Introduction

Times of crisis have a tendency to dampen the movement of economic migrants to the major immigrant-receiving regions of the world. However, counter to the widely held public perception, immigrants overwhelmingly choose to stay put in their adopted countries rather than return home despite high unemployment and lack of job opportunities (Migration Policy Institute 2009). Recessions have shown to hit migrants and their financial well-being particularly hard, with repercussions not only for the migrants themselves and their households but also for immigrant sending and receiving countries alike.

Many of the immigrant workers hardest hit by the recession are vulnerable for a number of reasons: their poor local-language skills and limited educational credentials; their concentrations in boom–bust sectors such as construction; their contingent work contracts and arrangements; and the discrimination they face that can be exacerbated in times of recession (Migration Policy Institute 2009). The newest hired workers, as well as workers from nationalities that entered a labor market most recently, may also lack social and job networks that can cushion the impact of recession. Furthermore, times of crisis and the decline in labor demand increase the likelihood of precarious and irregular labor. The result may be demands for more protectionistic measures or aggressiveness towards migrants.

The historical socio-economic context influences migration flows as the situation changes from labor demand to increased unemployment. Both the economic crisis in the 1970s caused by the oil crisis in 1973 and the economic crisis in the 2000s and 2010s caused by the financial crisis in 2008 are influenced by and contingent on a longer period of economic upturn with a demand for labor that exceeded the national labor force and foreign workers were therefore welcomed. In both cases, the crisis caused an economic downturn and increased unemployment, which in various ways has led to policy changes and affected the social construction of the ethnic “other”.

From 1965, migrant workers from particularly Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Pakistan were invited by the industry to Denmark to fill the vacant positions in low-skilled sectors of the labor market. Both Danish society and many migrants envisioned this stay as temporary, so there was little emphasis on integration up until the stop for immigration in 1973. However, by the time of the oil crisis, many migrant workers had earned the right to stay, to state support, and to family reunification, making permanent settlement in Denmark a more attractive option than the often insecure economic conditions in the homeland. During the economic boom in the 2000s a somewhat similar policy framework was prevailing. Although we find civic stratifications and a very restrictive integration policy framework targeting the traditional immigrant groups, e.g. newcomers as refugees, family-related migration as well as descendants, there were fewer concerns about integration when it related to targets of the specialized labor migration schemes as well as the labor migrants from new EU member states from Eastern Europe. The recent global financial crisis has arguably had an immense impact on the movement of economic migrants across the world. Contrary to public belief, many Eastern European migrants have chosen to stay in Denmark rather than return home. Considering the experiences from the previous period of economic upturns and inflow of labor migration why were integration measures again ignored? In this sense, we see parallels to the former recession culminating with the oil crisis in 1973.

When we speak of crisis in this context we understand it as economic crises. Such crises lead to structural transformations with economic stagnation and restructuring resulting in unemployment and lower demands for unskilled workers. Economic crises therefore also impact immigration flows. Reduced demands for labor affect employment and migrant workers’ position on the labor markets and possibly their working conditions. The crises may have different effects on immigration, e.g., increased flows of return migration as a reaction to unemployment or lower earnings; reduced levels of inflow from countries of origin; may worsen conditions for migrant workers on the labor market creating more vulnerable positions; may increase hostility towards migrants among majority populations; are likely to lead to changes in the prevailing policy framework pertaining to immigration and access to social welfare benefits.

In this article, we analyze and compare the development of policy frames and policy content before, during and after the crises and thereby seek to answer how economic contours affect not only policy-making processes and content but also the social construction of target groups. Furthermore, we ask what can be learned from the crisis/migration experiences from two historical cases.

Our comparative case study takes its theoretical point of departure in the literature on critical frame analysis (Schön and Rein 1994), sociological understandings of framing processes (Benford and Snow 2000), and the social construction of target groups (Schneider and Ingram 1997). Our main assumption here is that policy frames carry inherent goals and definitions as well as diagnostic and prognostic understandings of the “problem” at stake. We will develop this framework in the next section. Afterwards, we discuss the methodological challenges in comparing cases from different historical periods within the same national context.

