Abstract
Some intuitive normative principles raise vexing ‘detaching problems’ by their failure to license modus ponens. I examine three such principles (a self-reliance principle and two different instrumental principles) and recent stategies employed to resolve their detaching problems. I show that solving these problems necessitates postulating an indefinitely large number of senses for ‘ought’. The semantics for ‘ought’ that is standard in linguistics offers a unifying strategy for solving these problems, but I argue that an alternative approach combining an end-relational theory of normativity with a comparative probabilistic semantics for ‘ought’ provides a more satisfactory solution.
Article PDF
Similar content being viewed by others
Avoid common mistakes on your manuscript.
Change history
20 April 2022
A Correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03605-1
References
Bech G. (1955) Studien über das Deutsche Verbum Infinitum. Max Niemeyer Verlag, Tübingen
Belnap N., Horty J. (1996) The deliberative stit: A study of action, omission, ability, and obligation. Journal of Philosophical Logic 24: 583–644
Bratman M. (1987) Intention, plans and practical reason. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
Broome J. (1999) Normative requirements. Ratio 12(4): 398–419
Broome J. (2001) Normative practical reasoning. Supplementary Volume-The Aristotelian Society 75: 175–193
Broome J. (2002) Practical reasoning. In: Bermudez J.L., Millar A. (eds) Reason and nature: Essays in the theory of rationality. Oxford University Press, New York
Chisholm R. (1964) The ethics of requirement. American Philosophical Quarterly 1: 147–153
Dancy J. (1977) The logical conscience. Analysis 37: 81–84
Dancy J. (2000) Practical reality. Oxford University Press, New York
Davidson D. (2004) Incoherence and irrationality. In: Davidson D. (eds) Problems of rationality. Oxford University Press, New York
Dreier, J. (2009). Practical conditionals. In D. Sobel & S. Wall (Eds.), Reasons for action (pp. 116–133). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ewing A. C. (1953) Ethics. English Universities Press, London
Finlay S. (2004) The conversational practicality of value judgement. Journal of Ethics 8(3): 205–223
Finlay S. (2006) The reasons that matter. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84(1): 1–20
Finlay S. (2009) Oughts and ends. Philosophical Studies 143: 315–340
Finlay, S. (forthcoming a). Against all reason: Skepticism about the instrumental norm. In C. Pigden (Ed.), Hume, motivation and virtue. MacMillan.
Finlay, S. (forthcoming b). Normativity, necessity, and tense. In R. Shafer-Landau (Ed.), Oxford studies in metaethics 5. New York: Oxford University Press.
Foot P. (1972) Morality as a system of hypothetical imperatives. Philosophical Review 81: 305–316
Geach P. (1981) Whatever happened to deontic logic? Philosophia 11: 1–12
Gensler H. (1985) Ethical consistency principles. Philosophical Quarterly 35: 156–170
Greenspan P. (1975) Conditional oughts and hypothetical imperatives. The Journal of Philosophy 72(10): 259–276
Hampton J. (1998) The authority of reason. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Harman G. (1973) Review of Wertheimer. The significance of sense. Philosophical Review 82(2): 235–239
Harman G. (1975) Reasons. Critica 7: 3–18
Harman G. (1976) Practical reasoning. Review of Metaphysics 29: 431–463
Hill, T., Jr. (1973). The hypothetical imperative. In T. Hill, Jr. (Ed.), Dignity and practical reason in Kant’s moral theory. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Horty J. F. (2001) Agency and deontic logic. Oxford University Press, New York
Huitink, J. (2005). Analyzing anankastic conditionals. Retrieved 1 Nov 2008 from http://ncs.ruhosting.nl/sub9/program/huitink.pdf.
Jackson F. (1985) On the semantics and logic of obligation. Mind 94: 177–195
Kolodny N. (2005) Why be rational? Mind 114: 509–563
Kolodny N. (2007) How does coherence matter? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107: 229–263
Korsgaard C. (1997) The normativity of instrumental reason. In: Cullity G., Gaut B. (eds) Ethics and practical reason. Oxford University Press, New York
Kratzer A. (1977) What must and can must and can mean. Linguistics and Philosophy 1: 337–355
Kratzer A. (1981) The notional category of modality. In: Eikmeyer H. J., Rieser H. (eds) Words, worlds, and contexts. Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, pp 38–74
McNamara, P. (2006). Deontic logic. In E. Zalta (Ed.), Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Retrieved 1 Nov 2008 from http://plato.stanford.edu.
