Skip to main content

Statebuilding in Afghanistan: Inertia and Ambiguity

  • Living reference work entry
  • First Online:
The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Peace and Conflict Studies

Abstract

The statebuilding endeavor in Afghanistan as it unfolded after the 2001 intervention following the 9/11 terrorist attacks is put into context in this entry. In order to highlight the problematic assumptions guiding the intervention, Afghanistan’s history of statehood is briefly introduced; then, the main steps to re-establish state domination are outlined. Based on this, the ambiguity and conceptual inertia of the statebuilding project as well as its highly violent and unstable trajectory is analyzed.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Andersson, R., & Weigand, F. (2015). Intervention at risk: The vicious cycle of distance and danger in Mali and Afghanistan. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 9(4), 519–541. https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2015.1054655.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Barfield, T. (2010). Afghanistan. A cultural and political history. Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Braithwaite, R. (2011). Afgantsy. The Russians in Afghanistan 1979–89. London: Profile.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bliesemann de Guevara, B. (2012). Introduction. Statebuilding and state-formation. In B. Bliesemann de Guevara (Ed.), Statebuilding and state formation. The political sociology of intervention (pp. 1–19). Abingdon: Routledge.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Bliesemann de Guevara, B., & Kühn, F. P. (2010). Illusion statebuilding. Warum der westliche Staat so schwer zu exportieren ist. Hamburg: edition Körberstiftung.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bliesemann de Guevara, B., & Kühn, F. P. (2013). The political economy of statebuilding: Rents, taxes, and perpetual dependency. In D. Chandler & T. D. Sisk (Eds.), International statebuilding: Concepts, themes and practices – A Routledge handbook (pp. 219–230). London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dorronsoro, G. (2005). Revolution unending. Afghanistan: 1979 to the present. London: Hurst.

    Google Scholar 

  • Feifer, G. (2009). The great gamble. The Soviet war in Afghanistan. New York: Harper Collins.

    Google Scholar 

  • Finlan, A. (2014). Contemporary military strategy and the global war on terror: US and UK armed forces in Afghanistan and Iraq 2001–2012. New York: Bloomsbury.

    Google Scholar 

  • Goodhand, J., & Sedra, M. (2013). Rethinking liberal peacebuilding, statebuilding and transition in Afghanistan: An introduction. Central Asian Survey, 32(3), 239–254. https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2013.850769.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hastings, M. (2010). The Runaway general. Rolling Stone Magazine, July 10, 2010. Available at: https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/the-runaway-general-the-profile-that-brought-down-mcchrystal-192609/. Accessed 29 Oct 2019.

  • Hönke, J. (2018). Transnational clientelism, global (resource) governance, and the disciplining of dissent. International Political Sociology, 12, 109–124. https://doi.org/10.1093/ips/oly007.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Johnson, C., & Leslie, J. (2004). Afghanistan. The mirage of peace. London/New York: Zed Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kühn, F. P. (2008). Aid, opium and the state of rents in Afghanistan: Competition, cooperation, or cohabitation? Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 2(3), 309–327.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kühn, F. P. (2010). Sicherheit und Entwicklung in der Weltgesellschaft. Liberales Paradigma und Statebuilding in Afghanistan. Wiesbaden: VS.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Kühn, F. P. (2011a). Less is more: International intervention and the limits of external stabilization. Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, 17(1), 62–74. https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2011.559107.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kühn, F. P. (2011b). Deutschlands (Nicht-)Drogenpolitik in Afghanistan. Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, 4(S1), 115–129. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12399-011-0208-5.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kühn, F. P. (2019). Normative scaling and crisis knowledge: The problematic use of selective analogies to compare conflicts. Civil Wars, 21(4), 1–25. https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2019.1654326.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nettl, J. P. (1968). The state as a conceptual variable. World Politics, 20(4), 559–592.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Noelle-Karimi, C., Schetter, C., & Schlagintweit, R. (Eds.). (2002). Afghanistan – A country without a state? Frankfurt am Main/London: IKO Verlag.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rashid, A. (2010). Taliban. The power of militant Islam in Afghanistan and beyond. London: I.B. Tauris.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rubin, B. R. (2002). The fragmentation of Afghanistan. State formation and collapse in the international system. New Haven/London: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schetter, C. (2003). Ethnizität und ethnische Konflikte in Afghanistan. Berlin: Dietrich Reimer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sedra, M. (2013). The hollowing-out of the liberal peace project in Afghanistan: The case of security sector reform. Central Asian Survey, 32(3), 371–387. https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2013.843387.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Semple, M. (2009). Reconciliation in Afghanistan. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shahzad, S. S. (2011). Inside Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Beyond Bin Laden and 9/11. London: Pluto.

    Google Scholar 

  • Strick van Linschoten, A., & Kuehn, F. (2012). An enemy we created. The myth of the Taliban-Al Qaeda Merger in Afghanistan, 1970–2010. London: Hurst.

    Google Scholar 

  • Suhrke, A. (2016). Waging war and building peace in Afghanistan. In M. Turner & F. P. Kühn (Eds.), The politics of international intervention. The tyranny of peace (pp. 161–178). London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zyck, S. A. (2012). How to lose allies and finance your enemies: The economisation of conflict termination in Afghanistan. Conflict, Security and Development, 12(3), 249–271. https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2012.703534.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Florian P. Kühn .

Section Editor information

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2020 The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this entry

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this entry

Kühn, F.P. (2020). Statebuilding in Afghanistan: Inertia and Ambiguity. In: The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Peace and Conflict Studies. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11795-5_11-1

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11795-5_11-1

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-11795-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-11795-5

  • eBook Packages: Springer Reference Political Science and International StudiesReference Module Humanities and Social SciencesReference Module Business, Economics and Social Sciences

Publish with us

Policies and ethics