Modelling of the Force Protection Process Automation in Military Engineering

Abstract

Article deals with a set of problems linked to a Engineer Force Protection Provision algorithm design and evaluation of input factors series. This algorithm is generally compatible with The NATO Force Protection Process Model adjusting it to a part of engineer forces’ decision making process. The base of the algorithm is an application of repeated numerical matrix pattern and its word interpretation. The article provides a thought content being a possible key idea for the suitable software development.

1 Introduction

One of key success conditions of any military activity is own forces casualties reduction to such level that enable them keeping at disposal personal and material resources sufficiency therefore having preponderance over an adversary. Force protection presents a sectional field reflecting the demand mentioned above being multidisciplinary domain implicating all of military branches during a fulfilling of their tasks resulting from their predetermination. General abilities of forces necessary for successful force protection support are illustrated on Fig. 1. Force protection engineer measures are underlined on Fig. 2. The planning and execution force protection philosophy is based on the general force protection model (Fig. 3), presenting a force protection measures projection algorithm including an engineer provisions design. The algorithm is based on a thought model encompassing processes enabling to prevent potential incidents or to react to them by force protection measures adoption. Engineer measures act as possible means for a risk avoidance or it´s reduction. Their content and scope design followed by their planning and execution essentially belong to the risk management acting as a backbone activity of a planning and execution process of force protection measures.

Fig. 1.

(Source: STANAG 2528, p. 20)

General capabilities of forces required for a force protection support.

Fig. 2.

(Source: STANAG 2394, p. 18)

System base of engineer roles and tasks.

Fig. 3.

(Source: STANAG 2528, p. 35)

Force protection model

Analyses procedures of processes leading to particular engineer force protection measure design had demonstrated that a specific engineer risk management algorithm based on above mentioned general force protection model has not been still exist. It has created an opportunity to develop such algorithm therefore to fill an “empty area” in the mentioned sphere.

2 Appropriate Engineer Force Protection Measures Design Process Based on Risk Assessment of Critical Resources Damage

Design process of engineer provisions acting as risk reduction means is illustrated in the chapter. The risk is based on an impact of a particular event reaching from a particular threat occurring and resulting to the loss of particular resource. There are suggested following steps being parts of the process:

• resources criticality assessment,

• resources vulnerability assessment,

• risk assessment,

• appropriate engineer measures design leading to a risk reduction.

2.1 Resources Criticality Assessment

Critical assessment can be based on two main attributes necessary for a source to be critical. Its significance for particular task accomplishment can be considered as the first attribute while its restorability in case of a loss presents the second one. Assessment scales of source´s significance and restorability have been formulated in Tables 1 and 2. Each degree has been determined as based on possible consequences’ alternatives of resources’ loss and their restoration possibilities.

Table 1. Significance degree of a resource (Source: Záleský J, p. 77)

Table 2. Recovery degree of a resource (Source: Záleský J, p. 78)

Value of criticality H_k can be evaluated using a formula

$$ Hk\; = \;STv * STo, $$

(1)

where H_k = criticality value of particular source, ST_v = significance degree of source and ST_o = recovery degree of source.

Possible criticality values determined using the formula mentioned above while taking into account different combinations of significance and recovery degrees have been expressed in Table 3. Each sources’ evaluation using scale of criticality values can be formulated as:

Table 3. Resource criticality value (Source: Záleský J, p. 78)

• extremely critical source (criticality value 20 to 15),

• highly critical source (criticality value 12 to 9),

• moderately critical source (criticality value 8 to 5),

• low critical source (criticality value 4 to 1).

The evaluation enables assessors to prioritize sources and suggest which ones would require adequate engineer force protection measures adoption.

2.2 Resources Vulnerability Assessment

Each resource (without additional protective provision) can be characterized by vulnerability from the point of view of force protection. The character describes its ability to be eliminated or damaged by particular threat. Vulnerability levels can be determined by analogy with recovery and significance levels definitions (see Tables 1 and 2). An example of such expression for combat vehicle BVP-2 has been illustrated in Table 4 and Diagram 1. Based on similar vulnerability evaluations of each asset it is possible to develop and maintain resources´ vulnerability records. For numerical expression and definitions of vulnerability levels see Table 5. For vulnerability assessment of each resource from the point of view of all threats causing its potential loss the following procedure can be used:

Table 4. Vulnerability level assignment from point of view of particular threats (Source: Záleský J, p. 80)

Diagram 1.

(Source: Záleský J, p. 82)

Vulnerability level assignment to particular threats

Table 5. Vulnerability levels of personnel, equipment, material and structures (Source: Záleský J, p. 81)

• specific vulnerability level for each resource from each particular threat identified can be assigned,

• all vulnerability levels can be expressed with a table,

• the table will be then transformed to a diagram,

• based on an interpretation of data from a diagram it is possible to state resource´s level of vulnerability from each threat to consider which potential risk will be significant enough to evaluate its level.

