Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Precautionary Antitrust: A Precautionary Tale in European Competition Policy

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
Law and Economics of Regulation

Part of the book series: Economic Analysis of Law in European Legal Scholarship ((EALELS,volume 11))

Abstract

European competition policy applied to digital markets is at a turning point: new regulatory tools are under consideration and traditional antitrust analysis is altered given the new business realities embodied by tech platforms. These envisaged new solutions together with novel antitrust enforcement is justified, on one side, as the appropriate mean to overcome the error of under-enforcement of competition policy in digital markets whereas, on the other side, some criticize this new approach as erring in over-enforcement. Both claims that the other side is erring in its antitrust analysis are unsatisfactory. Each stance does not err, but rather, epitomise preferences towards regulation. This chapter argues and evidences that the new approach advocated by the European Commission for competition enforcement towards digital markets illustrates a preference for precaution. In the vein of the precautionary principle, the Commission’s perspective reveals a precautionary antitrust enforcement. It is neither a policy error nor a legal flaw—it is a regulatory preference for precaution over innovation and disruption. After having Introduced the Precautionary Principle (Sect. 1), this chapter defines Precautionary Antitrust and evidences it so that it becomes apparent that the European competition policy towards digital markets have adopted a regulatory preference leaning in favour of precaution over innovation (Sect. 2). We then conclude on our suggested explanatory framework as a guiding principle in the foreseeable trends in European and American antitrust enforcements (Sect. 3).

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution

Subscribe and save

Springer+ Basic
$34.99 /Month
  • Get 10 units per month
  • Download Article/Chapter or eBook
  • 1 Unit = 1 Article or 1 Chapter
  • Cancel anytime
Subscribe now

Buy Now

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 189.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 249.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 249.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. 1.

    Garnett and Parsons (2017), Persson (2016), Stefansson (2019), Lardeur (2003), Wiener and Rogers (2002), Vogel (2001a, b), Sand (2000), Slovic et al. (2000) and Shrader-Frechette (1991).

  2. 2.

    Purnhagen (2014), p. 454.

  3. 3.

    European Court of Justice such as C-157/96 & C-180/96 (1998) UK v Commission, I-2269, para. 99; Green Paper on the General Principles of Food Law in the European Union of 30 April 1997 (COM(97) 176 final); Bocchi (2016).

  4. 4.

    Manson (2007) and Persson (2016).

  5. 5.

    At the World Trade Organization (WTO ), see Article 5(7) of the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement defines precaution and the Codex Alimentarius, Appendix VIII, Working Principles for Risks Analysis for Food Safety for Application by Governments, CAC/GL 62-2007, para. 12. See Milieu et al. (2011), p. 14.

  6. 6.

    Doyle and Carney (1999).

  7. 7.

    Garnett and Parsons (2017), pp. 502–504; Boehmer-Christiansen (1994).

  8. 8.

    Garnett and Parsons (2017), pp. 502–504; Boehmer-Christiansen (1994).

  9. 9.

    Carter and Peterson (2015).

  10. 10.

    Grant and Quiggin (2013).

  11. 11.

    See London Declaration of 1987; Hague Declaration of 1990; 1985 Vienna Convention; 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.

  12. 12.

    On the distinction between the precautionary logic and the precautionary principle, see Trouwborst (2009b), pp. 113–114.

  13. 13.

    Gray and Brewers (1996); Resnik (2003); Sunstein (2005); Portuese and Pillot (2018).

  14. 14.

    Indeed, Allhoff and Henschke (2018), p. 56; Löfstedt (2014) p. 1090; Garnett and Parsons (2017); Todt and Lujan (2014); Origgi (2014); Milieu et al. (2011), pp. 36–37.

  15. 15.

    The Lancet (2000).

  16. 16.

    See Commission of the European Communities (2000), p. 8.

  17. 17.

    See Commission of the European Communities (2000), p. 7.

  18. 18.

    See, for instances, Directive 2001/18/EC (GMOs); Directive 2009/127/EC (Pesticide Machinery); Regulation (EC) No. 1946/2003 (GMOs); Directive 2011/65/EU (Restriction of Hazardous substances); Regulation (EC) No. 178/2002 (Food safety);Council Regulation (EC) No.708/2007 (Alien aquatic species); Directive 2013/30/EU (Offshore safety); Regulation (EC) No. 1334/2008 (Use of flavorings).

