Introduction

The term ‘nature’ in the title is used in the sense of the sāṅkhya concept of ‘prakṛti’. Aristotle seems to use the term ‘nature’ as ‘nature of something’ also in the same sense. If X is ‘prakṛti’ of Y, then Y is said to be ‘vikṛti’ of X.

‘Prakṛti’, for sāṅkhya, is ‘upādāna kāraṇa’. Most Indian ‘darśana’ consider two kinds of ‘kāraṇa’, namely, ‘upādāna kāraṇa’ and ‘nimitta kāraṇa’ of a thing. For issues limited to ‘prakṛti’, sāṅkhya acknowledges ‘upādāna’, (Īśwarakṛṣṇa, Sāṅkhya Kārika)Footnote 1 but not ‘nimitta’ kāraṇa. This seems to be the reason why sāṅkhya is often seen to use the terms ‘prakṛti’ and ‘kāraṇa’ interchangeably. If X is ‘kāraṇa’ of Y, then Y is said to be the ‘kārya’ of X. The terms ‘hetu’ and ‘hetumat’ are used interchangeably with, respectively, ‘kāraṇa’ and ‘kārya’. The term ‘kāraṇa’ translates to ‘cause’, and as per Aristotle, ‘men do not think they know a thing till they have grasped the “why” of it (which is to grasp its primary cause).’ (Aristotle, physics 194b16–194b23).Footnote 2 Causes of things, according to him, are the principles as to why things come to be and pass away and change in whatever way they do. The term ‘cause’, as Aristotle uses here, may be taken to be equivalent to ‘kāraṇa’ in Indian philosophy. The term ‘caused’ may be seen to correspond to ‘kārya’. Aristotle also seems to take ‘nature’ as ‘nature of a thing’ as a kind of its ‘cause’ because, ‘Of things that exist’, he says, ‘some exist by nature, some from other causes’ (physics, 192b9–192b11). What Aristotle means by ‘nature as cause’ seems to correspond precisely to ‘upādāna kāraṇa’, while his concept of ‘art’, to ‘nimitta kāraṇa’. Given this, we can characterize what he calls things that exist ‘by nature’ as those that are caused only by ‘upādāna kāraṇa’ and things of ‘art’ as those that have ‘nimitta kāraṇa’ also. This paper will compare the theories of such ‘nature’ of the psychophysical world as in phenomenology and in sāṅkhya.

‘Stuff’ and ‘form’ in phenomenology and the three ‘guṇa’ in sāṅkhya have been brought under a common concept named here as ‘elementary nature’ of things.

This paper is divided correspondingly into two parts, the first titled simply as ‘nature’ and the second as ‘elementary nature’.

‘Nature’

Residue of Phenomenological Reduction and ‘Buddhi’

According to phenomenology, the ‘psychophysical universe of nature’ (Husserl 1913, Ideas Pertaining to..,Ideas, P94,13§50,2,5)Footnote 3 transcends consciousness (Ideas, P94,16§50,2,8). As per Husserl (Ideas, P93; §50,1,5),

Reality, the reality of the physical thing taken singly and the reality of the whole world,…is not in itself something absolute…; rather in the absolute sense it is nothing at all… it has the essentiality of something which of necessity is only intentional, only an object of consciousness, something presented in the manner peculiar to consciousness, something apparent as apparent.

As per Husserl (Ideas, P111; §59,1,3), not only the physical things but also the ‘the set of universal objects’ are ‘transcendent to pure consciousness in certain manner’. All objects are constituted and posited by consciousness as they are given to us. Husserl therefore wants to eliminate the transcendental psychophysical world from consideration and attend only to its consciousness. To that end, he prescribes, ‘[w]e parenthesize everything which that positing encompasses with respect to being’ (Ideas, P56,23; §32,3,1). He says (Ideas, P94; §50,2,13),

we put all those positings ‘out of action’, we do not ‘participate in them’; we direct our seizing and theoretically inquiring regard to pure consciousness in its own absolute being. That, then, is what is left as the sought for ‘phenomenological residuum’ …we have excluded the whole world with all physical things, human beings, ourselves included.

He calls this as ‘phenomenological reduction’ (epoche), reduction of all these things to their consciousness. From an epistemological point of view, he calls it also as ‘transcendental epoche’ (Ideas, P60; §33,8,9).

