Abstract
Evolutionary games constitute the most recent major mathematical tool for understanding, modelling and predicting evolution in biology and other fields. They complement other well establlished tools such as branching processes and the Lotka-Volterra (1910) equations (e.g. for the predator - prey dynamics or for epidemics evolution). Evolutionary Games also brings novel features to game theory. First, it focuses on the dynamics of competition rather than restricting attention to the equilibrium. In particular, it tries to explain how an equilibrium emerges. Second, it brings new definitions of stability, that are more adapted to the context of large populations. Finally, in contrast to standard game theory, players are not assumed to be “rational” or “knowledgeable” as to anticipate the other players’ choices. The objective of this article, is to present foundations as well as recent advances in evolutionary games, highlight the novel concepts that they introduce with respect to game theory as formulated by John Nash, and describe through several examples their huge potential as tools for modeling interactions in complex systems.
Similar content being viewed by others
Bibliography
Altman E (2008) Semi-linear stochastic difference equations. Discret Event Dyn Syst 19:115–136
Cressman R (2003) Evolutionary dynamics and extensive form games. MIT, Cambridge
Dawkins R (1976) The selfish gene. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Friedman D (1996) Equilibrium in evolutionary games: some experimental results. Econ J 106: 1–25
Hofbauer J, Sigmund K (1998) Evolutionary games and population dynamics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York
Lotka-Volterra AJ (1910) Contribution to the theory of periodic reaction. J Phys Chem 14(3): 271–274
Maynard Smith J, Price GR (1973) The logic of animal conflict. Nature 246(5427):15–18
Sandholm WH (2009) Population games and evolutionary dynamics. MIT
Shakkottai S, Altman E, Kumar A (2007) Multihoming of users to access points in WLANs: a population game perspective. IEEE J Sel Areas Commun Spec Issue Non-Coop Behav Netw 25(6):1207–1215
Taylor P, Jonker L (1978) Evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics. Math Biosci 16: 76–83
Vincent TL, Brown JS (2005) Evolutionary game theory, natural selection & Darwinian dynamics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Watson HW, Galton F (1875) On the probability of the extinction of families. J Anthropol Inst Great Br 4:138–144
Weibull JW (1995) Evolutionary game theory. MIT, Cambridge
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2013 Springer-Verlag London
About this entry
Cite this entry
Altman, E. (2013). Evolutionary Games. In: Baillieul, J., Samad, T. (eds) Encyclopedia of Systems and Control. Springer, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-5102-9_32-1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-5102-9_32-1
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, London
Online ISBN: 978-1-4471-5102-9
eBook Packages: Springer Reference EngineeringReference Module Computer Science and Engineering