Abstract
This paper evaluates empirically how, in the course of globalization, partisan politics affected social expenditures in a panel of OECD countries. I introduce an updated indicator of government ideology and investigate its interaction with the KOF index of globalization. Two basic results emerge: First, at times when globalization proceeded at an average pace, partisan politics had no effect on social expenditures, but leftist governments increased social expenditures when globalization was proceeding rapidly. Second, policies differed in the 1980s and 1990s: Leftist governments pursued expansionary policies in the 1980s. Yet partisan politics disappeared in the 1990s, but not because of globalization.
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Potrafke, N. Did globalization restrict partisan politics? An empirical evaluation of social expenditures in a panel of OECD countries. Public Choice 140, 105–124 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9414-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9414-2