  19. 19.

    Garnett and Parsons (2017), pp. 508–509.

  20. 20.

    C-174/82 (1983) Sandoz BV. ECR 2445.

  21. 21.

    Purnaghen (2014).

  22. 22.

    On the interactions between the precautionary principle and the proportionality principle in practice, see the cases C-343/09 Afton Chemical Limited v Secretary of State for Transport, ECLI:EU:C:2010:419, para. 53; Case 54/85 Ministère Public v Xavier Mirepoix, ECLI:EU:C:1986:123, para. 16; C-504/04, Agrarproduktion Staebelow, ECLI:EU:C:2006:30, para. 40.

  23. 23.

    See also Case T-13/99, Pfizer, 2002 E.C.R. 11-03305; Case C-127/O2, Cockle Fishers, 2004 E.C.R. 1-07405. See MacMaolain (2003); The Lancet (2000); Majone (2002), p. 95; Stokes (2008), p. 496.

  24. 24.

    See Commission of the European Communities (2000), p. 13.

  25. 25.

    See Commission of the European Communities (2000), pp. 13–14; Trowborst 2002

  26. 26.

    Gollier and Treich (2003); Milieu et al. (2011), pp. 40–43.

  27. 27.

    See Commission of the European Communities (2000), where it is argued p. 20.

  28. 28.

    Gollier and Treich (2003).

  29. 29.

    Purnhagen (2014).

  30. 30.

    Persson (2016), pp. 138–139.

  31. 31.

    Peterson (2017).

  32. 32.

    Sunstein (2005) and Turvey and Mojduszka (2005).

  33. 33.

    Allhoff (2009), p. 20; Sunstein (2005); Portuese and Pillot (2018).

  34. 34.

    Laïdi (2019).

  35. 35.

    See Bradford (2020).

  36. 36.

    Wiener and Rogers (2002), p. 318.

  37. 37.

    Orset (2014).

  38. 38.

    Portuese and Pillot (2018) and Orset (2014).

  39. 39.

    Purnaghen (2014), p. 455; Turvey and Mojduszka (2005).

  40. 40.

    Trouwborst (2009a), p. 107; Trouwborst (2009b).

  41. 41.

    European Commission (2019a).

  42. 42.

    European Commission (2019a).

  43. 43.

    European Commission (2019b).

  44. 44.

    European Commission (2019b).

  45. 45.

    European Commission (2019b).

  46. 46.

    European Commission (2019b).

  47. 47.

    European Commission (2019b).

  48. 48.

    European Commission (2019b).

  49. 49.

    European Environment Agency (2013), p. 649; Principle 15 of the non-binding Rio Declaration on Environment and Development; WT/DS26/AB/R, EC—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, para. 123.

  50. 50.

    Valcarcel Siso (2017).

  51. 51.

    Commission Decision of 18 August 1982 (IV/30.6969—Distribution system of Ford Werke AG—interim measures, OJ 1092 L256; Commission Decision of 29 July 1983 (IV/30.698—ECS/AKZO: interim measures), OJ 1983 L252; Commission Decision of 29 July 1987 (IV/32279—BBI/Boosey & Hawkes: interim measures) OJ 1987 L286; Commission Decision of 26 March 1990 adopting (IV/33.157 Ecosystem/Peugeot—Provisional measures); Commission Decision of 25 March 1992 (IV/34.072—Mars/Langnese and Schoeller—interim measures); Commission Decision of 11 June 1992 (IV/34.174—Sealink/B&J—Halyhead: interim measures); Commission Decision of 3 July 2001 (Case COMP D3/38.044—NDC Health/IMS Health: interim measures, OJ 2002 L59).)

  52. 52.

    Case T-184/01 T, IMS Health Inc. V European Commission, II-2351. This case suspended the Commission Decision in COMP D3/38/044 NDC health/IMSHealth: Interim measures, July 3, 2001.

  53. 53.

    Case 792/79R (1980) Camera Care v. Commission, ECR 119; Lang (1981), p. 52; Morris (1985), p. 108; Mantzari (2020).

  54. 54.

    Id. para. 20.

  55. 55.

    Id. para. 27.

  56. 56.

    Mantzari (2020).

  57. 57.

    See Vestager (2017).

  58. 58.

    See European Commission (2020a) and Euractiv (2020).

  59. 59.

