Abstract
Intelligent Design creationism is often criticized for failing to be science because it falls afoul of some demarcation criterion between science and non-science. This paper argues that this objection to Intelligent Design is misplaced because it assumes that a consistent non-theological characterization of Intelligent Design is possible. In contrast, it argues that, if Intelligent Design is taken to be non-theological doctrine, it is not intelligible. Consequently, a demarcation criterion cannot be used to judge its status. This position has the added advantage of providing reasons to reject Intelligent Design creationism without invoking potentially philosophically controversial demarcation criteria.
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For critical comments on an earlier version of this note thanks are due to Samet Bagce, Glenn Branch, and James Justus. In unpublished work, Monton (2006) also criticizes the use of a demarcation criterion to show what is wrong with Intelligent Design (ID) but goes on to conclude that ID may be science. (For an earlier critique of the use of demarcation criteria to argue against creationism, see Laudan (1983).) This note was partly written to develop and elaborate scattered remarks in Sarkar (2007a), Chapter 9, which were critically questioned by Joe Lapp. Thanks are due to both Lapp and Monton for their input.
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Sarkar, S. The science question in intelligent design. Synthese 178, 291–305 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9540-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9540-x