive process of participation and maintaining realistic commitments for young people and the adults who work with them may determine the nature and amount of young people's engagement. There are mixed reactions to the motivational force of rewards (certificates, academic credit, work experience, salary, etc.), but it would seem potentially naively idealistic to ignore these matters (Davies et al. 2013).

For individual action there may be a range of facilitators. There are many (e.g., Byram 2008) who focus on the achievement of language as an essential indicator not only of identification but also of likely action. Acquiring language aids the functional aspects of citizenship (completing tax returns is perhaps a rather mundane example). It affects identity (it may be the case that I am what and how I speak), and it has a powerful impact on skills and dispositions (advocacy and representation are just some of the things that are achieved through language). The Linguistic Ethnography Forum (see <http://lingethnog.org/>) is devoted to exploring these issues. These issues and possible processes and outcomes about language have particular explicit resonance in diverse communities (e.g., see Szczepek Reed et al. 2017) but are important in all communities insofar as language has instrumental value, is an aspect of culture into which and through which people are socialized, and is a form of social contract in which there are opportunities for democratic or other types of dialogue.

Social media are seen as having huge potential, but this is contested. There may be reservations about the positive potential for youth engagement (e.g., see Davies et al. 2012). Social media may not be available to all. Furthermore, it may be used in ways congruent with the development of democracy which may lead only to an emphasis on traditional teaching and learning styles. Despite the claims associated with social media use, there are strong critical accounts of what is happening to youth engagement as a result of new technology with some suggesting that less rather than more democracy is likely (e.g., Taplin 2017). Even in the context of widespread use, it is not apparent that the amount of usage is sufficient for social media to impact for all on global citizenship education. Therefore, there remains lingering questions regarding the ways in which social media are used as they may not necessarily be aligned with democratic citizenship and its educational potential is at the very least under-developed (Davies and Sant 2014).

Perhaps the most traditional form of civic engagement is voting. There have for many years been concerns expressed at low youth turnout at general elections. The debate in England has focused in recent years around the merits of allowing voting at 16. There is uncertainty about the wisdom of lowering the voting age (Stone 2017). Some feel that in relation to attempts to increasing turnout young people may "grow

into” voting and that, in any case, not voting does not necessarily imply disengagement. Politicians may want young people to vote to secure short-term electoral advantage (and to weaken young people’s rights to receive state support). There may be a novelty value that would soon disappear (increases in turnout have been followed by decreases in, for example, the Isle of Man and Austria). Voting at 16 in light of rights held by young people in other spheres is seen by some as a spurious argument. For example, Russell (2014) sees those rights as “minimal, irrelevant, and diminishing,” and he also claims that comparing young people in this context with women’s campaigns for the vote or referring to changes to lifestyle regulation is inappropriate. What, however, seems clear is that the context for engagement is influenced by discussions over voting.

Making Explicit Connections Between Education and Youth Engagement

In general terms, there has been a strong connection made between education and an enriched civic culture. In their classic work that has been generally influential in many countries, Almond and Verba (1989 [1963]) suggest that:

educational attainment appears to have the most important demographic effect on political attitudes. Among the demographic variables usually investigated – sex, place of residence, occupation, income, age, and so on – none compares with the educational variable in the extent to which it seems to determine political attitudes. The uneducated man or the man with the limited education is a different political actor from the man who has achieved a higher level of education. (pp. 315–316)

There are distinctions regarding levels of education in relation to civic participation. Campbell (2009) argues that an absolute level of one’s own education (in other words, the value of education itself and not compared with that achieved by others) is relevant to membership in voluntary associations, institutional trust, and voting. But sorting (one’s educational position relative to others) may also be important and when education is, at least in part, a status symbol this may be relevant to societies which experience political conflict. A cumulative effect (i.e., increases in the average level of education) is good for interpersonal trust and as a result a wide-based engagement may develop. Beyond these general considerations, there has been a large amount of research in England (complementing international studies) that make a clear connection between certain types of citizenship education and engagement (e.g., Keating et al. 2010; Ofsted 2010). Whiteley’s (2013) research, for example, shows that:

citizenship education had a positive impact on three key components of civic engagement: efficacy, political participation and political knowledge. This . . . is likely to help offset some of the trends in civic participation among young people which have shown a sharp decline in key activities like voting and voluntary activities over time. (p. 1)

Generally, education occurs when the two tenets of constructivism are met: “learning as an active process of constructing knowledge rather than [only] acquiring it; and instruction is a process that involves supporting that construction rather than of [only] communicating knowledge” (Duffy and Cunningham 1996, p. 171). In order to apply that general insight to specific ideas and issues about citizenship education, it is interesting to look at research from the National Foundation for Education Research (<https://www.nfer.ac.uk/research/projects/cels/>) and reports from the Office for standards in education (OfSTED) (<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/citizenship-consolidated-a-survey-of-citizenship-in-schools>).

Those reports suggest that effective citizenship education will be achieved by establishing a clear rationale and characterization of educational engagement widely understood by “teachers” and “learners,” through explicit and focused consideration of key concepts, with recognition that certain areas (government, politics, and voting as well as diversity, identity, and global issues) present difficulties for teachers and learners, and with an appreciation that while assessment is difficult, good work may be achieved through open discussion in a positive educational “climate.” There is less research on nonformal or informal forms of education for engagement but these surely are very relevant and worthy of further research. This means that despite all the very many debates in this field, we actually already know what to do and what not to do: education for engagement should not be narrowly academic, left to chance or constructed narrowly around morality (in the form of character education) or law (in the form of civics).

Conclusion

As in other countries, there are significant concerns and challenges about youth engagement and education in the English context. These challenges and concerns are long-standing. Since 2010 – a period which has witnessed the effects of the global financial crisis; General Elections in 2010, 2015, and 2017; and referenda about Scottish independence (2014) and membership of the European Union (2016) – England has experienced something of a revolution in education. Schools are now less supported by local government, have greater autonomy (e.g., most schools are now not required to follow the National Curriculum), and typically focus on a limited number of centrally imposed targets (principally maths, English, and science rather than citizenship). Officially, there is a perceived need for civic knowledge, greater discipline, and increased individual volunteering. Research and evidence from the schools’ inspectorate about the value of citizenship education for civic engagement has been rejected by the government. Although the House of Lords is currently looking into the possibilities of reviving the educational focus on civic engagement (see <http://www.parliament.uk/citizenship-civic-engagement>), it is unfortunate that citizenship education in England has been characterized as being party political – essentially Labour Party – property and it is unlikely currently to regain its former prominent position.

The difficulties in the policy context for connecting education and civic engagement are significant. In many ways, England is witnessing a return to the period in the mid-1990s before the Crick Report when much of the key work was left to interested professional and funding bodies and individual academics. But that does not mean that little work is taking place. Internationally, the Council of Europe, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (<http://carnegieendowment.org/specialprojects/civicresearchnetwork/>), and Leverhulme (as evidenced by their support for the project referred to in the acknowledgements below of this chapter) are promoting relevant work. There is a wealth of work in several countries taking place in which efforts are being made to understand the nature and types of engagement and their links with education. For example, Johnson and Morris (2010), Westheimer and Kahne (2004), and Veugeliers (2007) divide citizens into the adapting citizen, the individualistic and/or the critical democratic citizen. There is exploration of the ways in which “new” technology may be shaped to provide the opportunities to move from the dutiful citizen to the self-actualizing citizen (Bennett 2008). In such a complex and contested field, interested parties need to continue to work to be clear about the meaning of key terms (while allowing for dynamic and flexible work). In addition, there is a need to pay attention to the context in which work takes place in order to review what seems to be relevant to the levels and types of engagement by young people and to see what is being done educationally, formally, and otherwise.

Cross-References

- ▶ [Constructions of “Youth” and “Activism” in Lebanon](#)
- ▶ [Education for Youth Civic and Political Action in Australia](#)
- ▶ [The Development of Civic Participation Among Youth in Singapore](#)
- ▶ [Youth Civic Engagement and Formal Education in Canada: Shifting Expressions, Associated Challenges](#)

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“You’ve Got the Skin”: Entrepreneurial Universities, Study Abroad, and the Construction of Global Citizenship

54

Sam Schulz

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Abstract

This chapter locates an Australian university study abroad venture in India within the contours of the worldwide transformation of higher education. This framing provides space to discursively analyze how “white” Australian participants contribute to the construction of global citizenship through beliefs and dispositions mobilized to make sense of lived experience. All study abroad ventures are nowadays enmeshed in international circuits of capital and neoliberal discourses that present as “race neutral,” natural and necessary such that those involved are positioned and influenced by dynamics that obscure the inequities on which these ventures are often grounded. Pre- and posttravel interviews and in situ photo diaries form the basis for analyzing participants’ experiences. These materials are read against a historically constituted field to shed light on the cultural, institutional, and geopolitical dynamics shaping and framing participant accounts. The chapter demonstrates how a majority of participants in the study at the heart of this chapter remain “innocently” implicated in reproducing hegemony. It links these findings to the way in which global citizenship and study abroad ventures alike are being shaped by the neoliberalization of higher education.

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Global citizenship · Study abroad · Visual discourse analysis · Whiteness · Entrepreneurial universities · Neoliberalism

Introduction: Contextualizing Study Abroad

Study abroad (also known as international service, international experiential learning, outbound mobility, global work-integrated-learning, or global education) has flourished in the West in recent years (Grantham 2018). This has occurred in tandem with at least two related phenomena; that is, the rise of voluntourism (or “volunteer tourism”) as an endeavor similarly geared toward enriching the lives of Westerners by creating opportunities for them to travel to (mostly) “less white” global regions for charity work and adventure (Mostafanezhad 2014). And secondly, study abroad has grown simultaneously to young people in the West being pressured to comport themselves entrepreneurially (Spohrer 2011).

Charles (2017) argues, young people are now enculturated to think like “shape shifting portfolio people” whose understandings of success and failure are not informed by socio-cultural or structural critique, but viewed as products of the hard-working, agile, or “deviant” Self. Fueling these dynamics is the rise of neoliberalism as a worldwide, monolithic force (Smyth 2017). Wilkins explains (► Chap. 10, “Neoliberalism, Citizenship, and Education: A Policy Discourse Analysis”), neoliberalism has emerged as one of the most cited concepts of the last 30 years. Neoliberalism – or “neoliberalization” to flag its processual (Canaan 2013) – has been invaluable for explaining the organized retraction of government spending on vital social services in Western democracies for several decades. But more than this, “neoliberalization” denotes an ideological shift, and hence form of governmentality by which our view of our own and others’ agentic capacities are systematically reduced to a decontextualized understanding of “individual will” (Davies and Bansel 2007). Canaan (2013) says, neoliberalism contracts the “horizons of the thinkable,” leading us to perceive critical *public* issues in de-historicized *personal* terms.

For a complexity of reasons – including neoliberalism’s support of the notions that individuals be responsible for themselves, and that any intensification of existing social inequalities along race, class or gender lines be blamed on *ir*responsible individuals who are spoiling a traditional (read: patriarchal, “white”) way of life – writers like Bauman (2016) draw explicit correlations between the rise of neoliberalism and whitelash populism, Brexit, xenophobia, economic nationalism, and the election of Donald Trump. These phenomena are all shaped by the increased flow of bodies, capital and commodities that globalization and neoliberal restructuring have ushered, as well as the synchronous firming of national borders to halt the flow of “Others” as necessary “safety precaution” (Patel 2017). Amidst these tensions, race is invoked “to silently reference those who threaten the fiscal wellbeing [. . .] or the social security of the nation” (Goldberg as cited in Cameron 2018, p. 94). This occurs, paradoxically, under ostensibly “race-free,” state-sanctioned rhetoric that vindicates the overtly racialized policies and populism to follow.

Furthermore, these and other writers have illuminated parallels between the growth of neoliberalism, the rise of the global super-rich, and the divide fast growing between global rich and poor (see Oxfam 2018). Discourses of neoliberalism would have us believe that we are all individuals whose achievements are the product of unfettered entrepreneurial spirit. For example, "successful" billionaires are not viewed as individuals whose wealth and achievements are built on unearned raced, classed, or gendered privileges (see, e.g., Schulz and Hay 2016); rather, they are positioned as role models to which all should aspire. Indeed, as Monbiot (2016) argues, neoliberalism has created a heroic narrative of extreme wealth, while conversely, individuals or collectives in need of sustained welfare support are framed as "living within a culture of dependency, with implicit suggestions of their persistent deviance" (Stanford and Taylor 2013, p. 477). In short, discourses of neoliberalism create a "victim blaming" culture that brackets existing privileges and disadvantages from view. Consequently, "good" neoliberal citizens are expected to think "individualistically" and this way of thinking is framed as "commonsense," while neoliberal forces simultaneously reduce what is "thinkable."

Higher education institutions were once seen as victims of these neoliberal processes. However, universities across the West are now increasingly "adopting, if not embracing, neoliberal values, goals, and processes" (Fraser and Taylor 2016, p. 4) by, among other means, defining the relationship between students and their institution in primarily economic terms: i.e., the student as "entrepreneurial individual" and "consumer" (Giroux 2005). As universities (in Australia, for example) continue to endure inequitable Federal funding cuts, public universities for public "good" are quickly transforming into corporations ruled by a mode of aggressive managerialism to guard against "risk" and promote economic growth. This is changing the way we think about education: from social good to private investment. Within what might be termed "entrepreneurial" universities, academic subjects are increasingly valued to the extent that they hold exchange value on the market. Those less amenable to outside funding are increasingly *devalued*, especially those of a critical nature that question power and expand our critical-contextual awareness. The citizen at the heart of these relations is thus essentially molded to be autonomous; no longer required to think and act in social terms but as an individual and "rational economic actor whose behaviors, both economic and noneconomic, are determined by a cost/benefit analysis" (Lemke as cited in Saunders 2011, p. 23).

Within this formulation that is heavily focused on free-market logic, some study abroad ventures have found fertile ground. Increasingly, universities "advertise international mobility programs as opportunities for students to develop marketable skills and to access real world job training for the globalized economy of the 21st Century" (Grantham 2018, p. 61). Study abroad programs can be used to generate "good news" stories about the institution while enhancing domestic enrolments (Jorgenson and Shultz 2012, p. 6). University advertising of this nature will typically promise "a whole world of opportunities" and "life changing experiences" that will enable students to "help where needed" while "boosting their brand" (Schulz 2019). And while university strategic plans will often frame study abroad ventures as vehicles by which they produce graduates "equipped to make a difference in the world as respectful and ethical global citizens" (Flinders University 2019,

p. 12), what are called the public and private transcripts (in other words, the front and backstage “rhetoric”) of neoliberal universities tend to be worlds apart.

As Greenhouse (2005) explains, domination dramatizes itself with public transcripts as the open performance of power; however, “the hidden transcript is the other side of that power, reworked as its negation” (as cited in Smyth 2017, p. 47). What strategic plans of entrepreneurial universities “dramatize” with respect to global citizenship is an orientation that *appears* akin to “thick” global citizenship (Andreotti 2006). In other words, an orientation grounded in critical, contextual awareness and self-reflexivity. Ethical orientations to global citizenship of the kind prefigured in these public transcripts stress the need for collective, informed political action rather than individual responses to complex structural issues, in which the West is deeply implicated. Ethical orientations thus demand that we move beyond a logic of individualism to permit structural, interconnected understandings of social life (Jorgenson and Shultz 2012, p. 3).

However, given the way in which neoliberal universities are systematically closing down spaces for critical thinking and devaluing critical education topics while demanding that academics demonstrate increased levels of productivity in compressed timeframes, in practice they are creating the conditions for “neoliberal citizenship.” According to Wilkins (► Chap. 10, “Neoliberalism, Citizenship, and Education: A Policy Discourse Analysis”), neoliberal citizenship conceptually signals the relationship between neoliberalism and citizenship in the field of education. At the heart of this construct, “is a narrow, rational, utilitarian view of citizens as consumers” (p. 2). Moreover, neoliberal rationalities bracket socio-historical and contextual relations from view; thus, a “neoliberal” orientation to global citizenship is unlikely to broaden students’ field of vision to take in present-day impacts of past and ongoing modes of global coloniality, racism, or the West’s implications in poverty, pollution and transnational environmental issues. Put simply, neoliberal citizenship undermines the capacity for reflexive global citizenship.

To prepare students to apprehend the world reflexively takes time. It requires supporting them, not only to cross the physical borders of international travel but to negotiate “invisible” borders of culture and race (Gómez-Peña as cited in Townsin and Walsh 2016, p. 218). Education of this nature essentially demands a long-term, strategic commitment from all levels of the institution; however, this orientation to global citizenship is unlikely to be embraced by entrepreneurial universities when their remit is to develop globally competitive, work-ready graduates in limited time. Those involved can effectively be caught at the crossroads between discourses of global neoliberalism and ethical global citizenship. The study at the heart of this chapter is caught in this bind.

“Capturing” Global Citizenship Via the Camera

The study on which this chapter reports explores the experiences of 18 Australian undergraduate students taking part in a 4-week study abroad experience in India delivering sport development programs to school-aged students. The design and

particulars of the study have been published elsewhere (see Schulz and Agnew [forthcoming](#)). Of interest to this chapter is that the majority of participants were studying a double degree in "teaching" and "sport, health and physical activity" (SHAPA), all but one were in their mid-twenties and all were "white" – in other words, drawn from Australia's middle-class, Anglo-dominated mainstream. Notwithstanding that the category "white" is complex and mutable, here it is used in a general sense to signal members of the most privilege group in a race-structured society.

Most Australian teachers are in fact white; this is a product of the nation's colonial heritage. Indeed, Australia has historically assumed an imperial role in the Indo-Pacific (Rizvi 2011). Consequently, a portion of funding for students' trips was derived from the Australian Government New Colombo Plan, which aims to enhance Australia's geopolitical standing by, among other means, supporting Australian undergraduates to experience "transformational" people-to-people encounters in Indo-Pacific countries (DFAT [n.d.](#)) – effectively, participants in New Colombo ventures are placed at the frontline of efforts to reconcile the nation's regional belonging. The present study has endeavored to understand how participants make sense of their experiences, how these experiences are transformational and, more broadly, to illuminate dynamics at play in the making of Western global citizens via short-term, university-led study abroad ventures like this one.

Pre- and posttravel interviews and in situ "photo-diaries" were used to capture participants' experiences. Modes of "visual" and "critical" discourse analysis were then applied to these materials hence grounding the study in the poststructuralist notion that discourse is about more than language; "discourses are articulated through all sorts of visual and verbal images and texts" (Rose 2012, p. 136). Photographs, in this sense, are not viewed as passive objects capturing empirical truth, they "act" in the world by engaging viewers in processes of representation and interpretation that provide producers and consumers of visual media with multiple means of constructing reality.

Analyzing photographs from a critical standpoint is therefore about illuminating ways in which power runs through them. Historical archives show countless examples of the photographic classification of raced bodies in Australia and India, which highlights how racialized power has historically functioned in this contact zone. This signals aspects of the legacy of white citizenship that participants in the study have inherited and underscores ways in which Westerners' experience of citizenship in their home countries shapes their orientations to global citizenship (Clost 2015). For example, if participants have grown up as members of the dominant group in a settler society like Australia that is resistant to reconciling with its colonial roots, this can limit students' ability to be "race cognizant" (in other words, to be mindful of colonization and its ongoing impacts) within the scope of their own lives. Put differently, reflexivity as a global citizen first requires reflexive awareness of one's positionality "at home."

Students contribute to these relations in multiple ways. According to Clost (2015), their contributions are linked to the "authoritative knowledge" gathered about the host destination prior to departure, but they are also linked (in this case) to whiteness as a structure of authority that is ascribed to "white" subjects. In this sense, relations between Self and Other are constantly negotiated, resisted and transformed through raced, classed and gendered processes of representation,

imagination and interpretation that occur before, during, and after an overseas placement – students can thus reproduce or resist racial hegemony, but their impulses are always influenced by the social, historical, and institutional environments in which they are immersed. The following analysis explores how the study abroad participants “made sense of” their overseas experiences and the orientations to global citizenship that were forged along the way.

“You’ve Got the Skin”: Constructing Global Citizenship

In pretrip interviews, one of the first questions asked of participants was why they had chosen to take part. Tiessen (2012, p. 3) notes, understanding participants’ expectations and motivations is an under-theorized yet vital area of inquiry for improving the management, satisfaction, and impacts of participants on study abroad placements. Participants’ expectations, whether realized or unmet, play a significant role in shaping their perceptions and any knowledge that is carried forward. When exploring participants’ motivations from a poststructuralist perspective, this enables movement beyond a logic of individualism to apprehend desire as a discursive construct in which subjects choose to invest. Participants’ desires thus serve as resources for analyzing society by indicating the discourses on which they draw to re-construct lived experience.

Similar to Tiessen’s (2012) findings, students’ overarching reasons for taking part in the study abroad venture to India included frequent recourse to three broad themes: “career” (i.e., boosting their CVs and testing their teaching or coaching skills); “travel” (i.e., experiencing “culture” or appeasing boredom); and “helping” (being a role model, nurturing children or improving the lives of those in need). With respect to helping, “Eve” noted:

... I have a real passion for making a difference and helping people and I guess that sort of drives me.

Charlie reflected:

I am keen to get out and explore new opportunities; get outside my comfort zone; keen to travel; see the world; make a difference – like I thought India would be a really good opportunity to you know [...] make a difference.

When asked why he thought India, specifically, would provide scope for making a difference, Charlie explained that being a “Third World” country, India would be “unbelievable”:

... I want to expose myself to those conditions that will really put me outside my comfort zone. I think the main thing is just the challenge and the comfort zone and just probably personal development.

Although blatant in this excerpt, the oft-cited and frequently critiqued helping imperative (see, e.g., Tiessen and Huish 2013) is usually framed by Western participants in terms of what they will "do for others," hence imbuing them with a selfless pretense. However, as Heron (2007) contends, and Charlie illustrates, the desire to help can be as much about "Self" as the more patently "self-interested" motivations linked to career and travel. Binding the participants' desires was thus their grounding in a neoliberal "self-enterprising" discourse centered on enhancing individual capital, which was expressed in the interviews in the absence of any reference to social justice, collaboration, long-term commitment, or activism.

In place of the latter, self-serving impulses featured far more prominently meaning that the focus was "nearly exclusively centered on the students' desires rather than the needs or requests from host communities" (McDonald and Tiessen 2018, p. 6). Tim remarked, travelling to India would be "another thing that I can put on my resume to [. . .] differ me from the next person that's applying for a job." Floyd said, study abroad would be "a potential CV stocking filler." Simon described it as "something that just popped up [. . . that I can] put on the resume." While Stewart, Laura, Nate, and indeed the far majority of remaining participants cited "travel to India" to experience culture or escape the boredom of everyday life in Australia as a primary motivating force. In Lucas' view, "to go over there and experience Indian culture [. . . is] something that everyone needs to tick off their bucket list," thus positioning the marginalized situation of many people in India as a novelty worth going to see. Not dissimilarly, Ben explained, "Australia doesn't really have much culture," which piqued his desire to experience culture "over there."

As suggested earlier, to be reflexive as a global citizen requires reflexive appreciation of one's positionality "at home." Despite that more than half the participants had undertaken at least one critical education topic as part of their degrees – (in this case, an Indigenous pedagogies topic that asks students to reflect on their privileges along various axes of oppression while appreciating that Australia is a race structured nation) – none advanced a nuanced understanding of Australian national identity in their interviews or photo diaries. Instead, references to "Australian culture" were articulated via benign stereotypes such as "summer, soft drinks, sunscreen and beach cricket" (Charlie, preinterview); in other words, normative images of "Australian-ness" that naturalize the nation as a White possession (Hage 2000). References to Australian national identity typically mirrored comments like Ben's, which frame White Australia as "cultureless," and as a corollary, the white Self as "just ordinary."

To discursively link "Australia" with "no culture" and white subjectivity with ordinariness equates whiteness with the power of normalcy, while denying Indigenous sovereignty. When white identity is understood this way, whiteness is negated as a system of historical, cultural, and social mechanisms that repeatedly return unearned material and psychological benefits to those positioned as "white." Although merely signaled in the examples included in this analysis, the far majority of participants in the study exhibited cultural lenses with this lacuna: i.e., blind spots relating to their privilege, which colored their experiences overseas. For instance, when asked in postinterviews to describe what "being white" meant in India, participants frequently marveled at being "stared at," "targeted for money" or "asked for autographs," but rarely did they

acknowledge whiteness as a system of benefits that sustains their lives. Articulating one of the most common themes, Ben, Tim, and Lucas remarked:

Probably the most memorable [part of the trip] was yeah just getting flocked by people to sign autographs and take photos. [. . .] It was pretty crazy to think *just because we are white* people that these guys want our autographs. (Ben)

Everyone was wanting autographs [. . .] a million autographs and selfies and it's like we were famous, but *we were just white*. (Tim)

They thought we were superstars, rock stars, sort of thing, and they would literally line up just to get our autograph when *we're just ordinary Australians*. (Lucas)

In each of these excerpts (where emphasis is added), whiteness is articulated as innocence. There is little recognition that their capacity to travel overseas is a product of their whiteness, an option that is unlikely to be a two-way street for those living in poverty in India. Australia's historical role as an imperial presence in India, and the ongoing impacts of this past, is thus erased from view when whiteness as a source of unearned privileges that still accrues to white subjects is overlooked. Instead, whiteness assumes a naturally elevated status, which was in turn reflected in students' photo diaries, particularly when those in the host destination were positioned as a homogenous group in relation to a single white subject whose status was consequently elevated (Clost 2015, p. 241). Common examples of the latter included: "fielding autographs amidst a crowd," "coaching a mass of students," "hugging primary schoolers," or, as pictured, "leading the class":



In an unusually sophisticated analysis, Joe nevertheless indicated movement toward reflexivity when describing an encounter that deepened his appreciation of what it means to be white:

I went to a club, a nightclub with somebody I met from Mumbai [. . .] and I'd recently taken off a button-up shirt and given it to a friend because they were leaving, I just had a t-shirt. We started entering this club and I realized everyone was wearing button-up shirts and I said to

this local Mumbai friend, "I should've kept my button-up shirt." And he said, "it's okay, you've got the skin."

McKinney (2005, p. 24) suggests, turning points are important junctures in white peoples' lives that signify moments of consciousness of whiteness when white subjects gain insights into the racialized nature of their existence. Turning points usually result from interactions with others who McKinney calls agents of epiphany; people who prompt a radically new way of thinking about aspects of our lives in a reflexive or self-analytic manner. Joe used this turning point experience at the nightclub to rationalize that his ostensibly elevated status as a "white" person in India, far from proving individual qualities of character, was a product of colonial relations that he'd, realistically, done nothing to earn. Applying this awareness to his teaching, Joe then reflected; "I suppose it's pretty easy for me to sit back and expect the rest of the world to learn English but . . . if I don't try and learn something from their language I'll be limited to my understanding of my own language." In this sense, Joe exhibited awareness of the need to decenter whiteness and his capacity (to a small extent) to do so pedagogically.

The development of reflexivity is, nevertheless, a complex and ongoing task and "how to be" reflexive is not always clear-cut. Notwithstanding Joe's realization that whiteness is more than skin deep, when subsequently asked how he negotiated encounters with poverty in India, the rationalities on which Joe drew restored his complicity with hegemonic whiteness and hence, neoliberal citizenship:

If someone came up and asked me for money, towards the end it was a no. I justified that within myself by saying that this will be for the betterment of them in the long run. [. . . But] how do you still show kindness [. . .] How do you support the person at the same time? That is a good question and I don't know the answer to that yet. But in terms of dealing with poverty, the behavior I'm not going to reinforce just by giving them money.

Despite permitting a structural understanding of social life when recounting the nightclub story, in this excerpt Joe secures the relational basis of whiteness through projecting fantasies of an Other who is caught in a self-induced cycle of dependency – in keeping with neoliberal rhetoric, poverty is viewed as a product of individual "poor" behavior. From this perspective, "that some of us are better off because others are and historically have been poor, and that this is structured by the intersections of race, class, and gender, is almost unrecognized" (Heron 2007, pp. 41–42). Instead of acknowledging these dimensions in the way that a "critical" global citizen might do, Joe drew on discourses that positioned him as a benevolent white man while reproducing the moral rationalization of the civilizing mission: an entitlement and obligation to intervene (Spurr 1993, p. 113), where intervention was limited to "showing kindness."

When detailing their encounters with poverty, some of the respondents articulated more patently racist dispositions. For instance, in a remarkably frank disclosure, Lucas explained that when approached by extremely poor people seeking money, he would "start looking on my phone hoping they'd go away [until eventually I'd say], 'driver, can you just tell them to piss off'." In comments like these, albeit that they were rare, the student's complicity with domination is obvious insofar as


positioning those who are structurally disadvantaged as “deviant” and disdainful. In contrast, Joe’s deployment of a helping narrative was arguably more insidious and was far more common across the interviews, given the way in which “helping” secures innocence and the story of the moral subject (Heron 2007, p. 121). This standpoint is particularly problematic for moving Western subjects towards “critical” orientations to global citizenship given that doing so would in fact require “relinquishing moral narratives of Self” (p. 143).

Innocent, brave, benevolent, worldly, or otherwise affirmative self-constructions were commonplace across the photo diaries, illustrating how immersion in a developing context can enable Western subjects to “discover” themselves through encounters with an Other (Mathers as cited in McDonald and Tiessen 2018, p. 7). For many of the participants, this inflated sense of Self that traveling to a developing context granted them piqued further desire for travel. For example, Stewart explained, having travelled to India he was ready for the next step:

I definitely want to travel solo next time because [. . . now that I’ve been to India] I can go by myself [because] a lot of people have said India’s really up there on the scale.

By describing India as “up there on the scale,” Stewart references the carnivalesque, and indeed, India was often constituted in students’ accounts in carnivalesque terms: a dangerous or exotic world that excites the appetite of cultural tourists by allowing them to eagerly realize their desires beneath the sign of the Other (Del Cooke 2006). Many of the photo diaries included pictures of Western students alongside Indian crowds or in relation to (what they perceived to be) outlandish sights in ways that accentuated their “intrepid traveler,” “caring teacher,” or “rock star” status. At other times, however, the host culture was erased altogether. The latter was noticeable, for instance, in travel shots sanitized for display on social media, as in the following example which Tim captions, “Boy meets world”:

Boy meets world



By framing these trips as, in part, about holiday-making – as in voluntourism – this too can allow an “innocent gaze” (Heron and Tiessen 2012). The term “boy” in Tim’s caption is therefore significant. Boys, opposed to men, *are* innocent and it is not the work of boys to advance a decolonizing agenda. An innocent stance on the part of Western participants can consequently reproduce rather than challenge superficial orientations to global citizenship while, nonetheless, enhancing their employability, framing their trips a “success” and imparting a “worldly” demeanor that can be “cashed in” back at home in return for social and professional kudos.

The global citizen who emerges from these analyses might therefore be described as “white,” largely non-reflexive and chiefly concerned with self-enhancement. This raises questions about the capacity of study abroad ventures to live up to the public transcripts of university strategic plans and produce graduates *equipped to make a difference in the world as respectful and ethical global citizens*, given the many challenges to this goal.

Discussion and Conclusion

In reality, study abroad ventures are diverse and multiple and so too are the students who take part in them. This chapter has particularized its focus to one venture administered by an Australian university undergoing significant neoliberal change. Although aspects of this program are unique, other details speak to dynamics that are shaping higher education and university-led study abroad programs more generally. For example, myriad details from the participants’ stories indicated ways in which students can remain implicated in reproducing center-periphery relations borne of colonization. In this sense, the analysis illuminated how residues of the colonial era remain at work in postcolonial contexts like India, such that white subjects of colonial heritage remain unfairly if “naturally” privileged. However, Indo-Pacific hosts are not passive in these relations. Moreover, it would be short-sighted to reify the locus of whiteness to individual students themselves.

To be fair, a complex “ensemble” (Foucault 1991, p. 102) of providers, departments, authorities, policies, and personnel make up the governmentality of “study abroad.” An overarching impact on these programs, one that shapes the dispositions and choices of all involved, is the contemporary neoliberalization of both higher and pretertiary education. For example, at the university where this study was carried out, undergraduate degrees in areas like Education are no longer staffed by a critical mass of critical educators. Students’ exposure to topics that allow them to apprehend their reality as social beings with social consciousness is, therefore, curtailed. Yet, developing critical awareness of this kind requires time, students need ongoing exposure to sociocultural discourses, and they also require scaffolded engagement with reflexive ways of thinking. Consequently, when questions of race or whiteness or critical global citizenship are relegated to topics such as Indigenous Education or one-off modules on cultural awareness, this can have the adverse effect of entrenching the covertly racist belief that such issues be ignored elsewhere (Schulz and Fane 2015).

Although participants in the present study were required to complete a “cultural awareness training” module in preparation for their trips; moreover, although most had undertaken a critical Indigenous Education topic as part of their degree, the analyses indicate that knowledge of this kind can be abandoned in favor of more hegemonic logics and practices that present as “commonsense.” In place of demonstrating hallmarks of what might be termed “critical intercultural competence” – in other words, “dispositions and skills that are cultivated over time, which then become the critical knowledge and understanding needed to cultivate creative solutions to complex challenges collectively with citizens across the world” (Townsin and Walsh 2016, p. 218) – participants reverted to shallow understandings their study abroad ventures, with the upshot being “shallow” articulations of global citizenship characterized chiefly by “white innocence.”

Compounding the issue was that to satisfy funding and program imperatives inside a university whose central remit is to produce “agile global competitors,” participants were also led to undertake units on “career development” and “entrepreneurism” – factors that circumscribed the efforts of the small number of academics designing and delivering the program, academics who were themselves working under compressed timeframes with little support. That the students were collectively wedded to discourses of “self-enterprise” and “personal growth” is therefore unsurprising – these are dominant discourses within and beyond their university.

Tiessen and Huish (2013) argue that the rapid growth of study abroad programs across the West has “far outpaced our ability to evaluate and understand [their] impacts” (p. 4). But more than this, entrepreneurial universities are co-opting study abroad ventures as marketing tools. As such, universities are far more likely to favor “good news” stories about study abroad than to allow critical research into these programs, which might tarnish the university’s brand. Indeed, neoliberal governance mechanisms are actively undermining, underfunding, and negating critical research in favor of that which is quantifiable and marketable (Cowden and Singh 2013), and this managerialist logic has worldwide reach.

For example, the Indian schooling system where the Australian students in this study were variously placed is deeply enmeshed in “doing neoliberalism” to survive, which means scaling national school rankings systems and actively engaging in image-maintenance practices like universities in the West. In this respect, Indian schools advertising that they are hosting “visiting Australian teachers and sports coaches” can have the (arguably) problematic effect of reinforcing Australian students’ elevated self-perceptions, which reduces the need for reflexive self-critique. Thus, Western students not only feed into and off these dynamics when unintentionally using study abroad primarily as a vehicle for self-benefit, they are also written into these relations by their hosts, by their institutions of higher learning, by the overarching corporate machinery that is fast turning study abroad into an extension of global capitalism, and by preparation programs that favor modules on “career development” and “entrepreneurship.”

Throughout the participants’ interviews and photo diaries, dysconsciousness of social relations thus had the effect of legitimating their voices “as individuals,” while negating structural or reflexive critique. If Western subjects of colonial heritage are

nonetheless to adopt a reflexive orientation to global citizenship, and in so doing live up to the “public transcripts” of neoliberal universities, greater levels of socio-political awareness and reflexivity must be developed. Western students need to have more than “white skin” to be critical global citizens; they require genuine “skin in the game” that underpins a long-term commitment to global equity. Neoliberal universities are arguably undermining this project; this should give all involved in study abroad serious pause for concern.

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Youth Participation, Movement Politics, and Skills: A Study of Youth Activism in Italy **55**

Ilaria Pitti

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Abstract

Studies of youth participation in social movement organizations (SMOs) have largely focused on the influence of upbringing on the development of activism. Other analyses have considered how young people use competencies acquired through their involvement in SMOs in their wider political activities in more institutional political settings, as well as in their private lives. While young activists' paths "toward" and "after" movement politics have been considered within political socialization and civic education studies, there is a need for deeper analyses on young people's paths "in" SMOs. The chapter intends to contribute to this debate by analyzing the specific skills a young individual is required to have to be recognized as a "promising" activist and progress in the SMOs' hierarchies. The chapter surveys existing literature and, drawing on data collected through an ethnography conducted on one Italian radical-left SMO, analyzes the importance of hard and character skills in young people's trajectories within movement politics.

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Keywords

Young people · Social movements · Political socialization · Youth participation · Skills

Introduction: Activism, Socialization and Skills

Research on youth civic and political participation has shown a growing interest for the analysis of the processes leading young people to develop participative conduct (Flanagan et al. 2012). A vast literature has developed around the concept of “political socialization” (Hyman 1959; Merelman 1986; Neundorf et al. 2013), which describes and analyzes processes of transmission and negotiation of political behaviors and norms between parents and children and, more generally, between adult and young people. These researches have demonstrated, for example, how growing up in politically supportive families and being exposed to certain political norms and behaviors in early childhood and adolescence impact on people’s political attitudes throughout their lives (Neundorf et al. 2013). Growing up in politically active families would result, for example, in higher levels of interest for political issues and political involvement (Torney-Purta and Amadeo 2011; Amnå 2012; Wray-Lake and Flanagan 2012; Martínez et al. 2019).

More recently, the debate on “civic education” (Sears and Levy 2003; Fischman and Haas 2014) has expanded the perspective of classic theories on political socialization (Torney-Purta and Amadeo 2012). The civic education model has contributed to broadening scholars’ attention beyond the time of primary socialization (Gordon 2008). As pointed out by Petrovic et al. (2014: 8), “more attention is nowadays given to the balance between what citizens learn during their youth and what is learned over the rest of the life course [and] the possibility of political socialization as a lifelong learning process has been considered.” In this perspective, the civic education model has contributed to encouraging analyses focused on agencies of socialization for politics which are alternative to the family – such as the peer group – as well as on the processes through which people acquire citizenship skills, knowledge, and expertise during their youth, adulthood, and old age (Fillieule 2013).

The prevalence of a constructivist paradigm within the civic education field has led scholars to abandon the idea of socialization as a one-way process where adults are in charge of teaching participation to young people. Of particular importance, the appreciation of civic education as a wider form of lifelong learning has challenged what has been defined as the “deficit model” of political socialization (Andolina et al. 2003; Torney-Purta and Wilkenfeld 2009; Kahne and Sporte 2008), that is, the idea of young people as “empty glasses” that adults have to fill. In so doing, the civic education model has recognized that “political socialization is something that [young people] do for themselves” (Earl et al. 2017). As suggested by Youniss et al. (2002), involvement in families, schools, and adult-led participative environments can provide young people with “raw materials – knowledge, models, reflective matter – and various forms of feedback, but it is ultimately the youth themselves

who synthesize this material, individually and collaboratively, in ways that make sense to them.”

Within research that has focused more specifically on youth participation in social movement organizations (hereafter SMOs), the political socialization and civic education models have been mostly applied, respectively, to (a) highlight the influence of upbringing on the development of activism and (b) shed light on the civic competencies that young people can acquire through their engagement in social movements.

Concerning the first point, social movement studies have analyzed the biographical paths leading young people to become active in movement politics, the influence that growing up in politicized milieus (families, schools, urban areas) has on the involvement in movement politics in later life and the biographical consequences of this involvement (Fillieule 2013; Giugni and Grasso 2016; Filleule and Neveu 2019; Walther et al. 2019). Research has shown how activists' personal histories often entail an upbringing marked by the witnessing of the intense activism of their parents. Parents would transmit a “propensity to activism” to their children through their example and through a series of daily behaviors oriented by their political values (Torney-Purta and Amadeo 2012). Moreover, the networks parents are involved in would become a socializing agent themselves as highlighted, for example, in a study conducted on the life stories of “red diaper babies” who have grown up American communist milieus during the 1950s by Kaplan and Shapiro (1998) and in the analyses realized by McCurties (2011) on the political attitudes and behaviors of the children of the “old left.”

In relation to the second point, SMOs have been considered as spaces of “civic development” through which young people acquire a series of competencies and knowledge that are relevant for the formation of their civic identity and the exercise of their rights as citizens (Ginwright and Cammarota 2007). From this perspective, SMOs help young people in discovering themselves as active citizens (van Dam et al. 2015) through different processes and mechanisms that foster a shift in the focus from the “I” to the “We” (Martínez et al. 2012). They teach young people to recognize and identify with collective values and beliefs that link one's conditions to a past and a present (Youniss and Yates 1997) and to a larger social and cultural scenario (Furrow and Wagener 2003). They also teach young people collective problem-solving (Kirshner 2007), encouraging them to work effectively together to have an impact on their and others' lives. As suggested by Van Dyke and Dixon (2013), participation in social movements allows individuals to acquire an “activist human capital” through the relationships they develop with other activists. The interaction occurring between activists would result in the acquisition of a series of tangible competencies in terms of organizing strategies, leadership skills, and group management that would contribute at sustaining their participation and that would result useful in their private lives as well.

These perspectives develop the ideas that participation in social movements requires certain values and ideological perspectives developed in the home and also require skills, knowledge, and competencies that can be developed through such action (Petrovic et al. 2014: 10). However, this brief review of the literature

highlights how scholars' attention has been mainly placed either on the acquisitions of those skills through processes occurring *before* the beginning of involvement in movement politics (i.e., the socialization in the family) or on the effects that socialization to politics *through* SMOs can have in terms of acquisitions of skills that are expendable elsewhere. In other words, the analysis appears largely focused on the "before" and the "after" the actual moment of the involvement in social movements, while the study of the "now" is still substantially underexplored. Indeed, there is a need for more analyses of the specific skills that are valued, cherished, and cultivated by SMOs themselves and of the knowledge and competencies that emerge as functional for effective participation in SMOs (Fligstein 2001; Van Dyke and Dixon 2013).

This chapter intends to contribute to this debate presenting the results of a preliminary analysis of the paths of involvement of a group of young activists within a left-leaning radical SMO based in Bologna (Italy). Leaning on Guzman-Concha (2015), I define radical SMOs as characterized by three distinctive elements: they pursue an agenda of drastic changes which would affect elite interests and social positions; they perform a repertory of contention characterized by the employment of unconventional means; they progressively adopt countercultural identities that frame and justify unconventional objectives and methods. Despite advocating in favor of radical political and social changes and using unconventional (and sometimes unlawful) means of action, radical social movements do not seek to overthrow democracy and its institutions.

In particular, the chapter is interested in the analysis of new members' "participative trajectories" within the observed SMO which will be considered to answer the following research question: what skills are needed to be recognized as a "promising" activist? The concept of participative trajectories refers to the progression (or not) of the new members in the group's internal hierarchies. Young people's participative trajectories will be used to highlight which skills are considered relevant and need to be acquired to be considered a good activist.

The chapter starts with an introduction of the case study followed by the analysis of the skills which emerge as important in determining one's possibility to access the SMO and progress in its informal hierarchies. The relevance of a series of "hard" (i.e., education) and "character" (i.e., optimism, vision, risk tolerance, etc.) skills is presented, and results are discussed in relation to their broader implications for the study of youth activism and social movements.

The Research: Case Study and Methodology

The data considered for this chapter have been collected between 2015 and 2018 through an ethnography conducted in one radical SMO which will be fictionally named "Lucha." The materials considered for this chapter have been collected within the research project "Youthblobs." The project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement no 701844. Between 2016 and 2018, Youthblobs

has investigated young people's practices and trajectories of activism in radical SMOs. The research has been conducted through participant observations and biographical interviews with activists involved in different leftist SMOs in Italy and Sweden and has explored how youth conditions in the two countries contribute at shaping the contents and the forms of youth participation. A more extended presentation of the project's result can be found in Pitti (2018).

