Abstract
In the Groundwork, Kant claims that the “ground” of the categorical imperative, the supreme principle of morality, is that “the human being and in general every rational being exists as an end in itself” and “must in all his actions … always be regarded as an end”(4: 428). Somehow being an end-in-itself, or being endowed with human “dignity,” is the basis of universal moral obligation. Recent scholarship has grappled with Kant’s articulation of these claims within the argument of the Groundwork. This chapter explores some of the roots of Kant’s conception of human dignity as the basis of moral obligation, as they emerge in Kant’s lectures and notes from the 1770s, leading up to the publication of the Groundwork in 1785.
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Notes
- 1.
For one helpful discussion of Rawls on this point, see Reath (2003, 137–138).
- 2.
- 3.
Schmucker declares this “genuine progress” over the unprincipled value pluralism of the Prize Essay (Schmucker 1961, 115). Indeed, he claims: “Without a doubt, we have here in the Observations the first formulation of this principle which is so foundational for Kant’s entire later ethics,” “the Groundwork’s second formulation of the supreme formal categorical imperative” (Schmucker 1961, 117). Schmucker considers the combination of love and dignity in Observations superior to the Groundwork focus on dignity alone (Schmucker 1961, 118). Unfortunately, Schmucker hardly traces the concept of dignity beyond the Observations, beyond a few remarks about Kant’s “Notes” to them (Schmucker 1961, 202, 255).
- 4.
After the publication of the Observations, in 1764–65, Kant jotted extensive and wide-ranging “Notes” in his personal copy of the book. In these “Bemerkungen” we find many suggestive explorations of the immediate goodness of actions and its connection to “inner moral grounds” and the goodness or perfection of the will. The object of moral feeling (and the source of motivation?) gets identified with the goodness or perfection of the will. Unsurprisingly given the fragmentary and exploratory nature of these materials from the 1760s, the precise nature of and relationship between these concepts is somewhat uncertain. Nonetheless, within a classificatory sketch of rival moral theories from 1769, Kant chose to articulate his own system, his own core moral doctrine, in terms of personal worth: “Our system is the doctrine of the power of choice subordinated to the essential laws of the pure will. It is the agreement of all actions with the personal worth of oneself” (Refl. 6631, 19: 119, 1769–70? (1771–72?)). Translations of the Reflexionen are usually my own. One very significant development occurred in Kant’s 1770 “Inaugural Dissertation,” where Kant declared that the first principles of moral judgment must not be grounded in a moral sense, but must be intellectual, involving a paradigm of noumenal moral perfection (§9) ID 2: 395–396.
- 5.
Stark has convincingly argued that the “Moral Kaehler” notes stem from 1774 to 75 and that these are the most reliable version of the material also found in the “Moral Collins” and the notes Menzer edited (Stark 2004). I will quote material from “Moral Kaehler” which I translate here drawing loosely on Heath’s translation of the Collins notes in the Cambridge volume Lectures on Ethics. I provide pagination to the Kaehler manuscript (hereinafter ‘kae’) and also the Akademie edition of Collins.
- 6.
Note: in “Moral Kaehler” there is not a clear distinction between Willkür, typically rendered as “free choice,” and Wille, typically rendered as “will.”
- 7.
While Kant insists that we may act upon the objective moral or prudential motives themselves, there are also (merely?) “subjective grounds (of execution)” which can be among our incentives (Triebfeder), grounds that are “drawn from the constitution of this or that subject, which are valid for and restricted to this or that subject,” and which he implies are in addition to objective grounds (of execution) that we may act upon (kae 46; 27: 263). When he considers the motiva satisfaciendi or subjective Bewegungsgrunde (of rule satisfaction), he again implies that what moral rules require is that the objective motive be our subjective motive be our subjective motive (kae 63; 27: 270–271). A bit later, Kant says a bit more about objective motives. Knowledge of the proper (objective) motive for a required or prohibited act which one has omitted or committed is among the conditions of its full imputation (kae 116; 27:291). Of course, one may have an objective motive, which may constitute an obligation, yet fail to bear fruit (fruchten) in action, and merely subjective motives may fill the gap for an objective motive in some cases, or some considerations may (ought?) only become subjective motives when the objective motives no longer bear fruit (kae 106; 27: 287).
- 8.
Timmermann (2019) makes a similar point about the conception of motives found in the Powalski lecture notes of the early 1780s. See also Ameriks (2017, 38). Here I also agree with Kuehn 2015, and reject Sensen’s assertion that there is not a “substantial account of value” in the lectures on ethics and his intimations of prescriptivism (Sensen 2011, 47–48).
- 9.
