Abstract
Doubts have been raised regarding the appropriate framework to address civil or criminal liability for damage or wrongful results caused by autonomous systems. These doubts present an opportunity to revisit several customary prerequisites for imposing liability, notably the significance of wrongdoing in general, which is a key element for both non-contractual liability and criminal liability. In dilemmatic situations (i.e. life versus life cases) arising from autonomous systems, many of the potential answers to ascertain potential criminal liability (of the producer, programmer, or operator) seem to depend on a clear distinction between unlawfulness and culpability. This paper reviews traditional and recent proposals to explain the concept of wrongdoing and discusses whether such proposals in general would help to resolve liability claims for damage or wrongful results caused by autonomous systems. Regarding specifically criminal liability, it is emphasized that Pawlick’s proposal of a citizen’s criminal law, despite its added value and the author’s intention to simplify the general theory of crime, nevertheless raises identical or greater difficulties than traditional conceptions of what is criminal wrongdoing in this connection. Therefore, the paper concludes that the answers to dilemmatic situations arising from autonomous systems must be found in other conceptions of criminal wrongdoing, as Pawlick’s proposal would fare no better (in this respect) than the traditional ones.
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Notes
- 1.
On the topic, see, in the German literature, inter alia: Thöne (2020), including a discussion of whether a fault-based model of responsibility will be suitable for the allocation of responsibility involving autonomous systems and admitting that it may require selective additions, as well as a unified approach at the level of European Union law; Hinze (2021); Ringlage (2021) and Sommer (2020) all making interesting lege ferenda proposals; and, more recently, Rosenberger (2022). Rosenberger’s work discusses to what extent the general regulations on liability in interaction with the special regulations included in the Road Traffic Act (Straßenverkehrsgesetz—StVG) for automatized driving may solve the question of liability appropriately and concludes affirmatively, although accepting that a different assessment may be needed as far as other autonomous systems such as Alexa or Pepper. In this respect, Rosenberger admits the possibility—de lege ferenda—of proposed regulatory systems, such as the establishment of an e-Person or the introduction of a new general strict liability offence for autonomous systems. A different approach has been followed by Steege (2022). The author starts by examining whether the regulatory content of the behavioral traffic regulations of the Road Traffic Act (StVG), with the amendments of 2017 and 2021, and the Road Traffic Regulations (Straßenverkehrs-Ordnung—StVO) is sufficient for automated/autonomous driving. He concludes that, notwithstanding Germany’s pioneering role internationally with the amendments of 2017 and 2021, the regulatory content is not sufficient for highly and fully automated and autonomous driving. Then the author tries to show how the legal requirements must be fulfilled according to the relevant traffic regulations. His conclusion is that these regulations seem to have been created in accordance with an anthropocentric principle and for situations of vehicle control by humans, which are influenced by judgment heuristics and social aspects that do not fit well with autonomous vehicles. Finally, by means of the formalization of the law, the author tries to demonstrate that the laws in Germany must be adapted so that automated application of the law will become possible. More so because, in his view, there is much discrepancy between human and machine behavior. In Steege’s opinion, this could be achieved by transforming legal sentences into a formal language with an exact regulatory content (albeit with limits), as well as by reviewing the regulatory content of existing laws, a task that goes beyond the formalization of the law. In Portugal, on the topic of civil liability arising from the use of autonomous vehicles or artificial intelligence systems, see, colorandi causa: Alcaide (2021); Barbosa (2021a); Felício (2019); González (2020).
- 2.
Non-contractual liability may also include other modalities or typologies, such as liability for lawful acts or for sacrifice, which will not, however, be considered here.
- 3.
Wandt (2022), §16/164: „Das Deliktsrecht normiert grundsätzlich eine Haftung für erlittenes Unrecht“.
- 4.
For an explanation of the different assumptions of tort liability in a comparative perspective, see Vicente (2021), pp. 279 et seq.
- 5.
An unlawful breach of duty in the contractual domain is also required, but since justification grounds rarely apply in the contractual area, such requirement is seen by some literature as generally unproblematic—in this sense, see Looschelders (2022a), §24/7.
- 6.
Vicente (2021), p. 281.
- 7.