Critical Frame Analysis and the Social Construction of Target Groups

The concept of framing or frame analysis has long been prominent in the social movement literature where it was linked to the role of ideas and discourses for political action. Framing describes “an active, procedural phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level of reality construction” (Benford and Snow 2000: 614). Thereby, the political process can be characterized as a contest between different frames regarding the right to interpret an issue or social problem (Benford and Snow 2000: 626). Hence, we may be able to identify policy frames as an object for analysis. Schön and Rein (1994) investigated such policy frames in what they termed a frame-critical policy analysis. In policy controversies the different parties struggle over the definition of a problematic policy situation and strive for control over the policy-making process (Schön and Rein 1994: 29). Schön and Rein claim that these struggles over the naming and framing of a policy situation “are symbolic contests over the social meaning of an issue domain, where meaning implies not only what is at issue but what is to be done” (ibid.). We combine this understanding with Benford and Snow’s conceptualization of collective action frames. According to Benford and Snow (2000: 615), these frames have different characteristic features of which we concentrate on two types. The first is core framing tasks, which comprise diagnostic framing, prognostic framing, and motivational framing. Core framing tasks concern the action-oriented function of collective action frames. Diagnostic framing refers specifically to problem identification and attributions. Prognostic framing involves “the articulation of a proposed solution to the problem or at least a plan of attack, and the strategies for carrying out the plan” (ibid: 616). Finally motivational framing evokes agency and mobilizes support. Following both Benford and Snow and Schön and Rein, we are interested in how particular policy problems and preferred solutions are grounded in different problem-setting stories rooted in different frames resting on different assumptions.

The last concept, we want to include is Schneider and Ingram’s understanding of target populations (1997). In their book Schneider and Ingram show how policy-making systems are characterized by an unequal distribution of political power, social constructions that separate deserving from undeserving, and an institutional culture which legitimizes strategic means of communication, i.e., particular frames, and political power (ibid: 102). Different target populations become subjects for different tools, rules and rationales legitimating problem definitions, allocation of resources, benefits and/or sanctions and basically political action. We will follow the comprehension that the construction of target populations is crucial for understanding the changes in the policy framework of integration. Migration flows are diverse and within this mixed flow different target groups are framed very differently again demanding, supporting and legitimizing different policy tools, rules, and assumptions.

Methodological Implications

In the article, we understand policy frames in a broad sense consisting of configurations of positions which can be identified and mapped. We determine diagnostic frames by looking at problem representations and we determine prognostic frames by looking at goals, policy actions, responsible actors and target groups. These are our analytical categories or frame markers. Policy frames are not only constructed within the formal institutional channels and political system but are also and at the same time constructed in public media and among particular stakeholders (e.g., trade unions, social partners and the industry). In that sense, policy frames are always constructed and situated in a field of contestation. Hence, we determine the dominant policy frames in the two periods by looking at the central policy documents (legislative texts, regulations, commission suggestions, and others). The analysis will be structured around key events and developments which in some cases caused a change in the policy framework and in other cases mainly spurred a debate in the parliament and public media. Therefore, we have looked at these debates, which we call policy debates, before, during, and after a particular event. We looked at responses from key actors in newspapers and parliamentary debates combined and supported by findings from previous studies of media representations of foreigners, etc. Key actors are policy makers, politicians, stakeholders and left-right ideological positions in major newspapers, i.e., as expressed in mainly editorials. In the analysis, we refer to particular texts as illustrations but our total data material is much larger. We emphasize that our focus has not solely been on actual changes in the policy framework but even more on the formulation and contestation of different problem representations. Only including changes in policy content would have neglected the analysis of unsuccessful and/or alternative frames. Denmark did not develop a coherent integration policy until 1998, but obviously this does not imply that integration was not discussed before. Our focus on policy frames and not only policy content therefore makes it possible to outline and identify discussions taking place at earlier stages. Concretely, we determine policy frames by looking first broadly at representations of how immigration is framed in general terms by key actors. Is the country perceived to be in need of immigration, which kind of immigration and why? That could be both diagnostic and prognostic framing. This provides a general outline of the different positions. We then outline how the notion of integration is established in the policy frame and how distinct policy issues, religious background, cultural characteristics, educational levels, position on labor market, language proficiency, housing, and mobility, normally considered key concepts when integration is conceptualized, are given meaning and importance (or not) within the integration frame.

In our comparative design, the two cases are treated as singular whole entities purposefully selected and constituted as instances of culturally and historically significant phenomena (Rubinson and Ragin 2007). The cases are chosen to account for possible qualitative changes and meaningful relations as well as status quo. A central reason behind the choice of cases is that there are several points of similar characteristics, such as the groups initially arriving as temporary labor migrants, being new immigrant groups at the point of the crisis, and because they, in large numbers, have decided to settle in Denmark.

