A study of the role of seafarers in combating piracy off the coast of Nigeria

Abstract

Piracy off the coast of Nigeria portends grave danger to the economic, security, and sociopolitical development of the country. It also threatens both international and regional trade as well as the stability of the West African sub-region. Despite Nigerian government’s attempts to curb piracy caused by poverty, unemployment, including corrupt and weak maritime regulatory and security institutions, attacks by pirates have continued to occur off the country’s coast. Consequent upon the adverse effects of piratical attacks on their day to day activities, seafarers can facilitate the suppression of piracy off the Nigerian coast. This paper uses statistics, provisions of international instruments and domestic legislations, the United Nations Security Council resolutions, soft laws, and opinions of researchers to examine the nature, causes, and effects of piracy on seafarers in Nigeria. The author argues that seafarers are necessary partners to curb piracy off the coast of Nigeria through enforcing maritime security conventions and other related instruments as well as testifying against pirates during trials. In conclusion, this paper contends that acts of piracy adversely affect crew members’ life, health, family, job, and finance thereby providing an overwhelming motivation for seafarers to play a role in suppressing piracy off the Nigerian coast.

1 Introduction

Piracy incidences in the Gulf of Guinea¹ region are essentially linked to the petroleum² industry, the mainstay of the region’s economy and the region potentially produces about 5.4 million barrels of crude oil per day.³ The main objective of pirates in the Gulf of Guinea is to capture vessels, particularly oil tankers, with a view to reselling their cargo at the lucrative black market.⁴ Pirates also hijack vessels, kidnap, and hold crew members hostage to obtain ransom payments. For instance, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) piracy report for 2015 reveals that 9 seafarers were held hostage while 19 crew members were kidnapped off the coast of Nigeria.⁵ According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) report, “(t)ankers are extremely vulnerable to pirate attacks in the Gulf of Guinea, given their high value cargo and their being stationary during ship-to-ship oil transfer. Thus, tankers and offshore energy exploration infrastructure have been the main targets of piracy…activities.”⁶ And seafarers most times are on the receiving end of such hijacks by pirates.

For illustrative purposes, the Ocean Beyond Piracy (OBP) report for 2014 states that the total economic cost of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea was about US$983 million, approximately US$314 million was spent on vessel protection, and the shipping industry was responsible for 47 % of this cost.⁷ Moreover, acts of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea threaten about US$600 million worth of fishing exports.⁸ The OBP report for 2014 further shows that 60 % of the attacks by pirates occurs off the coast of Nigeria,⁹ which invariably affects the economy of the country. For example, the 2012 audit report by NEITI discloses that the total revenue that accrues to Nigeria yearly from the petroleum industry is estimated to be US$62.944 billion.¹⁰ However, Nigeria losses approximately US$8 billion per annum to the activities of pirates and other maritime criminals.¹¹ Onuoha opines that as a result of piracy, Nigeria loses about US$9 billion per annum,¹² while Benin lost an estimated US$11 million between 2010 and 2012.¹³ More pointedly, the OPB report for 2014 on ‘human cost piracy key findings’ in the Gulf of Guinea uncovers that 1,035 seafarers were subjected to attacks, 170 seafarers were detained, and 55 % of these attacks involved weapons.¹⁴ Specifically, the number of violence to crew between 2011 and 2015 is 895 (2011), 662 (2012), 373 (2013), 479 (2014), and 333 (2015).¹⁵ To buttress this point, the IMB piracy report for 2015 makes it known that pirates in the Gulf of Guinea are well armed and violent, while the waters in the region remain risky for navigation.¹⁶ The paper submits that the above statistics and analysis lend credence to the fact that piratical acts off the coast of Nigeria are violent which adversely affects seafarers, hence a significant motivation for the crew to play a role in curbing piracy of the country’s coast.

This paper is divided into six different parts. After the necessary introduction section, an examination of factors that facilitate seafarers’ security competence and the interrogation of the working condition and welfare of the crew in Nigeria through the prism of law and policy are conducted in Part 2 in order to determine the existence of features and conditions that motivate seafarers to play a role in suppressing piracy. Further, the nature, causes, and effects of acts of piracy on seafarers off the coast of Nigeria are critically analysed in Part 3. The objective of this pivotal section is to underscore the peculiar nature of piracy in Nigeria, explore the root causes of acts of piracy off the Nigerian coast, and through the adverse effects of piratical attacks on the crew, identify the motivating factors for seafarers to facilitate the suppression of piracy off the coast of Nigeria. Part 4 of this paper explores seafarers’ challenges in curbing piracy off the Nigerian coast despite the adverse effects of piratical acts on crew members. In view of that, it is a truism that the absence of a conducive working environment and enhanced welfare condition due to lack of laws and policies discourages seafarers from playing a role in curbing piracy. In light of the above, Part 5 articulates workable recommendations toward enhancing the role of seafarers in suppressing piracy off the coast of Nigeria. And Part 6 concludes this paper by reiterating that piracy as a result of poverty, including unemployment, adversely affects crew members’ life generally and by introducing as well as implementing the recommendations proffered in this paper, seafarers can complement the suppression of piracy off the coast of Nigeria.

2 An overview of factors that facilitate the role of seafarers in suppressing piracy

The author argues that the welfare of seafarers is relevant in curbing piracy.¹⁷ This means that better welfare is one of the motivating factors for seafarers to effectively perform their security roles on board vessels. Thus, conditions of employment, hours of work and rest,¹⁸ accommodation, recreational facilities,¹⁹ food and catering, health protection, medical care,²⁰ living condition, social security for seafarers, and recruitment and placement services covered by the Maritime Labour Convention²¹ are of paramount importance in the role seafarers play in securing their vessels.²² In a similar vein, introducing a policy that mandates the compensation of the crew for financial, property, and job losses due to piratical attacks or as a result of participating in the prosecution of pirates motivates and facilitates seafarers’ role as a veritable tool and a major asset in safeguarding their vessels.²³ In view of that, seafarers are incentivised to use their security training and competence to complement other efforts toward suppressing piracy since injured crew members will receive adequate medical attention and in cases of death, kidnapping, hostage situation, and loss of personal property, the family members of the affected crew will be adequately compensated.

Moreover, seafarers require proper training, competence, and associated certification to enhance their capability to assess and analyse security risks during piratical attacks and to effectively respond by administering security protocol, which includes the use of modern security equipment.²⁴ It is argued that capacity building through training and certification and the elimination of flag of convenience²⁵ bolster the capability of seafarers to contribute in sustaining the security of ships.²⁶ Therefore, it is the position of this paper that well-trained and competent seafarers, like the ship security officers (SSOs), are better positioned to implement relevant maritime security conventions and other related instruments, assess and analyse security risks, and manage as well as administer security protocol to prevent or repel attacks on their vessels.