The story of Lucha begins in late 2012 when a group of young people decided to occupy an abandoned former barrack located in the center of the city of Bologna. The building became the "headquarter" of the organization, but also served as accommodation for many of the activists. Over the following 5 years was transformed in a "social center" where different projects were developed for and with local inhabitants. In the Italian context, the term *centri sociali* refers to a specific kind of political experience. Social centers are usually abandoned buildings which are squatted and turned in self-managed and countercultural spaces where political and social initiatives are proposed (for more, see Mudu 2012; Genova 2018). Within Lucha, one could find a self-managed shelter for migrants, a weekly farmers' market, a microbrewery, an organic garden, a pizzeria, a library and a study room, a bike repair shop, and a kindergarten along with seminars, workshops, self-training activities, and cultural events (i.e., concerts, art exhibitions).

Lucha was largely appreciated by local inhabitants of Bologna, but the relationships between the social center, local political institutions, and police authorities have been marked by strong contrasts due to the unlawful position of the *centro sociale*. The confrontation with authorities has resulted in the eviction of the SMO from the occupied barrack in August 2017. After the eviction, a demonstration has been organized, and more than 10.000 people have gathered in the street of Despina to ask for the reopening of Lucha. Authorities have refused to consider the possibility to maintain Lucha within the occupied barrack but have granted the group with a new space where some of the old projects were restarted along with new ones. For a more detailed presentation of the story of the case study and of the activities organized by the young people in Lucha, see Pitti (2018).

At the beginning of its history, the observed SMO was composed by a group of about 20–30 young activists with strong expertise in contentious politics. However, in August 2017 about 150 people, mostly aged between 20 and 25, were engaged in the activities of the social center. For the purpose of this analysis, it is particularly important to stress that many of these members were inexperienced. In fact, many of the young people involved in Lucha have started their path of activist into the observed SMO not through the engagement in protest actions (i.e., demonstrations, boycotts, etc.) but participating as "volunteers" in one of the abovementioned projects.

For many of them, the involvement in the activities of the self-managed shelter for migrants, of the school of Italian, or of the organic brewery was their very first experience of participation in movement politics. In fact, "calls for volunteers" were launched regularly to recruit new participants outside the movements' scene in order to involve in Lucha not only those who were already active in the radical left-wing politics. This characteristic makes it possible to analyze who of the new

“inexperienced” members had the possibility to progress in the hierarchies of the group and which skills made the difference in their paths.

The analysis is enriched by the in-depth perspective I have acquired on the case study thanks to the conduction of extended observations throughout a period of time encompassing more than 2 years. I have started to engage in the activities of Lucha as one of the many volunteers involved in the self-managed shelter for migrants, and, over the years, my engagement in the group has progressively increased to the point of being now a member. Although I have specified from the very beginning my professional role, the sustained involvement and the similarity (in terms of age, political views, and social backgrounds) to the young activists have led to the development of strong relationships of friendship and trust with Lucha’s activists.

Hard Skills and Character Skills in Participative Trajectories

Through the analysis of the activists’ trajectories of participation in Lucha has been possible to understand what skills influence possibilities to progress within the SMO’s informal hierarchies. In particular, the analysis of the collected data has highlighted the relevance of education a series of character skills on the paths of participation of the young activists.

For what concerns the kind of SMO considered in this chapter, it must be noted that – on a general level – radical-left SMOs are settings of participation distinguished by low barriers of access. Ideological frameworks that value and promote inclusion correspond to inclusive practices when it comes to the recruitment of new members. For example, the observed SMO adopted a very inclusive recruitment policy for new members, who were invited to take part in the activities of the group through the aforementioned “calls for volunteers.” In the calls, the willingness to take action on specific topics and donate one’s time to the SMO’s campaigns and projects was the only criterion defined to be welcomed.

If you think that from everyday concrete actions together with others is possible to build a fairer world for all, if you think that borders should not exist, if you are tired of cuts to fundamental rights disguised as “reforms”, if you want to commit yourself actively, then participate to our call for volunteers! (Lucha’s call for volunteers, 2016)

This openness resulted in the inclusion of members having very diversified backgrounds in terms of age, gender, ethnic origins, and educational levels and turned Lucha in a multiethnic and intergenerational meeting spot. Moreover, in line with the analysis conducted by Quintelier (2010) on unconventional forms of political participation, Lucha’s “open recruitment policy” fostered a massive engagement in the group of subjects – such young people and women – who frequently remain at the margins of more formal participatory processes.

Despite the substantial lack of entry barriers to the group, the relevance of a series of “hard” and “character” skills – such as education, optimism, flexibility, etc. –

emerges clearly if we focus our attention to the progressions of the new members within the hierarchies of the group.

On an official level, Lucha was a horizontal organization devoid of a formal hierarchical order. Indeed, the main decisions were always discussed in a weekly assembly based on the logic of consensus. Despite the absence of a formal hierarchy, an informal hierarchical order developed spontaneously within Lucha: a limited number of activists emerged from the base and assumed roles of greater responsibility, prestige, and visibility. This hierarchy was mirrored in the internal distinction of the members between “volunteers” and “activists.”

Lucha’s members name themselves “volunteers” or “activists”. “Volunteers” are the new members, who have no previous experience of participation in SMOs. “Activists” are either experienced members (who have a long history of militancy in radical left social movements) or volunteers who have been “promoted” after some months of participation in the group. On a daily basis, there is no major distinction in their activities within the squatted barrack and everybody can take part in the decision-making processes. However, the “agenda setting” is largely in the hands of the “activists.” (Fieldnotes, May 2016)

Looking at the stories of those new members who emerging from the base of the “volunteers” have managed to become “activists” and reach central positions in the group’s power structure is possible to notice that very specific hard and character skills have determined the outcome of their paths of participation.

Concerning hard skills, activists’ educational level emerged as a relevant factor in defining one’s possibilities of progression within the group hierarchies. None of the activists were required to possess a diploma or a university degree to participate in the activities of the social movement which – in terms of class background – was mostly composed of young people belonging to lower middle-class families, but the prevalence of university students and university graduates among those who assumed positions of visibility cannot be interpreted as just a chance.

The assumption of coordination roles by activists who own a higher educational degree appears favored because it guarantees to the group the internalization of competencies that may be relevant for the specific activities carried out by the movement (Fligstein 2001). For example, in the case of Lucha, students of law schools, educators, and social workers reached more frequently roles of coordination and visibility as they provided the SMO with the necessary competencies to run the shelter for refugees, the school of Italian, and other projects developed to foster migrants and asylum seekers’ inclusion in the Italian society.

Martina and Clara have quickly distinguished themselves from the other volunteers involved in the self-managed shelter for migrants and, after some months, they are *de facto* coordinating the activities of the shelter. Everybody refers to them as “activists” now. [. . .] They are about to graduate in educational studies and international cooperation and have expertise in providing services to migrants thanks to their studies and traineeships in NGOs so they have competencies which are highly valued in Lucha. (Fieldnotes, December 2016)

Moreover, a high educational level usually goes hand by hand with the possession of communicative, dialectical, and argumentative skills. These skills acquire central importance in the interaction with the institutions and in the activity of voice and claim enacted by any social movement. In the case of Lucha, students of political science, philosophy, communication studies, and sociology were encouraged to engage as spokespersons during press conferences or at taking care of the communication campaigns and social media profiles of the group.

The emerging relevance of educational level for participation in movement politics is in line with the tendencies highlighted by Bovens and Wille (2017) in their study on education-based inequalities in participation. The authors argue that education-based inequality represents the most worrying form of inequality in contemporary societies also for its effects on political influence. Bovens and Wille (2017) have coined the expression “diploma democracy” to describe how political influence is becoming accessible only to people having high educational credentials. In this context, movement politics appears to have a paradoxical role: at the same time, it fosters the involvement of politically marginalized social groups (including individuals with low educational credentials) and reproduces education-based inequalities in its internal hierarchies (Quintelier 2010).

Education becomes a relevant factor for progressing into the observed SMO, but the analysis of the collected materials underlines that the possibilities of advancement within the group are strongly determined also by the other skills, which sociological and psychological literature clusters under the concept of “character skills.” The term “character skills” describes a series of personal attributes that represent desirable qualities for certain activities (Heckman and Kautz 2014; Maccarini 2016). Widely used by scholars studying educational and work careers, the concept of character skills refers to a wide spectrum of abilities and traits that complement the so-called hard skills. While the latter refers to the technical abilities and the factual knowledge needed to accomplish a given task, character skills are a series of personal, social, and communication competencies that allow subjects to effectively use their technical abilities and knowledge.

When asked what skills a participant needs to be considered an activist, Lucha’s members persistently mentioned a series of character elements. Indeed, having the “right character” or the “right attitude” were expressions constantly used by the observed young people to explain why some people succeed in becoming activists and others do not.

I discuss with Federica, one of the activists, about Andrea, a new volunteer. Federica says she thinks Andrea has the “right qualities” to “be more active”. She thinks he can aspire to be more than a simple volunteer and become an “activist”. “He is intelligent, has big ideas, he is committed, etc. He has the right character” she says. (Fieldnotes, February 2018)

In particular, optimism, vision, sociability, constancy, autonomy, self-motivation, risk tolerance, and flexibility emerged as the most valued skills. These resources were described as crucial for performing activism and played a relevant role in

determining new members' permanence in the group and progression in the SMO's hierarchy structure.

Talking about a member who has left Lucha after being very active for a long time, Serena tells me that the problem was her lack of optimism and flexibility. "She was too much argumentative and pessimist" Serena says, adding that "she always puts down new ideas because she thinks they will not work. In the long run, you stop the group: it doesn't matter if you are the best at doing something if you don't have the right character." (Fieldnotes, May 2017)

Analyzing these elements in terms of "character skills" – instead of personality traits, personal attributes, and individual qualities – entails a paradigmatic change in the way we look at paths of participation and processes of socialization in movement politics.

On a first level, looking at optimism, constancy, risk tolerance, and other personal qualities in terms of "character skills" means giving full recognition to the role played by social skills in the lived, everyday practice of participation. The concept of character skills sheds light on a series of taken-for-granted capabilities that individuals continuously activate in any form of social interaction and which are crucial for the efficient accomplishment of a task, including a political task.

Existing literature on (youth) participation has discussed the influence that ascribed personal characteristics (i.e., gender, ethnic background, educational level) and networks have on individuals' political behaviors (Verba et al. 1995; Gallego 2007; Schäfer 2013; Schlozman et al. 2018). These elements allow us to understand why some people participate more than others, but they do not manage to completely explain why some people are simply more "at ease" than others in specific participatory settings.

Analyzing character skills means considering the personal resources that individuals rely upon to "navigate" the social challenges of participation. As argued by Fligstein, some activists are more socially skilled than others inasmuch as they are "better at making sense of a particular situation [and at producing] shared meaning for others" (Fligstein 2001: 113). The analysis of participative trajectories of Lucha's activists shows how character skills such as optimism, vision, and sociability are able to make a difference in movement politics inasmuch as they determine one's ability to attain cooperation.

Before meeting with a representative of the Municipality to bargain on the permanence of the Lucha in the occupied barrack, the activists discuss who should speak on behalf of the group. "I think it should be Daniele or Simona" says Tiziano and adds "They are more sociable. We have to avoid conflict this time." (Fieldnotes, September 2016)

On a second level, considering these attributes as skills means understanding them as something different from unmodifiable personality traits. While the concept of personality traits conveys the idea that optimism, vision, sociability, and persistence are largely inborn characteristics of an individual, the concept of "character skills" acknowledges the idea that these character elements can be acquired throughout life and recognize individual's incessant work on their self.

“It’s not like I was born activist” Marco tells me. “I was interested in political stuff since I was a teen, but I started to get involved in politics late when I was 20”. I ask him what has changed, and he replies: “I changed. I was too shy, too introvert, and too angry before. You know, being an activist is also about having the right character. You have to work on it.” (Fieldnotes, March 2017)

In other words, it means considering them as competencies that can be acquired and transmitted through socialization and social interactions.

For what concerns Lucha, for example, micro-processes of socialization to character skills could be noticed in the interaction between more experienced activists and new “promising” volunteers.

Martina, one of the volunteers at the homeless shelter, is very active in Lucha and everybody thinks she is a great resource for the group. However, she does not deal very well with the pressure: since she is taking more responsibilities in relation to the shelter, she is very nervous. [...] More experienced activists give her suggestions and feedbacks which rarely concerns how things should be done. They are mostly advices concerning how she should handle the pressure (Fieldnotes, June 2016)

Moreover, the participation of some of the “promising” volunteers to specific events – such as big and risky demonstrations and sit-in against authorities – was encouraged by more experienced activists because it could help in “building their character.”

“You learn something in these events. You learn to deal with the risk, you learn to coordinate yourself with others under pressure, you learn to stay calm when the police provoke you. It’s like a school for character” tells me Stefano. (Fieldnotes, May 2017)

Conclusions

Through the analysis of the participative trajectories of the young activists taking part in an Italian SMO, the chapter has sought to underline the relevance that skills have in shaping youth paths of participation in movement politics. In particular, education and character skills have emerged as factors able to determine young members’ possibilities to progress within the observed SMO. Analyzing trajectories of participation in social movements through the lenses of skills has interesting implications for the understanding of both youth activism and social movements.

First of all, this approach of analysis contributes to reinforcing the idea that movement politics is an activity that requires specific skills to be accomplished. In so doing, the study of skills in SMO contributes at questioning a still diffused “romanticized” representation on activism that sees involvement in movement politics as something “naturally” emerging from a combination of vocational and ideological aspects. While the romanticized perspective on movement politics suggests that every young person can become an activist if he has the right cause to fight for, the study of skills implies acknowledging that an efficient performance of

political militancy requires a relevant investment in terms of energies and formation on behalf of the young participants.

On a second level, analyzing skills in movement politics implies recognizing SMOs as sources of alternative knowledge production (Hill 2004) which are able to transmit to their members a series of competencies that are needed for the existence of the movement itself. This approach of analysis can fruitfully contribute to the debate around the functioning and structuring of SMOs understanding them as alternative learning sites and informal educational organizations (Walther et al. 2019).

Lastly, considering SMOs as contexts where sedimentation of knowledge and competencies occurs contributes at criticizing the idea that young people's engagement in SMOs is just a temporary and transitory form of engagement which will give space to more "conventional" ways of being active in the future. Analyzing how skills are produced and reproduced in movement politics means acknowledging that activism for many young people is not just a "phase" or the simple effect of a "biographical availability" that will disappear with adult life. It means, in other words, recognizing social movement as contexts of lifelong learning (Foley 1999).

Cross-References

- ▶ Civic Theory and Educative Processes in Informal Spaces: A Case Study in Three Italian Realities
- ▶ Constructions of "Youth" and "Activism" in Lebanon
- ▶ Informal Educational Infrastructure: Citizenship Formation, Informal Education, and Youth Work Practice

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Online Citizenship Learning of Chinese Young People

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Jun Fu

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Abstract

This chapter examines Chinese young people's citizenship learning through their participatory activities on the Internet. The discussions presented in this chapter are informed by recent developments in citizenship studies which maintain that citizenship learning is a lifelong process of participation in different formal and informal communities and practices (Biesta et al. 2009) and in the meaning-making activities reflected in various forms of social participation (Hoskins et al. 2012). Two intertwined forms of citizenship learning were identified from Chinese young people's online activities. The first is young people's learning about online citizenships through engaging with different virtual communities. Their learning of online citizenships is illustrated by their understanding of the norms and communal practices shaped by the shared language, values, attitudes, and joint enterprises for mutual engagement in these virtual communities. The second is their internet-mediated learning about Chinese society. The Chinese internet, in this case, offers a new way of

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engaging with and learning about Chinese society. The outcome of these two forms of learning constitutes the landscape of practice upon which their notion of Chinese citizenship is drawn. This chapter draws attention to the digital and constitutive nature of young people's social engagement in defining new forms of citizenship which are meaningful and relevant to their everyday lives (Lister, 2007; Wood, 2014).

Keywords

Citizenship, Learning, Young people, Internet, China

Introduction

This chapter examines the learning of citizenship by Chinese young people through their participation in different online activities. Its aim is to extend the research realm of citizenship learning of Chinese young people beyond formal school settings and to draw attention to their learning of citizenship in non-traditional school settings, the Chinese Internet in this case. Informed by recent developments in citizenship studies which maintain that citizenship learning is a lifelong process of participation in different formal and informal communities and practices (Biesta et al. 2009) and in the meaning-making activities reflected in various forms of social participation (Hoskins et al. 2012), this chapter identifies two intertwined forms of citizenship learning from Chinese young people's online activities. The first is learning of digital citizenship in online communities. The outcome of this learning is their understanding and practice of the shared language, values, attitudes, and joint enterprises for mutual engagement in different online communities. The second is their learning of Chinese citizenship through their engagement with Chinese society as represented online. The internet, in this case, offers Chinese young people a new way of engaging with and learning about Chinese society and social relationships. These two forms of learning mutually constitute the landscape of practice upon which their notion of Chinese citizenship is based.

The discussion in this chapter is organized into five sections. The first section briefly reviews citizenship education/learning of Chinese young people in formal school settings and discusses the limitations of restricting the study of citizenship learning of Chinese young people to the realm of formal education. The second section theorizes citizenship as social practice which informs my review of the online citizenship learning of Chinese young people. Sections three and four address the two intertwined forms of citizenship learning identified from Chinese young people's online activities. The final section provides a synthesis of the discussion. It calls for a broadening of our understanding of citizenship education/learning to acknowledge the significance of young people's everyday online participation in enabling their learning of citizenship in both the virtual and physical worlds.

Citizenship Learning in Formal School Setting

Being well aware of the role education can play in creating citizens, many governments around the world have chosen to implement compulsory citizenship education programs in the formal school sector (Brooks and Holford 2009). China is no exception in this regard. Since its establishment in 1949, the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) has implemented many initiatives in citizenship education. In their earliest iterations, a politically orientated citizenship model which advocated citizenship values such as collectivism, patriotism, nationalism, and self-sacrifice (Rosen 1983; Zhu and Camicia 2014) was adopted. Although this iteration did make progress in terms of legalizing citizenship rights and duties, and integrating concepts of equal rights and the rule of law into education, it did not make substantial progress (Law 2006) since it was frequently interrupted by political movements that arose between 1957 and 1978 (Wang and Huang 2008).

The *reform and opening-up* policy adopted by the state in 1978 marked a new era of citizenship education in China. The notion of citizenship demonstrated in education policies and school curricula was increasingly depoliticized, becoming a diversified and accommodative concept reflective of the social and economic transformations brought about by rapid modernization and globalization post 1978 (Goldman and Perry 2002; Law 2006). Studies of citizenship education in the Chinese school sector mainly focus on citizenship education policies, curriculum, teaching approaches and methods, and evaluations of the effects of policies and curricula. These studies illuminate the change of content in citizenship education on two different levels. On a social level, elements such as understanding of the law, China's political institutions and the concept of negotiated democracy, awareness of social engagement, and values such as rights, freedom, and responsibility were emphasized in citizenship education (Fairbrother 2004; Law 2011; Wang and Huang 2008). On an individual level, the curricula of citizenship education attached more weight to development and well-being, individual rights, self-esteem, character-building and self-management, personal achievement, global perspectives, and psychological health (Keane 2001; Lee and Ho 2008; Wang 2008; Zhong and Lee 2008).

These studies of citizenship education in formal-school context shed precious light on the citizenship learning of Chinese young people, but they cannot paint the full picture of citizenship learning in China. This is partly because these studies only show what students were taught at school in order to become a citizen; they do not explore what students actually learned as a result of this teaching. This is especially the case given that the education Chinese students receive before tertiary level is generally exam-oriented. Their highly regulated schedules at school leave little space for their citizenship learning through participatory activities with communities in and out of school (Lau 1996; Wang 2013). Moreover, citizenship learning these days is generally grounded in people's everyday engagement with other individuals, families, sociocultural communities, and political institutions (Lawy and Biesta 2006; Lister et al. 2003; Harris et al. 2010). Hence, study of school-based citizenship learning cannot fully reveal the forms of citizenship experienced by young people in

their everyday social and cultural participation. In view of this limitation, a practice-based understanding of citizenship is needed to examine young people's citizenship learning that is embedded in their everyday lived experience.

Citizenship Learning from the Viewpoint of Social Practice

Marshall (2009) defined citizenship as “a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community” (p. 149). The civil, political, and social citizenship rights outlined by him laid the foundation for the contemporary understanding of citizenship. The status view of citizenship in this definition is rooted in people's understanding of citizenship. Terms such as “citizens-in-training” (Anagnost 2008), “partial” citizens (Chun 2013), and “citizens-in-waiting” (Kennelly 2011) all imply that citizenship is still understood by people as a status. This is especially the case on a policy level. In their study of citizenship education in Britain, Lawy and Biesta (2006) suggest that the concept of citizenship articulated in official policies and practice discourse still largely hinged upon a status of “good citizen.” The role of citizenship education is to help young people to achieve this status and become capable of enacting a particular kind of citizenship. They argue that this status has denied young people's eligibility to citizenship by asserting a status differential between citizens and not-yet-citizens; hence, young people's informal and individualized social engagements in their everyday lives are not acknowledged as citizenship practices, and their claims to citizenship are negated. As people's citizenship practices shape their citizenship learning (Brooks and Holford 2009), their learning about citizenship through these informal participatory activities cannot therefore be examined through this theoretical lens.

In view of this limitation, scholars have sought to understand citizenship from the viewpoint of social practice. Citizenship can thus be conceptualized as a practice threaded in people's lives and transformed over time through their participation in the actual practices which constitute different elements of their life. For our purposes we understand practice as a set of interconnected doings and sayings specific to time and space. It consists of people's everyday “intentional and voluntary” activities (Schatzki 2012) through which people achieve purpose and derive meaning. These activities are mediated by a person's understanding of the power relations, rules, norms, and discourses of a social context. Practice is created in response to the social order, not as an outcome of it (Wenger 2010). In this sense, it is not merely a process of adapting or adjusting oneself to a practice but also a process of “invention and improvisation” of a new practice (Bourdieu 1990, p. 13).

From this perspective, citizenship learning is a process concurrent with young people's social engagement. Their everyday engagement with the practices of family, peers, school, work, and the media serves as a broad, fluid, and inclusive avenue through which to explore and make sense of the communities to which their citizenship relates (Hoskins et al. 2012; Smith et al. 2005). Children and young people are citizens who experience and learn about their citizenship like any other citizens in our society (Lawy and Biesta 2006). They become citizens through social

participation and their engagement in democratic practices (Baker and Blaagaard 2016; Lawy and Biesta 2006). Through this participatory process, young people learn the practices of the communities by which their citizenship in these communities is defined while simultaneously contributing to constituting these practices (Wenger 2010).

This inclusive view of citizenship offers a grounded perspective through which young people's citizenship learning in informal settings can be examined. The study by Lister et al. (2003) shows that young people often experience multiple citizenships simultaneously through actively engaging in civic activities in local communities. These activities demonstrate a broad, fluid, and inclusive citizenship experienced by young people in their everyday lives. This view of citizenship provides a helpful lens through which to examine the process of young people's socialization and subjectification, the key to them becoming a citizen (Wood 2014).

Understanding citizenship as practice also proves useful in examining the constitutive nature of everyday politics and sociocultural participation in young people's practices and learning of citizenship (Wood 2012, 2015). Studies of young people in Australia show young people are actively practicing and experiencing citizenship in informal and modest youth cultural spaces such as family, school, peer networks, and the Internet (Harris and Wyn 2009; Harris et al. 2007, 2008, 2010; Wyn et al. 2011). Informal citizenship learning was also seen in Chinese young people's online activities in forming new identities free from institutional control and maintaining identities in their physical life (Fu 2018a; Wang 2013). The individual political actions and practice of prefigurative politics in their everyday lives consist another significant sector of Chinese young people's informal learning of citizenship (Ash 2013; Fu 2019). The spaces and relationships experienced by young people outside of school therefore become major sites where the "hidden curriculum" of citizenship learning is absorbed (Brooks and Holford 2009). As Lawy and Biesta (2006) explained, young people are not educated into citizenship, but learn to be citizens via their engagement with the political and sociocultural practices of communities which make up their everyday lives. In the next section, I will draw on the theoretical understanding of citizenship learning as a social practice to examine Chinese young people's learning about citizenship through their online activities.

Learning Digital Citizenship Through Online Participation

The internet (especially social media) has provided new tools and spaces for people's interaction. Communities spawned online become important sites for people's identity formation and citizenship practice (Buckingham 2008; Harris et al. 2008). As a result, their engagement with the practices of these communities becomes the defining mechanism of the learning of their digital citizenship in relation to these communities (Bennett 2008). Chinese young people use the internet in a similar fashion for their learning of digital citizenship. China had 802 million internet users by mid-2018, with almost half of this population being under the age of 30 (China Internet Network Information Centre 2018). Chinese Internet users

(especially younger users) have made this medium into a vibrant cultural space characterized by a highly diversified community and intense contention (Yang 2009). Their mutual engagement on the internet generates communities and practices which give birth to new forms of digital citizenship and enable learning of these new digital citizenships through the same process.

In delineating different forms of online activism in China, Yang (2009) argues that the online activities of Chinese internet users have spawned a contentious online culture which showcases internet users' protests against social injustice and their struggle for recognition. This culture constitutes an essential part of the practice of a new citizen activism or "unofficial democracy" (p. 226) in China which is associated with a struggle for material distributive justice and aspiration for recognition and belonging. The evolution of this culture is marked by a series of digital practices consisting of rituals, genres, styles, and languages (Latham 2012; Meng 2011; Yang 2009; Yang et al. 2014). People's engagement with this culture represents the learning process through which they absorb these practices and begin to act as insiders. Moreover, their online activities enable them to make meaning of the shared enterprises of this contentious culture and to understand their roles as agents for maintaining and developing this culture. These two dimensions of learning are fundamental to the process of their becoming digital citizens in the online space in China.

The highly diversified Chinese online culture is not merely an illustration of how the norms and practices in different online communities are shaped by Chinese internet users' mutual engagement; it also testifies to Chinese internet users' learning of these norms and practices through their engagement with these communities, which constitutes the very process of their learning of digital citizenship in relation to these communities. Zimuzu (subtitle/fansubbing group) is an online collaborative community which produces and distributes Chinese subtitles for foreign media content online. Studies illuminate the practices of this online community from different perspectives. Meng and Wu (2013) examined its commons-based peer production practice in a commercial media environment. Kung (2016) investigated how members' discursive engagement and meaning-making participatory work make Zimuzu a community of practice in which norms and values are formed and practices about mutual engagement and engagements with texts and cultural materials are developed. The development of these practices, as a result of people's engagement with this community, is also the process through which interested internet users make sense of these practices and become a citizen of this community through their engagement.

A complex process of citizenship learning was also illustrated in Meng's (2018) study of "Facebook Expedition," a collective action of Chinese young patriots which flooded the Facebook page of the pro-independence leader of the Democratic Progressive Party in Taiwan. The study delineated how these young people swiftly organized and carried out a political action in a playful manner with the purpose of enhancing intercultural communication between people in Taiwan and mainland China. Shared memes and templates were used, and guidelines for action circulated and followed within the online community throughout the event. The high level of

media literacy and intelligence demonstrated in young people's participation in this event, such as in their competency in using a similar repertoire of popular cultural symbols and enacting shared protocols for engagement, illustrated a complex and effective process of learning about the cultural practices of the community.

Fu (2018b) examined citizenship practices of young Chinese on Weibo (A Twitter-like microblogging service and one of the most popular social media platforms in China). He showed that young people learn about the cultural practice of the Weibo community through their everyday interaction with others on Weibo. This cultural practice on Weibo is characterized by the language practices which share tacit meanings among Weibo users and underpinned by the values, attitudes, and joint enterprises to establish an equal and tolerant space rich in reliable information and diverse opinion, a space which can nourish informed and active public discussion and support learning about Chinese society. On Weibo, young people's learning of citizenship is a reciprocal process through which they make meaning of and contribute to shaping the cultural practices of this virtual community. Their learning of digital citizenship hence is not a passive process but a formative one in which new forms of citizenship practice are generated. Similar citizenship learning occurs in other online social and cultural communities, such as in young people's learning of cultural citizenship in online discussions of a popular Chinese talent show (Wu 2013), in young mothers' learning of community practices in parenting discussion forums (Wang 2003), and in Chinese gamers' experience of forging cultural identity in online gaming communities (Lindtner and Szablewicz 2011).

The reciprocal process of citizenship learning and practice of Chinese young people reviewed above, while occurring in the online space, is also deeply interlaced with the physical space (Valentine and Holloway 2002), constituting the reality experienced by Chinese young people in which they learn about their Chinese citizenship on a broad canvas. In the next section, I will examine young people's learning of their Chinese citizenship through online participation.

Learning Chinese Citizenship Through Online Participation

The internet is not merely a space in which digital cultures and citizenships are spawned; it has also become a key medium through which people engage with the physical world. This form of Internet-mediated social engagement offers Chinese young people a new way to make sense of the content and possibilities of their rights, duties, and identities and a new avenue for the formation of their subjectivity in a dynamic and fast-changing Chinese society. This process makes their citizenship learning possible on a broader social scale.

This form of citizenship learning is firstly demonstrated by the role the Internet plays in Chinese people's accessing of information and news. Internet users in China spent 27.7 h per week on average on the Internet (China Internet Network Information Centre 2018). Searching for information and accessing online news are the second and third most used functions (instant messaging being the first), with 656.9 million and 662.9 million users, respectively. The smartphone has become people's

major access point for information with 619.6 million users accessing news and 624 million users searching information on it. The high penetration of the Internet in people's information consumption demonstrates that it has become a crucial medium through which people are informed of different social issues. Although the authenticity of the online representation of our social reality is still a controversial issue, people's engagement with this (mis)representation of Chinese society represents two essential elements of their citizenship learning in this digital age: (1) becoming informed about the multiple facets of social issues and (2) being capable of reading media information critically.

Online participation also provides a new channel through which people can understand their position in and relationship with Chinese society. Studies of online activism in China show that contentious activities are shaped by a conflictual relationship between the state, the national/transnational capitalist market, the interests of China's subaltern classes, and cultural traditions (Yang 2009; Zhao 2008). Participation in these activities provides opportunities for people to engage with complex power relations on a daily basis and to learn how these power relations play out in their lives at a mundane level. Fu's (2018b) study of Chinese young people's activities on Weibo demonstrates the role of the internet in enabling young people to participate in public discussion and engage with Chinese society with ease. Although mediated by the Internet, this social participation is beneficial for young people's informed understanding of social issues and for their meaning-making of the general social context and practices which is essential for their effective citizenship practice. Their participation on Weibo plays a significant role in the formation of their identities and political subjectivities, which are essential features of their Chinese citizenship.

Online participation is also an important avenue through which people can explore the possibilities of their rights, duties, and identities in a fast-changing Chinese society when other channels of formal civic and political participation are relatively restricted (Leib and He 2006; Zheng and Pan 2016). The significance of online participation is evident in studies of online activism for citizenship rights and social change. Studies of environmental activism in China show that the Internet has played a key role in providing a platform for people not only to access information and discuss local environmental issues but also to mobilize offline collective action to stop industrial projects threatening to endanger the local environment (Huang and Yip 2012; Lang and Xu 2013). Similar usage of the online space can be found in Chinese citizens' struggle for equal rights for migrant labor, HIV/AIDS and hepatitis-B carriers, and LGBTI groups (Yang 2009; Yang 2018). Other cases include activism in online backpacking communities seeking to address immediate social problems, seeking social justice, and improving well-being within their sphere of influence (Zhang 2014); consumers' participation in virtual communities through which they solve consumption issues and learn about new modes of consumption (Huang 2012); and Chinese gamers' efforts to promote their rights against the pervasive discourse of internet addiction supposedly driven by participating in online gaming communities (Lindtner and Szablewicz 2011).

People's participation in these online activities can educate them about different aspects of social issues while developing their capacity to participate in public discussion (Hung 2012; Svensson 2016), all crucial elements of citizenship learning. More importantly, these online activities provide opportunities for Chinese citizens to learn about the possibilities of their citizenship through interacting with institutions, sociocultural discourses, and other individuals within a Chinese context (Yang 2018; Zhao 2008). This way, the horizons of citizenship learning for ordinary people is significantly expanded in the sense that it affords new opportunities for them to get hands-on experience of being agents for social change and to discover the potential of their Chinese citizenship through shaping new political identities and notions of citizenship on an individual level (Liu 2013; Wang 2013; Yang 2009).

In sum, online participation is a process through which Chinese people keep themselves informed by accessing diversified information, learn about general social practices, and explore different aspects of their rights, duties, and identities in relation to different social communities. This process is essential for their becoming informed and active citizens capable of pursuing effective civic and political participation. This part of their citizenship learning is especially meaningful given that the education they receive in formal school settings is largely concerned with students' performance on standardized tests and fails to offer a democratic space for citizenship practice either inside or outside school (Wang 2013; Ye 2011).

Conclusion

In this chapter, I first reviewed the citizenship learning of Chinese young people in formal school settings. In doing this, I highlighted the necessity of extending the scope of studies of Chinese young people's citizenship learning from formal school settings to their everyday lived experience. I then presented a framework of citizenship learning based on young people's social practice, one which enables us to examine their citizenship learning as it is embedded in their everyday lives. Using this theoretical lens, I identified two forms of citizenship learning from Chinese young people's highly diversified online activities. The first is their learning of digital citizenships as defined by the social and cultural norms and practices of different online communities. This learning occurs simultaneously as they absorb and contribute to (re)shaping these norms and practices through their participatory activities. The second is their learning of Chinese citizenship through their social participation, mediated by the Internet. In this dimension of learning, the Internet provides a representation of Chinese society which affords a convenient and accessible avenue for young people's social surveillance and engagement. This mediated social engagement represents a process of young people's learning about their social position and relationships in Chinese society. More importantly, it affords a vital way for young people to learn the possibilities of their rights, duties, and identities in a fast-changing Chinese society when formal channels of civic and political participation are limited and restricted. These two forms of citizenship learning

demonstrate that the online space, as a new venue for Chinese young people's citizenship practice, enables their learning of citizenship in a digitized Chinese society.

This chapter showcases Chinese young people's diverse sociocultural participation online through which they learn about their citizenship in an integrated space of the virtual and physical. This process of citizenship learning as a form of social practice is not only about making sense of existing social norms and practices and aligning one's behavior with them in order to be recognized as a member or citizen; it is also about understanding the possibilities of one's citizenship by contributing to and reshaping the practices of the online communities of which they wish to be a part. This view of citizenship learning can not only broaden our view of citizenship education/learning but also do greater justice to young people's active citizenship practices in their everyday lives by acknowledging their work in generating social and cultural communities and constructing new forms of citizenship.

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Education for Youth Civic and Political Action in Australia

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Abstract

Surveying and synthesizing existing theoretical and empirical literature, this chapter examines education for youth civic and political action in Australia. Recognizing the concern of developing greater levels of active citizenship is a core goal of education and youth policy in Australia, the chapter examines various central issues that impact on and shape the civic and political activism of young Australians. While not ignoring policy discourses and provisions, the chapter takes as its main focus a range of empirical studies – predominantly

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published over the last 10 years – which explore how young people’s civic and political activism is interpreted, enacted, and experienced in practice. As such, the chapter analyzes several key considerations regarding educating for youth civic and political action in Australia: the changing patterns of youth participation, barriers to participation for disadvantaged and marginalized youth, why youth participate, the role and use of new technologies, and key tenets of effective practice. In the conclusion, the main arguments are summarized, and some areas for further research are identified.

Keywords

Youth action · Australia · Civics and citizenship · Digital citizenship · Engagement and barriers to participation

Introduction

Surveying and synthesizing existing theoretical and empirical literature, the aim of this chapter is to examine how education for youth civic and political action is being interpreted, enacted, and experienced in Australia. While the chapter makes some reference to policy discourses and provision, its main focus is on actual practices of youth civic and political action in Australia. As such, it takes as its primary scope relevant (mainly empirical) studies about the Australian context published over the last 10 years, which predominantly, though not exclusively, inform us of how young people conceive and enact action within their political communities.

From the outset, it should be recognized that this chapter is written in a complex and changing context of youth participation. First and foremost, youth participation has been repeatedly and consistently viewed as a core goal for Australian education and youth services over the last 10 years. In their *National Strategy for Young Australians*, for example, the Australian Government (2010) made clear that it “respects and understands the value and contributions young people offer as citizens of today, not just the leaders of tomorrow” (2010). The importance of young Australians’ active participation forms a key goal of Australian Schooling (MCEETYA 2008). The current Australian Curriculum is predicated explicitly on helping “all young Australians to become successful learners, confident and creative individuals, and *active and informed citizens*” (ACARA 2018a; emphasis added; for more detailed analyses of action as part of the school curriculum in Australia see, for example, Peterson and Tudball 2017; Peterson and Bentley 2016; Reichert and Print 2017; Reichert 2016). In addition, the rationale for the Australian Curriculum: Civics and Citizenship makes reference to students exploring ways they “can actively shape their lives, value their belonging in a diverse and dynamic society, and positively contribute locally, nationally, regionally and globally. As reflective, active and informed decision-makers, students will be well placed to contribute to an evolving and healthy democracy that fosters the wellbeing of Australia as a democratic nation” (ACARA 2018a).

Yet historically, at a policy level, the importance and benefits of youth participation have often been predicated on the view that young Australians' levels of civic and political knowledge and understanding are generally low and would benefit from being increased (see, for example, SSCEET 1989; CEG 1994). More recently, the 2016 sample assessment of civics and citizenship within the National Assessment Program, for example, suggests that while there has been an increasing focus on civics in Australia's curriculum, this is not reflected in young people's civics and citizenship understandings. The test is conducted every 3 years to assess students' understanding of Australia's system of government, its civic institutions, and values. While results have remained stable for final year students, the results for year 10 students decreased from 49% of those who reached the target in 2010 to 38% in 2016 (Fraillon et al. 2017, p. xvi).

Despite the concerns that have been voiced by the Australian Government about this decline (see Ballantyne 2017), this kind of assessment provides limited insight into youth civic and political activism and engagement – particularly informal modes. While there are clearly many examples of youth civic and political action and engagement operating within Australia, as this chapter will suggest, significant concerns have been raised regarding (1) whether such action and engagement is a feature of all young Australians' lives and (2) the form that civic and political action actually takes. With regard to the latter, for example, Arvanitakis and Sidoti suggest that the extent of young people's engagement within *informal* politics “is disguised to some extent because it adopts forms that are often not understood, and frequently dismissed” (Arvanitakis and Sidoti 2011, p. 137).

Arvanitakis and Sidoti comment here reminds us that care needs to be taken in delineating the scope of what actually comprises civic and political action, particularly where young people are concerned. For the purposes of this chapter, we adopt a general and inclusive perspective of youth civic and political action as incorporating a range of formal and informal processes through which young Australians engage with others within their communities. Through such activities, young Australians seek to engage with, influence, shape, and contest matters affecting themselves, their communities, and others. As will become clearer as the chapter progresses, civic and political engagement may take place through formal, partisan political engagement, and/or within wider, potentially issue-based, social practices.

To identify relevant literature, an institutional¹ electronic library database was used to search for and identify relevant and appropriate literature published since 2010. A variation of search terms was used, combining the following key words: “youth,” “activism,” “education,” “schooling,” “civic,” “action,” “engagement,” “citizenship,” “engagement,” and “participation.” In all searches, the term “Australia” was used. As an interesting aside in light of our discussion later in this chapter, searches using the term “activism” returned far fewer results than those which employed “participation,” “action,” or “engagement.” Only literature reporting on the Australian context was considered, and to be included, forms of activism/engagement/participation had to have some form of political/social nature (most clearly, participation in sporting activities or health interventions were not

included). The term “youth” was understood reasonably broadly, but the main focus was on 14–21-year-olds.

In examining existing literature on education and young Australians’ civic and political action, the chapter comprises the following sections. First, we explore the nature of youth civic and political action in Australia, including the extent to which such action can be said to have changed in nature in recent times. Second, we examine literature on the barriers to action encountered by disadvantaged and marginalized youth. The third section pays some brief attention to the question of why young Australians participate, and in doing so suggests that little explicit attention is paid to this question of why beyond some fairly basic and perhaps superficial commitments. The fourth section focuses on new technologies and examines whether these have led to new forms of social action by young Australians. The fifth section identifies two key tenets for effective educational practice aimed at recognizing and fostering youth civic and political action in Australia.

Changing Patterns of Youth Action/Engagement?

Challenging earlier policy rhetoric that young Australians are in general terms politically apathetic, a body of literature both questions the perceived level of apathy and/or seeks to provide evidence of the ways that young Australians *are* motivated to participate actively within their communities, both now and in the future (Black 2016; Gidley 2010). A particular feature of this literature is the thesis that rather than being apathetic, young Australians are shifting their patterns of participation away from more conventional, formal, partisan forms of political participation to informal, issue-based politics in which young people think that they might have more influence (Martin 2012a). Research by The Whitlam Institute at University of Sydney, for example, has found that young people are civically engaged, but more through informal than formal politics. Sidoti (2011) suggests that young people “are strongly values-driven and their attachment is to issues rather than traditional political organisations. They are alienated from formal politics and the political organisations that dominate them.” Instead, according to Sidoti, they exhibit a “tendency to shop around for what best fits their values and concerns is reflected in the volatility of their voting intentions” (see also Brooker 2011).

Similarly, and drawing on International Social Survey Programme Citizenship data with regard to Australia in 2006, Martin (2012a) found that young Australians are engaging less in non-electoral forms of participation than older Australians (supporting previous evidence from Vromen 2003). This study reports that young people were more likely than older people to sign a petition and boycott products, and were also more likely to attend a protest or join a political forum on the internet, but these latter two were much less common activities generally compared to the first two, which Martin conceives as more individualized acts. Martin (2012b) states that young people are more than twice as likely to have attended a protest compared to the overall population. Young people are more likely to sign a petition, with nearly

half having signed a petition in the year prior to the survey (1991–1992). Martin (2012b, p. 222) concludes that for today’s young Australians “political activity occurs in a much more fluid way than before through groups that appear and disappear rather than political activity occurring through well-institutionalised channels such as political parties and trade unions.” In contrast, Tranter (2010) reports that young Australians are increasingly viewing protests as *passé* and as a result are moving to forms of action focusing on online forums and the giving of donations.

In their study of 15–18-year-olds funded by the Australian Research Council, Harris et al. (2010) draw on data collected from surveys and follow-up interviews to suggest that while young people evidence low levels of formal political participation, they do seek to be included through engaging in deliberative processes. Harris et al. identify a gap between these young Australians’ perceptions of politics and their everyday engagements, suggesting an “ordinariness” in participants’ everyday experiences and actions, such as recycling or donating money. According to their research, for these young people, being heard was in itself viewed as participatory. Crucial here is the suggestion that analyses of young Australians’ civic and political action need to look at “ordinary” young people too; that is, those who sit between young people who are deeply apathetic and young people who engage in unconventional forms of activism. Harris et al. (2010) suggest that:

while there has been a shift away from formal participation by these young people, this has not necessarily led to either full-scale disengagement from politics or a widespread turn towards sub-cultural or postmodern activism. Instead, our research suggests that these young people are disenchanted with traditional politics that is unresponsive to their needs and interests, but that they remain interested in social and political issues and continue to seek recognition from the political system. In this way, their relationship to politics cannot be characterized as straightforward apathetic disengagement. At the same time, their participatory practices are not oriented towards spectacular anti-state activism or cultural politics but take the form of informal, individualized and everyday activities (10).