However, the approach taken in this analysis is that the logic of comparison embodied in the design implies that specific phenomena or developments can be understood better when they are compared with other meaningful cases. In line with this thought, these cross-historical and cross-ethnic case studies become meaningful to compare due to the similarities and the differences that give us the opportunity to study and identify reactions to a particular phenomenon—economic crisis—and to what extent these are shaped by specific temporal contexts.

One of the challenges of using this particular comparative design is, however, that the differences in the cases make it difficult to apply direct comparisons. Two major differences between the cases need to be addressed. Firstly, the historical dimension due to the radical changes in the contextual setting between the 1970s and the 2000s, not least the escalation of the globalization process and the enlargement of the EU, which have resulted in different patterns of labor mobility. Furthermore, the status of the Eastern European migrants as EU citizens limits the possibilities of regulation through immigration policies.

Secondly, the ethnic and cultural differences between the groups may or may not be important in relation to the comparison. It is a common belief that the cultural distance between the established group and newcomers influences the acculturation process of immigrants (Berry, 1997). The larger the cultural distance, the more difficult or problematic it is believed to be to incorporate the newcomers into mainstream society of the destination country. These implications will be addressed and incorporated in the analysis.

The Situation Before and After the Crisis in the Early 1970s

Before the Economic Crisis

On 29 June 1964, the Social Liberal Minister of Trade Hilmar Baunsgaard initiated the debate on the future labor migration. In an article “Foreign Labour?” in the newspaper Aktuelt he began formulating a policy frame on labor migration:

All indications say that Denmark will have a labor problem for a long period to come. There are two ways of solving this—limit production and work to the productive capacity of the existing manpower or obtain extra manpower. If we choose the latter, we can stabilize growth at a higher level than by choosing the former. To the extent we cover our need for more labor by importing foreign workers, we create higher economic activity and higher production (Aktuelt, 29 June 1964).

This statement presents a diagnostic frame; an economic boom leads to labor shortage and unless we do something, this situation will impede growth. Moreover, it provides a prognostic frame with an inherent solution. To avoid labor shortage and stagnation the state should look into labor recruitment from abroad. The frame was supported by employers and actors in the private sector who pointed to the same findings from other European countries. They also started articulating a coherent policy understanding that foreign workers would be “temporary guests”, i.e., if the economy changed they could always be sent back home before unemployment affected the national workers (Jensen 2001: 33).

This frame was challenged by other frames, however. The trade unions either had strong reservations or directly opposed this as a potential solution. The same reservation was found in the media. The counter-frame used by the unionists and media applied the same frame diagnosis, i.e., an economic boom can lead to labor shortage but the solution was not to import foreign workers but to use profit on investments in labor-saving technologies and incentive pay systems, i.e., a profoundly different prognostic frame. An editorial in the newspaper Information responded: “What an idea! Incentive pay systems can give 10%–20% higher production without more labor” (Information, 1 July 1964). The solution was rationalization and this problem frame was supported by information from LO (Danish Trade Union Congress), which lent credibility to this particular framing. Another suggestion was to improve the technology, which was supported by the Social Democrats who suggested favorable tax policies on technological innovation.

A Long Period with No Immigration Policy—Ad Hoc Solutions

The Danish policy framework on immigration can be characterized as more or less non-existent between the mid-1960s and 1969. The general attitude in parliament was that the increasing need for labor could not be solved solely by modernization within for instance the agricultural sector or by the increasing rates of female participation on the labor market; hence a solution was to import foreign workers. Indeed the main demand from the employers and their political support in parliament (the Conservatives and Liberals) was to liberalize the Foreigners Act further and at least simplify the administration of residence and labor permits.

The supporting argument for the immigrant liberal policy frame was nevertheless dominant. The claim that foreign workers at all times could be expelled seemed to stand strong against the other concerns (Würtz Sørensen 1988). A good example of this logic which often is quoted was an editorial written by the Director of The Confederation of Danish Employers (DA) in their magazine Arbejdsgiveren in March 1970. Under the heading “Welcome Mustafa” DA stated that: “The guest workers are particularly welcome. First and foremost because this reserve has no additional costs compared to a reserve consisting of unemployed or housewives. If we have no use for the labor force, it can be expelled” (Arbejdsgiveren, 6 March 1970).

In the late 1960s, a competing and gradually stronger policy frame emerges. Its problem definition states that foreign workers by their presence increase the labor supply and thereby force the wage levels downwards, as for instance expressed by LO (Würtz Sørensen 1988: 8). Their presence is likewise perceived to reduce the employers’ incentives for modernization and technological improvement of production. The frame relates more to labor market policies in general and migration management than integration. A good example is the daily tabloid Ekstra Bladet, which in 1967 writes several articles based on the simple question: “Why should we let more immigrants into the country when Danes are unemployed?” (Ekstra Bladet, 21 October 1967). The same arguments are found among its readers: “It is intolerable to accept more newcomers when there are 50,000 unemployed Danes” (Ekstra Bladet, 6 July 1968).