In addition to the above, seafarers’ capacity building that leads to the acquisition of best management practices, like manoeuvring vessels during piratical attacks, aimed at avoiding pirates contributes to the overall security of vessels. This has not only enhanced the level of security awareness of seafarers, but provided a veritable and symbiotic working relationship between the crew and privately contracted armed security personnel²⁷ on board ships. There are instances where seafarers have been able to avoid as well as repel several piratical attacks on their vessels due to the application of best management practices, like enhanced security awareness and risk assessment.²⁸ More so, under the best management practices regime, seafarers’ assistance to PCASP has led to the prevention of acts of piracy on their vessels.²⁹ In fact, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has, in its resolutions, acknowledged IMO’s recommendations and guidance for preventing, repelling, and suppressing piracy and welcome efforts to update the guidance, which culminated in best management practices for seafarers.³⁰ Against this backdrop, it is the argument of this paper, which aligns with the observation of Coutroubis and Kiourktsoglou,³¹ that better trained seafarers in a conducive working environment engendered by laws and policies can effectively contribute to the suppression of piracy.

2.1 An X-ray of the labour and working conditions of seafarers in Nigeria

A comprehensive understanding of the role seafarers play in suppressing piracy off the coast of Nigeria requires a brief examination of the laws and policies that affect the crew in the country’s maritime industry. The exploration of such laws and policies will be an overarching testament and determination of the existence or non-existence of factors that facilitate seafarers’ competence, ability, and willingness to secure their vessels off the coast of Nigeria. It is noteworthy that the checkered history of the shipping industry in Nigeria culminated in the dearth of labour-related laws and the absence of effective and consistent shipping policies toward training and capacity building for seafarers.³² Against this background, the author argues that unless the current regime is changed, Nigerian seafarers will continue to be responsible for the human cost of piracy and would play no role in securing their vessels.

As a corollary to the above, there is an absence of policy direction in the shipping industry in Nigeria, especially in the area of training and capacity building for seafarers. The existing paradigm is that seafarers in Nigeria do not get adequate training required for proper management, safety, and security of vessels due to the dearth of relevant policies in the country’s maritime industry. In this regard, it is contended that the recent policy decision to remodel Nigeria’s National Seafarers Development Programme (NSDP), which is laudable, has been marred by the preference to train seafarers abroad rather than invest in the infrastructural development of the country’s maritime industry.³³ This unsustainable precedent arises because MAN³⁴ lacks funds, modern facilities, and, particularly, training vessels needed to adequately train Nigerian seafarers to become certified in accordance with the STCW Convention as amended. Consequent upon the existing policy which engenders ‘political patronage’ and MAN’s lack of training vessels and its attendant deprivation of sea time experience to its cadets, graduates of MAN do not have the requisite capacity and competence to secure their vessels.

More so, it is further argued that the recent attempt to re-establish the national shipping line, which has always been an exercise in futility in the country,³⁵ should be handled by stakeholders in the shipping industry in Nigeria. Such endeavour should not be undertaken by government; instead, it must be private sector driven with the support of government. Besides, MAN’s lack of infrastructural development has resulted in the declaration of its graduates as unemployable by ship owners, the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA),³⁶ and the Nigerian oil and gas industry.³⁷ This shows that the Nigerian government lacks the capacity to effectively manage maritime activities. In view of the policy gaps in capacity building and enhanced training for the crew, this paper submits that the security ability and competence of Nigerian seafarers are grossly undermined.

In light of the foregoing, it must be emphasised that some of the existing maritime laws have equally exposed seafarers to a condition where they are exploited by ship owners and, thus, discouraged from safeguarding their vessels. This is aptly illustrated by the fact that the Cabotage Act,³⁸ which ordinarily should encourage local participation in the shipping industry, creates waivers that allow vessels owned by foreigners and manned by foreign crew to operate in Nigeria. The implication of these statutory provisions is that Nigerian seafarers may not be employed to work in vessels owned by foreigners. In view of that, the author opines that the waiver which prevents the employment of Nigerian seafarers by foreign shipping companies and the unemployable status of MAN’s graduates pave way for unfair treatment of the few employed Nigerian seafarers by foreign shipping companies and their Nigerian counterparts.³⁹ Under such poor working condition, Nigerian seafarers cannot perform their security responsibilities effectively.

More pointedly, Nigerian seafarers that are either injured or lost their lives during acts of piracy do not have any form of compensation from their employers.⁴⁰ Lending credence to this fact, Santos observes that when seafarers die, suffer physical injuries or loss of properties in defense of their lives and those of others as well as in defense of properties on board ships as a result of piratical acts, “the legal regime, under international law, by which they can base their claim remains unclear.”⁴¹ This paper argues that Nigeria, like must countries, has no law that provides for compensations or benefits to seafarers who are victims of piratical attacks, including those that participate in the prosecution of pirates.

In furtherance of the above, it is pertinent to state that Nigeria has ratified, but not domesticated the MLC 2006 ⁴² in accordance with section 12 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended (the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria), which means that the labour and working conditions of more than 4000 registered seafarers in the country are still poor.⁴³ The convention has comprehensive provisions for the management and regulation of employers/employees relationships in labour matters in the maritime industry,⁴⁴ which, if implemented, will enhance the welfare of the crew, thereby influencing seafarers to protect their vessels from attack. However, due to the antecedents of Nigeria in implementing laws and policies, it is argued that the implementation of the MLC 2006 will remain a big challenge in the country when the convention is domesticated. It is common knowledge that the implementation of labour-related laws, policies, and regulations is particularly problematic in Nigeria, which culminates in incessant strike actions by government employees across virtually all sectors of the country’s economy.⁴⁵ Accordingly, the author observes that the attendant consequence of this present legal regime is that the plights of seafarers will continue in Nigeria.

In view of the above, it is observed that due to the prevalent situation in the maritime industry in Nigeria where the laws and policies do not empower, capacitate, and protect the crew, seafarers may not be incentivised to play a role in securing their vessels. Thus, seafarers’ role in providing insider leverage as witnesses during piracy trials, sharing information with navies engaged in (joint) naval patrols, employing best management practices to avoid attacks, and assessing as well as evaluating security risks to repel potential acts of piracy may be eroded. The author argues that in suppressing piracy off the Nigerian coast, seafarers should not be deprived of their mandatory training and capacity building or denied adequate compensation for their losses as a result of piracy, including losses incurred due to their testimonies during piracy trials. More importantly, government and ship owners should not make seafarers to feel rejected in any way or that their services are not sufficiently recognised.⁴⁶

3 Piracy and its effects on seafarers in Nigeria

This section interrogates the international law definition of piracy and further uses statistics to probe the nature, root causes, and effects of piracy on seafarers, especially off the coast of Nigeria.

