Abstract
In the secondary spectrum market, more and more primary users (PUs) release their idle spectrum to secondary users (SUs). While some of the existing auction mechanisms are truthful, few of them emphasize achieving a high usage rate. Even the SUs get the channel they require, the spectrum resource is still wasted in the spare time. In this paper, we propose a Reusable Truthful Double Auction (RTDA) mechanism for spectrum management, which considers temporal reuse and improve the usage rate significantly. Mathematical inference and game theory is used to prove that RTDA is economic-robust. The simulation results show that RTDA significantly improves the spectrum usage rate. In certain scenario, the usage rate can reach up to \(100\%\).
Access provided by Autonomous University of Puebla. Download to read the full chapter text
Chapter PDF
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Babaioff, M., Nisan, N.: Concurrent auctions across the supply chain. In: Proceedings of the 3rd ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC 2001, pp. 1–10. ACM, New York (2001)
Feng, X., Chen, Y., Zhang, J., Zhang, Q., Li, B.: TAHES: truthful double auction for heterogeneous spectrums. In: 2012 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM, pp. 3076–3080, March 2012
Gopinathan, A., Li, Z.: Strategyproof auctions for balancing social welfare and fairness in secondary spectrum markets. In: 2011 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM, pp. 3020–3028, April 2011
Huang, J., Berry, R., Honig, M.: Auction mechanisms for distributed spectrum sharing. In: Proceedings of 42nd Allerton Conference (2004)
Huang, Q., Tao, Y., Wu, F.: Spring: a strategy-proof and privacy preserving spectrum auction mechanism. In: 2013 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM, pp. 827–835, April 2013
Klemperer, P.: What really matters in auction design. The Journal of Economic Perspectives 16(1), 169–189 (2002)
Lin, P., Feng, X., Zhang, Q., Hamdi, M.: Groupon in the air: a three-stage auction framework for spectrum group-buying. In: 2013 Proceedings IEEE, pp. 2013–2021, April 2013
Ramanathan, S.: A unified framework and algorithm for (t/f/c)dma channel assignment in wireless networks. In: Proceedings IEEE Sixteenth Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies. Driving the Information Revolution, INFOCOM 1997, vol. 2, pp. 900–907, April 1997
Wang, S., Xu, P., Xu, X., Tang, S., Li, X., Liu, X.: TODA: truthful online double auction for spectrum allocation in wireless networks. In: 2010 IEEE Symposium on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum, pp. 1–10, April 2010
Wurman, P.R., Wellman, M.P., Walsh, W.E.: A parametrization of the auction design space. Games and Economic Behavior 35(1C2), 304–338 (2001)
Xu, P., Xu, X., Tang, S., Li, X.Y.: Truthful online spectrum allocation and auction in multi-channel wireless networks. In: 2011 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM, pp. 26–30, April 2011
Yang, D., Fang, X., Xue, G.: Truthful auction for cooperative communications. In: Proceedings of the Twelfth ACM International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing, MobiHoc 2011, pp. 9:1–9:10. ACM, New York (2011)
Zhou, X., Gandhi, S., Suri, S., Zheng, H.: eBay in the sky: strategy-proof wireless spectrum auctions. In: Proceedings of the 14th ACM International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking, MobiCom 2008, pp. 2–13. ACM, New York (2008)
Zhou, X., Zheng, H.: TRUST: a general framework for truthful double spectrum auctions. In: IEEE INFOCOM 2009, pp. 999–1007, April 2009
Zhu, Y., Li, B., Li, Z.: Core-selecting combinatorial auction design for secondary spectrum markets. In: 2013 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM, pp. 1986–1994, April 2013
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2015 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
About this paper
Cite this paper
Tian, F., Li, D., Li, S., Wang, L., Jin, N., Sun, L. (2015). RTDA: A Novel Reusable Truthful Double Auction Mechanism for Wireless Spectrum Management. In: Wang, Y., Xiong, H., Argamon, S., Li, X., Li, J. (eds) Big Data Computing and Communications. BigCom 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9196. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-22047-5_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-22047-5_2
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-22046-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-22047-5
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)