The Elkær–Hansen Committee—Towards an Immigration Policy

In 1969, the Social Liberal Minister of Labor Lauge Dahlgaard commissioned an investigation on the question of foreign workers’ position in Denmark. The commission was initiated at a time with growing hostility towards foreign workers in the general population (Jensen 2001) and dissatisfaction with the lack of a consistent immigration policy framework. A reason was that foreign workers were not affected by unemployment which therefore legitimated the lack of integration policy actions. If they could support themselves by working, other concerns were less important. Likewise, the main policy definition of this group was based on mobility: they would leave again.

Moreover, there is a developing antagonism between the two sides which constructs a new policy diagnosis by the critics regarding the inflow of foreign workers. The guest worker/foreign worker problem developed because the industrial sector wanted to keep low wage levels, maximize profits, and create competition between Danish low-wage workers not only for jobs but also for affordable housing (Folketingstidende, 1970–1971, sp. 1019–1020). This inevitably created xenophobia, and the industrial sector and supporting politicians were held responsible (ibid.). In contrast, the Conservatives, the Liberals and the employers constructed a problem frame stating that the problem was not the guest workers but inflexible regulation instruments. Making it more easy to close and open up for entrance to the country would solve these problems (ibid.: sp. 1014).

There is also an emerging awareness about the problems of expelling foreign workers who already had residence and work permits, and the goal is therefore to secure equal treatment. This implies full access to the welfare benefits. There is little articulation of retrenchment of rights or of a two-tier social system.

In 1971, a stronger focus on culture gains prominence. The “social” problems, e.g., lack of incorporation into the host society, hostility between natives and migrants, housing problems, and even discrimination of foreign workers are increasingly explained by differences in behavior and language. Hence, a problem created by the foreigners and not by a state that does not offer possibilities for a social life, etc. (see Jørgensen 2006). In 1971, Minister of Labor Dahlgaard articulated the new policy problem, which revolved around a concern about the labor migrants’ contributions to Danish economy (before that was taken for granted) and problems pertaining to accommodation. The first concern acknowledged a lack of incentives to invest in modernizing and streamlining the production apparatus. Regarding the latter concern, especially language and housing problems were pregnant (Folketingstidende 1970–1971, sp. 2090–2091). The best way to solve the problems was to limit the inflow of new migrants (ibid.).

The Peak of the Crisis and the (Full) Stop for Immigration

Denmark, despite what is often stated, never had any official “guest worker” program. A relatively unrestricted access lasted until 1 January 1970 when new conditions for arrival went into force, followed by the stop for issue of first-time residence and labor permits, which developed into a quota system followed by a full stop for immigration in December 1973.

After the restrictions in 1970, employers in the industrial and building sector pushed for administrative dispensations to be able to hire foreign labor. However, all special agreements and dispensations were terminated on 29 November 1973 when the oil crisis peaked, quadrupling the price of crude oil within a few months. The first stop for immigration in 1970 made exceptions for relatives of foreign workers, who still were able to apply for residence and labor permits. Again the policy frame takes various forms in two competing understandings. For anti-immigrant parties, this explains the flows of family-related chain migration, which later turned into integration problems. Another position holds that removing the mobility and flexibility of the labor migrants gave the migrants little choice but to stay in Denmark and bring their families there. International conventions made it possible to maintain a family life.

The situation leading up to the oil crisis and immigration stop and the subsequent period point to the formulation of the policy frame for the years to come. Here, immigration policies become intertwined with issues of integration. The left-wing parties advocated integration efforts, equal treatment, and protection against discrimination, even though they had been the fiercest opponents of labor immigration. The right-wing parties were more reluctant. The meeting between majority society and foreigners had been regarded as a problem for the foreign workers but not with the ethnic minority groups—and problems could be solved between the workers, the employers, and the market forces. Also, this understanding changes and the problem frame shifts gradually to focus on the problems constituted by the immigrants themselves. The lack of a political voice for anti-immigrant sentiments shortly after led the Progress Party to electoral success as the first political party with an explicit anti-immigration agenda. Both sides of the line nevertheless took permanent residence as the starting point for the individual problem framing.