3.1 Untangling the definitional conundrum of piracy under international law

Under international law regime, piracy involves illegal act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by crew members or passengers of a ship, directed on the high seas, against another ship.⁴⁷ However, it has been robustly argued that this definition is restrictive⁴⁸ because it limits piracy to acts committed on the high seas, requiring two vessels to occur, and the act must be for private ends. The implication of this extant piracy legal regime is that it confines the suppression of piracy to a narrow purview which creates lacunae for pirates to avoid prosecution after arrest by maritime security or regulatory agency. In view of these limitations, it is contended that while UNCLOS circumscribes piracy to the high seas, events have shown that most piratical attacks off the Nigerian coast and other piracy hotspots like Indonesia and Bangladesh occur in territorial waters, archipelagic waters, and ports. More so, most piratical attacks in ports do not need a second ship to occur.⁴⁹ Other limitations exist, for instance, there is a thin line between private and political ends in contemporary piracy and no obligations on states to criminalise piracy in their domestic legislation as well as prosecute pirates in their national courts.⁵⁰ As a result of these limitations in the definition of piracy under international law, several instruments have been introduced to accommodate piracy within kindred criminal acts.

In view of the above limitations of the definition of piracy, Wambua argues that “there have been attempts to ameliorate the deficiencies by expanding and modifying the definition of certain crimes that may well cover acts of piracy as well as the jurisdiction of states in other international instruments to deal with such crimes.”⁵¹ Although the drafting of the SUA Convention⁵² is the most significant attempt to reduce the effect of the limitations of the international law definition of piracy, it does not directly address piratical acts. Accordingly, the list of offences in article 3 of the SUA Convention covers a wide range of offences that constitute maritime violence, including terrorism. The author observes that these maritime crimes are akin to piracy and Wambua rightly pointed out that the offences listed in article 3 of the SUA Convention cover piratical acts.⁵³

In furtherance of the above, Roach opines that the “…SUA Convention proscribes acts that include one of the basic elements …of piracy: seizing or exercising control over a ship by force or threat of force…and injuring or killing any person in connection with the commission or attempted commission of that offense....”⁵⁴ It is pertinent to state that the SUA Convention excludes the geographical limitation, the private end condition, and the two-ship requirements. More pointedly, article 5 obliges state parties to criminalise the acts listed in article 3 in their domestic legislation, with a requirement that there should be a nexus between the offence and the state establishing jurisdiction.⁵⁵ The SUA Convention further provides that the crimes listed in article 3 constitute extraditable offences under extradition treaties.⁵⁶ This means that in the event a state party is not willing to prosecute, then the suspect can be extradited to another state that is prepared to prosecute. Against this background, the author argues that since the SUA Convention complements the regime of UNCLOS, seafarers can effectively implement both conventions in facilitating the suppression of piracy off the coast of Nigeria.

Furthermore, IMO, in defining piracy, incorporates armed robbery against ships to UNCLOS’s definition of the crime. Aside from adopting UNCLOS definition of piracy, IMO refers to ‘armed robbery against ships’ as “any illegal act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of piracy, committed for private ends and directed against a ship or against persons or property on board such a ship, within a State’s internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea.”⁵⁷ Anyiam submits that in determining the strategy to tackle unlawful acts against vessels, including where to prosecute offenders, a legal definition will be more appropriate and “the IMO’s definition of piracy in accordance with Article 101 of UNCLOS should be the preferred mechanism for this purpose.”⁵⁸ This is consequent upon piracy being an international crime for which every state has the right and duty to fight.⁵⁹ Thus, the author avers that despite the limitations of UNCLOS, it provides the legal framework for the suppression of piracy.

It is pertinent to note that Nigeria has ratified but not domesticated both UNCLOS⁶⁰ and the SUA Convention⁶¹ in accordance with the country’s constitution,⁶² which means that, presently, piracy is not a crime in Nigeria. The implication is that prosecuting pirates for acts of piracy is not possible in Nigerian courts.⁶³ It is imperative for Nigerian government to domesticate these conventions to create an enabling legal framework for the suppression of piracy in the country. Nevertheless, it is argued that Nigeria cannot avoid its obligations under international law on the pretext of non-domestication of a convention. Lending credence to this position, Fedeli states that “…failure to sign a self-executing treaty or failure to ratify a non-self-executing one does not preclude liability under customary international law.”⁶⁴ Although attempts were made to domesticate some of the existing maritime security conventions, the 7th National Assembly of Nigeria could not pass the bill into law⁶⁵ before the end of its tenure in 2015.⁶⁶

3.2 Probing the nature of piracy off the coast of Nigeria

According to Bridger, piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is a ‘Nigeria-centric problem’ that primarily occurs within 100 nautical miles of the coast and targets vessels plying the regional oil trade.⁶⁷ It is a trite fact that oil and gas is the mainstay of Nigeria’s economy accounting for about 80 % of the country’s budgetary revenue, over 90 % of the gross earnings, and approximately 95 % of foreign exchange earnings.⁶⁸ This natural resource is found in the Niger Delta region, and because of the amount of crude oil production that takes place there annually, it has attracted potential pirates interested in seizing the resource and selling it for profit on the lucrative black market. Most of this natural resource is found offshore; hence, the development of offshore petroleum industry has created a lot of desirable targets for piratical attacks, like drilling ships, rigs, pipelines, storage facilities, and support vessels.⁶⁹ Thus, aside from seafarers, piracy off the coast of Nigeria adversely affects the country’s revenue accruable from the exploration and sale of crude oil with its attendant consequences on the economic, infrastructural and sociopolitical development of the country.

Further peculiarity of Nigerian pirates is the use of heavy armament, which is consequent upon pirates’ proximity to their onshore bases in the Niger Delta region. Pirates in Nigeria also use military tactics and sophistication in their nefarious activities. In view of this, Doherty observes that pirates “know how to skillfully maintain and fire their weapons, they ambush security forces, and they board vessels with tactical precision.”⁷⁰ The author emphasises that the above observation lends credence to the statistics contained in Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4 below, with regards to the violent nature and human cost of piracy off the Nigerian coast. Between 2013 and 2015, there were 67 hostages, 59 kidnappings, 2 killings, and 6 injured seafarers off the coast of Nigeria compared to other African countries (see Tables 2 and 4 below).