2.3 Risk Assessment

A purpose of a risk assessment is an incident occurrence probability estimation and expected impact forecast [4, 5]. Based on results of such sub assessments it is possible to access specific level of risk of task accomplishing hamper or limitation. Risk assessment process consists of following steps:

• likehood assessment of incident occurrence,

• assessment of incident´s expected impact on a task accomplishing,

• level of risk assessment based on sub assessments of incident´s impact and probability,

• risk prioritization. [4, 5].

Likehood Assessment of Incident Occurrence

Occurrence likehood of particular incident has to be estimated in case of each threat. To express it by quantitative way the Table 6 can be used.

Table 6. Incident likehood categories (Source: Záleský J, p. 83)

Each incident occurrence likehood category can be expressed by percent using rectangular probability distribution as the most useful mathematic tool. Then a numerical expression can be used. Particular incident likehood can be estimated based on its occurrence in a particular operation during directly determined period of time. The time range will depend on particular conditions.

Severity Assessment of Particular Threat Impact on Particular Resource and Its Effect on Particular Task Accomplishment

Particular threat impact of particular resource assessment can be expressed by a level degree describing consequences of such impact on fighting power, combat task accomplishments or for combat readiness.

Following scale of potential consequences can be used for each threat impact severity assessment:

• catastrophic impact,

• critical impact,

• marginal impact,

• negligible impact.

Severity assessment of an incident caused by threat exploiting a vulnerability of particular resource can be based on following two key factors:

• particular resource vulnerability to a particular threat – expressed with vulnerability level STzr,

• particular resource criticality for particular task accomplishment – expressed with criticality value Hk.

Based on those factors severity level can be expressed using following equation:

$$ Dz\; = \;STzr * Hk, $$

(2)

where D_z = severity level, ST_zr = vulnerability level of particular resource and H_k = criticality value of particular resource.

Equation mentioned above is analogical to critical value (H_k) assessment mathematical formula. If particular numerical values expressed in Tables 3 and 5 are put down to the equation the level of severity will assume values expressed in the Table 7.

Table 7. Severity level values (Source: Záleský J, p. 84)

Apart from numerical expression severity value can be described using definitions (see Table 8).

Table 8. Severity level values definitions (Source: Záleský J, p. 85)

Specific Risk Level Assessment

Value of particular risk level of particular task nonfulfillment caused by particular incident impact resulting to a particular resource loss due to particular threat application can be expressed with following equation:

$$ Ru\; = \;Dz * Pv, $$

(3)

where R_u = incident appearance risk level, D_z = severity level and P_v = likehood category.

Putting down numerical values of likehood category (see Table 6) and severity level (see Table 7) to the equation shown above the value of appearance risk level assumes values expressed in the Table 9. Levels of risk can be classified into five categories (see Table 10). Based on such classification and prioritization force protection measures can be designed and implemented to reduce risk level assessed above.

Table 9. Potential values of incident risk (Source: Záleský J, p. 86)

Table 10. Risk level categories (Source: Záleský J, p. 88)

2.4 Appropriate Engineer Force Protection Measure Determination as a Mean to Reduce Value of Risk

Particular engineer force protection measure (set of measures) draft suitable for a particular resource in a logical sequence of risk level evaluated before seems to be a key issue. The measure has to be designed in detail in logical sequence of draft mentioned above.

Measure effectivity presumption has to be based on the fact that the vulnerability level of particular resource achieved after the measure adoption will be lower than the former one existing before the measure adoption. The proper measure design requires applying the resource destruction or damaging risk reduction rate. The rate may be based on the comparison of resource vulnerability before and after the adoption of a particular measure.

For easy mathematical expression of facts mentioned above the vulnerability mitigation coefficient Ksz can be established using an equation

$$ Ksz\; = \;\frac{STzrpre}{STzrpos}, $$

(4)

where K_{zs =} vulnerability mitigation coefficient, ST_zrpre = resource vulnerability level before force protection measure design and ST_zrpos = resource vulnerability level after force protection measure design.

If the numerical value of the coefficient is 1 or more the resource vulnerability level will be the same or higher after measure adoption. If it is lower than 1 the level will be lower too and the measure will be effective.

Reduced risk level of incident causing the loss of particular resource therefore the task completion failure or limitation can be evaluated using an equation:

$$ R\,\bmod \; = \;Ksz\, * \,Ru, $$

(5)

where R_mod = reduced value of incident risk, K_sz = vulnerability mitigation coefficient and R_u = initial value of incident risk before the measure was designed.

The risk can be also reduced by decreasing of a likehood and engineer camouflage and deception measures can be usefull means to reach it but the rate of likehood reduction measure assignment requires more difficult method using mathematical probability models. Therefore, it may be the topic of individual article.