This extract reminds us that young Australian’s civic and political action is multi-faceted and diffuse, meaning that simple representations may obscure the complexities involved. Indeed, the focus on the “ordinary” aspect of young people’s civic and political activism and engagement is continuing to gain ground within the wider youth citizenship literature (see, for example, Roose and Harris’ (2015) and Johns, Mansouri, and Lobos’ (2015) accounts of young Muslim people’s “everyday” activism and engagement).

Also significant is the way in which young people are giving voice, expression, and meaning to their own forms of action. To this end, Gidley (2010) presents research from 128 secondary students at three large Steiner schools in Australia. Gidley (Gidley 2010, p. 141) reports that respondents were positive about the need for action, as well as about their potential to act, citing a Year 10 student, Katrina, who expressed themselves in the following terms:

Obviously most people hope that the world will improve by the year 2020, but whether this is realistic or not is up to us. Everyone is able to do something in thousands of ways but

people don't seem to see that. They think that the problems are too great for them to deal with by themselves, so there isn't even any point in trying. I believe that we can do something and that it is in our hands to change the future of the world. I am personally involved with the third world organization called world vision (sic) and I have seen the difference that single people can make. . . So by educating children in schools about what they can and SHOULD do, more young people may take the initiative to act.

In their research, Vromen and Collin (2010, p. 98) report data which evidences that *both* policy makers and young people “agree that existing forms of youth participation are too formal and ought to be more informal to attract young people from more diverse backgrounds.” However, they also report that while “policymakers *contend* that youth participation should be youth-led, long-term, purposeful, fun, creative and responsive to young people’s lives, *in practice*, governments, organizations and services tend to use formal and adult-led processes to engage young people” (emphasis added).

In his analysis, Galei (2016, p. 4), and following others (Harris et al. 2010; Farthing 2010; Beadle 2011), describes the two discourses on young Australians’ civic and political engagement as focusing on “civic deficit” or “alternatively engaged” models. The former, often led by top-down political agendas, “suggests the overwhelming disengagement of Australian young people imposes a strict definition of participation without sufficient insight into how the young people themselves define participation” (Galei 2016, p. 4; see also Beadle 2011). The latter, often drawing on data which explores young peoples’ perceptions and intentions, focuses on the ways in which young people *are* engaging in “emergent forms of participation” (5). As Galei (2016, p. 6) reminds us, in viewing these two discourses “what needs to be acknowledged is that although there are many emergent forms of participation, there is a more complex picture of participation which neither of the approaches fully accounts for.” While analytically useful, drawing overly sharp distinctions between these two discourses may serve to obscure important relationships between the two. Here Galei, for example, invokes Harris, Wyn, and Young (2007, 2010) to suggest that young Australians’ participation is unlikely to sit firmly in one discourse or the other. We might add to this that more research is required to understand: (1) precisely *why* young Australians’ participation may have shifted to alternative forms of engagement; (2) whether, and if so in what way, moves away from formalized forms of participation are an active, conscious, and deliberate reaction against formal politics; and (3) whether alternative forms of engagement actually do involve, in some way, a connection with formal politics.

Barriers to Participation: Disadvantaged and Marginalized Students

While it is important to appreciate the shifting ways in which young Australians enact their engagement in civic and political action, it is equally crucial to identify the barriers and inequalities which impact on certain young Australians, particularly

those who are socially and economically disadvantaged. Indeed, there remains a keen interest in the experiences of groups of young people who may be considered disadvantaged or marginalized, though it should be noted that research in this area typically consists of small-scale studies which focus on a specific marginalized group.

Several studies point to a range of barriers which serve to restrict or limit the extent of disadvantaged young Australians' civic and political participation. In their report *Preventing Youth Disengagement and Promoting Engagement*, the Australian Research Alliance for Children and Youth (2008) identifies several such barriers: racism and prejudice, language and cultural barriers, lack of access to and availability of economic resources, and a lack of available opportunities. Summarizing barriers to young people's ability to participate generally, the Australian Infant, Child, Adolescent and Family Mental Health Association (2008) highlights similar factors, including: a lack of trust in decision-making systems, insufficient resources, a lack of confidence, a lack of efficacy, a lack of time due to family and/or caring responsibilities, and a lack of information and opportunities.

Crucial across studies focusing on the participation of disadvantaged and marginalized young Australians is the attempt to explore and elucidate the multifaceted (dis)connections between disadvantaged young Australians and their communities. Setting the scene, Black (2010) speaks of the complex relationship between community as a space of activism and a real and/or potential distrust of communities held by young people. In a complimentary study, Black (2011) cites a raft of evidence from the 2000s which suggested that low socioeconomic status affects a range of attitudes to, and capacities for, participation. Black et al. (2011) outline a range of projects – such as the *Building Bridges* project focused on outer North Melbourne and the *Western Young People's Independent Network* – through which young people in socio-economically disadvantaged areas have engaged critically with and in their communities. In doing so, they provide an interesting and insightful focus “on young people who are, for various reasons, located on the periphery of their communities but who may be said to be challenging the nature of those communities” (Black et al. 2011, p. 47).

In other studies, Correa-Valez et al. (2010) report on an intervention with young refugees, detailing how for these young people linking activities, which help to connect young refugees to their wider communities, are crucial in both making attaching and contributing to networks. Pavlidis and Baker (2010) focus on homeless youth and suggest that for these young Australians particular concerns related to notions of risk are at play – including day-to-day, immediate risks. According to these authors, risk for homeless youth is embodied rather than external, and this impacts on their participation in important ways. A similar argument is made by Black and Walsh, who consider the ways in which schools in low socioeconomic communities may encourage young people's local action and participation, while simultaneously constructing them as “both subjects and sources of uncertainty and risk” (Black and Walsh 2015, p. 191). Land (2011, p. 47) considers participative action undertaken by non-Indigenous youth in support of Indigenous struggles and raises concerns regarding the extent to which such action can remain shaped by

“colonialist attitudes and behaviors.” For Land, appropriate activism must be shaped and informed by a critical engagement with decolonization.

Important to understanding potential and actual inhibitors of civic and political action for disadvantaged and marginalized young Australians, too, is Beadle’s (2011) contention that the *opportunity* to engage and to have a voice on issues relevant to their own lives are crucial determinants of whether young people engage. Indeed, appreciating notions of opportunity and relevance seems particularly apt so far as the civic and political engagement of disadvantaged and marginalized young Australians is concerned.

Why Participate?

A further theme which can be drawn from existing literature is the extent to which the question of *why* young people should be active (or indeed activist) in the first place is either assumed or left implicit. As Wood and Black have pointed out, citizenship scholars have in recent years drawn an important distinction between relatively standard expressions of engagement such as voting, taxpaying, and the other standard acts of a “good citizen,” and more activist expressions of engagement which “break with routines, understandings and practices and serve to foster social justice and change, or to ‘make a difference’” (Wood and Black 2014, p. 56). Despite this, education policy and practice continues to frame young people’s participation mostly in terms of having a say, rather than necessarily challenging and changing structural issues – a point to which we return in the following section (Walsh and Black 2018).

This fuzziness also extends at times to the literature. Beyond the general idea that being an active participant in one’s community was a general good, there is often little exploration of the motivations, values, or relationships which might underpin young people’s education for civic activism and engagement in Australia. This means that the bonds and relationships between young people and other important actors within their schools or communities are frequently not attended to. It also means that where young people’s activism and engagement values and motivation are mentioned in the literature, these are rather general in nature and remain underdeveloped.

In her research, for example, Gidley (2010) refers to values and spirituality in relation to the Steiner school children who participated in her study, but only rather loosely (e.g., students mentioned some values) or by referencing a general commitment to concepts like socially equitable futures/social justice/just relationships. What precisely is meant by social justice and indeed the ethical basis of relationships between humans and/or humans and their environment remains ambiguous. Similarly, Head (2011) suggests that there have been three main rationales for more participation of Australian youth: (1) rights; (2) efficiency and better services; and (3) development benefits – individual (self-esteem, etc.) and social. Again, the precise meaning(s) of key terms here such as rights or social benefits remain elusive. In contrast, one area of writing in which the focus on underpinning relationships and

values receives greater attention is that which relates to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. Another example is when Land (2011) explores ideas relating to decolonization and solidarity as key in shaping appropriate and meaningful youth activism, and in doing so provides a more detailed and meaningful account of the *why* of participation than many other studies.

New Technologies, New Forms of Action?

When considering “alternative” or potentially “new” learning spaces in relation to young Australians’ civic and political action, a clear corpus of work has developed in relation to the impact, use, and possibilities of digital technologies. Presently, such research provides a rather mixed picture, with some studies welcoming the positive impact of technologies on youth civic and political activism and engagement and others adopting a more cautious approach.

In setting out the positive possibilities of technology, Kral (2011, p. 5) reports on practices undertaken by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander youth, suggesting that “through their rapid adaptation to and adoption of digital media technologies, young people are transforming their visibility by engaging in new forms of cultural production.” Kral (2011, p. 9) also points out that “informal learning spaces such as libraries play a vital role as *communal* ‘digital bedrooms’ where youth can access digital media and communications technologies in the non-school hours.” For Kral, access to new media resources is allowing Indigenous youth to be “the controllers of productive processes that generate unique resources and new forms of cultural production leading to agentive participation in public domains” (9). Kral (2011, p. 12) cites a young person, Maxwell, who in a speech to the Symposium on Indigenous Music and Dance in Darwin in 2009 had the following to say:

Come and listen to our stories. Spend time to listen and we’ll work together. We can show people of the world what Australia means. The problems that we really need to handle in this country is that people not really working together. We have an opportunity to tell the world using this media (sic).

Youth engagement and activism through campaigns, flash mobs, protests via social media such as Facebook and Twitter hashtags, and ethical consumption presents other avenues of engagement. For example, the rapid mobilization of “flash mobs” of people to a particular place or collective action, such as a protest, has been enabled through social media, e-mail, and Short Message Services (SMS). Such gatherings and actions have a range of forms, from soliciting petitions, crowd-sourcing funds, or to raise awareness through the satire of spontaneous performance. The Australian Youth Climate Coalition (AYCC), for example, used flash mobs to engage young people in raising awareness of environmental issues in campaigns such as Youth Decide (Walsh and Black 2011). Debate continues as to whether such forms of “point and click” engagement constitute genuine engagement and activism or whether they are “slacktivism”; that is, an impulse driven, relatively passive and

tokenistic form of engagement (Walsh 2012). Indeed, a more hesitant approach to the role of technology is provided by Harris et al. (2010, p. 27) who suggest that while the Internet offers a “space for social connection and self-expression,” action using new technologies has an ordinariness to it which replicates what young people might do in person – such as discussing issues in chat rooms. In their analysis of social media, youth participation and Australian elections, Chen and Vromen (2012, p. 3) posit the “newness” of social media in relation to participation in the following terms:

While this is often seen as a “new” phenomena, social media makes visible the types of active audience behaviours once difficult for elites to identify: the tendency for sociality and “cross talk” (i.e. “water cooler talk”), and audience “talk back” to media. What is new is the extent to which this discussion is visible to the public (providing greater access to it), and the digestion of this interaction (which allows for quantification of it). Thus social media is a new phenomena, but is not outside the range of human responses to the media seen throughout history.

There is also a wider wariness or skepticism toward the use and impact of technology in general – including among young people themselves. Gidley (2010) found that secondary age students attending a Steiner school were broadly skeptical of technologies. Pavlidis and Baker (2010) have also raised concerns, suggesting that youth, particularly those who are marginalized, are in fact at risk from new technologies. It is argued, however, that such discourses of risk are driven by adult anxieties about technology and its impact on children and young people (Collin and Third 2011), manifest in the plethora of policies and programs aimed at addressing forms of digital citizenship that equate citizenship with cybersafety. Third and Collin argue that “In this context, children’s and young people’s digital media practices present as needing to be ‘appropriately’ channelled, contained and/or disciplined” (Third and Collin 2016, p. 45). But as they also observe, “Over the last decade, the concept of ‘digital citizenship’ has begun to supplant ‘cybersafety’ as a critical pillar of policy and programs pertaining to the use of online and networked media” (Third and Collin 2016, p. 41). Given the benefits and opportunities for young people to engage in active citizenship, it is suggested that “coupling ‘citizenship’ with ‘the digital’ is a move brimming with promise for *rethinking citizenship through the digital*. And yet, this potential has gone largely un-noticed and untapped” (Third and Collin 2016, p. 41, original emphasis; see also Vromen et al. 2015, 2016).

Research also suggests that the relationship between political actors is both complex and fluid. Here, two particular examples are illustrative. The first is research which suggests that social media provides a potential tool for engaging young people in the political process by bringing them into connection with their political representatives. Reporting on a study of young peoples’ views of social media use by politicians in Australia, the UK and the USA, Loader, Vromen, and Xenos (2015, p. 415) report that “for politicians and celebrities to engage with young citizens they must develop more participatory communication styles” valued by young people – styles that is through which young people can develop “a deeper emotional insight

into the personal lives and qualities of these who claim to represent them.” The second, which relates to the first, is research which evidences further a disconnect between political agencies and young people. Research by Vromen (2011, p. 975), for example, draws on content analysis of government and community organization-led websites and reports that most of the Australian youth-oriented websites analyzed “follow a generally, institutionalized, discursively top-down and dutiful approach to young people’s civic engagement.” For Vromen, this reflects a dominant government-led understanding of young peoples’ participation “where there is an expectation that young people ‘have a say’ but only on the terms set by powerful traditional institutions” (975). In contrast, a minority of sites led by community organizations “allow young people to express themselves on the site” offering “a distinctive online experience that focuses on empowering young people in their creation of political space and encourage[ing] them to express their political viewpoints.”

Some Tenets of Effective Practices?

Across the existing literature a number of scholars and organizations have sought to include a focus on the hopeful possibilities and positive practices necessary for young Australians’ civic and political action. Though due to limitations of space it is not possible to outline these in depth here, and clearly the intention of this chapter is not to provide a “what works” guide for practice, in this final section we provide two tenets of effective practice stemming out of the available research.

The first tenet is the value of focusing on young peoples’ strengths and working with and on these (Black et al. 2011; Kral 2011). The Foundation for Young Australians has, for example, adopted this tone in *Unlimited Potential: A commitment to young Australians* (Callingham 2013, p. 1), in which it makes clear that “Our collective role is to be relentlessly optimistic about the young people of this country and about their capacity and capability to envision and create the nation and world in which they want to live and work” (cited in Callingham 2013). Such optimism is necessarily based on the recognition and embracing of the self-expression and creativity of young people (Black et al. 2011). To reiterate from the previous sections, appreciating the strengths, needs, preferences, and actual practices of young Australians is important for various forms of civic and political participation, including those based on digital and social media (Vromen and Collin 2010; Vromen 2011, 2012; Loader et al. 2015). Here, Vromen and Collin (2010) suggest that a shift is required from the structured, individualist method of policymakers to focus on the input of “expert citizens” to one that engages with young people in the spaces they already occupy, in particular the network-based presence of localized, youth-led, online spaces. Through this process, they argue, young people will be more confident in their ability to effect change in relevant policy.

Integrally related to the first, the second tenet is the need for collaborative, positive ways of working to engender, support, and recognize young Australians’ civic and

political action. Central to this tenet is the availability and commitment of dedicated professionals (Black 2015), who work with and for young people to overcome barriers concerning a lack of agency and locus of control (Harris et al. 2010), as well as structural and logistical barriers (ARACY 2008). One potential way to work toward this end is to position young Australians as co-researchers, such as through Youth Participatory Action Research (Callingham 2013). Another factor also seems crucial for this second tenet – namely, the need (often against a policy background which increasingly denies the importance of context) to adopt a situational approach (Head 2011), which starts from where young people are, their lives, their interests, and their possibilities.

Conclusions and Areas for Further Research

In surveying existing literature, this chapter has presented a complex and mixed picture of young Australians' action and engagement. While a core goal of Australian education, schooling, and youth services, current literature points to a range of factors which shape and inform the extent and nature of young people's action. Central here – and indeed perhaps underpinning the other factors considered in this chapter – is the question of precisely what sorts of action and engagement are prioritized by key actors involved. While not wishing to present it as fixed and binary, the identification between two discourses focused on: (1) a civic deficit of involvement in formal politics; and (2) a movement toward alternative forms of participation is analytically helpful. In turn, however, identifying these discourses raises important questions about which further research is needed. Here, two seem particularly important. First, what is the nature of interaction between young Australians' informal, alternative forms of participation and their conscious engagement (or indeed nonengagement) in formal political processes (e.g., is the latter an outright rejection of the former or does it lead to engagement in the latter in some important ways)? Second, how do, and can, official discourses and practices about youth participation in Australia respond to young Australians' preferences, needs, and experiences? In this regard, and to repeat from earlier, Vromen and Collin's (2010) suggestion that a shift is required from the structured, individualist method of policymakers to focus on the input of "expert citizens" to one that engages with young people in the spaces they already occupy, in particular the network-based presence of localized, youth-led, online spaces is prescient. Such a shift seems crucial and necessary if the action and engagement of young Australians within their communities is to be valued, appreciated, and meaningful.

Notes

1. University of South Australia

Cross-References

- ▶ [Constructions of “Youth” and “Activism” in Lebanon](#)
- ▶ [The Development of Civic Participation Among Youth in Singapore](#)
- ▶ [Youth Civic Engagement and Formal Education in Canada: Shifting Expressions, Associated Challenges](#)
- ▶ [Youth Engagement and Citizenship in England](#)

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Part V

New Directions in Citizenship and Education



Affective Citizenship and Education in Multicultural Societies: Tensions, Ambivalences, and Possibilities

58

Michalinos Zembylas

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Abstract

This chapter focuses on discussing the concept of *affective citizenship* and its potential contribution to citizenship education discourses, especially in the context of multicultural societies. The chapter synthesizes the literature on affective citizenship and identifies examples that show how the ideal of the “affective citizen” is promoted in schools internationally. The discussion focuses in particular on two widespread emotional injunctions in multicultural societies: the calls for “embracing the other” and “coping with difference.” The analysis examines the underlying assumptions invoked by these emotional injunctions in relation to discourses of citizenship education. Possible tensions and ambivalent obligations

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are identified and discussed. The chapter concludes that more attention to the implications of the notion of affective citizenship is needed in citizenship education particularly in relation to goals aiming at instilling more criticality in students' understandings of and feelings about citizenship.

Keywords

Affective citizenship · Multiculturalism · Emotion · Critical citizenship education · Education

Introduction

“Affect” and “emotion” have become important objects of study in politics, revealing that conceptions of citizenship and political life are much more *affective* than usually assumed (Ahmed 2014; Clarke et al. 2006; Marcus et al. 2002; Redlawsk 2006; Westen 2007). For example, notions of citizenship as loyalty and attachment to the nation (Fortier 2008) or citizenship as compassion and empathetic understanding of “the other” (Berlant 2004) entail important affective elements. As Di Gregorio and Merolli (2016) argue “turning to affective phenomena and the politics of affect reveals that communities founded on the tacit rational consent of citizens is at worst a myth and at best only part of the story” (p. 935). In particular, the concept of *affective citizenship* (Fortier 2010, 2016; Johnson 2010; Mookherjee 2005) has been suggested to show how ideals of citizenship are grounded in emotions and emotional relationships. Affective citizenship refers to the emotions that citizens are encouraged to feel about their membership or belonging to a nation (Jones 2005). Affective citizenship, then, is a helpful concept that identifies which emotional relationships between citizens are recognized and endorsed or rejected, and how citizens are encouraged to feel about themselves and others (Johnson 2010). In citizenship education, this concept has important implications because it suggests that educators need to examine more seriously how emotions are entangled with political participation and citizenship and which pedagogical conditions cultivate acts of solidarity, empathy, belonging, and struggles for democratic freedom, which are relevant to both citizenship and affect.

The aim of this chapter is to outline how affective citizenship has been approached in the literature and to identify the implications for citizenship education, especially in the context of multicultural societies. The chapter synthesizes the literature on affective citizenship and identifies examples that show how the ideal of the “affective citizen” is promoted in schools internationally. The discussion focuses in particular on two widespread emotional injunctions in multicultural societies: the calls for “embracing the other” and “coping with difference.” The analysis examines the underlying assumptions invoked by these emotional injunctions in relation to discourses of citizenship education. Possible tensions and ambivalent obligations are identified and discussed. The chapter concludes that more attention to the implications of the notion of affective citizenship is needed in

citizenship education particularly in relation to goals aiming at instilling more criticality in students' understandings of and feelings about citizenship.

The Notion of “Affective Citizenship” in the Literature

Work in the fields of political science and citizenship studies in the last decade suggests that the concepts of “citizenship” and “identity” have an affective basis (Ahmed 2014; Fortier 2008, 2010, 2016; Westen 2007). As Fortier writes:

the prescription of sentiment – of feelings for the nation, for the community, for the neighbour, for the Muslim, for the suicide bomber, for minorities – is also what race and ethnicity are about [. . .] the very act of naming who and how to love, suspect, befriend, care for, embrace, welcome, and so on, performatively constructs racial, ethnic, cultural and national differences, along with their gender, sexual, class and generational ‘identities’. (2008, p. 89)

In her seminal article on affective citizenship, Fortier (2010) uses the term “governing through affect” to indicate the management of affect for the purpose of community cohesion, namely, how the state or other sites of disciplinary power (e.g., fellow citizens; social and political organisations; schools) prescribe what it means to be a good or ideal citizen. Governing-through-affect has two important components that deserve a careful consideration in the context of citizenship education.

First, governing-through-affect determines how individuals are affectively governed by others (e.g., the state, fellow citizens, social and political organizations) through the creation of particular emotional relationships. For example, citizens (including children and youth at schools) may be encouraged to feel proximity with those having the “same” ethnic or cultural origin, while they may learn to be suspicious toward “illegal immigrants,” “irregular migrants,” refugees, or other “foreigners” who (supposedly) want to take advantage of the nation state and its resources (Johnson 2010). In Foucauldian terms, governing strategies operate on a biopolitical mode of power that is deeply affective (Fortier 2010). Thus, “the ‘affective subject’ becomes ‘affective citizen,’” writes Fortier, “when its membership to the ‘community’ is contingent on personal feelings and acts that extend beyond the individual self [. . .] but which are also directed towards the community” (2010, p. 22). For example, schools become primary sites of cultivating affective citizenship by teaching children and youth learn from an early age to direct their feelings toward fellow citizens or “others” in ideological ways (Zembylas 2012, *in press*).

The second component of Fortier’s (2010) idea about governing-through-affect concerns how “affective subjects” learn to govern themselves by expressing “appropriate” feelings, especially those of “good citizenship.” For example, the “good citizen” is constructed on the basis of performing particular emotions such as patriotism and loyalty:

So, citizens are expected to demonstrate that they feel loyal, patriotic and integrated. Those citizens are to be welcomed. People who are suspected of not having the correct feelings, including those accused of making a point of their difference (for example, by wearing a veil, or even preferring to speak a foreign language), are problematized and identified as legitimate subjects for critique, fear or suspicion. (Johnson 2010, p. 501)

Citizenship as governing-through-affect, then, is considered to be a process of policing the emotional boundaries of the community against others who look “dangerous” or “suspicious” or do not have the “appropriate” feelings. According to this perspective, students become “good citizens” when they express “appropriate” feelings and mobilize them in the public sphere to demonstrate loyalty and patriotism.

In her more recent work, Fortier (2016) uses the term “acts of citizenship” to refer “to both institutional and individual practices of making citizens or citizenship, including practices that seek to redefine, decenter or even refuse citizenship” (p. 1039). For example, encouraging students to engage in acts of citizenship that are more inclusive (e.g., welcoming refugees and migrants) and challenge normative rules of citizenship has important affective implications that need to be carefully examined in education. The question that follows, to paraphrase Fortier (2016), is: what does it mean for citizenship education to speak of and cultivate affective acts as acts of affective citizenship? This question suggests that educators need to pay attention to how curriculum and teaching may bring forth feelings that are attached to certain aspects of citizenship (e.g., national pride, etc.), while excluding other feelings such as solidarity for migrants and refugees (Ahmed 2014). Importantly, this sort of (ontological) questioning relocates debates of citizenship education from theory to practice, because it pays attention to the web of practices that make acts of citizenship “visible, audible, tangible and knowable” (Mol 2002, p. 33).

Learning how to feel about (certain aspects of) citizenship, how to act and feel as citizens, including how to protest as citizens or against terms of citizenship that are exclusive to some people “are invariably bound up with what we know about citizenship and its (failed) promises, much of which is assumed and taken for granted” (Fortier 2016, p. 1041). Paying careful attention to how the design, circulation, and distribution of certain emotions for and within a community delineate the codes of conduct of the “good” or “bad” affective citizens (Fortier 2016) is inextricably linked to the forms of disciplinary and biopolitical power constituted through certain educational policies and pedagogical practices, specifically, how students and teachers variously experience, enact, interpret, and feel these policies and practices. Put differently, writes Fortier,

exploring affective citizenship requires focusing on its complex logic: how the feelings that attach to citizenship are unevenly distributed across gendered, racialized, sexualized, classed bodies – some citizens feel safer than others; some citizens are deemed safer than others – and, in turn, how subjects’ feelings about citizenship are not equally valued – not all desires for citizenship are deemed equally desirable. (2016, pp. 1041–1042)

The concept of affective citizenship allows us to understand how various actors (e.g., students and teachers) are engaged in affective politics (Di Gregorio and Merolli

2016) – this understanding might yield critical insights into how certain attachments to citizenship that are cultivated can facilitate but also erode emancipatory projects in citizenship education.

Affective Citizenship and Critical Citizenship Education

Different conceptions of citizenship are inevitably associated with different approaches in citizenship education. Generally speaking, Banks (2008) divides citizenship education in two major approaches. On one hand, “mainstream citizenship education” is the approach that reinforces, and therefore perpetuates, hegemonic values and institutional knowledge. This approach is grounded in a conception of citizenship that adopts the established values and morals of the majority and maintains the dominant power relations in society; for example, citizenship education takes the form of promoting patriotism and allegiance to one’s political community. Discourses of liberal citizenship are also examples of mainstream assimilationist conceptions of citizenship, because they put emphasis on individual rights, while group rights of immigrant and ethnic groups and power relations are often put aside. In general, mainstream citizenship education does not pay adequate attention to the complexities that arise from unequal power relations and structures in society and tends to assimilate the particularities of different cultural groups.

On the other hand, “transformative citizenship education” aims to challenge mainstream conceptions of citizenship by engaging students in critical analysis of taken for granted assumptions about membership, identity, and community (Banks 2008). Also known as “critical citizenship education” (DeJaeghere 2006; DeJaeghere and Tudball 2007; Johnson and Morris 2010), transformative citizenship education recognizes and validates the cultural identities of students and puts emphasis on challenging inequalities, developing cosmopolitan values, and taking action to create just and democratic multicultural communities and societies. Transformative approaches, according to Banks (2008), aim to provide the conditions so that young people will take informed action to actualize values and moral principles beyond those of conventional authority. Critical or transformative citizenship education, then, challenges liberal assimilationist conceptions of citizenship that have historically been grounded in the Western European Enlightenment tradition (Banks 2008; Knight Abowitz and Harnish 2006).

Hung (2010) argues that most accounts of citizenship education do not adequately take into consideration the role of the “affective citizen,” that is, “a person who not only thinks and acts rationally, but also feels and cares affectively and sensitively” (2010, p. 493). Hung’s point is that both mainstream and critical conceptions of citizenship are contrived, because they ignore important elements of affective citizenship. Although he says that affective citizenship is not supposed to take the place of the rational critical one, Hung adds the “affective citizen” as a type of citizenship that is hierarchically above Bank’s “transformative citizen.” The problem is that the “transformative citizen” and the “affective citizen” are viewed as different rather than as integrated manifestations of critical citizenship. Hung’s

argument about the affective not already being a part of critical citizenship entails the danger of perpetuating a problematic dichotomy between the “rational” and the “affective” (Zembylas 2007, 2015). This (unnecessary) dichotomy makes the development of a holistic pedagogy of affective citizenship more difficult.

Critical or transformative citizenship education could be enriched in ways that reflect the contributions of the notion of affective citizenship identified earlier. That is, an enriched version of critical citizenship with perspectives of affective citizenship could identify more effectively and critically the multiple emotional affiliations of students and their implications in everyday life. In the context of critical citizenship education, for example, students can be taught to interrogate the ways in which they are encouraged to feel certain emotions about themselves and others and examine the consequences of those emotions. A broad concept of critical citizenship education, then, would benefit considerably by acknowledging that emotions have long been part of the very way in which citizenship is constructed in public and school discourses and practices.

Furthermore, an enriched version of critical citizenship education could problematize how emotion discourses and practices are embodied in the day-to-day routines of life in a multicultural society and could explore the possibilities that are opened for interrupting policies and practices which exclude “others” from certain affective communities (Zembylas 2009, 2010, 2015). Adopting this approach could lead to a more nuanced analysis of how students’ different emotional histories influence their decision-making, their actions and their understandings of membership, identity, and community. Therefore, putting in conversation the concepts of affective citizenship and critical citizenship provides a more holistic description of the ways in which students’ emotional histories are embedded in wider contexts of socio-political forces, needs, and interests.

All in all, an enriched framework for critical citizenship education creates openings to address more productively some major concerns stemming from the emotional tensions of living in multicultural societies – such as the emotional injunctions of “embracing the other” and “coping with difference” that are discussed in the next part of the chapter. In particular, an enriched framework for critical citizenship can respond to the hybrid identifications of citizens, by shifting its focus from a presumed consensus on ethical values to a “thin” consensus on the citizen’s practices of negotiating the demands of living in multicultural communities (Fortier 2010). This idea is grounded in the recognition of different affective bonds in multicultural societies rather than assuming there is a monolithic and one-dimensional way of living with the other. Thus, as it is shown next, the emotional injunctions of multicultural intimacy are better described as ambivalences rather than merely as obligations to, or dangers of, proximity with others (Fortier 2007).

The Emotional Injunctions of Multiculturalism: Two Examples

This part of the chapter will focus on the analysis of two widespread emotional injunctions in multicultural societies. The two injunctions to be analyzed are “embracing the other” and “coping with difference,” and they are chosen because

they are often highlighted as imperatives in multicultural societies, yet their assumptions are not always clearly identified (Fortier 2007). Through the analysis of the underlying assumptions of these emotional injunctions, the consequences for citizenship education are identified and discussed in order to show the mechanisms with which children, youth, and citizens in general are governed through affect, fabricating understandings and feelings of identity and difference with “others.”

“Embracing the Other”

Calls to “embrace the other” are often heard and distributed in multicultural societies; a major assumption underlying these calls is the ideal that “embracing the other” is supposedly a “good” thing – under certain conditions, of course. As Fortier (2007) argues, there are two important tensions with the emotional injunction of “embracing the other.” The first tension is between, on one hand, a rhetoric of embracing the other as “different,” and, on the other hand, the utopian view of a nation state as “an assumed bond of shared allegiance where ‘differences’ are obliterated under a veneer of universal diversity” (Fortier 2007, p. 108). The widespread motto that is found in many schools that “we are all different” is a classic manifestation of this tension that often works in an assimilationist manner under the banner of “we are all the same.”

Taking into consideration the concept of affective citizenship outlined earlier can actually expose this tension and its underlying ambivalences. The emotional embrace of the other in multicultural schools is often taking place on the basis of perceived relations of proximity or distance; wearing a veil or even preferring to speak a foreign language are acceptable, only insofar as they are exoticized. As Fortier explains: “The promise of the national embrace is to rewrite the national same so that ‘we’ could love ourselves as different” (2007, p. 108). What is important to emphasize though is that embracing the other is not a monolithic process; it is a process that creates *both* relations of proximity *and* distance with strong emotional connotations that might be ambivalent. It is not difficult to see, for example, how perceptions of a host community may be implicated in the generation of particular emotional ideologies and discourses that are hostile to migrants and at the same time tolerant and understanding. What is important, according to some scholars (e.g., Ahmed 2014; Fortier 2008; Svašek 2010), is how the narrative of integration often ascribes different identities to some individuals on the basis of who is seen as the legitimate object of empathetic and tolerant feelings (Johnson 2010). These ascriptions, for example, may make some migrant students “fit” and others “unfit” within a school community.

The second tension with the emotional injunction of “embracing the other” has to do with an underlying moral politics that projects the national affective bond on the basis of (hegemonic) values. As Fortier explains, “Within this moral politics the problem of living together becomes a problem of ‘them’ adjusting to ‘our’ values” (2007, p. 108). For example, this tension implies that migrant students are never fully “integrated” unless they embrace the (hegemonic) values of the host

community (i.e., homogeneity). In this manner, embracing the other is rewritten as an emotional management strategy that seeks to project the nation state as one that always has been multicultural, tolerant, welcoming, and enriched by embracing the other (Fortier 2005); yet, in reality, there is often an underlying or overt moral racist politics that polices the terms of tolerance, embrace, and empathy both in schools and in the wider society.

The advocacy of empathetic forms of citizenship, however, offers no simple solution to the challenges of multicultural coexistence (Johnson 2010). Again, taking into consideration the notion of affective citizenship exposes the underlying ambivalences of “embracing the other” – that is, both the desires and anxieties from empathizing with the other, yet demanding that he or she adjusts to the values promoted in “our” schools. The emotional management of multicultural intimacy in schools, then, is inextricably linked to who is seen as the legitimate object of embrace and who is not. Therefore, the call for “embracing the other” is not as innocent or idealist as it sounds; employing the concept of affective citizenship highlights this for the scholar and the teacher. Enriching (critical) citizenship education with the notion of affective citizenship is important because it helps educators acknowledge the ethically and emotionally ambivalent ways through which contemporary perceptions and acts of citizenship function in schools and the society more generally.

“Coping with Difference”

Another example of a widespread emotional injunction in multicultural societies is “coping with difference.” A usual assumption that is often made through this injunction is that multiculturalism brings emotional discomfort to the host population and, therefore, citizens have to learn to live with difference. That is, the origins of emotional discomfort are situated in the immigrants and their presence; the host population is “forced” to learn to cope with the increased diversity that is attributed to “immigrants.” The underlying idea is that immigrants bring unease and uncertainty to “our” community and threaten the nation’s “character” (Ahmed 2005; Bigo 2002).

However, the “strangeness” of immigrants and, therefore, the emotional origins and the extent of discomfort they create are already unevenly distributed, because of existing power relations that cast some immigrants within an “acceptable” visual–oral economy of multicultural citizenship, while others are designated as a threat to the core values of a country (Ahmed 2005). For example, not all migrant children are treated in the same manner in schools; their religion, ethnicity, race, and cultural values already situate them within a differentiated affective economy that casts some as more “acceptable” than others (Pinson et al. 2010). This uneven distribution reminds us about the role of affect in “who” gets constructed as a source of discomfort. Therefore, emotional injunctions – such as those of “embracing the other” or “coping with difference” – that might be perceived as evidence of “good will” on behalf of local teachers and students cannot simply will away the uneven distribution of affect.

“Coping with difference” reveals, then, a form of governing strategy that operates at the level of the “affective subject” in schools or more generally the “affective citizen” in society whose membership to the community is directly linked not only to his or her personal feelings that need to be managed but also to feelings that are projected to a collective level. As Fortier writes:

The project of community cohesion both relies on the ‘affective subject’ and seeks to shape ‘affective citizens’ whose personal membership to community is contingent on personal acts and feelings but which extend beyond the family and the individual, and which are rather directed toward their shared, public, locally integrated lives. (2010, p. 25)

Community cohesion, in other words, is deemed as an inter-personal process of governing through affect – a process in which affective subjects will have to learn to align themselves with the community, yet without questioning the power structures of this “community.” This is an attempt of influencing the feelings, attitudes, and behaviors of citizens in ways that preserve the status quo: members of majority groups are taught that difference is discomforting and thus they have to cope with it without disturbing “cohesion”; members of minority groups are being discouraged from requesting for targeted services that meet their needs, again in the name of an abstract notion of community cohesion (Fortier 2008).

Therefore, it could be argued that when taking into consideration the notion of affective citizenship treats the emotional injunctions discussed here as emotional ideologies that entail certain inclusions and exclusions. These emotional injunctions show the ambivalences toward diversity as both asset and threat, rather than offering an assumed either (negative) or (positive) response to multiculturalism. Emotional ambivalence indicates the ongoing oscillation between the desired boundaries of “us” and “them” in citizenship and citizenship education discourses (Zembylas 2009, 2012). An enriched framework for critical citizenship education that takes into consideration the notion of affective citizenship has important implications, as discussed more in the final part of this chapter.

Implications for Critical Citizenship Education

Despite these contentious debates, it is possible to develop an enriched framework for critical citizenship education that takes into consideration the notion of affective citizenship and its implications. This framework can be initially described in practice as having four distinctive elements along Cogan et al.’s (2002) definition of citizenship education as the formation of the knowledge, skills, values, and dispositions of citizens. Along each dimension of those elements, some suggestions are provided below concerning citizenship teaching and learning at different levels of education (primary, secondary, etc.):

- *Knowledge*: Construct knowledge and understanding about the affective elements of citizenship in different contexts; identify the underlying assumptions and

implications of various emotional injunctions about “identity” and “difference” and analyze how these assumptions are crucial factors in citizens’ decision-making and actions.

- *Skills*: Develop the capacity to expose and critique the entanglements of perceptions and acts of citizenship with emotional practices in schools and beyond; become capable to critically assess the politicization of affective citizenship and its various manifestations.
- *Values*: Trace the emotionality of one’s own and others’ values and the ethical and political grounds for acting on the basis of those values; develop a commitment to an ethic that recognizes the emotional ambivalences and complexities that are involved in enacting those values.
- *Dispositions*: Take responsibility for decisions and actions that are grounded in perceptions of affective citizenship; address in practice the consequences from the emotional injunctions of affective citizenship that establish or perpetuate inequalities and injustices in schools and the society. (Zembylas 2014, pp. 13–14)

The above points can be used as sample recognition of the potential contribution of using affective citizenship to enhance critical citizenship education. For example, a romanticized view of multiculturalism in schools is more likely to erase “negative” feelings that could create contestation and conflict over naming an incident as “racist” and would rather emphasize the “positive” feelings of embracing the other. As Fortier points out, this view is often translated into an economy of affect that determines which feelings are legitimate and which are not: “it is good to have fun, cool, easy and meaningful interactions, it is bad to tackle racism” (2010, p. 27). However, an enriched framework for critiquing and extending critical citizenship education that takes into consideration the notion of affective citizenship is more likely to acknowledge the emotional complexities and ambivalences that frequently remain unnoticed in schools through the use of emotional injunctions such as those discussed earlier. Teachers and students might use the points raised above to explore the emotional complexities related to the terms of entitlement, community, and identity in their school and their society. The enriched framework for critical citizenship education would help teachers and students understand why the cohesion agenda often collapses, when it fails to recognize the differential affective bonds involved in this process as well as the power relations that are linked to the affective economies of multiculturalism (Ahmed 2005, 2014). Consequently, teachers and students are able to see in practice why citizenship ends up being privatized by governing and individualizing the feelings that need to be aligned with those of the community.

It is suggested, therefore, that an enriched framework of critical citizenship education must engage deeply with the affective components of citizenship to extend understanding of the emotional injunctions of multiculturalism. Debates in citizenship education will benefit considerably by addressing peoples’ multiple emotional attachments and their significance in mediating affect, community, and citizenship. This consideration holds potential to truly expand the notion of critical or

transformative citizenship by contributing to the establishment of public and educational spaces in which the consequences of emotional injunctions are not only exposed but are also utilized productively to shape the way that social justice is imagined and enacted in multicultural societies.

Clearly, any attempt to develop such an enriched framework for critical citizenship education that takes into consideration the notion of affective citizenship has numerous challenges. The knowledge, skills, values, and dispositions of hegemonic citizenship education discourses are not easily suspended as they are deeply rooted in the emotional ideologies of the nation state (Bekerman and Zembylas 2012). As a theoretical and practical scaffold, this enriched framework for critical citizenship education requires the transformation of the very conditions of the production and reproduction of hegemonic affective economies in schools and multicultural societies. Undoubtedly, this is a monumental task, yet the enriched framework suggested here might at least provide small openings to support the structure and the process for teachers willing to interrogate the assumptions of affective citizenship. The advantage of this framework is that it can be constantly reinterpreted and enriched in the future as empirical studies inform it.

Conclusion

This chapter has considered how the notion affective citizenship has important implications for education, especially in multicultural societies. The task of any educator in citizenship education that is critical of the affective borders that are often created among “us” and “them” in schools is to identify the acts, practices, strategies, and spaces where affective transformation might be possible. By critically analyzing different elements of affective citizenship, there is a potential to identify possibilities for this affective transformation, while deconstructing taken for granted emotional injunctions about “others.” Enriching our theoretical and empirical understandings of affective citizenship in citizenship education requires asking critical questions about how the entanglement of power, politics, and affect in citizenship education projects can create openings for transformation or bring closures to emancipatory acts of citizenship.

Cross-References

- ▶ [Citizenship and Education in an Age of Extremisms](#)
- ▶ [Educational Mobility and Citizenship: Chinese “Foreign Talent” Students in Singapore and Indian Medical Students in China](#)
- ▶ [International Students: \(Non\)citizenship, Rights, Discrimination, and Belonging](#)
- ▶ [Typologies of Citizenship and Civic Education: From Ideal Types to a Reflective Tool](#)

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Hypercitizenship in the Age of Globalization

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Sara Petroccia and Andrea Pitasi

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Abstract

This chapter examines and theorizes the concept of citizenship and its evolution into hypercitizenship in an age of globalization. It argues that citizenship narratives are not necessarily placed in the contexts of material lives and nor do they constitute part of networks of direct relations. Instead, citizenship narratives can be reached in mediated ways and can be part of a virtual or a spatially imaginative context of reference. The growing interdependence and contemporary erosion and multiplication of boundaries make it possible to think of oneself as freed from local ties and as being immersed in global flows which interconnect the whole planet mostly through intangible assets portfolio such as digital information and intellectual Property Right Policy. The main focal point of this research shall be based on the conflict existing between citizenship rights and so-called cosmopolitan rights. From a cosmopolitan point of view of global citizenship, this tension might produce positive effects when international regulations succeed in interfering with the legal systems of single countries. Citizenship policies are sketching out a paradigm shift from nation state based on the level to transnational or supranational levels as testified for example by the hypercitizenship conceptual

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framework and vision described in this chapter. The old conception of nation state citizenship represents a reductionist vision of what is in practice evolved nowadays into a global flow shaped as a systemic process interconnected on a planetary level (i.e., the about 20 million double passport Brazilians who are also Spanish/Italian/German/Dutch/Portuguese shaping continuous flow of right between the European Union and the Mercosur). The traditional meaning of citizenship essentially focused on legal validity and political participation. Nowadays, in the complex contexts, legal validity and political participation are still very important. Nevertheless, citizenship is framed also by economical, financial, and biotechnological variables (such as the matter of the rights of animals or of intangible assets and of the outputs of human–machine–animal interaction output (Harris 2007), which also highlights the allocation of legal intellectual capitals in global scenarios.