On the question of whether it must be an absolute right, in the German legal system, in the light of §832, I of the BGB, see Fikentscher and Heinemann (2022), §107/1558 and Wagner (2021), §5/65–66. In Portugal, within the framework of Article 483, paragraph 1 of the Portuguese Civil Code and arguing that there is no reason to exclude other rights (such as credit rights), even if it is more difficult for third parties to violate them, see Cordeiro (2021), p. 415. Vicente (2021), pp. 284–285 points out the situations of family rights as not being absolute, although their violation can generate civil liability and raises doubts about the inclusion of credit rights in Article 483, paragraph 1 of the Portuguese Civil Code.
- 8.
Vicente (2021), p. 285. This further requirement is also linked with the question (also relevant for criminal law) of distinguishing between unlawfulness of the conduct and unlawfulness of the result/success. For such discussion in the German literature, see Fikentscher and Heinemann (2022), §51/596 et seq., and Wagner (2021), §5/11–13. In Portugal, see, for example, Ataíde (2022), pp. 324–328: this author stresses that injuring subjective rights (as well as breaching statutory provisions) must be always a consequence of non-observance of a duty of care.
- 9.
- 10.
Cordeiro (2016), pp. 443–444 e 483.
- 11.
In this sense, see, for German law, Looschelders (2022b), §58/4: „Entsprechend dem grundsätzlichen Bekenntnis zum Verschuldensprinzip setzen fast alle deliktischen Tatbestände des BGB ein rechtswidriges und schuldhaftes Verhalten des Schädigers voraus, wobei das Verschulden bei einigen Tatbeständen“.
- 12.
- 13.
For an explanation of the structure of the German tort model, in parallel with the structure of the criminal model, see Medicus and Lorenz (2008), §32/359, referring: “Dieser Stufenaufbau findet im Zivilrecht seine deutlichste Parallele bei den Delikten, etwa bei §832 I: Erst muss z. B. eine Eigentumsverletzung festgestellt werden. Danach geht es um die Rechtswidrigkeit, also darum, ob die Verletzung verboten war. Erst auf dieser Grundlage einer rechtswidrigen Tatbestandserfüllung kann man schließlich fragen, ob der Verletzter das Verbotene, das er getan hat, auch persönlich verantworten muss.” However, in French law, the requirement of fault is not dissociated from unlawfulness—Vicente (2021), pp. 288–289.
- 14.
Calling into question the idea that unlawfulness is restricted to non-compliance with the rules and arguing that objective and subjective elements may be included in it, see, in Portugal, Cordeiro (2021), p. 415. Ataíde (2022), pp. 328–334 and 380 et seq. sustains the inclusion of subjective elements in unlawfulness (dolus and negligence) which also perform a function in the domain of fault.
- 15.
On the subject, from a comparative perspective and in European law, see Oertel (2010).
- 16.
In a different sense, although only stating that the Gefärhdungshaftung does not require wrongful or faulty conduct, see Brox and Walker (2022), §28/8.
- 17.
Pereira (2021), pp. 451–452. According to the comparative perspective presented by Cappelletti, (2022), the justifications for imposing strict liability that emerge from some legal systems (England, USA, France, and Italy) may include: risk, accident avoidance, the ‘deep pockets’ argument, loss-spreading, victim protection, reduction in administrative costs, and individual responsibility.
- 18.
Leitão (2018), p. 365.
- 19.
Frada (1994), p. 206, and Frada (2006), pp. 4 and 84. This author criticizes the inclusion of the principal’s (“comitente”) strict liability for damages caused by the agent (“comissário”) in the liability for risk, because in his opinion a relation of commission (between the principal and the agent) is not particularly dangerous. In the same sense, see, for example, Barbosa (2017), p. 432.
Silva (1990), p. 426, already wrote: “it can then be concluded that the principal’s liability has an objective nature, because it is independent of his own fault, but it does not truly constitute a case of liability for risk, despite its inclusion in the subsection of the Civil Code regulating the same”.
- 20.
Wandt (2022), §14/9.
- 21.
Cordeiro (2016), pp. 594–595. Further on (p. 219), regarding unjust enrichment, the author clarifies the meaning he attributes to the idea of imperfect unlawfulness: “because it is a situation devoid of subjective elements. True (perfect) unlawfulness presupposes a human act (hence voluntary), contrary to a legal rule; here we do not pay attention to this dimension, but only to the result”.
