Abstract
The question of what means-and-ends structure our epistemic endeavors have is an important issue in recent epistemology, and is fundamental for understanding epistemic matters in principle. Crispin Sartwell has proposed arguments for the view that knowledge is our only ultimate goal, and justification is no part of it. An important argument is his instrumentality argument which is concerned with the conditions under which something could belong to our ultimate epistemic goal. Recently, this argument has been reconstructed and criticized by Pierre Le Morvan in a clear and helpful way. It will be shown, however, that Le Morvan’s criticism is not adequate, since it misconstrues the real instrumentality argument that can be found in Sartwell’s writings.
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Hofmann, F. Epistemic Means and Ends: In Defense of Some Sartwellian Insights. Synthese 146, 357–369 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-004-6210-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-004-6210-x