Keywords

Hypercitizenship · Evolution · Globalization · Cosmopolitanism · Educational innovation policy · Knowledge

Introduction: The Evolution of the Concept of Citizenship

The development of the concept of “citizenship,” from the political and juridical forms of absolutism to the conceptual frame of an open series of subjective rights, represents one of the salient aspects of the modern world. The configuration of citizenship, characterized by the binomial “belonging-rights,” bases its conceptual foundations in Locke’s philosophical thought the *Second Treatise of Government* (Locke 2016). In the course of this chapter, the concept of citizenship that shall be considered is composed of three main dimensions (Cohen 1999; Kymlicka and Norman 1994; Carens 2000): first of all, citizenship as a legal status, defined through civil, political, and social rights that makes the citizen free to act in accordance with the law and to claim its protection. The second dimension considers citizens specifically as political agents, actively participating in the institutions of society, and the third dimension refers to citizenship as the phenomenon to belong to a political community (Leydet 2011) which is actually able to develop a distinct identity base within it itself. The essay written by Thomas H. Marshall titled “Citizenship and social class” (Marshall 1950) represents the first theorization of this conception of citizenship as well as the key to understand the dynamics of a modern democracy occurring when assigning rights and duties to the new social classes emerging along with the development of industrial society starting from the second half of the eighteenth century. At Marshall’s times, citizenship was a mere category to aggregate a wide number of people labeled by the same right portfolio and they can access thus equality was he key pillar of that conception of citizenship. In this light, social citizenship, in spite of not being able to subvert the antiegalitarian logic of the market, may generate an

improvement in the quality of civil life by reducing risks and insecurity related to health, employment, and age.

The development of citizenship rights may not be represented as a gradual process, which emerges spontaneously from the institutions of the market and by virtue of the protection of the state, as citizenship rights basically derive from the social and political conflict of the subordinate classes. Therefore, it would be an illusion to consider the social rights introduced by the welfare state as factors of pacification within society (Giddens 1982). Whether it is true that, on the one hand, Marshall's approach prevents us from perceiving the internal tensions of the various phases of citizenship by referring to Marxist theories and claiming the impossibility of altering power relations with the simple introduction of social rights as these rights affect only the mechanisms of resource distribution and not also the ones concerning the production, on the other hand Marxist theories seem to underestimate the complexity of modern citizenship, binding it exclusively to the matter relating to the classes and the capitalist mode of production.

On the contrary, in our opinion, today the debate must take into account the increasing gap between citizenship, meant as the assignment of rights within individual countries, and the development of Transnational and Supranational Legislation (Neves 2013; Thornhill 2016; Teubner et al. 2006) in the globalized world where individuals, governmental, and nongovernmental organizations are found to be subject to new disciplines both on a national and supranational level. The definition of a citizen as a person coexisting in a society provided by the Council of Europe (O'Shea 2003) reinforces even more the aforementioned vision of citizenship as a flexible and open – to cosmopolitanism, for example – concept which acts as a key foci for transnational and supranational policy modeling.

This definition includes widening the concepts of both status and role, assuming a bigger scale model of citizenship. The model conceives citizenship as being shaped by a multidimensional pattern of variables, including, for example,

1. The right of the blood (birth or marriage)
2. *Jus soli* – rights accorded by birth in a given location
3. Citizenship as investment
4. Citizenship as artistic/scientific, institutional special merit and service, and
5. The Constructivist confederative reshaping of the world (as already theorized by John Locke in the seventeenth century)

Alongside a formal vision of citizenship as a legal status that attributes to the citizens rights and responsibilities within their own community, citizenship can also be defined through participation and commitment to public life. In this way there are two relevant concepts: first, the concept of citizenship is no longer affirmed only by taking into account national borders but by also including the international dimension. Secondly, in addition to expressing a status, the concept of citizenship also becomes a role. Citizenship, therefore, must be seen as a means not only of access to the areas of rights, but also of inclusion and integration as well as social promotion and active participation in the life of the community. When speaking of citizenship,

we have to consider it as a multidimensional concept as shown above in which legal validity is pivotal but not exclusive. Social, economical, and also technological dimensions affect the evolution of citizenship.

This is the reason why more and more frequently, in recent years, the term citizenship has been accompanied by adjectives that have better specified the intended meaning of the concept. Hence, there have been writings on a social citizenship (Marshall 1950), inclusive citizenship (Habermas 1998), active citizenship (Benvenuti 1994), administrative citizenship (Gallo 2002; Cavallo Perin 2004), health citizenship (Menichetti 2000), cultural citizenship (Miller 2010), multicultural citizenship (Kymlicka 2001), virtual citizenship (Downes Janda 1998) or digital citizenship (Cogo 2010), planetary citizenship (Annino 2013; Tussi 2010), participated citizenship (Mortari 2004), flexible citizenship (Ong 1999; Benhabib 2002, 2005), democratic citizenship (Habermas 1992), cosmopolitan citizenship (Held 1995), global citizenship (Romano et al. 2005; Benhabib 2008; Unesco 2015), and hypercitizenship citizenship (Pitasi 2012a, 2014b; Pitasi and Ferone 2017a). Specifically, these last three expressions better summarize and encompass the meaning of citizenship as these adjectival terms manage to combine the national level with the international level, emphasizing the “multiple identities” coexisting in the same subject.

This chapter is research and policy modeling based and it is essentially structured as follows:

1. A brief overview of the concept of citizenship in legal, political, and social sciences
2. An examination of the evolution of citizenship theory and policy since the 1960s focusing on the impact of globalization
3. A description of the emerging shape of global citizenship named “hyper-citizenship” which is the core of the research and policy agenda of this chapter evolving hypercitizenship also to testify the convergent trend towards a more unified, macro-, and transnational/supranational of globally interconnected policies

Hypercitizenship as an Evolution of the Global and Cosmopolitan Citizenship Idea

The goal of this chapter, beyond the historical background described above, is to set out the problem of the obsolescence of educational processes for citizenship based on the traditional methodological nationalism as clearly theorized by Beck (2006). The illusion that science and politics are two parallel universes was one of the biggest mistakes made by Max Weber, which was corrected by Karl Mannheim who in 1929 explained that politics, as any other aspect of social life, is knowledge intensive and science based. Expanding the famous motto by T. J. Lowi (2009) that research determines policy which determines politics, here we introduce hypercitizenship, which is represented as an evolution of the ideas of Global and Cosmopolitan Citizenship.

The emergence of citizenship as a multidimensional concept comes out from the evolution of social systems based on their autopoietic capacity, which should no longer be analyzed and studied by using old methods of social sciences but by using the most recent theoretical paradigm of systems theory. In this sense, social sciences need to present theoretical models that can diagnose existing problems and present the most adequate solutions to such problems. The concept of citizenship based on the notion of “world citizen” is redesigned by the globalized and cosmopolitan social system as one that overcomes the idea of citizenship being limited to the place of birth and hereditary matters. Let’s give a very simple example of hypercitizenship: The European Union currently has about 450 million inhabitants self-perceiving as national state citizens (Italians, Germans, French, and so on). Both the education system (in high school they study Italian literature or French literature or German literature, not European literature) and the political system are confirming this self-perception (they vote on a national scale also at the European Elections), while the science system, the economical system, and the legal system involve them as Europeans or even as Global Citizens. The more the citizenship expands legally, financially, economically, and scientifically, the more the education system and the political system are under pressure, either through resisting the expansion of citizenships or through the structural coupling of more localized system with the more global ones (Luhmann, *Theory of Society*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2012–13, 2 voll). Hypercitizenship is thus a research based policy model to facilitate the evolution of citizenship to a more and more macrolevel.

The Dimensions of Hypercitizenship

The concept of hypercitizenship evolves from the construction of citizenship shaped by systemically interconnecting four dimensions:

- (i) Beck’s cosmopolitan citizen
- (ii) Scientific citizenship
- (iii) Social autonomy capacity of self-organization
- (iv) Entrepreneurial citizenship

Here we describe the four dimensions considering the first two as more structural and the other two as more functional; thus, cosmopolitan citizenship and scientific citizenship will be dealt more in depth. The hypercitizen is portrayed as having a strong entrepreneurial spirit and is able to consider themselves as a citizen of the world. Hypercitizens have a cosmopolitan mentality acquired through training and life experiences; those skills are used in order to interpret the world and to choose for the right way to live one’s own life. This citizenship expansion also implies the move from doxa to episteme, and thus to eradicate, emotional, childish, and short-term oriented citizens moved by small-scale egoistic motivations toward more skilled, educated, cognitive, strategic citizens able to play the game of procedural deliberation as coding and programming systemic functions instead of primitive emotional

participation. These features do not come from ideological-political doctrines of any kind, rather they derive from the basics of human ethological evolution as shown by Irenaeus Eibl Eibelsfeldt (Dennet 2004). We now discuss these four dimensions in depth.

The first dimension of hypercitizenship is cosmopolitan citizenship, as it is portrayed in Ulrich Beck's cosmopolitan vision as largely characterized by the breaking of barriers. Here, cosmopolitanism is the outcome of a transformation in the globalized world. The cosmopolitan world needs what he calls "cosmopolitan vision" (Beck 2006). In this context, there is the need for a paradigmatic shift of the social sciences as assumptions to be able to deal with the complexity of the existing social relations in the systems.

The second dimension of hypercitizenship is scientific citizenship (Nowotny 2008) in which the ideas of citizenship, science, and technology are linked by the social system, which is supplied by means of the educational system. The educational system is the current means for social mobility and the insertion of people in knowledge intensive and research based economic and work relations. One cannot conceive the possibility of citizenship without education, as one cannot also imagine life without knowledge and technology. Social relations are defined more and more through the growth and improvement of science and technology and a highly educated and cognitive public opinion.

The third dimension – the social autonomy capacity of self-organization, or societarian (Donati 1993) – requires self-organizing autonomy for emergent networks and communities of citizens, in other words, the emergence of communities deriving from networks created by citizens. It implies the ability of citizens and social networks to generate and shape organizations that allow new emerging social forms by linking charity and lobbying.

Finally, the fourth dimension of hypercitizenship is entrepreneurial citizenship (Audretsch 2009); that is, the emergence of innovative and strategically applied ideas for development and expansion and of the citizen. In the space available here, there is not scope to cover all four of these dimensions in detail, so in the remainder of this section we concentrate on the first two dimensions before saying something much briefer about the third and fourth dimensions in the concluding section that follows.

Hypercitizenship and Cosmopolitanism

As stated above, the first dimension of hypercitizenship, cosmopolitanism, is inspired by Ulrich Beck's thesis, who ranks some principles of the cosmopolitan citizen, largely characterized by the breaking of barriers. On Beck's reading, cosmopolitanism is the result of a memetic transformation in the globalized world, in which barriers between nations do not limit crises or wars. The cosmopolitan world needs what he calls a "cosmopolitan outlook" (Beck 2006). In this global and cosmopolitan context, there is the need for a paradigmatic shift of the social sciences as assumptions to be able to deal with the complexity of the existing systemic

relations. Cosmopolitan theories influence the idea of citizenship in different ways. One of the reasons may be traced primarily to the basic meaning of “global citizenship,” which underlies a reference to the “citizen of the world” or to the commonality and equality of all human beings as such. Another reason may be linked to the increasingly renewed interest in the cosmopolitan ideal, considered today as one of the most effective interpretations of the globalized world. Cosmopolitanism has deep roots and inspires legal and institutional reform projects. Cosmopolitanism has been repeatedly underlined as crucial for a new reality characterized by the progressive increase in relations and exchanges at a global level because the economic, political, and legal fields require new conceptual schemes in order to be decoded, to foresee future developments and face the effects that these changes are producing. Thus, on a theoretical level, contemporary cosmopolitanism reveals the existence of a reality that is already strongly cosmopolitan in itself and represents, at the same time, an attempt to solve the new problems that it entails, to rethink some traditional conceptual categories in the light of the changes that have already taken place or that are currently ongoing, to develop new ones as well as to inspire and direct political-institutional reform projects. In fact, contemporary cosmopolitanism manifests itself as fragmented into a multiplicity of areas and contents: from ethics to politics, from sociology to jurisprudence, from cultural studies to gender studies. Since the beginning of globalization, national legal systems have been affected in relation to the formation of their internal norms and international agreements (Beck 2006, for a continuous upgrading of cosmopolitan sociological research please follow the works in progress of the European Sociological Association – Research network 15- <https://www.europeansociology.org/research-networks/rn15-global-transnational-andcosmopolitan-sociology>).

From the laws of trade and property, the effects of the network of cosmopolitan influences have affected ways of seeing and facing the context of inequalities. In the traditional national view, problems of inequality are usually situated in terms of interrelationships between the nation-state and the individual, national citizen. Thus, responsibilities for inequalities are attributed and distributed between the individual and society (through nation-state public policies). However, due to the movement produced by a cosmopolitan society, there has been a relocation that now sees national inequalities as a reflection of global inequalities (due to global economic crises and the flow of capital) (Beck 2006, p. 39). The cosmopolitan point of view reverses the traditional hierarchy of priorities, so that the principles of cosmopolitan, supranational law derogate the principles of national law. One can observe the application of this emerging process when considering the prosecution and application of sanctions relating to so-called crimes against humanity that cannot be judged or condemned by nation-states alone. This growing trend may signal a significant paradigm shift from a national society to a cosmopolitan society. For while maintaining the speed of diffusion from the cosmopolitan point of view of a human rights regime, there is a tendency to remove the internal-external boundary and question the legitimacy of the purely national action of the nation-state, both internally and externally (Beck 2006).

To seek to understand the emergence of a network of interdependent global normative concepts seems to be a necessity of contemporary law, either through cosmopolitanism that presupposes a minimum universalism of legal norms (Beck 2006, p. 49) or through its next step, hypercitizenship. The concept of hypercitizenship describes the existence of a catalog of strategically formulated laws, in which the hypercitizen will choose the one that is most favorable to them. Whether in the idea of cosmopolitan citizenship or hypercitizenship, we are forced to leave the concept of a legal system aimed at protecting the interests of a specific population, belonging to a particular culture, and circumscribed to a particular territory. We must start building the concept of a legal system aimed at the individual, as a plural citizen, who can use any culture or territory and heuristically implement them as memetic recombinations on a “glocal” scale.

This emphasis on a new global identity, especially provided by the concept of hypercitizenship, points to a positive dynamic role played by the citizen, who actively pursues his or her goals, provided by the conceptual tools that form the four constituent elements of hypercitizenship described above. This pursuit of certain events, relative to others and having the freedom to choose them, creates value and meaning, reintroducing value, meaning, and choice through agency. Kauffman (2010) reinforces the importance of the individual agent as responsible for the construction of evolutionary systems, from the simplest system that allowed the emergence of the first forms of life to the emergence of the economic, social, and legal systems. Agency, therefore, is the ability to act that presupposes an active characteristic, such as an active process of decisions and choices. In the context of new citizenships, agency can undoubtedly be seen in the active capacity of the new type of citizen to make decisions and choices based on scientific and technological knowledge, in the cosmopolitan vision, undertaking and catalyzing social groupings in search of their objectives (See Davies and Bansel 2007). All these actions take place in a space of freedoms created by the individual agency, which are catalyzed and shaped by law. Local social arrangements are encouraged or restricted through local legal rules. Local legal rules, in turn, are influenced by the network of global legal concepts, especially on the horizon of a cosmopolitan society.

The greater emphasis on the dissemination of human rights as supranational legal concepts, since the 1948 UN Declaration up to the EU Treaty of Nice and beyond, points to the formation of a nucleus around the individual, the individual citizen as responsible for the construction of a plural identity, through agency, contrary to the previously simple and local relationship between the citizen and the local nation-state. The law in this context can be seen doubly: not only as a legal science, but as a social technology (Pitasi et al. 2018). Now, through this definition, it is pointed out that law is a social technology as it allows the organized interaction of completely different people, who in any other context would have no reason to interact with mutual trust and conduct business.

The role of the stabilization of normative expectations (Luhmann 2006) exercised by law allows the construction of the economic and social architecture that we know, being completely compatible with the definition of Beinhocker. By viewing the law as a technology, we can be open to a constellation of innovations and

interconnections; it means to say that the entrepreneurial dimension of hypercitizenship can be used as a constant engine of innovation of the legal technique, not needing a whole new revolution in the science of law. Technology often evolves by a new recombination of well-known elements. Thus, many innovations in the application of law have been, although timidly, developed not necessarily by a scientific change caused by the science of law, but by entrepreneurs, jurists or not, that created virtual solutions for technical problems of legal application. Increasingly, the application of the law is being carried out through virtual platforms and increasingly the citizen (or hypercitizen) will have faster and better tools of not only choosing which legal system is most appropriate for their purpose, but also acting through those platforms directly in a system of choice, in a more independent and efficient way. Day by day, generation by generation the challenge is to empower the chances for an increasing amount of citizens accessing the hypercitizenship mindset through quality educational processes.

Just as globalization led to Beck's cosmopolitanism in an irreversible way, the technological convergence that has led to the concept of hypercitizenship, a step further from the cosmopolitan concept, asserts itself as an irreversible process. Legal systems have changed to seek better regulation in the face of these changes. But these timid and partial changes have failed to keep up with the speed of technology-driven changes. Law, like science and technology, must innovate as well. There is a need for a new angle in the study of legal systems, where law can be seen as a technology and a science that makes the evolution of agency and citizenship as a fundamental element. This new angle requires applying an unorthodox tooling to the study of Law, the tool used in the study of complex adaptive networks: the Sciences of Complexity. The work of describing the influence of agents on each other and on the normative network means describing how the interpretation of the flow of information between these elements takes place and what pattern emerges from that interaction. It is necessary to apply cognitive concepts to the process of emergence of social and legal patterns in a Complex Adaptive Social System that does not admit fixed and univocal concepts. A Complex Adaptive System is composed of a large number of elements with diversity in structure and capacities that interact, learn, and evolve (Holland 1995). From the interaction of these agents, various patterns can arise, through a process of self-organization without central control, called emergency (Mitchel 2009).

These characteristics can be found in the legal system described as a complex adaptive network of normative concepts that shape the agents' performance, who processes the concepts, acts (through their agency), applies the concepts concretely, and adapts to them alter the normative network, in a co-evolutionary cycle of influences and changes. It can be said that the agent acting is the main engine of self-organization of the legal system. Moreover, the agent processes the information received from the network of legal concepts and gives it meaning by acting positively. A possible relationship between the four dimensions of hypercitizenship and an effective use of individual capacities within the freedoms space of the agency may indicate a way of approaching how to understand and construct legal systems and public policies that are not only adequate for the full exercise of citizenship as it can

accelerate the process of emergence of hypercitizenship and its diffusion. From this point of view, the construction of legal norms and public policies must not only guarantee a sufficiently wide space of freedoms for the agency, but must also provide conditions for the four dimensions of hypercitizenship to be developed. This convergence for a hypercitizenship and an application of complexity science tools requires a society based on the diffusion of techno-scientific knowledge, which can only arise from a cosmopolitan context of inclusive differences, which will allow creative social grouping, driven by entrepreneurship.

As set out above, the second dimension of hypercitizenship is scientific citizenship: the idea of citizenship, science, and technology are linked through the social system, which is supplied by means of the educational system which is also shaped legally, but education policies are beyond the mere legal dimension of citizenship. An exemplary brief case: imagine a high level of obsolete jobs depending on a technological change, for example, the wedding photographer in a world of high definition mobiles with cameras and videocameras. Let's suppose an increase of the unemployment rate and a search for a political – legal decision: all wedding photographers will be working as state employees. As they are not trained and probably they are aged and not too open to be trained they will be hired by the state for no added value jobs. In the short term, it might be an apparent solution as it downsizes the unemployment and maybe – thanks to the new salaries – it might improve a little the consumption rate. Nevertheless, the consequences in the mid-long term would be on one side a wide increasing of no added value spending and on the other one the reproduction of obsolescence delaying both technological and organizational change delaying new job opportunities for “Young Blood.” In brief, an implosive short term, narrow minded solution. It often happens when educational policies about intellectual and professional training are camouflaged as unemployment reduction as a motto for political campaigning.

Nowotny, setting her scientific citizenship conceptually, clearly states that: “The convergent technologies based on successful connections among the biological, informational, nano, and cognitive sciences open up a broad field in which brain and matter, body and environment can interact in a controlled fashion. These and other transformations that spring from science and technology touch on humanity’s self understanding as much as they change our social life together” (Nowotny 2008, pp. 12–13).

Nowotny’s (2008) key contribution evolves into the scientific citizenship concept which shapes the knowledge based society. Thus, a knowledge based society also increases its production of epistemic things, various kinds of abstract objects, and technical artifacts that are subject to the same rules. So, the democratization of scientific expertise appears as the expansion of principles of governance that have served the Western liberal democracies well. It is logical to extend the concept of citizenship to scientific citizenship and argue then a broad agreement that more money should be invested in research to be achieved by putting the unexpected and new that comes out of the laboratory into the widest possible variety of contexts of applications to produce in them new knowledge that in turn brings forth new abilities and continues to spread in society. So that, the entire knowledge of humankind and

its impressive technological capacities is oriented toward a future that does not so much promise a new beginning as further intensification and dynamic continuation of what has already been achieved and the future we are now facing relies on innovation under conditions of uncertainty. This cannot be equated with the lack of knowledge – quite the contrary. Uncertainty arises from the surfeit of knowledge, leading to too many alternatives, too many possible ramifications and consequences, to be easily judged. In sum, the outcome aims at the expansion of possibilities of controlling the environment, enabling people to travel greater distances in less time and to settle the space they found more densely and efficiently. The loss of temporal distance blurs the difference between what is technologically possible and what is already present in the laboratory which is often a virtual reality, so the future presents itself as a sketch of technological visions that block out the social knowledge that is needed to live in a scientific technological world.

The Functional Dimensions of Hypercitizenship

The fourth dimension of hypercitizenship is entrepreneurial citizenship, that is, the emergence of innovative ideas and of the citizen who undertakes actions based on technology and knowledge. This fourth dimension is conceptualized from a reinterpretation of the ideas of Audretsch (2007), on the entrepreneurial society, extending it to an idea of entrepreneurial citizenship. Finally, the fourth dimension is the social relationship capability of citizens, the emergence of self-organized networks deriving from nets created by citizens' emergent new lifestyle trends. It implies the ability of shaping self-generating and self-organized networks which allow new emerging social forms by linking charity and lobbying, for example. In this framework, we affirm that hypercitizenship appears as an emerging systemic and global policy model (Pitasi et al. 2018; Pitasi and Ferone 2017b). This epistemological theoretical model recognizes the existence of new relations as elicitations for a response from law in order to “maintain expectations” systemically thus meaning expectations as autopoietic functions (Luhmann 2006). In this way, rights and obligations become systemic and global, withdrawing a nation-state's exclusive power and unlimited self-determination (Beck 2006). The concept of hypercitizenship could be a central point around the creation of public policy modeling and making.

Conclusion

After a brief historical description of the evolution of the concept of citizenship, this chapter introduced the hypercitizenship model at the crossroads between Sociology of Law and Sociology of Knowledge focused on its higher education impact, meaning by higher education the Three Academic Levels of the 1999 Process of Bologna. The four dimensions of hypercitizenship have been described above and hypercitizenship has been discussed epistemologically, theoretically, and as a

strategic policy model for tactical policy making of macroorganizations in the knowledge intensive globalization age.

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World-Seeing and World-Making: The Role of Aesthetic Education in Cultivating Citizens of the World

60

Suzanne S. Choo

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Abstract

One of the key distinguishing characteristics of the twenty-first century is the intensification of global mobility and interconnectivity. At the same time, this illusion of connectivity is also disrupted by rising instances of cultural and religious intolerance evidenced in the spread of extremism, fundamentalism, and xenophobia worldwide. Consequently, governments have become increasingly conscious of the need to empower citizens with the skills and dispositions to navigate cultural diversity in a global age. This chapter premises on the argument that education for citizenship be explicitly reframed as education for cosmopolitan citizenship. It focuses on the role of aesthetic education in developing a cosmopolitan imagination that continually disrupts national, institutional, and parochial norms. Though aesthetic education encompasses the production of artworks and the processes of art-making, it is primarily attentive to shaping perspectives and predispositions toward others. This occurs not merely through artworks themselves but through three key pedagogical tools that aesthetic education supports to developing an imagination hospitable to diversity and difference – pedagogies of interruption, bridge-building pedagogies, and critical cosmopolitan pedagogies. Through an ongoing process of world-seeing and

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world-making elicited through narratives of otherness, aesthetic education facilitates cosmopolitan sensitivities as a means to live ethically and hospitably with diverse and multiple others in a globally interconnected age.

Keywords

Cosmopolitanism · Aesthetic education · Critical citizenship · Dialogue · Literature · Hospitality

Introduction

One of the key distinguishing characteristics of the twenty-first century is the intensification of global mobility and interconnectivity. Paradoxically, while technological globalization has effected “time-space compression” contributing to the impression of a networked, global village (Bauman 1998), this illusion of connectivity is also disrupted by rising instances of cultural and religious intolerance evidenced in the spread of extremism, fundamentalism, and xenophobia worldwide. Consequently, governments have become increasingly conscious of the need to empower citizens with the skills and dispositions to navigate cultural diversity in a global age. Building on Osler and Starkey’s (2003) proposal that education for citizenship be explicitly reframed as education for cosmopolitan citizenship, this chapter focuses on the role of aesthetic education in developing a cosmopolitan imagination that continually disrupts national, institutional, and parochial norms. Through an ongoing process of world-seeing and world-making elicited through narratives of otherness, aesthetic education facilitates cosmopolitan sensitivities as a means to live ethically and hospitably with diverse and multiple others in a globally interconnected age.

Cosmopolitan Citizenship Education

It is commonly acknowledged that the term “cosmopolitanism” was first employed by the Cynic philosopher Diogenes in Ancient Greece who, living in an earthenware tub in the marketplace, declared himself a *kosmopolitēs* or citizen of the world. The concept was subsequently employed by Stoic philosophers who advocated moral obligation beyond the confines of family or nation and proposed to treat all persons regardless of class, gender, or nationality as quasi-siblings who deserved equal treatment.

Cosmopolitan ideals have also been located in Eastern philosophy such as in the Hindu Upanishads and in Confucius’ *Analects* (Hansen 2011). Like the Stoics, Confucius advocated the importance of extending concern that we naturally have for siblings to everyone in the world. He emphasized that the humane man “wishing himself to be established, sees that others are established, and wishing himself to be successful, sees that others are successful” (2008, §6.30, p. 23). Confucius modelled

a cosmopolitan attitude characterized by a willingness to learn from others to better appreciate what it is to be human.

In fields ranging from Anthropology to International Relations, Literary Studies, Philosophy, and Education, the ancient concept of cosmopolitanism has undergone a revival since the 1990s following the end of the Cold War and the intensification of globalization. On one hand, a cosmopolitan worldview aligns with the current global zeitgeist in its commitment toward the notion of a common humanity transcending territorial boundaries. On the other hand, the concept of cosmopolitanism provides a response to the injustices brought about by global capitalism and has been described as “the human face of globalization” (Cheah 2006, p. 19).

Cosmopolitan education has typically been categorized as one component of global citizenship education. In distilling five heuristics of global citizenship discourses, Gaudelli (2009) listed cosmopolitanism as one among others that include neoliberal, nationalist, Marxist, and world justice/governance. Similarly, in their typology of global citizenship conceptions, Oxley and Morris (2013) identified eight conceptions of global citizenship under two broad categories – cosmopolitan and advocacy. Cosmopolitan conceptions focus on political, moral, economic, and cultural aspects of global citizenship, while advocacy types focus on social, critical, environmental, and spiritual aspects of global citizenship. Essentially, there are three features that distinguish cosmopolitan education from other conceptions of global citizenship education.

The Other as an End in Place of the Other as a Means

First, cosmopolitan education supports an ethical approach to global citizenship education that counters neoliberal, utilitarian approaches. Broadly, neoliberal global citizenship education champions choice and competition and is aimed at equipping students to thrive in the global economy (Gaudelli 2009). Increasingly common is the influence of multinational corporations and businesses in crafting education reform initiatives that push for future-ready workplace skills (Spring 2014). Education is conceived in terms of economic utility – the capacity to thrive and compete in future work places, to get better jobs and higher wages, and to increase one’s productivity for a country. This utilitarian approach to education perpetuates the image of the citizen as what Foucault (1979) termed, *homo economicus*, one who is an “entrepreneur of himself, being for himself his own capital, being for himself his own producer, being for himself the source of earnings” (p. 226). The neoliberal citizen, depicted as an individualistic and autonomous capitalist, rather than part of a collective society, is motivated to maximize “utilities” in the accumulation of future-oriented skills (Tan 2014). At the same time, students are also “utilities,” conceived by the state as human capital to be invested in and measured for economic returns rather than for human development that then promotes a managerial school culture characterized by competition, standardization, and accountability.

Conversely, cosmopolitan education’s essential premise is that the other is an end in itself. In this sense, cosmopolitan education encompasses a teleological orientation rooted in the Aristotelian ethical notion that “every action and decision seems to aim at some good” (1985, §1094a, p. 1). This ultimate end is *eudaimonia* or human

flourishing which is not merely an individualistic goal but one that also transcends self-interest. Thus, Aristotle identified justice as the most superior virtue “because the person who has justice is able to exercise virtue in relation to another, not only in what concerns himself” (1985, §1130a, p. 119). For Aristotle, the just person is concerned with questions about fairness and equality and such concerns, extending beyond the self, demonstrates a sense of responsibility to others.

When cosmopolitan ideals were later revived in the eighteenth century to counter rising nationalism, the philosopher Immanuel Kant (1785/1995) reiterated the imperative of treating the other “always as an end and never as a means only” (§429, p. 46). The primacy of the other was also reiterated in Kant’s political writings in which he expounded on the concept of hospitality as foundational to cosmopolitan rights. In the third article of “Perceptual Peace” entitled “The law of world citizenship shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality,” Kant (1795/1963), while recognizing the sovereignty of nation-states, argued that this was insufficient in guarding against hostilities toward foreigners. Universal hospitality was a necessary condition that transcended national rights which he went on to define as “the right of a stranger not to be treated as an enemy when he arrives in the land of another” (§358, p. 102). In the same way, the notion of hospitality grounds a cosmopolitan education aimed at developing students’ sense of openness and solidarity with others including those othered in their own communities (Osler and Starkey 2003).

Multiple as Opposed to Monolithic Conceptions of Belonging

Second, unlike nationalist global citizenship education targeted at strengthening civic identity between a nation and its people, the end of a cosmopolitan education is “other-centered” (Choo 2018) and supports multiple affiliations to home and the world. Contemporary scholars have concurred that cosmopolitanism is essentially an ethical orientation characterized by a willingness to engage the other (Hannerz 1990), an attitude that allows one to learn from the other rather than merely tolerate him/her (Hansen 2011), and a sensitivity toward empathizing with others (Nussbaum 1997).

On one hand, cosmopolitanism embodies the view of identity affiliations as occurring beyond the single space of the nation. On the other hand, contemporary conceptions of cosmopolitanism, or new cosmopolitanism, resists the other extreme in which identity is an empty signifier connected to an abstract idea of the world. This world-embracing spirit, rooted in the ideas of Stoic and Cynic philosophers who rejected allegiance to the polis, subscribes to a universal view of human identity. Not only does this perpetuate a detachment from all material affiliations, it assumes the possibility of a single monolithic ideology that can be imposed on other cultures thus masking its own imperialist agenda.

Today, the universalist notion of cosmopolitanism has been criticized for advancing a monolithic vision of world citizenship that conflates moral and political conceptions of belonging. In articulating a vision of cosmopolitan education, Tagore (2003) argued that this should encompass an affiliation beyond the nation (moral belonging) as well as rootedness to the nation (political belonging). Likewise, conceptions of new cosmopolitanism that arose from the late twentieth century

embrace the paradoxical image of a “cosmopolitan patriot” (Appiah 1998) and “vernacular cosmopolitan” (Werbner 2006) as one who responds to mounting pluralism and forms multiple attachments to diverse communities within and beyond the nation.

A key aspect of cosmopolitan education then involves helping students explore local, translocal, and transnational networks of sociocultural histories of people and places (Rizvi 2009). The inclusion of other cultural perspectives may also sensitize students to the ways their own perspectives have been shaped by nationalist ideologies as well as promote critical reflexivity as students consider how they may be implicated in the processes of global capitalism and consequently, injustices committed against others.

Bottom Up in Preference to Top-Down Transnational Engagements

Third, while cosmopolitan education complements rights-based citizenship discourses such as Human Rights Education, it differs by emphasizing a more ground-up dialogic as opposed to top-down hegemonic approach to citizenship education. For example, Human Rights Education intersects with peace education, holocaust education, and environmental education, among others, but the distinguishing feature is that principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights remain central to its program (Tibbitts 2002). The program is generally organized into two kinds: learning about Human Rights including knowledge about the history of Human Rights, central Human Rights documents, and controversies about Human Rights and learning for Human Rights where the focus is on empowering citizens to participate in the transformation of society on the basis of Human Rights (Lohrenscheit 2002).

Dominant criticisms of a rights-based approach to education include the observation that it tends to be reductive. The Declaration which seeks to safeguard the inherent dignity of the human fraternity is encapsulated in a narrow list of principles that emphasize only minimal standards of treatment (Robeyns 2005). The fixation on a set of universal rights hinders the productive role of public discussion and opens debates about the essential freedoms and forms of agency needed for the flourishing of human beings (Sen 2004). It can paradoxically become a tool of oppression when universal principles are deployed without taking into account particular contexts or specific needs of minority communities or when used as an ideological tool for western powers to intervene politically, economically, and culturally in less developed economies (Badiou 2002; Žižek 2005).

As Gaudelli (2009) observes, cosmopolitans, though not opposed to institutionalizing global citizenship, privilege ongoing discourses around values, ethics, justice, and international agreements about Human Rights as a means to further dialogue about the nature of a global society. In this sense, cosmopolitan education advocates cooperative and dialogic modes of learning (Delanty 2006). It is through intercultural encounters and interactions that the individual is pushed to perceive reality beyond his/her own parochial beliefs or values. The significance of dialogic encounters is reflected in other adjectives associated with cosmopolitanism such as “relational cosmopolitanism” (Baillon and Damico 2011), “ordinary cosmopolitanisms” (Lamont and Aksartova

2002), “everyday cosmopolitanism” (Choo 2014; Vasudevan 2014), and “actually existing cosmopolitanism” (Robbins 1998). Such “cosmopolitanism from the ground up” is rooted in everyday life that “radiates from the bottom outward rather than awaiting top-down initiatives” (Hansen 2010, p. 3). Thus, cosmopolitan education provides opportunities for students to encounter others physically, virtually, or imaginatively through cultural narratives. It precludes affective, as opposed to purely intellectual engagements with marginalized groups and facilitates students’ active participation as citizens who can effect transnational transformations (Saito 2010).

The Role of Aesthetic Education in Cosmopolitan Citizenship Education

Countering current pressures by governments to invest in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) education, this chapter draws attention to the significant role of the arts in developing global sensitivity and key dispositions fundamental to securing more peaceful and tolerant societies. Specifically, this chapter centers on aesthetic education, rather than arts education, and surveys the kinds of pedagogies employed to cultivating the cosmopolitan imagination. Maxine Greene (2009) makes a helpful distinction between arts education and aesthetic education in which arts education centers on appreciating objects of beauty, while aesthetic education involves “nurturing imaginative and reflective encounters with works of art” (para. 1). In this sense, aesthetic education attends not so much to knowing about artworks, appreciating its formal and stylistic properties or acquiring the skills to create art; rather, its primary focus is on facilitating ethical attunement and dispositions through engagements with art. In contrast to nineteenth-century aestheticism and associated movements in the twentieth century such as Formalism and New Criticism that subscribed to the belief that art and the study of beauty were ends in themselves, aesthetic education perceives aesthetics as a means to ethics as an end. The reception and production of art provides the bridge to encountering, empathizing, and engaging with other cultures in the world. Though aesthetic education encompasses the production of artworks and the processes of art-making, it is primarily attentive to the shaping of perspectives. In this sense, the aim of aesthetic education is closely aligned with cosmopolitan education which is concerned with an existential orientation to being in the world (Tagore 2003), an “outlook” that allows one “to break out of the self-centered narcissism of the national outlook” (Beck 2006, p. 2) and a “state of mind or a mode of being in the world” (Marotta 2010, p. 112). Given that the primary faculty that directs a person’s orientation, outlook, and state of mind toward others is the imagination, aesthetic education can powerfully advance the goals of cosmopolitan education by equipping students not so much with a set of knowledge or skills but a predisposition toward diverse others. This occurs not merely through artworks themselves but through three key pedagogical tools that aesthetic education supports to developing an imagination hospitable to diversity and difference.

Pedagogies of Interruption

The first pedagogical strategy that aesthetic education facilitates focuses on interrupting stereotypical, one-dimensional interpretations of the other. The imagination is the first filter that can hinder a person from wanting to know or reach out to an other. For example, in Harper Lee's *To Kill a Mockingbird*, the key character and her brother imagine their neighbor "Boo Radley" as a monster figure, and this prevented them from trying to understand him until he rescues them at the end. The novel thus exemplifies for readers the innate capacity of the imagination to enclose the mind. One significant goal of aesthetic education then is to disrupt the blinkered imagination. Exposure to narratives such as *To Kill a Mockingbird* can explicitly sensitize students to the dangers of a prejudiced mind. Further, exposure to narratives from distant times and places can also expand students' awareness of different cultural beliefs and practices.

Beyond exposure to alternative cultural narratives, aesthetic education supports the interruption of the single story (Adichie 2009). In her study of literature classrooms in Singapore schools, Choo (2014, 2016) discussed how teachers intentionally paired literary texts so that one would disrupt the cultural viewpoint of the other. For example, in one grade 11 literature class, as students discussed Shakespeare's *Taming of the Shrew*, the teacher would interrupt this with other short stories by African American writer Toni Morrison, Caribbean American writer Jamaica Kincaid, Chinese Singaporean writer Stella Kon, and Japanese American writer Kyoko Mori. The point was to encourage students to explore how the objectification of women occurred in different cultural contexts. In another grade 10 literature class, a teacher utilized the short story "The Moon above His Head" by Yann Martel that revolves around a Somalian asylum seeker living in Canada to get students to think about how the story might disrupt stereotypical media representations of asylum seekers. Similarly, Chappel (2018) observed how a high school teacher of a world literature class at a Buddhist school introduced his students to Bhagavad Gita, a classical text of Hinduism to have his students explore similarities and differences in order to unsettle their Buddhist interpretations of Karma and so become open to another culture's views.

These empirical examples illustrate how teachers used narratives to arouse what Greene (1995) termed "wide-awakeness," which occurs by disrupting habitual ways of reading others conditioned by mass media, institutional, and other structures that impose a singular interpretation of culture. The potential for aesthetic education lies in the ways teachers can introduce stories from other cultural worlds to push the limits of the imagination's attempts to know and perceive otherness (Spivak 2012). It is only when we imagine that things can be otherwise that the possibility for encounter and action can then occur (Greene 1995).

Bridge-Building Pedagogies

While pedagogies of interruption disrupt biased, one-dimensional views of the other, the second pedagogical strategy that aesthetic education facilitates emphasizes building bridges with the foreign other via imaginative encounters. This can occur in two ways – passive and active engagement with others.

Pedagogies that support passive engagement with others may begin by exposing students to a range of art and stories from different cultures to foster what Nussbaum (1997) terms the “narrative imagination” that allows one to venture beyond narrow group loyalties and to consider the reality of distant lives leading to habits of empathy and expansion of sympathies (p. 10). What grounds this consciousness of an alternative is an innate cosmopolitan impulse to understand reality beyond self and nation, to be aware of what it means to live in the world, and to envision a common world in the making (Greene 1995). However, unlike multicultural education that foregrounds local, communal, and national particularities through the reification of cultural distinctiveness, cosmopolitan education promotes more complex awareness of cultural interconnections and seeks to dislocate essentialist claims of the local (Donald 2007). Urry’s (1995) framework of aesthetic cosmopolitanism entails key competencies including “an ability to locate one’s own society and culture in terms of a wide-ranging historical and geographical knowledge, to have some ability to reflect upon and judge aesthetically between different natures, places and societies” (p. 167).

What do bridge-building pedagogies look like in practice? DeJaynes (2018) described the use of “artifactual literacy” that allowed students to connect with one another in deeper ways through sharing artifacts and personal stories tied to these. The artifacts provided invitational windows into the lives of students outside of school and helped establish “relational learning” and “empathetic listening” in the classroom. In one study, Parry (2010) explored how students, teachers, and theater practitioners collaborated to create a performance installation at a school that highlighted issues related to Human Rights at a societal and global level. The installation provided a representational space for students to question existing territorial boundaries and to reconstruct and deconstruct geographical knowledges. In another study, Abbate-Vaughn (2005) described how the incorporation of ethnic literature about marginalized populations in a teacher preparation program enabled these largely middle to upper middle class student-teachers to better empathize with students from minority, low-income communities and see connections between these students’ lives and their own.

More active bridge-building pedagogies provide opportunities for students to co-construct meaning with others particularly those from different cultures. Hull and Stornaiuolo (2010) discussed the creation of an international social network that allowed students from Africa, India, Norway, and the United States to exchange and create digital artifacts. From stories to music, stop-motion videos, animations, and artwork, they engaged in critical dialogue about common concerns such as discrimination, school pressures, poverty, and the challenges of media representation. Likewise, Vasudevan (2014) described a theater-initiative program for court-involved youths. Through improvisations that reflected daily realities of their lives, youths were pushed to critically engage with their own and one another’s stories and then to collectively explore alternative possibilities. The multiple stories elicited from these exercises provided the avenue for cosmopolitan conversations as youths became more sensitized to the multiplicity of perspectives beyond their own parochial lens.

Both passive and active bridge-building pedagogies are essentially aimed at expanding the cosmopolitan imagination by developing hospitable and empathetic ways of world-seeing and world-making. By examining connections between one's life story and those of others and by collectively exploring everyday existence through artworks, aesthetic education can push students to perceive others beyond narrow nationalistic sentiments and reinforce a cosmopolitan imagination that embraces plurality, ambiguity, and difference. Because artworks do not primarily make definitive, authoritative claims, their inherent educative potential lies not so much in the lessons they teach but the ethical invitations they give. As Gregory (2010) has elaborated, these are invitations to feeling, beliefs, and ethical judgment. These ethical invitations provide avenues to challenge the self's preconceived notions and reconfigure citizenship identity in relation to new encounters with others.

Critical Cosmopolitan Pedagogies

Aside from interruptions and bridge-building, aesthetic education supports pedagogies that empower students to engage critically with transnational realities of our time. Rather than perceiving globalization as an external phenomenon, this approach presumes glocalization as exemplifying contemporary conditions in which the global intersects in and through the local (Roudometof 2016). As a "dialectical mode of criticism" grounded on the work of critical social theorists such as Freire, Foucault, and Habermas (Gills et al. 2017), critical cosmopolitan pedagogies are characterized by two essential features – meta-analysis and social-global justice activism.

First, critical cosmopolitanism entails meta-analysis of sociocultural and socio-structural systems and their perpetuation of oppression, inequalities, and injustices within and beyond nations (Strydom 2012). Its epistemological orientation is post-universalistic since it critiques irreducible tensions between the global and local and the universal and particular while proposing a dialogical universalism that defies universal assent or a single interpretation (Delanty 2006). More specifically, critical cosmopolitanism may involve critiques of the historical legacies of colonialism and its continued effects on post-colonial nations, how power and colonial difference is produced, reproduced, and maintained by global capitalism (Mignolo 2000).

In education, critical cosmopolitan pedagogies aim to empower students to understand their situatedness in relation to social networks and political institutions beyond the nation as well as the influence of multinational and transnational corporations on local communities (Rizvi 2009). Gills et al. (2017) have offered a useful framework for educators to consider five key capacities to facilitating a meta-ideological work of critical cosmopolitanism involving "(1) the capacity to develop historicized interpretations of social reality and the recognition of its complexities; (2) the ability to engage in critical self-reflection or self-problematization; (3) the openness to the multiplicity of avenues of change in different contexts; (4) the capability to act beyond the scale of power and to recognize the intersectionality of inequalities; and, finally, (5) the recognition of the multispatiality of emancipatory praxes (e.g. local, national, regional, and global)" (p. 447).