Having effected such phenomenological reduction, Husserl asserts (Ideas, P59; §33,6,10), ‘consciousness has, in itself, a being of its own which in its own absolute essence, is not touched by the phenomenological exclusion. It, therefore, remains as the “phenomenological residuum”’. What ‘phenomenological’ reduction makes accessible, Husserl calls ‘pure consciousness’ (Ideas, P59; §33,7,) or ‘transcendentally pure consciousness’ (Ideas, P108; §56,1,2) or as the residue of ‘transcendental’ reduction, simply, as ‘transcendental consciousness’. He seems to call it also as ‘absolute consciousness’ as when he talks of ‘reduction of the natural world to absolute consciousness’ (Ideas, P110; §58,1,6). This reduction, he says, ‘yields factual concatenations of mental processes of consciousness’ (Ideas, P110; §58,1,7). The term ‘consciousness’, with any of all this variety of adjectives qualifying it, seems to denote but one and the same concept. We need not be misled into thinking that they refer to different concepts.

As for sāṅkhya, the author has shown elsewhere (Burte, D P, ‘Consciousness in Phenomenology and Sāṅkhya’)Footnote 4 in sāṅkhya, the term ‘vastu’ corresponds to transcendent ‘true object’ as Husserl calls it and ‘viṣaya’ corresponds to ‘intentional object’ as posited by its consciousness. Sāṅkhya concerns with ‘viṣaya’, ‘cittavṛtti’, etc. but with no ‘vastu’. Thus, we can say that sāṅkhya already is in what Husserl calls ‘phenomenological attitude’ and the discourse of sāṅkhya is a post-epoche discourse. For sāṅkhya, ‘cittavṛtti’ ultimately are processes of ‘buddhi’ and it is finally ‘buddhi’ that experiences all ‘viṣaya’.Footnote 5 We, therefore, identify ‘pure consciousness’ in phenomenology precisely with ‘buddhi’, which is also called ‘mahat’.

‘Ground’ of Pure Consciousness and ‘Prādhāna’

The transition to pure consciousness, Husserl says, ‘leads necessarily to the question about the ground for the this now-emerging factualness of the corresponding constitutive consciousness’ (Ideas, P111; §58,2,8). We may understand the term ‘constitutive consciousness’ in this quote also as descriptive of ‘pure consciousness’ itself. The ‘ground of pure consciousness’ is a least ambiguous description of a concept, which is important for us. We now look at the following quote from Husserl (Ideas, P105,29; §54,2,1) regarding this concept.

Certainly a consciousness without animated organism and …also without psyche, a consciousness which is not personal, is imaginable. That is to say, a stream of consciousness in which intentional unities of experience, organism, psyche, and empirical ego-subjects did not become constituted, in which all of these experiential concepts, and therefore the concept of a mental process in the psychological sense, as a mental process of a person, an animate ego, would be without any basis and in any case, without any validity.…One must convince oneself…that in contrast to the empirical mental process there stands as a presupposition for the sense of that process, the absolute mental process.

It is quite clear from the description of the concept that the ‘ground of pure consciousness’ is pre-conscious; it is not conscious. It yet has no intentionality, and that is why it cannot be referred either as ‘consciousness’ or as ‘mental process’ with any adjective whatever. But unfortunately, the above quote talks of ‘a stream of consciousness in which intentional unities of experience....did not become constituted’. In saying, ‘in contrast to empirical mental process there stands as a presupposition for the sense of that process, the absolute mental process’ the above quote, describing the ground as presupposition almost names it as ‘absolute mental process’. In difference to the right of the originator of a concept in naming it, we may refer to ‘ground of pure consciousness’, if at all, as ‘absolute mental process’, yet sans the meaning of the referring phrase. The meaning is misleading, and we must guard against slipping over it.

What sāṅkhya calls ‘prādhāna’ is ‘prakṛti’ of, that is, nature of ‘buddhi’, which we identified with ‘pure consciousness’. While ‘prādhāna’, thus is a ‘prakṛti’, there is no ‘prakṛti’, in turn, of which ‘prādhāna’ is a ‘vikṛti’. In other words, ‘prādhāna’ as ‘prakṛti’, is ultimate, that is, ‘mūla’. It, therefore, is described as ‘mūla prakṛti’ and also, as ‘mūla kāraṇa’.Footnote 6 We now identify ‘prādhāna’ with the ‘ground of pure consciousness’, which Husserl almost names as ‘absolute mental process’ in phenomenology.