Constructing Target Groups

The policy debates revolve around the “numbers game”. However, at the peak of the labor migration flows, Denmark still had received a rather limited number compared to other (West) European countries. The Turks were by far the largest group, and as of 1 January 1965, 85 Turks were registered in the country compared to 6,073 in 1970, almost all with work permit (Würtz Sørensen 1988: 7). Until the mid-1960s, labor market problems were discussed on a structural level without distinguishing between different groups. From the mid-1960s, the distinction between native and foreign workers became more outspoken, for instance in articles in Ekstra Bladet on the theme “Why accept foreigners when Danes are unemployed?” A distinction between deserving and undeserving groups was hereby created (cf. Schneider and Ingram) pertaining to access to jobs. Immigrants who had settled in Denmark were gradually constructed as a deviant group. This tendency is strengthened by the fact that immigrant workers who were redundant on the labor market still could make a better living on the social benefits they received in Denmark than by working in their home country. Even though such benefits were established rights, immigrants were perceived as being less deserving. In 1970, the parliament debated whether the foreigners should be characterized as “guest workers” or “foreign workers” (Jørgensen 2006: 15). “Guest” obviously connotes something temporary and the appropriate policy actions are therefore either non-policy (as they leave) or regulations (providing incentives/sanctions for them to leave). Moreover the “guest workers” are “culturalized” in a way that ignores most particularities and the groups become synonymous with primarily Turks but also Pakistanis and Yugoslavs. The groups blend together, however, and are characterized under one as being from “backward” cultures and deviating from the Danes in terms of culture and behavior (Jørgensen 2006).

The dominant frames and policy issues pertaining to integration are summarized in Table 1.

Table 1 Transformation of policy issues before, during and after the crisis in the early 1970s
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In sum, the crisis had two main outcomes for the discussions on the immigration and integration policy framework: (1) that cultural differences become the basis for policy making, i.e., differences necessitate the development of policies, and (2) that the crisis leads the political mobilization, especially the formation of an anti-migration party, here illustrated by the Progress Party. The latter outcome is strengthened by the government’s difficulties with expelling immigrants already living in the country, if such an aim should be pursued. Combined with growing hostility towards foreigners in the public, the Progress Party makes the most of the situation and mobilizes broadly in a populist manner—putting forth claims never really to be pursued.

Crisis of the 2000s—The Case of Eastern European Workers

The Situation Before and After the Financial/Economic Crisis of 2008

Since the liberal–conservative government came to power in Denmark in 2001, immigration and integration policy has been tightened numerous times and Denmark is now one of the most restrictive migration regimes in Europe (Thomsen 2010). The debate about the influx of foreign workers gained new energy in May 2004 when ten—mainly Eastern European—countries were included in the Union. From May 2004 until May 2009 more than 52,500 Danish work permits were given to Eastern European workers—about half of them to Polish workers. The number of Eastern European migrants has steadily increased and more than 20,000 are living in Denmark today. The majority of the Eastern European workers have taken employment in low-skilled sectors. Only a small percentage was employed in highly skilled areas such as the medical sector. The primary occupational sectors are the industry, construction/building, agriculture, and domestic services where the need for work experience and language proficiency is rather low (Thomsen 2010).

Before the Financial Crisis in 2008

Denmark, like many other European countries, experienced an increased demand for labor to fill vacancies in both low- and high-skilled sectors during the economic boom in the late 1990s and 2000s. The prevailing strategy for achieving a satisfactory match on the Danish labor market has been to facilitate controlled, employment-motivated immigration of people with the right qualifications. In 2007, Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen said:

Labor shortage costs prosperity and welfare. Private companies lose orders and production. The public institutions are not able to deliver the service we require […] Controlled immigration will secure that those who arrive have the right qualifications and are able to support themselves. Denmark needs foreign labor—the right way (Rasmussen 2007).

The diagnosis of the policy frame was shared by a wide spectrum of the political parties and actors in the labor market. The shortage of national workers had negative consequences for the production and economic activity. The prognosis was based on the need for foreign workers to meet the demands, and selective skilled migration programs, such as the blue card program, were introduced. The left-wing party Red–Green Alliance is in principle for the free mobility of workers, but not in the sense of creating a more competitive domestic market. Its position is based on the right to mobility and the right to work and it strongly emphasizes the protection of equal rights for workers.

