Abstract
Surveys concerning environmental and health risks point out the lack of trust of citizens in risk evaluations provided by governments. The aim of this paper is to take into account the impact of this potential distrust on political decisions concerning risk reduction. We prove that lack of trust reduces the attractiveness of risk reduction measures. When heterogeneity in risk exposure and the possibility of complete risk elimination are introduced, political decisions of risk reduction may differ from the preferred decision of any risk and trust group. Namely, total risk elimination can be adopted, even if all individuals prefer null or partial risk reduction measures.
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Jeleva, M., Rossignol, S. Political decision of risk reduction: the role of trust. Public Choice 139, 83–104 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-008-9380-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-008-9380-0