Abstract
Watsuji Tetsurō’s ethics as a study of human relationships or of persons as between-ness (aidagara) is often conceived as a critical, but fruitful, development in phenomenological studies. However, in the last chapter of Ethics as a Study of Human Beings, Watsuji evidently claims that hermeneutic and phenomenological methods are incompatible and that phenomenology cannot make any contributions to ethics. This chapter aims at presenting Watsuji’s ethics as the product of an opponent of phenomenology rather than a good colleague in good standing in phenomenological circles by considering what precisely his criticism of phenomenology is and to what extent this criticism plays a significant role in the framework of his hermeneutic ethics. This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section reconstructs Watsuji’s criticism of the basic concepts in phenomenology: intentionality and person. The second section illustrates Watsuji’s observation that the phenomenological account of intentionality and person inevitably fails to treat the communal aspects of human beings: further, it explains how this leads to Watsuji’s rejection of phenomenological methods for ethical thinking. The final section assesses his criticism of what he terms the Cartesian individualism of phenomenology and defends the methodological meaning of the Husserlian version of Cartesianism for ethical considerations.
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Notes
- 1.
While there is no English translation of this work, the German translation may be useful for those who are interested (Watsuji 2005).
- 2.
See Watsuji 1992: 395–404.
- 3.
- 4.
See Heidegger’s famous letter to Husserl, as they unsuccessfully tried to complete an article on phenomenology for the Encyclopedia Britannica (Husserl 1968: 601–602).
- 5.
The English translation of Ethics does not include the third chapter of the original Japanese book that focuses on several kinds of moral groups such as the family, economic organizations, or the state.
- 6.
Furthermore, I would like to add that it is fairly clear that the experience of solitude is thought of as a mode of being with others in Heidegger as well as in Scheler. In the analysis of our everyday mode of being-in-the-world, he states, “being alone is a deficient mode of being-with. The very possibility of being alone is the evidence for that” (Heidegger 1962: 157).
- 7.
Cf. Yoshikawa 2011: 190–191.
- 8.
See for example, Bernet 1994.
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Ikeda, T. (2019). Ethics Can Only Be Hermeneutic and Not Phenomenological: A Critical Assessment of Watsuji Tetsurō’s Thesis. In: TAGUCHI, S., ALTOBRANDO, A. (eds) Tetsugaku Companion to Phenomenology and Japanese Philosophy. Tetsugaku Companions to Japanese Philosophy, vol 3. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21942-0_10
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