Characteristics of Particular Engineer Measures Supporting Force Protection

Following measures illustrated on Fig. 2 represent the real and tangible part of force protection engineer measures design. If adopted, the elimination risk of personnel, equipment, material, installation, or breakdown of activity critical for mission accomplishment will be eliminated or limited.

Their combination creates the synergic effect increasing the efficiency of force protection more than, if they would have adopted sequentially:

• protective works and field fortifications (chicanes or route access control points, fences, screens, or bunkers surrounding a facility or vehicle, equipment or troop concentration, preparation of sites for tactical air and aviation units, advice/assistance with the construction of protective barriers, perimeter protection systems, support to CBRN collective protection, advice on the construction of field fortifications, construction of command posts, construction of artillery gun positions, tank scrapes and weapon pits, preparation of alternate positions, preparation of sites for tactical air and aviation units, strengthening field fortifications and building reinforcement),

• concealment and deception (terrain camouflage capacity exploitation assessment, assistance with natural camouflage measures design, assistance with artificial camouflage measures implementation, dummy objects building, decoy installation, anti-radar camouflage measures, thermal camouflage measures, explosives usage for the purpose of deception),

• explosive threat management (planning, command, control and training of activities connected in with explosive hazards, EOD activities, engineer part of C-IED),

• support to CBRN (field fortifications building and collective protection means installation, mobility support within contaminated areas and around them, assistance with decontamination points building, assistance with industrial disasters consequences disposal),

• Firefighting (fire protection means installation, assistance with fire extinguishing and localization, fire-fighting equipment building) [2].

The Development Procedure of Engineer Force Protection Measures as Means to Reduce Risk

Rules of suitable engineer force protection measures design mentioned above can be formulated as a procedure that is a result of their applicability research. The procedure consists of following steps:

• 1. Significance degree quantification of particular resource based on particular task analyses (see Table 1),

• 2. Recovery degree quantification of the resource based on its availability and capabilities to distribute it to particular unit or troop (see Table 2),

• 3. Criticality value calculation via Eq. 1,

• 4. Arrangement of all resources necessary for particular mission accomplishment in compliance with criticality value,

• 5. Assignment of all identified threats to each resource that can be threaten by such hazards,

• 6. Vulnerability level assignment of each resource from each threat relevant for it (see Table 5),

• 7. Severity level calculation for each relationship threat-resource via Eq. 2,

• 8. Likehood evaluation of each threat occuring for each resource (see Table 6),

• 9. The risk calculation of event capable to limit or harm the usage of particular resource critical for particular mission accomplishment due to particular threat exploring particular vulnerability. Using of Eq. 3,

• 10. Acceptability evaluation of each risk calculated,

• 11. Prioritization of all risks in compliance with their value,

• 12. Particular engineer measures adoption and their impact evaluation on risk reduction. The evaluation is based on equation vulnerability levels before and after the adoption comparison (see step 6) with usage of Table 5,

• 13. Vulnerability mitigation coefficient calculation using the Eq. 4

• 14. Reevaluation of risk level after the particular measure adoption for each relationship threat-resource. Using Eq. 5,

• 15. Repeated arrangement of all risks in compliance with their value and their acceptance decision or next possible measure adoption.

The process illustrated above even though it seems to be difficult, can be routinely repeated. If some resource is then recognized as low critical and generally available in terms of a price and a quantity it will not be necessary to continue the risk assessment process to protect it. Likewise, if the threat although generally perceived does not affect the resource in particular situation or if the resource is invulnerable by the hazard, it will be void to access the potential risk.

Tables 3, 7, and 9 containing data calculated with an application of particular equations after data from Tables 1, 2, 5, and 6 had been inserted can be used for calculation advance.

Data ranges in Tables 8 and 10 specifying severity and risk levels reach from singular numerical values reaching from insertion of numerical expression of vulnerability levels, significance and recovery degrees to particular equations. The generally accepted axiom has been taken in account, that catastrophical and critical severity levels of risks represent the highest necessity of force protection measures adoption including engineer ones. Therefore, it is the reason why the scale of these severity levels has been developer so wide (Fig. 4).

Fig. 4.

(Source: Author)

Design process of engineer force protection measures as means for risk reduction

3 Conclusion

Process suggested in the article would be useful for each engineer measure development and assessment based on risk level of incident occurring that can cause the particular resource loss or damage originating its usability thwarting for particular mission accomplishment. The process ca be applied also for more measures designed together to accomplish their synergic effect. The area for additional research has been opened therefore. Each step of the process can be used separately too as a mean for decision making process. The potentials to develop software based on mathematic equations and data tables expressed in the article can be taken in account as well together with the usage of existing software having mathematical functions. The example of such software can be MS Office Excel, MS Office Project or MATLAB.