Abstract
Priest (2009) formulates a propositional logic which, by employing the worldsemantics for intuitionist logic, has the same positive part but dualises the negation, to produce a paraconsistent logic which it calls ‘Da Costa Logic’. This paper extends matters to the first-order case. The paper establishes various connections between first order da Costa logic, da Costa’s own Cω, and classical logic. Tableau and natural deductions systems are provided and proved sound and complete.
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Priest, G. First-Order da Costa Logic. Stud Logica 97, 183–198 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-010-9303-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-010-9303-1