- 22.
Deutsch and Ahrens (2014), p. 130.
- 23.
In this sense, see, for example, Hirsch (2009), Rn. 429, which defends that the producer’s liability is part of the Gefährdungshaftung, which in turn is part of the strengere Haftung. But, putting the question even in relation to the liability based on Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products, see Wagner (2021), §9/9-11. In German law, producer liability can emerge from §823, I (which is a fault-dependent tort liability—verschuldensabhängige Haftung) or from the europäische Produkthaftungsgesetz (which is a non-fault-dependent liability—verschuldensunabhängige Haftung)—Wandt (2022), §22/4 et seq. The same can be said in relation to Portuguese law: on the one hand, one may speak of a subjective liability of the producer who has as a point of reference the general clause of Article 483, paragraph 1 of the Portuguese Civil Code (the so-called “common liability”), which may require however an improvement of the material evidence law due to the difficulties that the injured party faces in proving the fault of the producer; on the other hand, we may find an objective liability that emerges from the special regime of civil liability enshrined in Decree-Law no. 383/89, which transposed the European Directive 85/374/EEC.
- 24.
Cordeiro (2016), p. 692. In Portugal, Silva (1990), pp. 503–524, characterizes the liability of the producer based on Directive 85/374/EEC as an objective liability, even if imperfect or limited, rejecting the idea that the producer’s defense of the state of the art provided for in the Directive and in the Portuguese regime should be seen as the consecration of a presumption of guilt: a subjective impossibility of the producer is not in question, but a general impossibility of science and technology. In either case, the same author does not fail to recognize (p. 377) that “the common law of producer’s liability has as a point of reference the general clause of Art. 483, paragraph 1”.
- 25.
Leitão (2018), pp. 397–398.
- 26.
Júnior (2010), p. 380.
- 27.
Cordeiro (2016), p. 692. With a different perspective, rejecting that the defense of the state of the art can be framed in the domain of fault (thus, within the framework of a presumption of fault), invoking that what counts “is the absolute impossibility, the general impossibility of science and of technique to discover the existence of the defect, and not the impossibility of the producer” and stressing that the European Directive abandoned “the excessive objectification of fault”, i.e. a fault without culpability, see Silva (1990), pp. 513–516.
- 28.
For a detailed discussion of the liability of the vehicle owner (Fahrzeughalter), of the vehicle driver (Fahrzeugführer), of the motor vehicle liability insurer (Kfz-Haftpflichtversicherer) and of the producer (Hersteller) in Germany, not only according to the StVG, but under the BGB and the Gesetz über die Haftung für fehlerhafte Produkte, see Rosenberger (2022), pp. 84 et seq. and Hinze (2021), pp. 28 et seq. For an Austrian perspective on the matter, especially of the liability of the owner (Halter), driver (Lenker) and producer (Hersteller), see Weichbold (2022), pp. 29 et seq. The topic is also relevant regarding other autonomous systems or other types of vehicles, such as vessels. For a discussion of liability in case of a ship collision involving autonomously operating vessels, see Etzkorn (2022).
- 29.
For example, some have sustained de lege ferenda that legal developments could be made in Germany through the introduction of new liability concepts, namely by: (i) introducing changes and adaptions in the producer’s liability legal framework; (ii) discussing the possibility of an electronic person (elektronische Person or e-Person) and its liability; (iii) resorting to other alternatives such as admitting a robot with limited liability (Roboter mit beschränkter Haftung or RmbH) or other solutions not connected with personification—see Hinze (2021), pp. 190 et seq. and Ringlage (2021), pp. 207 et seq. For a broad or monographic discussion of the topics of artificial legal entities (artifizieller Rechtssubjekte), electronic persons and robots with limited liability in Germany, see Linardatos (2021a), pp. 479 et seq. and Kleiner (2021). With interest see also the explanation of the electronic person alternative included in Reusch (2022), pp. 80–86. In Portugal favorable to the admission of the eperson alternative, see Antunes (2021), but, against, see Pimenta Mendes (2022), pp. 462–464, essentially following the position of Barbosa (who has written ex professo and extensively on the matter in Barbosa (2021b)). Raising the question, see also González (2020), pp. 80 et seq.
