Abstract
This paper uses a new panel of more than 2,000 Brazilian municipalities over 13 years to analyze the influence of public expenditures on the probability of mayors’ reelection. We examine Brazilian municipal elections from 1988 to 2000 using a logit fixed-effects model. The results suggest that mayors who spend more during their terms of office increase the probability of their own reelection or of a successor of the same political party. In particular, higher capital spending over the years preceding elections and current expenditures in election years are beneficial to Brazilian incumbent mayors.
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Sakurai, S.N., Menezes-Filho, N.A. Fiscal policy and reelection in Brazilian municipalities. Public Choice 137, 301–314 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-008-9329-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-008-9329-3