The EU Enlargement and the Transitional Agreement

Transitional agreements were introduced in most of the “old” EU countries (EU15) as specific national transitional regulations (except in Sweden, Ireland, and the UK) in response to the enlargement in 2004. A main purpose of the transitional agreement in Denmark was to secure that the standards for wages and employment conditions also applied to foreign workers. The political motivation was to avoid development of a segregated labor market with an A and a B team. The transitional agreement was introduced in 2004, extended in 2006, moderated in 2007, and repealed as of 1 May 2009 (Malchow-Møller et al. 2009). An important reason the majority of the political parties in the Danish parliament voted for a continuation of the transitional agreement until 1 May 2009 was political pressure from the trade unions (Andersen and Hansen 2008). The prognostic frame presented by the trade unions was based on a wish to protect the existing labor market model and the conditions and salary level of national workers. A competing frame was presented by an actor from the employers’ organizations, who argued that: “The East Agreement has a negative effect on the productivity of Danish businesses and harms their international competitiveness” (interview, Danish Construction Association 2006).

Danish Industries supported the free mobility of EU workers, arguing that it will strengthen Danish businesses’ export possibilities. The government took the same position. The Danish People’s Party was the only center-right party that opposed the enlargement and free mobility across EU borders with reference to loss of sovereignty and risk of wage dumping. This attitude also reflects the party’s anti-immigration agenda. The prognostic framing of the situation was based on indications that Eastern European workers were creating unequal competition for the jobs available and causing social dumping. The main political effort for incorporating new labor migrants into Danish society has focused almost exclusively on labor market conditions and it can be difficult to judge whether this was to protect migrant workers, the national workers or possibly both.

During and After the Crisis in 2008

The impact of the economic crisis on Danish economy has been worse than often assumed. It has affected the domestic market heavily and the loss measured in demand is the fourth largest in Europe (Pedersen and Knigge 2011). Furthermore, the sectors where most of the Eastern European workers find employment have been affected severely by the financial crisis in 2008. In particular, the construction and building sector experienced a massive downturn and workers in great numbers were made redundant. Some returned to their home countries or migrated to other countries, but many of them have settled in Denmark. Eastern European workers are not so welcome anymore and surveys show that only one out of nine Danes are positive towards them (Avisen.dk 5 March 2010; Hansen and Hansen 2009). The negative attitude is not necessarily directed towards the workers, but also “towards the employers who exploit Eastern Europeans to press the wage down” (Viladsen 2010). The Danish People’s Party agrees with this perception of the current labor migration. The situation in 2011 is characterized by very different attitudes towards labor migration. The diagnosis seems to have developed towards more differentiated framing of the labor market situation. Due to the economic crisis and the resulting increase in unemployment, the opinion towards labor migration seems to have shifted from demand for extra labor force delivering competitive production. The trade unions’ argumentation is no longer based on protecting the workers—national or non-national—but on being competitive in a time of economic crisis (P1 Debat, 4 February 2011). Struggles over the prognosis are in this debate based on either creating better forms of production and protecting Danish workers, which are central issues for the trade unions, whereas the use of cheaper and more flexible labor to reduce the cost of production is the prognosis of neo-liberal positions.

Changing Attitude Towards Labor Migration and Target Population

Eastern European labor migrants are in various ways stigmatized by the way they have been portrayed in the media and by the political discourse, where they are constructed as a specific target population (cf. Ingram and Schneider) demanding specific policy actions. The trade unions are concerned both with illegal activities such as black labor and with illicit behavior like wage dumping by Polish and other EEC workers to the absolute minimum, which is below the norm agreed on in collective bargaining. Media headlines like “The invasion from the East” and “Indecent to dump wages” are examples of this discourse. Eastern European workers have also been called scroungers by various politicians, among them Villy Søvndal from the center-left Socialist People’s Party: “They don’t have the right to scrounge just because they are from Eastern Europe” (Søvndal 2008). This framing of the target population can be seen in relation to the debates of changing the social welfare system from a universalistic model based on equal rights to a system based on differentiated rights that must be earned.

Eastern European workers are often viewed as contenders who are mainly in it for their own personal winning and who do not contribute to Danish society. New social media such as Facebook offer new ways to share opinions, and different Facebook groups (Facebook 2011a, b) have been established to share view points on the perceived threat of labor migrants. The response to the mobility of citizens from the new EU member states primarily concerns residence and employment and much less integration aspects. This political position may partly be due to a prior assumption that these migrants are temporary, partly to the short geographical distance between the countries. However, an increasing number of these workers settle in Denmark; for example more than 1,700 Eastern Europeans have received parental benefits. Another indicator of settlement is that the number of claims for social benefits increased to 1243 in 2009, which is 16 times more than in 2007 (Information, 30 August 2010).