- 30.
Barbosa (2021a), pp. 91–109.
- 31.
Although “wrongdoing” and “unlawful” may be used to characterize a conduct that is contrary to the law (in German, in Widerspruch zur Rechtsordnung steht), the terms may be distinguished in criminal law: unlawfulness only expresses the absence of a justification reason to commit a conduct that fulfills the elements of the offense, while wrongdoing may be quantifiable—in this sense, see Murmann (2022), §12/9.
- 32.
For such an exercise, see the various papers (of German and Spanish literature) included in the work organized by Estellita (2019) and also the book of Cramer (2022). In the German literature, on the discussion (which is still in its beginning) around the criminal relevance of the conduct of autonomous systems (such as drones and autonomous vehicles), while rejecting the possibility of punishing machines, and on the collision problems involving programming of autonomous vehicles, with development, see Roxin and Greco (2020), §8/66f e §16/125d-125 s. Such conclusion has been confirmed by Cramer (2022), p. 266 in respect to the discussion of solutions for dilemmatic situations in autonomous driving: “die Diskussion über die Auflösung dilemmatischer Situationen beim autonomen Fahren noch in den Anfängen steht”.
A legal philosophical perspective on this matter can be found in Linardatos (2021b). This author adopts an approach criticizing utilitarianism (as it aims at maximizing the benefits of society as a whole) and favoring instead Rawls’ concept of justice applied to dilemmatic situations, from which he sustains to be possible to extract the only convincing principle: harm minimization. In his opinion, such principle could be implemented in the following way (pp. 111–112): (i) a quantitative weighing goes hand in hand with this principle in cases of life against life; (ii) priority should be given to the protection of humans in the relationship to things and to animals; (iii) hierarchy between action and omission should not be accepted as it obscures individual characteristics; (iv) whenever the concrete consequence of the damage cannot be clearly calculated due to the circumstances, is admissible to select the alternative with the lowest damage potential on the basis of statistical rules with some experience knowledge or, in the lack of such rules, a random heuristic should be used as a fallback option; (v) the primacy of human action must remain, although the situations will rarely be at the actual disposal of humans; (vi) notwithstanding that, safety precautions should be implemented to ensure smooth road traffic—not only through appropriate response systems for functional failures, but also by creating a technical resilience against improper (third-party) intervention.
- 33.
On the philosophical origins of the separation of wrongdoing and culpability, see Mendes (2013).
- 34.
In German law, thus referring to a Grundstruktur of the Deliktsaufbau, see Murmann (2022): §12/1-10. Also recognize this some private law scholars, such as Medicus and Lorenz (2008): §32/359, whom state: „Die klassische Strafrechtslehre prüft das Vorliegen einer Straftat in drei Stufen: Tatbestandsmäβigkeit, Rechtswidrigkeit und Schuld“.
- 35.
The relation between the fulfillment of the elements of the offense (Tatbestandsmäβigkeit) and unlawfulness (Rechtswidrigkeit) was always somewhat troubled in the German context. Essentially, the discussion aimed to know whether the fulfillment of the elements of the offense could be conceived independently of unlawfulness (as a Normwidrigkeit or as containing the Verbotsmaterie) and even what meaning could be attributed to the fulfillment of the elements of the offense when it competed with unlawfulness—Silva Sanchéz (2010), p. 631. In Portugal, also underlining the issue, see, for example, Costa (2017), pp. 241–242.
- 36.
On the theory of personal wrongdoing (die personale Unrechtslehre or die Lehre vom personalen Unrecht) and its links to finalism, see the classic works of Kaufmann (1974), Lampe (1967) and, with other references, Roxin and Greco (2020), §10/89, Kindhäuser and Zimmermann (2022), §5/12, Rengier (2022): §7/4 and Murmann (2022): §13/10. In particular, the latter author emphasizes (in note 25) that it is possible to speak of a subjective conception of the wrongdoing whenever it is at stake (as in finalism) perspectives that place the legal relationships of persons (die Rechtsbeziehungen der Personen) at the center of the theory of wrongdoing. In Portugal, favorable to such as proposal, see Costa (2014), pp. 567 et seq.