    Autorité de la Concurrence (2020) Décision No 20(MC-01) relative à des demandes de mesures conservatoires présentées par le Syndicat des éditeurs de la presse magazine, l’Alliance de la presse d’information générale e.a. et l’Agecne France-Presse, April 9, 2020.

  60. 60.

    Autorité de la Concurrence (2020) Décision No 20(MC-01) relative à des demandes de mesures conservatoires présentées par le Syndicat des éditeurs de la presse magazine, l’Alliance de la presse d’information générale e.a. et l’Agecne France-Presse, April 9, 2020.

  61. 61.

    Autorité de la Concurrence (2020) Décision No 20(MC-01) relative à des demandes de mesures conservatoires présentées par le Syndicat des éditeurs de la presse magazine, l’Alliance de la presse d’information générale e.a. et l’Agecne France-Presse, April 9, 2020 [hereinafter: Autorité de la Concurrence (2020) Décision No 20].

  62. 62.

    Autorité de la Concurrence (2020) Décision No 20.

  63. 63.

    Autorité de la Concurrence (2020) Décision No 20.

  64. 64.

    Autorité de la Concurrence (2020) Décision No 20.

  65. 65.

    European Commission (2020b).

  66. 66.

    German Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy (2017), p. 106.

  67. 67.

    BEUC (2020).

  68. 68.

    Vestager (2019).

  69. 69.

    See, for instances, the Furman Report (2019), BRICS Report (2019) and Cremer Report (2019).

  70. 70.

    See also ECN+ Directive on the 11 December 2018.

  71. 71.

    Trouwborst (2009a), p. 110.

  72. 72.

    Wiener and Rogers (2002), p. 321.

  73. 73.

    See Commission of the European Communities (2000), p. 20.

  74. 74.

    See Commission of the European Communities (2000), pp. 20–21.

  75. 75.

    Wingspread Conference on the Precautionary Principle (1998).

  76. 76.

    See Craig (2019).

  77. 77.

    See Espinoza and Fleming (2019).

  78. 78.

    Cremer Report (2019), p. 4.

  79. 79.

    Furman Report (2019), p. 101.

  80. 80.

    Autorité de la Concurrence (2020), p. 9.

  81. 81.

    C(209/10 (2012) Post Danmark A/S v Konkurrenceradet, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172, para. 20.

  82. 82.

    Akman (2015), Deutscher and Makris (2016), Wright and Ginsburg (2013), Crane (2009), Lande (2001) and Behrens (2015).

  83. 83.

    See Wright and Ginsburg (2013), pp. 2046–2047.

  84. 84.

    See European Commission (2005), pp. 19–20; Akman (2015), pp. 274–280.

  85. 85.

    Wright and Ginsburg (2013), p. 2422.

  86. 86.

    Case AT/39740 (2017) Google Search (Shopping), June 27, 2017.

  87. 87.

    Case AT.40099 (2018) Google Android, July 18, 2018.

  88. 88.

    European Commission (2017).

  89. 89.

    Portuese (2017), Portuese (2018) and Nazzini (2015).

  90. 90.

    Manne and Wright (2016), Kokkoris (2017) and Renda (2015).

  91. 91.

    Kokkoris (2017).

  92. 92.

    Portuese (2017), Portuese (2018) and Hoppner (2017).

  93. 93.

    T-612/17 Google and Alphabet v Commission, 2017/C 369/51.

  94. 94.

    Renda (2015).

  95. 95.

    Portuese (2018) and Nazzini (2015).

  96. 96.

    Kucharczyk (2017).

  97. 97.

    Case AT/39740 (2017) Google Search (Shopping), June 27, 2017, para. 593 et seq.

  98. 98.

    Id. at paras. 597–598; Reyna and Martin (2017) and Iacobucci and Ducci (2019).

  99. 99.

    Manne and Rinehart (2013), p. 2.

  100. 100.

    Portuese (2017), Portuese (2018) and Daly (2017).

  101. 101.

    Bergkamp (2019), pp. 537–539.

  102. 102.

    European Commission (2018).

  103. 103.

    Akman (2018) and Holzweber (2018).

  104. 104.

    Hyrynsalmi et al. (2014).

  105. 105.

    Sidak (2015) and Akman (2018).

  106. 106.

    Todd (2017).

  107. 107.

    Reinhardt (2016).

  108. 108.