‘Vikṛti’ is a ‘manifest’, that is, ‘vyakta’, because it is a manifestation (of its ‘prakṛti’). Being no ‘vikṛti’, ‘prādhāna’, the ‘mūla prakṛti’, is no manifestation; it is ‘unmanifest’, that is, ‘avyakta’.

Satkāryavāda

As per the causal theory of sāṅkhya, ‘kārya’ is already existent (Vācaspatimiśra,Sāṅkhya Tattva Kaumudī)Footnote 7 (that is, ‘sat’), if potentially, in its ‘kāraṇa’, which is why this theory is named as ‘satkāryavāda’. As per satkāryavāda, coming of something from its ‘potential’ being into its ‘actual’ being is its ‘āvirbhāva’ or ‘sarga’ while its going out of its ‘actual’ being back into its ‘potential’ being is its ‘tirobhava’ or ‘laya’. Sarga is sarga of kārya from its kāraṇa, and laya is laya of a kārya back into its kāraṇa.

Husserl says

consciousness in its ‘purity’ must be held to be a self-contained complex of being; a complex of absolute being into which nothing can enter and out of which nothing can slip. (Ideas p93,22; §49,7,5).

This, on the part of phenomenology, seems to be a clear commitment to satkāryavāda.

According to Aristotle, to grasp the ‘why’ of a thing ‘is to grasp its primary cause’ (Physics, 194b16–194b23). The ‘primary cause’, according to this sense, of the individual realities like physical things as well as the ‘universal’ objects may be taken as their constitutive consciousness. In that case, phenomenological reduction becomes reduction to primary cause, this ‘primary cause’ of the psychophysical world being its ‘consciousness’ or say ‘pure consciousness’. Therefore, the idea of phenomenological reduction may be said not to be different from the sāṅkhya concept of laya of the natural world into its cause, its nature, the ‘pure consciousness’.

Further, the constitutions of the concatenations of mental processes of consciousness can be said to be ‘caused’ by their ‘ground’, that is, ‘absolute mental process’. This ‘ground’ in sāṅkhya parlance also has to be recognized as the ‘kāraṇa’ or the ‘cause’ of pure consciousnesses. ‘Reducing’ the ‘pure consciousness’ to this ground, therefore, can be said to be its ‘laya’ in the ‘ground’, while constitutions in the ‘ground’, that is, that of ‘pure consciousness’, can be said to be its ‘sarga’ in its ‘ground’, that is, in ‘absolute mental process’.

Divine and Transcendent or Merely Unmanifest?

Husserl seems to be led to believe in the existence of an extra-worldly ‘divine’ being (Ideas, P111; §58,2,17), which he seems to take as this ‘ground’ of ‘pure consciousness’. The ground of ‘pure consciousness’, Husserl says, ‘does not have the sense of a physical-causal reason.’ (Ideas, P111; §58,2,13). But since, as we have seen, this ground manifests itself as pure consciousness, the same, we have to say, is the ‘cause’ and ‘nature’ of pure consciousness. If at all the ground of the manifest world of ‘pure consciousness’ can be taken to be ‘extra-worldly’ or ‘divine’, it can only be in the sense that unlike ‘pure consciousness’ it is unmanifest.

Further, about the being of the ‘ground’, that is, ‘absolute mental process’, Husserl says, ‘What concerns us here,…is that this being would obviously transcend not merely the world but “absolute” consciousness.’ (Ideas, P111; §58,2,16). In qualifying ‘absolute mental process’ as transcendent to ‘absolute consciousness’, Husserl is seen to declare a ‘cause’ to be transcendent to its ‘caused’, prakṛti as transcendent to its vikṛti, gold as transcendent to golden ornaments. This understanding goes against that of sāṅkhya. Sāṅkhya declares vyakta as well as avayakta is aviveki, that is, not isolableFootnote 8 and just as pradhāna, even mahat etc., being the same (as pradhāna itself) by nature, cannot isolate from pradhāna. Footnote 9

‘Elementary Nature’

After phenomenological reduction of the world of objects, phenomenology is left with its consciousness or the mental processes intentionally directed to it. Of mental processes, it recognizes two strata. It refers to one as ‘matter’, alternatively called ‘hyle’, ‘stuff’, ‘substrate’, etc. and the other as ‘form’. Sāṅkhya on its part introduces three ‘guṇa’. We may put ‘stuff’ and ‘form’ of phenomenology and the three ‘guṇa’ of sāṅkhya under the general heading of ‘elementary natures’ under their respective schemes.