At least early in the course, Kant analyzes the inner goodness of action, and the goodness of free choice, with little explicit attention to ends. The moral imperative “is either unconditional, or under an objectively necessary condition. The end is actually undetermined by the moral imperative, nor is the action determined by the end, for it relates only to free choice, be the end what it may. Hence, the moral imperative commands absolutely, without looking to the end” (kae 11–12; 27: 247). He briefly notes that the rule of universal validity may also be formulated as a rule of universally valid ends: “the subjection of our will under the rule of universally valid ends is the inner goodness and absolute perfection of free choice, for then it is in conformity with all ends” (kae 34–35; 27: 257). Later in the course, he does consider “being an end” and the “essential ends” of humanity. Ward remarks upon the relative lack of systematization between the interrelated strands in the Lectures (1972, 54–55).
- 10.
For discussion of the pure moral motive in these lectures, see (kae 33–39, 69–70, 85, 99–108, 121–123, 133–135, 143; 27: 257–260, 274–275, 1428, 284–288, 293–294, 299–300, 303). While Kant insists upon a pure moral motive, at this point he insists that it has a theological component. “[…] [W]ithout a supreme judge all moral laws would be without effect, since in that case there would be no inner motive, no reward and no punishment. … if an honest man tries to practice the moral law from pure motives, because of the inner goodness of the actions, and does God’s bidding with gladness, he honors God. […] If the act has arisen from an inner principle, and if I do it, and do it gladly, because it is absolutely good in itself, then it is truly pleasing in the sight of God. God wishes to have dispositions, and they must come from an inner principle, for if we do a thing gladly, we do it also from a good disposition” (kae 77–80; 27: 278, 1426). Moreover, Kant does not demand at this point that the pure moral motive is one’s only incentive (Triebfeder), he allows “subsidiary motives” and incentives to play a role, for example (kae 143, 155; 27: 303, 309). For discussion of this issue in the lectures on ethics, see Kuehn (2015); Frierson (2015); Sensen (2015, 2019, 97–100); Timmermann (2019).
- 11.
This distinction certainly distinguishes the account of the good will in the lectures from that of the Groundwork in particular, but here I mean to emphasize how it indicates some incompleteness in the Lectures account in its own terms. The distinction Kant draws here is, in the first instance, a distinction in functional role, which raises a question about what the precise relation may be between that which fulfills the first role and that which fulfills the second.
- 12.
There is some ambiguity in the wording of the notes: some lines suggest that the understanding must have some power to move beings like us, while other lines suggest the understanding itself cannot have any such power.
- 13.
Similarly, “practical laws express the necessity of free actions, and they are either subjective, insofar as [the free actions] actually are done by humans, or the [practical laws] are objective insofar as [the free actions] ought to be done [by humans]; the objective laws are twofold: pragmatic and moral” (kae 65; 27: 272). Here it seems that the objective moral and prudential laws are sometimes subjective.
- 14.
One interpretation of the “Stein der Weisen” reference is that the objective motive cannot actually become what moves us, rather it is always only associated with a separate state, a distinctive moral feeling or state of the heart in virtue of which we perform that action (if it is “strong” enough and if it complemented by necessary incentives). But in Kaehler there is already clear insistence that ethics involves action “aus Pflicht” (kae 62–65; 27: 271–272). And motiva subjective moventia seem to count as Triebfeder, lying in the heart—the moral feeling (kae 70, 85–89; 27: 274, 1428–1429).
- 15.
On the relation of this formulation in the lectures to some of Kant’s earlier reflections, and to the Groundwork’s Formula of Universal Law, see Stark (<CitaitonRef CitaionID="CR16">2004</CitaionRef>, 64n44), and Kuehn (2015). As Kuehn emphasizes, one important difference is that Kant argues here for the distinction between “the principle of judgment of obligations” and “the principle of its performance or execution” (kae 69; 27: 274) whereas the Groundwork’s “Formula of Universal Law” links them quite closely. At the same time, we must keep in mind that even here there are important connections between the two: an absolutely good finite will acts from duty, or “because it is good,” acting reluctantly but gladly.
Aside from these examples in the foundational portion of this lecture course, Kant rarely appeals directly to this version of the “supreme principle” when discussing particular obligations.
- 16.
He does explicitly note that a demand for universal form must be associated with the intellect, of course.
- 17.
There is also the lingering question about how honoring humanity might qualify as an intellectual principle, grasped by the reason or understanding, which is not explicitly taken up here. But, Kant does observe that “the distinction what is morally good or bad must be judged according to the understanding” (kae 46; 27: 263) and “the concept of the good is [that of?] an object which satisfies [gefällt] everyone, thus it can be judged through the understanding” (kae 47; 27: 264). Kant also insists that moral goodness or moral perfection is the perfection of the will, and this is something intellectual. (Kae 51, 74; 27: 265-266, 276. See also “Inaugural Dissertation,” §9, ID 2:395-396, mentioned above.) Later in the course, Kant will also claim that virtue is an Ideal, as is holiness.
- 18.
Unfortunately, for this part of the ethics course, there are no extant directly corresponding Reflexionen to consult, since we have no record of Kant’s personal copy of Baumgarten’s Ethica.