In practice, Oikonomidou (2016, 2018) described case studies conducted with secondary and college students exploring how critical cosmopolitan capacities can be elicited by returning to the school as a site of study situated within global webs of power. Students may be empowered to understand how hegemonic structures expressed via the school curriculum, texts, and assessment condition their perspectives and practices. Such a critical cosmopolitan systematic analysis of the school can allow both teachers and students to recognize the disconnect between the reality of school and their imagined futures. In a different project conducted with salsa dancers, Medina (2012) observed the potential for aesthetic experience to invoke social connections. As students move from appreciating beauty in art to becoming connected to the world through art, aesthetic experience can become a vehicle for sharing experiences of oppression. This visceral connection with art and with others provides a powerful avenue for forging cooperative bonds to counter social injustices.

Second, critical cosmopolitan interrogations inevitably lead to social-global justice activism as a strategic intervention. Such interventions do not emerge from the naïve idealism of the individual but arises through solidarity with distant others. Building on Habermas's theory of communicative action, Delanty (2012) argued that dialogue and deliberation are fundamental to critical cosmopolitanism as it allows openness to alternative perspectives allowing for re-evaluations and re-workings of self and society through encounters with the other. Delanty (2012) contrasted critical cosmopolitanism with other critical traditions such as those of Foucault and Bourdieu. Essentially, critique for Foucault focused on the subject's discursive constitution in systems of power, while critique for Bourdieu entailed a reflexive sociological approach foregrounding one's situatedness and habitus in order to engage in social problems from a multiplicity of perspectives. Absent from both approaches is critical cosmopolitanism's goal of "immanent transcendence" that focuses on possibilities for the internal transformation of society within the present. This communicative and transformative impetus aligns with Robbins' (2012) call for a "new, dirty cosmopolitanism" (p. 44) in which affiliations with distant others result in an organic globalization-from-below, such as grassroots movements that resist neoliberal, market-driven globalization-from-above.

In the classroom, aesthetic education facilitates pedagogies that enable students to dialogue with others about power and privilege through artworks. For example, Hawkins (2018) described the Global StoryBridges project that brought youths who live in communities of poverty in various locations around the world to share digital stories and chat about their lives via an online space. She reported that youths collaborated on creating and editing videos and then sharing it with youths from other countries who commented on them. The project enabled these youths to engage in discussions on sensitive issues in a spirit of inquiry and enabled them to recognize differences in resources and privilege. She observed the potential for such projects to empower youths in impoverished conditions to find solidarity with others and seek proactive ways to counter systemic injustices arising from various social and global forces.

Aside from developing transnational affinity groups through collaborative inquiry projects, aesthetic education also supports pedagogies that prepare students to participate in simulated forums that mirror democratic deliberative practices needed for the mobilization of a critically informed public sphere. For example, Choo (2017) described a Language Arts curriculum involving the use of short stories, graphic novels, and film on the theme of “Human Rights.” Students were tasked to conduct research on a marginalized group in their country and to participate in a forum where they acted as representatives defending the need for laws to protect this oppressed group. Following this, students reflected on the extent to which their own country protected the rights of these marginalized groups.

In her proposal that educators can employ counter-narratives to disrupt hegemonic discourses, even actions justified in the name of Human Rights, Adami (2014) also cautioned that critical pedagogy risks reifying groups into categories such as those who perpetuate, defend, or are victims of oppression. Such dichotomies may paradoxically limit the possibility of radically imagining more constructive alternatives to such binaries as colonizer versus colonized, global north versus global south. Thus, an essential feature of critical cosmopolitan pedagogy should be the push for dialogue as an act of negotiation and as a habit of mind that not only allows one to incorporate the worldview of another but also attunes one to the processes of reformation through social struggle. Dialogue then provides a hospitable space for the collective identification of transformative potential within present moments of contention.

Conclusion

In an age of flux and mobility, how should educators empower students to be citizens of the world? Perhaps it would be helpful to return to Stoic conceptions of cosmopolitanism in which the citizen was envisioned as one who was not merely tied to the material world but one who was a citizen of the cosmos (Heater 2002). In this sense, cosmopolitan citizenship, as an extraterritorial aspiration transcending space and time, can only be realized imaginatively. The polysemic and open-ended nature of aesthetic language provides a vital catalyst to igniting the imagination’s creative world-seeing and world-making potential.

In this chapter, various empirical case studies have served to highlight pedagogies that teachers have used in aesthetic education – namely, pedagogies of interruption, bridge-building pedagogies, and critical cosmopolitan pedagogies. These pedagogic interventions continually challenge the limits of hospitality toward the other that go beyond passive tolerance and sympathy toward a commitment to diverse others in the world. This problematizing of conditional acts of hospitality ultimately aims at the possibility of what Derrida (2000) termed, “absolute hospitality.” Whereas conditional hospitality entails an openness determined by a citizen’s claims to power in which engagement with the other follows according to his/her cultural norms, political laws, and demands for assimilation, absolute hospitality entails an openness that leads to moral obligation to the other. It is here, as Levinas (1987)

explained, the other “is neither an object nor an interlocutor. His absolute remoteness, his transcendence, turns into my responsibility – nonerotic par excellence – for the other” (p. 165). Indeed, aesthetic education provides the means through which one can empathize with the other, recognize one’s own complicity in the suffering of the other, and establish one’s commitment to destabilizing linguistic, symbolic, and other forms of objectifications of the other. Ultimately, both affirmative and critical engagements with stories and cultural artworks beyond the nation reinforce the development of ethical relations with diverse others in the world as a moral priority in global citizenship education.

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Lessons from Dystopia: The Security of Nations and the Securitized Citizen

61

Liam Francis Gearon

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Abstract

This chapter provides a critical overview of the complex relationship between citizenship education and state security. Drawing on some major sources from the historical literature of totalitarianism, the chapter provides necessary reminders that these current concerns over security are far from new, but argues that bearing them constantly in mind is essential since citizenship education and the universal human rights values it espouses arose in the modern, post-Second World War era precisely as a response to the global trauma of autocracy, dictatorship, and totalitarianism. Critically demonstrating, though, that risk and threat to societal and geopolitical order – the security of nations – are transnational, it highlights the 2020 pandemic as a primary exemplar of such threat to the security of nations. Delineating this part of a now well-documented context of securitization, these new contexts do not easily fit, it is argued, traditional models of national citizenship education nor too optimistic models of global collaborative cosmopolitanism. In examining the present-day transnational notions of intensified threats as a reconfiguration of the traditional correlation of citizenship education and state

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security, the chapter argues for both a forward-looking urgency and a simultaneous turning not to political diktat but to the imaginative configurations of societal and geopolitical problematics. Taking dystopian literature as an exemplar, here, it is argued that amidst the fictionally threatened security of nations, the securitized citizen and the state itself may conjointly find both reflective freedom and creative solution to very real non-fiction problems. Such problematics are, however, it is argued, as existential as they are practical or political. These are the lessons from dystopia.

Keywords

Security · Citizenship · Dystopia · Pandemic · Camus

Introduction

This chapter provides a critical overview of the complex relationship between citizenship education and state security. It highlights a still relatively recent, post-9/11 shift in the relationship between the citizen and the state. In this important context, citizenship education, understood in the broadest sense, has increasingly taken a role in the protection against the threats, real and imagined, posed by the global environment of terror. Here citizenship education is part of a wider, mandated, that is, legislatively integrated, role of education as a public policy measure in a general struggle against violent and ideological extremism. Drawing on some major sources from the historical literature of totalitarianism, the chapter provides necessary reminders that these current concerns over security are far from new, but argues that bearing them constantly in mind is essential since citizenship education and the universal human rights values it espouses arose in the modern, post-Second World War era precisely as a response to the global trauma of autocracy, dictatorship, and totalitarianism. The chapter critically demonstrates, though, that risk and threat to societal and geopolitical order – the security of nations – are transnational. Pandemic and environmental crisis are primary exemplars of such threat to the security of nations. This is part of a now well-documented context of securitization (Van Munster 2012). These new contexts do not easily fit, it is argued, traditional models of national citizenship education nor too optimistic models of global collaborative cosmopolitanism. In examining the present-day transnational notions of intensified threats as a reconfiguration of the traditional correlation of citizenship education and state security, the chapter argues for both a forward-looking urgency and a simultaneous turning not to political diktat but to the imaginative configurations of societal and geopolitical problematics. Taking dystopian literature as an exemplar, here, amidst the fictionally threatened security of nations, the securitized citizen and the state itself may conjointly find both reflective freedom and creative solution to very real non-fiction problems. Such problematics are, however, it is argued, as existential as they are practical or political. These are the lessons from dystopia.

The Security of Nations and the Securitized Citizen

Terrorism has brought citizenship to the foreground of national political life in ways which are new but not unprecedented. It is evident in the number of ways in which counterterrorist measures traverse all aspects of public policy. While itself a highly contested term with multiple academic and legal definitions, many of which center around who is defining the terrorist act and the terrorist actor, in the power play of international legislation overseen by the United Nations, terrorism – along with a multitude of other transnational threats, the environment, and organized crime – is identified as one of the key areas of threat to international stability (UN 2019). With its “devastating human cost . . . in terms of lives lost or permanently altered, terrorist acts aim to destabilize governments and undermine economic and social development,” terrorism is characterized as posing “a major threat to international peace and security” which “undermines the core values of the United Nations.” Responding to such threats to international stability, the United Nations’ collective determination has been to create “a common universal legal framework against terrorism,” this is one supported by instruments of the United Nations Security Council (UN 2019). The United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), guided by Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005), was established “in the wake of the 11 September terrorist attacks in the United States” in order “to bolster the ability of United Nations Member States to prevent terrorist acts both within their borders and across regions.” The consequent the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy consists of four pillars, which deeply integrate not only legal measures but historical and socio-geopolitical impetuses, security actions in directly countering violent ideology and action, and is supported, above all, by measures of reinforcement of the international community in the rule of law and human rights (UN 2019). Directly and indirectly, such measures have helped define the nature of the citizen in national life and the international community. If terrorism is seen as threatening of the world order, of stability, engendering conflict, under a variety of terms – ideological and violent extremism, radicalization – global moves to counterterrorism have become an integral part of a struggle to identify (or more properly reaffirm) the acceptable limits of social, cultural, and particular participation. Such developments have highlighted here, too, the role of education across all age phases in the formation of the citizen.

Exemplars illustrative of how these notions have impacted educational institutions include, in the UK, the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 and its legal definition of extremism as opposition to “fundamental British values” (CTSA 2015). For universities in particular the CTSA 2015 has brought major new legal responsibilities including the monitoring of and reporting on ideologies and actions deemed to be potentially a cause of terroristic incident (UUK 2016). Multiple ethical and professional issues are raised by such legislative developments, from academic integrity, freedom of speech, and the independence of academic institutions themselves, matters which I have charted extensively. The notions of British values are themselves contested both in definition and, by default, implementation in schools and universities.

The domestic and foreign policy of the European Union now integrates similar security concerns of all aspects of its bureaucratic operations, making security an integral part of European social, cultural, and polity life (EAS 2015). Across Europe, and of course globally, religion has been a critical element in this process, and debates have raged now for several years about how justifiable is the increasing politicization and securitization of religion in education (Gearon 2019a). An important review of the global literature shows just how widespread are measures to counter ideological and violent extremism in education (Ghosh et al. 2016).

These developments are often seen, however, as part of a wider and deeper process of societal securitization. Some years before 9/11 the Copenhagen School thus determined that the shift of security policy away from its traditional home in military and related intelligence structures for national defense to the intrusion of security agendas into civil and public life, a move which has been labeled “securitization” (Albert and Buzan 2011; Buzan et al. 1997; Buzan and Hansen 2009; Laustsen and Wæver 2000; Taureck 2006). Raising the usual specter of a tension between liberty and security, such enhanced public policy moves to increase security provision have increasingly been challenged as problematic to the foundational values of Europe itself, particularly the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights and the plethora of rights legislation which came thereafter (Gearon 2016, 2019b; Gearon et al. 2019). The most systematic critique has come from arguably the world’s leading human rights organization. Thus, Amnesty International’s Report *Dangerously disproportionate: The ever-expanding national security state in Europe*, while recognizing the requirement of states to counter “wanton violence,” this being “obvious and urgent,” but highlights, too, that “the right to life, enabling people to live freely, to move freely, to think freely” are “essential tasks for any government.” Amnesty argue, though, that security cannot trump liberty; the tasks of societal protection against risks to life in particular cannot be made justifications for nations “riding roughshod over the very rights that governments are purporting to uphold.”

If terror has largely defined the geopolitics of the early twentieth-first, totalitarianism defined the twentieth (Friedrich and Brzezinski 1967). Long before the pervasive present-day lexicon of terror entered the politics of national and international governance, Hobsbawm had defined the twentieth century as “the age of extremes.” Following the end of the Cold War, there had been an anticipation that the extremes witnessed in global politics would be ameliorated by a new world order, one characterized by the shared international trajectory toward liberal democracy, a move which marked by no less than “the end of history.”

Arguably the last “end of history” had occurred at the close of the Second World War, the formal defeat of Fascism and Nazism, the foundation of the United Nations, and the instigation of a value code of universal human rights. The framing of the foundational document of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations on 10 December was a direction imitation of the eighteenth-century documents which defined the modern world through near parallel aspiration to the rights of the citizen which guided the revolutions in America and in France. The violence used to achieve these rights for the citizen always, in the eighteenth as in the

mid-twentieth centuries, also presented contradictory moral problems. This is why a number of scholars – whose voices in my view are too little listened to today – cautioned against the violent imposition of values and highlighted the ironic parallels between fraternity, freedom, and equality espoused and their actuality in history. Karl Popper’s *The Open Society and Its Enemies* thus castigated the oppression that defined the historical realities of state communism inspired by Marx, but saw, too, the origins of the totalitarian in the classical era of Plato to which the anti-clerical revolutionaries, at least in France, drew so much of their inspiration. It is why Isaiah Berlin in his “Two Concepts of Liberty” stressed that freedom was something in name only when it was imposed by violence of either imposed ideologies and or the force of the state. It is why Hannah Arendt *The Origins of Totalitarianism* took the historical long view of the twentieth century and detailed the germinating ideas and power structures of modern dictatorship both in the western prevalence for colonialism and imperialism. These contradictions persisted even in what I am calling here the first modern “end of history” at the end of the Second World War. For a number of powerful Security Council signatories of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights remained at that time colonial powers, most notably Britain and France. The Security Council formed in San Francisco in June 1945 to oversee the new world order themselves sanctioned the American bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki a mere few weeks later in August 1945.

In what I term here the second “end of the history” at the end of the Cold War, the resentment of nations and interest groups at the imposition of values which they did not espouse, though their own states did, and which they even felt contradicted their own outlook on the world – what is fashionably today called a “worldview,” itself an ideological imposition – provided the new basis for conflict. It was to be, as we know now, less a war of ideology than a conflict of cultures and especially those religious cultures rooted in histories millennia older than the United Nations.

The late Samuel Huntington, as I have highlighted in many other writings, himself predicted this and wrote an indirect retort to his former Harvard student in a work itself castigated for introducing the lexicon of conflict into a world that had just settled to a peaceful new era: *The Clash of Civilizations* (Gearon 2019a; Gearon et al. 2019). The tensions between the universality of human rights values and especially religious traditions are not uniform. There are multiple differences of accommodation and rejection to the United Nations’ notions of rights, and even arguments that the secular formulations of these rights are themselves of religious or theological origin (Gearon 2016). Yet there is now a vast literature which interrogates the terrain.

In both eras, education has been and remains the most prominent point of public policy for the formation of citizens. It was ever thus. And there is arguably nothing surprising in political systems wish for and seeking models of education which uphold their political ideals. Both the totalitarianism of the twentieth century and the terror of the twenty-first – both versions of an extreme – are distinctive in the marriage of ideology and violence. For the state and state education systems, this has meant the need, in both cases, and universally the case today, to conjoin the security of the state through education for the formation of citizens. By which move,

inevitably, the security of nations securitizes the citizen. The conjoining of these notions of national security and the securitized citizen is a fact of our age and a now near indelible feature of our educational institutions.

A large proportion of my recent work has been in examining these issues of security in the context of universities, and particularly important here has been an elaboration of models which deal with university relations with the security and intelligence agencies (Gearon 2019a, b, c, d). Here, I have conceptualized and provided the foundations for an academic subfield of education, security, and intelligence studies. As highlighted above, this has been critically prompted by the widening of security to areas beyond its traditional home in explicit military concerns. The disciplines of security and intelligence studies have themselves begun to respond to these wider notions of threat and in so doing have begun to refine the remit of their own fields (Gearon 2019a).

In terms of policy, research, and theoretical framing, this is what I have termed the universities-security-intelligence nexus. In essence this nexus is concerned with the elaboration of higher education institutions – in teaching, policy, and research – with state security apparatus in order to protect against risk and threat in the present and in preparedness for the future. Because learning from the past is critical to addressing both present and future concerns, the past histories of such questions are also significant, indeed foundational. There are few academic disciplines which do not fall into this remit. The universities-security-intelligence nexus has four overlapping domains: the operational, the epistemological, the ethical, and the existential. The *operational* defines the different modus operandi of engagement between universities and security and intelligence agencies and deals now significantly with threats which go beyond the nation state; the *epistemological* domain is concerned with knowledge and marks the shared interest of security and intelligence agencies in knowledge to deal with both national and transnational threat; the ethical domain treats of those multiple ranges of issues which such interactions being to different types of institutions in and through their collaboration, academic and security-oriented; the existential domain demonstrates a common shared set of highly complex concerns centered around forewarning or predicting of threat and measures such as civil contingency and emergency governmental powers enacted for the protection against such threats, which, again, now far transcend (and arguably put into perspective) national concerns about the protection of states, in large measure because we are now concerned as a human species not merely with the survival of states and societies but of species and the shared planetary environment (Gearon 2019a). The modeling can be presented as follows (Fig. 1).

Writing in the present-day midst of a still unfolding coronavirus pandemic is a tragic illustration of the urgency and indeed unpredictability of such nascent and future threat. All of which have brought in broadly conceived terms security to foreground of nation states. The role of universities in confronting and finding solutions to such threats is evident but also highlights a wider and deeper issue about the role of universities themselves in the formation of educated citizens able to learn and to research and thereby make a contribution to the well-being of societies through the formation of its citizens who in turn further contribute to the well-being




Fig. 1 The Universities-Security-Intelligence Nexus (Gearon 2019c)

of societies of which they are part (Dunn Caveltly and Balzacq 2017). Historical analyses of the social and political role of universities in the creation, dissemination, and application of knowledge – which today is most often conceptualized as “impact” – have in the west at least been an evolving part of the defining role of the university itself.

International public policy initiatives, importantly from the United Nations itself, have in recent years begun to frame these broader notions as a concern for citizens through the notion of “human security.” For example, the UN’s “Framework for Cooperation for the system-wide application of Human Security” (UN 2015) integrates and highlights the global community’s needs for prediction and protection to address these pressing and complexly interrelated societal, that is, today, shared global problems:

For many people, today’s world presents insecure threats on many fronts. Natural disasters, violent conflicts, persistent poverty, epidemics and economic downturns impose hardships and undercut prospects for peace and stability, as well as sustainable development. Crises are complex, entailing multiple forms of human insecurity. When they overlap, they can grow exponentially, spilling into all aspects of people’s lives, destroying entire communities and crossing national borders. (UN 2019)

The United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security conceptualizes these around three freedoms, freedom from want, freedom from fear, and the freedom to live in dignity (UN 2019). In conceptual and theoretical terms, instances of such

transnational preparedness in many senses coincide with securitization theory so presciently modeled by the Copenhagen School.

The role of education, and particularly higher education dimension, remains critical. Originally founded under the auspices the American Council for the United Nations University, the Millennium Project has thus, by way of example, for decades now produced *State of the Future* reports both as a reflection of current preoccupations of human societies and as a predictive set of measures to enable the prioritizing of protection against such problems. Here is a diagrammatic representation of one recent modeling (Fig. 2):

The UK security and intelligence themselves have, too, long expressed the need, in their rare public announcements, to broaden public understanding of societal threat and security against such. As a former Director General of MI5 remarked: “. . .progress has been made in reducing our national vulnerabilities – there have been definite improvements – but I worry that, against the background of no attacks here, we risk becoming complacent. So my message is to broaden your thinking about security issues.” Speaking to a community of business representatives, even now nearly two decades ago, she said:

A narrow definition of corporate security including the threats of crime and fraud should be widened to include terrorism and the threat of electronic attack. In the same way that health




Fig. 2 Millennium Project, *State of the Future* Global Challenges

and safety and compliance have become part of the business agenda, so should a broad understanding of security. . .

More recently the current Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service, MI5's sister agency MI6, Alex Younger, speaking at St Andrews University similarly stated:

Across the century of SIS's existence, we have evolved continuously to confront each generation of threat: from the World Wars to the Cold War to the rise of transnational threats including international terrorism. Now, we are evolving again to meet the threats of the hybrid age.

The notion of hybridity in warfare is important. If widening of security concerns to aspects of society previously untouched by it defines securitization theory, warfare itself has come into the foreground of society too. Thus, the post-Cold War era has seen the mergence of the notion of "hybrid," "hybrid threat," or "nonlinear" warfare, connoting "the use of conventional military force supported by irregular and cyber warfare tactics." The Russian determination of "nonlinear conflict" is a variant form of this now widely applied strategic term which in effect "has meant has meant major shifts in intelligence gathering and in the epistemological complexity of intelligence gathering., including the widening and deepening of dependencies on academic expertise, and far transcending traditional images of spy-craft and espionage." This is accepted as a fact of modern security now because "the sources of knowledge required to combat threat or perceived from sources beyond the conventionally military have inexorably multiplied." Ball usefully summarizes the distinctions:

Linear conflicts are defined by a sequential progression of a planned strategy by opposing sides, whereas nonlinear conflict is the simultaneous deployment of multiple, complementary military and non-military warfare tactics. A nonlinear war is fought when a state employs conventional and irregular military forces in conjunction with psychological, economic, political, and cyber assaults. Confusion and disorder ensue when weaponized information exacerbates the perception of insecurity in the populace as political, social, and cultural identities are pitted against one another.

I have analyzed at length how such a proliferation of conflict and security contexts has impacted educational institutions, those students who attend them, the academic who teach and research there, and the managers who oversee the objectives of universities and related institutions themselves.

Unarguably modern warfare itself has traversed the boundaries between military and civilian. The bombing of civilian populations in the Second World War is the prime modern example, including the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki which formally defined its close. Security and intelligence agencies, too, have always been interested not simply in the military capacity of enemies but in their societal makeup, and indeed their own, to see traces of weaknesses in defense or in preparedness for attack. The Cold War is good instance, and John Preston's extensive work on government work on the civil preparedness of citizens in the

event of a nuclear strike on them has been critical in developing our understanding of how the notion of securitized citizen is not new, only new formulated by the issues of another though not so far distant age. And as, too, an extensive literature show, the Cold War in particular was as keenly about culture as traditionally defined by the arts, literature, and ideological identity as it was about nuclear armaments.

The Fictions of Security

Fictional representations of such threats are rarely far from the spy agencies. Alex Younger – the same MI6 Chief who above showed the importance of a widening definition of security – only recently highlighted this in identifying his role with a famous fictional spy and distancing his professional work from another: “the merits of what he considered to be appropriate characters in fiction”: “. . . I should make it clear that, despite bridling at the implication of a moral equivalence between us and our opponents that runs through novels, I’ll take the quiet courage and integrity of George Smiley over the brash antics of 007, any day.” There was, he claims, a further relevance to spy fiction:

We have attracted some great writers; some have become famous, many more have set aside their vocation and remained in the service. Some of the operational correspondence I have seen during my career would grace many an anthology were it not for its classification.

The relationship between the actual geopolitical of the secret world of spying and its fictional representation is even seen in symbiotic relationship:

Despite inevitable tensions between the secret and published world, the relationship has generally been of mutual benefit. Literature gains an edgy genre. We are painted in the minds of a global audience as some form of ubiquitous intelligence presence. This can be quite a force multiplier, even if it means we are blamed for an astonishing range of phenomena in which we have no involvement at all.

As Ewen MacAskill has argued, “It is a reminder, if ever one was needed, of how good fiction can question the way that governments work.” As I have intimated elsewhere, there is good reason for this. If literature is a lie which seeks to tell a truth, and espionage is a trade dependent on deceit, where the two professions meet, the dissembling knows no limit (Gearon 2019a). John le Carré, writing of his real-world persona as novelist and former intelligence officer for both MI5 and MI6, sees a close, autobiographical, correlation between: “I’m a liar, born to lying, bred to it, trained to it by an industry that lies for a living, practised in it as a novelist.” Spy fiction and spy facts have thus provided a range of novelistic practitioners who have drawn on their real-life experience as security and intelligence professionals prior to writing: Eric Ambler, John Bingham, John Buchan, Ian Fleming, Graham Greene, John le Carré, Eliza Manningham Buller, Somerset Maugham, and Arthur Ransome are instances of high renown and profile.

There is, though, a far wider correlation between the worlds of security and literature, a complex interface of cultural production of all varieties, and the security of nations and/or the ideologies which they represent, across all political hues (Chomsky 2008; Herman and Chomsky 1995; Wilkinson 2009). It is for this reason that literary as well as those who produce it have so often through history been targets of the regimes which their fictions are deemed to oppose. There are chilling examples from Nazi Germany, elaborated in sickening detail by Bytewek's (2004) *Bending Spines*. The large academic literature on propaganda shows how books and other cultural outputs have often become part of political and security apparatus of the state, something which in broader political terms has long fascinated modern cultural theory (Adorno et al. 2007). Interconnecting books and bombshells, Taylor (2003) thus calls propaganda the "munitions of the mind" (see also Taylor 1999, 2012). O'Shaughnessy (2000) defines propaganda as a "weapon of mass seduction" (also O'Shaughnessy 2016, 2017). And the use of often covert cultural influence is far from simply the provenance of the totalitarians. As a controversial and contested academic literature shows, liberal western societies have seen over decades a well-documented series of interventions by security and intelligence agencies directly into the world of cultural influence (Miller Harris 2016; Risso 2014; Stonor Saunders 2013; Whitney 2018; Wilford 2003, 2009).

As I have shown, this also long predates the Second World War or the Cold War, but can be seen explicitly in the efforts of Britain's First World War Propaganda Bureau (Gearon 2019a). In the same early twentieth century, one author can even lay credit for having influenced the formation of Britain's Security Service and its Secret Intelligence Service. Chris Andrew, official biographer of MI5 even opens his *Defence of the Realm* with an introduction relating the importance of William Le Queux's 1906 story of German foreign invaders – in its time the massively bestselling *The Invasion of 1910* – with the enhancement of a sense of British public insecurity, one which led, if indirectly to the early, formal establishment of the Britain's security and intelligence agencies (Andrew 2010).

In a context where citizen education and all the security agenda with which it has been faced in recent decades is so often delivered through lessons about the positive roles of democratic, human rights and government – very much rooted in the real world of actual, national, and international politics, and reported as such in the extensive literature of citizenship education research – literature here seems a less than well-used avenue for convening many of the themes which confront the subject. In terms of threat, risk, and imagined scenarios for dealing with the security of nations, spy literature is naturally important, as has been highlighted. It takes us, however, only so far. It rarely moves beyond representation of specific risks and their resolution to broader conceptualization of society's political future or indeed the planet's. What is now commonly framed in literary studies as dystopian fiction does so, and presents, I argue, some lessons which can enrich our perspectives both of the security of nations and the securitized citizen. I loosely term this approach lessons from dystopia.

Lessons from Dystopia

The notion of “lessons from dystopia” originated as one element of a larger conceptualization to reconfigure the relationship between philosophy, literature, and education, with my own interests here focusing on political philosophy and questions of the security uses of literature in real-world socio-political contexts.

Originating from a symposium I convened at the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain (PESGB) at New College Oxford in 2013, developed through a major grant funded by PESGB for a seminar series on this theme, a Society for Educational Studies funded Colloquium on Writers and their Education at Oriel College Oxford (Gearon and Williams 2018), all culminated in two significant edited collections for international educational research journals (Gearon and Williams 2018, 2019). With a particular focus on citizenship education, the explicit notion of “lessons from dystopia” was the heading for a focus on the political dimensions of the interface of philosophy, literature, and education in 2016 at the British Academy, London. Borrowing from the seminar series theme, Christine Sypnowich’s (2019) “Lessons from Dystopia: Critique, Hope and Political Education” – in our special issue of the *Journal of Philosophy of Education* – analyzed utopian and dystopian literature as an aspect of political education, detailing how the notion of utopia and dystopia appear both in literature and political philosophy. For the politically educative role of this “genre,” she treated of Orwell’s *Nineteen Eighty-Four* and Zamyatin’s *We*. Beyond the broad sense of the political, I have undertaken extensive subsequent work on the relationship between security and literature (Gearon 2019a) and am currently also editing a Polish international journal, *Text Matters*, on the theme of *Literature and Security*.

In our Special Issue of the *British Journal of Educational Studies* on Writers and their Education (Gearon and Williams 2019) was included my article “Engineers of the Human Soul: Readers, Writers, and their Political Education” (Gearon 2019a). This detailed the long history and particularly acute *modern* history around the political uses and abuses of literature. I had framed my premise for discussion around an extreme example of the political uses of literature by highlighting Stalin’s much quoted diktat presented to the first congress of the Union of Soviet Writers that artists should be “engineers of the human soul,” showing the uses to use cultural outputs, and especially literature had been used by dictatorial regimes as a means of upholding and furthering totalitarian goals, not least too in Hitler and Maoist regimes. Here I was particularly struck by recent attempts to construct “literature pedagogy” for cosmopolitan, “globalizing,” political ends, specifically an article in the *Harvard Education Review* by Suzanne Choo (2017). These are and remain naturally more benign aims and purposes for the use of literature in schools, and of course in university literary studies, but my sense of wariness arose from the warnings of history about other more malign uses. My own piece provided some stark reminders about conjoining educational and political objectives through a literature not designed for either purpose. This has prompted a further recent response for Choo (2020), and the debate on the uses for specific goals in citizenship education is ongoing. And while there are difference of nuanced opinion – for

example, between Choo and myself – on this pedagogic maneuvering of a literary-political aesthetic, the epistemological terrain is important, not least because the issues at stake are existential, that is, in fiction as in geopolitical factuality life and death at stakes, and not simply the life and death of individuals, but the life and death of societies and, indeed, that of the human species itself.

Cultural outputs and still here literature are important even in a digital age. There is narrative and counter-narrative in the political domain, and there is the narrative of fiction which it is often now claimed colors both (Croft and Moore 2010; Glazzard 2017), what Jameson (2002) famously called the political unconscious. Knowledge-gathering by the security and intelligence agencies in new security contexts still includes focus on the representation of geopolitical realities, and the importance of this is evidenced in the prevalence of such terms as “fake news” and epistemological and political consideration of “post-truth.” Fiction like security and intelligence gathering here are united in many ways by imagining unimaginable risks and threats. Environmental catastrophe; global health threats; attacks of global reach of a chemical, bacteriological, radiological, or nuclear nature; or future wars over the physical resources for survival (food and water and fuel) as much as physical territory are all equally integral features of new security landscapes. But they have been features of fictional landscapes for longer. It is not for no reason that the genre of science fiction, which has been critical in defining much modern utopian literature, emerged in the modern world contemporaneously with the rise of science, whether this is romantic rebellions and later science fiction reflection over the dehumanizing prospects of science and technology – from *Frankenstein* to Isaac Asimov’s *I, Robot* series – or the fear of invasion. On the latter is a powerful instance of how fantastical variants on the latter theme in H. G. Wells’ late nineteenth century *War of the Worlds* – Martians invade England – arguably impacted the more prosaic threat from across the Channel with, less than a decade later, William Le Queux’s bestselling novel from 1906 *The Invasion of 1910* which with journalist realism narrated a German military takeover of Britain. In all literary and political cases, the civilian, the citizen, all civilians, and all citizens are impacted. This extension of security to a wider population is not exclusive to the modern age, but it has in this era taken on particular forms.

Despite, then, particular reservations about the direct and heavy-handed uses of literature for political ends – even George Orwell is explicit about the political purposes of both his journalism and his fiction – or perhaps highlighted by them, literature remains one of the most powerful weapons in the arsenal of political education. Gregory Claeys’ (2018) *Dystopia: A Natural History* provides powerful testimony here. Claeys’ study of modern despotism, identifying its antecedents in political and religious history, its articulation in the West at least Christian theology and classical philosophy. In considerable detail – from Thomas More’s sixteenth-century *Utopia* to the classics of twentieth-century literature (focusing on George Orwell’s *Nineteen Eighty-Four* and Aldous Huxley’s *Brave New World* as iconic texts of a wider literature bordering science fiction and prophetic futuristic fiction) – he shows how these political and theological themes of great antiquity continue to have their literary diffractions suited to the modern age through new genres of fiction.

Conclusion

Within weeks of the coronavirus or COVID-19 outbreak, one of the perhaps not too surprising literary outcomes in the world of book sales has been the return of the Nobel Prize winning Albert Camus' 1947 classic set in the 1940s Oran, *The Plague*. I took from my own bookshelf at Oxford a 40-year-old edition of the novel read and dutifully underlined throughout, from my undergraduate study of philosophy and literature at the University of Lancaster. These personal biographical details are to me are important, as citizenship education tends so much toward the impersonal, the statistical, and the macro-political, leaving the individual voice as a sometimes less significant element in the broad sweep of geopolitical history. The writer, Camus, is here no exception, always draws on the personal, the world of character and characters, to show the individual, lived response to predicaments. Camus thus drew largely from his own Algerian-French heritage to write a story about a nondescript town in his homeland. The town, his narrator notes on the first page of *The Plague*, "let us admit, is ugly. It has a smug, placid air and you need time to discover what it is that makes it different from so many human business centres in other parts of the world." It is the particularities of Oran in confronting the plague, how its populace responds, and how the characters react. The devoted Dr. Bernard Rieux ministers to the sick and the dying, the Jesuit priest Father Paneloux ("very highly thought of in our town, even in circles quite indifferent to religion") to their souls, the police inspector who oversees order between the living and the dead, who visits and castigates the would-be suicide Cottard, the individuals who provide factual details our narrator has not directly observed – the journalist Raymond Rambert, or the journal-writer Jean Tarrou, and Joseph Grand, whose day job was as clerk at the Municipal Office and becomes responsible for charting the grim statistics of fatality, but whose private work was the more ambitious and lofty goal of studying "the growth of personality." The life and legacy of Camus endures, then, and one of the obvious facts of this legacy is the particular endurance of his literary as opposed to his more formally philosophical works. Its success lies arguably in the multi-layered readings to which *The Plague* – like much great literature (greatness being measured in the extent not to which it sells on publication but the extent to which it sells beyond the author's own lifetime) – can be subject. Here, from excerpt taken from Olivier Todd's (1997) unsurpassed biography, is Camus, modestly declaiming his own genius, while outlining the multivalent readings of his own, even then famous, work:

La Peste may be read in three different ways. It is at the same time a tale about an epidemic, a symbol of Nazi occupation (and incidentally the prefiguration of any totalitarian regime, no matter where), and, thirdly, the concrete illustration of a metaphysical problem, that of evil . . . which is what Melville tried to do with *Moby Dick*, with genius added (Camus, cited in Todd 1997: 168)

The novel as a literary form has in many respects thus its most profound impacts as literature by contrast with the personal reading, the imagining of oneself in

situations unknown and untrammelled. It is one of the purposes of imaginative fiction not merely to transport the reader to other worlds but to enable to provide fresh readings of their own.

One of my challenges to Choo is in the providing of literature with a singular, however, beneficent reading, for broad political or narrow citizenship education purposes. In the context of the present challenges – and there are always present challenges – for the security of nations, the securitized citizen can choose either docilely to comply to the political diktat of the age or to venture forward into the less certain territory of moral and political ambiguity. One of the lessons here of dystopian fiction is something almost entirely neglected by citizenship education itself.

That is, in its original struggles to move from the metaphysical and the theological, the religious, and the existential, by focusing on the pressing realities let us say of the political pavement it neglected, and still does neglect, the heavens above. I do not think this was the intention of the Enlightenment context which did so much intellectually to frame the political movements of the eighteenth century, which is our political legacy today in liberalism, democracy, and human rights. Without doubt one of the founding figures of the Enlightenment, Immanuel Kant after all opened his 1788 *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788), his important thesis on the morality, by stressing the practicalities needed in the political and the social (the clue is in Kant's title), but never forgetting the cosmological and thus existential context which frame the former, and so important was this dual view for Kant that he frames his second Critique around it: "Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the more often and steadily we reflect upon them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me." Indeed, so important were these sentiments on the existential that on his death Kant's friends chose these words for the epigram on the great philosopher's tombstone.

One of the lessons from dystopia is arguably then not the simple taking of practical political messages for the education of mechanistic citizens, cogs in the machinations of global politics, the taking of moral messages from books (though these may be drawn), but of using books to free citizens from, to enable them to see beyond, the narrowly conceived confines of the political to the personal, with some glimpse, however perplexing, of what ultimately remains the mystery of human existence.

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Citizenship and Education in an Age of Extremisms

62

Reza Gholami

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Abstract

This chapter aims to show the ways in which contemporary liberal democracies find themselves in an “age of extremisms,” an age defined by the increasing dominance of extreme ideas and practices across the political spectrum, including in the mainstream. Nation-states partially bear responsibility for this situation through their responses to extremist movements, and because of these responses, the very pillars of liberal democracy, such as human rights and social justice, are today under threat. Crucially, in this age of extremisms, both citizenship and education have been formally drawn into counter-extremism policy across the Western world. This shift in policy has important implications for, and raises vital questions about, citizenship and education as ideas, principles, and practices. The chapter will explore these issues and questions. It will use a range of academic and nonacademic sources, but its examples are mainly drawn from the UK context and its primary analytical thrust is sociological.

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Citizenship · Education · Extremism · Liberal democracy · Policy · Terrorism

Introduction: The Age of Extremisms

In his seminal book *The Age of Extremes* (1994), the late, prominent historian Eric Hobsbawm traces what he calls the “short twentieth century,” the period between 1914 and 1991. This period is unique in that it witnessed two World Wars (leading to the state sanctioned killing of an unprecedented number of people), the near collapse and subsequent restructuring of capitalism, the beginning of the postcolonial world, and the fall of communism. The century was also marked by great advances in science and civil rights. Ultimately, however, Hobsbawm delivers a damning verdict on capitalism, state socialism, and nationalism in the twentieth century. His conclusion is that neither the past nor the present (as he found it in the 1990s) provide a useful roadmap for the future of humanity. In fact, his predictions for the twenty-first century are rather grim, involving continued global violence and political and economic instability.

In the years immediately following Hobsbawm’s publication – from the mid-1990s until the early 2000s – the historian’s predictions might have looked to be inaccurate. During that time, a great deal of academic research and policy initiatives emerged that painted a much more optimistic picture of human living. In the social sciences, authors such as Arjun Appadurai, Ulrich Beck, James Clifford, Stuart Hall, Aihwa Ong, and Saskia Sassen, to name a few, wrote of a world of hybridity, fluid national boundaries, “flexible” citizenship, cosmopolitanism, and diasporic connections, a world that offered opportunities for the marginalized to meaningfully challenge the structures that had historically oppressed them. These advances were mirrored in education policy by a commitment to a multiculturalist and inclusive education as well as a desire to increase pupils’ political literacy and global outlook in a rapidly globalizing world. These principles came to underpin the school subject of Citizenship in England, which became statutory in 2002 following the publication of the Crick Report in 1998.

However, with the benefit of hindsight, the world as we encounter it in the summer of 2018 seems a great deal closer to Hobsbawm’s grim predictions. Since the terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001, the world has consistently witnessed major political and economic catastrophes: the devastating financial crash of 2008; the Syrian war and refugee crisis, which in part led to the rise of ISIS; the threat of nuclear Armageddon resulting from the stand-off between the USA and North Korea; the rapid growth of right-wing extremism across the Western world; systematic persecution and ethnic cleansing (e.g., of Myanmar’s Rohingya Muslims); and so on. Moreover, in socialist democratic countries like the UK, government policy has generally turned against the welfare state with severe cuts to the funding of fundamental public services such as health and social care, housing and, of course, education. There is evidence that austerity politics has hit the poorest

members of society, as well as ethnic minorities and women, the hardest (see Portes 2018). In education, it has arguably reduced quality and increased the potential for corruption (Sodha 2018; FT 2017).

What does all of this have to do with an “age of extremisms”? Whereas Hobsbawm’s short twentieth century saw epic battles between major global ideologies, those ideologies had firm historical and ideological moorings. Therefore, within those ideological frameworks, the behavior of proponents and opponents alike was to a large degree predictable, and they operated with reference to a perceived solid center. Today, however, any sense of predictability seems to have left social, political, and economic affairs. Social and political life feels like a game in which “anything goes” and those with the most wealth and power can say or do whatever will influence public affairs to their own benefit. In the time of posttruth (now officially an entry in the Oxford English Dictionary) and fake news, politicians seem to lie with impunity and governments use cyber technology to interfere in the democratic processes of other countries. Moreover, facts and expertise seem to matter less to many voters than emotions, perceptions, and personal cults. For example, the Leave.EU campaign that helped to secure the UK’s vote to leave the European Union in 2016 explicitly denigrated economic and political experts and asked people not to listen to them, while the “Remain” side predicted unprecedented economic disasters that were seen by some Leave supporters as fake news. And much of current US policy seems to be dictated by Donald Trump’s whimsical Twitter outbursts with no sense of coherence or forethought whatsoever.

Such political capriciousness, however, is not just characteristic of a few inflated personalities such as Trump. In July 2018, the UK’s Home Secretary, Sajid Javid, stated without any forewarning that the UK government would not oppose the death penalty for two British men due to face prosecution in the USA on suspicion of having carried out terrorist offences for ISIS. This move, which was severely criticized by a range of stakeholders, is in direct contradiction to the UK government’s long-standing opposition to capital punishment and its policy of seeking assurances that British citizens prosecuted abroad would not be put to death. The government’s argument was that it is better to ensure the prosecution of these men in the USA than to risk failing to bring them to justice in the UK. However, legal experts argued that the UK justice system is more than robust enough for the task (see Foa 2018). Presumably, the government believed that in this case the crimes are so heinous – and they are indeed most heinous – that they warrant a U-turn on the UK’s political and ethical stance. But the important question, surely, is whether, to what extent, and *how* a democratically elected government should change its position on such matters. At the time of writing, the government has temporarily suspended its decision due to heavy pressure from civil society, though it defends its position and the case is ongoing.

The above case underscores the whimsical, unpredictable, and emotionally charged nature of contemporary politics, even in matters of utmost importance to a liberal democratic society. However, it also draws attention to another important feature of the age of extremisms, namely, the way in which liberal democracies are choosing to respond to extremist movements and the implications of such responses.

The Home Secretary's aforementioned decision followed an earlier statement by Rory Stewart, Minister of State for the Ministry of Justice, in which he appeared to sanction the killing of British citizens who had gone to Syria to join ISIS. In an interview, he said: "I'm afraid we have to be serious about the fact these people are a serious danger to us, and unfortunately, the only way of dealing with them will be, in almost every case, to kill them" (BBC 2017). This is emblematic of much of contemporary Western politics (Trump's "Muslim ban" can be cited as another example): in their response to extremist movements and ideologies, liberal democracies founded on the principles of justice and human rights are taking increasingly extreme positions themselves, backtracking on their own values in a sort of "fight-fire-with-fire" politics. The driving force behind such a politics is the fact that in the context of terrorism, economic hardship, and refugee crises, politicians are playing on the emotional outrage of their electorates. In turn, they may be leading their countries down a dangerous path. Donald Trump's election campaign is a good example of this: his unashamed ridiculing of women and disabled people alongside his venomous attacks on Muslims and Mexicans have gone a long way to embolden extreme far-right voices in the USA and generally create an acrimonious public discourse (see, e.g., Vowels 2017).

