Abstract
The paper examines the determinants of the assignment of EU funds to Portuguese municipalities using a large and unexplored dataset covering all (278) mainland municipalities over 15 years. Empirical results reveal that besides normative objectives, political motivations also influence the distribution of funds by the national government across municipalities. Grants to municipalities increase during local election years, and more funds are transferred to municipalities where legislative elections have been closely contested and where the ruling national party had been supported by voters.
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Veiga, L.G. Determinants of the assignment of EU funds to Portuguese municipalities. Public Choice 153, 215–233 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9786-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9786-y