Abstract
Individual citizens are the largest source of contributions for congressional candidates in the United States. This paper investigates if and how fundraising from this source is related to the ideological positions of candidates. Specifically, we ask whether the amount of contributions depends on: (1) the extremity of candidate ideology; and (2) the level of candidate divergence in the same race. These results have important implications for candidate positioning strategies, as well as for evaluating the effects of recent campaign finance reforms.
Article PDF
Similar content being viewed by others
Avoid common mistakes on your manuscript.
References
Adams, J. (2001). Party competition and responsible party government: A theory of spatial competition based on insights from behavioral voting research. Ann Arbor, MI: Michigan University Press.
Adams, J., & Merrill, S. III (2003). Voter turnout and candidate strategies in American elections. The Journal of Politics, 65(1), 161–189.
Aldrich, J. H. (1983). A Downsian spatial model with party activism. The American Political Science Review, 77, 974–990.
Aldrich, J. H. (1995). Why Parties? The origins and transformation of political parties in America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Ansolabehere, S., de Figueiredo, J. M., & Snyder, J. M. Jr. (2003). Why is there so little money in US politics? The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17, 105–130.
Ansolabehere, S., Snyder, J. M. Jr., & Stewart, C. C. III (2001). Candidate positioning in US House elections. American Journal of Political Science, 45, 136–159.
Baron, D. P. (1994). Electoral competition with informed and uninformed voters. The American Political Science Review, 88(1), 33–47.
Basinger, S. J., & Ensley, M. J. (2007). Candidates, campaigns, or party? A structural analysis of US House elections. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 32(3), 361–394.
Bianco, W. T. (1994). Trust: Representatives and constituents. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Brehm, J. J. (1993). The phantom respondents: Opinion surveys and political representation. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Burden, B. C. (2004). Candidate positioning in US congressional elections. British Journal of Political Science, 34, 211–227.
Burden, B. C., Caldeira, G. A., & Groseclose, T. (2000). Measuring the ideologies of US senators: The song remains the same. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 25, 237–258.
Cameron, C. M., & Enelow, J. M. (1992). Asymmetric policy effects, campaign contributions, and the spatial theory of elections. Mathematical and Computer Modelling, 16, 117–132.
Claassen, R. (2007). Campaign activism and the spatial model: Getting beyond extremism to explain policy motivated participation. Political Behavior, 29(3), 369–390.
Cox, G. W., & Magar, E. (1999). How much is majority status in the US Congress worth? The American Political Science Review, 93(2), 299–310.
Denzau, A. T., & Munger, M. C. (1986). Legislators and interest groups: How unorganized interest groups get represented. The American Political Science Review, 80, 89–106.
Erikson, R. S., & Palfrey, T. R. (2000). Equilibria in campaign spending games: Theory and data. The American Political Science Review, 94, 595–609.
Francia, P. L., Green, J. C., Herrnson, P. S., Powell, L. W., & Wilcox, C. (2003). The financiers of congressional elections: Investors, ideologues, and intimates. New York: Columbia University Press
Francia, P. L., Green, J. C., Herrnson, P. S., Powell, L. W., & Wilcox, C. (2005). Limousine liberals and corporate conservatives: The financial constituencies of the Democratic and Republican parties. Social Science Quarterly, 86, 761–778.
Fenno, R. F. Jr. (2000). Congress at the grassroots: Representational change in the South, 1970–1998. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press
Gopoian, J. D. (1984). What makes PACs tick? An analysis of the allocation patterns of economic interest groups. American Journal of Political Science, 28, 259–281.
Green, D., & Krasno, J. (1988). Salvation for the spendthrift incumbent. American Journal of Political Science, 32, 884–907.
Grier, K. B., & Munger, M. C. (1991). Committee assignments, constituent preferences, and campaign contributions. Economic Inquiry, 29, 24–43.
Grier, K. B., & Munger, M. C. (1993). Comparing interest group PAC contributions to House and Senate incumbents, 1980–1986. The Journal of Politics, 55(3), 615–643.
Grier, K. B., Munger, M. C., & Roberts, B. E. (1991). The industrial organization of corporate political participation. Southern Economic Journal, 57, 727–738.
