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Autonomous Systems and Tort Law

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Legal Aspects of Autonomous Systems (ICASL 2022)

Part of the book series: Data Science, Machine Intelligence, and Law ((DSMIL,volume 4))

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Abstract

At the present stage of their development, as the European Law Institute pointed out, algorithms have five main characteristics: complexity, increasing autonomy, opacity, openness and vulnerability. Being able to learn through cumulative experience and to take independent decisions and standing as true ecosystems of connected elements, the autonomous systems pose a challenge for the classic tort law remedies. Thus, if damage or harm caused by an autonomous system occurs, who can be liable? In this paper, after showing the difficulties of the classic remedies, we will consider some possible solutions for this problem, examining three separate solutions: the establishment of a fund for the compensation of AI harm; the direct liability of the autonomous systems; and the establishment of a new hypothesis of strict liability.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    ELI (2022), 21 s.

  2. 2.

    ELI (2022), 23.

  3. 3.

    Expert Group on Liability and New Technologies (2019), 17 s.

  4. 4.

    By contrast, see Richards, Neil; Smart William D. (2013); Hubbard’s (2016), 25–50.

  5. 5.

    Nevejans (2016), 6.

  6. 6.

    Karnow (2016), 51–77.

  7. 7.

    ELI (2022), 21.

  8. 8.

    Expert Group on Liability and New Technologies (2019), 17.

  9. 9.

    Richards, Neil; Smart William (2013) 1–25. In the same sense, see Hubbard’s (2016) 25–50. On the contrary, see Karnow (2016) 51. See also Nevejans (2016), 6: “civil liability law, for example, might be less easily applied to developments in autonomous robotics, particularly in a scenario where a machine might cause damage that cannot be easily traced back to human error. Whole chapters on civil liability law might, then, need rethinking, including basic civil liability law, accountability for damage, or its social relevance”; and considerandum AB of the Resolution of The European Parliament of 16-2-2107.

  10. 10.

    Karnow (2016), 63.

  11. 11.

    Karnow (2016), 64.

  12. 12.

    Expert Group on Liability and New Technologies (2019), 19.

  13. 13.

    See Expert Group on Liability and New Technologies (2019), 19.

  14. 14.

    See Expert Group on Liability and New Technologies (2019), 20.

  15. 15.

    See Expert Group on Liability and New Technologies (2019), 21.

  16. 16.

    See Expert Group on Liability and New Technologies (2019), 22.

  17. 17.

    ELI (2022), 23.

  18. 18.

    For more details, see Barbosa (2013). The model we propose has sufficient elasticity to accommodate these complex cases. Thus, however, does not mean that it is not necessary to considerer the specificities of the new technological reality.

  19. 19.

    Neves (1996), 38.

  20. 20.

    See Noorman (2012).

  21. 21.

    See Noorman (2008), 32 and Johnson, Deborah G.; Normann, Merel (2014), 143–158.

  22. 22.

    Noorman (2008), 46.

  23. 23.

    Sullins (2006), 23–29.

  24. 24.

    Shoemaker (2011), 603–632. For a critical of Shoemaker, see Smith (2021), 575–589.

  25. 25.

    See Savigny (1840), 310–313.

  26. 26.

    See Cordeiro (2007), 469-475 and Cordeiro (2011), 545, 676.

  27. 27.

    See Cordeiro (2007), 494; Cordeiro (2011), 573–574; Duguit (1901), 1–3; Wolf (1973), 100.

  28. 28.

    Gierke (2010), 470–475.

  29. 29.

    Cordeiro (2007), 517; Cordeiro (2011), 594.

  30. 30.

    Andrade (1997), 50.

  31. 31.

    See Nevejans (2016), 16.

  32. 32.

    See Nevejans (2016), 16.

  33. 33.

    Teubner (2018), 43 s.

  34. 34.

    Teubner (2018), 36.

  35. 35.

    The type, dimension and extension of damages that arise from a specific activity; the difficulty to prove fault; the importance of the violated values are some of the reasons that we can demand in order to justify it. Damage arising from the use of AI mechanisms fulfil these justifications. The use of AI entities may cause damage, for which a human activity does not contribute, as the new AI entities can act autonomously. And if fault can be discovered in reference to some cases, like when the owner of the robot does not actualize the software or does not accomplish the safety duties in order to guarantee that hackers do not invade the system, in many others situations damage arises without any fault.

  36. 36.

    Expert Group on Liability and New Technologies (2019), 36.

  37. 37.

    Expert Group on Liability and New Technologies (2019), 44–45 and 48.

  38. 38.

    In this sense, cf. ELI (2022), 5.

  39. 39.

    Silva (1999), 612 s.

  40. 40.

    Some authors questioned if software could be qualified as a tangible thing, but this opinion has been rejected. About this, see Voit, Wolfgang; Geweke, Götz (2001), 362; Bydlinski (1998), 305.

  41. 41.

    Silva (1999), 613; Bertolini (2013), 214–247; Koch (2019), 105.

  42. 42.

    ELI (2022), 9 s.

  43. 43.

    ELI (2022), 10–11.

  44. 44.

    ELI (2022), 12.

  45. 45.

    ELI (2022), 12.

  46. 46.

    ELI (2022), 14.

  47. 47.

    ELI (2022), 14.

  48. 48.

    Expert Group on Liability and New Technologies (2019), 43.

  49. 49.

    Expert Group on Liability and New Technologies (2019), 43.

  50. 50.

    ELI (2022), 16–17.

  51. 51.

    Expert Group on Liability and New Technologies (2019), 41.

  52. 52.

    Expert Group on Liability and New Technologies (2019), 41.

  53. 53.

    Koch (2005), 105–106.

  54. 54.

    Expert Group on Liability and New Technologies (2019), 39.

  55. 55.

    Expert Group on Liability and New Technologies (2019), 45.

  56. 56.

    Pagallo (2013), 23, 40, 103–105.

  57. 57.

    See Justo (2017), 31–33; Justo (1997), 27.

  58. 58.

    Pagallo (2013), 103–104.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Law, University of Coimbra, Coimbra, Portugal

    Mafalda Miranda Barbosa

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  1. Mafalda Miranda Barbosa
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Correspondence to Mafalda Miranda Barbosa .

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  1. Faculty of Law, University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal

    Dário Moura Vicente

  2. Faculty of Law, University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal

    Rui Soares Pereira

  3. Faculty of Law, University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal

    Ana Alves Leal

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Barbosa, M.M. (2024). Autonomous Systems and Tort Law. In: Moura Vicente, D., Soares Pereira, R., Alves Leal, A. (eds) Legal Aspects of Autonomous Systems. ICASL 2022. Data Science, Machine Intelligence, and Law, vol 4. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-47946-5_1

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