Abstract
The chapter provides an overview of Malpas’ topological thinking both in its connection to hermeneutics and as a particular elaboration on the notion of place. Malpas’ topological approach is presented here as an exploration of the character and structure of human placedness or situatedness. This inquiry into situatedness is argued to be integral of any attempt to lay bare the topological character of understanding and interpretation, and therefore of any project aiming at developing a topological hermeneutics. The chapter offers, firstly, a general outline of Malpas’ topology as a philosophical method that is most characteristic of his sustained commitment to explore topos and the belonging together of time and place (along with space) as proper to human involvement in world. Secondly, the chapter moves on to explore certain core spatial and topological concepts in order to explain what is at issue in Malpas’ topological elaboration of hermeneutics and how this essential connection between place and hermeneutics is construed by him. Finally, the chapter takes up explicitly the question of place and attempts to clarify in what sense Malpas’ treatment of this notion might be said to be distinctive in relation to other contemporary developments.
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Notes
- 1.
Although completing his early university education in New Zealand, Malpas has worked for most of his academic career in Australia, first at the University of New England, in NSW, then Murdoch University in Western Australia, and then at the University of Tasmania where he has been located for the last 17 years. He has also spent time at universities in the US, principally UC Berkeley, and in Germany primarily at Heidelberg, Munich, and Freiburg. He has talked about his personal and academic background more broadly in various interviews (in Ennis 2010, 19–34; Ralon 2010; Babich 2014).
- 2.
In spite of the fact that this is not a frequently practiced dialogue, nor an easy one (as shown by the mutual misreading between the very leading figures of these traditions; see Davidson and Gadamer 1997), Malpas’ continuing engagement with both hermeneutical and phenomenological thinkers and topics (Malpas 1992a, 2002b, 2005a, 2010a, 2015f; Malpas and Zabala 2010, Malpas and Gander 2015), on the one hand, and with modes and concerns characteristic of the Analytic tradition and of philosophy of mind and language (Malpas 1992b, 1998, 1999b, 2011a, b), on the other hand, has been integral to his exploration of topological motives.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
As Malpas has explained in a number of places, he has used both terms (along with the notion of “chorography”; see Malpas 2016a) in an interchangeable way. However, “topography” refers to a more geographic sense of the traditional practice of topographical surveying (Malpas 1999a, 2015a, 39–41, 195ff), whereas “topology” relates directly to Heidegger’s own use of the idea of “topology of being” (as a way of self-characterizing his thinking, “Topologie des Seins”, in Heidegger 2004, 41, 47).
- 6.
Both the question of the “implicit” character of topological issues in post-Kantian philosophy and the allegedly “metaphorical nature” of some spatial concepts or images within it, are issues that Malpas has taken up repeatedly in order to problematize the underlying assumptions attached to those takes on how topological images or figures are to be understood (Malpas 2015a, b, c, 120–22).
- 7.
Here, Kant is presented as having a foundational role in philosophical topography (Malpas 2015b, 115–118; Malpas and Thiel 2011, Malpas and Zöller 2011), and Malpas has construed Kant’s mode of arguing as essentially attuned to an exploration of the interrelatedness of the structure at issue in knowledge and experience. Besides this, Malpas’ topological reading of Nietzsche (Malpas 2014), Hegel (Malpas 2015b, 115–118), or, in a more extensive and detailed way, Heidegger (Malpas 2006, 2012a, 2016d), Gadamer (Malpas 2015e, 2016c) or Davidson (Malpas 1992b, 1999b, 2011a) have aimed at uncovering the essential continuation of the topological orientation of post-Kantian philosophy.
- 8.
- 9.
- 10.
- 11.
See Malpas 2015b, 103; 2015d, 2015e, 2016c. Again, this topological exploration is not something that occurs unnaturally, because the detailed and patient elaboration on implicit spatial elements already at work in Gadamer’s or Heidegger’s thought as to fully develop them and highlight their centrality to the proper understanding of hermeneutics occurs through a very steady argumentative path, as we hope it will be shown in what follows. However, this does not mean that Malpas’ elaboration on such thinkers is not controversial at all (see, for example, criticism on the part of Norris 2004; or the exchange with De Beistegui 2008, 2011; Crowell 2011, and Young 2011; and reply in Malpas 2011a, b).
- 12.
See for example Malpas 2016e. As Malpas has put it: “Understanding the significance of place and situation in relation to hermeneutic thinking is thus to understand something of the very essence of hermeneutics and the hermeneutical” (Malpas 2015d, 354). See Figal 2010 or Makkreel 2015 as examples of hermeneutical works alluded to by Malpas as moving in this same spatial direction and as an explicit thematization of topological concerns within hermeneutics (important differences with Malpas’ topology follow from these authors’ understanding of objectivity and spatiality though).