Recent political debates regarding restriction on the rights to social welfare services and benefits will challenge the motivation and possibilities of integration of the many newly arrived immigrants. EU citizens have the right to social services and insurance schemes in Denmark as long as they reside legally and meet the same general requirements as national citizens. The proposed restrictions of the right to welfare require that newcomers pay taxes in Denmark for 7 years before becoming entitled to various types of social services.

The dominant frames and policy issues pertaining to integration are summarized in Table 2.

Table 2 Transformation of policy issues before, during and after the crisis in the 2000s
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Summing up, there are two main changes in the policy framing of labor migration from the EU member countries from Eastern Europe: (1) a strong political agreement on foreign workers before the crisis but with restrictions to protect national workers. The crisis created a new situation with high unemployment, which fueled the anti-immigration discourse. (2) Little focus on cultural integration at national level partly due to the migrants’ status as EU citizens, who are not obliged to integrate or assimilate into other EU countries. Proposed restrictions of vesting requirements for social benefits indicate a turn away from the universalistic welfare model in Denmark

Comparing the Effects of Crises

What can we learn by comparing two cases from historically different periods? The economic crisis in the 1970s led to a total stop for migration inflows. Instead of directly increasing return flows, it opened up for permanent settlement and future flows of family-related migration. Economic downturns affect both receiving and sending countries. From the 1960s to 1973, the Turkish economy was characterized by low growth rates. An economic crisis peaked in the late 1970s, but the country was not much worse off than its West European neighbors (European Communities 2009). The economic crisis in the late 2000s did not affect Poland to the same degree as many other European countries. Hence, we have somewhat different contexts for our two cases. The Turkish case would predict that Turkish migrants chose to settle in Denmark as the economy was worse in Turkey, but the same conclusion cannot be drawn in the Polish case. In the 1960s and late 1990s/early 2000s the economy was booming and the unemployment rate was low, causing a labor shortage in various sectors. The solution was, in both cases, to rely on import of foreign workers to heighten production and economic activity. However, the two cases do differ in several ways. First of all, the contextual frames are quite different and a central aspect is the acceleration of the globalization process during the three decades between the crises. Another difference is the circumstances for immigration by foreign workers. In the 1960s and early 1970s, the migrants were non-formalized guest workers; in the 2000s, most migrant workers arrived as a consequence of the EU enlargements in 2004 and 2007, but they were welcomed due to labor shortage in many sectors. The difference between the Danish industry actively inviting foreign workers with the approval of the national authorities and the supranational decision of the EU enlargement and the free movement of labor may well influence the political climate regarding the newcomers and attitude towards integration.

A similar feature of the two cases is that the labor migration primarily was directed towards low or unskilled jobs in specific labor market sectors. In both cases, it is apparent that the dominant frame for attracting migrant workers was based on economic arguments, but as the stay became more permanent, focus on the importance of cultural integration and language proficiency increased. Other major differences between the two groups are religion and the Eastern European workers’ status as EU citizens, which limits the national government’s ability to respond to the immigration.

In both cases, the economic crisis has increased unemployment, which appears to be one of the main reasons for the changes in both public and political discourse leading to policy changes. In the 1970s, the reaction to the unemployment brought on by the crisis was the immigration stop. This was not a possibility in the 2000s although the Eastern Agreement did provide regulations until 2009. The same problematizations regarding unemployment are being repeated however. As we saw, newspapers in the 1970s problematized that Denmark allowed foreign workers to enter the country when there were unemployed Danes. The same type of “Danish jobs for Danish workers” framing is being used today. Not by the labor unions, who have to stick to the claim of equal pay for equal jobs, but by the public opinion in general and the Danish People’s Party in particular. In reality, these demands revolve around a simple claim for protectionism and are most often highly discriminatory and prejudiced in terms of language and framing.