    Case AT.40099 (2018) Google Android, July 18, 2018, paras. 155–190.

  109. 109.

    See, in the same vein, Etro and Caffara (2017) and Vezzoso (2018).

  110. 110.

    Sidak (2015) and Hyrynsalmi et al. (2014).

  111. 111.

    Walker (2016), Hyrynsalmi et al. (2014) and Sherr (2011).

  112. 112.

    Hyrynsalmi et al. (2014).

  113. 113.

    Kadar (2019), p. 447.

  114. 114.

    Portuese and Wright (2020), pp. 173–179.

  115. 115.

    Todd (2017) and Portuese (2019a).

  116. 116.

    Case AT.40099 (2018) Google Android, July 18, 2018, para. 773.

  117. 117.

    Portuese (2019a, b).

  118. 118.

    Portuese and Wright (2020), pp. 175–179.

  119. 119.

    Akman (2018) and Todd (2017).

  120. 120.

    Sidak (2015) and Hyrynsalmi et al. (2014).

  121. 121.

    Kastrenakes and Patel (2018) and Portuese (2019a, b).

  122. 122.

    Todd (2017).

  123. 123.

    See Sect. 2 of this chapter.

  124. 124.

    Sidak (2015) and Hyrynsalmi et al. (2014).

  125. 125.

    Portuese (2019b).

  126. 126.

    Akman (2018) and Holzweber (2018).

  127. 127.

    Galloway (2017).

  128. 128.

    See, for instance, the US Congress Hearing on July 2020, France 24 (2020).

  129. 129.

    Irwin (2019).

  130. 130.

    Manne and Stapp (2019).

  131. 131.

    Stengel (2019).

  132. 132.

    Marty and Warin (2020), Subramaniam et al. (2019), Vezzoso and Nicholls (2019) and Kitsing (2020).

  133. 133.

    Petit (2020).

  134. 134.

    Petit (2020).

  135. 135.

    Bourreau and de Streel (2020), Motta and Peitz (2020), Gautier and Lamesch (2020) and Bryan and Hovenkamp (2020).

  136. 136.

    Ringel et al. (2020).

  137. 137.

    See market definitions in Google Shopping and Google Android decisions discussed above.

  138. 138.

    Stucke and Ezrachi (2020).

References

  • Akman P (2015) The concept of abuse in EU competition law. Hart Publishing, Bloomsbury

    Google Scholar 

  • Akman P (2018) A preliminary assessment of the European Commission’s Google Android decision. CPI Antitrust Chronicle, December 2018, pp 2–7

    Google Scholar 

  • Allhoff F (2009) Risk, precaution, and emerging technologies. Stud Ethics Law Technol 3(2):1–27

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Allhoff F, Henschke A (2018) The Internet of Things: foundational ethical issues. Internet of Things 1–2:55–66

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Autorité de la Concurrence (2020) Contribution de l’Autorité de la Concurrence au débat sur la politique de la concurrence et les enjeux numériques. 19 février 2020. https://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/sites/default/files/2020-02/2020.02.19_contribution_adlc_enjeux_numeriques_vf.pdf

  • Behrens P (2015) The ordoliberal concept of ‘Abuse’ of a dominant position and its impact on article 102 TFEU. In: Nihoul P, Takahashi I (eds) Abuse regulation in competition law, proceedings of the 10th ASCOLA Conference, Tokyo

    Google Scholar 

  • Bergkamp PA (2019) The European Commission’s Google Shopping decision: could bias have anything to do with it? Maastricht J Eur Comp Law 26(4):524–539

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • BEUC (2020) Digital Services Act (Ex-ante rules) and new competition tool, BEUC Contribution to Roadmaps. BEUC-X-2020-059, June 30, 2020. http://www.beuc.eu/publications/beuc-x-2020-059_beuc_response_to_roadmaps_dsa_ex-ante_and_nct.pdf

  • Bocchi M (2016) Is the EU really more precautionary than the US? Some thoughts in relation to TTIP negotiations. EJIL: Talk! August 9, 2016. https://www.ejiltalk.org/is-the-eu-really-more-precautionary-than-the-us-some-thoughts-in-relation-to-ttip-negotiations/

  • Boehmer-Christiansen S (1994) The precautionary principle in Germany - enabling government. In: O’Riordan T, Cameron J (eds) Interpreting the Precautionary Principle. Cameron May, London, pp 31–60