Grier, K. B., Munger, M. C., & Roberts, B. E. (1994). The determinates of industry political activity, 1978–1986. The American Political Science Review, 88(4), 911–926.
Groseclose, T. (2001). A model of candidate locations when one candidate has a valence advantage. American Journal of Political Science, 45(4), 862–886.
Hinich, M. J., Ledyard, J., & Ordeshook, P. C. (1972). Nonvoting and the existence of equilibrium under majority rule. Journal of Economic Theory, 4, 144–153.
Hinich, M. J., & Munger, M. C. (1994). Ideology and the theory of political choice. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Hinich, M. J., & Ordeshook, P. C. (1969). Abstentions and equilibrium under majority rule. Public Choice, 7, 81–106.
Hinich, M. J., & Ordeshook, P. C. (1970). Plurality maximization versus vote maximization: A spatial analysis with variable participation. The American Political Science Review, 64(3), 772–791.
Jacobson, G. C. (1980). Money in congressional elections. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Jacobson, G. C. (1985). Money and votes reconsidered: Congressional elections, 1972–1982. Public Choice, 47, 7–62.
Jacobson, G. C. (2004), The politics of congressional elections. New York: Longman.
Keim, G., & Zardkoohi, A. (1988). Looking for leverage in PAC markets: Corporate and labor contributions considered. Public Choice, 58, 21–34.
Londregan, J., & Romer, T. (1993). Polarization, incumbency, and the personal vote. In: W.A. Barnett et al. (Ed.), Political economy: institutions, competition, and representation. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Masters, M. F., & Keim, G. D. (1985). Determinants of PAC participation among large corporations. The Journal of Politics, 47(4), l158–l173.
McCarty, N., & Poole, K. (1998). An empirical spatial model of congressional campaigns. Political Analysis, 7, 1–30.
Milyo, J., Groseclose, T., & Primo, D. (2000). Corporate PAC campaign contributions in perspective. Business and Politics, 2(1), 75–88.
Moon, W. (2004). Party activists, campaign resources and candidate position taking: Theory, tests and applications. British Journal of Political Science, 34, 611–633.
Morton, R., & Cameron, C. (1992). Elections and the theory of campaign contributions: A survey and critical analysis. Economics and Politics, 4, 79–108.
Mueller, D. C., & Stratmann, T. (1994). Informative versus persuasive campaigning. Public Choice, 81, 55–77.
Plane, D. L., & Gershtenson, J. (2004). Candidates’ ideological locations, abstention, and turnout in midterm US Senate elections. Political Behavior, 26(1), 69–93.
Poole, K. T., & Romer, T. (1985). Patterns of political action committees contributions to the 1980 campaigns for the United States House of Representatives. Public Choice, 47, 63–111.
Poole, K. T., & Rosenthal, H. (1997). Congress: A political-economic history of roll call voting. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.
Poole, K. T., Romer, T., & Rosenthal, H. R. (1987). The revealed preferences of political action committees. The American Economic Review, 77, 298–302.
Romer, T., & Snyder, J. M. Jr. (1994). An empirical investigation of the dynamics of PAC contributions. American Journal of Political Science, 38(3), 745–769.
Smith, B. A. (2003). Unfree Speech: The folly of campaign finance reform. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Snyder, J. M. Jr. (1990). Campaign contributions as investments: The US House of Representatives, 1980–1986. The Journal of Political Economy, 98, 1195–1227.
Snyder, J. M. Jr. (1993). The market for campaign contributions: Evidence for the US Senate 1980–1986. Economics and Politics, 5, 219–240.
Squire, P., & Wright, J. R. (1990). Fundraising by nonincumbent candidates for the US House of Representatives. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 15, 89–98.
Stoker, L., & Bowers, J. (2002). Designing multi-level studies: sampling voters and electoral contexts. Electoral Studies, 21(3), 535–536.
Welch, W. (1974). The economics of campaign funds. Public Choice, 20, 83–97.
Welch, W. (1980). The allocation of political monies: Economic interest groups. Public Choice, 35, 97–120.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Ensley, M.J. Individual campaign contributions and candidate ideology. Public Choice 138, 221–238 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-008-9350-6
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-008-9350-6