Nordlinger R., Traugott E. (1997) Scope and the development of epistemic modality. English Language and Linguistics 2: 295–317
Parfit D. (1997) Reasons and motivation. Supplementary Volume-The Aristotelian Society 71: 99–130
Parfit, D. (forthcoming). On what matters.
Piller C. (2007) Ewing’s problem. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 3: 43–65
Raz J. (2005) The myth of instrumental rationality. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1: 2–28
Ross, J. (2006). Acceptance and practical reason. Rutgers University Ph.D. dissertation.
Ross, J. (forthcoming). How to be a cognitivist about practical reason. In R. Shafer-Landau (Ed.), Oxford studies in metaethics 4. New York: Oxford University Press.
Sæbø K. J. (2001) Necessary conditions in a natural language. In: Féry C., Sternefeld W. (eds) Audiatur Vox Sapientiae: A Festschrift for Arnim von Stechow. Akademie Verlag, Berlin, pp 427–449
Scanlon T. M. (1998) What we owe to each other. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Scanlon T.M. (2003) Metaphysics and morals. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 77: 7–22
Schroeder M. (2004) The scope of instrumental reason. Philosophical Perspectives 18: 337–364
Schroeder M. (2008) Having reasons. Philosophical Studies 139: 57–71
Schroeder M. (2009) Means-end coherence, stringency, and subjective reasons. Philosophical Studies 143: 223–248
Schroeder, M. (ms). Do oughts take propositions?
Setiya K. (2007) Cognitivism about instrumental reason. Ethics 117: 649–673
Shafer-Landau R. (2001) Moral realism: A defence. Oxford University Press, New York
Sidgwick H. (1907) The methods of ethics. MacMillan, London
Sloman A. (1970) “Ought” and “Better”. Mind 79: 385–394
Thomson J. J. (2007) Normativity. In: Shafer-Landau R. (eds) Oxford studies in metaethics 2. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 240–265
Velleman J. D. (2000) The possibility of practical reason. Oxford University Press, New York
Vermazen B. (1977) The logic of practical “ought” sentences. Philosophical Studies 32: 1–71
von Fintel, K., & Iatridou, S. (2005). What to do if you want to go to Harlem: Anankastic conditionals and related matters. Retrieved 1 Jan 2006 from http://mit.edu/fintel/www/harlem-rutgers.pdf.
von Fintel, K., & Iatridou, S. (2008). How to say Ought in foreign: The composition of weak necessity modals. In J. Guéron & J. Lecarme (Eds.), Time and modality (Studies in Natural Language and Linguistic Theory) (Vol. 75, pp. 115–141). Springer.
von Stechow, A., Krasikova, S., & Penka, D. (2006). Anankastic conditionals again. Retrieved 1 Nov 2008 from http://folk.uio.no/torgriso/fs/files/stechowetal.pdf.
von Wright G. H. (1963) Norm and action. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London
Wallace R. J. (2001) Normativity commitment and instrumental reason. Philosophers’ Imprint 1: 1–26
Way, J. (forthcoming). Defending the wide-scope account of instrumental reason. Philosophical Studies.
Wedgwood R. (2006) The meaning of ought. In: Shafer-Landau R. (eds) Oxford studies in metaethics 1. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 127–160
Wertheimer R. (1972) The significance of sense: Meaning, modality, and morality. Cornell University Press, Ithaca
Wheeler S. III (1974) Inference and the logical “ought”. Nous 8(3): 233–258
Williams, B. (1981). “Ought” and moral obligation. Reprinted from Moral luck, pp. 114–123 by B. Williams, Ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
This article is published under an open access license. Please check the 'Copyright Information' section either on this page or in the PDF for details of this license and what re-use is permitted. If your intended use exceeds what is permitted by the license or if you are unable to locate the licence and re-use information, please contact the Rights and Permissions team.
About this article
Cite this article
Finlay, S. What ought probably means, and why you can’t detach it. Synthese 177, 67–89 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9640-7
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9640-7