    Google Scholar 

  • Bourreau M, de Streel A (2020) Big tech acquisitions - competition & innovation effects and EU merger control. CERRE Issue Paper, February 2020. https://www.cerre.eu/sites/cerre/files/cerre_big_tech_acquisitions_2020.pdf

  • Bradford A (2020) The Brussels effect: how the European Union rules the world. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • BRICS Report (2019) Digital era competition: A BRICS view. http://bricscompetition.org/upload/iblock/6a1/brics%20book%20full.pdf

  • Bryan KA, Hovenkamp HE (2020) Antitrust limits on start-up acquisitions. Rev Ind Organ 26:1–22

    Google Scholar 

  • Carter JA, Peterson M (2015) On the epistemology of the precautionary principle. Erkenntis 80(1):1–13

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Commission of the European Communities (2000) Communication from the Commission on the precautionary principle. 1 final, 2.2.2000, pp 7 et seqq

    Google Scholar 

  • Craig E (2019) Vestager considers shifting burden of proof for big tech. Global Competition Review. October 31, 2019

    Google Scholar 

  • Crane D (2009) Technocracy and antitrust. Texas Law Rev 86:1159

    Google Scholar 

  • Cremer Report (2019) Competition policy for the digital era. Final Report. European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/reports/kd0419345enn.pdf

  • Daly A (2017) Beyond ‘Hipster Antitrust’: a critical perspective on the European Commission’s Google decision. Symposium on Google Shopping. Eur Competition Regul Law Rev 3:188–192

    Google Scholar 

  • Deutscher E, Makris S (2016) Exploring the ordoliberal paradigm: the competition-democracy nexus. Competition Law Rev 11(2):181

    Google Scholar 

  • Doyle A, Carney T (1999) Precaution and prevention: giving effect to article 130r without direct effect. Eur Energy Environ Rev 8(2):44–47

    Google Scholar 

  • Espinoza J, Fleming S (2019) Margrethe Vestager eyes toughening ‘burden of proof’ for Big Tech. Financial Times. October 30, 2019

    Google Scholar 

  • Etro F, Caffara C (2017) On the economics of the Android case. Eur Competition J 13(2-3):282–313

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Euractiv (2020) Commission charts new competition tool ‘fit for the digital age’. Euractiv, June 12, 2020. https://www.euractiv.com/section/digital/news/commission-charts-new-competition-tool-fit-for-the-digital-age/

  • European Commission (2005) Discussion paper on the application of article 82 of the treaty to exclusionary abuses. December 2005

    Google Scholar 

  • European Commission (2017) Antitrust: Commission fines Google €2.42 billion for abusing dominance as search engine by giving illegal advantage to own comparison shopping service. Press Release, June 27, 2017

    Google Scholar 

  • European Commission (2018) Antitrust: Commission fines Google €4.34 billion for illegal practices regarding Android mobile devices to strengthen dominance of Google’s search engine. Press Release, IP/18/4581

    Google Scholar 

  • European Commission (2019a) Antitrust: Commission imposes interim measures on Broadcom in TV and modem chipset markets. Press Release, 16 October 2019

    Google Scholar 

  • European Commission (2019b) Antitrust: Commission opens investigation into Broadcom and sends statement of objections seeking to impose interim measures in TV and modem chipsets markets. Press Release, 26 June 2019

    Google Scholar 

  • European Commission (2020a) Antitrust: Commission consults stakeholders on a possible new competition tool. Press Release IP/20/977

    Google Scholar 

  • European Commission (2020b) Inception Impact Assessment - Digital Services Act package: Ex ante regulatory instrument for large online platforms with significant network effects acting as gatekeepers in the European Union’s internal market. Ares(2020)2877647, June 2, 2020

    Google Scholar 

  • European Environment Agency (2013) Late lessons from early warnings II: science, precaution and innovation. EEA Report 1/2013

    Google Scholar 

  • France 24 (2020) Congress panel concludes GAFA companies have monopoly power, July 30, 2020. https://www.france24.com/en/video/20200730-congress-panel-concludes-gafa-companies-have-monopoly-power

  • Furman Report (2019) Unlocking digital competition - report of the digital competition expert panel. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/785547/unlocking_digital_competition_furman_review_web.pdf

