Abstract
Basic Downsian theory predicts candidate convergence toward the views of the median voter in two-candidate elections. Common journalistic wisdom, moreover, leads us to expect these centripetal pressures to be strongest when elections are expected to be close. Yet, the available evidence from the US Congress disconfirms this prediction. To explain this counterintuitive result, we develop a spatial model that allows us to understand the complex interactions of political competition, partisan loyalties, and incentives for voter turnout that can lead office-seeking candidates, especially candidates in close elections, to emphasize policy appeals to their voter base rather than courting the median voter.
Article PDF
Similar content being viewed by others
Avoid common mistakes on your manuscript.
References
Adams, J., & Merrill, S., III (2008). Candidate and party strategies and two-stage elections beginning with a primary. American Journal of Political Science, 52(2), 344–359.
Adams, J., Bishin, B., & Dow, J. K. (2004). Representation in congressional campaigns: evidence for directional/discounting motivations in United States senate elections. Journal of Politics, 66(2), 348–373.
Adams, J., Merrill, S., III, & Grofman, B. (2005). A unified theory of party competition: a cross-national analysis integrating spatial and behavioral factors. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Adams, J., Dow, J. K., & Merrill, S., III (2006). The political consequences of alienation-based and indifference-based voter abstention: applications to presidential elections. Political Behavior, 28(1), 65–86.
Aldrich, J. (1995). Why parties? The origins and transformation of party politics in America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Alvarez, R. M., & Nagler, J. (1995). Economics, issues, and the Perot candidacy: voter choice in the 1992 presidential election. American Journal of Political Science, 39, 714–744.
Alvarez, R. M., & Nagler, J. (1998). When politics and models collide: estimating models of multiparty elections. American Journal of Political Science, 42, 55–96.
Anderson, S., & Glomm, G. (1992). Alienation, indifference, and the choice of ideological position. Social Choice and Welfare, 9, 17–31.
Ansolabehere, S., Snyder, J., & Stewart, C. (2001). Candidate positioning in US House elections. American Journal of Political Science, 45, 136–159.
Baughman, J. (2004). Party, constituency and representation: votes on abortion in the British House of Commons. Public Choice, 120, 63–85.
Bishin, B. (2000). Constituency influence in Congress: does subconstituency matter? Legislative Studies Quarterly, 25, 389–415.
Bishin, B. (2009). Tyranny of the minority: the subconstituency politics theory of representation. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Brody, R., & Page, B. (1973). Indifference, alienation, and rational decisions: the effects of candidate evaluation on turnout and the vote. Public Choice, 15, 1–17.
Burden, B. (2001). The polarizing effects of congressional elections. In P. F. Galderisi, M. Ezra, & M. Lyons (Eds.), Congressional primaries and the politics of representation. Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield.
Burden, B., & Lacy, L. (1999). The vote-stealing and turnout effects of third-party candidates in US presidential elections, 1968–1996. Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, GA.
Butler, D. (2006). Explaining the increased polarization in the US Congress. Typescript.
Callander, S., & Wilson, C. (2006). Context-dependent voting. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 1(3), 227–254.
Campbell, A., Converse, P. E., Miller, W. E., & Stokes, D. E. (1960). The American voter. New York: Wiley.
Clinton, J. D. (2006). Representation in Congress: constituents and roll calls in the 106th House. Journal of Politics, 68(2), 397–409.
Clinton, J. D., Jackman, S., & Rivers, D. (2004). The statistical analysis of legislative behavior: a unified approach. American Political Science Review, 98(2), 355–370.
Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. New York: Harper and Row.
Endersby, J., & Galatas, S. (1998). British parties and spatial competition: dimensions of evaluation in the 1992 election. Public Choice, 97, 363–382.
Enelow, J. M., & Hinich, M. J. (1989). A general probabilistic spatial theory of elections. Public Choice, 61(2), 101–113.
Erikson, R., & Romero, D. (1990). Candidate equilibrium and the behavioral model of the vote. American Political Science Review, 84, 1103–1126.
Erikson, R., & Wright, G. (1997). Voters, candidates, and issues in congressional elections. In L. Dodd & B. Oppenheimer (Eds.), Congress reconsidered (6th ed.). Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press.
Erikson, R., & Wright, G. (2000). Representation of constituency ideology in congress. In D. Brady, J. Cogan, & M. Fiorina (Eds.), Continuity and change in House elections. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Fenno, R. F. (1978). Home style: house members in their districts. Boston: Little Brown.
Fiorina, M. (1981). Retrospective voting in American national elections. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Green, D., Palmquist, B., & Schickler, E. (2002). Partisan hearts and minds: political parties and the social identities of voters. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Grofman, B. (2004). Downs and two-party convergence. Annual Review of Political Science, 7, 25–46. Polsby, N. (Ed.).
