Abstract
Transfer of information between senders and receivers, of one kind or another, is essential to all life. David Lewis introduced a game theoretic model of the simplest case, where one sender and one receiver have pure common interest. How hard or easy is it for evolution to achieve information transfer in Lewis signaling?. The answers involve surprising subtleties. We discuss some if these in terms of evolutionary dynamics in both finite and infinite populations, with and without mutation.
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Open Access This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0), which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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Huttegger, S.M., Skyrms, B., Smead, R. et al. Evolutionary dynamics of Lewis signaling games: signaling systems vs. partial pooling. Synthese 172, 177–191 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9477-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9477-0