  • Galloway S (2017) The four: the hidden DNA of Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google. Random House Large Print, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Garnett K, Parsons DJ (2017) Multi-case review of the application of the precautionary principle in European Union Law and Case. Risk Anal 37(3):502–516

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gautier A, Lamesch J (2020) Mergers in the digital economy. CESifo Working Paper, No. 8056. https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/215058/1/cesifo1_wp8056.pdf

  • German Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy (2017) White paper - digital platforms. digital regulatory policy for growth, innovation, competition and participation. https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/EN/Publikationen/white-paper.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2

  • Gollier C, Treich N (2003) Decision-making under scientific uncertainty - the economics of the precautionary principle. J Risk Uncertainties 27:77–103

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Grant S, Quiggin J (2013) Inductive reasoning about unawareness. Econ Theory 54(3):717–755

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gray JS, Brewers JM (1996) Towards a scientific definition of the precautionary principle. Mar Pollut Bull 32(11):768

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Holzweber S (2018) Tying and bundling in the digital era. Eur Competition J 14(2-3):342–366

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hoppner T (2017) Duty to treat downstream rivals equally: (merely a natural remedy to Google’s monopoly leveraging abuse). Eur Competition Regul Law Rev 3:208–222

    Google Scholar 

  • Hyrynsalmi S, Suominen A, Mäkilä T, Knuutila T (2014) The emerging application ecosystems: an introductory analysis of Android ecosystem. Int J E-Bus Res 10(2):61–81

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Iacobucci E, Ducci F (2019) The Google search case in Europe: tying and the single monopoly profit theorem in two-sided markets. Eur J Law Econ 47:15–42

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Irwin N (2019) It’s a winner-take-all world, whether you like it or not. The Atlantic, June 17, 2019

    Google Scholar 

  • Kadar M (2019) Article 102 and exclusivity rebates in a post-intel world: lessons from the Qualcomm and Google Android cases. J Eur Competition Law Pract 10(7):439–447

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kastrenakes J, Patel N (2018) Google will start charging Android device manufacturers fee for using its apps in Europe. The Verge, October 16, 2018

    Google Scholar 

  • Kitsing M (2020) Scenarios for digital platform ecosystems. In: 5th international conference on computer and communication systems (ICCCS), IEEE, pp 453–457

    Google Scholar 

  • Kokkoris I (2017) The Google case in the EU: is there a case? Antitrust Bull 62(2):313

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kucharczyk J (2017) When product innovation becomes a competition law infringement: preliminary thoughts on the Google Shopping Decision, symposium on Google Shopping Decision. Eur Competition Regul Law Rev 3:193–197

    Google Scholar 

  • Laïdi Z (2019) The hardening of soft power. Project Syndicate, November 4, 2019. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/hardening-of-soft-power-by-zaki-laidi-2019-11?barrier=accesspaylog

  • Lande RH (2001) Consumer choice as the ultimate goal of antitrust. Univ Pittsburgh Law Rev 62(3):503

    Google Scholar 

  • Lang JT (1981) The powers of the commission to order interim measures in competition cases. Common Mark Law Rev 18:49–61

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lardeur KH (2003) The introduction of the precautionary principle into EU law: a pyrrhic victory for environmental and public health law? Decision-making under conditions of complexity in multi-level political systems. Common Mark Law Rev 40:1455

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Löfstedt RE (2014) A possible way forward for evidence-based and risk-informed policy-making in Europe: a personal view. J Risk Res 17(9):1089–1108

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • MacMaolain C (2003) Using the precautionary principle to protect human health: Pfizer v Council. Eur Law Rev 28:723

    Google Scholar 

  • Majone G (2002) What price safety? The precautionary principle and its policy implications. Common Mark Stud 40:89

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Manne G, Rinehart W (2013) The market realities that undermined the FTC’s antitrust case against Google. Harvard Journal of Law & Technology. Occasional Paper Series - July 2013

    Google Scholar 

  • Manne G, Stapp A (2019) This too shall pass: unassailable monopolies that were, in hindsight, eminently assailable. Truth on the Market Blog, April 1, 2019. https://truthonthemarket.com/2019/04/01/this-too-shall-pass-unassailable-monopolies-that-were-in-hindsight-eminently-assailable/

  • Manne G, Wright J (2016) Google and the limits of antitrust: the case against the case against Google. Harv J Law Public Policy 34:171–244

