Abstract
The present paper offers an approach to anticipation and meaning, based on Wild Systems Theory (WST), which begins by describing organisms as self-sustaining energy transformation systems that constitute embodiments of context. This idea leads to the assertion that anticipation refers to a self-sustaining system’s ability to prespecify and constrain the dynamic possibilities of its nested transformation systems. The paper describes how anticipation, defined as the prospective constraint of context, evolved from the small-scale contexts constrained by a single cell to the full-blown, self-aware prespecification and constraint of contexts (i.e., forward-looking thinking) exhibited in human anticipation. Specifically, anticipation scaled up because (1) the systems that phylogenetically entailed it (i.e., organisms) were simultaneous energy transformation systems whose status as such rendered them a possible energy source for potentially emergent energy transformation systems (i.e., plants and herbivores) and (2) as self-sustaining embodiments of context, such systems are naturally and necessarily “about” the contexts they embody. As a result, they are inherently meaningful, and the phenomenon we refer to as consciousness, or self-awareness, is a phylogenetically scaled-up recursion of the self-sustaining prespecification and constraint of nested, dynamic possibilities we see in single-cell organisms.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Bauer, W. (2011). An argument for the extrinsic grounding of mass. Erkenntnis, 74(1), 81–99.
Bishop, R., & Atmanspacher, H. (2006). Contextual emergence in the description of properties. Foundations of Physics, 36, 1753–1777.
Blakemore, S. J., & Decety, J. (2001). From the perception of action to the understanding of intention. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 2, 561–567.
Blakemore, S.-J., Wolpert, D. M., & Frith, C. D. (2000). Why can’t you tickle yourself? Neuroreport, 11, 11–16.
Calvo-Merino, B., Glaser, D. E., Grèzes, J., Passingham, R. E., & Haggard, P. (2005). Action observation and acquired motor skills: An fMRI study with expert dancers. Cerebral Cortex, 158, 1243–1249.
Clark, A. (1997). Being there: Putting brain, body, and world together again. London: MIT Press.
Critchfield, T. S., & Jordan, J. S. (2014). Prospective cognition in education and enculturation: An overview. Journal of Cognitive Education and Psychology, 13(2), 139–147.
Dehmelt, H. (1989). Triton,...Electron,..., Cosmon...: An infinite regression? Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 86, 8618–8619.
Desmurget, M., & Grafton, S. (2003). Feedback or feedforward control: End of a dichotomy. In S. H. Johnson-Frey (Ed.), Taking action: Cognitive neuroscience perspectives on intentional acts (pp. 291–338). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Dussutour, A., Fourcassie, V., Helbing, D., & Deneubourg, J. L. (2004). Optimal traffic organization in ants under crowded conditions. Nature, 428, 70–73.
Edelman, G. M. (1987). Neural Darwinism: The theory of neuronal group selection. Basic Books.
Gardner, S. (2007). The limits of naturalism and the metaphysics of German idealism. In E. Hammer (Ed.), German idealism: Contemporary perspectives (pp. 19–49). Abingdon: Routledge.
Gerhardt, H. C., & Huber, F. (2002). Acoustic communication in insects and anurans. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Ghin, M. (2005). What a self could be. Psyche, 11(5), 1–10.
Golfinopoulos, E., Tourville, J. A., & Guenther, F. H. (2009). The integration of large-scale neural network modeling and functional brain imaging in speech motor control. NeuroImage, 52, 862–874.
Grezes, J., Costes, N., & Decety, J. (1998). Top-down effect of strategy on the perception of human biological motion: A PET investigation. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 15(6/7/8), 553–582.
Grush, R. (2004). The emulation theory of representation: Motor control, imagery, and perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 27, 377–442.
Hahn, T., & Jordan, J. S. (2014). Anticipation and embodied knowledge: Observations of enculturating bodies. Journal of Cognitive Education and Psychology, 13(2), 272–284.
Hahn, T., & Jordan, J. S. (2017). Sensible objects: Intercorporeality and enactive knowing through things. In C. Meyer, J. Streeck, & J. S. Jordan (Eds). Intercorporeality: Emerging socialities in interaction (pp. 267–288). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hall, L., Illes, A., & Vehrencamp, S. L. (2006). Overlapping signals in banded wrens: Long-term effects of prior experience on males and females. Behavioral Ecology, 17, 260–269.
Harré, R. (1986). Varieties of realism: A rationale for the natural sciences. Oxford: Blackwell.
Hebb, D. O. (1949). The organization of behavior: A neuropsychological theory. New York: Wiley.