There are two criteria, which we will argue, the ‘elementary natures’ under each of these schemes have to satisfy. In the two sub-parts of this part, these schemes of ‘elementary natures’ will be tested under them.

Criterion of ‘Non-selfsufficiency’

‘Selfsufficiency’ and ‘Non-selfsufficiency’

Husserl introduces (Ideas, P28,34; §15,1,1) a basic distinction between objects on the basis of whether they can or cannot, be thought of, on their own. He calls the former as ‘selfsufficient’ and the latter as ‘non-selfsufficient’. Husserl defines an absolutely selfsufficient essence as a ‘concretum’, a non-selfsufficient essence as an ‘abstractum’ and a ‘this-here’, the material essence of which is a concretum, as an individuum (Ideas, P29,25; §15,3).

Sāṅkhya, a post-epoche discourse, refers to objects only as ‘viṣaya’. For sāṅkhya, viśeṣa viṣaya,Footnote 10 is one which can be experienced (that is, as pleasurable, painful or indifferent). Therefore, viśeṣa viṣaya is ‘selfsufficient essence’ and a ‘concretum’.

Selfsufficiencies Cannot Be Elementary

A concretum as the essence of an individual is an eidetic singularity (Ideas, P30,2; §15,5,1). In a concretum, according to Husserl (Ideas, P30,6; §15,6,1), other eidetic singularities, which ‘are necessarily “heterogeneous”’ are included discretely. What is made up of a plurality of other things can, obviously, not be considered as ‘elementary’. All vykta and avyakta entitiesFootnote 11 as per sāṅkhya also are’saṅghāta’,Footnote 12 which translates to ‘close union’ or ‘combination’. Therefore, they also cannot count as ‘elementary’. Therefore, whatever is a concretum or a ‘saṅghāta’ cannot count as ‘elementary nature’. It is only what unites into a concretum and themselves are non-concrete, that is, abstract, we may say, can probably count as elementary.

Empirically Intuited and Empirically Instantiated Essences

We have identified (Burte) perception with ‘pratyakśa pramāṇa vṛtti’ and, empirically intuited essence or say, ‘empirical essence’ of an individual object with ‘pratyakśa’ or ‘dṛṣṭa’. ‘Empirically’ intuited essences or say ‘empirical essences’ are selfsufficient essences and hence are concrete. They cannot count as ‘elementary nature’. Husserl says (Ideas, P10,6, §3,1,4), “Experiencing or intuition of something individual can be transmuted into ‘eidetic seeing’ (ideation)…What is seen when this occurs is the corresponding ‘pure essence‘, or ‘eidos”. Intuition of such essences, Husserl says (Ideas, P12,5; §3,7,1), has “as its basis a principle part of intuition of something individual.”. It is the possibility of turning one’s regard to a ‘corresponding’ individual and forming a consciousness of something individual, we may note, which makes ‘intuition of essence’ possible. ‘Intuition of essence’ is thus based upon the previous empirical experience of some individual/s. Such previous empirical experience may be said to serve as a previous ‘example’ (Ideas, P12,11; §3,7,7), or say an ‘empirical instance’, of the ‘pure essence‘. Such a ‘pure essence’ may, therefore, be qualified as the ‘previously empirically instantiated pure essence’, which translates to ‘dṛṣṭasvalakṣaṇa sāmānya’, which, in sāṅkhya is ‘viṣaya’ of ‘pūrvavat’ kind of ‘anumāna’. ‘Pure essence’ or ‘eidos’, as Husserl describes above may be identified with ‘dṛṣṭasvalakṣaṇa sāmānya’ and the corresponding ‘eidetic intuition’, with ‘pūrvavat anumāna’. The ‘empirically instantiated pure essences’ do qualify as ‘pure forms’ and hence, as ‘elementary nature’ in the case of phenomenology.