    Google Scholar 

  • Manson NA (2007) The concept of irreversibility: its use in the sustainable development and precautionary principle literatures. Electron J Sustain Dev 1:3–15

    Google Scholar 

  • Mantzari D (2020) Interim measures in EU competition cases: origins, evolution and implications for digital markets. CLES Research Paper Series 1/2020

    Google Scholar 

  • Marty F, Warin T (2020) Innovation in digital ecosystems: challenges and questions for competition policy. No 2020s-10, CIRANO

    Google Scholar 

  • Milieu, TMC Asser Instituut, Pace (2011) Consideration on the application of the precautionary principle in the chemicals sector. Final Report. August 2011

    Google Scholar 

  • Morris V (1985) Interim measures in EEC competition cases. Int Tax Bus Lawyer 3:102–118

    Google Scholar 

  • Motta M, Peitz M (2020) Big tech mergers. Information Economics and Policy. 100868

    Google Scholar 

  • Nazzini R (2015) Google and the (ever-stretching) boundaries of Article 102. J Eur Competition Law Pract 6:301

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Origgi G (2014) Fear or principles? A cautious definition of the precautionary principle. Mind Soc 13(2):1–11

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Orset C (2014) Innovation and the precautionary principle. Econ Innov New Technol 23(8):780–801

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Persson E (2016) What are the core ideas behind the precautionary principle? Sci Total Environ 557–558:134–141

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Peterson M (2017) Yes, the precautionary principle is incoherent. Risk Anal 37(1):2035–2038

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Petit N (2020) Big tech and the digital economy: the moligopoly scenario. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Portuese A (2017) Fine is only one click away - symposium on the Google Shopping Decision. Eur Competition Regul Law Rev 3(2017):1–6

    Google Scholar 

  • Portuese A (2018) When demotion is competition: algorithmic antitrust illustrated. The Google Shopping Decision. Concurrences. No-2018: 26–29

    Google Scholar 

  • Portuese A (2019a) The rise of precautionary antitrust: an illustration with the EU Google Android decision. CPI EU Column, November, 17, 2019

    Google Scholar 

  • Portuese A (2019b) Google AdSense for search: fines always come in threes. CPI EU Column, 29, April 2019

    Google Scholar 

  • Portuese A, Pillot J (2018) The case for an innovation principle: a comparative law & economics analysis. Manchester J Int Econ Law 15:214–237

    Google Scholar 

  • Portuese A, Wright J (2020) Antitrust populism: towards a taxonomy. Stanf J Law Bus Financ 25:131–181

    Google Scholar 

  • Purnhagen K (2014) The behavioural law and economics of the precautionary principle in the EU and its impact on internal market regulation. J Consumer Policy 37:453–464

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Reinhardt K (2016) Google cites Apple competition in EU Android dispute. Investor’s Business Daily, November 10, 2016

    Google Scholar 

  • Renda A (2015) Searching for harm or harming search ? A look at the European Commission’s antitrust investigations against Google. CEPS Report No 118, September 2015

    Google Scholar 

  • Resnik D (2003) Is the precautionary principle unscientific? Stud Hist Philos Sci, Part C: Stud Hist Philos Biol Biomed Sci 34:329–344

    Google Scholar 

  • Reyna A, Martin D (2017) Online gatekeeping and the Google Shopping Antitrust Decision: the beginning of the end or the end of the beginning? Symp Google Shopping Eur Competition Regul Law Rev 3:204–207

    Google Scholar 

  • Ringel M, Baeza R, Panandiker R, Harnoss JD (2020) In innovation, big is back. Boston Consulting Group, June 2020. https://image-src.bcg.com/Images/BCG-Most-Innovative-Companies-2020-Jun-2020-R-4_tcm9-251007.pdf

  • Sand PH (2000) The precautionary principle: a European perspective. Hum Ecol Risk Assess 6:455–458

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sherr I. (2011) Google’s Android updates increase competition with Apple. Dow Jones Institutional News. May 10, 2011

    Google Scholar 

  • Shrader-Frechette KS (1991) Risk and rationality: philosophical foundations for populist reforms. University of California Press, Berkeley

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Sidak JG (2015) Do free mobile apps harm consumers? San Diego Law Rev 52:619–694