- 19.
In Refl. 6590 and much of these “Moral Kaehler” lectures, Kant appeals directly to the worth of humanity to explain and derive duties to oneself, but not typically duties to others. In another note, from roughly the same time period, Kant does consider duties to others: “Humanity is holy and inviolable, as much in one’s own person as in that of another. […] All duties, namely those that are necessary, consist in our giving preference to and honoring not the welfare of human beings but rather humanity and dignity. Thus the right of humanity is that which limits all freedom through necessary conditions” (Refl. 6801, 19: 165–166, 1773–75? 1772?). Kaehler does suggest that perhaps the essential ends of humanity can provide a principle for all duties (kae 225; 27: 346).
- 20.
For an excellent discussion of this, and related issues in Moral Kaehler, Vigilantius, and the Metaphysics of Morals, see Denis (2010).
- 21.
For a rather different value-based interpretation of Kant’s ethics in this period, and this passage in particular, see Guyer (2016). Guyer contends that Kant considers morally neutral freedom (the setting of ends in general) to be the supreme value, and defends morality as the means for maximization of this value.
- 22.
Similarly, in Refl. 6801 (excerpted above), a long note from around the time of these lectures, Kant suggests that this same holy and inviolable dignity is found as much in one’s own person as in that of another, and it can apparently be the basis of our duties to others, as well as those to ourselves. On the next page of his textbook, apparently from around the same time, Kant also argued that freedom must stand under the law of reason and its universal law, and thus our actions ought to possess universal validity. (Refl. 6802, 19: 166) There is little indication that he saw these formulations as rivals. For another suggestion about their relationship and the roots of duties to oneself, see Refl. 6851, 19: 179, 1776–78. Of course, Kant continued to focus specifically on the link between dignity and duties to oneself: “All duties to oneself arise from [gehen auf] inner dignity” (Refl. 6966. 1776–78? (1770–71? 1773–75?)).
- 23.
Here, and at kae 441–443; 27: 464–465, he considers beyond vice, the possibility of becoming devilish …
- 24.
Respect, approval, and esteem are results of and responses to something of value, a person, or action. “The principium of the self-regarding duties does not consist in self-favor, but in self-esteem [Selbstschätzung]; our actions, that is, must agree with [übereinstimmen] the dignity of humanity. … We have in us two grounds [Gründe] for our actions: inclinations, which are animal in nature, and humanity, to which the inclinations have to be subordinated. … All such [self-regarding] duties are founded on an inner honor, a love of honor, consisting in the fact that a man values [schätzt] himself, and in his own eyes is not unworthy that his actions should be in keeping with humanity. To be worthy in his eyes of inner honor, the treasuring of approval, is the essential ingredient of the duties to oneself” (kae 227–228; 27: 347).
Similarly, the Reflexionen of the 1770s also sometimes emphasize the dignity and self-esteem that result from one’s action (Refl. 6619, 6857, 6892, 7071, 7081) and other times suppose that some dignity and self-esteem precede and/or motivate one’s action (Refl. 6856, 6864, 6866, 6966, 7074). (Some are ambiguous.)
- 25.
Similarly, in several Reflexionen of the late 1760s and 1770s, Kant demands agreement with (or limitation by) oneself, or with the subject or person (Refl. 6621, 6631, 6713, 6792, 6795, 6801, 6851, 6853, 6864, 6977, 6989, 7038).
- 26.
Kant also clarifies that not every violation of duty to oneself completely destroys one’s good disposition or ceases one’s being human (kae 441–443; 27: 464–465). [For discussion of throwing one’s humanity away, see Bunch (2014).]
- 27.
In a note, probably from around the same time period, Kant explicitly contrasts and connects the two related types of dignity, one found in our nature, through which we can become worthy of happiness, the other in the realized worthiness to be happy: “The dignity of human nature lies solely in freedom; through it we alone can become worthy of any good. But the dignity of a human being (worthiness) rests on the use of freedom, whereby he makes himself worthy of everything good. He makes himself worthy of this good, however, when he also works toward participating in it as much as lies in his natural talents and is allowed by outer agreement with the freedom of others” (Refl. 6856, 19: 181, 1776–78? 1780–89?? CUP trans.).
The key link here seems to be between the capacity one has for freedom, and the perfection and proper use of that freedom. Similarly, in another note, Kant links the absolute goodness in the very existence of freely acting beings with the absolute goodness in them, of their disposition to properly use that freedom which is the goodness of the will. “Nothing is absolutely good (unconditional in every respect) except the existence of freely acting beings, and in these, not understanding, happiness, etc., but the disposition to use well everything that is mediately good. Thus the practical disposition of good aims. This is therefore the goodness of the will” (Refl. 5444 18: 183–184, 1776–78).
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Kain, P. (2021). Motivating Humanity. In: Lyssy, A., Yeomans, C. (eds) Kant on Morality, Humanity, and Legality. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54050-0_6
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