The ‘Ultimate Substrate’ and ‘Reciprocal’ Non-selfsufficiencies

Empirical instances of these ‘pure forms’ again, however, remain concrete and selfsufficient. This leaves the issue of the other ‘elementary nature’, namely, the ‘ultimate substrate’ open.

Husserl says,

[C]ategorical objectivities can function as substrates of categorical formations, which, in turn, can do the same, etc. Conversely, every such formation refers back to ultimate substrates, to objects of a first or lowest level, i.e. to objects which are no longer syntactical-categorical formations, which no longer contain any of those ontological forms (Ideas, P24; §11,2,19).

It is only the ultimate substrate that can be and has to be ‘formless’ and thus ‘pure kind of nature’. At this stage, we may note that Husserl has mentioned not one but two kinds of non-selfsufficiencies, namely, the ‘unilateral’ and the ‘reciprocal’ (Ideas, P29,15; §15,2,7). We may characterize ‘empirically instantiated essences’ as ‘unilateral’ non-selfsufficiencies.

The other kind of non-selfsufficiency, which Husserl mentions, is noteworthy. This kind involves essences in plurality, which are ‘unthinkable without each other’ (Ideas, P28,34; §15,1,5) and hence are all non-selfsufficient together and w.r.t. each other. It is these essences that Husserl seems to refer as ‘reciprocally’ non-selfsufficient essences (Ideas, P29,15; §15,2,7). Husserl seems to illustrate ‘reciprocal non-selfsufficiency’ with ‘substrate and form’ (Ideas, P28; §15,1,4). ‘Substrate’ can be ‘pure kind of nature’ only as ‘reciprocal’ non-selfsufficiency.

Substrate as ‘reciprocal’ non-selfsufficiency, obviously, cannot have any empirical instance and hence has to be described as ‘uninstantiated non-selfsufficient’ essence, which may be identified with what sāṅkhya calls ‘adṛṣṭasvalakṣaṇa’ kind of ‘sāmānya viṣaya’.

The ‘eidetic intuition’ of such ‘viṣaya’ can be said to correspond to what sāṅkhya calls ‘sāmānyato dṛṣṭa’ kind of ‘anumāna’.

‘Guṇa’ of Sāṅkhya

‘Pleasure’, ‘pain’ and ‘apathy’, according to sāṅkhya, are ‘mutually opposed’Footnote 13 and hence ‘pure’ of each other. The observed variety in the world is caused by the possibility of their ever overcomingFootnote 14 each other. Causes of ‘pleasure’, ‘pain’ and ‘apathy’ must be conceived exclusively to be what these causes, by nature, respectively are. Sāṅkhya proposes that the exclusive causeFootnote 15 of pleasure is what is ‘sukhātmaka’, that is, ‘pleasure by nature’, which ‘sattva’ is meant to be, that of pain, what is ‘duḥkhātmaka’, that is, ‘pain by nature’, which ‘rajas’ is meant to be and that of apathy, what is ‘mohātmaka’, that is, ‘apathy by nature’, which ‘tamas’ is meant to be. Sāṅkhya, therefore, holds that just as golden ornaments are gold by nature, the objects in the world and the world as a whole are ‘pleasure’, ‘pain’ and ‘apathy’ by nature, that is, ‘sukhduḥkhamohātmaka’.Footnote 16 Such natures, however, need not prevent ascriptions of concomitant functionsFootnote 17 and propertiesFootnote 18 to guṇa. Sāṅkhya ascribes them functions, respectively, of ‘illuminating’ (prakāśa), ‘propelling’ or ‘energizing’ (pravṛtti) and ‘controlling’ (niyama). It ascribes them also properties which suit their functions. ‘Sattva’ is described as ‘agile’, ‘nimble’ (laghu)Footnote 19 ‘rajas’ as ‘full of movement’ (calam) and ‘tamas’ as ‘heavy’ (guru). ‘Tamas’ controls the functioning of the other two guṇa by this ‘heaviness’ of its. These three guṇa are simultaneously conflicting and cooperating.Footnote 20

As per sāṅkhya ‘indriya’ deriveFootnote 21 from ‘sattva’ and ‘tanmātra’, from ‘tamas’, while ‘rajas’ contributes to both. The ‘full of movement’ (calam) ‘rajas’ propels both, ‘indriya’ as well as ‘tanmātra’. It is to the ‘agile’ and ‘nimble’ (laghu) ‘sattva’ that ‘indriya’ owe their efficiency in performing their functions. ‘Tamas’ in ‘tanmātra’, however, controls not only the illumination due to ‘sattva’ of ‘indriya’ by ‘shrouding’ but controls also the motion due to ‘rajas’ in both ‘indriya’ as well as ‘tanmātra’.

The unmanifest ‘mūla prakṛti’ or ‘pradhāna’ according to the doctrine of triguṇa is nothing but the state of equilibriumFootnote 22 among the three guṇa. It is when the equilibrium gets disturbed, that is, when guṇa predominate over each other, that the hierarchy of the manifest starts evolving.

Guṇa can neither be ‘empirically perceived’ nor be ‘empirically instantiated’. This precludes their being either empirical essences or ‘pure essences’ of the ‘empirically instantiated’ variety. Their kind has to be described as ‘empirically uninstantiated’ essences and identified with ‘adṛṣṭasvalakṣaṇa’ kind of ‘sāmānya viṣaya’ in sāṅkhya. Guṇa do not act alone, but act only along with each other and in pairs (mithunavṛttayaḥ ca guṇāḥ | kārikā 12). Clearly, therefore, each of them is ‘unthinkable without’ others, and hence, they are ‘reciprocally non-selfsufficient’ essences. Thus, we can say that the three guṇa qualify as ‘elementary nature’.

Criticism of ‘Sense-Data’

Husserl analyses intentional mental processes into their ‘primary content’ and ‘their moments which bear in themselves the specific trait of intentionality’ (Ideas p172,13; §85,2). We can see ‘substrate’ and ‘form’, respectively, therein. Substrate is referred to also as ‘stuff’ or ‘hyle’. In order to serve as ‘elementary nature’, ‘stuff’ and ‘form’ have to be non-selfsufficiences, that is, ‘stuff’, ‘formless’ and ‘form’, ‘stuffless’, also as insisted by Husserl (Ideas p173,4; §85,6,13). ‘Stuff’, partiularly, has to be ‘reciprocal’ kind of non-selfsufficiency. Now Husserl makes a move. He projects ‘sensuous stuff’ or ‘hyletic data’, as ‘stuff’ or ‘hyle’ (Ideas p173,39; §85,7,44). Husserl says, ‘[t]o the “primary content” of mental processes belong certain “sensuous” mental processes, which are unitary with respect to their highest genus “sensation contents” such as colour-data, touch-data, tone-data and the like.’ (Ideas p172,5; §85,4,1). These data are also commonly called as ‘sense-data’. Thus, according to him, each sense-datum is ‘unitary’. What is ‘unitary’ has to be an individual or its essence. We can say that a sense-datum is an instance of the genus ‘sensation contents’. Now the genus ‘sensation contents’ become an instantiated pure essence, that is, ‘unilateral’ non-selfsufficiency and the instance, a ‘selfsufficient’ concretum. Neither ‘sensation contents’ as a genus nor ‘sense-datum’ as its instance is ‘reciprocally non-selfsufficient’, and hence, neither qualifies as any ‘elementary nature’.

We note that in the use itself of the term ‘sense-data’, one acknowledges that ‘sense-datum’, its singular, is an individual, which as per Husserl is ‘a this-here, the material essence of which is a concretum’ (Ideas, P29,25; §15,3). In the ‘primary component’, Husserl himself also says, ‘we find such concrete immanental data as components’ (Ideas p172,13; §85,4,9). Now if sense-data were to be concreta, they cannot be ‘formless’ and hence cannot be ‘ultimate substrate’. Thus, it seems that we do not have, from Husserl, satisfactory application of the concept of ‘formless stuff’ and of ‘elementary nature’ in ‘sense-data’.

Now as Husserl says, sensuousness (and hence sense-data) has to be ‘conveyed by the “senses”’ (Ideas p173,20; §85,7,17). In that case, we have to consider corporeal senses (and then the corporeal body, etc.) as the cause of the sensuous. ‘Sense-data’ thus gets into circularity as to what causes what, and the issue of ultimacy remains undecided.

Criterion of ‘Comprehensiveness’

Comprehensiveness

Aristotle considers ‘causes, their character and number’ (Physics, 194b16–194b23). He enumerates four senses of cause: (1) ‘Material cause’—that out of which a thing comes to be and which persists and its genera (Physics, 194b27–194b29). (2) ‘Formal cause’—the ‘form’ or the archetype, i.e. the statement of the essence, and its genera (Physics, 194b27–194b29). (3) ‘Efficient cause’—the primary source of the change or coming to rest (Physics, 194b30–194b32). (4) ‘Teleological cause’—the end or ‘that for the sake of which’ a thing is done (Physics, 194b33–195a2). Aristotle also proposes two kinds of natures, the ‘material’ and the ‘formal’.

Aristotle says, ‘what is actually, is produced from, what is potentially’ (physics 217a11–217a26). This rule just like the principle of satkāryavāda requires the ‘nature’ of a thing and hence also the set of its ‘elementary natures’, to comprise the being of the thing along with all its attributes, if potentially. Applicability of this rule (and also satkāryavāda) has to be limited only to the things that exist by nature. We may call this requirement as the criterion of ‘comprehensiveness’. ‘Matter’ and ‘form’ are the two ‘elementary natures’ of things according to Aristotle. He does demonstrate immanence of all the four causes to these two ‘elementary natures’, which may be taken also as the demonstration of satisfying the criterion of comprehensiveness.

The objects, phenomenology and sāṅkhya have to explain, exist by nature. Therefore, the criterion of comprehensiveness must require each of them to demonstrate immanence of all their Aristotelian causes in their respective set of ‘elementary natures’. Moreover, the objects to be explained, being mental, inhere, in addition to the Aristotelian causes, consciousness as well as moods of pleasure, pain and apathy. The criterion of comprehensiveness, therefore, must require phenomenology as well as sāṅkhya to be able to trace not only the Aristotelian causes of their objects but also moods and consciousness to the ‘elementary nature’ as per their respective theories. We will now examine their performance on the criterion of comprehensiveness.

Material Cause

Husserl’s ‘stuff’ is to be taken as the material kind of nature of mental processes. The same, for phenomenology, accounts for the ‘material cause’ of mental processes.

The three guṇa are the elementary natures as per sāṅkhya. All the three, as per sāṅkhya, are themselves holders of properties and hence are ‘dravya’, which seems to translate to ‘matter’. This is illustrated by the simile between golden ornaments being gold and the world being ‘sukhaduḥkhamohātmaka’, that is, being ‘pleasure’, ‘pain’ and ‘apathy’, by nature, as said earlier. Sāṅkhya, therefore, needs no separate essence to account for ‘material cause’.

Formal Cause

Husserl’s ‘form’ is to be taken as the ‘formal kind of nature’ of mental processes. The same accounts for their ‘formal cause’.

As for sāṅkhya, cittavṛtti is ‘vṛtti’ of ‘citta’. Citta, by nature, comprises but the three guṇa. ‘Vṛtti’ may be identified with ‘form’ of a particular state or configuration of the three guṇa.

Efficient Cause

Husserl clubs what he calls ‘drive’ (Ideas p172,13; §85,4,9) with ‘stuff’. If we relate efficient cause in phenomenology with ‘drive’, we would be clubbing it with ‘stuff’. But if we relate it to the functions like animating, sense-bestowing synthesizing, etc., we would be ascribing it to ‘noesis’ and hence to ‘form’. Therefore, it is not clear whether it is in ‘stuff’ or in ‘form’ as natures that Husserl is inclined to locate the efficient cause.

Sāṅkhya describes ‘rajas’ as what propels other guṇa. ‘Tamas’ controls them, in the sense that it tends to fade out the ‘illumination’ caused by ‘sattva’ and, like friction or viscosity, brings to rest the ‘motion’ caused by ‘rajas’. I, therefore, suggest that we may account for what Aristotle calls ‘principle of motion’ in ‘rajas’ and the ‘principle of stationariness’ in ‘tamas’.

Teleological Cause

We can say that it is only consciousness which is ‘that for the sake of which’ mental processes or cittavṛtti have their being. Both ‘form’ as well as ‘matter’, we can say, have to be appropriate for fulfilling this teleological cause just as, to quote Aristotle, our teeth come up such that ‘the front teeth sharp, fitted for tearing, the molars broad and useful for grinding down the food’ (Physics, 198b17–198b33).

