Abstract
In recent years, the self-representational theory of consciousness emerged as a trend that moves beyond the debates between first-order and higher-order theorists, and the HOP (higher-order perception) versus HOT (higher-order thought) debates among higher-order theorists. This theory seems to offer us a model of consciousness that is closer to truth, but it also has limitations. My study will particularly address these limitations and attempt to overcome them by developing a theory of consciousness that is deeply rooted in the Buddhist epistemological tradition. I will illustrate the dual-aspect structure of consciousness and criticize the self-representational theory for collapsing the distinction between these aspects. This study will lead to what I call a theory of the accumulation of aspects.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
This is especially the case with Gennaro (Higher-order theories of consciousness: An anthology. John Benjamins, 2004) and Van Gulick (2004). Kriegel (2007, 50, 61n78) lists many supporters of the self-representational theory, starting with Brentano (1973 [1874]), followed by phenomenologists Lehrer (1996, 1997) and Smith (1986, 1989), and others including Brook and Raymont (2006), Caston (2002), Hossack (2002), Kriegel (2003), and Williford (2006). Close variations of this theory are found in Carruthers (2000, 2006), Gennaro (1996, 2002, 2006), Kobes (1995), Kriegel (2005, 2006), and Van Gulick (2000, 2004).
- 3.
See below for more of a discussion on the transparency of experience.
- 4.
Quoted from Kriegel (2009b, 14), who also thinks that a similar expression in Aristotle’s De Anima III.2 (425b11–7) can be read as endorsing self-representationalism.
- 5.
Admitting phenomenal consciousness and then accounting for it in non-phenomenal terms is entirely different from not admitting it at all.
- 6.
Historically the term ākāra-pracaya was a label for the Buddhist epistemological theory of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti created by their Mīmāṃsaka opponent Kumārila. See Hattori (1968, 108–109).
- 7.
Whether it is reflective or pre-reflective is contributed by the intensity and focus of attention. See below for a discussion of this.
- 8.
Historically, this memory argument was taken to be one of the most important arguments for the dual aspects of cognition and the plausibility of self-awareness in the Buddhist epistemological tradition. See Yao (2005, 141–144).
- 9.
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Yao, Z. (2023). Beyond Self-Representationalism: A Neo-Dignāgian Theory of Consciousness. In: Geniusas, S. (eds) Varieties of Self-Awareness. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 121. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39175-0_12
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