Hofmeyr, J. H. S. (2007). The biochemical factory that autonomously fabricates itself: A systems biological view of the living cell. Systems biology: Philosophical foundations, 217–242.
Iacoboni, M. (2005). Understanding others: Imitation, language and empathy. In S. Hurley & N. Chater (Eds.), Perspectives on imitation: From mirror neurons to memes (pp. 77–99). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Ito, M. (2008). Control of mental activities by internal models in the cerebellum. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 9, 304–313.
Jammer, M. (2000). Concepts of mass in contemporary physics and philosophy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Jordan, J. S. (2003a). The embodiment of intentionality. In W. Tschacher & J. Dauwalder (Eds.), Dynamical systems approaches to embodied cognition (pp. 201–228). Berlin: Springer Verlag.
Jordan, J. S. (2003b). Emergence of self and other in perception and action. Consciousness and Cognition, 12, 633–646.
Jordan, J. S. (2006). Born to be wild: Faust, Pinocchio and the Marlboro man meet the embodied other. Mitteilungen, 3, 5–19.
Jordan, J. S. (2008a). Toward a theory of embodied communication: Self-sustaining wild systems as embodied meaning. In I. Wachsmuth, M. Lenzen, & G. Knoblich (Eds.), Embodied communication in human and machines (pp. 53–75). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jordan, J. S. (2008b). Wild-agency: Nested intentionalities in neuroscience and archeology. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B (Biological Sciences), 363, 1981–1991.
Jordan, J. S. (2009). Forward-looking aspects of perception-action coupling as a basis for embodied communication. Discourse Processes, 46, 127–144.
Jordan, J. S. (2010a). Wild systems theory: Overcoming the computational-ecological divide via self-sustaining systems. In Proceedings of the 32nd annual meeting of the Cognitive Science Society. Portland: Cognitive Science Society.
Jordan, J. S. (2010b). Shusterman, Merleau-Ponty, and Dewey: The role of pragmatism in the conversation of embodiment. Action, Criticism & Theory for Music Education, 9(1), 67–73.
Jordan, J. S. (2012). What’s new in new realism: A review of Edwin Pierce’s a new look at new realism [Review of the Book A New Look at New Realism]. PsycCRITIQUES: Contemporary Psychology – APA Review of Books, 57, Article 6.
Jordan, J. S. (2013a). Seeing through the noise: Where was this Guy headed? Ecological Psychology, 25, 219–225.
Jordan, J. S. (2013b). The wild ways of conscious will: What we do, how we do it, and why it has meaning. Frontiers in Psychology, 4.
Jordan, J. S., & Day, B. (2015). Wild systems theory as a 21st century coherence framework for cognitive science. In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds.), Open MIND: 21(T). Frankfurt: MIND Group. https://doi.org/10.15502/9783958570191.
Jordan, J. S., & Ghin, M. (2006). (Proto-) consciousness as a contextually-emergent property of self-sustaining systems. Mind & Matter, 4(1), 45–68.
Jordan, J. S., & Heidenreich, B. (2010). The intentional nature of self-sustaining systems. Mind & Matter, 8, 45–62.
Jordan, J. S., & Ghin, M. (2007). The role of control in a science of consciousness: Causality, regulation and selfsustainment. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 14(1–2), 177–197.
Jordan, J. S., & Knoblich, G. (2004). Spatial perception and control. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 11(1), 54–59.
Jordan, J. S., & Mays, C. (2017). Wild meaning: The intercorporeal nature of objects, bodies, and words. In C. Meyer, J. Streeck, & J. S. Jordan (Eds). Intercorporeality: Emerging socialities in interaction (pp. 361–378). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jordan, S., & Ranade, E. (2014). Multiscale entrainment: A primer in prospective cognition for educational researchers. Journal of Cognitive Education and Psychology, 13(2), 147–163.
Jordan, J.S., & Vandervert, L. (1999). Liberal education as a reflection of our assumptions regarding truth and consciousness: Time for an integrative philosophy. Modeling Consciousness Across the Disciplines, 307–331.
Jordan, J. S., & Vinson, D. (2012). After nature: On bodies, consciousness, and causality. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 19, 229–250.
Jordan, J. S., & Wesselmann, E. D. (2015). The contextually grounded nature of prosocial behavior: A multiscale, embodied approach to morality. In D. A. Schroeder & W. G. Graziano (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of prosocial behavior. New York: Oxford University Press. Published online November 2014. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195399813.013.031.