The central role of the trade unions in the framing debates on respectively guest workers and migrant workers is closely related to the structure of the Danish labor market where the trade unions remain strong players. Their reserved position on foreign workers and arguments displays a certain political framing of the Eastern European workers as potential wage dumpers and undermining the Danish wage and labor conditions. However, the solution does not seem be “equal pay for equal work”, as a persistent claim is that foreign workers impede rationalization, improvement of productivity, and introduction of new technologies. It was a prominent diagnostic and prognostic frame in the late 1960s and 1970s advanced by different actors and it is being reproduced by trade union spokespersons in the 2000s (P1 Debat, 4 February 2011). The construction of Eastern Europeans as a target population has incorporated frames of them as either criminals and/or economic exploiters, which has recently led to the reintroduction of border control (as part of the fiscal budget negotiations). Policy frames matter in this way as they lead to very tangible institutions and measures. Looking broadly at the main policy responses to integration we find that in both cases there was little or no focus on integration before the crisis as the migrants were believed to be temporary and would go home once their labor was no longer in demand. After the crisis, there was more focus on integration. Language proficiency attracts little attention in the initial period of stay in both cases, but once the number of settlements becomes clear it becomes an issue. In the 1970s, the introduction of 40 h of language school was solely seen as a means to upgrade the workers’ job skills and did not hold cultural connotations as such. This has changed and language has become pivotal in discussions of cultural integration and belonging. Nevertheless, language again lost importance during the economic upturn in the 2000s and only resurfaced during the crisis. EU citizens are not obliged to integrate in EU countries and language courses are therefore only an option and not an obligation. Religion plays a surprisingly small role in the policy frames in both periods. In the first period, it was simply not a point of interest and nobody related people’s religion to labor market issues. In the second period, the target population is not Muslims, and religion is therefore not a concern. Assessing the impact of the political constituency we find that the political actors change their positions quite dramatically. In the 1960s/early 1970s the Liberal, Conservative, and Social Liberal parties were all pro-labor immigration whereas the Socialist People’s Party, Left Socialists, and the Social Democrats were against. From 1979/1980, we find the opposite situation: in the 2000s, the parties on the left are still open for labor migration, but as integration gradually becomes a salient policy issue and still more politicized, it has become difficult to defend a liberal approach as voters have been very easy to mobilize on this issue. Today only the small leftist party Red–Green Alliance and the Social Liberals have more open attitudes towards immigration and Red–Green Alliance in reality supports many of the claims raised by the trade unions. The anti-immigrant sentiments articulated by the Progress Party have been continued by its successor, the Danish People’s Party, and have become a very efficient motivational frame, upholding the restrictive approach to immigration. Both sides of the political spectrum in this sense are somewhat paradoxical. We would expect pro-EU parties to support the mobility of labor within the Union (the Conservative and Liberal parties), but they do not. Theoretically, we would expect left-wing parties to fight for equal rights for all workers, but their frames are actually very protectionist. In the first period, we find a strong focus on self-regulation of the labor market despite Social Democratic governments. In the 2000s, we find no such focus, except in liberalist/neo-liberal think tanks despite a decade of Liberal–Conservative governments. Hence, the traditional political cleavage structures do not really hold the necessary explanatory power if we want to understand the policy responses to labor migration and integration. The fact that EU cooperation entails loss of national sovereignty must of course be taken into consideration in terms of national possibilities for immigration control.

A last similarity on the two cases indirectly relating to the impact of economic crises is the developing understanding of circular migration. Circular migration has been perceived as a benefit by the European Commission and international actors like the World Bank (see Jørgensen 2010). However, these recommendations often ignore the issues of integration and simply assume that all work migrants would accept staying in a particular country for a few years and then move on to another location or return home. The same understanding gained ground in Denmark in the early 1970s and again in the 2000s. In both cases, circular migration is regarded as a pursuable solution at the end of and after the economic crisis. It would entail a comprehensive and consistent policy framework supporting this type of migration. Of course, we have seen such attempts but the findings from our analysis also show that people take unexpected actions and that many migrants choose to stay once they have started an everyday life in a new country.

Conclusion

The two cases show that there are many similarities and differences in debates on and policy framework of migration and integration policies in the respective periods. The fact that Denmark did not have an official policy on integration of guest workers in the 1960s and 1970s created a different point of departure than in the 2000s where the experience with and policy on integration of immigrants are much more developed. It is therefore also rather striking that many of the mistakes from the 1960s and 1970s seem to be repeated in the 2000s. In sum, we argue that issues such as religious background, cultural characteristics, and educational levels, position on labor market, language proficiency, housing, and mobility which all pertain to integration are given less attention in times of economic upturn. In such times, the market is believed to be able to adjust itself, an understanding drawing on a liberalist political rationale. However, when the economy suffers, issues of integration reappear and the different markers of integration are situated in different frames. One of the main differences in the two cases is the enlargement of the EU and the consequences of tightened national immigration policies, which require other means of regulating and controlling immigration. The two cases are taken from different historical periods but investigating how integration policy frameworks are developed and immigrant target groups are constructed in and through a crisis cycle reveals the similarities and logics behind the policy-making processes. In that sense, analyzing distinct historical cases can show how history repeats itself by ignoring past experiences and policy learnings.