Abstract
Freedom of will for Ockham consists in the possibility of opposite choices, as Panaccio puts it (Panaccio 2012, 75–93 and 91). Voluntarists such as Ockham commonly argue for the need of positing the possibility of opposite choices as a prerequisite for moral responsibility. An agent can be held morally responsible for his action only if he could have done other than he actually did. This conception, however, gives rise to the worry that it implies the very possibility of acting irrationally, insofar as it implies the possibility of acting for no reason at all. My aim in this paper is to show that Ockham has the means to meet the objection of irrationality, at least if this is the objection that there can be free, yet ‘random’ choices of actions that are carried out for no reason, or for no end and thus, resist any attempt of explanation. As a result, it should become clear that this reading implies that Ockham basically splits up rational and moral action by allowing human agents to set up anything which exists as an end. The challenge for Ockham, then, is to show how rational and moral action can be reconciled on this basis.
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Notes
- 1.
As Normore rightly points out, Ockham’s account differs sharply from so-called Aristotelian accounts of action insofar as in the latter, there seems to be no room for what can rightly be called choosing. See Normore (1998, 25).
- 2.
See Adams (1999, 266). She writes: “Persistent is the worry that liberty of indifference is power to act outside the bounds of reason.”
- 3.
See, for instance, Ord. d. 1, q. 6, OTh I, 503; Rep. IV, q. 16, OTh VII, 350. All references are to Ockham unless otherwise specified.
- 4.
Quodl. I, q. 16, OTh IX, 87: “[…] voco libertatem potestatem qua possum indifferenter et contingenter diversa ponere, ita quod possum eumdem effectum causare et non causare, nulla diversitate existente alibi extra illam potentiam.” I rely heavily on Normore’s translation here, see Normore (1998, 34, n. 24).
- 5.
For the various explanations of “contrarium” see SL I, c. 43, OPh I, 128ff.
- 6.
Quodl. II, q. 17, OTh IX, 188: “[…] omnes actus qui sunt in voluntate, sunt in potestate voluntatis.” See also Rep. IV, q. 16, OTh VII, 358–359.
- 7.
To nill to do x is to will not to do x.
- 8.
Quodl. I, q. 12, OTh IX, 67–68: “Volitio et nolitio sunt contraria quae possunt successive esse in eodem subiecto sine omni mutatione alia quam ad istas formas tam a parte corporis quam a parte intellectus. Patet enim quod aliquis odiens aliquem potest eum diligere sine omni mutatione nova corporali et etiam intellectuali solum ex libertate voluntatis; […].”
- 9.
See the Introduction, where I articulate the worry concerning libertarian approaches.
- 10.
Cf. Rep. II, q. 12–13, OTh V, 259.
- 11.
Rep. II, q. 20, OTh V, 441–442: “[…] potest concedi quod intellectus est prior voluntate, quia actus intelligendi est causa efficiens partialis respectu actus volendi, et potest esse naturaliter sine actu volendi sed non e converso.”
- 12.
“Alone among agents either corporeal or spiritual, the will is able to move from potency to act without a ‘triggering’ cause. This aspect of the structure of the will is crucial to Ockham’s account.” (Normore 1998, 35).
- 13.
Quodl. II, q. 2, OTh IX, 116: “[…] actus intelligendi naturaliter et necessario causat volitionem, et tamen volitio libere causatur, quia voluntas est causa partialis illius et contingens, cuius contingentia sufficit ad hoc quod effectus sit contingens.”
- 14.
Ord. d. 38, q. 1, OTh I, 579: “[…] concedendum est, quod voluntas, quando causat, contingenter causat. Sed ista potest habere duas causas veritatis. Vel quia possibile est quod in eodem instanti sit verum dicere quod non causat; et hoc est impossibile, […]. Vel dicitur causare contingenter quia libere, sine omni variatione adveniente sibi […] et non per cessationem alterius causae, potest cessare ab actu in alio instanti, ita quod in alio instanti sit non-causans, non quod in eodem instanti sit non causans. Et isto modo voluntas causat contingenter.”
- 15.
It is quite another question whether the view that one does not need a reason to actually stop willing something is plausible in psychological respect. It might become problematic that this view is implied by Ockham’s conception of the ontological structure of volitional acts—unfortunately, I cannot discuss this problem here.
- 16.
Ord. Prol. q. 10, OTh I, 290: “Et ratio huius est quia voluntas nihil agit nisi propter finem, et hoc vel propter finem dictatum a ratione vel propter finem quem ex libertate sua sibi praestituit.”
- 17.
Ockham distinguishes between different sorts of incomplex and complex acts of the intellect in his Ordinatio. See his Ord. Prol. q. 10, OTh I, 285–290.
- 18.
In modern terms, incomplex acts correspond to non-propositional acts, whereas complex acts correspond to propositional acts.
- 19.