Jordan, J. S., Bai, J., Cialdella, V., & Schloesser, D. (2015). Foregrounding the context: Cognitive science as the study of embodied context. In E. Dzhafarov & J. S. Jordan (Eds.), Contextuality from physics to psychology (pp. 209–228). Berlin: Springer.
Kauffman, S. (1995). At home in the universe. New York: Oxford University Press.
Kawato, M., Furukawa, K., & Suzuki, R. (1987). A hierarchical neural-network model for control and learning of voluntary movement. Biological Cybernetics, 57(3), 169–185.
Kinsbourne, M. (2002). The role of imitation in body ownership and mental growth. In A. Meltzoff & W. Prinz (Eds.), The imitative mind: Development, evolution, and brain bases (pp. 311–330). New York: Oxford University Press.
Kinsbourne, M., & Jordan, J. S. (2009). Embodied anticipation: A neurodevelopmental interpretation. Discourse Processes, 46, 103–126.
Knoblich, G., & Jordan, J. S. (2003). Action coordination in groups and individuals: Learning anticipatory control. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 29(5), 1006–1016.
Koziol, L., & Lutz, J. (2013). From movement to thought: The development of executive function. Applied Neuropsychology: Child, 2(2), 104–115.
Koziol, L., Budding, D., & Chidekel, D. (2011). From movement to thought: Executive function, embodied cognition, and the cerebellum. The Cerebellum, 11, 505–525.
Lotka, A. J. (1945). The law of evolution as a maximal principle. Human Biology, 17, 167–194.
Maturana, H.R., & Varela, F.J. (1980). Problems in the neurophysiology of cognition. In Autopoiesis and cognition (pp. 41–47). Springer Netherlands.
Mennill, D. J., Ratcliffe, L. M., & Boag, P. T. (2003). Female eavesdropping on male song contests in songbirds. Science, 296, 873.
Metzinger, T. (2003). Being no one. The self-model theory of subjectivity. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Miall, R. C. (2003). Connecting mirror neurons and forward models. Neuroreport, 14, 2135–2137.
Odum, H. T. (1988). Self-organization, transformity, and information. Science, 242, 132–1139.
Paulin, M. G. (1993). The role of the cerebellum in motor control and perception. Brain, Behavior and Evolution, 41(1), 39–50.
Prior, E., Pargetter, R., & Jackson, F. (1982). Three theses about dispositions. American Philosophical Quarterly, 19, 251–257.
Rizzolatti, G., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., & Gallese, V. (2002). From mirror neurons to imitation: Facts and speculations. In A. Meltzoff & W. Prinz (Eds.), The imitative mind: Development, evolution, and brain bases (pp. 247–266). New York: Oxford University Press.
Rosen, R. (1985). Anticipatory systems: Philosophical, mathematical. New York: Pergamon Press.
Schaffer, J. (2003). Is there a fundamental level? Noûs, 37(3), 498–517.
Seligman, M. E., Railton, P., Baumeister, R. F., & Sripada, C. (2013). Navigating into the future or driven by the past. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 8(2), 119–141.
Shadmehr, R., & Krakauer, J. W. (2008). A computational neuroanatomy for motor control. Experimental Brain Research, 185, 359–381.
Skinner, B. F. (1976). About behaviorism. New York: Vintage Books.
Streeck, J., & Jordan, J. S. (2009). Communication as a dynamical self-sustaining system: The importance of time-scales and nested contexts. Communication Theory, 19, 445–464.
Vandervert, L. (1995). Chaos theory and the evolution of consciousness and mind: A thermodynamic-holographic resolution to the mind-body problem. New Ideas in Psychology, 13(2), 107–127.
Wesselmann, E., & Jordan, J. S. (2016). Wild heroes: The complexity of being “moral”. In T. Langley (Ed.), The psychology of civil war (pp. 111–124). New York: Sterling.
Wolpert, D. M., Miall, R. C., & Kawato, M. (1998). Internal models in the cerebellum. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2(9), 338–347.
Wolpert, D. M., Doya, K., & Kawato, M. (2003). A unifying computational framework for motor control and social interaction. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B Biological Sciences, 358, 593–602.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2019 Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this entry
Cite this entry
Scott Jordan, J. (2019). Wild Anticipation: On the Evolution of Meaning. In: Poli, R. (eds) Handbook of Anticipation. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-91554-8_59
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-91554-8_59
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-91553-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-91554-8
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyReference Module Humanities and Social SciencesReference Module Humanities