Table 1 The number of (actual and attempted) piracy attacks off the Coast of Nigeria (2009–2015) (table created by the author) (see IMB Piracy Report for 2013, p. 5, IMB Piracy Report for 2014, p. 5, & IMB Piracy Report for 2015, p. 5)

Table 2 Types of violence to crew off the coast of Nigeria (2013–2015) (table created by the author) (see IMB Piracy Report for 2013, p. 11, IMB Piracy Report for 2014, p. 11 & IMB Piracy Report for 2015, p. 10)

Table 3 Locations of (actual and attempted) piracy attacks (2009–2015) (table created by the author) (see IMB Piracy Report for 2013, p. 5, IMB Piracy Report for 2014, p. 5 & IMB Piracy Report for 2015, p. 5)

Table 4 Types of violence to crew (2015) (table created by the author) (see IMB Piracy Report for 2015, p. 10)

In fact, IMB data on piracy off the coast of Nigeria show that in 2013, there were 31 attacks, 18 attacks in 2014,⁷¹ 14 attacks in 2015,⁷² and the overall number of seafarers killed in all piracy hotspots globally between 2010 and 2015 is 28.⁷³ In many incidents, pirates hijacked the vessels for several days, ransacked the ships, and stole the cargo usually crude oil. A number of crew members were also injured and kidnapped in the past attacks. As a consequence, ships are advised to be vigilant as many attacks have gone unreported.⁷⁴ There are reported attacks off Lagos, Bayelsa, Brass, Port Harcourt, and Kwa Ibo.⁷⁵ In the context of the above IMB data, it is argued that since seafarers are responsible for the human and, sometimes, economic costs of piratical acts in Nigeria, they are better positioned and motivated to contribute in suppressing piracy off the country’s coast. For instance, seafarers can play a role in suppressing piracy by providing insider leverage as witnesses during piracy trials, sharing information with navies engaged in (joint) naval patrols, employing best management practices to avoid or repel attacks, assessing and analysing security situations in other to respond effectively, and implementing maritime security instruments and other related conventions as well as local laws.

In light of the foregoing, the author posits that the role of seafarers in complementing the suppression of piracy off the coast of Nigeria is weakened in the absence of effective legal and policy regime in spite of the overwhelming negative effects of acts of piracy on crew members and the country’s economy. It is pertinent to state that seafarers are pivotal in implementing relevant maritime security conventions and other related instruments, like the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) Code, 2002 and the International Ship Management (ISM) Code, 2013 as amended, in securing their vessels. This is because the guiding philosophy in the drafting of these conventions is to establish specific responsibilities, a chain of accountability, and, through training, ensure that seafarers have the appropriate skills and competence needed to fulfil the responsibilities which they have been entrusted with,⁷⁶ especially in securing the vessels they man.

3.3 Root causes of piracy off the coast of Nigeria

At this juncture, it is pertinent to briefly examine some of the root causes of piracy off the Nigerian coast. Evidently, some of these root causes of piracy include, inter alia, poverty, unemployment, corruption in the petroleum industry and the maritime sector, illegal fishing, underdevelopment of the oil producing communities, environmental degradation, weak maritime regulatory and security institutions, and the Niger Delta insurgency.⁷⁷ These root causes of piracy are briefly appraised under the following sub-heads: political, economic, and environmental factors.

3.3.1 Political root causes

It is a fact that most piracy hotspots are located in regions engulfed in political instability, civil unrest, insurgency, regional maritime boundary disputes, and basically ravaged by poverty and unemployment.⁷⁸ Furthermore, Nigerian pirates are motivated by the culture of corruption and impunity prevalent among government officials, politicians, bureaucrats, and the elite. In addition to lack of political will by government to prosecute those that have been linked to corrupt practices, regulatory and security agencies turn blind eyes to corrupt activities in the petroleum industry and collude with pirates in exchange for a share of the plunder.⁷⁹

3.3.2 Economic root causes

One of the consequences of illegal fishing and poaching which contributed to the collapse of the fishing industry in Nigeria is the increase in the number of unemployed youths in the riverine communities in the Niger Delta region of the country. Besides, the pollution of farmlands and fish ponds as a result of the exploration of crude oil in the oil-producing communities has aggravated the unemployment rate in Nigeria and there is infrastructural decadence in the Niger Delta region despite the fact that approximately 83 % of the country’s revenue comes from the region.⁸⁰ The import of this situation is that these unemployed youths become pirates in order to survive. More importantly, the economic gain, the relative costs of attack, and the low probability of capture and prosecution due to the absence of legal regime encourage piracy off the coast of Nigeria.⁸¹

3.3.3 Environmental root causes

From the foregoing, it is a trite fact that there is a causal relationship between piracy and environmental degradation due to the activities in the petroleum industry. Thus, piracy off the coast of Nigeria arises because of poverty, unemployment, and militancy caused by environmental degradation and pollution of the ecosystem (as a result of oil exploration), as exemplified in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria.⁸² In summary, the root causes of piracy in Nigeria anchor on a “systemic inequality and corruption which ⁸³ have been enduring sources of national tension, along with the environmental degradation … have spawned widespread criminality and militancy as these groups attempt to seize their share of the national wealth.”⁸⁴

3.4 Effects of piracy off the coast of Nigeria on seafarers

Having examined the root causes of piracy off the Nigerian coast, there is need to robustly interrogate the implications of piratical acts on seafarers. It is trite that Nigerian pirates carry weapons and are very violent during attacks which implicate on the life, health, family, job, and finance of seafarers. Below are the analysis of some of the effects of piracy off the Nigerian coast on seafarers.