    Google Scholar 

  • Slovic P, Flynn J, Mertz CK et al (2000) Nuclear power and the public: a comparative study of risk perception in France and the United States. In: Renn O, Rohrmann O (eds) Cross-cultural risks perception: a survey of empirical studies. Kluwer Academic Press, Dordrecht, pp 55–102

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Stengel J (2019) Apple, Google and other titans are snatching up start-ups to fuel innovation. The secret behind their successful corporate coupling. CNBC, September 23, 2019. https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/23/why-apple-google-are-snatching-up-start-ups-to-fuel-innovation.html

  • Stefansson O (2019) On the limits of the precautionary principle. Risk Anal 39(6):1204–1222

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stokes E (2008) The EC Court’s contribution to refining the parameters of precaution. J Risk Res 11:491

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stucke ME, Ezrachi A (2020) Competition overdose: how free market mythology transformed us from citizen kings to markets servants. Harper Business, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Subramaniam M, Yyer B, Venkatraman V (2019) Competing in digital ecosystems. Bus Horizons 62(1):83–94

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sunstein C (2005) The law of fear. Beyond the precautionary principle. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • The Lancet (2000) Caution required with the precautionary principle. Editorial 356(9226):256

    Google Scholar 

  • Todd PF (2017) Out of the box: illegal tying and Google’s suite of apps for the Android OS. Eur Competition J 13:62

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Todt O, Lujan JL (2014) Analysing precautionary regulation: do precaution, science, and innovation go together? Analysing precautionary regulation. Risk Anal 34(12):2163–2173

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Trouwborst A (2002) Evolution and status of the precautionary principle in international law. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Trouwborst A (2009a) Prevention, precaution, logic and law. The relationship between the precautionary principle and the preventative principle in international law and associated questions. Erasmus Law Rev 2(2):105–127

    Google Scholar 

  • Trouwborst A (2009b) The precautionary principle and the ecosystem approach in international law: differences, similarities and linkages. Rev Eur Commun Int Environ Law 18:26

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Turvey CG, Mojduszka EM (2005) The precautionary principle and the law of unintended consequences. Food Policy 30:145–161

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Valcarcel Siso RL (2017) Applying precautionary measures in antitrust cases. Question for written answer E-004559/2017. European Parliament. Rule 130, PE 607.713

    Google Scholar 

  • Vestager M (2017) Answer on behalf of the Commission. E-004559/2017, European Parliament, September 21, 2017

    Google Scholar 

  • Vestager M (2019) Digital power at the service of humanity. Conference on competition and digitisation, Copenhagen, November 29, 2019

    Google Scholar 

  • Vezzoso S (2018) Android and forking restrictions: on the hidden closedness of ‘Open’. Mark Competition Law Rev 11(2):17–45

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Vezzoso S, Nicholls R (2019) Decentralised digital ecosystems and competition law: a conceptual framework. SSRN 3484479

    Google Scholar 

  • Vogel D (2001a) Risk regulation in contemporary Europe: an American perspective. Presentation at the Center for Analysis of Risk and Regulation. London School of Economics, 29 January 2001

    Google Scholar 

  • Vogel D (2001b) Ships passing in the night: the changing politics of risk regulation in European and the United States. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. European University Institute, Working Paper 2001/16

    Google Scholar 

  • Walker K (2016) Android’s model of open innovation. Google Europe Blog, April 20, 2016

    Google Scholar 

  • Wiener J, Rogers M (2002) Comparing precaution in the United States and Europe. J Risk Res 5(4):317–349

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wingspread Conference on the Precautionary Principle (1998) Consensus statement on the January 26, 1998. https://www.sehn.org/sehn/wingspread-conference-on-the-precautionary-principle

  • Wright J, Ginsburg D (2013) The goals of antitrust: welfare Trumps choice. Fordham Law Rev 81:2405–2423

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Antitrust and Innovation Policy, Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, Washington, DC, USA

    Aurelien Portuese

Authors
  1. Aurelien Portuese
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Law, University of Lucerne, Lucerne, Switzerland

    Klaus Mathis

  2. School of Law, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN, USA

    Avishalom Tor

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2021 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this paper

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this paper

Portuese, A. (2021). Precautionary Antitrust: A Precautionary Tale in European Competition Policy. In: Mathis, K., Tor, A. (eds) Law and Economics of Regulation. Economic Analysis of Law in European Legal Scholarship, vol 11. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70530-5_10

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70530-5_10

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-70529-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-70530-5

  • eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation