Abstract
This paper defends the theory that knowledge is credit-worthy true belief against a family of objections, two instances of which were leveled against it in a recent paper by Jennifer Lackey. Lackey argues that both innate knowledge (if there is any) and testimonial knowledge are too easily come by for it to be plausible that the knower deserves credit for it. If this is correct, then knowledge would appear not to be a matter of credit for true belief. I will attempt to neutralize these objections by drawing a distinction between credit as praiseworthiness and credit as attributability.
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Riggs, W. Two problems of easy credit. Synthese 169, 201–216 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9342-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9342-6