3.4.1 Physical effects

The major effects of piracy on seafarers are physical injury, abuse, and death’ (see Tables 2 and 4 above). The types of violent attacks on seafarers off the coast of Nigeria and other piracy hotspots like Malaysia and Indonesia include assault, kidnapping, hostage taking, and killing of crew members (see Tables 2 and 4 above ). According to Hurlburt et al., seafarers in the course of their capture, captivity, and rescue get injured and sometimes die.⁸⁵ This has been aptly illustrated by the incidence whereby Somali pirates hijacked two South Korean fishing boats; the crew were held hostage and as negotiation dragged on for months, captured seafarers were beaten and starved before they were released after ransom was paid.⁸⁶ Further, the author observes that kidnapped seafarers are denied of food and water, shot at with water cannons, locked up in ship’s freezer, tied up in hot sun, kept in solitary confinement, forced to parade naked, participated in mock executions, denied medical care, forced to collaborate with pirates, and used as human shield.⁸⁷

3.4.2 Psychological and behavioural effects

In addition to the physical consequences, it is argued that many seafarers that encounter attacks by pirates may be exposed to psychological abuse and experience long-term psychological or behavioural effects.⁸⁸ It is important to emphasise that piracy off the coast of Nigeria is extremely violent, which is exhibited even before pirates board the ships, thereby increasing the stress and anxiety levels of the crew (see Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4 above). Seafarers whose ships are boarded may additionally suffer the stress and uncertainty linked to waiting in citadels and those captured face abuse on board ships or onshore as hostages of pirates.⁸⁹ Most kidnapped seafarers suffer post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and post-release or recovery reintegration is not always conducted with sufficient appreciation of the need for psychological support. This paper submits that these situations potentially increase the risks seafarers experience in relation to recovering from piratical attacks.⁹⁰

3.4.3 Financial effects

Aside from the physical and psychological ramifications of piracy, this paper asserts that seafarers risk financial difficulties in both short and long terms after acts of piracy. There are a number of ways in which piracy compromises seafarers’ finance aside from being robbed of all or most of their personal belongings when they encounter pirates.⁹¹ Some of the most common ways include loss of money which they are not reimbursed, loss of wages, and financial loss from changing careers to avoid returning to sea.⁹² Besides, the author argues that seafarers’ contracts are interrupted and wages are lost as a result of being taken hostage by pirates. Seafarers equally expend money, without compensation, in the process of testifying against pirates in courts.

3.4.4 Emotional effects

In furtherance of the above, it is pertinent to posit that seafarers are emotionally traumatised after attacks by pirates. Seafarers may consider disclosure of emotional suffering a sign of weakness and shame and such sentiments inhibit disclosure as well as limit access to care.⁹³ As a matter of industry culture and convention, the expectation that self-reliant seafarers are hardened and resilient contributes to group pressure on individuals, preventing the disclosure of crew members’ emotional state⁹⁴ which aggravates their condition. Additionally, seafarers’ ethnic and national cultures may hold prejudices that obstruct access to effective treatment after release from captivity.⁹⁵ Nincic aptly summarises the impact of piracy on seafarers thus:

The harm to seafarers is not limited to the attack itself. Being hijacked and held hostage, or injured during a pirate attack has, in many cases, led to symptoms closely resembling post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) among affected seafarers, particularly among those who have been held hostage for any length of time. These symptoms can be of some duration. At the same time, the human costs are not limited to the seafarers alone. If a crewmember becomes so traumatized by an attack or from having been held hostage he or she may not be willing to sail again; absent other job opportunities or sources of financial support, their families may suffer. Additionally, not all ransoms are paid by shipping or insurance companies; sometimes families have had to contribute at a significant financial burden to them.⁹⁶

4 Challenges confronting seafarers in curbing piracy off the coast of Nigeria

In spite of the adverse effects of acts of piracy on the crew, there are factors that prevent seafarers from playing a role in curbing piracy off the coast of Nigeria. Though some of the factors are linked to ship owners and the management of shipping companies, government agencies’ inability to perform their statutory functions creates the enabling environment for piracy to thrive. Consequent upon that, government agencies have failed to perform their oversight function in the maritime industry in Nigeria which has culminated in poor labour and working conditions and inadequate training and capacity building for seafarers. Some of these challenges are interrogated below.

4.1 No inter-personal relationship between ship owners and seafarers

There is no gainsaying the fact that many ship owners do not know their employees. Statistically, about 20 to 30 % of ship owners has minimal relationships with their crew and they do not follow-up with seafarers after piracy incidents.⁹⁷ Further, organisational culture that disparages management from the crew and interpersonal relationships at work, such as conflicts with the behaviour of supervisors and conflicts with management policies,⁹⁸ are factors that prevent seafarers from being committed to securing their vessels. Moreover, it is adumbrated that insufficient resources to do the job, like defective equipment or inadequate supplies, or low salary structure can affect the morale of seafarers, thereby discouraging the crew from ensuring that their vessels are secured.⁹⁹

4.2 Misplaced priority

As a corollary to the above, new challenges in maritime operations are ordinarily met by putting significant effort into developing new technology. There has been little focus on the crew despite the fact that many accidents and incidents are indirectly caused by human factor. This human factor that leads to poor performance is due to severe working and living conditions, stress, and ergonomically poor technical solutions.¹⁰⁰ In support of this position, Fedorowicz states that “many seafarers face recruitment based on cost rather than on proper training and experience”¹⁰¹ and such situation, it is argued, culminates in incompetence and nonchalant attitude to ship security by the crew.

4.3 Lack of welfare package for seafarers

From the discussion so far, it can be inferred that the welfare of the Nigerian seafarers has not improved in the last decade. Of utmost concern to seafarers in Nigeria is the loss of jobs to their foreign counterparts because the major players in the oil and gas industry are foreign ship owners and the fact that some of the Nigerian seafarers are not well trained to man vessels. More troubling is the allegation that seafarers in the employ of Nigerian-owned vessels are underpaid, dehumanised, work in deplorable environment, and most times live in abject poverty.¹⁰² Under such condition, it must be emphasised, seafarers are discouraged from enhancing the security of their ships.

4.4 Lack of adequate training

In furtherance of the above, lack of training or inadequate training affects the competence, productivity, and professionalism of seafarers. In other words, most Nigerian seafarers lack the mandatory training needed to be up to speed with the security and safety operations on board vessels. This is because indigenous shipping companies could hardly purchase state of the art equipment or employ enough seafarers (even those employed are not sent for further training). This paper further posits that some of these indigenous shipping companies are also out of date in terms of new developments in the training of seafarers. Besides, MAN, which is the major government institution saddled with the responsibility of training seafarers in Nigeria, has no training vessels for its teeming cadets. Consequent upon that, MAN’s graduates lack the mandatory sea experience for the acquisition of competence and certification to man ships. It is a fact that seasoned seafarers are expected to undergo IMO mandatory practical training under the STCW Convention as amended, after which the seamen can work on board any vessel in the world. Unfortunately, not all Nigerian seafarers undergo this important training¹⁰³ and therefore they do not have the requisite competence and experience to secure their vessels.

4.5 Poor working and living conditions

Additionally, the author submits that the Nigerian government and the maritime regulatory agencies do not treat Nigerian seafarers as partners in curbing piracy. Seafarers are sometimes denied access and use of port and shore facilities. The situation is worsened when seafarers are made to feel rejected, which could mean that their services are not sufficiently acknowledged or needed. For instance, every year in Nigeria, many seafarers are either injured or lost their lives during attacks by pirates; unfortunately, their employers do not have any form of compensation for them.¹⁰⁴ Furthermore, the wages of seafarers are sometimes paid late or not paid at all,¹⁰⁵ and this is not peculiar to Nigeria because it happens globally.¹⁰⁶

4.6 Lack of good maritime policies

More importantly, the paper reiterates that Nigeria has no defined maritime policy which has contributed to the policy ‘flip flop’ and lacklustre performance in the industry, generally. This is exemplified by government’s attempt to re-establish a national shipping line without the active participation of the private sector. More so, MAN lacks infrastructural development and the existing maritime policy does not address the issue. For example, instead of engaging in infrastructural development of MAN, government is spending huge sum of money to train “green horns selected by politicians at the states when thousands of graduates of MAN are roaming the streets simply because they could not access sea-going vessel where they would complete their training and qualify for NIMASA’s certification as Officers…”¹⁰⁷

4.7 FOC or related conditions

Although Nigeria does not operate an FOC framework,¹⁰⁸ NIMASA, the institution saddled with the responsibility of ensuring that vessels that fly Nigerian flag adhere to the conditions established by statute, has been unable to perform its duties which creates a condition similar to an open registry in the country.¹⁰⁹ This is illustrated by the existence of conditions where Nigerian seafarers are treated as if they are working under an FOC regime: they are poorly paid, work under bad labour conditions, get inadequate training, and work in sub-standard vessels.¹¹⁰

4.8 Inadequate training facilities

A corollary to the above is the existing condition where graduates from MAN are lacking sea time experience in accordance with extant convention. Besides, this major maritime institution is ill-equipped and lacks adequate funds to acquire vessels and other necessary equipment needed to train seafarers in accordance with global standard. In view of that, it has been observed that the “implication of all of these is that many Nigerian seafarers become willing tools in the hands of criminal elements who use them to steal the nations crude oil, petroleum products and perpetrate heinous crimes against ships plying the nation’s waters.”¹¹¹

4.9 Challenges in the implementation of maritime instruments

Aside from the non-domestication of some of the maritime security instruments, like UNCLOS¹¹² and other related conventions, the author submits that the implementation of such instruments in Nigeria would be fraught with a lot of challenges considering the country’s unfavourable reputation for implementing laws. This is as a result of corruption, lack of state of the art facilities, absence of trained manpower, inadequate funds, and lack of political will on the part of NIMASA to perform its duties effectively.¹¹³ More so, the ‘shoddy’ way in which some of these instruments are domesticated compounds the already compromised situation in the maritime sector.¹¹⁴ Commenting on the domestication of instruments in Nigeria using the MSA 2010 as a case study, Wilson opines that a “quantum leap was made by Section 215 of the new Act which in one swoop, incorporated into the Act twelve (12) important International Conventions relating to maritime safety and maritime labour.”¹¹⁵

4.10 Lack of care for the kidnapped seafarers

Stevenson posits that many seafarers feel abandoned and left ‘high and dry’ by their countries and the owners of the ships they man after being released by pirates.¹¹⁶ It is pertinent to state that most ship owners abdicate their duties under maritime law to pay seafarers their earned wages, to pay for seafarers’ personal property stolen by pirates, to provide medical care for seafarers injured during attacks by pirates up to maximum cure, and to repatriate seafarers when they complete their employment.¹¹⁷ It is important to reiterate that these obligations exist even when pirates hold seafarers hostage.¹¹⁸ In light of the above, it is regrettable that after the release of the vessel, MV Faina and its crew, which was captured on the 25th of September 2008, crew members have not been paid their earned wages or compensated for their personal property stolen by pirates and some of the injured seafarers during their captivity have not been provided medical care.¹¹⁹ The families of the kidnapped seafarers are also neglected and overlooked in the scheme of things by ship owners, which increases the anxiety of the crew.¹²⁰ The author submits that the existence of the above challenges prevents seafarers from playing a complementary role in suppressing piracy off the Nigerian coast.

5 Recommendations for enhancing the role of seafarers in suppressing piracy off the Nigerian coast

Consequent upon the above challenges faced by the crew, there is need to bring to the fore ways to enhance the role seafarers play in curbing piracy off the coast of Nigeria. Against this backdrop, this research argues that by introducing the recommendations below, seafarers will be motivated to play a complementary role in suppressing piracy off the Nigerian coast.

5.1 Developing a guidance on human element issues in relation to seafarers

There is need to develop guidelines for post-piracy care for seafarers in Nigeria. The aim of such guidelines is to produce guidance on how to establish plans and procedures for putting in place measures and taking appropriate actions with a view to providing adequate welfare for any attacked or kidnapped seafarer.¹²¹ The guidelines should also outline seafarers’ rights and eliminate the possibility of victimisation of seafarers seeking post trauma medical advice. This should be done voluntarily and confidentiality is also of utmost importance in this regard.¹²² In the same vein, it is argued that there should be a policy or guideline toward incentivising seafarers to testify during piracy trials in Nigeria. In view of that, the author contends that seafarers who are witnesses should be “properly compensated for any pecuniary loss including loss of opportunity to secure future work while absent in court.”¹²³

5.2 Care for the crew and their family

In the context of seafarers released from captivity, by introducing a regime where ship owners nominate senior company representatives to take charge of the reception arrangements for the ship and the crew on their arrival at a safe port, the company sends a signal to the freed crew members that the company cares about their welfare. Such step will encourage and motivate seafarers to always secure their vessels. Further, the nominated representative will have to balance the welfare of the crew and the need to get them away safely to their families, which is the priority, with the need for them to ‘decompress’ after a long period in captivity.¹²⁴ Dobbs insists that the ship owner’s representative must demonstrate from the moment of seafarers arrival in the port of refuge that their suffering is acknowledged and that appropriate welfare provision and management are in place for their immediate physical, personal, medical, and psychological needs.¹²⁵

5.3 Paying seafarers wages and compensating them for their stolen personal properties including their general welfare

In furtherance of the above, the MV Faina case depicts that there are instances where shipping companies have not paid seafarers their earned wages or compensated for their personal properties that were stolen by pirates long after being released from captivity by pirates. This type of ill-treatment meted out to the crew has to stop so as to motivate seafarers to perform their security role effectively. In cases where ship operators fail to meet their obligations to the crew, there should be a mechanism available to seafarers to recover unpaid wages earned while they were being held hostage by pirates and to compensate them for their stolen properties.¹²⁶ Brown opines that efforts must be made to stop ship owners from abandoning seafarers with impunity and in “…so doing … afford seafarers the basic human right to a safe place of employment and fair pay for a fair day’s work. In the process… ensure that seafarers cannot be manipulated in such a way as to benefit the interests of the few at the greatest possible cost to the many.”¹²⁷ Concurring with Brown’s position, Balbaa reiterates the importance of seafarers welfare by arguing that the “need to afford special protection to seafarers is a major task. The seafarer’s welfare is the most important issue, and shore leave is the most important element to keep seafarers …in the best condition.”¹²⁸ Hence, the introduction of compensation or ‘captivity pay’ for seafarers for their loss due to piracy as well as paying their earned wages after release from captivity by pirates would motivate the crew to protect their vessels.

5.4 Introduction of corporate security culture

Just like in safety, ship owners or companies should have a security culture instilled in their seafarers. A systematic management can contribute to the quality, safety, and security of the ship. It is a truism that the performance in different aspects and functions within an organisation is engraved in the culture of that organisation.¹²⁹ Due to the notion that it is largely accepted that organisational culture determines the behaviour and performances of its individual members, it is imperative that security awareness and preparedness should be inculcated in the day to day activities of seafarers in Nigeria.¹³⁰ From this standpoint, it is argued that the role of the SSOs, who have the knowledge, competence, and experience in security administration, security risk assessment and analysis, implementation of relevant maritime security conventions and other related instruments, and the application of soft laws including maritime security recommendations, becomes inevitable in projecting the security culture of a vessel.¹³¹

5.5 Adequate and proper training of seafarers

As a corollary to the above, Hawkes maintains that proper training of seafarers, coupled with security indoctrination, is needed in maintaining maritime security.¹³² The author reiterates that this could be achieved by training seafarers on how to react timeously when there is sufficient warning of an imminent danger of piracy attack or when the vessel is traversing piracy hotspots like the Gulf of Guinea. It is pertinent to note that only those masters who have grasped the nature and magnitude of piracy threat and who have carefully assessed and analysed such threat as it relates to their vessels are prepared to properly indoctrinate and train their crew and develop ships capable of foiling piratical attacks.¹³³ Consequent upon that, only “…those operators … who have taken the time and made the effort to understand the security ramifications of doing business within today’s maritime industry are likely to do so unscathed.”¹³⁴ Such training should be backed up by providing recreational facilities for seafarers as a means to encourage healthy living and socialisation.¹³⁵ In view of that, the author submits that, if properly implemented, the introduction of the capacity building initiative and mandatory training under the NSDP by the Nigerian government will empower seafarers with the necessary skill and competence to secure their vessels.¹³⁶

5.6 The domestication and application of UNCLOS and other related conventions

More so, the domestication of relevant maritime security instruments and other related conventions, like MLC 2006, by the Nigerian government is an overarching step toward motivating seafarers to safeguard their ships. Hence, there is need to domesticate, in accordance with the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria, UNCLOS and the SUA Convention to adequately provide the legal framework for the suppression of piracy off the Nigerian coast. It is a disincentive for seafarers who go through the trauma of attacks by pirates to see arrested pirates set free without prosecution due to lack of piracy legal regime.¹³⁷ Moreover, seafarers are often the key witnesses in piracy trials and therefore provides insider leverage during the prosecution of pirates. Thus, domestication of relevant maritime security instruments ensures that pirates do not only go through trials, but are adequately prosecuted with the testimonies of seafarers. More so, the Protocol to the SUA Convention which expands the scope of criminal acts against ships has to be domesticated.¹³⁸ Furthermore, in addition to the existing SSO training, STCW Convention as amended introduces three new levels of security training: security related familiarisation, proficiency in security awareness, and proficiency in designated security duties¹³⁹ so as to secure their vessels. It is therefore important that relevant maritime security instruments and other related conventions should be domesticated for immediate and effective implementation by seafarers.

5.7 Vigilance by seafarers

In addition to proper training and improved working condition, Nigerian seafarers should always maintain vigilance during navigation. On many occasions, the first indication of an attack has been when pirates appear on the bridge or in the master’s cabin. Advance warning of a possible attack or threat of attack will give seafarers opportunity to sound the alarms, alert other ships, inform the coastal authorities and naval forces, illuminate the suspect’s craft, undertake evasive manoeuvrings or initiate other response procedures.¹⁴⁰ Hawkes opines that adequate warning and timely reaction are important in repelling potential acts of piracy on vessels.¹⁴¹ More so, signs that the ship is aware that it is being approached can deter attackers¹⁴² and the implementation of such preventive measures and preparatory vigilance by seafarers address the security challenges of vessels.

5.8 Ship security officer and ship security plan

Sequel to the appointment of the SSO¹⁴³ for every ship is the preparation of ship security plan (SSP).¹⁴⁴ It is the responsibility of the SSO to prepare and/or update the SSP. The SSP should reflect all shipboard activities in all geographical locations in which the vessel may traverse. It should be sufficiently flexible to allow different levels of security in the various ports of call and it should create preventive measures for unauthorised access to the ship at sea as well as in ports.¹⁴⁵ The author argues that the use of the SSP by competent SSOs to secure vessels can boost the morale and confidence of seafarers in safeguarding their vessels.

5.9 The use of PCASP on board ships should be allowed by Nigerian government

The use of PCASP on a vessel is to complement the efforts of the master and other designated security officers in protecting the vessel. Against this backdrop, the author argues that the introduction and use of PCASP will enhance the capability of seafarers to secure their vessels.¹⁴⁶ For illustrative purposes, the deadly 2009 hostage incident aboard Maersk Alabama showed the limitations of ship’s non-lethal anti-piracy tactics, which involved lookouts, a fortified secure room, and firing of flares. The introduction of PCASP must be done with due diligence and observance of the guidelines for the use of armed guards.¹⁴⁷ Banning the use of well-trained, well-equipped, and professional PCASP will pave way for the deployment of local guards to escort vessels as currently done in Nigeria.¹⁴⁸ The author observes that these local guards are ill-equipped and ill-trained to undertake such high-risk jobs and some of these so-called local guards collude with pirates to hijack vessels in exchange for a share of the loot.¹⁴⁹ Thus, the author argues that this policy should be discarded because it is not in the interest of seafarers or ship owners.

5.10 Adoption of best management practices for the protection of seafarers

Furthermore, the introduction and use of best management practices¹⁵⁰ to protect and prevent piracy is a veritable way to protect seamen from being harmed by pirates. This is because the best management practices (BMP4) booklet, for example, contains experiences and data collated by naval/military forces regarding acts of piracy,¹⁵¹ which could be used by the crew to avoid acts of piracy. Care should be taken when formulating measures to prevent illegal boarding and external access to ship so that crew members will be able to escape without being trapped inside the citadel in the event of another type of emergency, like fire.¹⁵² Besides, there should be consideration for ballistic protection for seafarers who may be required to remain on the bridge during piratical attack, recognising that pirates increasingly fire at the bridge of a vessel to try to force it to stop.¹⁵³ In addition, the interim guidelines for protection from piracy in the Gulf of Guinea,¹⁵⁴ which complements the BMP4, among other things, state that there is need to start and end shipping operations during daylight, since pirates like striking at night.¹⁵⁵ It is important to note that the use of BMP4 most times complements having PCASP on board vessels and both measures can be used together to fend off pirates. It is particularly important for “the Masters and the PCASP to make informed decisions to keep clear of small boats, dhows, fishing vessels and if necessary take evasive actions, increase speed and request assistance as needed.”¹⁵⁶

5.11 Coordinated and comprehensive effort by Nigerian government

Kraska suggests that prior to any set of measures or recommendations, it is imperative for relevant government agencies and relevant institutions to gather accurate statistics of incidents of piracy and armed robbery against vessels.¹⁵⁷ These data should be collated under type and area and the nature of the attacks assessed, with special emphasis on types of attack, accurate geographical location, and modus operandi of pirates.¹⁵⁸ Moreover, these statistics should be published to all interested parties, particularly ship owners, in a format that is comprehensible and usable.¹⁵⁹ In view of this, it is contended that advanced intelligence could prove useful in order to act in a coordinated manner even prior to an attack by pirates.¹⁶⁰ Based on the data and any intelligence report on piracy, Nigerian government should issue to ships entitled to fly its flag and vessels calling at its ports advice and guidance on any appropriate additional precautionary measures ships may need to adopt to be protected from attack. More importantly, government of Nigeria should involve representatives of ship owners and seafarers in developing these measures to prevent and suppress maritime crimes off its coast.¹⁶¹ From the foregoing, the author submits that the introduction of the above measures will substantially enhance seafarers’ role in the suppression of piracy off the Nigerian coast.

6 Conclusion

It is a truism that the Nigerian government has done a lot to stem the tide of piracy off its coast. For instance, it has improved its surveillance system,¹⁶² established a local naval force,¹⁶³ and engaged in bilateral¹⁶⁴ and regional cooperation¹⁶⁵ with a view to suppressing piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. However, the capacity of Nigerian government to suppress piracy is undermined by the fact that only 28 % of the Nigerian Navy’s warships and frigates is operational at any given time, which means that “maritime operations usually amount to intermittent sweeps, rather than a continuous patrol presence.”¹⁶⁶ Besides, there is urgent need to domesticate UNCLOS and the SUA Convention in order to have a legal basis for prosecuting pirates in Nigerian courts. This will influence and facilitate seafarers’ role as witnesses in the prosecution of pirates. Furthermore, there have been efforts to enhance the security and safety capacity of seafarers¹⁶⁷ as well as improve their welfare¹⁶⁸ in Nigeria through the ratification of relevant conventions.¹⁶⁹ In view of the root causes of piracy off the coast of Nigeria, like weak regulatory institutions, this paper argues that there is need for the maritime regulatory agencies to introduce and implement laws and policies that enhance the welfare and capacity of seafarers to secure their vessels. More pointedly, policies that promote capacity building, training and retraining of crew members on risk assessment and analysis, security management of vessels, and encourage the compensation of seafarers for their losses during and after piratical attacks¹⁷⁰ should be introduced and implemented in Nigeria.¹⁷¹ More so, training facilities and vessels should be provided for MAN to empower its graduates with the needed skills and competence to safeguard their ships, while MLC 2006 should be domesticated to enhance the labour and working conditions of Nigerian seafarers.¹⁷² All these measures will provide a conducive environment for Nigerian seafarers to inculcate new, effective, and comprehensive methods of repelling piratical attacks, withstand the mental stress of navigating through piracy hotspots, assess and analyse security risks, and assimilate how to react when pirates board their vessels. In addition, effective legal regime and policies that enhance seafarers’ insider leverage in preventing and suppressing piracy through testifying against pirates in courts, sharing information with navies engaged in (joint) naval patrols, and observing security and safety measures contained in maritime security instruments and soft laws should be instituted in Nigerian maritime industry. On the other hand, seafarers should be treated fairly and compensated adequately since they are killed, tortured, maimed, and incur financial losses as a result of piracy. A situation where seafarers are confronted with “increased difficulty joining and leaving their ships in foreign ports, taking shore leave, and visiting medical facilities ashore” which make already challenging seafaring life less attractive should be stopped.¹⁷³ Therefore, the working and living conditions of seafarers in Nigeria should comply with international standard. Lending credence to the position of this paper that seafarers play a complementary role in suppressing piracy off the Nigerian coast, Mitropoulos argues that governments, port authorities, ship owners, among others, should treat seafarers as partners in the fight against piracy and other maritime crimes “… and facilitate their access to ports and shore facilities.”¹⁷⁴ It is imperative that in view of safety, efficiency and security of the shipping industry, seafarers “need adequate opportunity to relax and recover before they take their ships out to sea again in pursuit of their peaceful objectives in the service of world trade.”¹⁷⁵ The author concludes that the introduction and application of the above recommendations, which are in tandem with the views of stakeholders in the shipping industry,¹⁷⁶ will enhance the complementary role of seafarers in suppressing piracy off the Nigerian coast. Lending credence to the author’s conclusion, Malhotra observes that every stakeholder in the maritime world recognises “the fact that security on board ships and in ports cannot be implemented without the cooperation and assistance of seafarers. Accordingly, seafarers are necessary partners in the implementation of new and enhanced security regulations.”¹⁷⁷ In his words, Mitropoulos reiterates the importance of seafarers in the safety and security of the shipping industry by stating that:

Shipping relies heavily on the initiatives, cooperation and constant vigilance of seafarers to help prevent breaches of maritime security and, without their support and wholehearted commitment, the system the ISPS Code aims to put in place will be severely weakened. It is crucial that seafarers are not made to feel in any way rejected or that their services are not sufficiently recognised.¹⁷⁸ Effective implementation of international instruments, such as the 2006 ILO Maritime Labour Convention, is one means to improve the working and living conditions of seafarers worldwide. Along with its 2014 amendments, it is an important instrument to protect seafarers against cases of exploitation and safety hazards, to achieve decent work for seafarers while securing economic interests in fair competition for shipowners. Capacity-building to facilitate implementation of the 2006 Convention by States is crucial to the safety and security of maritime trade.¹⁷⁹