- 13.
This point emerges from Malpas’ long-standing engagement with Heidegger’s thought and as a particular exploration of the “factical situatedness” of human being in the world such as Heidegger understands it (Heidegger 1999). This is to be understood as a topological elucidation of the nature of the “Da” of Heideggerian “Da-Sein” (see Malpas 2006, 2010a).
- 14.
See Malpas 1999a, 109–156; 1999b for further development on this important point. The nature of the spatiality that is at issue in Malpas’ topology (notably, as this relates to his way of defining subjective, allocentric and objective space) has very important consequences to be drawn as to his treatment of place (Malpas 1999a, 44–71).
- 15.
This is a very important point in Malpas’ argument about hermeneutic situatedness since it is closely related to the notion of truth. This relation of subject to place means that we are called to respond to the places in which we encounter things, others and ourselves (inasmuch as place allows them to appear). “Truth names the demand that is placed on us beyond our own interests, preferences and opinions -the demand that comes from the reality of our inevitable and concrete placedness in a world, as ourselves, and among others.” (Malpas 2010a).
- 16.
- 17.
Although there is insufficient space here to develop it properly, it is worth bringing up the question whether this topological deployment of already implicit spatial elements in hermeneutics means just a sort of thematization that gives continuity to the proper content of hermeneutic core concepts, or rather implies a deep re-elaboration of underlying hermeneutic modes of arguing (that is part of Malpas’ wider rejection of the strong tendency within modern and contemporary philosophy that takes temporality as prior and central to the structure of subjectivity). The way Malpas sometimes draws upon Derridean notions (such as “inscription” or “difference” –differing/deferring) as to rework Gadamerian approach (Malpas 2010a) gives an important clue into this issue as to how is to be interpreted the nature of this re-orientation of hermeneutics. The same might be said as to how Davidson triangulative notions are deployed by Malpas in order to rework Gadamerian conversational model of language (Malpas 1999c).
- 18.
This practical character has been explored by Gadamer, notably through his engagement with both Plato’s dialogic structure (the dialectic questioning to be found in Platonic dialogues) and Aristotelian notion of phronesis or practical wisdom (particularly following Heidegger’s elaboration on this idea through his 1920s works -notably his 1923 lectures; see Heidegger, 1999), and Malpas 2005a, 2015f.
- 19.
- 20.
“Understood in this topological fashion, the transcendental thus concerns not that which goes beyond, the metaphysically transcendent, but rather that which is already given –and so given within the bounds proper to it- and through which a form of transcendence, in Kant’s case the opening up of the world or of knowledge, is made possible.” (Malpas 2010a).
- 21.
Malpas has further elaborated on the idea of “hermeneutical space” (as put forward by Figal 2010, 121–153) by deploying his topological analysis in order to set out the project of a “topological hermeneutics” (Malpas 2015d) that is to be understood as “centered on the issue of the essential grounding of understanding in situation and place” (Malpas 2015d).
- 22.
As Malpas 1999a, 174 has put it: “The differentiated and complex unity of place reflects the complex unity of the world itself; it also reflects the complex unity, given focus through a creature’s active involvement with respect to particular objects and events, that makes for the possibility of memory, of believe, of thought and of experience.” See also Malpas 2012a, 55–6: “Topos refers us not to a subjectum, but rather to that domain of interrelatedness in which the very things themselves come to appearance, and which does not itself appear other than in and through such appearing.”. See also Malpas 2015f for important remarks about why the language of place (as, for example, displayed in Heideggerian commitment to poetic language) cannot be treated as just metaphorical/metaphysical.
- 23.
Although there is always in Malpas’ texts some sort of allusion to this debate, the question has been more explicitly taken up by Malpas 2012b, 2015a, 2016f. Geographers’ treatment of spatial concepts figure prominently in Malpas’ recent engagement with these debates, as geographers have persistently try to develop critical and theoretical modes of arguing (typically constructivist) about place and space. See Puente-Lozano 2015, where I have attempted at showing the relevance of Malpas’ arguments in identifying some of the main pitfalls of dominant geographic views on place.
- 24.
Malpas has commented not only on the work of celebrated geographers such as D. Massey, D. Harvey or E. Soja, but also on so-called “spatial thinkers” such as Deleuze & Guattari, Lefebvre, Foucault or Sloterdijk.
- 25.
This is the case of much contemporary Anglophone geographic writing about space. Claims about the necessity for geography to provide itself with its own conceptual foundations have persistently run across the field over the last five decades, and this has typically adopted the form of a claim about the necessity for developing a theory of space. Paradoxically, the more this attempt has been pursued, the more constructivist modes of arguing have dominated the field, and thus the more any substantive treatment of place or space have been undermined and hindered by those very epistemological and ontological stances (See Puente-Lozano 2011, 2015 for further development on this).
- 26.
See Malpas 1999a, 29–31. This also implies important criticism about much of what is commonly said about “sense of place” or “genius loci” (Malpas 2015g), notably in their connection to the idea of the extraordinariness (as the dominant way of understanding the singularity of place). Dominant forms of conceiving of “sense of place” move the focus away from the ordinary and the mundane (being the most basic and fundamental forms of our being-in-place), and therefore weaken our understanding of placedness and what is at issue in human situatedness.
- 27.
See Malpas 2016f, where he has brilliantly and sharply captured the argumentative structure of dominant constructivist modes of approach. He has summarized the argumentative strategy of many constructivist treatments of place as providing a simple but effective explanation about the fundamental link existing between the negative effects that particular places bring about and the discursive formation to which certain conceptions of place belong. What is implied in such mode of arguing is that reorienting such discursive structures (away from place, or toward new spatial conceptual configurations) would be the key to avoiding certain negative political or ethical effects associated with place.
- 28.
In this respect, Levinas is presented in Malpas analysis as the paradigmatic case of a contemporary thinker committed to ethics as incompatible with any prioritization of attachment to place. Also Kristeva or Nussbaum (as representative of certain form of cosmopolitism), along with utilitarian stances are analyzed as examples of ethical eschewing of local attachments. Against these miscontruals of place and identity Malpas has tirelessly argued as to lay bare the extent to which the character of our very human situatedness implies that identity always remain open to determination (Malpas 2012c, 2015g). Placing is as much about bounding and enclosing as it is about opening and connecting.
- 29.
As one within which “space appears as a swirl of flows, networks and trajectories, as a chaotic ordering that locate and dislocates, and as an effect of social processes that is itself spatially dispersed and distributed.” (Malpas 2012c, 228). This is most evident in the work of authors such as Massey, Amin, Thrift or other geographers associated with a so-called “topological turn” (one quite different from Malpas topology; see Allen 2011a, b; Paasi 2011), which has developed around recent reworkings of the idea of scale on the basis of the so-called “flat ontologies” (see Collinge, 2006; Springer, 2014), and also the prioritization of networks and flows against territories and topographical ideas of places as contained and bounded spaces. See Malpas 2015a, where he has taken up these debates. Place appears in such relational views as just a mere effect of “relational convergence” or merely “points of linear intersection” (Malpas 2012c, 229).
- 30.
This is what he has couched as place’s nested character or structure (Malpas 1999a, 101–6). “Places contain sets of interconnected locations that are nested within those places such that […] I can grasp the interconnected character of a variety of locations within my current location. Places also open out to sets of other places through being nested, along with those places, within a larger spatial structure or framework of activity.” (Malpas 1999a, 195).
- 31.
See Malpas (2015a, 206ff). Malpas has drawn upon Aristotelian idea of “topos”, as a bounding surface (and limit as that which allows for the difference between inner and outer to emerge), along with Platonic sense of “chora” as a sustaining ground (Malpas 2016a) in order to elaborate on this. Moreover, Malpas has extensively reflected on Heidegger’s famous statement about boundary as “not that at which something stops but […] that from which something begins its presencing” (Heidegger 1971, 154).
- 32.
The idea of “emergence” is also central to this argument (see Malpas 2012c, 236).
- 33.
This poem is alluded to in Malpas 2012a, v, 267, when reflecting on the topos of thinking. For Malpas, philosophy and any form of thinking begin out of a wonder that is not related to the extraordinary but rather emerges in the midst of the ordinary and the most mundane. Bringing to awareness this very ordinary place within which thinking occurs is the fundamental task of any explorer of the proper topos of thinking: “the place in which [thinking] already finds itself, which it never properly leaves, and in which there is always something further to explore.” (Malpas 2012a, 266–7).
- 34.
This notion of “impenetrability” is very much tied to the concept of “opacity” (and to other related terms such as “obscurity” or “density”), as central to Malpas’ thinking on place (Malpas 1999a, 19–43) and to his elaboration on the kind of situatedness that it has been at issue here (Malpas 2012a, 261ff; 2002a; 2015g). It is not by chance that Ed Casey has refer to Malpas’ work on place as casting “the most light into [the] darkest corners” of such an elusive, historically neglected and misunderstood concept as place (Casey 2001, 225). The “pervasive” and “fundamental” character of topos is what makes it such an “elusive subject” (Casey 2001 and Malpas 2001).
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Puente-Lozano, P. (2017). Jeff Malpas: From Hermeneutics to Topology. In: Janz, B. (eds) Place, Space and Hermeneutics. Contributions to Hermeneutics, vol 5. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52214-2_22
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