A dictionary definition of extremism is "belief in and support for ideas that are very far from what most people consider correct or reasonable," which is also adopted by UNESCO (2017). By this definition, it is possible to say that the kinds of statements made by Donald Trump and Rory Stewart, and indeed many other politicians around the world, are extreme because they contradict what most people consider acceptable speech and behavior. That is, presumably most people, especially in a democratic country, do not agree with the denigration of women, disabled people, or religious and ethnic minorities; nor would they go as far as to promote the state murder of youths who have joined an extremist movement. Panjwani et al. (2018) talk about an age of *extremisms* (in the plural) in this sense. Although in popular debates extremism has come almost exclusively to refer to the activities of Islamist movements, and in some cases the Far-Right, they argue that it is today equally important to pay attention to "extremisms of the mainstream" – Trump, Stewart and others. As the coming sections will demonstrate, the age of extremisms has immensely important implications for citizenship and education, in terms of policy and practice, because both have become formally drawn into the counter-terrorism agenda. The next section will examine questions of citizenship, followed by a more specific focus on counter-terrorism policy. The chapter will then explore what is at stake in educating citizens in today's liberal democracies.

Citizenship in the Age of Extremisms

What does it mean to be a citizen, especially a citizen of a liberal democracy, in the sort of world described above? The most obvious answer is that extremisms of all sorts will have an impact on being a citizen. For Panjwani et al. (2018), people today live in an age of extremisms because even though most citizens do not hold extreme

beliefs, they nonetheless live surrounded by extreme ideas, even in the mainstream, and have come to anticipate them in every aspect of their lives. This includes key areas of policy, which this chapter will return to below. The dangerous flip-side of this, of course, is that gradually extreme ideas, policies, and practices will come to dominate the public sphere and seem normal, resulting in a shift of an entire society towards more extreme positions. There are already signs of such a shift. In the past few years, for example, ultra-nationalist and far-right demonstrations in many European countries have attracted very large crowds from across social classes, with one such march in Poland in 2017 drawing up to 60,000 people (see Taylor 2017). Similarly, recent German polls show that the right-wing, anti-immigrant AFD party has the support of some fourteen percent of the German electorate, which equates to the sobering figure of around 8.7 million people (The Local 2018).

In such a political environment, citizenship becomes very palpably split along racial, ethnic, and religious lines and comes to mean very different things to different people. At its core, “citizenship” denotes membership of a political community (i.e., a status) that confers upon an individual certain rights and duties and determines the level of participation in the affairs of that community. However, there are also important tensions in the idea and practice of citizenship, namely, in the balance between emphasizing a homogeneous polity alongside the recognition of social diversity (see Joppke 2007; Balibar 2015). Joppke highlights that in addition to status and rights, identity is also a key dimension of citizenship – that is, the way in which individuals perceive themselves, behave, and are expected (by the state) to behave as members of the political community. His argument is that in the era of globalization and multiculturalism, state membership no longer imputes a specific/unitary identity, which is to say that citizenship has become available to diverse individuals without ethnic, racial, sexual, or religious provisos (ibid: 38). The upshot of this, for Joppke, is a weakening of the long-existing links between nation-states and their sense of ethnic homogeneity.

However, as demonstrated earlier, today there are concerted efforts across the political spectrum in many Western countries to revitalize the links between citizenship, national identity, and ethnic/racial/cultural homogeneity. In the age of extremism, being a citizen is increasingly defined as belonging and being loyal to a particular understanding of the nation-state, one that is racialized, linked to ideas of religious heritage, and plays on the notion of shared values and culture. As mentioned, this conception of citizenship creates a rift in the way diverse people, especially religious and ethnic minorities, experience their citizenship. In turn, it affects how those people behave and practice their citizenship. A useful way to conceptualize these dynamics is to draw upon Banks’ notion of “failed citizenship,” which he argues comes to exist when:

individuals or groups who are born within a nation or migrate to it and live within it for an extended period of time do not internalize the values and ethos of the nation-state, feel structurally excluded within it, and have highly ambivalent feeling toward it. Individuals who experience failed citizenship focus primarily on their own needs for political efficacy, group identity, and structural inclusion rather than the overarching and shared goals of the nation-state. Their allegiance and commitment to the nation-state is eclectic and complex. (2017: 366)

Banks is right to focus on the discord that materializes when an individual's or group's values and priorities are divergent from those that dominate the national agenda. However, he seems to place the onus too heavily on the "failed citizens" to internalize the nation-state's dominant values, potentially holding them disproportionately responsible for the "failure." This is further seen in Banks' choice of language that failed citizens *feel* (rather than are) structurally excluded. Perhaps this is not surprising when considering that Banks is defining failed citizenship in relation to a patriotic citizenship that is ultimately held together by/in a nation-state and pledges allegiance to it foremost (ibid: 369). What Banks does not sufficiently address, however, is that regardless of rhetorics and policies of equality and "shared goals," nation-states are sites of unequal power relations, social hierarchies, and governance through hegemony. As the next section will demonstrate, in some cases citizens from minority backgrounds are excluded and demonized in the national mainstream despite their best efforts to integrate. This is significant in the context of this chapter because key policies affecting citizenship and education are often shaped in relation to ethnic and religious minorities and tend to problematize and disadvantage them.

Policy, Representation, and Exclusion

In 2017, a report by the UK's All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on social integration, which is chaired by Labour MP Chuka Umunna, recognized that immigrants in the UK are often demonized. It further stated that the demonization, which has been a growing problem after the Brexit vote, is a significant barrier to integration (APPG 2017). However, the problem of integration is faced not only by recent immigrants but also by British citizens whose families have in some cases been settled in Britain for three generations or more. For example, a recent study of Iranians in the UK found that despite very high levels educational, professional, and economic success, language proficiency, and cultural proximity to the mainstream, Iranians are nonetheless negatively represented in dominant discourses about integration (see Gholami and Sreberny 2018). According to this study, the main reason for Iranians' demonization and exclusion was that they were perceived in the mainstream as Muslims, even though the majority of the study's participants, and reportedly the majority of UK Iranians (Sreberny and Gholami 2016), identified as secular. This research lends a great deal of credence to the argument that one's legal status and rights as a citizen, and even a high degree of integration, are not sufficient to ensure acceptance by a majority community. Rather, the bestowal of such an acceptance remains the privilege of the majority and tends to be strongly connected with racial, ethnic, and religious positionalities and perceptions.

It is clear, then, that in terms of practice citizenship is constituted through legal, social, and cultural "assets" (or capital) to which a country's citizens have varying levels of access. If at the time of the French Revolution – generally accepted as the birth of the modern citizen (see Brubaker 1989) – national citizenship was imagined as the great equalizer, that promise certainly has not been borne out throughout its

history. Generally, minority ethnic, racial, and religious people seem to have to “work harder” to be *and remain* citizens. This raises the important issue of the potential loss of citizenship, which is also a top-down process over which minorities exert little control. In July of 2018, for instance, the Indian government rescinded the citizenship of some four million Bengalis in Assam whom it declared “illegal.” These people could, as a result, find themselves completely outside the protection of the law, face internment, separation from family members, and deportation. Another example is the 2018 “Windrush” scandal in the UK during which people from the Caribbean, former British colonies, who migrated to the UK between 1948 and 1970 and settled there in the belief that they were British, suddenly found themselves as “illegals” and faced deportation. Some were deported and others experienced loss of employment, housing, and benefits payments. Particularly disturbing was the fact that the children of those migrants, who had been born and raised in Britain and identified as British, were asked by the UK Home Office to “prove” their Britishness or they themselves could face deportation.

These cases underline the complex relationship between citizenship as lived experience and citizenship defined purely legally. State policy, concerned only with the latter, operates as if the two can be neatly separated. However, when the state casts doubt over a person’s legal status as a citizen – as in the case of the Windrush scandal in the UK – it also wreaks havoc on even the most intimate parts of that person’s life (see for example, Quinn 2018; Khan 2018). Of course, the boundary between lived and legal citizenship is blurry and complex for all members of a society. For example, the 2013 British Social Attitudes Survey on national identity found that most people define Britishness by a range of civic *and* ethnic factors. Thus, although 95% said that speaking English (a civic factor) was a key factor in being British, 77% mentioned having lived in Britain for most of one’s life; 74% highlighted being born in Britain; and 51% noted having British ancestry as major factors in defining Britishness. It is also noteworthy that 24% of respondents listed Christianity as a determining factor (NatCen 2014). The issue, however, is that the interrelationship between the civic and the ethnic is rarely, if ever, questioned in the case of majority populations, who of course also tend to make up most of the government. This, then, throws into sharp relief the centrality of power in matters of citizenship policy and whether power favors the majority group or is equally distributed. If the former, minorities will always be in danger of treatment as second-class citizens and of losing their citizenship altogether, which can have grave, even fatal, consequences.

In his influential book *Homo Sacer* (1998), Agamben likens the loss of citizenship (one’s political life) to a person’s reduction to “bare life” (an unpolitical, purely functional/biological life). Crucially, this reduction places the individual outside the law, a space Agamben calls “the state of exception” where individuals may be “lawfully” killed by the state. The treatment of Jews in Nazi Germany offers a brutally vivid example of the state of exception, where millions of people, stripped of their citizenship and thus all their rights, were at the total mercy of the state (ibid: 114). In most cases, they were systematically abused, tortured, and eventually murdered without anyone (in Germany at the time) being legally responsible.

However, such horrific events cannot be dismissed as a “thing of the past”: for Agamben, the state of exception is an integral part of how modern politics works. In fact, even in liberal democracies today it seems that people do not so much have the right to have rights, as Hannah Arendt famously put it, as they are *allowed* to have rights. Albeit not a direct comparison to Nazi concentration camps, Guantanamo Bay prison serves as a useful contemporary example because the underlying logic for its existence is the state of exception. People suspected of terrorism are incarcerated there indefinitely and are subject to torture (officially called “enhanced interrogation” and otherwise illegal) by the US government. Although the European Union (EU) does not have an equivalent to Guantanamo, European citizens have been imprisoned at the US facility.

In the age of extremisms, the revocation of citizenship has come to play a major role in political life in Western democracies, being used by politicians, and called for by ordinary citizens, as a legitimate defense against perceived security threats. To be sure, citizenship – or revocation thereof – now forms an integral part counter-terrorism policy across many Western countries. Esbrook (2016: 1276) describes this use of citizenship as extreme and notes that after the Second World War Western countries generally shunned the practice exactly because it was a tool of the Nazis. However, things have changed markedly since 9/11. Whereas the UK government, for example, rescinded zero citizenships between 1973 and 2003, from 2003 to 2012 it rescinded the citizenship of twenty-seven people, followed by another twenty revocations in 2013 alone (ibid: 1282). The legislative safeguard against citizenship deprivation has historically been the clause that revocation cannot take place where a person is rendered stateless as a result. However, as Mantu (2018: 34) explains, Western states (e.g., Austria, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, the UK) have in recent years amended their laws to enable them to revoke citizenship even when this results in statelessness, provided that the individual concerned obtained citizenship through naturalization. Thus, here, too, one’s minority status is significant, as these laws have applied virtually exclusively to foreign-born, or naturalized, citizens (Esbrook 2016: 1285). Ultimately, Esbrook warns that using citizenship as a counter-terrorism tool is profoundly dangerous because it threatens to upend the hard-fought achievements of post-WW2 liberal democracies. Esbrook’s concern is echoed by Mantu (2018: 39) who argues that citizenship deprivation poses a significant challenge to the human right to nationality and to a slew of international legal measures ratified by democratic countries designed to protect that right.

However, current policy logic in many Western nations suggests that governments are unlikely to redress the decline in protecting citizen rights so far as revocation is concerned. In fact, the logic of that policy is now shaping other policies, creating an environment in which suspicion and securitization shape a great deal of public life. For example, the borders of the nation-state are being tightened and suspicion of the Other is being (re)enforced through public institutions such as schools. Public employees, including teachers, are being required to act as security agents, and citizen-on-citizen surveillance is increasingly commonplace. Arguably, this is precisely how “Prevent,” a key strand of the UK’s flagship CONTEST counter-extremism policy operates. Prevent assumes that without state

intervention young people are vulnerable to radicalization, and thus requires teachers and other public employees to “spot signs of radicalization” (HM Government 2015) and refer suspected individuals to the government’s Channel program, which provides support for those “at risk” of being drawn into terrorism. In 2016–2017, 7631 people were referred to Channel, with two-thirds of the referrals being for concerns about “Islamist” extremism. These figures have sparked criticism that the policy disproportionately targets people of Muslim backgrounds and is therefore Islamophobic (see Novelli 2017). Interestingly, 86% of the referrals were rejected by Channel, and of the remaining cases, 96% left the Channel program without the need for any further action. This belies the fact that spotting the signs of radicalization is a straightforward process rather than being a process which inevitably relies on racial, religious, and behavioral stereotypes and assumptions.

Clearly, the issues targeted by the Prevent policy – youth radicalization and the prevention of terrorism – must be addressed. However, questions must be posed about whether or not the policy is best suited for its purpose to safeguard people and communities from terrorism, including whether its negative side effects are a price worth paying (see Open Society 2016). In addition to the issue of Islamophobia, teachers and other educators, as we will see, have criticized the Prevent policy for making their jobs difficult and for hindering young people’s ability to engage in discussions about controversial topics. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the Channel program is in doubt. For instance, after an attempted terrorist attack on London’s underground rail network by Ahmad Hassan in September 2017, it became clear that the perpetrator was known to the authorities and had in fact received Channel support (Guardian 2018). Finally, Prevent defines extremism as “*vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values of democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, and mutual respect and tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs*” (HMG 2015, emphasis added). However, as Hand (2014) argues, although the focus on the values (which incidentally can be found in the constitutions of many countries around the world) is welcomed, attempting to link them to British national identity is problematic as it can cause exclusion and resentment (cf. House of Lords 2017).

On the whole, it is possible to argue that policies such as Prevent play on a fluid version of Agamben’s state of exception, i.e., several states of exception with varying degrees of brutality. By defining anyone who even vocally challenges a state-selected list of values as a potential extremist, and by requiring public professionals to use racial, religious, and behavioral markers to spot potential terrorists, Prevent opens up the possibility for citizens to be placed in a temporary *and partial* state of exception. Being referred to Channel arguably suspends an individual’s normal life by identifying them, possibly in front of their peers and community, as a potential terrorist. This, in turn, exposes that person to, and justifies, treatments, and representations not normally experienced by British citizens. By the same token, the person also enters into a new relationship with the state. Although the Channel stage is described as “support” and cannot be compared to extreme measures like Guantanamo, a referred individual is potentially on a trajectory that could send them up the policy chain to Guantanamo-like practices and citizenship revocation. In this way, *states of exception* seem to be working through the entire “repertoire” of

counter-terrorism policies, functioning exactly as a means to curtail individual agency *at the same time as* they implicate the concept of citizenship, which, at least in theory, is about guaranteeing individual agency and freedom.

Educating Citizens in an Age of Extremisms

In their 2003 paper, Osler and Starkey built on Held's notion of "overlapping communities of fate" to suggest that citizenship education must be seriously concerned with educating *cosmopolitan* citizens who are "confident in their own identities and will work to achieve peace, human rights and democracy within the local community and at a global level" (2003: 246). For Osler and Starkey, education for cosmopolitan citizenship is predicated upon an understanding that young citizens, though formally seen as citizens-in-waiting, are in fact highly political and live lives that span across local, national, regional, and global arenas. The authors are critical of national curricula that fail to recognize and prepare young people for, those complexities. Fifteen years later, and no closer to Osler's and Starkey's vision, the educational agenda in many Western democracies is today dominated by an inward-looking, ethno-nationalist logic increasingly formalized through policy. In the UK, education is being reshaped by the Prevent duty with its statutory requirement to promote "fundamental British values" (FBVs), which fosters a radically different vision of citizenship.

One of the striking features of the Prevent policy, as alluded to above, is that it identifies the education sector as a key site for counter-extremism. Incidentally, schools and colleges were responsible for the largest number of referrals to Channel (33%) in 2016/2017. Furthermore, as Panjwani et al. (2018: 5) show, key concepts and definitions central for and to Prevent have been honed through education policies, including the teaching of FBVs. Drawing the education sector into counter-extremism policy so formally and explicitly is unprecedented, and it has had wide-reaching implications for how some young British people are perceived and perceive themselves, as well as for citizenship education more generally (cf. House of Lords 2017).

The UK's Association for Citizenship Teaching (ACT 2015) has argued that the citizenship classroom is the right place for pupils to discuss the sort of "controversial issues" raised by the Prevent policy. This view builds on the government's own advice to schools in the wake of the policy highlighting the importance of citizenship education and discussing controversial topics (DfE 2015). ACT's report thus sets out quite detailed ideas for how citizenship teachers can incorporate the Prevent duty and FBVs into their lessons. Importantly, ACT draws attention to the problem of Islamophobia, which can be exacerbated by Prevent. ACT also suggests that Prevent itself be discussed as a controversial issue. These are useful ideas in so far as they acknowledge the civic and socio-political dimensions of extremism and that policy processes are complex and need critical dialogue. However, ACT also recognizes that Prevent places considerable limitations on citizenship classrooms. As the report states:

A key consideration is the way in which the tension is resolved between facilitating the discussion of controversial issues (which implies there are a variety of valid viewpoints) and the need to challenge some views or even report them to senior colleagues (which implies some views are forbidden). (ACT 2015: 2)

Thus, under Prevent, some views will always be “too controversial” and beyond the realm of engagement; they will trigger, rather, a process that marks the end of teaching/learning/debating/exploring and divides the classroom into “good” and “bad” citizens. In other words, although subtly, FBVs-style citizenship works increasingly normatively and is shot through with moral imperatives *determined by the state in the context of extremism and terrorism*. To be sure, liberal democracies are increasingly becoming contexts in which crucial questions of values, social relations, and political engagement are approached primarily in relation to extremism and terrorism. In such contexts, citizenship education risks becoming a training course by which young people learn to merely internalize, and not question, the state’s imperatives, accept extremism/terrorism as normal and act in relation to them, accept the logic of everyday suspicion and surveillance, and identify people with divergent views as enemies.

It should be noted that the British government maintains that there is nothing problematic or disruptive about the addition of the Prevent duty to education; that the former is a natural extension of the latter, because ultimately it is about safeguarding young people (see DfE 2015; see also HM Government 2018). However, evidence from teachers points to many challenges in the classroom resulting from the difficulty of implementing the Prevent duty into daily teaching practice. As Quartermaine (2018: 32) observes:

Both politics and religion are considered [by Prevent] as definable components of terrorism, but the promotion of political ideas must be avoided (restricted by the Education Act 1996: 230) and respect for freedom of religion or belief must be maintained. A skilled teacher may have the necessary tools to undertake such a complex task, but even then, the resultant restricted discussion may not have the desired effect of preventing certain individuals from engaging in violent activities.

In this vein, recent research on education professionals by Busher et al. (2017) shows that among their respondents, a third of education staff without a lead safeguarding role could not describe themselves as even “fairly confident” in implementing the duty. Confidence levels were lowest among younger and less experienced teachers. Staff also mentioned that the duty makes it harder to provide an inclusive educational environment, and were particularly worried about the stigmatizing effect it has on Muslim children. Overall, the effectiveness of the policy in picking up individuals with a genuine potential for violence was questioned. What is more, there is evidence that the policy can be counter-productive by creating in some youths a resentment towards mainstream society, potentially inspiring them to join extremist movements (see Open Society 2016).

In light of these difficulties, politicians have taken it upon themselves to develop curricula and educational materials. In 2017, the UK government started to write a

curriculum for teaching FBVs to address the anxieties of the teaching profession (Whittaker 2017). The new curriculum is meant to be delivered through existing subjects such as Citizenship, History, and Religious Studies. In this way, FBVs is set to become a key component of the entire national curriculum, which could work to justify the whole FBVs agenda. In History, for instance, the “chronological teaching” of British history is supposed to “foster integration,” according to Lord Agnew, the Academies Minister (*ibid*). The focus will be to teach pupils about the evolution of parliamentary democracy and religious tolerance in Britain. These themes are of utmost importance, but there is a danger that such selective teaching presents a distorted and overly triumphalist picture of British history. This sort of celebratory approach has been part of the government’s educational agenda since Conservative politician Michael Gove’s tenure as Education Secretary (2010–2014). Teachers, however, have been complaining about a “white-washed” history curriculum that is apologetic for the racist brutality of the British Empire at the same time as downplaying the experiences of the peoples it exploited (see Lais 2017). In the context of extremism/terrorism and FBVs, such a curriculum risks hiding from view the role that Western states played in bringing about the current state of affairs, for example, by creating, funding, and educating violent Islamist movements in Afghanistan after the Cold War (see Novelli 2017). In terms of citizenship education, moreover, the curriculum will not enable young people to adequately engage with the complex dynamics and nuances of contemporary citizenship, such as those raised above regarding the fluidity of states of exception.

The issue of Prevent and FBVs in education sketched briefly here casts light on what is increasingly a defining characteristic of education in the age of extremism: competency, legitimacy, and expertise, as well as wider educational goals of nurturing young minds and instilling in them values of global justice, peace, and equity, seem today to matter less than the enforcement of noneducational policies through public education *and* the instilling of narrowly defined values by educational means, as educators now perform the role of intelligence and border force agents and politicians are involved in designing curricula and managing educational institutions.

Conclusion

It should be borne in mind that the issues raised in this chapter are unfolding in a wider educational context in which arts, humanities, and some social studies subjects – subjects that encourage a critical and creative relationship with the world – are being devalued. The devaluation is often systematic and structural taking the form of under-funding or accusations of lack of academic rigor. This is a trend that can be witnessed in many parts of the world (see Nussbaum 2009). In the UK, and in England more specifically, citizenship education has not been unaffected by this trend despite being singled out by the government for the promotion of its counter-extremism agenda. As Education Secretary, Michael Gove was vehemently critical of citizenship education and attempted unsuccessfully to

make it a nonstatutory subject. However, Gove's wider reforms, including introducing the English Baccalaureate to promote "traditional" academic excellence, have had a negative impact on subjects such as citizenship. According to the latest official figures, between 2014 and 2018 GCSE entries for Citizenship Studies have dropped by 53.3% (The Telegraph 2018). Similarly, one of the least popular A-Level subjects in 2017 was Critical Thinking, which only attracted 1241 students out of a cohort of 720,000 (Nixon 2018).

Interestingly, this sort of systematic devaluation may itself be one of root causes of radicalization and terrorism. Sociologists Gambetta and Hertog (2016) have shown that the vast majority of Islamist suicide bombers have had science backgrounds, especially in engineering. Their conclusion is that these are clever young people who are unable to question authority. Panjwani et al. (2018), too, have suggested that it is vital, now more than ever, for society to renew its commitment to the values of liberal education, which emphasizes the holistic nurturing of human beings, critical thinking, and a balance between the arts and sciences. In stark contrast to this, as this chapter has shown, the age of extremism is one where both citizenship and education have become tools of counter-terrorism policy in the highly volatile political and economic environment of contemporary liberal democracies. But in so doing, Western countries are no closer to eradicating the threat of radicalization and terrorist attacks by Islamist or far-right movements. Instead, they have increasingly normalized extreme discourses, practices, and policies throughout their own societies, marginalizing their ethnic and religious minority citizens and risking the erosion of the very foundations upon which their democracies have been erected.

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Teaching Migration as Citizenship-Building in the United States and Beyond

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Abstract

It is increasingly uncommon to find any city, town, or county in which immigrants do not play a role: they are integral to the present and future of civil society. Changing student demographics and the complex realities of a globalized world require school personnel to reconsider what and how they teach their students. Teaching about migration as a fundamental part of human history and

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contemporary society represents one way that teachers can seek to improve all classroom relationships. Migration – as an essential topic of study – can be an avenue for helping students develop foundational civic habits and international civic understanding. This chapter presents the Re-imagining Migration Learning Arc, a novel approach to civics education designed to bridge students' understanding of migration and their preparation as active agents in a transforming world. The Arc starts with the premise that migration is a basic part of the shared human condition; and it places migration at the center of students' educational inquiry. The chapter also asserts that the study of migration is a necessary component of a robust civics education agenda in the twenty-first century. First, the chapter provides an overview of the foundational theories that inform the Learning Arc: civic and citizenship education, social and emotional learning (SEL), and culturally responsive teaching (CRT). Second, it provides examples of how the Learning Arc is implemented in classrooms and other educational institutions in the United States and describes how educators, policy-makers, and leaders in diverse contexts can adapt the Learning Arc to their particular settings and local imperatives.

Keywords

Migration · Civics education · Curriculum · Pedagogy

Introduction

Images of migrants held at the US-Mexico border and families sailing across the ocean in unstable boats headed for Europe dominate media portrayals of twenty-first-century global human migration. However, the migrants and asylum seekers whose experiences are reflected in sensationalistic media coverage comprise only a small, albeit important, proportion of people on the move across the globe. The majority of the 271.5 million people currently living in countries outside of their place of birth are working, studying, and contributing to the daily life of their local communities as any other resident or citizen (UN 2019). In the United States, many parts of Europe, and elsewhere, it is becoming increasingly uncommon to find any city, town, or county in which immigrants do not play a role: they are integral to the present and future of civil society. However, all too often they must contend with stereotypes and misinformation circulating in the information ecosystem from politicians, the press, social media, and public discourse.

Changing student demographics and the complex realities of a globalized world require school personnel to reconsider their personal and professional identities vis-a-vis their students and to update their teaching practices and curricula. Positive student-teacher relationships are consistently shown to be significant predictors of positive school adjustment, increased academic and behavioral engagement, and long-term school success (Birch and Ladd 1997; Curby et al. 2009; Ewing and Taylor 2009; Hamre and Pianta 2001; Rudasill et al. 2010). To build such positive

relationships, teachers must invest in getting to know their students as individuals (Croninger and Lee 2001; Gehlbach et al. 2016; Whitlock 2006); demonstrate interest in learning about their stories, backgrounds, and experiences; and build a positive, safe classroom climate (Rudasill et al. 2006; Spangler Avant et al. 2011).

Yet, teachers' work does not end with building personal relationships with students. Rather, they must also explore ways to effectively engage all students in new approaches to learning in the global age, regardless of their linguistic, ethnic, cultural, racial, or religious background. Teaching about migration as a fundamental part of human history using strategies that explicitly aim to engage diverse student perspectives represents one way that teachers can use curriculum to foster positive learning relationships: between teachers and students and among classmates. As important, migration as a topic of study can be an avenue for helping students develop foundational civic habits and international civic understanding.

Indeed, rising xenophobia and myths about the causes and consequences of migration are sowing divisions and undermining social, economic, and democratic prospects for the global population (Cinalli and Giugni 2016; Crandall et al. 2018; Flores 2018; Rogers et al. 2019; Ruzza 2018; Wieviorka 2018). Schools are at the center of this maelstrom: they are both sites of discrimination and hate incidents directed toward immigrant-origin students and spaces where teachers can educate newcomers and their peers about the role that migration has played in enriching local, national, and global societies (Bajaj et al. 2016; Crawford 2017; Faas 2016; Huang and Cornell 2019; Ee and Gándara 2019; Rogers et al. 2019). In a period marked by partisan divides and skepticism toward institutions and traditional sources of information (Hochschild and Einstein 2015; Rich 2018; Rogers et al. 2019), educators are being called on to better align their curricula and pedagogical practices with their students' needs and experiences and with the new demands of the twenty-first century (Crawford and Dorner 2019; Nieto 2017; Suárez-Orozco 2007).

The need for a comprehensive approach to teaching students of immigrant-origin backgrounds and for teaching about the importance of migration as a part of civics education for all students has been brought into sharp relief in recent years. Increasingly restrictive immigration policies, border closures, intensified immigration enforcement activities, and a reduction in the number of refugees accepted by the United States and many European countries (Human Rights Watch 2019; Meissner et al. 2018; Pierce 2019) have been accompanied by a rise in anti-immigrant rhetoric and violent actions inside and outside of schools (Ee and Gándara 2019; Huang and Cornell 2019; Rogers et al. 2019; USDOJ 2018). Global challenges in response to migration are felt more intimately in the lives of young people in schools around the world, whose identities, histories, and experiences are what immigration scholars Carola Suárez-Orozco, Marcelo Suárez-Orozco, and Robert Teranishi (2016) refer to as "the human face of globalization."

In the United States, for example, hate crimes occurring in primary and secondary schools as well as post-secondary institutions increased by 25% in 2017 compared to the prior year, according to data collected by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (USDOJ 2018). A longitudinal study of bullying in Virginia schools before and after the 2016 US presidential election also found that reported bullying incidents were

18% higher after the election in schools located in areas where a majority of people voted for Trump in the 2016 election, compared to schools in non-Trump majority localities (Huang and Cornell 2019). Significantly, the response rate to the survey question asking if students had been teased “because of their race or ethnicity” was 9% higher in majority-Trump voting areas after the election. Finally, two groundbreaking surveys of students (Rogers et al. 2019) and school personnel (Ee and Gándara 2019) documented widespread and troubling consequences for immigrant-origin and non-immigrant-origin students’ physical and mental health and educational engagement associated with the political climate, immigration enforcement activities, and anti-immigrant sentiment in the Trump era. Teachers, principals, school counselors, and other staff also experience significant negative effects working in these stressful conditions in which students come to school traumatized and afraid, if they make it to school at all (Ee and Gándara 2019; Rogers et al. 2019; Sattin-Bajaj and Kirksey 2019).

Responses to the cultural, demographic, and social changes that accompany migration reveal tensions that exist around ideas about civics and citizenship including rights, belonging, and responsibilities to the most vulnerable. While migration presents economic and cultural opportunities, it is also seen as challenging the status quo, often requiring cross-border solutions that expose the limits of national sovereignty. Moreover, the nature of migration itself presents a window into some of the toughest civic challenges that individuals, nations, and regions face, raising questions about responsibilities to people on the move, who should be eligible for citizenship and according to what criteria. By exploring these and other civic dilemmas, a study of migration highlights the importance of citizenship, membership, voice, and rights in a time when people are grappling with questions about how to coexist and cooperate across difference.

These issues are both timeless and timely. In fact, such an endeavor is necessary to achieve target 4.7 of the United Nation’s sustainable development agenda. This target calls for ensuring that “all learners acquire the knowledge and skills needed to promote sustainable development, including, among others, through education for sustainable development and sustainable lifestyles, human rights, gender equality, promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence, global citizenship and appreciation of cultural diversity and of culture’s contribution to sustainable development” (UN 2015). Yet, there is a dearth of supports for teachers who are committed to addressing the civic implications of migration in schools.

Recognizing the lacunae in the research and professional development offerings, in this chapter, we focus on the Re-imagining Migration Learning Arc (Boix Mansilla et al. 2019), a novel approach to civics education designed to bridge students’ understanding of migration and their preparation as informed, active agents in a transforming world. The Arc starts with the premise that migration is a basic part of the shared human condition, and it places migration at the center of students’ educational inquiry. It also asserts that the study of migration, people’s experiences with migration, and the implications of human mobility for society and civic institutions are necessary components of a robust civics education agenda in the twenty-first century. As such, the Learning Arc is geared for a wide audience of

educators and students; it is explicitly designed to reach non-immigrant-origin students as well as students of immigrant backgrounds. It is part of a broader Re-imagining Migration Educational Framework (Boix Mansilla et al. 2019) that outlines capacities and dispositions that may help young people successfully participate in diversifying societies as students, citizens, and future leaders.

Re-imagining Migration’s Learning Arc: Citizenship Education for a World on the Move

There is a vigorous debate at present about citizenship education in a world of migration. This chapter focuses on one way that migration can be understood as vital to citizenship education, and it provides strategies for how it can be incorporated across disciplines in K-12 classrooms. Here the definition of citizen is expansive; it is based on the notion that all individuals have rights regardless of where they are living or their documentation status within national communities – a premise aligned with the vision articulated in UNESCO’s 1998 report *Citizenship Education for the 21st Century*. These rights are also articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the covenants that followed the adoption of the UDHR (UN General Assembly 1948). The Learning Arc presented here combines values and traditions from the field of human rights with firm grounding in the priorities of civics education (Gould et al. 2011).

The Learning Arc is designed around inquiry into a series of key questions about the human experience. Fundamentally, it proposes to guide students and their teachers as they interrogate ideas about humans – as individuals and communities – and consider where people come from and how they evolve. Lessons and discussions progress into examinations of the reasons people leave their homes, the meaning and function of borders, and the legal and human rights bestowed upon people who straddle more than one nation. Ultimately, the Learning Arc seeks to take students on a reflective journey that allows them to consider their own responsibility in constructing welcoming and inclusive societies.

The Learning Arc is positioned as an antidote to the polarized, often hate-filled responses to migration, offering opportunities for young people to engage in dialogue about complex civic issues, practice civic inquiry, develop civic knowledge, and cultivate civic dispositions. It culminates in a call for young people to engage in relevant, civically oriented actions inspired by the question “How can we take action toward more inclusive and sustainable societies?” (Boix Mansilla et al. 2019). Civic action projects prompted by the Learning Arc have included a range expressions of student engagement, from a whole school Youth Participatory Action Research (YPAR) project that explored the impact of story sharing across a school community to art projects and public presentations made to community and school leaders.

The next section provides an overview of the foundational theories and related educational approaches that inform the Learning Arc: civic and citizenship education, social and emotional learning (SEL), and culturally responsive teaching (CRT). It is followed by a discussion of some of the existing US-based curricular and

pedagogical programs designed to help teachers educate students about difference and address issues of hatred, bias, and discrimination from history and today. It also describes the ways in which Re-imagining Migration Learning Arc differs from these other programs in terms of goals and approaches. Then, the Learning Arc is introduced, including examples of how it is being implemented in classrooms and other educational institutions. The chapter closes with a discussion of how educators, policy-makers, and leaders in diverse contexts can adapt the Learning Arc to their particular settings and local imperatives.

Theoretical and Pedagogical Foundations of the Re-imagining Migration Learning Arc

Re-imagining Migration's work draws from fundamental skills, competencies, and practices in civics education as described in the Carnegie Corporation's report on the Civic Mission of Schools (Gould et al. 2011). The report highlights six proven practices of civics education, which include (1) instruction in government, history, law, and democracy; (2) in-class discussions of current, local, national, and international issues and events; (3) opportunities to apply lessons through community service activities linked to the formal curriculum and instruction; (4) extracurricular activities that facilitate school or community involvement; (5) opportunities for student participation in school governance; and (6) student participation in simulations of democratic processes.

Despite their value in establishing a baseline for civics education, these practices and other important civic initiatives tend to be framed in purely national terms with nationally-focused solutions (iCivics 2019). The complexities of a world transformed by globalization, migration, transnationalism, and unprecedented economic and political interdependence belie this framing that reverts to a traditional notion of national membership and national borders. For example, it is common for those promoting civics education to emphasize political engagement and voting as benchmarks for success, obscuring a host of other, equally compelling aspects of civics education (ibid.). These goals, which reflect meaningful measures of civic participation and knowledge, do not accurately capture the range of possibilities for (and limits to) civic engagement in the lives of many young people, particularly immigrant-origin youth, whose families may be unable to vote and may be reluctant to get involved in standard expressions of civic action. Moreover, narrow conceptions of civic involvement and civics education may result in excluding eager members of civil society who wish to contribute (Suárez-Orozco et al. 2015).

Recognizing the need for a more expansive approach to civics education for a world on the move, Re-imagining Migration's Learning Arc is informed by insights from the MacArthur Foundation's Youth Political Participation Project. Participants in the project outline a new civics for the digital age, one that emphasizes "participatory politics" and the skills that are essential to "leverage the power of social networks, the creation and circulation of civic media...as a means of investigating issues, promoting dialogue, impacting cultural norms, and mobilizing others"

(Kahne et al. 2016, pp. 2–3). These practices reveal new, and more inclusive, models for civic action, including the DREAMers, a political movement led by undocumented youth in the United States who sought to regularize their migration status.

Social Emotional Learning Insights Informing the Re-imagining Migration Learning Arc

Cultivating informed, empathic, civically engaged global citizens requires attention to students’ social emotional needs as well as explicit instruction in civics education. Work in the area of social and emotional learning therefore provides a starting point for the opening sections of the Learning Arc, which builds on many of the competencies that SEL seeks to develop in young people.

CASEL, the largest consortium promoting research into SEL and the integration of SEL into the life of schools, defines social and emotional learning as “the process through which children and adults understand and manage emotions, set and achieve positive goals, feel and show empathy for others, establish and maintain positive relationships, and make responsible decisions” (CASEL n.d.). The broader SEL community promotes a set of competencies that can be helpful for young people forming identities in a transforming world, including empathy, communication across difference, and perspective-taking. These competencies are particularly relevant for schools with diverse student populations, or in demographically changing communities. Re-imagining Migration incorporates them into its work and extends them in the Learning Arc for the purposes of citizenship education via studies of migration.

Culturally Responsive Teaching

Culturally responsive teaching (CRT) shapes the Re-imagining Migration Learning Arc, particularly in terms of pedagogical approaches. CRT is rooted in Gloria Ladson-Billings’s seminal work (2009/1994), *The Dreamkeepers*, which explores the exemplary teaching practices of eight teachers working in predominantly African-American school districts and their successful efforts to create “intellectually rigorous and challenging classrooms” that honor students’ cultural and social backgrounds and experiences. At the heart of CRT is the understanding that “culturally relevant teaching uses student culture in order to maintain it and to transcend the negative effects of the dominant culture. The negative effects are brought about, for example, by not seeing one’s history, culture, or background represented in the textbook or curriculum or by seeing that history, culture, or background distorted” (Ladson-Billings 2009, p. 19).

Culturally responsive practices recognize that students learn best when they see themselves reflected in the classroom and in the curriculum. One of the central principles of CRT is the belief that educators must rethink the canon of texts they introduce to students. More than that, educators must take students’ cultural backgrounds and emerging identities seriously, not just on an interpersonal basis, but also as subjects worthy of study.

At the same time, CRT is often framed as an educational approach for students who are not part of the dominant groups within a society – newcomers as well as people often treated as ethnic, racial, and religious outsiders (Gonzalez 2018; Teaching Tolerance n.d.-a; Wlodkowski and Ginsberg 1995). CRT practices are important for all students, including students whose cultures and histories are associated with the mainstream. Students from dominant social groups need exposure to a wide range of social actors and perspectives to develop informed perspectives about power and privilege and individual responsibility to address inequities. Moreover, exclusion of the dominant groups reinforces difference and division and presents a false picture of an increasingly interdependent world. Thus, part of learning how to live in a changing world means that young people need to develop at least some basic knowledge of cultures other than their own and an understanding about how those cultures shape the way all people live in the world.

Culturally responsive practices have a lot to offer civics and citizenship teachers. Enabling young people to find pro-social opportunities for engagement in their communities is important for both themselves and their communities as a whole. What is more, an orientation toward culturally responsive teaching compels educators to consider which stories and which civic actors are featured in the curriculum and who may be missing. Guided by the philosophy of CRT, the last section of the Re-imagining Migration Learning Arc seeks to make visible the voices and actions of lesser known, often immigrant-origin social actors working to create more welcoming and sustainable communities.

Existing Programs

Re-imagining Migration is not new in its creation of resources and strategies to help educators lead students in scholarly exploration of pressing, often controversial issues. Over the course of the past 40 years, a number of organizations have developed educational programs for middle and high school students that seek to address issues of bias and discrimination in the United States. For instance, in the late 1970s, *Facing History and Ourselves* used the Holocaust and mass violence as a point of departure for teaching students about empathy, the fragility of democracy, dangers of stereotyping, and ethical decision-making (Facing History n.d.) (The use of the phrase “fragility of democracy” is inspired by Facing History and Ourselves.). *Teaching for Change* (teachingforchange.org) was founded when teachers in 11 cities gathered to create the Network of Educators’ Committees on Central America after the number of Central American students escaping civil war began to swell. Finally, *Teaching Tolerance* was formed by the Southern Poverty Law Center with the principles of the civil rights movement as a guide (Teaching Tolerance.org n.d.-b).

Many of these organizations have since expanded beyond their original purview to teach broader issues of social justice and democracy, often using specific historical events as a starting point for their programs. The diffuse and ongoing nature of migration as an influential human phenomenon makes it difficult to capture using this same approach; consequently, it is often lost in the classroom. Instead teachers

spend a few days on key events or a literary work but miss the connections across time and experience (Strom and Boix Mansilla 2019).

Civic and citizenship education programs in the United States, on the other hand, often emphasize civic knowledge or skills taught in the form of action civics activities, simulations, legal cases, and case studies or increasingly through educational games. Organizations providing support to civics and citizenship educators promote a wide range of approaches. Some, like iCivics, began by harnessing digital technologies to produce games for use inside and outside of the classroom that focus on developing civic knowledge. Others, like Generation Citizen, offer an action civics model in which students research a civic issue and develop an action plan (Generation Citizen n.d.). The Democratic Knowledge Project based at Harvard University seeks to build core knowledge about democracy, engage students in explorations of what democracy looks like in practice, and then inspire them to develop civics intervention-based research led by the MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Youth and Participatory Politics (Democratic Knowledge Project n.d.). The Democratic Knowledge Project reaches beyond K-12 classrooms to engage libraries, museums, universities, and other civic institutions.

In sum, none of the current educational programs directly addresses the issues faced by immigrant-origin children or provides guidance to adults who teach these students and seek to broaden the perspectives of all students – immigrant and non-immigrant-alike. The work of Re-imagining Migration fills this gap by presenting educators with a whole-child, whole-school approach to migration that nurtures students’ curiosity, empathy, and respect for difference while simultaneously addressing the broader educational culture. As such, the Re-Imaging Migration framework and its Learning Arc can be understood as a tool for civics education that helps engender the ideals of inclusivity and cross-cultural understanding by developing worldly, knowledgeable, civically oriented students.

The Learning Arc

Each of the five sections of the Re-imagining Migration Framework is designed to reinforce the others, with the Learning Arc serving as a model for developing curriculum (Boix Mansilla 2019). While other sections of the Arc put forward core beliefs about students, the purpose of education, best practices for creating nurturing education settings, and the role of the teacher, the Learning Arc illuminates universal themes in the experience of human migration that crosses time and geography. It also introduces essential questions that help tease out the differences between particular episodes of human migration. Veronica Boix Mansilla writes that the Learning Arc “is centered on the belief that the goal of teaching about migration is not a matter of simply remembering information. Instead, it entails having the capacity to reason one’s way through and respond to a situation, a media report, a new refugee crisis, feeling oriented enough to advance possible explanations, interpret or contextualize perspectives, and compare present developments with past ones” (Boix Mansilla 2019). Organized into three parts, Stories of Migration, Understanding Migration,

and Taking Action, the Learning Arc aims to develop five critical habits and dispositions that are essential for citizenship and civic participation: perspective-taking, inquiry, communication across difference, the ability to look for and recognize inequities, and the capacity, sensitivity, and inclination to take action toward inclusive and sustainable societies.

The Learning Arc does not prescribe particular episodes in human migration that must be taught. Instead, it is focused on how any lessons about migration should be taught. The Arc serves as a guide for the selection of resources as well as the range and order of themes that might be included. It also presents an approach that connects understanding of migration to informed action.

The following introduces the guiding questions proposed by the Learning Arc. Then, three moments in the Arc are highlighted and illustrated with specific examples of practice drawing explicit connections to the dimensions of civics education.