Ord. d.1, q. 6, OTh I, 502–503: “[…] quoddam est velle respectu incomplexi, et hoc proprie vocatur amor, et quoddam est respectu complexi, large accipiendo complexum, sicut velle habere beatitudinem vel velle non esse vel aliquid tale, ita est quoddam nolle respectu incomplexi, et potest vocari odium vel detestatio, et est quoddam nolle respectu complexi, sicut nolle esse vel nolle habere divitias vel nolle habere honores, et tamen non odit propter hoc divitias nec honores, nisi accipiendo large ‘odire’.”
- 20.
Elsewhere, Ockham also calls love a passion of the will. See Quodl. II, q.17, OTh IX, 186–188.
- 21.
Quodl. II, q. 17, OTh IX, 187: “Amor enim et spes non distinguuntur ab actibus, quod patet per inseparabilitatem illorum ab actibus, sed sunt actus immediate eliciti a voluntate et ab habitibus voluntatis.”
- 22.
Similarly, an act of dissenting that p is an act of assenting that not-p.
- 23.
Note that a mere incomplex willing would not be sufficient to cause an act of eating an apple, since an incomplex willing pertains either to apples or perhaps to the activity of eating.
- 24.
Rep. IV, q. 16, OTh VII, 358: “Respondeo quod duplex est actio conveniens homini, scilicet exterior et interior. Tunc ad hoc quod voluntas agit actum exteriorem mediate vel immediate, magis unum quam eius oppositum – ut ambulare vel non ambulare, comedere magis quam non comedere – oportet quod determinetur ad unum istorum per aliud a se, puta per electionem sive volitionem efficacem qua vult unum esse et non aliud.”
- 25.
Ord. Prol. q. 1, OTh I, 21: “[…] quod omnis actus iudicativus praesupponit actum apprehensivum. Et actus apprehensivus respectu alicuius complexi praesupponit notitiam incomplexam terminorum, […].”
- 26.
Quodl. IV, q. 1, OTh IX, 293: “[…] dico quod causalitas finis non est aliud nisi esse amatum et desideratum ab agente efficaciter, propter quod amatum fit effectus.” The translation is Freddoso and Kelley’s in Ockham, Quodlibetal Questions, 245.
- 27.
Quaes. var. q. 4, OTh VIII, 104–105: “[…] dico quod quaerere propter quid aliquid fit, potest intelligi dupliciter vel propter quid oditum vel [propter quid] amatum. Illud per quod respondetur ad quaestionem factam per ‘propter quid’ primo modo, certum est. quod non est causa finalis. Sicut si quaeratur propter quid aliquis ambulat […], potest responderi: propter infirmitatem amovendam vel destruendam. Et tamen infirmitas non est causa finalis deambulationis vel abstinentia, manifestum est. Illud autem per quod respondetur ad quaestionem factam ‘propter quid’ secundo modo, est illud propter quod amatum aliquid facit.”
- 28.
Cf. Panaccio (2012, 83).
- 29.
Cf. Adams (1999, 260).
- 30.
Adams makes a similar point. See Adams (1999, 266). Only, in my view, she does not sharply distinguish between moral and rational choices (and actions).
- 31.
Quodl. II, q. 17, OTh IX, 187: “Amor enim et spes non distinguuntur ab actibus, quod patet per inseparabilitatem illorum ab actibus, sed sunt actus immediate eliciti a voluntate et ab habitibus voluntatis.”
- 32.
On this sense of “good” see Jenny Pelletier’s contribution in this volume.
- 33.
SL I, c. 10, OPh I, 38: “‘Bonum’ etiam, quod est convertibile cum ‘ente’, significat idem quod haec oratio ‘aliquid secundum rectam rationem volibile vel diligibile’.” In this context, I take “ratio recta” to mean nothing but “reason making a correct judgment about how things are.” See Baudry (1958, 229). The point is that “being” and “good” being convertible implies the sameness of their extension. For Ockham’s conception of “being convertible” see his SL I, c. 29, OPh I, 91. For discussion of that conception see Schierbaum (2014, 223–225).
- 34.
For a detailed account of Ockham’s ethical theory see T. Holoponainen (1991).
- 35.
See Quodl. II, q. 14, OTh IX, 177. For instance, it might become immoral to desire one’s neighbour’s jewelry or husband, since actions having these objects as ends could count as cases of theft or adultery.
- 36.
In Ockham’s view, acting morally also involves that one acts in this way because one wants to act morally, that is, according to “right reason.” Of course, in this context, “right reason” is more than mere “correct judgement,” but rather, prudence (prudentia). Quodl. III, q. 15, OTh IX, 260: “Similiter nullus actus est moraliter bonus vel viruosus, nisi sibi assistat actus volendi sequi rectam rationem, vel quia causatur a tali velle; puta volo honorare patrem vel continuare honorem, quia volo facere quod recta ratio dictat; […].”
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Schierbaum, S. (2017). Intellections and Volitions: Ockham’s Voluntarism Reconsidered. In: Pelletier, J., Roques, M. (eds) The Language of Thought in Late Medieval Philosophy. Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action, vol 5. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66634-1_8
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