Groseclose, T., & Snyder, J. M. (2000). Estimating party influence in congressional roll-call voting. American Journal of Political Science, 44, 187–205.
Guttman, J. M., Hilger, N., & Shachmurove, Y. (1994). Voting as investment vs. voting as consumption—new evidence. Kyklos, 47(2), 197–207.
Heckman, J. J., & Snyder, J. M. (1997). Linear probability models of the demand for attributes with an empirical application to estimating the preferences of legislators. Rand Journal of Economics, 28, 142–189.
Hinich, M., & Ordeshook, P. (1970). Plurality maximization versus vote maximization: a spatial analysis with variable participation. American Political Science Review, 64(3), 772–791.
Jennings, K., & Niemi, R. (1981). Generations and politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Kenny, L., & Lotfinia, B. (2005). Evidence on the importance of spatial models in presidential nominations and elections. Public Choice, 123(3), 439–462.
Key, V. O. (1947). Politics, parties, and pressure groups. New York: Crowell Company.
Krasno, J. S. (1994). Challengers, competition, and reelection: comparing Senate and House Elections. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Lacy, D., & Paolino, P. (1998). Downsian voting and separation of powers. American Journal of Political Science, 42, 1180–1199.
Lee, D. S., Moretti, E., & Butler, M. J. (2004). Do voters affect or elect policies? Evidence from the US House. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(3), 807–859.
Markus, G. A., & Converse, P. E. (1979). A dynamic simultaneous equation model of electoral choice. American Political Science Review, 73, 1055–1070.
McIver, J. P., Erikson, R. S., & Wright, G. C. (1993). Public opinion and public policy: a view from the states. In Dodd, L. C., & Jillson, C. (Eds.), New perspectives on American politics. Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press.
Merrill, S., III, & Adams, J. (2002). Centrifugal incentives in multicandidate elections. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 14(3), 275–300.
Millbank, D., & Allen, M. (2004). Bush fortifies conservative base: campaign seeks solid support before wooing swing voters. Washington Post, July 15.
Miller, G., & Schofield, N. (2003). Activists and partisan realignment in the United States. American Political Science Review, 97, 245–260.
Miller, W., & Stokes, D. (1963). Constituency influence in Congress. American Political Science Review, 57(1), 45–56.
Miniter, B. (2005). The McCain myth: the moderation that makes him a Senate powerhouse will keep him out of the White House. Wall Street Journal, May 31.
Nagourney, A. (2003). Political parties shift emphases to core voters. New York Times, August 30.
Owen, G., & Grofman, B. (2006). Two-stage electoral competition in two-party contests: persistent divergence of party positions. Social Choice and Welfare, 26(3), 547–569.
Palfrey, T. (1984). Spatial equilibrium with entry. Review of Economic Studies, 51, 139–151.
Peress, M. (2008). Securing the base: electoral competition under variable turnout (Typescript). University of Rochester.
Polsby, N. W. (1983). Consequences of party reform. London: Oxford University Press.
Poole, K., & Rosenthal, H. (1984). The polarization of American politics. Journal of Politics, 46, 1061–1079.
Roemer, J. (2001). Political competition: theory and applications. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Schmidt, A., Kenny, L., & Morton, R. (1996). Evidence of electoral accountability in the US Senate: are unfaithful agents really punished? Economic Enquiry, 34, 545–567.
Schofield, N. (2004). Equilibrium in the spatial ‘valence’ model of politics. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 16, 447–481.
Schofield, N., & Sened, I. (2005). Modeling the interaction of parties, activists and voters: why is the political center so empty? European Journal of Political Research, 44(3), 355–390.
Schofield, N., & Sened, I. (2006). Multiparty democracy: elections and legislative politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Serra, G. (2008). Polarization of what? A model of elections with endogenous Valence. Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, MA, September 2008.
Snyder, J. (1994). Safe seats, marginal seats, and party platforms: the logic of party differentiation. Economics and Politics, 6(3), 201–213.
Stone, W., & Simas, E. (2008). Candidate valence and ideological positions in the 2006 elections (Typescript).
Toner, R. (2004). Political memo. New York Times, p. 141, 19 December 2004.
Uslaner, E. M. (1999). The movers and the shirkers: representatives and ideologues in the Senate. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Van Houweling, R. P., & Sniderman, P. M. (2005). The political logic of a Downsian space (Working paper).
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Open Access This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0), which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
About this article
Cite this article
Adams, J., Brunell, T.L., Grofman, B. et al. Why candidate divergence should be expected to be just as great (or even greater) in competitive seats as in non-competitive ones. Public Choice 145, 417–433 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9573-1
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9573-1