Stories that Make us Human	
What are our stories of movement and change?	In what ways do stories of migration help us understand who we are? What can we learn from the many visible and invisible stories of migration around us? How can we approach the sharing of stories of migration with understanding and compassion?
Where do we humans come from?	Where do humans come from, and what is our shared story? How do we know about our ancestors who migrated around the planet over the last 70,000 years? How is our shared human history shaping our lives today?
Understanding Migration	
Life Before Migration	
Why do people leave their homes?	What was life like before migration? In what ways do societal and environmental push and pull forces and more intimate personal contexts motivate people's decisions to leave their homes? What happens to those who stay, and how do they relate to those who leave?
The Journey	
What do people experience as they move from one place to another?	In what ways are people's migration journeys similar and different from one another? How much control do migrants have over their journey, and what are the choices and dilemmas people face during their journey? What do these journeys reveal about human nature?
How do borders impact people's lives?	What is the purpose of borders? How do the visible and invisible borders people encounter shape their lives? How can borders work in an ethical way?

(continued)

<p>Ambiguous status: Who is responsible for people in the in-betweens?</p>	<p>What are the rights of people on the move with ambiguous status (not clearly recognized by the State)? Who is responsible for people on the move with an ambiguous status? How should nations decide who can settle and who cannot?</p>
<p>An Ecology of Adjustment</p>	
<p>What are the conditions in the new land, and how do these shape the experience of migration?</p>	<p>How might the environment in the new land help or hinder newcomers' inclusion? How do newcomers come to understand the new land and their place in it over time? How might newcomers and the receiving community balance their identities, cultural values, and world views as they interact with one another?</p>
<p>What are the public stories of migration, and how do they influence people's perspectives and behaviors?</p>	<p>What messages about migration are people hearing through media and thought leaders? How can we assess whether available public stories about migration are reliable and representative? How do stories of migration influence how people think and (re)act?</p>
<p>How do local narratives of migration relate to global patterns?</p>	<p>In what ways do particular cases reflect the bigger picture of human migration over time and around the globe? What can we learn from other narratives about migration to help us to inform our perspective? What are the universal and unique qualities of successful integration?</p>
<p>What are the public stories of migration, and how do they influence people's perspectives and behaviors?</p>	<p>What messages about migration are people hearing through media and thought leaders? How can we assess whether available public stories about migration are reliable and representative? How do stories of migration influence how people think and (re)act?</p>
<p>How do local narratives of migration relate to global patterns?</p>	<p>In what ways do particular cases reflect the bigger picture of human migration over time and around the globe? What can we learn from other narratives about migration to help us to inform our perspective? What are the universal and unique qualities of successful integration?</p>
<p>From Stories and Understanding to Action</p>	
<p>How can we take action toward more inclusive and sustainable societies?</p>	<p>What issues related to migration do we care about and why? What can we learn from the ways individuals and groups have addressed issues of migration in the past? How might we use our spheres of influence to create and sustain inclusive and welcoming communities?</p>

In a nod to Urie Bronfenbrenner's (1979) ecological systems theory, Re-imagining Migration's approach crosses the educational system from school-based interventions to work with museums and other community-based educational institutions. At the core of the Learning Arc is the belief that successful citizenship education involved more than curriculum design. Veronica Boix Mansilla writes that there are "five re-conceptualizations deemed essential to educate about, for, and through migration."

[The Re-imagining Migration Framework] invites us to recast our idea of the child, and our theories of learning and teaching; to reframe our understanding of human migration; sharpen our views about learning environments and envision new approaches to professional development. In each case, the framework proposes a novel set of principles and practices to support educators in their work. For educators working in schools, museums, libraries and communities interested in preparing immigrant-origin students, their families and peers to participate fully in contemporary societies this framework stands as an invitation to re-frame migration not merely as a pressing challenge but mostly as an opportunity to re-imagine a new approach to education—one destined to benefit all. (Boix Mansilla 2019)

Educators in a wide range of educational settings and geographic locations are adapting the Learning Arc to develop curriculum. For example, in Charlotte, North Carolina, a 9th grade Language Arts unit uses the Learning Arc to organize an exploration of migration through a range of texts. Students thread their own stories of migration together with a selection of primary sources, essays, and short stories. After developing an understanding of migration, drawn from the Re-imagining Migration Learning Arc, the unit concludes by asking students to brainstorm about the borders in their community and encourages students to draw up a plan to eliminate a "harmful border to help people in the community feel more welcome."

In Boston, Massachusetts, the Learning Arc anchors a project across eight public schools that forges a collaboration between the Office of English Learners and the Department of History and Social Studies. The in-classroom lessons follow the Re-imagining Migration Learning Arc, beginning with student storytelling workshops facilitated by I Learn America, an organization that works with immigrant youth to creatively express their stories. The project then pivots to historical reflection on migration through a mini-unit guided by the second section of the Learning Arc, understanding migration through primary source texts such as Emma Lazarus's poem "The New Colossus" that links the Statue of Liberty to ideas of inclusion and welcoming of immigrants. The Boston Public Schools' project culminates in a public civic storytelling event bringing students from each of the schools together to an audience of community members. Outside of schools, a team representing a cross section of museums, centers, and initiatives at the Smithsonian Institution, a group of 19 museums and research centers administered by the US government, is developing an online learning place for educators that will include digital resources from the vast collection of the Smithsonian organized around the Learning Arc.

The Learning Arc is intentionally left flexible so that people in different sectors of society (e.g., schools, museums, community-based organizations) working in distinct contexts (predominantly immigrant, new immigrant destination) can expand

and modify it to suit their community's particular needs. It can be the launching pad for deeper academic study of different topics and themes; prompt teachers to pursue new pedagogical, student-centered approaches; and bring questions about immigrant students' experiences to the fore in classrooms, schools, and districts previously unprepared to respond to demographic changes and what they demand of educational institutions.

Conclusion

Migration is one of the defining civic issues of our time. Responding to the civic challenges and opportunities that accompany large-scale human migration demands that citizens and noncitizens alike rethink the nature of our ethical, moral, civic, and legal bonds. There may be no more fundamental question for citizenship education than who can be a citizen and what rights are owed to noncitizens.

Yet, too often discussions of citizenship entirely overlook the complex tensions around migration and how it tests long-held assumptions about the ways citizenship should be defined and who should be counted among citizens. This raises important questions about how best to prepare diverse citizens to participate in civil society. Re-imagining Migration's work broadens the scope of these conversations and, with them, extends notions of citizenship, civics education, and teaching for the age of migration by including the perspectives and lived experiences of the ever-more diverse members of global societies.

Teaching for and about migration tests our commitment to and understanding of contemporary citizenship. Humans do not confine themselves to national borders, neither should citizenship education. The Learning Arc can help educators move forward on the path toward competently engaging in the critical task of educating members of civil society to successfully coexist in a changing global context.

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Revisiting a Spiritual Democracy: In Search of Whitman’s Democratic Vistas

64

Gabriel P. Swarts

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Abstract

In today’s civic sphere, anxiety regarding the “threats” of authoritarianism, migration, economic disruption, multiculturalism, globalization, identity, etc. permeates political and public life as division and fear reverberate through media broadcast and local conversation. The “threat” discourse is pervasive, persistent, and often paralyzing. Questions linger regarding where we go from here. This chapter focuses on the exploration of envisioning a spiritual democracy, specifically the cultivation of a democratic spirit through exploring ideas that inform art, poetry, teaching, and literature to stage a reimagining of Walt Whitman’s seminal work, *Democratic Vistas*. Using Whitman’s manuscript, and related foundational writings to set the historical and social context, this chapter aims to build on Whitman’s vision to construct an artistic pathway forward, embracing democratic living through love, expression, community, and citizenship.

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Democracy · Spiritual · Democratic vista · Poetry · Walt Whitman · Citizenship · Community · Creativity

We have frequently printed the word Democracy. Yet I cannot too often repeat that it is a word the real gist of which still sleeps, quite unawaken'd, notwithstanding the resonance and the many angry tempests out of which its syllables have come, from pen or tongue. It is a great word, whose history, I suppose, remains unwritten, because that history has yet to be enacted. Walt Whitman (1871/2009, p. 37)

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to reexamine a foundational American democratic poet and philosopher, Walt Whitman, and how his work in *Democratic Vistas* can influence citizenship education and democratic living in education today (Whitman 1871/2009). A meandering exploration of life, community, democracy, and creativity, this seminal work established Whitman as a “seer” of the potential of democratic living (Dewey 1927/2008). Specifically, Whitman’s work birthed the ideal of a “spiritual democracy,” an emergent theme incorporating higher ideals from religion and moral teachings through a poetic investigation of his United States. At once hopeful and visionary, Whitman’s essay recognized the profoundly unfinished work of American democracy. Whitman envisioned the democratic apex of the United States being achieved by an educated, intelligent community, through the works of poets, artists, and lecturers – what he called the “literatus.” This creative cohort would connect individual experience through democratic values, within an educative framework, reestablishing our commitments while nurturing the democratic “spirit” in all (Whitman 1871/2009, p. 6).

For this chapter, democracy is defined as a multilayered, seemingly contradictory process that is focused on individual rights, decision-making, participation, subjectivity, and freedom of choice (Dahl 1989; Schumpeter 1943/2010; Touraine 1997). In light of these defining characteristics, how divorced are we from Whitman’s grand vision? The search for the democratic spirit of Whitman’s work may be more complicated than ever as division, competition, and faction may be further revealing, or exacerbating, democracy’s long struggle with an inherent “instability and flawed character” (Dewey 1888). For proof, in 2016 and as part of a larger global trend affecting 72 surveyed nations, the United States was downgraded to a “flawed” democracy by the Economist Intelligence Unit. An arm of *The Economist* magazine’s data department, this group has developed a “democracy index” approach to review nation-state institutions, structures, and practices (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2016). Citing a variety of research-based studies, political results, and global trends, the globally focused white paper declared the Western political and societal machinations in 2016 as a “democracy recession.”

In this recessionary trough, division and angst among citizens in nation-states around the world have fed into strained political divisions and vice versa, leaving many to ponder the fundamental ideals and aims of democratic society and governance at large (Hook 2017; Schmitter and Karl 1991; Suh 2014; Touraine 1997). Public figures, publications and media, commentators and scholars in psychology politics, and the general public discourse repeatedly cite fracturing “threats” to current political and social order (Oxley et al. 2008). In the United States, which was Whitman’s focus, it seems that all political sides have embraced threat discourse; Whether conservatives bemoan the “threats” of multiculturalism, globalization anxiety, and identity politics or progressives furiously denouncing authoritarian “threats” in a Donald J. Trump presidency and GOP-controlled Congress. Even centrists place blame on extremists regarding the lack of cross party legislation, deliberative approaches, institutional concerns, and communicative strategies. “Threats” exist on all sides of larger discussions on civic life and democracy. In a variety of media, academic, and public spaces, “threat” discourse is pervasive, all-encompassing, and highly influential in how we can couch the social and historical roots of the (real or perceived) “recession” in contemporary US democracy.

As it seems in these discourses, democratic living is facing unprecedented challenges as the “deconsolidation” of democratic ideals and practices occurs, reversing long-term, long assumed, trends of Western democratic function. (Foa and Mounk 2016, 2017). How did a foundational ideal of Western society get to this point? Many factors and trends must be at play and need to be scrutinized and studied. The aim of this chapter is to explore a way forward, or a potential answer, based on a *vision*. Instead of asking how we got here, perhaps the question can be framed, instead, around how to journey toward the horizon.

In this current context exists devastatingly complex questions: What *are* the threats to democratic living? What democratic future *do* we want? What driving “spirit” is *envisioned* in a democratic society (Taylor 2016)? For Walt Whitman, the historical and literary focus of this chapter, democracy was something distant yet grand, in his own words, a “vista” (Whitman 1871/2009). This chapter is a reimagining of Whitman’s vision in order to build a spiritual capacity, a horizon line, for citizenship education to counteract the preoccupation with threat discourses so pervasive in public discussion today. Through exploring work on the “spiritual” side of democratic living in the United States, democracy forms through creativity, centered in artistic expression of a democratic culture through communication in literature, aesthetics, poetry, and other forms of creative practice (Abbott 1910; Dewey 1939/1989; Dewey 1940).

Early Perspectives on the Democratic Spirit

Prior to Whitman’s *Vistas*, politicians and scholars as far back as ancient Greece explored the spirit and virtue of the democratic citizen. This chapter is not intended as an encompassing survey of democratic thought but, instead, a touchstone of scholars/philosophers which contributed important foundational ideas to the

exploration of spiritual democracy in this chapter and to Whitman's literary arc. Ideals of lived practice in democracy and the emergent spirit of the democratic living can be historically traced through foundational ideals from two purposefully selected works written by foundational democratic spiritualists: Aristotle and Baron de Montesquieu.

The feeling of Whitman's scholarship aids in imagining a democracy of individual recognition within the larger community, with an intense focus on the development of the inner self (Myers 1934). The realization of self, as one within a One, is a profound link enunciating the religious depth of Whitman's work. In that vein, exploring both ancient and modern interpretations of democratic action and wisdom, through the works of Aristotle and Baron de Montesquieu, allows the reader to trace Greek and Enlightenment ideals of ethics, belonging, and morality within Whitman's writing. These foundational works influenced modern American politics and thinkers and still provide founding, constructive ideals for educators and students to prepare the next generation for democratic living in classrooms (Pearl 2018; Rubin 2018).

Aristotle composed a structure of ethical traits or characteristics befitting Athenian democracy. Building from ethical and moral foundations, *The Nicomachean Ethics* studies and classifies various ethics such as courage, temperance, liberality, and generosity, building concurrently and accessed through practical judgment or wisdom, what Aristotle called "phronesis," or practical wisdom (Kraut 2006; Schwartz and Sharpe 2010). This practical wisdom allowed for citizens to maintain a spirited democratic life, specifically the *hoi mesoi*, or middle-class Athenians, who neither craved wealth or power nor were ignorant (Lintott 1992). In a paper on Aristotle's politics, M.A.R. Habib (1998) explains the mean of social class and the distinct role the "middle" must play in balancing democratic living within the body politics, through practical wisdom:

The principle of the middle way thus introduces itself on a number of levels in Aristotle's exposition of polity. The aim of this constitutional mixture, says Aristotle, is to regard the interests of both rich and poor, the wealthy and the free. The criterion of virtue, paramount in an ideal aristocracy, is also to be included. Thus polity occupies a "middle" position in which the extremes of both democracy and oligarchy disappear. Aristotle observes that all states contain three sections, the very rich, the very poor and those in the middle. Again invoking the principle of the mean, he asserts that to hold a "middling" amount of property is best of all. People in this condition, whom he calls *hoi mesoi*, are most easily obedient to reason; they exhibit the least reluctance and least eagerness to hold office; they are exempt from the arrogance of the very rich, who cannot understand how to be ruled; and from the wickedness of the poor, who cannot understand how to rule. (Habib 1998)

To Aristotle, these middle-class leaders, through their commonalities and like-minded ideals, could be entrusted with reason to further democratic vision and maintenance while striving to construct a more virtuous society, thus avoiding infighting, conflict, and institutional atrophy.

Building on Aristotle's exploration of virtue, Whitman's writing explores love, both as a binding agent and also as a field of contention, which ultimately led critics

to brand his work as obscene and out of step with the morals of the time. The exploration of his own love and passion, his eros, became a central tenet of his work providing space for the nurturing of spiritual democracy as an acceptance of equal love, for men and women within his life and work. This “bi-eroticism” was a foundational component of the fundamental nature of equity and equality in Whitman's *Vistas* and allowed a view into Whitman's own sense of belonging, community, and spirit through his poetry and prose (Herrmann 2014).

In 1748, Baron de Montesquieu published a highly influential work on comparative politics called *de L'Esprit des Loix* (The Spirit of the Laws). Within this work, Montesquieu explored an exhaustive list of publications and political structures, aiming to distill governmental practices (de Montesquieu 1748/1989). Reducing political structures to three major types (despotic, monarchical, and democratic), Montesquieu sought to identify the ticking mechanisms of political life. In exploring democracy, Montesquieu arrived at a key principle for democratic existence and sustainable living: the love of virtue. *The Spirit of the Laws* gave structure to liberal democratic structures of the eighteenth century, with limitations to human freedom in a democracy, such as slavery, colonialism, and authoritarian practices, fiercely challenged (Carrithers et al. 2001). Montesquieu went on to establish the “spirit” of democratic governance, through the principle of virtue, which he explicitly tied to the work of educators in order to sustain this “love of laws” in a democracy:

This virtue may be defined as the love of the laws and of our country. As such love requires a constant preference of public to private interest, it is the source of all private virtues; for they are nothing more than this very preference itself. This love is peculiar to democracies. In these alone the government is entrusted to private citizens. Now a government is like everything else: to preserve it we must love it... Everything therefore depends on establishing this love in a republic; and to inspire it ought to be the principal business of education. (de Montesquieu 1748/1989, book 4, Chap. 5)

Montesquieu's “love” emerged in Whitman's work as a focal point, as to love democracy or society or laws was not to love blindly but to love as self and in search of awakening. The spiritual, or religious, miasma of Whitman's democracy allowed for all religions to be subsumed under the umbrella of the “spiritual” in an intimate acceptance of all religious ideals (Whitman 1871/2009). To engage in Montesquieu's ideal “spirit,” one must immerse the self in reflection, moral and ethical deliberations, informed by an intimate love of the public. This intimacy, this love that Whitman describes, can only be found through interaction and is described in a relational sense by Garrison and O'Quinn (2004):

The greatest American epic is the story of what it means to attain spiritual democracy. The enduring story of spirituality seeks relations that are more intimate with the world around it, especially other people, and values a commonwealth wherein individual, creative acts matter in the course of cosmos. The continuing story of democracy is one of unique individuals questing in community with other such individuals for more intimate relations. (Garrison and O'Quinn 2004, p. 68)

Whitman's focus on literature, poetry, and the arts as the vehicle for such spiritual work in a democracy allows for the intimacy that Garrison and O'Quinn describe. Creative acts and the vision of self in a democracy require the "love" that both Whitman and Montesquieu describe. For de Montesquieu, cultivating relationships and the formation (for Whitman, "adhesion") of love of democracy and fellow citizens were the central tenets of education and the establishment of a spiritual democracy. This construction enabled a citizenship of belonging, shared humanity, and creative exploration of the love and communal ties among selves.

The belief that conceptions of belonging and citizenship must include love, in addition to Aristotle's practical wisdom, allows for a constructive starting point for Whitman's work in which the One of humanity can be explored through education for democratic living and visioning. Once more, Garrison and O'Quinn (2004) exemplified this process in educational terms guided by the artistry of teachers and learners in the construction of democratic values:

Educators are meliorists. They want to ameliorate suffering, oppression, and hopelessness. Meliorists are moral agents and as such require a moral compass to find their way in darkness. (Garrison and O'Quinn 2004, p. 70)

In education, as citizenship educators and, in essence, the artistic keepers of democracy, teachers and students must be the builders, the constructionists, and the creators. John Dewey described teaching as the "supreme art" of a democratic society, as the ultimate creative endeavor (Dewey and Small 1897).

Through Aristotle and Montesquieu's theorizing of an ideal democratic spirit, Whitman's journey is clarified. Aristotle's virtue of the middle class requires education as a resource for creative cultivation. Montesquieu's "love of laws" is not simply acceptance of governance without critique but a profound respect and admiration for the structure of democratic living, for the sake of the democratic public over all private interests and motivations. Thus, the emergence of self, interaction, love, and creativity becomes the nexus of Whitman's exploration in *Vistas* and builds upon the foundation of democratic ideals and the core of democracy itself. As visionaries, educators and artists are responsible for construction of creative, poetic, and nurturing connections within society to ensure the survival of the democratic spirit extolled by Aristotle, Montesquieu, and Whitman. Specifically, Whitman's emphasis on literature and creativity spoke to the need in society for a compass or guiding light. Educators and teachers of citizenship and democratic principles can look to Whitman and his work as this compass, the ultimate "seer" of democracy, to guide in the foundation of educational and artistic work (Dewey 1927/2008).

Seeing Further: Creative Visions of the Spirit

Using Whitman's own words and approach in *Democratic Vistas*, this section outlines key interpretations of his work as well as a historical context for Whitman's impact and philosophical approach. This will serve as a foundation for reimagining a

“spiritual democracy” as an artistic and educational journey toward Whitman’s horizon of the American, democratic promise. Though the focus will be on Whitman, one commonality with all of the cited works is that of constructing, or building, democratic society through philosophy *and* practice. Understanding larger ideals of “spirit,” “virtue,” “leadership,” etc. as worthy pillars in democratic society is acknowledging the necessity that creative, deep, caring, and thoughtful conversations must happen to guide individuals who participate and shape these ideals in order to advance democratic society. Democracy must exude a spiritual nature, to continue as a living organism and to function at its most visionary state. More than a century ago, Abbott (1910) described this animated democratic process:

... the emergence of man from a state of pupilage toward the state of manhood, with all his animal appetites and passions, all his higher aspirations and desires, as yet neither understood nor controlled. It is the spirit of growth, of progress, of development. Democracy is not merely a form of government; it is not merely a phase of society; it is a spirit of life. Democracy, therefore, does not merely have to do with the political organization. It is the reign of the common people in every department of life. It therefore *revolutionizes* every department of life: architecture, mechanics, invention, literature, art, the home, the school, industry, government, religion. (italics added for emphasis, Abbott 1910, p. 24)

It is imperative that shared democratic aims, like Abbott’s ideals of common man, living revolution, and spirit, be informed by a deep commitment to pluralistic humanism which are deliberated, theorized, and folded into daily democratic life and educational aims (Henderson et al. 2018). Whitman exemplified this commitment in *Vistas* and valued the lives of the worker and their spirit, much as Aristotle did (Townsend 2011). In order to advance such connection and voice, individual experiences amplified through thoughtful study and creativity can be harnessed to light the pathway of the democratic journey.

In Whitman’s construction, the virtuous individual, guided by the poets and artisans of society, lives through the ultimate “leveler” of democracy. Through democratic values, the individual can maintain and sustain this leveling force in lived practice, which he envisioned as follows:

I can conceive such a community organized in running order, powers judiciously delegated, farming, building, trade, courts, mails, schools, elections, all attended to; and then the rest of life, the main thing, freely branching and blossoming in each individual, and bearing golden fruit. I can see there, in every young and old man, after his kind, and in every woman after hers, a true Personality, developed, exercised proportionately in body, mind, and spirit. I can imagine this case as one not necessarily rare or difficult, but in buoyant accordance with the municipal and general requirements of our times. And I can realize in it the culmination of something better than any stereotyped *eclat* of history or poems (italics in the original). (Whitman 1871/2009, p. 47)

The common spirit, fueled by the virtue of democratic life, illustrated a society of spirited citizens, was one built for, and of, democratic life. Although seemingly utopian, Whitman saw these ideals as common in everyday life, constructed in daily interactions and through creative exploration. For Whitman, the question was

whether these ideals already existed somewhere in the nation and whether these communities could practically fulfill his ideals of democracy.

This fulfillment, according to Whitman, progressed through three stages of democracy, two of which have been unevenly achieved while the third level is yet elusive. Whitman's first two levels of democracy are described in *Vista's* as:

The *First Stage* was the planning and putting on record the political foundation rights of immense masses of people indeed all people-in the organization of Republican National, State, and Municipal governments, all constructed with reference to each, and each to all. This is the American program, not for classes, but for universal man, and is embodied in the compacts of the Declaration of Independence, and, as it began and has now grown, with its amendments, the Federal Constitution and in the State governments, with all their interiors, and with general suffrage; those having the sense not only of what is in themselves, but that then: certain several things started, planted, hundreds of others, in the same direction, duly arise and follow. The *Second Stage* relates to material prosperity, wealth, produce, labor-saving machines, iron, cotton, local, State and continental railways, intercommunication and trade with all lands, steamships, mining, general employment, organization of great cities, cheap appliances for comfort, numberless technical schools, books, newspapers, a currency for money circulation, etc. (*italics added for emphasis, Whitman 1871/2009, p. 55*)

While it can be argued that all three stages are still incomplete today, important work has been achieved in stages one and two of Whitman's description. Despite uneven distribution and access, political rights and wealth abound in modern democracies in comparison to past epochs as well as in comparison with current authoritarian regimes. Modern democracies reflect many of Whitman's unfinished stages. Flawed and contested, the promise of the United States in these first stages of Whitman's democratic maturation is present. Historically, these democratic progressions have occurred despite the lingering wounds of slavery, Native American genocide, LGBTQ oppression, gender inequality, etc. as those are still open and important and can be influential in creating space for further staging. Whitman knew these stages were morphing and ever changing and that the horizon lines were still far into the distance but present nonetheless.

The third stage becomes a realization of the most distant vista, the emergence of the educated poet-citizen, and the full blossom of creative expression within democratic living. This is where, as educators, important work has yet to be completed. Whitman's views relied fully on the perspective of the artist (the poet, the teacher, the architect, etc.) for democracy to function as he envisioned. Artists and educators are needed to function as visionaries to fully reconcile the emergent, expressive self with larger communal beliefs. Whitman described this final stage as spiritual, unifying, and guiding society forward toward the distant vistas:

The *Third Stage*, rising out of the previous ones, to make them and all illustrious, I, now, for one, promulge, announcing a native *Expression Spirit*, getting into form, adult, and through mentality, for These States, self-contained, different from others, more expansive, more rich and free, to be evidenced by original authors and poets to come, by American personalities, plenty of them, male and female, traversing the States, none excepted-and by native superb tableaux and growths of language, songs, operas, orations, lectures, architecture-and by a sublime and serious Religious Democracy sternly taking command, dissolving the old,

sloughing off surfaces, and from its own interior and vital principles, entirely reconstructing society. (*italics added for emphasis*, Whitman 1871/2009, p. 56)

The “expression spirit” of Whitman’s work exemplified the maturing United States as a unique salvation for humankind. This salvation in the third stage was made possible and able to mature through artistic expression. Through their work, artists were able to expose, embrace, or confront the most electric promises and sinister evils of a truly democratic society (i.e., slavery, corruption, or extending LGBTQ rights). Whitman focused on a “democratic literature” as the rocky passage of which reconciliation of self and community would occur. Individual talents, struggles, and convictions laid in “service of the larger ideal of democracy” (Whitman 1871/2009, p. 89). Being able to place one’s experiences within the larger maturation of democracy allowed for a strengthening of individual and communal spaces through one another. So, as society contends daily with the “threats” of any given time, citizens and artists have the ability to critique, search for, engage with, or create the literature and space needed to contribute to the construction of the third stage, the “spiritual” component of American democracy. In education, literature is defined through our daily texts of teaching and learning in the classroom. Lesson planning, curriculum work, and pedagogy allow for spaces in which the collective spirit of democracy can “dissolve the old.” Whitman’s ideal artist was an emergent figure, fueled by love and creativity and guided by self-discovery and educative experience.

Spiritual Citizens

So where are the spiritual citizens, the “shamans” of the democratic spirit, today (Herrmann 2014)? Reading Whitman’s descriptions of farmers or laborers, mothers, teachers and students, local characters, and friends, it was apparent that anyone was capable of contributing to the artistic construction of the spiritual awakening. In Whitman’s view, the “spirit” was an ethos of citizenship, a way of living, and could be nonreligious. The idea that spirit was love, as in Montesquieu’s conception of spirit in *The Spirit of the Laws*, is a helpful parallel. Whitman moved beyond Christian ideals of the spirit to focus instead on a creative oneness that formed communal interactions, practices, and journeys. This “spiritual” living would have to inform the citizen as well as visions of an American democracy.

Drawing on all religions as this greater One in *Vistas*, Whitman saw individuals in the United States in much the same way. Capable of esteemed citizenry, daily democratic action, artistic expression, and hardened resolve, the exemplars of Whitman’s democracy were emergent from any corner of the state. However, the key figures in Whitman’s work in the third stage of democracy were the intellectual and artistic leaders. As these artisans create and explore, our feelings and connections of self and community are exposed and challenged. In Whitman’s own writings – which were succinctly summarized by esteemed Whitman scholar Ed

Folsom in the forward of the most recent pressing of *Vistas* – the power of lighting the democratic spirit was embodied by poets:

What is most striking about Whitman's emphasis in *Democratic Vistas* is his insistence that a democratic literature was the most essential factor, for as long as the imagination of the country remained shackled by feudalistic models of literature, by romances that reinforced power hierarchies and gender discrimination, and by a conception of literary production that put authorship only in the hands of the educated elite, then democracy would never flourish, regardless of the form of government.

Whitman was finally more intrigued with the way a democratic self would act than the way a democratic society would function, and the defining of this revolutionary new self, he knew, was a job for the poet. A democracy, then, would require a new kind of imaginative relationship between reader and author, a more equalizing give and take, and so Whitman argued that "a new Literature," a "democratic literature of the future," and especially "a new Poetry, are to be, in my opinion, the only sure and worthy supports and expressions of the American democracy. (Whitman 1871/2009, p. xviii)

In Whitman's view, the artists, the teachers, and the "meliorists" create and search for their "moral compass" as they continue Whitman's vision. These creators maintain and continue Whitman's work in everyday interactions, lesson plans, and works. Some voices become amplified, bringing important topics and viewpoints to the forefront, demanding attention. For example, in recent times we have seen in the United States recognized "poets" and leaders such as Pulitzer-prize winning hip-hop artist and sold-out stadium-touring Kendrick Lamar (2017); the unflinching Donald Glover (2018), a hip-hop artist, actor, and TV show producer; #metoo catalyst, actress, and director Rose McGowan (2015); and Randy Olsen, the photographer behind National Geographic's Planet or Plastic awareness campaign (2018). On a grassroots level, teacher groups and organizations have engaged in worker strikes and demanded higher expenditures for education across the board in Oklahoma and West Virginia, as more education advocates collectively exercise a moral authority (Galchen 2018). These artists and educators have created important works and movements that exemplify the combination of individual expression and experience with community concerns and the larger aims of democratic society. Even more so today, through media and social media, creative and civic work can more visible, connective, accessible, and representative of our lived experiences. Whitman's "democratic literature of the future" may exist already in Lamar's hip-hop verses, teacher social media comments or accounts, or in Olsen's photographs on Instagram, and these works offer a kinetic possibility unseen before in our democracy.

As teachers look toward their classes, lessons, and curricula, the artistry of their work in education becomes starkly focused; the poets, the creators, the lecturers, the architects, and the mechanics contribute their own artistic visions to society. It is a teacher's work to enable and embody these visions and to provide a space for the freedom of their presentation. How else can poetic voices hone their "new poetry" but through teaching and learning in a democratic life? These educative spaces enable the virtue, the love of democratic promises, and must be cultivated for the good of society, its institutions, and its progress (Costa 2009). To rediscover the unappreciated "depth and fullness of meaning" in democratic societies today, it is

important to interpret education, everyday teaching and learning, as poetic and artistic (Rockefeller 1989, p. 301). John Dewey saw teaching as the “supreme art” of society and Whitman as the ultimate “seer,” inspiring the vital currents of this chapter (Dewey and Small 1897, Dewey 1927/2008). Whitman envisioned a creative society of artists and creators, of which teaching is the most fundamental. To reach the third stage of Whitman's *Vistas*, educators must look forward and be the true visionaries of society through their daily work. The “threat” discourses of politics are not constructive or visionary but destructive and reactionary. Whitman (as well as Aristotle and Montesquieu) believed that emotional bonds made democracy truly function, enabling discovery of self within a more perfect society. The possibility of a “teacher-poet” truly allows for a visionary and creative approach to encouraging these emotional bonds while linking educational experience with the roles of democratic citizenship.

Conclusion

As teachers and learners we can incorporate these poets and others into our citizenship discussions every day. The job as teacher-artists has to be exposure, deliberative debate, and investigation into daily democratic practice as a way of life (Dewey 1916/1944). To Whitman, democracy also was a lived experience, one that was deeply spiritual. On this reading, the role of educators is to use personal judgment and interpretation to champion the works of the poets while inspiring the next generation of creators to stoke the flames of democratic spirit. Touraine (1997, p. 197) sums up the aims of this spirit by stating that a “democratic culture is a means toward the end of recomposing the world and individual personalities by encouraging different cultures to come together in such a way that we can all share as much as possible of the human experience.” The recomposition of democratic virtues, derived from individual experience, action, and shared amongst communities, allows for citizenship education to have a foundational structure, a spirit.

For Whitman, the vista of democracy was achieved through a loving and creative life. There could be no “best citizen” or best societal structure, a specific window from which to view the way forward. Instead, for Whitman, the view was to be distant, emergent, and complicated, needing careful curation and inspiration as democratic society looked forward toward the distant horizon lines. This vision required faith in the work it would take to build on knowledge from the past, to forge new paths and roads, novel ideas and creations, and a new language of democracy. To that end, Whitman saw as far as he could and left inspiration for today's poets and educators:

America demands a Poetry that is bold, modern, and all-surrounding and kosmical, as she is herself. It must in no respect ignore science or the modern, but inspire itself with science and the modern. It must bend its vision toward the future, more than the past. Like America, it must extricate itself from even the greatest models of the past, and, while courteous to them, must have entire faith in itself and products out of its own original spirit only.

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Typologies of Citizenship and Civic Education: From Ideal Types to a Reflective Tool

65

Aviv Cohen

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Abstract

The field of democratic civic education continues to dominate theoretical and empirical studies, influencing practitioners in countries across the globe. This abundance of available, and at times competing, discourses creates a convoluted reality in which the assumptions, goals, and practices of democratic civic education are highly debated. One methodological approach that has been adopted to deal with this convoluted reality is the use of ideal types, which has led to the construction of numerous typologies of civic education. The goal of this review is to examine these typologies by offering a critical methodological discussion of their merits. The main argument to be presented is that such typologies should not

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be seen as external goals, guiding this process based on fixed desired ideals, but rather as an internal heuristic tool, offering a starting point for the process of self-reflection.

Keywords

Citizenship · Citizenship education · Civics · Classifications · Ideal types · Typologies · Review

Introduction

Civic education continues to raise questions and pose challenges in countries across the globe (Hahn and Alviar-Martin 2008; Lee and Fouts 2005; Torney-Purta et al. 2001). Ultimately, it is generally agreed upon that civic education may be defined as the course of “help[ing] young people acquire and learn to use the skills, knowledge, and attitudes that will prepare them to be competent and responsible citizens throughout their lives” (Gibson and Levine 2003, p. 4). However, moving beyond this basic definition, one of the field’s main challenges is that it includes an abundance of both theoretical and empirical studies. As Kerr (1999) mentions regarding this issue, “this breadth and complexity is both a strength and a weakness” (p. 2). This abundance of existing research creates a convoluted reality and a real “embarrassment of riches” in which the assumptions, goals, and practices of civic education are highly debated.

One methodological approach that has been adopted to deal with this reality is the use of ideal types, which has led to the construction of numerous theoretical typologies of citizens, and by extension, education for citizenship. The goal of this review is to examine these typologies by offering a critical methodological discussion of their merits. The main argument to be presented as a result of this review is that such ideal types should not be seen as an external goal, guiding the process of civic education based on fixed desired ideals, but rather as an internal heuristic tool for practitioners, offering them a starting point for the process of self-reflection. The chapter starts with some general explanations of the field of civic education, followed by a short description of the concept of ideal types and their use in educational research. Afterward, the approach to the literature analysis will be presented, followed by the presentation of the 12 typologies of civic education. A discussion of these typologies will be offered, highlighting the importance of relating to such typologies as a reflective tool, relating to implications for teacher education.

Throughout this review, the term citizenship and civic education (CCE) will be deliberately used. This term encompasses a vital assumption that frames this field, regarding the connections between the theoretical mode of citizenship aspired to and the educational practice implemented to achieve this goal. In this manner, the chosen term of CCE emphasizes the connection between these two components – the philosophical conception of citizenship and the educational practice of civic education.

Theoretical Frameworks

Conceptions of Citizenship and Civic Education

Many agree on the importance of CCE, as expressed, for example, in the fact that some form of CCE exists as both an educational goal and curriculum policy in most nations (Hahn 2010). Nevertheless, one may be overwhelmed by the abundance of topics and plurality of issues dealt with while reviewing the research in the field. Levstik and Tyson (2008) categorized this spectrum into five broad categories representing the main components of CCE manifested in the U.S. classrooms: (1) U.S. democracy; (2) cross-national comparisons; (3) discussion and decision making; (4) service-learning; and (5) cosmopolitan and multicultural education. Cotton (2001) also offered an extensive overview of this field of study after surveying 93 scholarly items. She divided this area of study into three main categories: (1) studies of the relationships between educational practices and students' civic outcomes; (2) critiques, concept papers and reports regarding such studies; and (3) papers that concentrate on general and specific student populations.) Focusing on the relations between general citizenship discourses and the practice of civic education, Abowitz and Harnish (2006) offered a review of different citizenship conceptions, questioning their manifestation into the classrooms. They concluded that

the conceptions of citizenship that currently are communicated in schools reflect little of the theoretical and practical insights that these discourses bring to meanings of citizenship. Citizenship education that engaged the debates, questions, and multiple discourses associated with civic and political life would prove to be far more enlightening, engaging, and inspiring for students than the current civics curriculum—with its vision of a more cleansed, idealized, narrow, and fairy-tale-like citizenship than actually exists (p. 681).

Thus, they argued that it is precisely this reality, of a gap between general citizenship discourses and the ways civics is taught in schools, which gives rise to students' apathy and cynicism towards this subject. Similarly, while focusing on the use of metaphors and embodied cognition, Fischman and Haas (2012) pointed to the complex reality of educating toward democratic citizenship, specifically in regard to the discrepancies and tensions that exist between the “prototypical visions of democracy, and the lived experiences of both individuals and groups” (p. 186).

Such reviews point to how existing research in the field of CCE encompasses different foundational conceptions of the terms citizenship and civic education: while one approach may emphasize the knowledge that individual citizens hold regarding the political sphere (Milner 2002), a second approach may emphasize the common values shared by the community as a whole (Bottery 2000). Moreover, a third approach may claim that knowledge and values are not satisfactory, and good citizenship is judged by the criteria of civic engagement (Nie et al. 1996), and a fourth approach may claim that such engagement must be critical in its nature (Apple 1993). In other words, reviewing the literature of the field of CCE exposes a real discrepancy between the widely agreed upon importance of this field and the lack of

consensus regarding the different conceptions practiced. Whereas this may be the case regarding other subjects taught at schools, such as math or science, the teaching of civics is highly influenced by the social and political realities, resulting in such a wide variation (Castro and Knowles 2017).

This confusing state of affairs may be seen as what John Dewey (1927) referred to as “the great bad.” Dewey warned of “the mixing of things which need to be kept distinct” (p. 83). In the case of CCE, this “great bad” may occur when the different conceptions are translated into different educational practices, incompatible with one another at best and contradictory at worst. This unclear situation, in which numerous conceptions of CCE influence classroom practice, is similar to what Barr et al. (1977) identified regarding the general field of social studies in the USA, viewed by them as a “seamless web of confusion” that suffered from an “identity crisis” (p. 10). In an attempt to untangle this web of confusion, a common methodological tradition that has been adopted by several scholars was the use of ideal types and the construction of typologies. In the following, I will offer a more detailed look at the concept of ideal types and the use of such types as part of educational research. In the next sections of this chapter, I will describe a study of 12 specific CCE ideal types.

The Methodological Tradition of Ideal Types

Whereas the act of classification can be traced to the philosophy of Aristotle (Hartigan 1996), the modern term ideal type was presented by Max Weber (1949), one of the founders of the social sciences. His guiding assumption was that researchers’ knowledge is constantly influenced by the particular point of view from which they evaluate reality. He thus challenged the notion that a researcher can bring forth the facts themselves without being influenced by their personal characteristics, and saw this notion as naïve. He explained that researchers’ personal beliefs and values influence what is seen as valuable, important, and significant regarding the phenomenon being evaluated. Weber explained that any attempt to analyze a social reality without relating to the researchers’ personal beliefs “is absolutely meaningless” (p. 82).

This inherent personal bias led Weber (1949) to set the question of what is significant about theories and theoretical conceptualization in the field of social sciences. As an answer to this question, he offered the use of ideal types, which were defined by him as “a mental construct for the scrutiny and systematic characterization of individual concrete patterns which are significant in their uniqueness” (p. 100). In other words, Weber proposes the use of a utopian display of a phenomenon that has been created by what he refers to as an “analytical accentuation of certain elements of reality” (p. 90). It is important to point out that Weber did not see these ideal types as a goal in itself, but rather as a means to research the social sphere. In this sense, he explained that when evaluating a particular social reality, the emphasis should be on what factors make this phenomenon unique, while comparing it to similar cases. A central distinction to consider is between the common meaning of the term ideal, relating to a utopian portrayal that suggests the best or most

preferred performance, as opposed to defining and detailing the specific characteristics of a particular phenomenon. Following Weber, the typologies of CCE to be presented in this chapter take the form of the latter sense.

According to Weber (1949), the use of such ideal types shifts the concentration of the research from the phenomenon itself, to the evaluation of the relationship between the phenomenon and the ideal type. Thus, the use of ideal types should not be seen as a method of describing reality, but rather as a heuristic analytical tool, utilized to enable the researcher to form a hypothesis regarding reality. Weber stressed the understanding that such ideal types are genetic concepts rather than a reflection of reality.

To compose an ideal type, Weber (1949) explained that an individual phenomenon should be evaluated from numerous points of view. In this manner, a synthesis of the different components of this phenomenon is created, thus forming a “unified analytical construct” (*Gedankenbild*) (p. 90), or a mental image. Weber clarified that with this use of numerous points of view, the final ideal type is, in fact, a utopian portrayal of the phenomenon that “cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality” (p. 90).

With the ideal type in hand, Weber (1949) explained that the next step of research is the comparison of the actual phenomenon to its ideal. This comparison may generate insights regarding the manner in which the phenomenon approximates or rather exceeds the utopian ideal. With this analytical tool, a researcher may better understand the social circumstances of reality at a given place and time. Furthermore, numerous case studies may be compared, thus revealing long-term processes as well. Also, Weber suggested composing numerous ideal types regarding a broader question, thus supplying the platform for an evaluation of the relationship between these different ideal types, creating an even more in-depth understanding of a complex reality.

The Use of Ideal Types in Educational Research

Holmes (1981) referred to the use of ideal types while researching the field of education. He explained that this analytical tool is especially useful while comparing different educational issues studded in different cultures. He recommended the use of ideal types to understand the normative statements regarding education that people “debate, accept or reject” (p. 112). In this manner, ideal types may be used as a means of obtaining a better understanding of the proposed norms underlying contemporary debates in the field of education. Holmes explained that ideal types provide “conceptual clarity and simplicity” (p. 113) of a complex reality. This insight relates to Weber’s main point, seeing ideal types as a way of understanding the manifestation of ideas, rather than attempting to portray reality itself.

On the practical level, Holmes (1981) detailed the process of composing ideal types when dealing with educational issues. He stressed the importance of relating to educational, political, religious, and economic factors that are debated in society. Thus, he elaborated on three fields that he saw as mandatory when producing such an

ideal type: (1) the nature of man, (2) the nature of society, and (3) the nature of knowledge. He explained that each one of these fields must be confronted from the educational point of view. For example, the nature of man may relate to questions regarding equality and the tracking system, dividing student based on their personality. The nature of society may deal with questions regarding what types of schools exist in a given society and what different opportunities exist for the children in that society. Questions regarding curriculum, pedagogy, and methods of assessment are all driven from the fundamental conceptions of the nature of knowledge.

