Abstract
Some contemporary Western theories of consciousness, such as the higher-order thought (HOT) theory and self-representationalism, hold that there is an implicit (pre-reflective) “self-awareness” that accompanies each conscious mental state. Important twentieth-century historical figures, such as Sartre and Brentano, have also embraced a similar position. This view, or something very close to it, can also be found centuries earlier in some Indian philosophy (such as in Dignāga) where conscious experience is thought of as “inherently reflexive” and cognition is understood to have a “dual-aspect.” In this chapter, I lay out some of the similarities and differences among these views and explain why I prefer the way that HOT theory accounts for such self-awareness as compared to the others, including HOT theory’s ability to avoid the much-discussed infinite regress threat and its more plausible explanation of introspection. I also explain how HOT theory, like many Buddhist accounts, is not logically committed to the existence of an enduring substantial “self.”
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Gennaro, R.J. (2024). Consciousness and Implicit Self-Awareness: Eastern and Western Perspectives. In: Satsangi, P.S., Horatschek, A.M., Srivastav, A. (eds) Consciousness Studies in Sciences and Humanities: Eastern and Western Perspectives. Studies in Neuroscience, Consciousness and Spirituality, vol 8. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13920-8_4
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