Abstract
The rules-based fiscal framework of the EMU relies heavily on the development of medium-term fiscal plans by the EU governments. In this paper, I present an empirical analysis of the deviations from the plans presented in the annual Stability and Convergence Programs. I focus on projections for real GDP growth and general government balances, revenues and spending at different time horizons. I show that deviations from the projections presented in these Programs since 1999 can be explained by institutional factors, i.e., the form of fiscal governance and the stringency of fiscal rules.
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von Hagen, J. Sticking to fiscal plans: the role of institutions. Public Choice 144, 487–503 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9680-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9680-z