Hayhoe (2007) added to these three fields an additional venue in the form of the normative values that each ideal type contains. She presented a critical point of view aimed at scholars such as Holmes, due to the neutral-scientific manner in which they displayed the concept of ideal types. She claimed that each ideal type holds a value-based normative assumption that must not be overlooked. Therefore, she called to use ideal types not just as a “scientific” analytical tool, but rather as a means of promoting normative values to be implemented in the future.

Approach to Literature Analysis

This review of typologies of CCE is based on the examination of 92 academic resources, dating from 1977 to 2017 (see Table 1 – Summary of sources reviewed). The sources were gathered based on searches in academic websites and databases (such as Google Scholar, Eric, JSTOR, ProQuest). Following the focus of this review, sources that presented a clear conceptual view of CCE were identified. It is important to point out that this review did not include curricular materials but instead concentrated on empirical and theoretical studies that examined such primary sources.

Due to this concentration on written documents, methodological insights were drawn from previous studies with similar thematic focuses (Alridge 2006; Brown and Brown 2010; Hess 2005). Literary analysis was adopted as the main methodological approach (Marshall and Rossman 2010), aspiring to reach theoretical insights based on the reading of text-based sources. This approach was utilized in four stages: (1) review of the text, (2) identification of the central themes, (3) discussion of these themes, and (4) presentation of examples that support the themes. A research protocol was used to assist in the evolution of these texts (see Appendix A – Document Analysis Protocol).

As a result of this process, and based on a preliminary review of this examination (Cohen 2010), the use of ideal types was identified as a prominent methodological approach, resulting in the construction of at least 12 typologies of this field, as will be presented following.

Table 1 Summary of sources reviewed

Books	Book chapters	Articles	Total
37	9	46	92

12 Citizenship and Civic Education Typologies

The following section will present a survey of 12 offered CCE typologies that utilized the methodological tradition of ideal types as their primary approach. These typologies include both general typologies focused on the field of citizenship that have significant educational implications and typologies focused on the field of CCE (see Table 2 – Summary of typologies of CCE).

Table 2 Summary of typologies of CCE

	Resource	Focus	Theoretical or empirical	Offered ideal types
General citizenship typologies	Marshall (1950)	Rights	Theoretical	1. Universal civil rights 2. Political rights 3. Social rights 4. *Cultural rights (added)
	Almond and Verba (1963)	Citizenship orientations	Theoretical	1. Parochial 2. Subject 3. Participant
	Hirschman (1970)	Citizens' efficacy	Theoretical	1. Exit 2. Voice
Typologies of CCE	McLaughlin (1992)	Citizenship interpretations	Theoretical	1. Minimum conception of citizenship 2. Maximum conception of citizenship
	Lamm (2000)	Forms of CCE	Theoretical	1. Ideological education 2. Political education
	Sears and Hughs (1996)	Conceptions of CCE based on a study of official Canadian educational documents	Empirical	1. State-based conception 2. Liberal conception 3. Cosmopolitan conception 4. Social justice conception
	Westheimer and Kahne (2004)	Beliefs of good citizenship as manifest in three educational programs aimed at promoting democracy in the U.S.A	Empirical	1. Personal responsibility conception 2. Participation Conception 3. Justice-driven conception
	Rubin (2007)	Civic identities based on interviews and discussions conducted with students from four USA high schools	Empirical	1. Aware 2. Empowered 3. Complacent 4. Discouraged

(continued)

Table 2 (continued)

	Resource	Focus	Theoretical or empirical	Offered ideal types
	Sim and Print (2009)	Citizenship understandings and classroom practices based on eight teachers in Singapore.	Empirical	1. Nationalistic 2. Socially concerned 3. Person oriented
	Castro (2013)	Approaches to citizenship presented by preservice teachers at a Midwestern university in the USA.	Empirical	1. Conservative values based 2. Awareness based
	Sim et al. (2017)	Study of 14 Singaporean social studies teachers' approaches to citizenship.	Empirical	1. Character driven 2. Social participatory 3. Critically reflexive
	Cohen (2010)	Conceptions of CCE	Theoretical	1. Liberal 2. Diversity 3. Critical 4. Republican

One of the first of such typologies was offered by the sociologist Marshall (1950), who concentrated on the issue of rights. It is important to mention that although Marshall did not relate in his writings to the field of education, his typology may influence the translation of such ideas derived from the social sciences into educational practice. For example, the Crick Report in England (Crick 1998) employed Marshall's conception as a starting point. Marshall claimed that in different periods of modern history, an emphasis was put on different types of rights. In the eighteenth century, the emphasis was put on the idea of universal civil rights, influenced mainly by the liberal political thought that dominated this era. Following the industrial revolution, Marshall explained, the emphasis shifted to political rights that were closely connected to the idea of the nation-state that started to emerge at that time. In this period, the term citizen started to relate to particular national rights, in addition to the universal civil rights of the previous era. The two world wars of the twentieth century brought forth a third type of rights – that of social rights. Marshall explained that following the atrocities of the Second World War, there was a need to define social rights to be respected by the states. Interestingly, based on the writings of scholars in the field of multiculturalism (Kymlicka 1995), we may add to this typology a fourth type of right, that of cultural rights.

In their seminal work, Almond and Verba (1963) were the first to identify the components and characteristics of the participatory culture that identifies democracies. They offered a typology of three citizenship orientations:

(1) parochial – a citizen that has no knowledge of the public sphere and no will to participate; (2) subject – a citizen that has knowledge of the institutions but shows no will to participate; and (3) participant – a citizen that has strong knowledge of the political institutions and has the will to influence the public sphere.

Another general theoretical typology often advocated in the field of civic studies (Flew 2009) offers the distinction between the terms “exit” and “voice,” coined by Hirschman (1970). Although rooted in the field of economics, these terms help in understanding citizens’ beliefs in their feeling of civic self-efficacy, particularly concerning the state in which they live. In short, the exit option reflects citizens who have mentally abandoned their social and political surroundings, due to their feelings that they cannot influence them. The voice option represents competent citizens who feel that they can amplify their positions, enabling them to influence social and political outcomes. (As mentioned, these three typologies do not relate directly to the field of education. Nevertheless, the different citizenship conceptions that each one of these typologies presents have educational implications, which ought to be considered. For example, Marshall’s distinction between civil, political and social rights is used as a starting reference point, interestingly enabling the examination of elements that are often overlooked (Lister and Campling 2017). Almond and Verba’s (1963) classification of the parochial, subject and participant modes of citizenship help in framing the goals of civic education for example regarding the potential use of technology as a tool to create a civic culture (Dahlgren 2000). Hirschman’s (1970) positioning of citizens in the exit or voice options has been used to better understand socio-cultural curricular perspectives (Cohen 2017).)

The following typologies relate directly to the educational arena. McLaughlin (1992) drew attention to the “ambiguities and tensions inherent in the concept of ‘citizenship’ which are therefore involved in any attempt to educate for citizenship” (p. 236). To better understand these ambiguities and tensions, he offered a continuum of interpretations divided between a minimum and maximum conceptions of citizenship. Based on the minimalistic view, citizenship is reduced to a passive respect of law or in other words citizenship that “is seen merely in formal, legal, juridical terms” (p. 237). Supporters of the maximalist view see citizenship as connected to active participation by the citizens that is “conceived in social, cultural and psychological terms” (p. 237). He further explained that the minimal conception’s main priority is the provision of information and thus its emphasis is mainly on the procedural aspect of citizenship while excluding critical reflection or understanding. As such, this conception promotes “unreflective socialization into the political and social status quo” (p. 239). In opposition to this conception, the maximal conception of citizenship will require a “considerable degree of explicit understanding of democratic principles, values and procedures on the part of the citizen, together with the dispositions and capacities required for participation in democratic citizenship” (p. 238).

Similarly, an important distinction that helps clarify the very essence of the CCE process was offered by Lamm (2000), who presented its two optional forms: (1) ideological education and (2) political education. Lamm explained that whereas in the ideological education process the primary goal is to persuade the students to adopt a specific partisan political ideology, political education is the process in which the student is taught the ability to take part in the political world while developing his views independently. Therefore, Lamm stressed the importance of promoting the political education process as the primary goal of CCE.

In addition to such theoretical debates, the six following studies offered typologies of CCE based on the findings of empirical research. Sears and Hughes (1996) presented ideal types of CCE based on a study of the existing conceptions of CCE in Canada. To compose the different ideal types that represented these different conceptions, they evaluated numerous official documents regarding CCE from throughout the country, representing all of Canada's provinces. Based on the evaluation of these documents, the researchers derived the existing conceptions of CCE and presented them as ideal types. These types include: (1) a state-based conception, which concentrates on issues of national importance, such as the state's institutions and its shared values and norms; (2) a liberal conception, which emphasizes the personal skills such as the ability to scrutinize public issues and the articulation of personal value positions; (3) the cosmopolitan conception that stresses the need to understand world issues such as the topic of environmental responsibility; and (4) a social justice conception that is centered on the issues of equality, oppression, and discrimination.

In the same manner, Westheimer and Kahne (2004) surveyed the different undercurrent beliefs of good citizenship as appeared in educational programs aimed at promoting democracy in the USA. In their research, they pinpointed three concepts of good citizenship that may be seen as the base for the ideal types of CCE: (1) the personal responsibility conception, which sees its goal as developing each citizen's own individualistic character; (2) the participation conception that promotes citizenship that is of an active leadership role; and (3) the justice-driven conception that calls for citizens to critically assess the structures of injustice in society. The authors illuminated the limitations of the personally responsible citizen, thus promoting either the participatory or the justice-oriented models of CCE. These two sets of typologies are similar in the sense that they illuminate the conceptions of CCE as they are defined based mainly on the initial stage of the educational process concerning the normative expectations and goals.

Rubin (2007) offered a typology of civic identities based on interviews and discussions conducted with students. She arranged these identities of citizenship based on the range of the students' approaches regarding their civic experiences about the ideals taught in school and based on their attitudes toward civic participation. As a result, she offered four types of civic identity: aware, empowered, complacent, and discouraged. In relation to these identities, Rubin pointed to the fact that factors such as race, socioeconomic status, and

community of origin all influenced the development of the students' civic identity.

Based on a study of eight social studies teachers in Singapore, Sim and Print (2009) offered three ideal types that encompass these teachers' citizenship understandings and classroom practices. These types include a nationalistic, socially concerned, and person-oriented approaches, whereas each approach emphasizes the surrounding related to as part of the civic education process – the nation, society, or the individual student. In a subsequent study of 14 social studies teachers in Singapore (Sim et al. 2017), additional ideal types of citizenship were presented. These included: (1) character-driven, (2) social-participatory, and (3) critically reflexive approaches. The authors showed how each approach emphasized different aspects of teaching. For example, whereas the character-driven approach yielded different teaching methods, the critically reflexive teachers engaged more in issues of social justice.

An additional typology based on an empirical study was presented by Castro (2013), who investigated the approaches to citizenship presented by preservice teachers at a Midwestern university in the USA. His guiding assumption was that citizenship worldviews served as a foundation, guiding teachers' beliefs and actions. He found that participants identified with either a conservative-values-based or awareness-based definitions of citizenship, presenting them as ideal types of civic education. The former type relates to teaching certain values, traits, and morals, whereas the latter emphasizes the citizen's awareness of community issues and the ability to enforce social change.

Based on parts of this review, a preliminary report (Cohen 2010) resulted in the construction of four ideal types of conceptions of CCE, set on a theoretical field between the interactions of two axes: political knowledge and normative values (see Fig. 1 – Four conceptions of civic education on two axes). These conceptions were determined by the combination of what type of knowledge and which perception of values are emphasized in the educational process, influencing the civic behavioral outcome. The four ideal types and their main educational goal are as follows: (1) Liberal Civic Education – the student will develop the individualistic skills needed in order to take part in the political process; (2) Diversity Civic Education – the student will understand the ways in which the different social groups that compose society may receive recognition and take part in the national field; (3) Critical Civic Education – the student will develop individual analytical skills needed in order to understand the unjust reality of society better; and (4) Republican Civic Education – the student will possess a feeling of belonging and solidarity to the national entity.

To summarize, reviewing these 12 typologies of CCE exposes the various assumptions, frameworks and classroom practices that guide and influence how this subject can potentially be taught. Whereas such typologies may be seen as a helpful tool, in the sense that they enable a better understanding of such different options, in the following I will argue that they should not be seen as a mere prescription, but rather as a reflective tool.




Fig. 1 Four conceptions of civic education on two axes (Cohen 2010)

Typologies of Citizenship and Civic Education – Towards a Reflective Tool

As a result of this review, in the following section, the merits of the methodological approach of ideal types in the context of CCE will be discussed, while critically examining its practical applications. I will first question the potential oversimplification that may be the result of using such ideal types, due to their grounding in specific empirical cases alone. Building on the ideas of Karl Popper (1965), I will advance this debate by emphasizing the ideal types' theoretical-philosophical components. Based on this critique, I will offer to shift the attention from the contents of the ideal type to the methodological process in which they were created.

Following Banks (1993b), who explained that the use of ideal types is “a useful conceptual tool for thinking about knowledge and planning” (p. 6), I will ultimately argue that the use of such typologies should not be restricted to the portrayal of fixed desirable ideals, marking educational goals and aspirations that are external to the practitioners' perceptions, but rather as a heuristic tool that is situated as an internal means of self-reflection. To the best of my knowledge, studies that examine how such typologies are accepted and perceived by teachers, teacher educators, or practitioners do not exist. Therefore, this argument is in no way aimed at the scholars who constructed them. Nevertheless, the argument does wish to address current trends in the field of educational studies that fixate on tangible educational practices

alone, overlooking reflective aspects. (For an example of such a debate in the field of teacher education see Zeichner (2012).)

One apparent flaw that emerges as a result of this review is the lack of a sound theoretical ground on which several of the ideal types are based, particularly those rooted in empirical research limited in cases. This critique is mainly based on the foundational ideas of Karl Popper (1965), who stressed the use of a more deductive point of view, one that bases the understanding of the world on a solid hypothesis solely derived from observations. (He argued that such a hypothesis should be checked and rechecked by additional observations, and in time, may be refuted. Popper explains that this sort of understanding is more scientific and it differs from explanations that are based on an ongoing gathering of observations that tend to reinforce themselves. In the realm of this inductive methodology, this ability to refute a theory by setting additional counter options does not exist. As a result, Popper explains, the emphasis on the inductive assumptions and methods may, in fact, encourage pseudo-scientific studies.) Thus, typologies based on ideal types that represent a specific reality of the cases studied by the research alone are less satisfactory.

As mentioned, the goal of this claim is not to undermine scholars who conducted such work, but rather to question the tendency to oversimplify significant differences in theoretical positions on CCE, which in turn may obscure fundamental implications for practice. When creating ideal types, the researcher should aspire to correlate the types with the theoretical-philosophical debate, which will enable a future evaluation of multiple case studies. In other words, based on Popper's (1965) assumptions, it may be claimed that ideal types that were derived from the inductive methodology leave room to question the process of generalization that is based on these cases alone. In fact, this methodological practice contradicts Weber's (1949) original suggestion to compose ideal types that are based on numerous case studies to create an accurate ideal representation of the phenomenon. It may be claimed that this representation can never be reached due to the problem of the researcher's personal bias. Nevertheless, this does not dismiss the researcher's responsibility to aspire to reach the best representation based on the theoretical aspect of the field of study.

In this regard, typologies of CCE that are based on the inductive process of constructing ideal types rooted in particular settings are of some importance since they offer potential interpretations of this educational practice that may not exist in other settings. In this manner, several studies analyzed CCE while comparing empirical data to such ideal types. (For example, Leung et al. (2014) compared official policy documents from Hong Kong to the three ideal types offered by Westheimer and Kahne (2004), pointing to the lack of the justice-oriented citizen conception in this context. Marri et al. (2014) reached a similar conclusion in their study of U.S. based urban pre-service teachers' views.)

However, once such ideal types are portrayed as desirable ideals that practitioners should aspire to, the practitioners particular and local understandings and interpretations may get lost in the process. Patterson et al. (2012) express such a concern regarding their empirical study of teacher's views based on a comparison to the Westheimer and Kahne (2004) ideal types. They concluded that "teachers are able to articulate 'university-speak' citizenship aims, but too often the nuance of their

responses suggests a different kind of citizenship” (Patterson et al. 2012, p. 204). Instead, such typologies should attempt to encompass different theoretical options and possibilities, following the deductive approach offered by Popper. Thus, the very role of the use of ideal types will shift – from the portrayal of educational goals and practices to a heuristic tool that enables the process of self-reflection. In other words, instead of emphasizing the content of the ideal type, we should embrace the methodological process in which they were created. This logic will be demonstrated following based on an example derived from the field of teacher education.

General educational studies (Marcos and Tillema 2006), and particular research in the field of teacher education (Gay and Kirkland 2003; Hatton and Smith 1995), point to the act of teacher reflection as an essential factor, influencing practice. Following this notion, typologies and ideal types may be used as a pedagogical tool, encouraging this act of self-reflection. For example, as part of preservice and in-service training, student-teachers and novice teachers may be asked to compose a typology based on ideal types they identify in their educational surroundings. Such an act may help them reflect on the particular context in which they act and on their role in this context. Subsequently, student-teachers and novice teachers may be asked to create their own desired ideal type, as an amalgamation of different components they identified and related to. This too, I assume, will assist in their process of self-reflection regarding their personal aspirations, while relating to their students and the institutions in which they teach.

A significant advantage that such an approach offers is that it does not force teachers to choose one ideal type over the other. The different ideal types are thus not seen as competing, but rather as completing one another. In this manner, teachers have the freedom to decide which components of the ideal types should be emphasized, based on their understanding of the context in which they teach. As explained by Banks (1993a):

Typologies are helpful conceptual tools because they provide a way to organize and make sense of complex and disparate data and observations. However, their categories are interrelated and overlapping, not mutually exclusive. Typologies are rarely able to encompass the total universe of existing or future cases. Consequently, some cases can be described only by using several of the categories (p. 7).

The benefits of such an approach are twofold: it encourages practitioners to relate to existing concepts and ideas as presented as part of the discourse; also, it respects their personal views and ideologies in relation to their local contexts.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I examined the methodological use of typologies and construction of ideal types in the field of CCE. I explained that this approach is not surprising due to the convoluted state of the field of CCE. Nevertheless, when relating to the original intentions of this methodological tradition, and the methodological discussions it sparks,

it became clear that the strength of this approach is not only in the presentation of such types based on empirical studies of limited cases. The danger of such an approach is in the oversimplification when translating such types to actual classroom practice. Therefore, as an alternative, I offer to expand such discussions beyond the content of fixed ideal types, to the very process in which such ideal types are constructed.

As such, future studies may examine how ideal types are enacted by teachers, teacher educators, and practitioners. Various methods of using such ideal types as pedagogical tools may be explored on both theoretical and practical levels. In addition, it would be interesting to examine how such use of ideal types is accepted and perceived by different types of learners and by diverse cultural groups. In this manner, the use of ideal types as part of the CCE process may be further explored, emphasizing its use as a true educational-pedagogical reflective tool, forging the much-needed connections between theory and practice.

Document Analysis Protocol

Identifying Information:

1. Resource Name
2. Author/s
3. Year of Publication
4. Publishers
5. Description (Book/Book Chapter/Article)

General Questions:

1. What are the goals and main arguments of this document?
2. What topics does it relate to?
3. How is it organized?

Conceptions of Citizenship and Civic Education:

1. Which conceptions of citizenship and civic education appear in the document? In what manner?

Conception	Expression

2. How else does the text refer to conceptions of citizenship and civic education?
3. What is the excerpt that best represents the manifestation of conceptions of citizenship and civic education in the text?
4. Are conceptions of citizenship and civic education represented in a theoretical manner? What is the best excerpt that represents this?
5. Are conceptions of citizenship and civic education represented empirically? What is the best excerpt that represents this?

Summary:

1. How can this text be summarized?
2. Any additional observations?

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Citizenship, Disability Discrimination, and the Invisible Learner

66

Fiona Hallett

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Abstract

This chapter outlines three theoretical lenses (Inclusive Education, the Capability Approach, and Disability Studies) that can be used to think about citizenship, disability discrimination, and the invisible learner. Throughout the chapter, the term invisible learner is used in order to emphasize the marginalizing effects of educational systems and the processes of identity formation and societal engagement. The lenses have been selected to represent the ways in which scholars have described the impact of educational systems on learners with disabilities. The first lens, Inclusive Education, will be familiar to most readers in citizenship education and includes debates around the disabling effects of society. The Capability Approach is then outlined as an example of how thinking in other fields –

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predominantly philosophy and economics – has been adopted and adapted in education. The third theoretical lens, Disability Studies, includes Critical Disability Studies, (Dis)ability Studies, and Transnational Models of Disability. The notion of an invisible learner emerges throughout each of the models as a product of blinkered viewpoints that pathologize difference rendering the learner less visible than the perceived disability. The chapter concludes with an outline of arguments that seek to look beyond the global West in theory application and development.

Keywords

Ableism · Disability · Capability approach · Critical disability studies · Disability · (Dis)ableism · Inclusive education · Inclusive pedagogy

Introduction

When considering citizenship, or for that matter, citizenship education, it is all too easy to ignore disability, and it is difficult to understand why this might be the case. As a form of Othering in practice (the term “Othering” is used in sociology to analyze how minority identities are constructed), disability discrimination demonstrates the nature of fractured societies and is worthy of deeper analysis. Indeed, whether the reader of this text has an interest in disability, or not, is less relevant than the need to look at citizenship from a range of perspectives.

Exclusion and disability discrimination have been studied over a number of decades from a range of theoretical perspectives. While debates in the field naturally evolve, and even resurface, the current United Nations’ focus on equality in education creates a space for a chapter of this nature to be both introductory and of practical relevance. For instance, debates around Inclusive Education are addressed in the United Nations General Assembly 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (U.N. 2015), which is based around 17 Sustainable Goals that represent a framework for action that is universal, ambitious, and significantly, “of the people, by the people and for the people” (U.N. 2015, p. 12).

Sustainable Development Goal 4 – Education – calls for the international community to “ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all” within key pillars of access, equity, and inclusion. Here, attention is paid to the need to:

- Eliminate gender disparities in education and ensure equal access to all levels of education and vocational training for the vulnerable, including persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples, and children in vulnerable situations. (SDG 4.5)
- Build and upgrade education facilities that are child, disability and gender sensitive and provide safe, non-violent, inclusive, and effective learning environments for all. (4a)

In addition, with reference to the Capability Approach defined later in this chapter, a commitment is made to ensure that:

People who are vulnerable must be empowered. Those whose needs are reflected in the Agenda include all children, youth, and persons with disabilities (of whom more than 80 per cent live in poverty). (U.N. 2015, p. 7)

Each of these perspectives is interrogated by Disability Studies scholars. That is, the need to effect change by examining the intersectionality of gender, race, sexuality, and disability is brought to the fore: Disability Studies is about more than the study of disability in society.

In response to this agenda, this chapter deals with three theoretical lenses, which can be used to think about citizenship, disability discrimination, and the invisible learner. This is not to create artificial separation between these fields; rather, the purpose is to outline areas of scholarship that can be explored more thoroughly by the reader. To this end, key readings are identified and interrogated, throughout the chapter in order to demonstrate the wider relevance of this area of scholarship.

Inclusive Education

While the concept of inclusion may be ubiquitous and even dominant across educational discourses, it would be fair to say that an agreed meaning of either “inclusion” or “Inclusive Education” remains elusive. In 2012, Hodkinson published an often-cited article within which he articulated the conceptual difficulties in attempting to define what inclusion is, and what Inclusive Education became, during the latter part of the twentieth century and first decade of the twenty-first century in England. In this article, Hodkinson expressed three primary concerns, namely, that inclusion in England was not a simple construct but was infected with extant ideological ghosts, that government policy was confused, and that inclusion policy failed and became illusionary, because it was not radical enough (Hodkinson 2012, p. 4). Liz Atkins further analyzed the idea of illusionary inclusion (Atkins 2016) by applying it to a real-world example of the legitimization of discriminatory practices, highlighting the influence of what has been described as the “Special Educational Needs (SEN) industry” (Tomlinson 2012, 2017). By adopting this term, Tomlinson points to the learned helplessness of parents and professionals who, faced with “specialist” resources, provided on the basis of categorization, become dependent upon an industry designed to expand their clientele in performative school cultures.

These complexities remain significant in the field with many authors tackling the continued conceptual confusions surrounding Inclusive Education. For example, Julie Allan continues to examine conceptual confusion, alongside how such confusions are played out in practice (2015). More than 20 years after the Salamanca Statement, Allan, and others, seek to explore the degree to which the Salamanca vision of “all children being accommodated in ordinary schools” (UNESCO 1994) had been achieved.

An interesting text that analyzes Inclusive Education across a broad range of national contexts (Armstrong et al. 2016) includes an international conversation on Inclusive Education by Jenny Corbett and Roger Slee. Originally published in 2000, this book outlines enduring debates around Inclusive Education (at least in the global West), such as those relating to human rights, equal opportunities, and social justice. This is not to argue that these agendas no longer require scrutiny in the West; indeed, one value of this book is that it examines enduring challenges from new perspectives. Further evidence of the degree to which these challenges remain in the global West continue to be explored in relation to issues such as disability hate crime (Ralph et al. 2016) and the impact of austerity on funding choices (Timberlake 2018).

Within these debates, Inclusive Pedagogy could be described as a means by which inclusion can be enacted in educational settings, focusing on meeting the needs of all learners, including those with Special Educational Needs and Disabilities. As such, Inclusive Pedagogy rejects the notion that any learner has a “fixed” ability with an emphasis on recognizing that what teachers choose to do impacts upon achievement. The very notion of Inclusive Pedagogy, similar to that of inclusion, is seductive; who would not want to adopt inclusive pedagogical approaches? However, the concept can be somewhat slippery; what does Inclusive Pedagogy look like? How does it differ from teaching that is nondiscriminatory in intent?

Lani Florian is, arguably, the primary proponent of Inclusive Pedagogy and has written widely on the subject, from initial explanations of Inclusive Pedagogy (Florian 2010; Florian and Black-Hawkins 2011) to more recent expositions of the Inclusive Pedagogical Approach in action (Florian 2015). As she explains in the latter publication:

By focusing on how achievements in learning are realised through participation in the community of a classroom, the inclusive pedagogical approach acknowledges that there are individual differences between learners but avoids the problems and stigma associated with marking some learners as different. (Florian 2015, p.11)

This focus on the community of a classroom attempts to highlight the stigma of labels in order to address important questions about Dilemmas of Difference which Brahm Norwich (2009) has identified as the cost/benefit of diagnosing or “labeling” a child with a disability in order to gain access to additional support or resources. Clearly, such debates become a political endeavor and are gaining more attention across the field. For example, Greenstein argues for Radical Inclusive Pedagogy by drawing upon:

theoretical ideas from disability studies to explore notions of difference, interdependency and social exclusion/inclusion, and on the ideas of various critiques of education, particularly those associated with the field of critical pedagogy, to rethink the meaning of education and the role of schools. (Greenstein 2016, p. 5)

As a former practitioner (teacher, speech, and language therapist), Greenstein offers a compelling account of his move from practitioner to researcher in the

process of developing a more openly political approach to education and schooling. He describes Oliver's explanation of the Social Model of Disability (Oliver 1990a) as a "lightbulb moment." Oliver's model holds sway in much of the literature around inclusion and Inclusive Education, if only as a counterpoint to the Medical Model of Disability. In brief, Oliver argued that the Social Model of Disability:

... does not deny the problem of disability but locates it squarely within society. It is not individual limitations, of whatever kind, which are the cause of the problem but society's failure to provide appropriate services and adequately ensure the needs of disabled people are fully taken into account in its social organization. Further, the consequences of this failure does not simply and randomly fall on individuals but systematically upon disabled people as a group who experience this failure as discrimination institutionalized throughout society. (Oliver 1990b, p. 3)

Interestingly, he has revisited these arguments in recent years, exploring their relevance "30 years on." Firstly, Oliver and Barnes revised *The Politics of Disablement* which, while in many ways true to the original text, has additional chapters addressing issues around ideology, the disabled individual, and constructing disabled identities in more depth (Oliver and Barnes 2012). In addition, Oliver authored a retrospective article on the use and utility of the Social Model of Disability, restating his view of what the Social Model was and what he sees as its potential for improving the lives of disabled people (Oliver 2013).

In summary, Inclusive Education (including discussions around the Social Model of Disability and Inclusive Pedagogy) is widely recognized in the West and is beginning to be addressed in areas such as Central Asia (Rouse and Lapham 2013). In an interesting juxtaposition of questions that remain on the agenda in the West, Rouse and Lapham offer a series of case studies conducted in Central Asia, which aimed to address the following questions:

- To what extent do education policies and practices include, or further marginalize, the most vulnerable?
- How are services structured to account for the needs of different groups?
- Are government programs using education as an equalizing force, particularly in the early years, or are educational policies and practices designed to preserve the status quo or create new elite groups?
- Does the broader community of teachers, parents, and children have meaningful opportunities to participate in the conception, design, delivery, and monitoring of education?
- How is disability defined in the region, and to what extent are these notions of disability consistent with social and interactional models of disability in other parts of the world?
- What are the implications for the reform of teacher preparation and professional development for those who work to support children, young people, and their families? (ibid., pp. 2–3)

In terms of the aforementioned debates around conceptions and enactments of Inclusive Education, it is interesting to note that this set of questions continue to be asked by the previously cited authors about practices in the UK, Australia, the USA, and other European contexts. Furthermore, even where it is accepted that deficit approaches need to be addressed, there can be a lack of focus on interrogating deeper assumptions about the aims and purpose of education; it is all too easy to assume that practice that looks inclusive *is* inclusive.

The next section in this chapter turns to the Capability Approach. While originating in the work of Nobel Prize winner Amartya Sen around welfare economics, the Capability Approach continues to be adopted, and adapted, by the academic community and therefore represents an important focus for those interested in citizenship, disability, and the invisible learner.

The Capability Approach

While initially developed as an economic theory, the Capability Approach has latterly been used as an approach to understand disability beyond the aforementioned “Dilemma of Difference” (Terzi 2005). Amartya Sen presented “basic capability equality” in The Tanner Lecture on Human Values (Sen 1979) recognizing that:

The notion of the equality of basic capabilities is a very general one, but any application of it must be rather culture-dependent, especially in the weighting of different capabilities. (Sen 1979, p. 219)

In terms of the “invisible learner” referred to in this chapter, the Capability Approach offers a useful conceptual framework for understanding explicit, and implicit, forms of discrimination. Sen’s position was adopted in contradistinction to the “primary goods” arguments set forward by Rawls, who Sen described as taking:

primary goods as the embodiment of advantage, rather than taking advantage to be a relationship between persons and goods. (Sen 1979, p. 216)

From his original notion of equality of basic capabilities, Sen elaborated the Capability Approach by arguing for five distinct types of freedoms, political freedoms, economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees, and protective security, each of which helps to advance the general capability of a person (Sen 1999).

Aligned, but with something of a twist, Martha Nussbaum argues for a *Capabilities* (my emphasis added) Approach in the form of a list of aspects of life to which capabilities relate. These are:

1. *Life*. Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length.
2. *Bodily health*. Being able to have good health, including reproductive health; being adequately nourished.

3. *Bodily integrity*. Being able to move freely from place to place; being able to be secure against violent assault, including sexual assault.
4. *Senses, imagination, thought*. Being able to use the senses; being able to imagine, to think, and to reason – and to do these things in a way informed and cultivated by an adequate education; being able to use imagination and thought in connection with experiencing and producing expressive works and events of one’s own choice; being able to use one’s mind in ways protected by guarantees of freedom of expression with respect to both political and artistic speech and freedom of religious exercise; being able to have pleasurable experiences and to avoid non-beneficial pain.
5. *Emotions*. Being able to have attachments to things and persons outside ourselves; being able to love those who love and care for us; being able to grieve at their absence, to experience longing, gratitude, and justified anger; not having one’s emotional developing blighted by fear or anxiety.
6. *Practical reason*. Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one’s own life (This entails protection for liberty of conscience).
7. *Affiliation*. Being able to live for and in relation to others, to recognize and show concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; being able to imagine the situation of another and to have compassion for that situation; having the capability for both justice and friendship.
8. *Other species*. Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and the world of nature.
9. *Play*. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities.
10. *Control over one’s environment*. (a) *Political*: being able to participate effectively in political choices that govern one’s life; having the rights of political participation, free speech, and freedom of association (b) *Material*: being able to hold property (both land and movable goods); having the right to seek employment on an equal basis with others. (Nussbaum 1999, pp. 41–42)

Nussbaum justifies this list by arguing that each of these capabilities is needed in order for a human life to be “not so impoverished that it is not worthy of the dignity of a human being” (2000, p. 72). Crucially, she contends that we need to consider people individually (UN 2006). This is particularly important when considering disability discrimination; when a learner has a given “label,” it is easy to classify them in terms of their diagnosis, which could form the basis of discrimination – albeit often benignly intended. Furthermore, citizenship and dignity can be viewed in sympathetic, potentially patronizing terms. Again, while this may be well-intentioned, such behaviors must be challenged in a civil society.

For the purpose of this chapter, it is important to consider how Lorella Terzi has applied the Capability Approach to Disability Studies, where she argues that:

the capability approach allows the theorization of a unified framework that sees the interplay of the theoretical level of defining disability and special needs in education with the political level of determining a just educational entitlement. (Terzi 2005, p. 445)

From this perspective, the Capability Approach encourages us to see the whole child, including their strengths and how these can be built upon. The World Health Organization uses this approach in the International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (WHO 2007). This document sits alongside the WHO Diagnostic Manual (2018) as a means by which people can assess the positive functions of an individual, alongside making a diagnosis.

While not specifically aligned with the Capability Approach, the intention is clearly similar; as Terzi points out:

perspectives emphasizing individual limitations end up overshadowing the role played by the design of schooling institutions in determining learning difficulties. Conversely, perspectives that identify schooling factors as causes of learning difficulties tend to overlook elements related to individual characteristics. (Terzi 2005, p. 446)

Here, Terzi implores us to reconsider the Dilemma of Difference in terms of justice, an argument that she developed more fully 3 years later (Terzi 2008) and latterly with specific reference to citizenship (Terzi 2015). With regard to the central premise of this chapter, this emphasis on equity seeks to bring the whole learner into focus, rather than viewing them through the lens of a given disability.

This leads us to Disability Studies, a field of scholarship that brings discrimination into sharp relief. By examining the meaning, nature and consequences of disabilities, Disability Studies scholars embrace interdisciplinarity and intersectionality as ways in which different disciplines ask questions about ways of being that can help our understanding overall.

Disability Studies

Disability Studies is something of an umbrella term that can be interpreted in myriad ways. In an effort to tease out the usages of the term, this section will outline three of the main concepts: Critical Disability Studies, (Dis)ability studies, and Transnational Models of Disability. The purpose of this is to explain each term while acknowledging the fact that some authors have written across genres and others have critiqued aspects of Critical Disability Studies in ways that require further examination. It could be argued that, while not wanting to pit one theoretical position against another (when all are equally motivated by the need for change), a more immediately practical guide to understanding Disability Studies can be found in broader sociological texts (Barton 2017). As with Oliver's book mentioned in the first section of this chapter, the first version of Barton's text was published in 1996 and revisited two decades later in order to capture developments in the field.

To fully understand Disability Studies, this text is organized into four sections:

- **Theoretical development**, which includes chapters by the aforementioned Mike Oliver (2017) and Colin Barnes (2017).

- **Disability and Education**, which includes reflections on the language of reasonable accommodations (Slee 2017).
- **Disability, Charities, Normalization, and Representation**, which includes chapters on power and prejudice (Shakespeare 2017) and the politics of identity (Peters 2017).
- **Disability: A Particular Research Method**. This section presents a methodology for accessing the voices of individuals with learning difficulties (Booth 2017).

For those new to, and interested in, the application of theory to the everyday – and vice versa – this text, alongside others, “foregrounds micro- and mundane moments in order to make sense of powerful discourses, practices and relations” (Thomas and Sakellariou 2018, p. 4). Again, as discussed earlier in this chapter, there is little to argue with here; identity, citizenship, and belonging raise culturally and politically bounded questions (for related arguments about developing citizenship education for diverse learners, see Banks 2006).

Critical Disability Studies

A useful introduction to Critical Disability Studies (CDS) was given by Dan Goodley who identified five aspects of CDS: theorizing through materialism, bodies that matter, inter-/trans-sectionality, global disability studies, and self and other (Goodley 2013). In doing so, Goodley concluded that:

Discrimination is an increasingly complicated entanglement of disability, gender, sexuality, nation, ethnicity, age and class. Critical disability studies have not developed simply to capture the theoretical interests of scholars, but have developed theories that are in concert with contemporary lives, the complexities of alienation and rich hopes of resistance. (Goodley 2013, p. 641)

In this sense, Goodley and others seek to explore what it means to be human and how society pathologizes difference (Goodley et al. 2017) bringing forth the political nature of this debate.

The strengths and weaknesses of CDS as an academic discipline have been examined by a range of scholars in an attempt to move the field forward to take account of barriers faced by individuals in developing national contexts. For example, Vehmas and Watson argue that CDS has challenged practice to the same degree as the Social Model of Disability (2013, p. 638), thus recognizing the profound impact that this theoretical model has had on the field. Nonetheless, 10 years ago, Meekosha and Shuttleworth argued that:

If CDS wants to contribute to theory and politics on a global level, we certainly need to listen to theories of emancipation and social participation emerging from the global south. (2009, pp. 65–66)

If, as is argued by scholars in the field, CDS is about emancipation and equal social participation, these arguments need to extend beyond the developing world. The fact that most scholarship is written in English and published in books and journals in the West does not help this situation.

Many scholars are now considering the way forward for Critical Disability Studies (Ellis et al. 2019) by revisiting issues of identity, politics, agency, and oppression. The next section in this chapter explores these developments in more detail.

(Dis)Ability Studies

By 2014, Goodley had addressed the argument put forward by Vehmas and Watson (although from his own perspective, not as a specific response to this criticism) by presenting (dis)ableism, recognizing that CDS scholars were in danger of backing themselves into theoretical and political corners. Goodley sets out the reasons for a distinct intellectual project that might encourage reconceptualization of disability, ability, and the need to address the “occlusion of concerns from equally transformative political movements” (Goodley 2014, p. ix). This text theorizes ableism and disableism, which have been explored by other authors with regard to factors contributing to continued discrimination and prejudice (Heesoon 2018), invisible disabilities (Kattari 2018), and Crip Theory (McRuer 2006, 2018). Given that the purpose of this chapter is to examine the ways in which disability discrimination can foreground the disability at the expense of recognizing the whole learner, it is worth briefly explaining each of these terms.

Ableism

Ableism, in short, constitutes discrimination in favor of able-bodied people. Interestingly, ableism has been addressed in a number of recent fields such as philosophical debates (Scuro 2017) and special education (Hehir 2018).

Disableism

Disableism refers to discrimination against disabled people and tends to be used alongside ableism. However, the distinction made by some scholars is that disableism recognizes the imposition of the social category of disability and its label.

Crip Theory

Robert McRuer introduced Crip Theory in 2006 as a foray into the ways in which the interdisciplinary fields of Disability Studies and Queer Theory can inform one

another. While many other scholars have developed Crip Theory – too many to mention here – McRuer has recently published a text exploring disability, globalization, and resistance which relates to notions of citizenship education (McRuer 2018). In this book, he critiques the political and economic shifts observed over recent decades and examines how disability activists can generate change and resist dominant forms of globalization in an age of austerity which he describes as “crip times.”

Transnational Models of Disability

The need for a transnational model of disability has been argued by Mladenov, who pointed out that:

For disability studies and activism, the significance of embracing a transnational perspective is potentially as far-reaching as was the significance of embracing the social model of disability in the 1980s and the 1990s. (Mladenov 2016, p. 1236)

Referencing the paradigmatic shifts in the field, Mladenov further argues that:

Considering that the overwhelming majority of disabled people reside in the Global South, it follows that only a transnational model of disability could effectively address the issues faced by most of the disabled people in the world. (ibid. 2016, p. 1236)

Such concerns are explored in a far-reaching edited collection addressing real-world contexts of war, poverty, and critical intersections (Grech and Soldatic 2016). Specifically, this collection covers:

- Critical issues in conceptualizing disability across cultures, time, and space
- The challenges of disability models, metrics, and statistics
- Disability, poverty, and livelihoods in urban and rural contexts
- Disability interstices with migration, race, ethnicity, gender, and sexuality
- Disability, religion, and customary societies and practice

If, as argued by Mladenov, the significance of embracing a transnational perspective has the game-changing potential of the introduction of the Social Model of Disability, the importance of this movement cannot be underestimated. Indeed, to come full circle, the case studies published in the Rouse and Lephram collection, mentioned in the first section of this chapter, elucidate the degree to which questions of this nature are emerging in national contexts hitherto beyond the mainstream academic gaze in order to shed a different light on the “conceptual schemas of disability that are formulated by Western theorizing” (Gable 2014, p. 88). By examining practices in other national contexts, we create opportunities to turn a critical lens back on our own practice so that we can see the forms of citizenship in which we are embedded in a new light.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the three broad models discussed in this chapter represent the field of disability to date. While some could be argued to be more openly politicized than others (notably those that sit within Disability Studies), each provokes thinking about what it is to be an equal citizen in civil society.

Inclusive Education, including Inclusive Pedagogy, aligns with Oliver's Social Model of Disability and, while some describe Inclusive Education as an illusionary concept, it offers a useful introduction for those unfamiliar with the field. The primary aim of Inclusive Education is to put the learner before the disability and teach in ways that include all learners, including those with Special Educational Needs and Disabilities.

The Capability Approach is less well known to those involved in education emerging, as it did, from economic theory and philosophy. Nonetheless, the focus on what individuals can do, and how society can be structured to enable all citizens to lead a fulfilled life, is wholly relevant to education. Terzi's interpretation of the Capability Approach demonstrates how this lens enables the identification of disability discrimination in schools in order for those involved in education to "see" all learners.

Similarly, Disability Studies, in all forms, highlights the political nature of the debate and the need to confront forms of discrimination in education, including those relating to disability. While education cannot compensate for inequalities in society, it remains deeply implicated in the reproduction of the many inequalities that exist. As exemplified by the authors cited in this chapter, interrogation of the various aspects of our identities helps us to better understand our thinking, our perception of the world, and how we see and interpret others.

It is hoped, therefore, that a chapter of this nature does more than outline a field of study; the purpose is to engage in thinking that goes some way toward aiding us in avoiding "Othering" citizens from different groups and with different backgrounds, experiences, and expectations. Aligned to this, hooks argues that there can be no intervention that challenges the status quo if we are not willing to interrogate the norm (hooks 2003, p. 147). Familiarizing ourselves with the arguments and research outlined in this chapter is an important start and serves as a basis for developing our own understanding of citizenship. The next step is to reflect upon our personal educational trajectories and our beliefs, values, and expectations with respect to education.

In addition, we need to be aware of potential barriers to learning such as the need to "eliminate gender disparities in education and ensure equal access to all levels of education and vocational training for the vulnerable, including persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples and children in vulnerable situations" (United Nations 2015, SDG 4.5). As such, we must continually guard against viewing individuals from underrepresented groups as being "problematic" and/or as inevitably needing additional support. As has been argued throughout this chapter, there is much that can be done to model a perspective that normalizes diversity and assists social integration, to promote positive attitudes to diversity among students and colleagues,

and to develop and embed inclusion in education (UN 2006). In this sense, a space can be created to examine ethical norms and social justice in education (Reindell 2016) in order to make all learners visible. Accordingly, and in response to the call to “conduct more research on factors that may impact ableist ideas and actions” (Friedman and Owen 2016, p. 2), scholarship around disability discrimination offers new ways of conceptualizing the links between citizenship and education.

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