It is intentionality, as per phenomenology, that affords consciousness. Husserl says, ‘Sensuous data present themselves as stuffs for intenitve formings or sense-bestowing…’ (Ideas p172; §85,6,7). He says ‘we find these sensuous moments overlaid by a stratum which…“animates”, which “bestows sense”’, etc. (Ideas p172,15; §85,4,11). Husserl introduces the term ‘noetic moment’ or ‘noesis’ (Ideas p171,11; §85,8,9) to mean the overlaying stratum, that is, ‘what forms stuff into intentive mental processes’. This indicates that phenomenology successfully traces consciousness as ‘intentionality’ to ‘form as nature’.

Consciousness is the teleological cause of cittavṛtti. Citta carries consciousness, which it does, thanks to a vṛtti it takes on. Vṛtti, as noted earlier, is the ‘form’ into which the three guṇa, the ‘elementary nature’ as per sāṅkhya, combine. Citta is thus appropriately said to be buddhi. Footnote 23 To illustrate, let us take the case of consciousness in pramāṇa vṛtti, which is the determination occurring in the vṛtti. This vṛtti is described as upsurgeFootnote 24 of sattva simultaneous with subdual of tamas (both powered by rajas), etc. It is a description of but the ‘form’ into which the three guṇa combine. They, however, do so thanks only to their properties. The teleological cause of consciousness in cittavṛtti can thus be seen to be traceable to properties of three guṇa.

Moods

As for sāṅkhya, sattva’, ‘rajas’ and ‘tamas’ themselves by nature, as said earlier, are moods, respectively, of pleasure, pain and apathy.

As for phenomenology, Husserl clubs ‘pleasures and pains’ with ‘stuff’ (Ideas, p172,11; §85,4,7). But on the other hand, he sees ‘mental processes of liking or disliking, …’ as ones ‘which contain many… strata, noetic and, correspondingly, also the noematic ones’ [italics mine] (Ideas; p172,11; §95,1). Now ‘liking and disliking’ relate clearly to moods of ‘pleasure and pain’, and accounting for them in terms of noetic and noematic strata indicates that Husserl sees moods as something to be imposed by noesis. Therefore, Husserl can be taken to trace moods to some basic kind of nature, but to which precisely, that is, whether to ‘stuff’ or to ‘form’ is not clear.

Conclusion

The sense of the term ‘nature’ in the title is that of ‘prakṛti’ in sāṅkhya. In view of this, among other reasons, Aristotle’s concepts of ‘cause’ and ‘nature’ as ‘nature of things’ are identified with the sāṅkhya concept of ‘kāraṇa’ and ‘prakṛti’, respectively. Aristotle as well as Husserl are shown to be in agreement with the sāṅkhya principle of ‘satkāryavāda’. It is suggested that phenomenological reduction can be seen as an instance of ‘laya’ of the ‘caused’ into its ‘cause’. What Husserl calls ‘absolute mental processes’ has been identified with the unmanifest ‘mūla prakṛti’. ‘Pure consciousness’ has been identified with what sāṅkhya calls ‘mahat’ or ‘buddhi’ both as the immediate manifestation of the unmanifest and as the constitutive consciousness of the natural world.

‘Form’ and ‘stuff’ as the set of ‘elementary natures’ of phenomenology and the three ‘guṇa’ as that of sāṅkhya are examined on two criteria for qualifying as ‘elementary natures’. One criterion relates to ‘non-selfsufficiency’ as prescribed by Husserl. It is particularly the ‘reciprocal’ kind of ‘non-selfsufficiency’ that is found to serve the purpose. Reciprocal non-selfsufficiency has been argued to be what sāṅkhya calls ‘adṛṣṭasvalakṣaṇa’ kind of ‘sāmānya viṣaya’. ‘Sense-data’ which Husserl projects as ‘material nature’ is seen to fail on this criterion. The other criterion called the ‘criterion of comprehensiveness’ is as required by satkāryavāda. In regard to this criterion, Husserl is not found to be clear whether it is to ‘form’ or to ‘stuff’ that efficient cause and moods are to be traced. The three ‘guṇa’ of sāṅkhya, on the other hand, are shown to satisfy both, the criterion of ‘reciprocal non-selfsufficiency’ as well as that of ‘comprehensiveness’.