- 37.
Mendes (2007), p. 24.
- 38.
Developed on several occasions, namely in (2004), Pawlik (2010, 2012, 2016, 2019). For a general appreciation and review of Pawlik’s work, see Greco et al. (2020) (with a special focus on Pawlik (2012), but also reviewing the main ideas of Pawlik’s thinking); Marteleto Filho (2018) (review of the work of Pawlik (2012)); Engländer (2014) (review of the work of Pawlik (2012)); Kaiser (2006) (review of the work of Pawlik (2004).
- 39.
Already in Pawlik (2004), p. 85, this idea emerges very clearly, when referring to the fact that the maintenance of a state of liberties requires active participation in ensuring the continuous existence of its necessary conditions, to the point of being allowed to speak of a normative duty to contribute to the project of freedom through law. Adding later the following (pp. 86–87): “The specific plus of the wrongdoing of the citizen lies in the violation of law as law, understood as the existence of freedom”.
- 40.
For a more developed analysis carried out by Pawlik about Binding’s contribution to criminal theory, see Pawlik (2020a).
- 41.
In Portugal, see Mendes (2007).
- 42.
Making such clarification, see Pawlik (2016), p. 135.
- 43.
Pawlik (2016), p. 103.
- 44.
- 45.
Pawlik (2016), p. 105.
- 46.
In the words of Duff (2010), p. 293: “Rather than appealing to penal parsimony as a constraint on the otherwise insatiable demands of the criminal justice system, we should develop a positive account of the proper aims of criminal law which shows parsimony, or moderation, to be integral to those aims. We can do this by developing a republican conception of criminal law as a law that citizens impose on themselves”.
- 47.
Pawlik (2019), pp. 52–53.
- 48.
- 49.
Pawlik (2019), pp. 47–48.
- 50.
For a very recent critique of the (restricted/binary) conception of citizenship adopted by Pawlik and other authors, favoring instead a typological conception based on an eminently gradual relationship of citizenship between the State and the person, see Coca-Vila and Irarrázaval 2022.
- 51.
However, also analyzing the position of the excluded, see Pawlik (2020b).
- 52.
Pawlik (2019), pp. 48–51.
- 53.
Vicente (2021), pp. 286–288.
- 54.
- 55.
In this way, see Mendes (2007).
- 56.
Coca-Vila and Irarrázaval (2022), p. 57.
- 57.
With this criticism very clearly, although with a special focus on punishment, see Greco et al. (2020), who, by way of conclusion, writes: “der Mensch, also der in Wahrheit von der Strafe Betroffene, und nicht bloß die Kunstfigur des „Bürgers“, ernst genommen und vor Anmaßungen anderer bewahrt wird. Denn bestraft wird nicht ein Bürger, sondern ein Mensch”.
- 58.
Already so in Pawlik (2004).
- 59.
Moura (2015), pp. 138 and 422.
- 60.
Pawlik (2016), p. 105.
- 61.
Moura (2015), p. 138.
- 62.
Also underlining the difference, referring to a distinction between weak permission, i.e. a general absence of criminal prohibition or a scope of what is not criminally prohibited (in exemptions or offense modification defenses) and strong permission or reason to act (in justification defenses), see Dias (2008), pp. 154–155, and (2016), pp. 225–226.
- 63.
Furthermore, in terms of participation, Pawlik only says that the behavior of the participants (who have helped) is only relevant as a denial of the legal community if the main fact also manifests this denial, otherwise there will be mediate authorship—Pawlik (2010), pp. 133–135.
- 64.
- 65.
For a more developed explanation of Pawlik’s theory of duress, see Pawlik (2015).
- 66.
Pawlik (2016), pp. 136–138.
- 67.
Pawlik (2016), p. 76.
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Pereira, R.S. (2024). Autonomous Systems and Wrongdoing: Revisiting the Meaning of Wrongdoing. In: Moura Vicente, D., Soares Pereira, R., Alves Leal, A. (eds) Legal Aspects of Autonomous Systems. ICASL 2022. Data Science, Machine Intelligence, and Law, vol 4. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-47946-5_9
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